

TROIKA MAGAZINE

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Bianca Ukleja, Yale University


A FULLY STUDENT-PRODUCED JOURNAL
PUBLISHING UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH, CREATIVE
WRITING, AND ART IN THE FIELD OF
SLAVIC, EASTERN EUROPEAN, AND EURASIAN STUDIES.

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
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
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EDITOR'S NOTE

Interested in having your work published in Troika's next issue? Email your submissions to troikaberkeley@gmail.com. We accept a variety of student work: from research papers and memoirs, to photography and art.

Dear Reader,

The edition of Troika that you are reading today is the result of a year and a half-long labor of love. Kathleen and I started the process of revitalizing the magazine, which had been on hiatus for a few years, when I was a sophomore. We were soon joined by John, Hannah, and then Alexandra.

Many groups before us had attempted to revitalize the magazine, but with no luck. This group's perseverance speaks volumes about students' dedication to educating the larger UC Berkeley community about cultures that are too often overlooked.

I look forward to my senior year, knowing that the groundwork for the continuation of the Troika tradition has been laid out. There is much to do, such as recruiting a new team of editors so that the magazine does not die when we graduate. Regardless, I would like to dedicate this issue to the editors-- John, Alexandra, Hannah and Kathleen. Thank you so much for your hard work; I've enjoyed working with you and getting to know you all.

Kasia Metkowski
Spring 2017

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TRANSFORMING THE "BROKEN FAMILY" IN POST-YUGOSLAV FILM:

Bianka Ukleja, Yale University

Introduction

Beginning in the 1960s, a decade of experimentation and flirtation with alternate realities, there emerged a rich tradition of ruthless social critique and complete freedom of speech indissociable from the Yugoslav Black Wave aesthetic of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Decuir 24). Yugoslavia's film industry responded to Josip Broz Tito's liberal "socialism with a human face" by screening radical artistic bottom-up views of communism to the world (Decuir 21). Since 1958, Yugoslavia submitted many films to the Academy Awards for Best Foreign Language Film. Even so, beyond an elite group of film critics, economists, political scientists, and expatriates, few actively followed the internal political, social, and economic changes that motivated the breakup of Yugoslavia.

In the 1990s, the wars in the former Yugoslavia put the Balkans back on the map of Europe. While the rest of the continent was coping with mass immigration, southeastern Europe looked as if it were reverting to an earlier historical logic of territorial wars and ethnic homogenization (Mazower, 147). Suddenly, this Balkan "Post-Yugoslav" space was of interest again to international audiences. The internal tragedy of this region was to be mourned as a battle between a Socialist Past and Capitalist Future: a broken family caving in on itself for lack of moral, physical, and financial support. Given the region's recent history, this very cliché of the "broken family" has been explored time and time again by some of the region's most influential filmmakers.

In this paper, I will study four Post-Yugoslav films that challenge each other ideologically and aesthetically to transform the cliché of post-Yugoslavia as "a broken family." In chronological order of their respective release dates, I will be discussing Emir Kusturica's 1995 *Underground*, Goran Paskaljevic's 1998 *Cabaret Balkan*, Goran Rebic's 2003 *The Danube*, and Aida Begic's 2008 *Snow*. I will introduce these four films, briefly talking about their directors, general plot overviews, rise to fame, and in some cases, their infamy. Finally, I will use these four films to evaluate how their portrayal of the "broken family" reveals an incredible transformation in the region's self-awareness in the last twenty years.

Underground

I begin with director Emir Kusturica and his masterpiece *Underground*. *Underground* is the only film in the series that ambitiously constructs an epic history of Yugoslavia from World War Two to the present. For this reason, I will pay particular attentions to its plot, to be read as a complete creative vision and a "history." In no ways is it a full, nonpartisan history, but it already gets us thinking about Kusturica's potential interpretation of what a Yugoslav family once looked like, and how, already in 1995, the broken Post-Yugoslav family could potentially view itself on the big screen.

Emir Kusturica was born in 1954 and grew up as the only child of a secular Serb family in Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He made his feature film debut in 1981 with *Do You Remember Dolly Bell?*, which won the prestigious Silver Lion for Best First Work at the Venice Film Festival. In 1988, Kusturica made *Time of the Gypsies*, a film about a Romani community that was an overt homage to a celebrated Yugoslav Black Wave film, *The Feather Collectors*. Kusturica has competed at the Cannes Film Festival on five occasions and won the Palme d'Or twice.

The film begins April 6th, 1941 in Belgrade, the capital of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Before we are gifted a recognizable cityscape, we hear the blip of a trumpet and the entrance of a brass outfit that has absolutely no intention of tuning: in other words, no intention of adjusting to a correct or uniform pitch. Resolving to stay out of tune, the band, like the film, itself, erupts into full exuberance, and the viewer is escorted through the streets of Belgrade by a Balkan brass band playing its iconic thump and smash theme, grasping at money as it falls from the sky.

EMIR KUSTURICA'S 1995
UNDERGROUND, GORAN PAS-
KALJEVIC'S 1998 CABARET
BALKAN, GORAN REBIC'S
2003 THE DANUBE, AND
AIDA BEGIC'S 2008 SNOW

In this same sequence, we are introduced to two of our main protagonists: Blacky, who perilously raises his gun into the sky, and Marko, his brilliantly sleazy buddy who drinks in celebration of Blacky's induction into the Communist Party. Blacky is cheating on his pregnant wife with a petty city actress, Natalija. Meanwhile, Natalija is seeing a Nazi officer on the side. Blacky's bombastic jealousy is echoed by documentary-style snippets of the war-torn city and of merciless bombing of the characters' most intimate spaces. Kusturica's stylistic choice suggests that under the duress of external pressure, the physical city and the backbone of city life, the family unit, quickly fall apart before our very eyes.

Moving ahead in time, Blacky kidnaps Natalija at one of her shows. They are to be married! At the wedding, slippery Marko seduces Natalija. In order to have his way, Marko tricks Blacky into living underground, lying that Tito wants the revolutionary hero Blacky to keep producing arms in secret. We are now in the heat of the Cold War in the 1960s. Marko fuels the people underground by maintaining that the Second World War has never ended. By burying his best friend along with other citizens, Marko becomes an unstoppable force on the surface: he becomes a celebrated poet and even gets a coveted TV Special on the communist network.

Blacky resurfaces in the early 70s, and when he does, he is armed and ready for action, ready to take down anyone who challenges his homeland. We are then swept up into the 90s and the wars that resulted in the breakup of Yugoslavia. In an absolutely stunning scene, Blacky repents on a cross while the body of his old friend, Marko, and his former lover, Natalija, circle him in an electric wheelchair engulfed by flames. The audience knows it is Blacky who blindly called for the couple's execution. While all his friends have "moved on," it is the unfortunate Blacky who must live with yet another burden on his lost soul: a tragedy masked by a euphemism feeding into the spiritual void.

Controversially, *Underground* ends with a feast. On a sunny island, old friends have been seemingly resurrected from the dead and the family that betrayed itself in a past life can sit around the table and bury a past that has caused them so much pain. Here, I direct your attention to the length of this film: it is approximately three hours long – what you might expect of a history epic. In short, three hours of pain have been reduced to a sunny island of nostalgia.

By the end of the film, not everyone can or will sympathize with Blacky, who turbulently heads the table at the final feast. Is it meant to be funny that there are already seeds of conflict in this final celebration, or is it simply a reminder of unresolved conflicts from a distant past? In 1995, Kusturica leaves us with a vision of a broken family that, through gritted teeth, smiles at one another, laughs about the past, and tries to pretend it never happened.

Cabaret Balkan

The next film I'm going to discuss is *Cabaret Balkan*, directed by Serbian director Goran Paskaljevic. In the Kusturica film, we follow one historical trajectory in the lives of Blacky, Marko, and Natalija. In the Paskaljevic film, we sample multiple narratives that cover a wide range of societal issues. Paskaljevic treats the Balkans as a theater for incredible acts of arbitrary violence, the analogous boxing ring where brother against brother is realized to its full potential. Where *Underground* leaves us under the opiate of nostalgia, *Cabaret Balkan*, only three years later, presents us with a very different state of affairs. In the Paskaljevic film, it seems as though the post-Yugoslav family has genuinely found itself in a moral and spiritual rut at all levels of society. Feeling emptier than ever, all people carry the potential to go off on each other, undoubtedly inspiring the original title (*Powder Keg*) for this 1998 film.

Filmmaker Goran Paskaljevic was born in Belgrade in 1947. As a young man, he worked with his stepfather in the Yugoslav film archive and later graduated from the well-known Film Faculty of the Academy of Performing Arts in Prague. In 1992, he left Yugoslavia for France. From this western vantage point, Paskaljevic watched his homeland become a warzone. Paskaljevic returned to Serbia in 1998 to film *Cabaret Balkan*. The film won international critics' prizes at the Venice Film Festival and at the European Film Awards.

Loss is the glue that holds the narratives in *Cabaret Balkan* together because arbitrary violence creates this loss; viewers are dropped off at the most violent and climactic parts in these characters' lives: the scene of the crash, a bus hijacking, and the botched hostage job. I am reminded of a recent article in *The New Yorker* that I found incredibly useful for thinking about arbitrary violence and recognizing a societal cry (and more importantly, a societal need) for some form of collective therapy to address arbitrary violence. The article, titled "Ghost Stories: Making Peace with the Dead in Germany," referenced a growing phenomenon for collective therapy for individuals whose lives have been affected, directly or even indirectly, by the memories of World War II. Whether those memories be your own, or memories inherited from survivors by the next generation, there need to be options out there for people to talk about the broken parts in a family's history. In Germany, public health insurance pays for up to three hundred hours of counseling. In the 1990s, the Yugoslav public health system had largely fallen apart, and corruption, inefficiency, and physician shortage defined Serbian healthcare. It is this mental and moral disintegration that pervades the Paskaljevic film.

The Danube

While Kusturica and Paskaljevic portray the Balkans as a very insular, toxic space, Rebic prompts us to consider post-Yugoslav countries (Serbia, for example) as pieces of a bigger European puzzle. His 2003 film *The Danube* opens up the post-Yugoslav family to opportunities in the West in an unspoken contract with the very river that pulses through the region. Rebic portrays the Danube River as a marker of trans-historical trauma, yet he also highlights its importance as a trans-European lifeline for individuals whose identities have been shaped between Western and Eastern Europe (Stob 142).

Goran Rebic is a Serbian-born Austria-based filmmaker who left Serbia in 1969 at the age of one. He continues to live and work in Vienna, and his films feature multilingual actors and multinational technicians and staff. Jennifer Stob in an article identifies Rebic as a prototypical filmmaker of independent transnational cinema. *The Danube* was conceived by Rebic in the mid-nineties as he witnessed from a distance the painful series of wars that fractured his birthplace (Stob, 143).

The Danube boldly constructs a river-mapping project set on a rusty old ship sailing from Vienna to the Black Sea. The death of a Romanian swimmer motivates an angsty teenager Bruno to find Franz to fulfill the last request of his deceased mother: to be buried at the Iron Gates at the border of Serbia and Romania. The death of Mara sets into motion the journey east and the fusion of multiple generations who speak in different tongues, united in a mystical utterance of the Danube's many names: "Donau, Duna, Dunaj, Dunav, Dunarea."

Captain Franz, the presumed father, is a gruff pilot whose rusty old ship is a true safe-haven, an ark of sorts for renegade Serbs, Hungarians, Ukrainians, Romanians, and Austrians who have somehow lost their way. In order to suggest a real Danubian community exists, Rebic makes the ship a true microcosm of Danubian life: he choreographs the lives of travelers whose own narratives represent the many kinds of realities found on and along the river. For example, an undocumented Romanian worker wants to return back to Austria, where job prospects and quality of life are much better. He risks his life by trying to swim across the river in Bratislava, almost drowns, but is rescued by Franz and company. At the beginning of the film, the Romanian has nothing, not even a shirt on his back. At the end, he has an Afro-Austrian wife and an adopted Romani kid, a brand new lifestyle in 1000km for those with an open mind and a desperate socio-economic situation.

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The Danube, in many cases, depicts a nonconventional family united not by blood ties or nationality, but by marriage, adoption, and death. This is Rebic's interpretation of a modern European family: one that cuts across race, ethnicity, and social class. Of course, this kind of family will have its share of challenges, even in a rapidly changing Europe. Here, I note the Balkans today participate in a different Europe, a Europe whose values are inscribed in its dominant cross-national institutions: the European Union, NATO, and the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe). These institutions have transformed the region geopolitically, as well, since the Balkans now find themselves at the center of a greatly expanded market that takes place in the Black Sea, the former Soviet Union and central Asia (Mazower, 155).

Snow

In her 2008 film debut *Snow*, Aida Begic portrays the rhythms of daily life for a community of rural Bosnian women. All the men in the village, with the exception of a grandpa and a mute boy, have perished in ethnic conflict. Summers in the village are spent trying to pick, process, and sell a delicious bounty that is essentially going to waste without a way to market the product. In this Eden-like place, these women have no physical help from their brothers and no guidance from their teachers. There is no time for school because they have to run the orchard. The tradeoff is enormous: without an education, who will take them seriously? Without an orchard, they risk disappearing anonymously into city life. Like in the Paskaljevic film, loss guides the narrative of *Snow*.

The accent of the film falls on Alma, a young widow. Alma is a faithful Muslim and a hard worker, a conservative poster girl with big dreams to feed the entirety of Europe with her preserves, pickles, and so on. These villages, to this day, supply fresh food, pigs and fruit more reliably and far cheaper than other markets (Mazower, 135). Very early on in the film, a stroke of luck stokes Alma's fire: Hamza accidentally runs over her preserve wagon with his 18-wheeler, and a business deal is put on the table: he promises to buy her summer stock. There is potential here to sell her preserves as far away as Germany, where Hamza commutes in his 18-wheeler. Before that deal can be finalized, another deal is put on the table by a distant Serbian relative: sell the village to a foreign developer in town, make the money, and start living bigger.

The women of the village are split fifty/fifty on the big decision to sell the village. The film is an inversion of what we would traditionally expect: the older women, the ones without an education, want to leave the village; Alma, on the other hand, the young entrepreneur (also without an education), wants to stay. With a heavy heart and a loaded past, the film roots for the underdog, who ultimately wins with the help of some fruitful miracles. The ending is charming, but audiences should look at it critically. *Snow* is a woman's Eden where women are grossly unprepared to face the world at large: they have no education and no business plan beyond a sturdy handshake.

Conclusion

Looking back on these four films, the horizons have greatly expanded for the post-Yugoslav family into the international arena of business, race relations, and even transnational citizenship. The problems of southeastern Europe are dilemmas shared by most European countries; therefore, the post-Yugoslav family in cinema represents something greater than itself. These four films directly challenge Post-Yugoslav society to reconcile old patterns of welfare provision with the competitive pressures of global capitalism; to provide affordable energy; to prevent the total decline of rural ways of life, and to build the prosperous economies that will reduce the attraction of organized crime, alcoholism, drug addiction, sexual violence, and war (inspired by Mazower, 156). With time, I am pleased that each film more critically evaluates the hostility of its Yugoslav past and attempts to construct an alternative future; looking forward, I anticipate many great films coming out of this post-Yugoslav space, because the "broken family" is always transforming into something glorious for the next generation to piece together.

My name is Bianka Ukleja, Yale College class of 2018. I am a Russian and Eastern European Studies major of Polish heritage. I enjoy engaging with regional film traditions in various national contexts.

TWELVE

By Alexander Blok

Translated by Aleksey Calvin

Tsukanov, UC Berkeley

1

Black the evening.
White the snow.
Wind beats, wind beats!
And there stands not a soul.
Wind beats, wind beats –
All through God's own realms!

Now wind is weaving
White snowfluff
And under snow - it's icy!
Slippery, tough
Each walker
Slides - ah, what a pity!

From building to building
Stretching,
Pulls a thickly-wound cable.
On the cable – a placard
Voicing:
"All Rule to the Constituent Assembly!"
A little old woman fusses up –
weeps,
Just wouldn't get it, what it all means,
What for - this big placard,
This big fabric piece?
How many foot-wraps could've
been sown for the kids?
But instead, just pick one – got no
clothes, no shoes...

The little old thing, like a chicken.
Barely swings over a snow-bank.
-- Oh, Holy Mother, my Protectress!
-- Oh, Bolsheviks will shut my cas-
ket case!

The wind is lashing!
The frost keeps up as well!
And a bourgeois on the corner's
Hid his nose into a coat collar..

And who is this? – With the long
hair
And speaking softly, like he's bare-
ly there:
--- Traitors!
--- Perished, our Russia! ---
Must be, the writer ---
Of some eloquence...

And right over yonder, mister long
robe –
Slyly --- hides behind a snow-
bank...
Why so upset these days,
Comrade priest?

Do you recall, how once it was,
You walked around with your
gut-upfront,
Your big belly shining
With a cross to the folk?..

Here a fancy lady warm in a caracul
Ran into another madam:
- How we cried and cried...
She slips up
And – bam – on the ground's
All stretched out!
Hey! Hey! Hey!
Lend a hand, help me up!

The wind so joyous
Both angry, and glad.
It spirals coat hems,
Cuts down pedestrians,
Rips, bends, and tosses
That humongous poster:
"All Rule to the Constituent As-
sembly"...
And carries words across:
... And we too had an assembly...
... Right here in this building...
... Discussed –
... Decreed:
For the night – twenty five; for an
hour - ten...

Besides studying Comparative/World Literature at San Francisco State University, Aleksey Calvin takes classes in Slavic literature at UC Berkeley. He was born and raised in Russia, and immigrated to the USA at twelve. When not dedicated to literary and scholarly pursuits, he performs as a multi-instrumentalist in post-punk bands or as a solo singer. He is also a licensed cosmetologist and worked for several years as a hairdresser in Los Angeles. He says Russian Poetry is in his blood. See more of his work at www.SilverAgePoets.com, a website he created in order to make Russian Silver Age culture and poetry more accessible to Anglophone readers.

... And don't take any less from
anyone...

... Let's go sleep now....

Late evening.
The street empties.
Only a single vagrant
Bends and hunches,
And the wind whistles...

Hey, poor boy!
Come closer ---
Let's make out...

I demand bread!
Who's that ahead?
Come on through!

And the sky is black, so black...

Spite, sorrowful spite,
Boils in the breast...
Black spite, blessed spite...

Comrade! Watch out
With both eyes!

2
Wind lets loose, fluttering snow.
There are twelve of them as they
go

Black is the belt where each rifle
hangs-
All around them flare up - flames,
flames, flames...

A rolled cig in the teeth, a
well-crumpled cap,
Slap an ace of diamonds to his
back!

Freedom, freedom goes -
Hey! -
Without a cross!

Bam-bam-bam!

It's so cold,
Comrades, cold!

- Vanya and Katya - in the drinking
hole...

- Stuffing down her socks that Ker-
ensky dough!

- And Vanya too grows rich some-
how...

- Was once with ours, he's a soldier
now!

- Son of a bitch, Vanya, boughie
man!

- Come and kiss my ass, soldier, if
you can!

Freedom, freedom goes -
Hey! -
Without a cross!

Vanya busies Katya!
Busy doing what?..
Trata tata ta!
And around them flare up -

flames, flames, flames!
From their shoulders hang down -
rifle belts!

March ahead with Revolution's
feet!
Our dauntless enemy never sleeps!

Comrade, don't cower, your rifle
hold fast!

Let's blast a bullet at Russia the
Blessed!

At the wooden-hutted,
Fat-assed,
Dense!

Hey, hey, hey
And without a cross!

3
How our local kids went off -
In the Red Guard went to serve -
In the Red Guard went to serve -
Drop their hotheads to the earth!

Oh you, bitter-bitterness;
Oh, sweet life of fun!
A torn up little overcoat,
An Austrian gun!

To grieve boughies everyplace,
We'll ignite a world-sized blaze
Fire across the world in blood!
Global fire, so bless us God!

4
Swirling snow, wild cabby cries,
Vanya next to Katya flies -
And a small electric flashlight
Dances from the rushing sled...
Hey hey hey, away, ahead!...

All dressed up in a soldier's coat,
With the face of an idiot,
Twirling, twirling his black whis-
ker,

And twisting, and twisting,
And kidding, and kidding...

Look at Vanya - so broad-should-
ered!

Look at Vanya - so well-worded!
Hugging, hugging foolish Katya,
Talking her top off...

Now she'd lift that face of hers,
Tiny teeth would glisten: pearls...
Oh you, Katya! Oh, my Katya!..
Oh, my fatty-face...

5
Katya, right there on your neck,
There's a knife-scar that remains.
Katya, why, beneath your breast,
There's a scratch and it's still fresh!

Hey, hey, do your dance!
Much too fine those little legs!

Strolled in lacy undergarments -
Stroll-away-hey, stroll-away!
With the officers philandered -
Whore-away-hey, whore away!

Hey, hey, whore away!
In her heart a sudden pain.

Do you still recall the sergeant -
How the knife tore up his flesh...
Maybe, scum, you can't remem-
ber?
Or is memory not fresh?

Hey, hey, freshen up!
Let him sleep next to your lap!

Walked around in those gray gai-
ters,
Guzzled candy bars "Mignon"...
With the junkers promenaded -
Now the soldiers leading on?

Hey, hey, sin away!
Far more light the soul would
weigh!

6
...Again the rider sweeps ahead,
He flies, he yells and wails like
mad...

Stop, stop! Andrey, now help me
here!
Run, Petya, get him from the rear!

Bambambam-bam-bam-bam-
bry!
The snowy ash weaves through
the sky!

Just watch that fiend - with Vanya
- run...
Another round! Raise triggers,
now!

Bam-bambam! So that you
learn
What happens when you snatch a
girl!..

The bastard's fled! Don't hold
your breath!
Tomorrow it's just you and death!

But where is Katya? - Dead, she's
dead!
A gunshot ran right through her
head!

Well, Katya, happy? - Not a
word...
Then lay there, dead meat, on the
snow!

March ahead with Revolution's
feet!
Our dauntless foe, he never sleeps!

7
And again the twelve keep pace,
At their shoulders rifles show...
Just the wretched killer's face
Slips into a heart of woe.

Faster, faster, faster yet
He is speeding up his step...
But can't shake it off his back..
Ties a scarf around his neck...

- Comrade, hey there, why unhap-
py?
- Are you bugging out there, bud-
dy?.

- Why'd you droop your nose,
Petruha,
Or for Katya feeling sorry?

- Oh my brothers, oh my com-
rades,
I sure loved that girly so...
Many evenings, black and saucy,
I would spend right next to her.

- All because of fatal boldness
Hiding in her flaming eyes,
Of a crimson birthmark burning
By her right-hand shoulder side!..
And I killed her, what a moron,
Ruined her in frenzy.... Why!

- Look, you wretch, you better
shut it,
What are you a broad now, huh?
- Spare us this revealing moment.
Like a soul worn inside out!
- Keep your posture good and
straight!
- Get a grip upon yourself!

- These are not the proper days,
Wasting time to nurse you straight!
And the times will only get,
My dear comrade, tougher yet!

And Petruha's slowing down
His uneasy rapid steps.

He lifts up his boyish head!
There is joy upon his face...

Hey, hey, hey! Well, heyhey, hun!
It's no sin to have some fun!

Lock your attics, lock your floors,
For tonight the robber goes!

But those cellar stores leave wide -
For the rabble romps tonight!

8
Oh, you bitter bitterness!
Boredom boringmost,
Murderous!

Why, some timey time
I'll sure spend, sure spend...

Why, on top a bitty head
I'll sure scratch, sure scratch...

Why, some sunflower seeds,
I'll sure shell, sure shell...

Why, with my tiny knife,
I'll sure slash, sure slash...

Now, you fly, bougie, fly as a spar-
row babe!
Your sweet blood I'll drink down
For my heartthrob hon,
For my black-browed one...

Grant rest, good Lord, to the soul
Of your servant, the maiden...

How boring!

9
One hears no more of city's clam-
or,
The Nevsky spire in silence stands,
The city guardsman's gone forev-
er -
So revel without wine, my friends.

A bougie stands by crossing streets,
Into the collar hides his nose.
A wretched hound, right next to
him,
Would tuck its tail and cringe its
furs.

The bougie, like that starving
hound,
Stands speechless as a question
mark.
The old world, like some wretched
hound,
Stands by him with its tail well-
tucked.

10
Well, the blizzard's getting wild
Crazy blizzard! Stormy play!
Everybody's gone from sight,
Even from four steps away!

Snow into a funnel swirls,
Snow into a column rose...

- What a blizzard, Jesus save us!
- Petka! Hey, don't gorge on lies!
Just from what have golden icons
Ever saved you, by and by?
You're utterly unconscious!
Use your reason, think it out!
Aren't bloody hands the only
Consequence of Katya's love?
- Keep up with Revolution's step!
Our tireless foe is close ahead!

Keep on, keep on!
Oh, working folk!

11
... Having left the holy name be-
hind,
All twelve – walk far along.
Well-prepared for anything they
find,
They pity nothing at all...

Their steely darling rifles
Aimed at a phantom foe...
Through muted alleys no one,
But storming snowflakes, go...
And into feathered snowbanks -
Where boots get stuck in snow...

Scarlet flag
Strikes the eyes.

Far resounds
The even pace

Mortal foe
Soon will rise.

And the blizzard dusts their eyes
Days and nights
Away...

Forward, forward,
Working folk!
Forward and ahead!

12
...Off they go in valiant step...
- Who's out there? Now show
yourself!
Just the wind up in the distance
Playing with the scarlet flag....

There's a snowbank up ahead
- You in the snowbank, show your-
self!..
Just the pooch, all poor and hun-
gry,
Totters softly in the back...

- Now get lost, you mongrel crea-
ture
Or my bayonet will get you!
I say, old world, make like that
dog;
Drop out of sight or feel my poke!

... Bares his teeth – the hungry
wolf –

Tail's tucked-in – but follows
through –
Ice-cold hound, the kinless mon-
grel...
- Hey, respond, who's out there
walking?

- Who's there waving that red flag?
- No use looking, darkness black!
- Who's out there that walks so
quickly
Digging in by every wall?

- All the same, somehow I'll get
you,
Best surrender while you breathe!
- Hey there, comrade, won't end
well,
We'll start shooting, show your-
self!

Bam-bam-bam! And only echoes
Answer from the darkened walls...
Just the blizzard with its laughter
Rolls along the fallen snow...

Bam-bam-bam!
Bam-bam-bam!

...And so they walk a valiant
stride,
The starving dog treads close be-
hind,
While ahead – with a bloody ban-
ner,
And behind the snow unseen,
Safe from any bullet's sting,
Softly pacing over snowdrops,
Through the snowy pearly swirls,
In a wreath of roses white -
Leading them walks Jesus Christ.

- Petrograd, January 1918

COMMON ANTI-CANCER PLANTS AND FUNGI USED BY HUTSUL HEALERS

Column and Illustrations by Alexandra Dubinin, UC Berkeley

Hutsuls, an ethnocultural group of Ukrainians who inhabit regions of the Carpathian Mountains, are known for their freedom-loving, independent nature and regard for tradition. These pastoralists have a distinct culture that deeply respects the highland fauna, relying on it for shelter, food, and medicine. Their traditional healing dates back to the times of the ancient Greeks and continues to be popular. Not only do locals seek out Hutsul healers for medical advice, but the scientific community has become interested in the potential of their herbs for pharmaceutical development. In cancer research, plant-based drugs are widely sought after because of their potential to complement existing therapies and better safety profiles. Burdock, penny bun, and celandine are three examples of plants frequently used by Hutsul healers that are currently undergoing rigorous scientific investigation because of their promising anti-cancer properties.

While at first glance, burdock (*Arctium lappa* or реп`ях) seems like a plant to be avoided, with its imposing, spiny burrs, this Eurasian weed has proven to be a medical miracle plant. Numerous studies have attested to its immunoregulatory, antioxidant, and neuroprotective properties in applications such as combating cancer and enhancing memory; however, before this widespread attention, burdock was routinely administered by Hutsul healers (Lee, 2011), (Lou, 2017). Topically, it soothed head or joint aches, and orally, it cleansed the blood of toxins (Sõukand, 2016). In addition to medicinal applications, burdock was used cosmetically to promote healthy skin and hair (Lopuh Velikiy, 2016). Also, though it may not have the same appeal as a ripe tomato, in certain regions of Siberia where only the hardiest of plants can survive, burdock is even used in everyday cooking (Repiah, 2016).

Boletus edulis, colloquially known as penny bun (білий гриб), is widely acknowledged throughout Ukraine for its many medicinal properties. Its earliest recorded therapeutic uses, dating back to the 17th century, was to treat gastrointestinal diseases (Narodna Meditsina, 2015). Since then, traditional healers have also incorporated the fruit of *Boletus edulis* in remedies for conditions such as angina and severe cough (Sõukand, 2016). These mushrooms are an important part of Ukrainian cuisine and enjoyed fresh or preserved, often incorporated into soups and sauces (Łuczaj, 2015). This seemingly ordinary fungus piqued the interest of researchers in the 1950's when its anti-cancer potential was first discovered (Lucas, 1957). Recent studies in mice with renal cancer have confirmed this observation and suggest that this property is the result of a polymer in this mushroom that activates an anti-tumor immune response (Wang, 2014).

In Ukraine, it isn't uncommon to find passersby squeezing the highlighter-yellow sap of the weed, celandine (*Chelidonium majus* or чистотіл), onto patches of skin to cure warts, but this hardy, roadside plant can perform many other medicinal wonders. Its medical value has been appreciated since the time of the Ancient Greeks, and has been used in treating cancer, various skin, digestive, gynecological, and circulatory diseases. (Chistotil Korisni Vlastovosti, 2016). Because this plant is toxic, Hutsul healers often prescribe a few drops of a celandine infusion with vodka or water to be taken with a meal (Spirtova Nastoianka Chistotilu, 2014). Celandine is also a promising anti-cancer agent, and forms the basis of the anticancer drug, Ukrain. Research in various cell lines, animal, and clinical trials suggest that it is effective in treating a wide variety of cancers, though there are toxicity concerns (Ernst, 2005). Despite the need for further efficacy and safety research, Ukrain has been approved in several countries as a chemotherapy alternative (Boehm, 2009).

Traditional healers, such as the Hutsul herbalists of the Carpathian Mountains, have an incredible understanding of plant medicinal properties. Without technology, they were able to discover and pass on for centuries knowledge that modern biotechnology is only beginning to build on and understand. Yet, with all this, we are only beginning to appreciate the many wonders of nature that surround us.



PARTY FACE

Mariah Stewart, University of South Carolina

Wind wisps a yellow petal of laughter
through the closed window.
It spins on the stack of Pravda by the front
door.
Black-tooth smile, aren't we patriotic?
Ears grow from the walls
and our eyes blink from the balls of our feet
ground into pavement grit.
I can see if I kick up my heels.
Lips whisper sweet lies
that taste of air —
Some new color of oxygen,
Did you notice?

Mariah Stewart is a sophomore majoring in Russian and International Studies at the University of South Carolina. Born to American parents in Bratislava, Slovakia, she has always held a fascination with Eastern European history and culture. She hopes to one day work as a Foreign Service Officer for the U.S. State Department; until then she will continue to burn her earnings on plane tickets rather than save for a car, which is practical but less exciting. Mariah spends her free time researching Eastern European and Russian history for her historical fiction projects instead of doing Russian homework. She has published works in *Glass Kite Anthology*, *The Noisy Island*, *Polyphony H.S.* and works forthcoming in the *Young Adult Review Network*. She is fiction editor for the University of South Carolina's undergraduate literary magazine, *The Lettered Olive*.

MILITARY INTERVENTION DURING THE KOSOVO WAR: SUCCESSFUL U.S. FOREIGN POLICY?

Ian Rohr, Tulane University

After Serbia signed the Dayton Accords in 1995, no one thought there would be another war in former Yugoslavia. In the 1990s Slobodan Milosevic, the president of Serbia, wanted to exert influence over the former Yugoslav republics, similar to the influence Serbia held before the ratification of the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution. The international community believed that these accords permanently ended Milosevic's aggression since they asserted the right of these newly-formed countries to self-determination and prohibited violence in the region. However, Serbian aggression was evident, especially in Kosovo. Kosovo, an autonomous region within Serbia comprised of mainly ethnic Albanians, had its own government and constitution. In 1988 the Yugoslav Constitution was amended and gave the Serbian national government more authority by "reducing the autonomy of the provinces" to the same status before the ratification of the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution (Dragnich 140). Milosevic changed the laws to make discrimination against Kosovar Albanians legal and to force schools in Kosovo to adopt a Serbian-regulated curriculum rather than use their own curriculum. Additionally, the number of arrests in Kosovo rose during the 1990s; nevertheless, people coped with these problems.

One of Kosovo's main goals was to become an independent state like Bosnia, Croatia, and Slovenia. The problem was that unlike those countries, Kosovo had historically and officially been a part of Serbia. Furthermore, the Dayton Accords did not give further recognition to Kosovo as an autonomous state. Ibrahim Rugova, a major political leader in Kosovo, tried to peacefully achieve independence through a strategy of passive resistance. Yet, his non-violent approach did not produce any tangible results. To the Kosovar Albanians, non-violent diplomatic means had little success at achieving their goals of an independent state and the ceasing of persecution. It seemed to them that war was the only viable option to voice their concerns to the rest of the world. This ethnic conflict became an important issue during former President Clinton's second term because there was the possibility that NATO would intervene again in the Balkan Peninsula. As a result, the United States would likely be dragged into this war as well. While NATO had already established a precedent for intervention outside its territories, there was no specific precedent to resolve an intrastate conflict. Kosovo was still officially part of Serbia, so Serbia technically did not invade a sovereign territory like it had done in the previous Yugoslav wars. The United States and NATO would undertake a new challenge in trying to settle Serbia's internal affairs.

U.S. national security strategy was to create peace through "preventive diplomacy—through such means as support for democracy, economic assistance, overseas military presence, [and] involvement in multilateral negotiations" ("A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement" 18). The idea was that the spread of democracy in Central Europe would increase stability in the region. When countries were more stable, the United States resolved problems "with the least human and material cost" ("A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement" 11). The United States wanted to enlarge the number of democratic states in the world and considered it necessary to engage in the enlargement. Military intervention was one way to accomplish this strategy.

There were three categories in which U.S. troops could be deployed: 1) when it involved "overriding importance to the survival, security, and vitality" of the nation; 2) when it involved "cases in which important, but not vital, U.S. interests are threatened;" and 3) when it involved "primarily humanitarian interests" ("A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement" 18). Conflicts in Kosovo did not threaten U.S. national security directly, but they did create a humanitarian crisis. Since the humanitarian crisis destabilized the Balkan region, instability could "exacerbate rivalries between Greece and Turkey, two NATO allies with significant and often distinct interests in Southern Europe" (Dept of Defense 2000, 4). Therefore, it was in the interests of the United States to re-stabilize the Balkans not only to resolve the humanitarian crisis, but also to preserve the NATO alliance. The United States had an interest to work with NATO because it believed that NATO was a "guarantor of European security and a force for European stability" ("A National Security for a New Century" 37). A member of this alliance, the U.S. wanted to collaborate with NATO whenever it carried out operations in the Balkans in order to preserve the alliance's unity.

The United States had four goals to resolve the conflict in Kosovo: 1) maintain the status of Kosovo as an autonomous republic within Serbia, 2) end fighting between the Serbs and the Kosovar Albanians through Milosevic's capitulation, 3) restore confidence in the Kosovar Albanians by showing the international community was looking out for them, and 4) return refugees displaced by the war back to Kosovo. The United States did not want to establish an independent state out of fear of further destabilization in neighboring Macedonia (Caplan 755). While the United States supported the right of others to self-determination, it did not want to exert this right to the extent that it would create further conflict in the Balkans that NATO would have to resolve in the future. The main goal was to stop the fighting between both the Serbians and the Kosovar Albanians. Milosevic had to be defeated, and the Kosovar Albanians had to be convinced that the international community was looking out for their interests. Ending hostilities required successful communication on both sides, not simply the defeat of one side. After fighting ended, the final goal was to return displaced refugees home to Kosovo, a major sign of stability and success within a region devastated by war.

Clinton had four options to consider that could stabilize Kosovo. The first option was to maintain the status quo. The advantage of maintaining the status quo was that the United States would neither suffer casualties nor spend any money. After all, the Kosovo War did not directly threaten U.S. national security since it was mainly an ethnic war. The majority of Americans considered the war a minor issue. Doing nothing would have few political consequences; there was simply a general interest in keeping Europe stable. Yet, maintaining the status quo would allow instability in Kosovo to continue. Left uncontrolled, this instability could spread to other countries that had significant Albanian minorities such as Macedonia. Ethnic cleansing would continue, and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) might have been less likely to engage in diplomatic negotiations. One report estimated that "more than 260,000 people... were internally displaced" in 1998, and that "over 800,000 Kosovar Albanians fled to neighbouring countries" after Serb ethnic cleansing intensified (Salama 2204). As a result of the fighting, the number of Kosovar refugees continued to increase; other European countries would have to re-settle them. In the eyes of Western Europe, inaction might portray the United States as apathetic toward the Kosovar Albanians. Furthermore, inaction would make U.S. foreign policy inconsistent. The United States already intervened in the previous Yugoslav wars by issuing sanctions and launching air strikes. Critics would certainly question whether the United States has an obligation to intervene once more in the Balkans.

Short of direct intervention, the United States could impose sanctions on Serbia. If done with other countries, sanctions would have a crippling effect on Serbia's economy. Sanctions were a good possibility because they were a non-lethal option in the sense that they did not kill anyone directly, although the lack of trade could prevent vital resources such as food and medicine from getting to people in need. The imposition of sanctions did not require the use of military forces, thus causing little domestic backlash. Sanctions would make U.S. foreign policy consistent because they have been used in the past. In 1992 former President George H.W. Bush "announced new sanctions against Belgrade" after the Serbian Army blocked relief supplies and attacked non-Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Crosette). The international community usually regarded sanctions as an effective tool, and it gave the image that the United States was concerned about Kosovo.

On the other hand, sanctions might not work. Milosevic was fueled with a strong sense of nationalism and determination to win. The United States and other European countries had already applied sanctions in past conflicts such as the Bosnian War; nevertheless, they failed to stop him ("Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Sanctions" 2376). It likely required more than sanctions to stop this leader. There was also the possibility that the rest of the world would not be convinced that the United States was doing its fair share. Since Western European countries had already sent troops, they might not be fully satisfied until the United States established an active military presence. However, such an issue was less likely to occur than the failure of sanctions because, as previously mentioned, sanctions would show that the United States was putting forth some effort to curb Serbian aggression.

If Serb aggression still continued, then the final option was to intervene militarily by forming a coalition with NATO. Acting unilaterally was not a viable option for the United States at the time because forming a coalition helped preserve the unity of NATO. Many European countries were concerned during the Bosnian War that the United States was not doing its fair share. Working with NATO would eliminate this concern. The military option was divided further into two sub-options: using airpower alone or using airpower with ground forces. The U.S. military had air superiority over the Serbian military, so there would be a low risk of casualties. Collaborating with NATO forces, the United States could form a strong coalition. Strong airpower would send a message to Milosevic that the West would not tolerate his behavior; it worked in Bosnia. Since the United States had used airstrikes in Bosnia, using them again in Kosovo would make U.S. foreign policy consistent. Consistency led to higher credibility around the world by discouraging similar intolerable actions in other countries. Airpower would further establish credibility by showing an active concern in Kosovo; there was no stronger message to send to a country than sending in the U.S. military.

The con was that airstrikes alone might not be the most effective option. Because the geography of Serbia and Kosovo consisted of dense forests, the Serbs could deeply entrench themselves. Airpower might not adequately drive them out of their fortifications. As with most air operations, there was the risk of collateral damage. While jets at this time were more accurate compared to piston engine planes during World War II or jets during the Vietnam War, innocent civilians may be hit. The Milosevic regime could use collateral damage as propaganda to gain sympathy among ethnic Serbs and boost resilience in his troops, and innocent civilians might be less cooperative with the United States and NATO. This could present major complications since Kosovo was still officially part of Serbia. NATO intervention would already cause a rally 'round the flag effect both in Serbia and among Serb minorities in the former Yugoslav republics; collateral damage would exacerbate the situation further.

Deploying ground troops might reduce the risk of collateral damage and be more effective when combined with air power. Soldiers were more capable of penetrating the forests and engaging the entrenched Serbs. Sending U.S. ground troops would send a strong signal to both Serbia and NATO. Milosevic would see the determination of the United States to end the Kosovo War, and NATO forces would know that the United States is not shirking its responsibilities as a NATO member. The United States needed to preserve NATO in order to maintain stability in Europe. The deployment of troops could reinforce NATO troops, who mainly came from "Europe's armies, [which were] for the most part un-modernized and incapable of serious power projection" (Rodman 51). As a result, deployment of U.S. troops might be necessary in order to achieve success in Kosovo. Finally, the U.S. Army was vastly stronger than the Serbian army. Milosevic's troops would likely not endure long against U.S. infantry.

Many of the cons of deploying ground forces were similar to the cons of using airpower. Infantry would have to trudge through dense forests, Serb determination would not decrease, a rally 'round the flag effect would occur in Serbia, and U.S. forces would enter into what is still officially an intrastate conflict as opposed to an interstate one. Furthermore, it was probable that the casualty rate would be higher using ground forces than using air power. Deploying ground troops was a last resort, but the "Clinton administration had determined that it had to win in Kosovo whatever the cost and that its major allies would have supported a ground invasion" (Cotter 607). Yet, without a clear exit strategy, it was possible that NATO and the United States could be dragged into a second Vietnam War. It would be much harder to convince the American public to sustain a war in Kosovo than to sustain one in Vietnam. There were ethnic conflicts worldwide that the United States chose not to intervene in militarily. What made Kosovo more important than Rwanda? If the final outcome in Kosovo were unsuccessful like in Vietnam, there would be "wider ramifications for U.S. foreign policy" (Rodman 49). Defeat would show the inability of the United States and NATO to resolve conflicts, and Milosevic could continue his pattern of aggression and ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians.

With all these options to consider, President Clinton consulted various advisers who could not reach a consensus of decision. Secretary of State Madeline Albright suggested that the United States take a firm stance against Milosevic and strongly consider the use of NATO forces, while Secretary of Defense William Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel Berger vehemently disapproved of using military force, claiming that the "U.S. Congress and the American public won't tolerate another U.S. deployment in the Balkans" (Robbins and King). President Clinton also had to consider other countries' stances on Kosovo. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia could block any UNSC Resolution regarding intervention in the Balkan Peninsula. They officially opposed intervention in other countries' internal conflicts, including Serbia's, because it was waging an internal conflict of its own in Chechnya (Robbins and King).

Ultimately, NATO decided to intervene militarily at a North Atlantic Council meeting on April 12, 1999. The United States supported this decision, as it is a major member of the alliance. Since the majority of the NATO military is comprised of U.S. military, it was up to President Clinton to decide how to carry out a military campaign. He decided to use air power. This major decision was based on a policy of promoting peace and democracy worldwide and a determination to stop Milosevic. Using air power was appropriate because time had shown sanctions to be an ineffective policy tool. After envoys Richard Holbrooke and Robert Gelbard previously brokered a peace agreement between Serb and Kosovar leaders, the United States and its allies decided "to lift the foreign investment ban as a reward for Mr. Milosevic" (Robbins and King). Milosevic took advantage of this reward and soon reignited a new war in Kosovo. Therefore, force was the only viable option.

NATO air strikes were successful by "eliminating virtually all of Serbia's oil-refining capacity, reducing its military oil stockpiles by half, [and] seriously disrupting its transportation arteries" (Daalder and O'Hanlon 131). Such massive losses forced Milosevic to capitulate and sign the peace agreement that officially ended the war. By the end of July 1999, more than 770,000 refugees had already returned home, a sign that showed the air campaign's success (Salama 2204). However, NATO did not employ the most efficient strategy. Most of its planes flew above 15,000 feet in order to reduce NATO casualties. Consequently, high altitudes reduced the effectiveness of bombings and increased collateral damage (e.g., bombing refugee convoys), causing major backlash (Anderson and Phillips 1). If these planes had continually caused collateral damage, public support would have dramatically decreased since military action was not being implemented in a "disciplined and restrained manner, in accordance with international norms" (Wall 413). Sino-American relations also suffered for a brief time due to the "accidental U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade" (Rodman 49). While relations returned to normal, this accident showed how the consequences of collateral damage could extend beyond a small region such as the Balkans.

NATO's campaign was not perfect, but the positive outcomes outweighed the negative ones. Through military intervention the United States accomplished all four of its major goals. A successful air campaign ended the fighting, allowing hundreds of thousands of displaced refugees to return home. As a result, the Kosovar Albanians had confidence that the international community was addressing their concerns. Kosovo remained an autonomous region in Serbia after the war ended, although it became an independent state in 2008. The decision to militarily intervene through NATO collaboration in Kosovo showed consistency in U.S. foreign policy. Having already intervened in the previous Yugoslav wars, the United States showed its concern for maintaining regional stability in Europe. It achieved stability with few casualties, most of which did not occur by Serbian forces but by accidents such as helicopter crashes during training exercises ("Two Die in Apache Crash").

The United States had four goals in Kosovo and four possible ways to achieve them. Military force was chosen because all other methods such as diplomacy and economic sanctions failed to stop Milosevic. The United States collaborated with NATO to launch Operation Allied Force, a bombing campaign against Serb forces. Although the campaign was successful, it was not the most efficient. NATO and U.S. forces took measures to sustain as few casualties as possible. It was a controversial campaign because NATO acted without authorization from the UN Security Council. This paper does not attempt to answer the moral question of U.S. and NATO intervention, nor does it attempt to answer whether Clinton's strategy "Engagement and Enlargement" was good or bad. The goal of this paper is to analyze U.S. foreign policy during the Kosovo War and whether it was consistent with other policy decisions during the Clinton administration. However, an analysis of U.S. and NATO intervention raises the question of whether countries in the future will specifically use humanitarian crises as an official reason to intervene in another country's politics, citing intervention during the Kosovo War as a precedent. It would be a good topic for further international relations research.

NATO's strategy was not the quickest one to end the war, nor did it bring about the Kosovar Albanians' desired goal of creating an independent state. Yet, from a U.S. foreign policy perspective it was still successful. It accomplished all four of its goals in Kosovo and was consistent with the Clinton Doctrine of "Engagement and Enlargement." Moreover, NATO remained unified. The United States stopped an aggressive leader with few casualties, restored confidence in NATO allies, and proved it still had the capability to resolve both interstate and intrastate conflicts worldwide.

Ian Rohr is an undergraduate senior at Tulane University in New Orleans, LA. He will be graduating in May 2017 with a B.A. in Political Science (International Relations) and Russian with a minor in economics. Ian became interested in Russian culture as a kid when he joined Komenka, a New Orleans-based ethnic dance and music ensemble that performs folk music from around the world. He was fascinated by the Russian and Eastern European songs he performed with the group. This interest in Russian culture led him to study Russian at Tulane University. As an undergraduate student Ian has been to Russia twice: once in Moscow through a Tulane-sponsored study abroad program and once in Nizhny Novgorod through the State Department's Critical Language Scholarship program (CLS). While in Moscow he worked as an intern at the Agency for Strategic Initiatives. After returning to Tulane from the CLS program, he created a Russian conversation club for students to practice Russian outside of a formal classroom setting. Additionally, he has worked at the University of Economics in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. He plans to accept a Consular Adjudicator Limited Non-Career Appointment (CA/LNA) with the Foreign Service after graduation.

AT THE CROSSROADS OF MODERNISM AND REBELLION

Editor column by Kasia Metkowski, UC Berkeley

In Poland, the Catholic Church scurries to brand itself. The Church would like to claim itself to be the guardian of human dignity in Poland, especially during the “Godless” Communist years. Pope John Paul II, the Polish hero, is portrayed resisting Nazism and, then later, Communism.

The reality is a bit more nuanced. Some Catholic Poles did betray their Jewish neighbors during the Holocaust. Pope John Paul II was head of the Church during the sex abuse scandal, and many accuse him of not adopting an aggressive-enough stance against predators.

Rebellion is said to be at the heart of being Polish; to rebel and to be Polish have become almost synonymous with one another. To whom the rebellion is aimed at depends on the century-- 18th-20th was against Austria, Prussia, and Russia. Later, that list would include the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, the Organization for Ukrainian Nationalists under Stepan Bandera, and more. The Catholic Church played a constant role throughout, both above and underground. Mass was often a stage for conspiracies, just as how traditions such as Names’ Days became sites for complaining about the regime.

Today, the question of rebellion lies in its contents. Does Polish resistance cling onto traditional values such as gender roles? Or, does it drop the yoke of old-school religion and Westernize? That battle of nuances recently came to a head in the Black Protest, or Czarny Protest, on October 3, 2016. Thousands of women worldwide participated in an emergency global protest against a bill that would outlaw abortion completely-- even in cases of rape and fetal deformities. If passed, this bill would have endangered lives, as it would have dissuaded doctors from providing abortions in life-threatening situations. Despite the fact that the ultra-conservative Peace and Justice (PiS) party in power controls the presidency and both levels of parliament, the bill was dismissed due to the protests. The public even pressured the Church into withdrawing support, even though many churches held prayer services in favor of the bill.

It is important to acknowledge that some of Poland’s best qualities do claim roots in the Catholic Church’s claimed commitment to families. Strikingly, Poland was one of the first countries to outlaw marital rape, in 1932-- more than half a century before the United States would do so in the 1990s. Recently, the Polish government enacted a policy called 500+, which gives families of more than one child upwards of 500 zł a month, roughly equal to \$125. Families with more children receive more money, regardless of income levels. Families in Poland have much to worry about, but unlike in the United States, healthcare, education, and basic material comforts are not included in the list.

Father Tadeusz Rydzyk has raised many donations from the elderly and taxpayers to support his radio station, Radio Maryja, whose programs are often accused of anti-Semitism, Holocaust denial, misogyny, Islamophobia and more. Even Pope Benedict XVI reprimanded the station in 2006 for its extremism. The station plays an important role in politics: The PiS party relied on broadcasts to garner support and votes. Though not listened to by the majority of the country, the station seems to find its audience in those who feel alienated by the growing secularisation of Poland. His station, and in turn, the priest himself, both embody the pushback of these alienated people against change.

As Father Rydzyk cruises about the country in his private helicopter, I wonder who he sees below him. Misguided sheep, moving too briskly in the direction of Westernization? God’s flock, unknowingly but genuinely needing to be saved? The final battlefield between secularists and traditionalists? Potential donors? Who knows.

GOGOL’S TABLEAU OF APOCALYPSE IN THE GOVERNMENT INSPECTOR (1836)

Natasha Kadlec, University of Pennsylvania

Nikolai Gogol’s *The Government Inspector* reads as a hyperbolic indictment of *proizvol*, the arbitrariness of monarchal rule, under Nicholas I (Platt 71-2). His Chief of Police is a “regular highwayman” (Inspector, 50), his hospital is so dank with tobacco smoke that the patients “look like blacksmiths” (Inspector, 2), and his officials invariably operate through codified systems of bribery. Beyond that, his play’s eponymous government inspector is not a government inspector at all. Indeed, almost universally, Russians interpreted the play as a condemnation of their government (Ehre 176). Yet Gogol, the staunch monarchist, protested vehemently against the idea that his play subverted the Tsar’s monarchy (Nabokov 56-58), to the point of publishing several clarifying codas (Gogol, qtd. in Ehre 169-191). His play’s famous “dumb scene” is critical to understanding this apparent paradox. Through the dumb scene, *The Government Inspector* indicts societal norms of bribery and corruption, which themselves subvert the government, rather than condemning the imperial government. In reaching this conclusion, I read the dumb scene as apocalypse in the mode of the Book of Revelation, and argue that the dumb scene signals a coming day of judgement, tacitly casting the Tsar as God.

A careful reading of the dumb scene is key to understanding *The Government Inspector* as a whole. The dumb scene stands apart from the rest of the play on several fronts. Physically, the stillness of the scene presents a major contrast to the frenzied movement of the rest of the play. From Dobchinsky and Bobchinsky’s arrival, “com[ing] in panting” to warn of the arrived inspector (Inspector, 7), to Anna Andreyevna and Marya Antonovna, who “come in running” to prepare to meet the inspector (Inspector, 12), to the Postmaster, entering “out of breath” in the penultimate scene to expose the inspector as a pretender (Inspector, 67), the petty officials of *The Government Inspector* are constantly in motion. The dumb scene stands out, then, just for this contrast. The difficulty of the dumb scene’s execution also indicates its importance to the play. The “elaborately formal tableau” of the dumb scene presents a significant challenge, requiring the actors to possess the “best will in the world” to remain perfectly still for ninety seconds (Beresford 65). Gogol must have considered the dumb scene of essential importance to justify its technical difficulty.

Indeed, Gogol’s supplementary writings on *The Government Inspector* emphasize the dumb scene’s importance. In his “Fragment of a Letter to a Man of Letters, Written by the Author Shortly after the First Performance of *The Government Inspector*,” Gogol complained at length about the actors’ unwillingness to successfully execute the dumb scene and reiterated that “the curtain must not drop for two to three minutes” (“Theater” 180). A separate letter urged its reader to “pay particular attention to the final scene” (“Theater” 176), and another noted that “the final scene... must be performed with particular intelligence” (“Theater” 174). For Gogol, then, the final dumb scene defines the play. The importance Gogol attaches to the dumb scene suggests that it ought to make a substantially new contribution to viewers’ understanding of the play.

The penultimate scene, the discovery of Hlestakov as imposter, transitions directly into the dumb scene when a member of the Gendarme appears. He announces the arrival of a Petersburg official “by imperial order” (Inspector, 71). These are the final words spoken in the play, and they “strike all like a thunderbolt,” leaving the group “petrified” (Inspector, 71). This petrification signals the beginning of the dumb scene. The villagers stand in varied positions and display varying reactions to the announcement: while the Chief of Police “stands in the midst like a post, his arms outspread” and his family and other officials, similarly, are strongly affected by the news, the minor characters demonstrate less reaction. “Three lady guests,” for example, merely aim “the most sarcastic expressions” at the Chief of Police, while Korobkin, a retired official, makes “a derisive gesture” at the Chief of Police, and the others “simply stand like statues” (Inspector, 71-2). The actors, Gogol instructs, are to remain in this position “for nearly a minute and a half” (Inspector, 72). The differing degrees of reaction to the news clearly correlate to the characters’ degree of culpability in local corruption. Their reactions, then, indicate the collective knowledge that judgement is coming.

The “dumbness” of the scene transforms the play’s final moments into a single tableau vivant, rather than a proper final scene at all. Indeed, Gogol notes in his 1846 “Advice to Those Who Would Play The Government Inspector as It Ought to be Played,” “the whole scene is wordless, and hence must be composed like tableaux vivants” (Gogol, qtd. in Ehre 174). This sudden generic shift has two apparent functions. First, it presents a striking contrast to the rest of the play. The Government Inspector during the dumb scene is no longer a play at all, but merely a picture that is burned into the audience’s vision “for nearly a minute and a half” (Inspector, 72). Second, the history of the tableaux vivants genre signifies a religious subtext. During the Renaissance, tableaux vivants, played for a monarch, “were a unique means of communication between the citizens [and] the monarch, [and] had a direct bearing on current issues,” employing “religious, mythological, & symbolic themes” to illustrate those issues (Karimi). Correspondingly, early through modern religious films have “relied” on the use of tableaux vivants to portray biblical scenes “since these subjects had strong ties to an age-old iconographic tradition in the theatre and visual arts” (Jacobs 97). Tableaux vivants, then, have maintained their religious connotation well beyond Gogol’s time. Consequently, the tableau of the dumb scene serves not only to capture the audience’s attention but also to direct that attention towards a biblical message.

A biblical reading of the dumb scene makes sense in the context of *The Government Inspector* and in the context of Gogol’s agenda. Gogol “inclined to religious emotions, dreams and fantasies,” and “expected [The Government Inspector] to bring about a moral and religious rejuvenation in Russia” – apparently explaining his disappearance to Rome when such a “rejuvenation” failed to occur (Cizevsky 16). Although Gogol’s later revisions and commentary on *The Government Inspector* included far more explicit religious content, a religious subtext is already present in the dumb scene (Cizevsky 7). Religious imagery is not uncommon in Gogol: his short story “The Portrait,” written two years before *The Government Inspector*, contains the figure of the antichrist (Cizevsky 15). The antichrist figure is apparently a fixation of Gogol’s, as in *The Government Inspector*, he revisits that figure in the context of an apocalyptic tableau vivant. As Artemy Filippovich wisely comments in the penultimate scene, “It’s as if a fog had descended upon us and the devil had misled us” (Inspector, 70).

Reading the dumb scene against the Book of Revelation is instructive here. In Revelation, a prophetic vision of final judgement preceding Christ’s second coming, John of Patmos, an otherwise unimportant messenger, brings the message of Christ’s impending arrival to Earth. As portrayed in Revelation, the second coming is a time of physical chaos: “lightnings, and voices, and thunderings, and an earthquake, and great hail” (Rev. 11:19). This chaos is interrupted by the coming of a false prophet, the antichrist, who the people follow as a deity. However, God ultimately sends “the false prophet that wrought miracles... and them that worshipped his image” to hell (Rev. 19:20). Finally, God judges all of the dead, sending all of the wicked to hell, in preparation for the utopian world that will accompany his arrival (Rev. 20:11-15).

Beginning with the role of Hlestakov as antichrist, we can read the dumb scene as an extended allusion to the Book of Revelation. This reading reveals the twofold way in which the devil has “misled” the villagers. First, directly, though the presence of Hlestakov:

From the Book of Revelation, it is well-known that the Second Coming of Christ will be preceded by the temporary accession of a false Christ – the antichrist. Like the Second Coming of Christ, which happens at the end of time, the arrival of the real government inspector in Gogol’s play also happens at the very end... he is preceded by the appearance of the false inspector – Hlestakov.

As the Antichrist of Revelation, Hlestakov deceives “them that dwell on the earth by the means of those miracles which he had power to do” (Rev. 13:14). Indeed, Hlestakov performs petty ‘miracles’ for the entire village: for the Chief of Police and his family, he purports to offer, through marriage, higher social status and a move to Petersburg (Inspector, 59-60); for the villagers who are antagonized by the Chief of Police, he appears as a higher authority for appeal (Inspector, 49-50). In Revelation, similarly, the devil directly misleads the people through the appearance of the antichrist, but this deception is only a symbol of the figurative way that the devil misleads the people by tempting them onto a path of sin. If Hlestakov serves as antichrist, then, for Gogol, engagement in corruption and bribery are the sins that indicate the devil’s presence in the lives of the villagers every day.

Beyond Hlestakov’s role as antichrist, Gogol places several visual and textual references to Revelation within the dumb scene. In the stage directions immediately following the Gendarme’s announcement, Gogol writes that “the words just pronounced strike all like a thunderbolt” (Inspector, 71). The use of thunder imagery is not a coincidence. In “Advice to Those...,” Gogol describes how “the announcement... hits [the Chief of Police] like a *thunderclap*” (emphasis added) (Ehre 146). Two paragraphs later, he emphasizes that some of the others present in the dumb scene should “bolt abruptly; they are thunderstruck (emphasis added)” (Ehre 147). Similarly abundant thunder imagery characterizes Revelation, including four nearly identical references to “lightnings and thunderings and voices” among the chaos of apocalypse. Most tellingly, the “voice from heaven” is “as the voice of a great thunder” (Rev. 14:2). The villagers of *The Government Inspector*, then, are *thunderstruck* by the words of the Gendarme: the voice from “heaven,” the home of God – here, the voice from Petersburg, the home of the Tsar.

That voice from heaven, the Gendarme, stands in for the voice of John of Patmos: the otherwise irrelevant messenger whose function is to inform the people of Christ’s second coming. Crucially, before His second coming, the final judgement must be completed, wherein wrongdoers will be condemned. Although the literal figure that is coming to the village, the real government inspector, is not the Tsar himself, the villagers presume that he is backed by the full power of the Tsar (as they presumed about Hlestakov). Thus, the Christological subtext of the dumb scene emphasizes Gogol’s message that Russian officials must cease their sinfully corrupt behavior. Only then will there “be no more curse: but the throne of God and of the Lamb shall be in it; and his servants shall serve him: And they shall see his face” (Rev. 22:3-5). By casting the Tsar as God within the context of Revelation, Gogol warns the Russian people not to follow the “antichrists” among them, officials who appear to represent the power of the Tsar but who in fact only exploit their power for personal enrichment. After all, Hlestakov’s heist differs from the corruption of the others only in magnitude. He is the paradigmatic corrupt official taken to an extreme.

influence on American modernism and the ways in which it is distinct from Malevich’s spiritual aspirations.

Thus, Gogol simultaneously condemns the actions of government officials without condemning the regime itself, resolving the apparent tension between Gogol's monarchist views and his satiric political commentary. It would appear that a link between "corruption under a certain government" and "the government itself" is inextricable, meaning that Gogol's criticism necessarily condemns the Tsar himself (Nabokov 36-7). But the key function of the dumb scene is its ability to differentiate between "corruption under" that government and that "government itself." By casting the Tsar as the Christ-figure of Revelation, Gogol separates the earthly, corrupt officials from the heavenly, incorruptible Tsar. In this way, Gogol can write social criticism, even political criticism, which still stops short of criticizing the monarchy itself.

Yet surely Gogol was aware that the symbolism of his final scene was open to interpretation, and that his entire audience would not spontaneously manage to get that interpretation 'right.' In the dumb scene, he "brings his world to the brink where final judgement waits" (Ehre 139). But why not take things further? Only those officials who understood the play's demands of them could act on those demands. Including in the text of the play a scene of explicit judgement, in which the wrongdoers are summarily punished, would have made that message far clearer. It seems unlikely that Gogol, for whom "the theater is a great school," made this decision on the basis of aesthetics (Moeller-Sally 30). More likely, the ambiguity of the dumb scene played a role in the play's didactic message.

To resolve this question, Gogol's epigraph is instructive: "if your mug is crooked, don't blame the mirror." Rather than bringing The Government Inspector to a definitive conclusion, Gogol allows his dumb scene to hold up a "mirror" to its spectators, leaving the play's final analysis in the hands of the audience. Despite its strongly Christological and religious overtones, which place the blame on the corrupt officials while absolving the Tsar, an indisputable ambiguity remains. Perhaps Gogol wished to leave the possibility open that any wrongdoers, even up to the level of the Tsar, could take the play as an invitation to reflect on their actions and change course. After all, the final decision – whether or not a spectator's "mug" was "crooked" – could not be blamed on Gogol's "mirror."

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Edward Maza, Yale University

Modernist art historical discourse has held the work of Kazimir Malevich as a significant precursor to the development of later American painting. However, discussions of Malevich's influence on American Modernism have focused almost exclusively on his formal achievements, implying that Malevich's major contribution to American Modernism was the development of purely formalist abstraction. This intellectual lineage can be traced as far back as Alfred Barr's highly influential 1936 exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art, *Cubism and Abstraction*, to the Gagosian Gallery's 2011 show, *Malevich and the American Legacy*. In the famous genealogical chart of Modernist movements that accompanied Barr's 1936 exhibition Malevich's "Suprematism" was wedged into a lineage from "Neo-Impressionism" to "Geometrical Abstract Art" on formalist grounds. The 2011 catalogue for *Malevich and the American Legacy*, which only briefly notes the often-neglected philosophical parallel between the work of Malevich and American modernists, also focuses heavily on morphological similarities between Malevich's work and those of American artists such as Mark Rothko, Richard Serra, and Sol Le Witt. Even the artists in the exhibit refer primarily to the formal qualities of Malevich's work. This formalist bias has shifted focus away from a critical component of Malevich's work: its relation to spirituality and the Orthodox icon tradition, and ignores a major philosophical distinction between Malevich and American abstraction.

In his recent paradigm-shifting book, *The Avant-Garde Icon*, Andrew Spira has offered a crucial comprehensive philosophical framework within which to understand the complex spiritual potency of Malevich's work. Spira has demonstrated that despite modernism's general embarrassment over notions of the spiritual, in the context of Malevich's work, to ignore the spiritual elements is to miss something in it. In this paper, I want to use Spira's framework as a guide in rethinking the relationship between Malevich and one particular American Modernist, Mark Rothko. Specifically, I will compare the spiritual ambitions of Malevich's *Black Square* (1915) with those of the Rothko Chapel in Houston (conceived and constructed between 1964-1971). The work of Rothko, like that of Malevich, is deeply spiritual and must be understood in spiritual terms. Both of these artist aimed to dissolve the distinction between the viewer and the artwork; which is to say the subject and the object. The spirituality of the works is not just present in the thought behind them, but also in the material execution and architectural display of the paintings. However, ultimately Malevich strives for a disembodied transcendence while Rothko aims to create a corporeal transcendental space.

In discussing the spiritual nature of the *Black Square*, Andrew Spira establishes that, "the selfless, non-objective nature of reality could not be realized until the presumption of a subject/object distinction had been released." The viewer and object must fuse together in a spiritual unification. "Malevich realized that it would ultimately be erroneous to regard icons or the *Black Square* as sacred objects per se - for to do so would be to regard them as discrete objects, thereby sustaining a discrete subject, the viewer, by implication." Ultimately, Spira claims that Malevich was not trying to create an isolated artwork, but rather an object that acts a conduit for a spiritual experience. Spira's line of thinking must be applied to the work of Rothko and the Rothko Chapel in order to fully grasp Malevich's influence on American modernism and the ways in which it is distinct from Malevich's spiritual aspirations.

For Rothko, an effective painting forces recognition within the viewer, "When we perceive a painting properly we become aware of the life of the picture as a whole, and that the sum total effect of our recognitions and emotions—that is, our associations and what they have made us feel—is the result of the plastic journey we have enjoyed." The experience Rothko imparts is not beyond the realm of human existence, as Malevich tries to convey. It focuses on the articulation of corporeal human emotions as a step towards an embodied spiritual experience. Rothko held that the body was an important aspect of spirituality, "let us not condemn the flesh, for without it we should never know the spirit."

Malevich declared that, "easel art is done with; the idol-artist is a prejudice of the past." This declaration can be understood as a rejection of all artistic development between the Orthodox icon and Suprematism, and, in so doing, rejecting the nineteenth and twentieth centuries' aversion towards the spiritual. Both Suprematism and Orthodox icons use minimized figurative expression to allow the viewer to use the work as a tool of transcendence. Malevich's first exposure to art was to the local icons in Kiev, where he was born and grew up. Russian icons were made by layering pigment onto wood boards to create a minimally realist, church sanctioned depiction of a holy figure or scene. By consciously minimizing the realism of the figures, icons painters absolved themselves of the struggle to depict the subject truthfully in order to allow the icon to become a non-idolatrous devotional object.

The 1757 establishment of the Russian Academy of the Arts, a product of Peter the Great's westernizing reform in Russia, brought European "easel art"—along with what Malevich called the idol artist—to Russia. The new western style art moved away from the utilitarian Orthodox icons, using figurative representations as ends in and of themselves as opposed to spiritual tools, shifting from a utilitarian primacy to one of representation. Hence the idolatrous nature of the western artist: shifting from worship of God to worship of self. In reference to the icon tradition western style art takes on an idolatrous nature, moving away from the spiritual utility of the icon.

A strategic use of architecture made the Black Square's link to the icon explicit: it was hung in the "red corner" of the room, the spot traditionally reserved for icons. As Spira relates, "In their own ways, both icons and the Black Square are to be engaged as forms of sacred art; both were conceived as agents of self-surrender, in contemplative identification with which the viewers could be drawn beyond themselves into the higher identity of a divine or absolute reality." The placement of the work forces the viewers gaze upwards towards the heavens. The work was engaged with the eyes, leaving the body back on the ground of the gallery. Ultimately, Malevich was hoping to move beyond art to a point at which, "there will be no need for reason, hearing, sight, or the sense of touch, for there will be nothing to overcome, there will be no existence to oppose me and direct my consciousness away from itself and towards the conquering of existence itself."

In contrast to the way in which Malevich strategically utilized architecture to enforce the spiritual encounter with the Black Square beyond the body, Rothko relied on architectural space to enhance the corporeal spiritual qualities of his work. Rothko would carefully oversee the installation of his work to ensure that it was placed with proper lighting and appropriate viewing space. By controlling the light and atmosphere of the environment, he was able to create spaces conducive for the corporeal experience he was trying to express. Finally, with the construction of the Rothko Chapel, he was able to create an immersive space for his works. Rothko achieved his spiritual experience through emotion.

As he explained, "I'm interested only in expressing basic human emotions — tragedy, ecstasy, doom, and so on — and the fact that lots of people break down and cry when confronted with my pictures shows that I communicate those basic human emotions... The people who weep before my pictures are having the same religious experience I had when I painted them." For Rothko, a successful experience culminates in a physical response: tears. It is not enough that the viewer feels the emotion he is relating, they must fully embody that emotion through the painting.

Like Malevich, Rothko built on common religious tropes to create a space of transcendence and dissolve the subject-object distinction. Even though the chapel was conceived of as a non-denominational space for meditation, the main octagonal space of the chapel is inscribed in a cross, adorned by triptychs (indicative of the Trinity) comprised of abstract color-field paintings. In the chapel Rothko creates abstracted triptychs, reducing the images of Christ and saints to dark abstract planes of color. Rothko, like Malevich, thus drew on an already established tradition of religious space in order to facilitate a transcendental experience.

The aesthetic structure of Black Square is minimally expressive, indicative of the transcendent goal of the work. Its white border creates a space for the square to occupy, but gives no sense of gravity, as the square floats in the middle of the white. For Malevich, "anarchy is colored black... a single dark ray has swallowed up all the colors and placed everything beyond mere difference and advantage. Everything is now the same." The radical equality Malevich ascribes to the color black renders all figurative representation obsolete. By painting over the colorful background of Black Square with a solid field of black paint, Malevich is highlighting the redundancy of polychromatic representation. The square rejects gravity and distinction of the material world to push the viewer beyond the painting towards transcendence.

Like the Black Square, the Rothko Chapel places a premium on black and darkness. Even though there is a massive skylight, the space is dark and from a distance the paintings seem to be solid black. The solid dark planes draw the viewer closer, where upon further reflection the black transitions into deep blues and purples, revealing the unprimed canvases beneath the paint, in much the same way the colored under-paint shines through the black surface of Black Square. As one Chapel historian, Suna Umari said, "the bright colors stop your vision at the canvas, where dark colors go beyond. And you're looking at the beyond. You're looking at the infinite."

While Malevich's work uses only viewer's gaze to help access truth by forcing the viewer's gaze upwards, Rothko's work uses the body as a tool to access transcendence. The large-scale works in the Chapel are all consuming. They all have visible brushstrokes and lack the mechanic consistency of some of the Suprematist works. Unlike the Black Square, the color-fields have no borders separating them from the space they occupy. Each one of them extends fully into the chapel consuming the visitor. One exception to this is the triptych on the East wall, which has a gray border around the primary navy center. However, the size of the painting allows it to encompass the entire field of vision of a viewer, thus conveying the notion of envelopment. Even the notion of a triptych and crucifix in-and-of themselves are tied to a notion of embodied spirituality, linking the worshiper to the body of Christ. In a sense, the paintings become the actual square of Malevich's work while the physical space of the chapel acts as the square's white border, distinct, yet inseparable from the square.

This consumption is highlighted by the shape of the chapel, which swallows up the guest, who is surrounded by Rothko's work on every side. No natural light enters into the space, except from the grated pyramid skylight above, indicating that a-physical transcendence is not the aim of the space. Or, pulling from a Talmudic adage that would most certainly have been familiar to Rothko, "[spirituality] is not in the heavens," truth is present in the world. Man is forced to find transcendence within the confines of the material world, and by extension within himself.

Malevich and Rothko's contrasting notions of corporeality have affected the long-term potency of their works. Despite his disdain towards corporeality, Malevich's Black Square has become an object of materiality, neutered by the flat wall of the gallery in which it hangs. Whereas he had wanted his work to serve as a conduit to transcendence beyond it, the painting has become the subject of intensive study and scrutiny. Rothko, in contrast, by embracing the corporeal element of his works, managed to create a permanent architectural home for his paintings, in which they can never be fully violated. The space itself is imbued with a material spirituality that is only enhanced by the utilitarian nature of the space. The work of Andrew Spira has highlighted this philosophical divide between the two painters, and has demonstrated the need for rigorous reflection on the spiritual nature of the two in order to fully understand Malevich's influence on, and major distinctions from, American Modernism. Despite the morphological similarities in their works, the two are operating on different philosophical planes, and the alleged link between them must be further problematized.

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SURPASSING APATHY: RUSSIA'S YOUTH PROTEST KREMLIN CORRUPTION

Editor column by Hannah Berkman, UC Berkeley

Moscow is an imposing city. Enormous Stalin-era buildings that house the government's intricate and often oppressive machinery tower above seemingly tiny people snaking along the sidewalks, rendering the divide between the citizens and their leaders palpable. The city's streets are lined with buildings that evoke different eras of Russia's past – an imperial home, an Orthodox church, and a Soviet apartment building all sit beside a skyscraper built in the short years since Communism came crashing down. In each of these eras, this city has seen its residents line the streets and demand accountability from that far-off government sitting in its fortresses that line the boulevards.

This happened yet again on March 26, 2017, when Russia's youth surprised nearly every analyst, journalist, and Russia researcher by pouring onto Tverskaya, proclaiming, "Russia will be free." Thousands of people, including many students and even adolescents, decided that their anger with the government's corruption, as manifested in Aleksey Navalny's recent investigation into Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev's fortune, overrode their fear of draconian protest laws and potential arrest. Over 1000 people were reportedly arrested in Moscow alone, with protests occurring in more than 90 cities across the country; after the Bolotnaya protests in 2012, the Kremlin has made it much harder to get a permit to assemble, so most of the protests were unsanctioned.

And yet they came out in droves, defying all of our expectations, including mine. I spent last summer in Moscow researching Russian governmental censorship of the news media, and I left feeling like nothing was ever going to change. The youth really did seem apathetic – my cousins told me that they knew the government was corrupt but they did not feel that they had the power to change that, and they certainly knew that going to the voting booth was useless. In Russia, the joke goes, the results of elections are known ahead of time.

The Kremlin has been tightening the informational and public spheres for nearly two decades, since Putin's ascent to power, and censorship has limited access to non-governmental news sources. State media parrots the same propaganda message to the country's 11 time zones, and many eat it up happily. Yet here they were, thousands, who watched Navalny's investigation and did not care the least bit about what Kremlin propagandists had to say about it; this is the generation of social media and YouTube, not television, after all. There was a state media blackout during the protests – they were not mentioned at all for nearly a week. This only proved the protesters' point further: they have been reading exactly what the Kremlin and its propagandists don't want them to know and they would never see on state television. The blackout did nothing but further delineate these two realms, and showcase their growing divide. The Kremlin's efforts to censor the media are rendered all but useless in the face of a generation wanting and willing to know and not to simply accept. The government must be at a loss – how do they keep the younger generation from reading Navalny and get them to toe the Kremlin line?

There will surely be further crackdowns on protests, schools, and universities in the aftermath of these events, but they have given many hope for the future of Russia. After having written off the younger generation as politically useless, we have been proven wrong.

**“THE AUTHOR AS PRODUCER” AND THE DIRECTOR AS POET:
INALIENABLE LABOR AND VISUAL RHETORIC IN
DZIGA VERTOV’S “A SIXTH PART OF THE WORLD”**

Scarlet Cummings, UC Berkeley

Though Karl Marx presented his hypotheses on capital and labor in a time before cinema and Walter Benjamin predominantly examines the mediums of the newspaper and theater in his essay “The Author as Producer,” both texts lend themselves to the analysis of film form, especially in concert with Dziga Vertov’s 1926 film *A Sixth Part of the World*. Vertov’s overarching poem, which threads together the disparate shots of the film, may be read as a simplified, literary translation of Marx’s main claims in “Alienated Labor,” and the film’s visual elements may be seen as optical renderings of the theoretical text’s concepts; this critical integration of word and image endows Vertov’s work with the revolutionary value Benjamin expounds and advocates in “The Author as Producer.”

Vertov’s poem strives to unite its readers/viewers who are separated by vast geographic and cultural expanse. It begins with a critique of capitalism, visually demonstrating Marx’s theory that, “The devaluation of the human world increases in direct relation with the increase in value of the world of things” (Marx 121). This is discernible in the proliferation of items in the *mise-en-scène* – piles of gold watch casings, countless cups, toys, records, furs – all reproduced in rapid montage, objects made by alienated workers for the bourgeoisie. The latter Vertov portrays as incomplete, their physical beings segmented and made less than whole. Disembodied hands holding items, and fox-trotting legs bisected by cropped frames.

Marx writes, “The alienation of the worker in his product means not only that his labour becomes an object, assumes an external existence, but that it exists independently, outside himself, and alien to him, and that it stands opposed to him as an autonomous power” (Marx 122-23). Vertov verifies this principle visually and textually in his representation of capitalism at the beginning of the film, but in capturing the image of the proletariat, he succeeds in portraying their inalienable, or free, labor. The poem’s constant, unabated employment of the pronoun “you” (both formal and informal depending on the respective visual subject) and the possessive adjective “your” is essential for it removes the divide between the worker and his labor, emphasizing the ownership of the proletariat over their industry.

The relentless flashing of words before the eyes of the audience, the persistent textual reminder of their self-determination, is crucial. Without this unequivocal possession conveyed by the accompanying literary text, the visual components of *A Sixth Part of the World* would be not potentially revolutionary, but purely documentary. Furthermore, Vertov’s embracing of work that cannot be commodified (“You mother, playing with your child”), as well as the incorporation of leisure into his poem (“You child, playing with the captured arctic fox”), makes his literature inclusive; text and image unite to convey that no one is alienated by labor or social structure in the Soviet Union.

Regardless of one’s activity, age, gender, race, occupation, or role, every individual is a vital part of a collective that contributes to the fate, the progress, and the success of the Soviet Union. Under communism, “...labour ...is [not] a labour of self-sacrifice,” nor is man alienated “...from the product of his labour, from his life activity [or] from his species-life” (Marx 129). Rather, Vertov textually and visually communicates his explicit written message – “You / All / Are the masters / Of the Soviet / Land / In your hands lies / The sixth / Part / Of the world” – exemplifying the “...political tendency [of his product] ... [and] the attitude with which it is to be followed, [an attitude Vertov] ...can only demonstrate ...in writing, [the apparatus through which] ...readers or spectators [are turned] into collaborators” (Benjamin 233).

Vertov’s position as “Author-Leader,” his accredited title, is evident in these final words of the excerpt. In rejecting illusionistic cinema and the “legalized myopia” (Vertov 18) of Hollywood, he answers Bertolt Brecht’s “...far-reaching demand not to supply the apparatus of production without, to the utmost extent possible, changing it in accordance with socialism” (Benjamin 228).

Benjamin writes, “...technical progress is for the author as producer the foundation of his political progress,” and this is true of Vertov, manifested in his desire to eradicate mystification, to create a cinema that reveals the process of its own making, as well as the proletariat’s own potential to itself (Benjamin 230). *A Sixth Part of the World* has “...over and above [its] character as [a work], an organizing function,” which consists of its highly structured editing and pivotal intertitles, to which the principle of interruption is crucial (Benjamin 233).

Although referring to Brecht’s epic theater, Benjamin’s explanation that, “The interruption of action ... constantly counteracts an illusion in the audience,” is applicable to Vertov’s film (Benjamin 235). Such counteraction occurs when Vertov directly engages with the viewers of *A Sixth Part of the World*. His poem reads, “And you, sitting in the audience,” then the camera cuts to a reflexive shot of the backs of heads in a theater as they view one of the opening shots of the very film we watch. In this self-referential move, Vertov not only challenges the deception of conventional narrative film, but also calls us, the audience, to action. This jarring interruption engendering our self-realization, the waking of our consciousness.

Interruption also arises with each intertitle. The shocking black background and forceful, stark white Cyrillic characters disrupting the flow of images, transforming the “...often merely modish procedure [of montage] [into] a human event,” which produces a revolutionary character in *A Sixth Part of the World* that is far more conspicuous than in other Vertov films such as *Man with a Movie Camera*, in which text plays little to no role (Benjamin 230). To change the productive apparatus, one must “...overthrow ...the barriers, ...transcend ...the antitheses, that fetter the production of intellectuals, in this case the barrier between writing and image,” which Vertov achieves in structuring his film in a way in which the textual becomes inextricable from the visual, the words essential to the image (Benjamin 230). In doing so, Vertov demonstrates “...the ability to give his picture the caption that wrenches it from modish commerce and gives it a revolutionary useful value” (Benjamin 230).

Excerpt from Dziga Vertov’s poem in A Sixth Part of the World:

You with the grapes
And you at the rice
You, eating raw reindeer meat
You, drinking from mother’s breast
And you, lusty centenarian
You mother, playing with your child
You child, playing with the captured arctic fox
You, unleashing the reindeer
You, doing the laundry with your feet
And you, sitting in the audience
You...
Knee-deep in grain
Knee-deep in water
You, spinning your flax in the spinning room
You, spinning your wool in the mountains
You...
All...
Are the masters...
Of the Soviet...
Land
In your hands lies...
The sixth...
Part...
Of the world

Scarlet Cummings graduated with honors from UC Berkeley in 2016, earning her B.A. in Film and Art History with a minor in English. She was awarded the 2015-16 Departmental Citation by the Film & Media Department. Scarlet’s Polish ancestry inspires her scholastic interest in Slavic languages, literature, fine art, and cinema. She studied abroad in Prague twice, once in her junior year at Charles University and the Film and TV School of the Academy of Performing Arts (FAMU), and again in summer 2016 for an intensive Czech language course through the University of Pittsburgh’s Slavic, East European, and Near Eastern Summer Language Institute. Scarlet watches *The Simpsons* in Czech to keep her language skills sharp. In addition to the essay on Dziga Vertov’s *A Sixth Part of the World* that appears in this issue of *Troika*, Scarlet has written about the works of Mikhail Bakhtin, Petr Brandl, David Černý, Fyodor Dostoevsky, Sergei Eisenstein, Miloš Forman, Vladimir Karfík, František Kupka, Vladimir Nabokov, and Leo Tolstoy. She studies the depiction of fine art in cinema, philosophical issues of the copy, Marxist/critical theory, and genre and gender in media. She begins a master’s program in Cinema & Media Studies at USC in 2017.

THE “FEMALE IDIOM” IN SOVIET AND NAZI PROPAGANDA, 1930-40

Sierra Barton, UC Berkeley

In spite of their wide ideological differences, both the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany saw themselves as concerned not just with revolutions of governance, but also, and perhaps most importantly, with revolutions of identity. Theirs was a shared, radical mission to “change humanity in part by reshaping the public sphere,” to form a wholly unprecedented type of public citizen – a new social, moral, and physical type to live in the new utopia (“Aesthetics, Propaganda and Culture” 205-15). While Nazi Germany looked to replace the identifying loyalties of Weimar society with a unifying sense of national consciousness and commitment, the Soviet Union envisioned “what Trotsky called ‘a new biologic type’ of human being,” born from Soviet social ideals (“Nazi Propaganda” 217). Both turned to propaganda to convey these respective futures, depicting reality not as it was, but as it was meant to be, often through a particular visual lexicon of ideal female types. German propaganda imagined a society already “successfully reorganized into the Volksgemeinschaft,” while Soviet “typicalization entailed a rendering of images not as they currently existed, but as they would exist at some unspecified time in the future [of socialism-produced essential types]” (“Nazi Propaganda” 219). For women, these propaganda tropes expose the liberating yet restrictive tensions in the symbolic and political spaces the two regimes envisioned female citizens occupying in the promised chiliastic future.

This paper will draw primarily on propaganda from the interwar period, focusing on 1930-1940 for the Soviet Union and 1933-1940 for Nazi Germany, with the later start date reflecting Hitler’s ascension to the Chancellorship. Not only does this time period avoid the complications and exigencies brought on by World War II, but it also reflects a similar state of ideological dictatorship in both states. Although the Nazi state came into being when the Soviet Union was over a decade old, the Soviet propaganda state, defined by its “co-option and harnessing of mass culture, educational institutions, and the press for the purpose of popular indoctrination” did not fully nor effectively come into being until the 1930s (Brandenberger 2-3, 5, 9). Stalin’s ascension to power, and the corresponding dampening of the freedom and experimentation of the 1920s under a single party line, brought Soviet and Nazi sociopolitical absolutism into parallel.

For materials, I mostly confine my study to state-produced or sponsored posters and otherwise static, image-based media. Due to material constraints, however, for the Soviet Union I will be drawing primarily off of posters and published photographs, while for Nazi Germany I will work more extensively with covers of the bi-weekly NSDAP women’s magazine, *Frauen Warte*, supplemented by posters. While this adds the variable of intended audience to my comparison between the two countries, I argue that the clear visual parallels between *Frauen Warte* and the posters indicate a similar propagandist take to solely female and universal audiences – part and parcel with creating a universal image and role for the ideal woman in the minds of men and women alike.

The implications of the images Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union chose for their propaganda have added weight in light of the reality that each regime viewed propaganda as a consciously constructed educational tool. The notion of regime agency in crafting and disseminating its propaganda is key to Brandenberger’s definition of propaganda as “a deliberate and concerted attempt to use political sloganeering, imagery, and iconography in order to advance a systematic message designed to influence and shape popular beliefs, attitudes, and behavior” (Brandenberger 2-3, 5, 9). This “deliberate” conception is clearly present in the Soviet and Nazi processes. In the Soviet Union, Lenin and Stalin both used industrial terms to mechanize and appropriate the propaganda process, envisioning “the press and various mass cultural venues like literature, theater, and film as ‘instruments,’ ‘tools,’ and ‘transmission belts’ that would allow the party to disseminate its vision throughout society as a whole” (Brandenberger 11). Germany took a similarly modernist approach to their propaganda, establishing the bureaucratic Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda within the official government chain and creating an integrated network of propaganda mediums and narratives to holistically “re-educate” the German people (“Nazi Propaganda” 213-214).

For the Soviet Union, one of the most fundamental social transitions of the Stalinist period was the shift towards collectivization, or the relocation of private peasant workers onto collective, communal farms (*kolkhoz*). The peasant woman – or, more specifically, the collective farm woman (*kolkhoznitsa*) – began to play an essential role in not just defining the image of collective farm life, but also in soliciting support



Figure 1: Peasant Woman, Go to the Collective Farm! (1930)



Figure 2: Go, Comrade, to Us in the Collective Farm! (1931)

for movement to the *kolkhoze*. Figures 1 and 2, from 1930 and 1931 respectively, explore the role the *kolkhoznitsa* played as both figurehead and example in urging her peasant peers to move to the collective. Figure 2 emphasizes the effect of life on the *kolkhoz*, with a healthy, robust man and woman looking back, urging their comrades to come join the community, the “us” of the collective farm (“*k nam v kolkhoz*”).” In Bonnell’s interpretation, the woman “is placed in the dominant position in the poster – that is, in front of the man and engaged in action;” additionally, her red kerchief serves to elevate her importance in the image, referencing the visual code where “red was a privileged color in both religious and Bolshevik art. It conferred sacred status on a person or object” (Bonnell 102, 106). While perhaps not explicitly “heroic,” the female peasant worker is nonetheless presented as having a clearly elevated and integrated role in the new lifestyle of the collective farm.

Figure 1, meanwhile, sets the peasant woman as a giant, stolidly brushing past grasping class enemies clustering impotently around her bare feet as she leads the way to the collective farm (“*doroga v kolkhoz*”), arm outstretched in an almost military-esque gesture of purpose. Interestingly, the woman is identified in the caption as a *krest’ianka*, or peasant woman, rather than as a *kolkhoznitsa*, or collective farm woman; she is coded as a transitional figure between the peasant of the past and of the future. The visual cues used in the poster are themselves transitional, mirroring the changing role of the peasant woman in political dialogue; as Bonnell notes of the early 1930s, “[r]ural women not only appeared in novel combinations in political posters, they were also represented in the larger-than-life format previously reserved only for workers and Red Army heroes,” an image that in turn became a “stock figure in visual propaganda of the early 1930s” (Bonnell 103-104). Figure 3 draws on similar cues, framing its giant, wholly red *kolkhoznitsa* as the protector of the *kolkhoz*, rejecting the tiny figures at her feet with the strong invocation that “In our *kolkhoz*, there is no place for priests or *kulaks* [wealthy peasants and Soviet class enemies].” *Kolkhoznitsa* heroism was further and more explicitly outlined through the course of the 1930s, especially after 1933 when she began appearing in close visual linkage with Stalin (Bonnell 120).



Figure 3: *In Our Collective, There is No Place for Priests and Kulaks* (1930)



Figure 4: *Cultivate Vegetables!* (Translation Courtesy of the International Institute of Social History) (ca. 1930)

However, the heroic space created for the female peasant worker carries with it an implication of overall subordination. The overwhelming usage of the kolkhoznitsa created a process where “[p]olitical artists promoted collectivization in the female idiom and, in the process, feminized the image of the peasantry as a social category” (Bonnell 122). This can perhaps most clearly be seen in the 1937 construction of what would become a key symbol of the Soviet Union: the visual union of the female peasant and the male industrial worker, striving together in a combination of rural and urban, industrial and agricultural, and male and female (Bonnell 122). However, what might seem like a symbolic representation of equality belies the reality of the Soviet urban, industrial emphasis; the part played by the female hero on equal terms in propaganda imagery was a part inherently subjugated to the industrial male in ideological reality.

Figure 4 encapsulates this urban / rural tension; the emphasis on the vegetables in the foreground, coded with the giant scale of the hero, versus the diminutive and solely female agricultural laborers in the background weights product above process, delegitimizing what is specifically coded as female labor even as it emphasizes the fruits of that labor. Furthermore, the poster shows that the produce is meant for the city, with trucks and boats speeding towards the industrial, urban space cutting a swath through the upper right of the image – further disassociating the producers from their product. Coupling this urban-centric imagery with Bonnell’s interpretation of kolkhoz propaganda as fundamentally intended for urban rather than rural audiences supports the theme that “[i]n terms of both syntax and lexicon, Stalinist iconography expressed the domination of the cities over the countryside” (Bonnell 112, 122). This framework thus problematizes the presumed equality of the idealized female peasant / male industrial worker by exposing the political and economic subordination of the agricultural countryside to the industrial city.

The dressing of female peasant bodies points to another form of disassociation, as propaganda turned women’s bodies into sites of exhibition, meant to convey the status and success of the regime. This became particularly clear in the mid-1930s, when a new visual emphasis on stylish, accessorized women began to appear “as part of the New Moscow fantasy in which Stalin proclaimed ‘Life is getting better Comrades, Life is getting jollier!’” (“Rodchenko” 8). This trope, originally noticeable in advertising, found parallels in Soviet propaganda; rural prosperity and its material accouterments – including aprons, decorative shawls, and other accessories glaringly out-of-place in their settings of agricultural labor – began to dominate the imagery of the peasant woman (Bonnell 116-119). The inclusion of these details was meant to represent “serenity and joyfulness amid abundance (Bonnell 116)” – and in the process, impersonalized the female body as a blank slate for projecting both the promises and the successes of the regime in providing for its citizens.

Visual aesthetics of the body played an acutely important role in both Nazi and Soviet propaganda, particularly in the context of the urban, athletic body. For the Soviets, the athletic ideal, especially when applied to women, “can be argued to be extensively ideologically charged with reference to pre-existing constructs of the evolution and attributes of the utopian and mythological future New Person” (“Rodchenko” 5). Figure 5 shows one of Aleksandr Rodchenko’s many parade photographs, “Female Pyramid,” which draws on this notion of the New Person: a Soviet citizen both fit and communal, joined and transformed as one for one overarching purpose. Although not state-produced, Rodchenko’s photographs still fall within the scope of state-sponsored propaganda, as they were often used by the state for both domestic and foreign propaganda purposes in the form of coffee table books, albums, exhibitions, and/or catalogues (“Rodchenko” 2). This photograph also represents the tension between implicit versus explicit objectification in Soviet imagery. In contrast to the implicit, structural objectification of the female body discussed earlier, vis-à-vis dressing the female body, “the tenets of Socialist Realism forbade the representation of Soviet women as domestic or sexual objects, and severe censorship was applied to images, writings, or displays perceived by the Party checkers to be titillating or pornographic” (“Rodchenko” 8). Though scantily clad, the women of Rodchenko’s image are not sexualized; the emphasis is less on the individual body and more on the union of bodies.



Figure 5: A. Rodshenko, “Female Pyramid” (Moscow 1939)



Figure 6: A. Rodshenko, “The Victory of Life is the Meaning of the World” (Translation Courtesy of Calvin College) (1939)(Moscow 1939)

In Germany, “the ideal Nazi woman was not frail and helpless, but strong, vigorous, athletic, able to do hard physical work if her labor were needed by the state” (“Mother of the Volk” 375-376). Figure 6, a 1939 cover of the Nazi Party’s bi-weekly women’s magazine *Frauen Warte*, draws on this image, presenting a cluster of young women in active athletic poses. While most of the women are wholly engrossed in exercise, the skintight uniform of the foremost woman coupled with her relaxed, open, and almost pin-up-esque pose points to the role of the body on display. The expectation of female viewership does not diminish how the cover simultaneously empowers and disempowers the athletic female body, offering women readers an ideal of both glorification and objectification. In keeping with Nazi propaganda goals, however, the athletic body was often paired with the motherly figure. Rupp, for instance, references how “numerous collections of photographs of women, which often served as propaganda for the Labor Service, show women working in the fields, doing calisthenics, and practicing trades, as well as caring for children, cooking, and working at other more typical ‘womanly’ tasks” (“Mother of the Volk” 376). Similarly, the lead article of the *Frauen Warte* issue in figure 6 focused on health education, pairing the physical ideal with the motherly, caring ideal (“The NS Frauen Warte”).

Figure 7: Mothers, Fight for Your Children! (Translation Courtesy of Der Bundesarchiv) (1933)



Figure 8: Healthy Parents, Healthy Children (Translation Courtesy of Der Bundesarchiv) (1933)



Figure 9: The NSDAP secures the Volksgemeinschaft (Translation Courtesy of Der Bundesarchiv) (ca. 1933/39)



For Germany, in contrast to the Soviet Union, motherhood served as the main visual and practical ideal of womanhood. Figures 7-11 all speak to the importance of the mother, especially the mother of many children. The continuity of the mother image across all 5 figures from 1933 to 1938 speaks to the stability of the mother in Nazi ideology, as well as structurally reflects the content-based theme of the cyclic continuity of multi-generational motherhood (“Everyday Heroines” 25). In their role as mothers, women came to embody “the ideal female whose bravery, selflessness, unquestioning devotion, and sacrifice mirrored the role individuals would be expected to play in the Volksgemeinschaft” (“Everyday Heroines” 21). Of the figures above, figure 7 (“Mothers, Fight for Your Children”) most explicitly invokes the mother as protector, though the *Frauen Warte* cover of figure 9 visually parallels the sacrifices and contributions of the farmer, the soldier / warrior, and the mother.



Figure 10: Frauen Warte, Issue 20, vol. 6 (1937/38)



Figure 11: Happy Families are the Best Foundation of Our People (Translation Courtesy of the German Propaganda Archive) (1938)

In utilizing both the warrior and the infant, figure 9 further reflects a common Nazi trope of “childbirth as an analogue to battle,” situating women’s fundamental contribution to the state as childbearing (“Mother of the Volk” 363). All reference the mother as caretaker, and all feature the mother surrounded and defined by her family, notably including her husband in all except figure 7.

The presence of the husband in figures 8-11 reflects the Nazi reality that the perfect mother of propaganda was in large part also defined by the perfect, genetically suitable partner. In the Nazi idiom, the mother became responsible not just for raising her children, but also for the “purity” of those children; as Rupp notes, “[w]omen, were, in fact, made responsible for the preservation of the purity of the ‘Aryan’ race” (“Mother of the Volk” 371). Figures 8 and 11 – “Healthy Parents, Healthy Children” and “Happy Families are the Best Foundation of Our People,” respectively – most directly reference the genetic implications of the family and the role of that family vis-à-vis the national community. This genetic function, however, also highlights the tenuous place of the mother in an unforgiving context, where one misstep could lead to brutal consequences: “The Nazi vision of motherhood was distinctive in its definition of acceptable procreation, and the regime aggressively pursued the elimination of ‘undesirables’ through forced sterilization and eventually mass murders” (“Everyday Heroines” 22). While women were given great authority in the propaganda image of the mother, this authority was predicated on the creation and exclusion of an “other” – an other that could come to include the women themselves.

As the interplay between the construction of the appropriate mother in both Nazi propaganda and Nazi reality shows, the visual tropes used to define categories, especially gendered one, have ramifications beyond the images. This holds true in the Soviet case, as well, where imagined versions of peasant and urban women stood as stand-ins for the ideals of the state, and the association of women with rural labor in an urban-dominated society reflected unspoken gender-based tensions. Image carries weight beyond the page, constructing and defining the world that sees it through the world it imagines. Petrone describes the adoption of ritual, even without belief, as creating a “mutually constitutive system, [where] adhering to form lent power to content that citizens may or may not have endorsed” (“Aesthetics, Propaganda and Culture” 214) – when applied to propaganda, the form can become axiomatic of society, creating a societal assumption of where and how people are meant to interact with the ideal.

Sierra Barton is a senior history major at Cal concentrating in Soviet gender history. Although she has served as an Associate Editor for Cal’s undergraduate history journal *Clio’s Scroll* for three years, this is her first submission to *Troika*. Sierra started college committed to Japanese language and history before a professor introduced her to late-Imperial Russian women’s memoirs, and she was hooked. Her undergraduate thesis focuses on constructions of Soviet identity through gendered space in the magazine *Soviet Woman* from 1980-1991. Post-graduation, Sierra will be teaching history to middle or high school students in the Richmond area as a Teach for America corps member.

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