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troikaberkeley@gmail.com

TROIKA

BEFORE WE BEGIN

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NOW, A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT,

Dear reader,

For this edition, we at Troika distinguished ourselves by picking a theme that directly addresses the embittered temperament that, over the past year, has crept into our lives. By “celebrating disillusionment,” we challenge this temperament.

This year, Berkeley students have grown especially weary, faced with constant protests and security measures surrounding both controversial speakers and unpopular election results, as well as the continual struggle against an unresponsive bureaucracy. Additionally, millennials across the country have continued to experience decreasing job prospects, increasing debt, and a political system that is distant from everyday realities.

Instead of subduing these feelings and frustrations, we channel them into fresh and innovative work. We hope that by celebrating instead of hiding, at least in print, we can encourage others to step away from complacency.

Thank you for picking up this edition of Troika. We hope that in each of the pages, you can feel the weight of our dynamic group of disillusioned historians, artists, and students.

Kasia Metkowski + the Troika Team
Spring 2018

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MANIFESTO FOR THE READER

This is for the disillusioned historians and artists, researchers and citizens, who feel impatient with the world.

We bring forth the untold stories of a misunderstood world -- Eastern Europe, Russia, Central Asia, the Caucasus -- and nail them to the forehead of the world.

Come with us. Ques-

tion your reality. Find what you seek in the work of your peers.

TROIKA stands against comfort, platitude, simplicity, obedience, yes-men. We promote your right and duty to speak, to voice ideas, to argue your perspective. Come with us. Be TROIKA.

If you are against the tenants we propose: thank you and shut up.

ХУДОЖЕСТВЕННЫЙ АНАЛИЗ

pronounced
who-doe-zhest-veh-knee ah-nah-lee's
Translation:
ARTISTIC ANALYSIS

REVOLUTION

AND EDUCATION



IN

MAYAKOVSKY'S

MYSTERY

BOUFFE

V LADIMIR Mayakovsky's contributions to the political strategy of agitprop – that is, the use of agitation and propaganda to shape and incite public opinion – during the Russian Revolution were far from slight. Rather, his artistic offerings infused with his devotion to the revolution took the form of illustrated posters, slogans, films, and plays. Agit-plays were often ephemeral and according to Lynn Mally, “were designed to educate audiences about important policies or events and perhaps even to inspire action” (Mally 2003). Mayakovsky's inaugural Socialist play *Mystery-Bouffe* was written and produced in 1918 and later expanded upon in 1921. *Mystery-Bouffe* breaks with the fleeting nature of agit-plays but is in accordance with the same means to an end as agitprop. While *Mystery-Bouffe* can be considered a farce, Mayakovsky carefully constructs his work using the didactic intent of the medieval mystery play, the absurd qualities of the opéra bouffe, and his experience with creating agitprop in order to push forward the goals of communism by illustrating the proletariat's rise to power.

In the 1921 version of the play, Mayakovsky indicates that “In the future, all persons performing, presenting, reading, or publishing *Mystery-Bouffe* should change the content, making it contemporary, immediate, up-to-the-minute” (*The Complete Plays* 1968). This declaration gives the play plurali-

ty and underscores his passion for and propagation of world revolution as it is essentially an agit-template in which one can exercise their struggle. Mayakovsky's final arrangement of *Mystery-Bouffe* consists of six acts in which a flood inundates the world. The survivors include seven pairs of The Unclean and seven pairs of The Clean. That is to say, fourteen proletarians and fourteen bourgeois. Alongside these twenty-eight characters are a Compromiser who represents a Menshevik, an Intellectual, and an opportunistic Lady. They all convene at the North Pole where The Unclean build an ark that is quickly seized by The Clean and the three auxiliary characters. The ark functions fleetingly first as an autocracy, then as a democratic republic, when finally The Unclean overthrow The Clean – quite literally over the edge of the ark and into the water. They venture over the earth in their ark in search of the Ararat mountains where they encounter an entity walking on water: the Man of the Future. He tells them of the Promised Land where “labor is sweet” and electricity is abundant (*The Complete Plays* 1968).

To get there The Unclean pass through Hell, Paradise, and the Land of Chaos before ultimately reaching the Man of the Future's kingdom “which is earthly, not heavenly” (*The Complete Plays* 1968). The Promised Land is abundant with everything The Unclean need: food, tools, shelter, electricity, and most importantly no bourgeoisie to hinder them. The play ends with a victory chorale sung by The Unclean in which they emphatically declare: “We who were naught, today are all” (*The Complete Plays* 1968).

Although a devout atheist himself, Mayakovsky utilizes the flood myth of Noah as well as the parable of Christ walking on water to construct his play. His use of biblical narratives within a theatrical work finds its origins in the mystery play – a type of drama practiced in Europe during the Middle Ages which was put on by members of the church in consecrated arenas, usually in Latin. By the 13th century the strict religiosity of the mystery play began to wane as acting guilds began to perform outside of the church, in the vernacular,

*“In the future, all persons performing, presenting, reading, or publishing *Mystery-Bouffe* should change the content, making it contemporary, immediate, up-to-the-minute”*

and increasingly added apocryphal ingredients. Satirical elements were introduced – going as far as mocking monks and priests – which ultimately led to the demise of the mystery as the church no longer supported the dubiousness of the new interpretations. Moreover, the mystery play was not concerned with linearity in terms of time, space, and action. Rather, multiple locations or climates could be represented at once in juxtaposition to each other (“Mystery Play”).

Mayakovsky utilizes these elements of mystery to their fullest extent. First by employing both Old and New Testament narratives while concurrently turning them on their heads. Although *Mystery-Bouffe* has a religious framework, the play’s secularity is seen in the Christ figure, played by Mayakovsky himself, as a “manifestation of the collective proletarian spirit” (Purkey 2011). A line in the epilogue, spoken by Mayakovsky, also illustrates his satiric and atheist disposition: “It was I who stuck my finger into the sky: I proved that He’s a thief!” (*The Complete Plays* 1968). Rather than using the Old Testament’s device of divine intervention instructing the characters to build an ark before the

earth starts to flood, or “leak”, Mayakovsky subverts the narrative and has the characters construct the ark in response to the event. The flood itself is apocryphal as it is continuously described as both wet and dry. When the German appears in Act I he speaks oxymoronic of a waterless flood that soaked him to the skin. He reports: “I looked around me: everything was dry, yet it poured, and poured, and poured” (*The Complete Plays* 1968). Both The Clean and The Unclean speak disjunctively of their respective countries being inundated but also of no rainfall whatsoever. Speaking to the confounding phenomenon that is a waterless flood, the Intellectual chimes in with what is the key to Mayakovsky’s flood narrative as a symbol of world revolution:

At first everything was simple, with day following night—except the sunset red was much too bright. But then laws, ideas, beliefs, the granite heaps of the capital cities, and even the steady red glow of the sun itself— all things become more fluid, as it were:

somewhat more diluted, a little bit slipperier. Then, what a downpour! The streets were brimful; melted buildings collapsed on other buildings. The whole earth, smelted in the open hearth of revolution, poured down like one big waterfall. (*The Complete Plays* 1968)

Here Mayakovsky uses the dramatic and wide-reaching nature of the flood in order to illustrate revolution as a process. He demonstrates laws and ideologies dictating the ebb and flow of the everyday while the red – that is to say, Communist-red – glow of the sun steadily nurtures a change in tide. The fluidity is a gradual process; first becoming diluted, then a bit slippery, until finally a full on fiery flood takes control. Mayakovsky also exemplifies revolution as a process in the rising action of The Unclean on their journey to the Promised Land. In order to survive and make their way to the Man of the Future with his knowledge of the Promised land they must first seize the ark and defeat The Clean. Subsequently, they have to pass through three separate realms in order to reach their destination where the socialist dream is achieved.

In line with the medieval mystery, Mayakovsky does not heed to reliable narratives – as demonstrated in the use of the flood myth – or alternatively, in sensical representations of geographic space. To transition The Unclean into alternate realms Mayakovsky employs a katabasis – a descent into the

underworld, to Hell. Although The Unclean go to Hell in Act III, their journey is inverted. Instead of down, they go up through the clouds. Still further they ascend through the clouds into Paradise, and further up into the Land of Chaos until they meet their ultimate ascension into the Promised Land. Being that the Promised Land is “earthly, not heavenly” it is as if The Unclean instead make a cyclical journey that places them back on earth, albeit a revolutionized one. Mayakovsky not only utilizes the concept of the play genre but also the visual methods it employed. The staging of mystery plays included a bisection of space and use of mechanical elements such as a trap door or zip-line. Historically, the English pageant wagon and the Russian *vertep* – a two-level puppet booth – both functioned as roving multilevel stages used for the production of mystery plays (Von Geldern 1993). In *Mystery-Bouffe*, dual-level stages connected by a trapdoor were constructed to transition the characters through these realms. One set functioned as the ark itself which revealed a clear class divide when The Clean initially took control and banished The Unclean to ship’s hold. A second two-tiered set operated as the division between Heaven and Hell (Von Geldern 1993).

Moreover, the divide between stage and spectator – between performance and reality – was disregarded as audience members were invited to join the actors onstage during the fina-

le of *Mystery-Bouffe*. According to Sharon Aronson-Lehavi, mystery plays which end in a utopian vision of the world make use of “...a communal sharing and merging between stage and audience [which] signifies belief in the performativity of this [type of] future” (Aronson-Lehavi 2009). As the barrier is broken the theater itself becomes utopian as “...it creates a space that is ‘no place’” (Aronson-Lehavi 2009). Mayakovsky’s inclusion of the audience in his socialist utopian vision signifies a propagation of his ideologies onto the audience. The performers and spectators imagine the future collectively thus “...turning the performance into a rehearsal of a ‘real’ future” (Aronson-Lehavi 2009).

Additionally, and implicit in the title, *Mystery-Bouffe* is also utilizing the genre of *opéra bouffe* – a type of 19th century French operetta characteristic of comedy, satire, and farce. Mayakovsky’s comedic and satirical elements are found in his absurdities and hyperbole. In Act III when The Unclean are in Hell, the Blacksmith turns to the lead devil Beelzebub who is attempting to intimidate The Unclean and says:

In Moscow they’d pay you for all that firewood. There, people get sick from the freezing weather. But the temperature’s fine here in Hell. It’s a seventh heaven: you all go around au naturel. (*The Complete Plays* 1968)

The Farmhand also goes on to

tell the devils of their “earthly torments,” specifically the atrocities of World War One, slavery in British colonies, and factory related injuries. A voice from among the devils responds:

No more! It makes my fur stand on end! These stories leave me numb! (*The Complete Plays* 1968)

Here Mayakovsky satirizes the conditions of Russia as being worse than Hell while simultaneously empowering The Unclean through the experiences they have endured. Hell is no match for what they have seen or encountered on earth and march forward toward the Promised Land. Furthermore, *opéra bouffe* also relies on characters from everyday life. The Unclean are essentially silhouettes of a stock character type Mayakovsky’s audience would have recognized or identified with. Unlike the Clean they have no cultural designation which further purports the notion of world revolution. The audience’s identification with The Unclean is integral to the agitprop quality of *Mystery-Bouffe*. The Unclean consistently band together during their journey and often speak simultaneously in a manner that is sloganesque. That is to say, similarly to the slogans on agitprop posters made by Mayakovsky and others for the Russian Telegraph Agency, or ROSTA. These posters, known as Window ROSTA, were originally displayed in empty shop windows but as their popularity increased they were found in railway stations, clubs, and

**“It was I who stuck his finger into the sky:
I proved that He’s a thief!”**



Figure 1: Those are the weapons our factories used to produce, library.brown.edu



Figure 2: Now we have a new kind of weapon to use, library.brown.edu

various public venues (Deák 1973). Russian audience members would have been familiar with the calls to action found on Window ROSTA and recognized this attribute in the collective expressions of The Unclean. Figures 1 through 6 depict a series of Window ROSTA made by Mayakovsky and Mikhail Cheremnykh in 1921, the same year that the second version of *Mystery-Bouffe* was produced. In this series titled “All for Farming Equipment Repair Week!” Mayakovsky and Cheremnykh alert workers to a new opportunity for employment: repairing farming equipment in preparation for the cultivation of spring crops. They rouse workers with a “new kind of weapon” – the symbol of hammer and sickle – which represents a socialist worker-peasant alliance. Similar to the character types within *Mystery-Bouffe* the figures rendered in the posters are generalized and non-individualistic. This Window ROSTA series was likely in response to the inauguration of the New Economic Policy (NEP) that the 10th Party Congress introduced the same month these posters were pro-

duced. One facet of the NEP was that it returned agriculture to private ownership in order to help stabilize the economy (“New Economic Policy”). Figures 5 and 6 state: “Worker, a new front has opened...Quickly, a new front has opened...Quickly, go fix the farming equipment!” Similar calls to action for work that rewards the proletarian are present in *Mystery-Bouffe*. In Act II, after The Unclean meet the Man of the Future who provokes them to find the Promised Land, voices from The Unclean say in unison:



Figure 3: For Spring's arrival we must prepare, library.brown.edu

So that we can get there faster, raise your hammers high! Lift up your axes! Dress ranks! The ark is cracking! Salvation lies in discipline! (The Complete Plays 1968)

A thread of agitprop-like slogans are riddled throughout The Unclean's script. In Act V – which was not included in the first iteration of *Mystery-Bouffe* – an anthropomorphized Steamship and Locomotive are dying which rouses The Unclean to intervene. In chorus they declare:

Lift your mattock, light as down! Swing your pick with all your might! Drive your drill into the ground! Be a Stakhanovite! (The Complete Plays 1968)




Figure 4: Get the plow and harrow in full repair, library.brown.edu

This verse could easily be rendered into a series of illustrations for Window ROSTA with each line dictating an image of a productive worker, or Stakhanovite, handling their tool similarly to the design in figure 6. In 1928, speaking to

his agitprop work, Mayakovsky wrote: “Window ROSTA was a fantastic thing...It meant men of the Red Army looking at posters before a battle and going to fight not with a prayer but a slogan on their lips” (Deák 1973). Although *Mystery-Bouffe* is steeped in a religious myth The Unclean react likewise to the Red Army soldiers, always with slogans and never with prayers.

Mayakovsky imbues *Mystery-Bouffe* with the edifying notion that through collective work and discipline the proletarian will succeed. His methods agitate the spectator to be on the side of The Unclean and his goal is realized at the end of the play when the actors and audience create their ‘no place’. The use of historically didactic theater techniques coupled with his political mindset make *Mystery-Bouffe* an enduring piece of agitprop ready to be adapted to present or future class struggle. The subversion of religious allegory coupled with agitprop tactics become a forum for Mayakovsky's political ideologies and served to instruct his audience and possibly even inspire them.

itprop ready to be adapted to present or future class struggle. The subversion of religious allegory coupled with agitprop tactics become a forum for Mayakovsky's political ideologies and served to instruct his audience and possibly even inspire them.



Figure 5: Worker! A new front has opened! library.brown.edu



Figure 6: Hurry! Go fix the farming equipment! library.brown.edu

Written by Melissa Foote

BEYOND

THE

BLACK SQUARE

KAZIMIR Malevich was not always a Suprematist. Once a young Cubist and eventually a prisoner of the state, Malevich lived a sporadic, fluid life rife with ideological transformation. He is most well-known for his *Black Square*, a repudiation of virtually all elements of design. His Suprematist manifesto made him one of the most prominent figures in Russia's early-twentieth century avant-garde movement. Though bookmarked by periods of radically different ideological persuasions, Malevich's Suprematism – specifically, the *Black Square* – is undoubtedly his claim to fame. However, a complicated narrative about Kazimir Malevich ventures beyond the Square. Malevich carved out his own avant-garde movement, separating himself from peers and endangering his reputation. Beyond the Square lies a complex narrative of ideological oscillation and theoretical genius that, though less popular than the Square, is just as enticing.

To fully comprehend Suprematism and its dense theoretical justifications, one must first understand Malevich's movement toward Suprematism. In this paper, I will ask: how did Malevich conceptualize Suprematism? I will decipher Malevich's philosophy of art as it intersects with German Idealism and as it developed throughout his lifetime. Using biographical information, theoretical texts, and artwork, I will explain how Malevich made the leap from Futurism to Suprematism

MALEVICH'S IDEOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

and how he fits into the Russian and European narratives of art, history, and philosophy.

Between 1910 and 1914, a group of Moscow poets and artists – first associated with the Jack of Diamonds exhibit society – embraced Fauvism; in Russia, Fauvism developed into a quasi-Cubist movement (“Fauvism”). Spearheaded by Mayakovsky, Aleksei Kruchenykh, and Velimir Khlebnikov, the movement known as Cubo-Futurism entered the Russian artistic consciousness, bringing with it *zaum*.

The concept of *заумь* (*zaum*) is the most useful in understanding Malevich's early work. *Zaum* translates to “beyond reason” or “beyond sense,” combining the Russian prefix “за” and noun “ум” (Lawton et al. 183). Slavic scholar Gerald Janecek describes *zaum* as “experimental poetic language characterized by indeterminacy in meaning” (1). *Zaum* is a pedagogical leap forward; it is a philosophy of refining meaning that resonated across revolutionary art forms. In poetry, the *zaum* language displayed the poet's “advanced consciousness” in a series of seemingly

incomprehensible sound-words and neologisms. Most notable is the application of *zaum* in Aleksei Kruchenykh's 1912 poem “Дыр бул щыл,” in which *zaum* is a “universal poetic language,” yet simultaneously incomprehensible (Lawton et al. 183). Unlike Esperanto, which is artificially constructed, *zaum* allows for the expression of “primal emotions” without the “intermediary of rational thought” (Douglas et al. 8).

In the case of Kruchenykh, old languages are fossils of antiquity; they are too constrictive and overused, hence Kruchenykh's harsh critique of Imperial Russian literature. *Zaum* is a language constructed to avert “definite meaning,” allowing for fuller expression. (Janecek 78). Kruchenykh's vision of a naturally occurring, materialistic language reveals the essence of his philosophy: that the past – old language – can be revived and reformed to construct a futuristic and universal way of understanding and expressing emotion.

Malevich socialized with the Cubo-Futurists in 1913, adopting *zaum* as an artistic concept. He

labeled his Cubist works *Morning in the Village after the Snowstorm* (1913) and *Portrait of Ivan Kliun* (1913) “Zaum realism” (Douglas et al. 9). This marked a step forward for Malevich. Between 1913 and 1915, he experimented with different styles of Cubo-Futurism informed by the revolutionary concept of zaum. Malevich’s vision of zaum as an artistic concept, rather than a literary one, would inform his later conversion to Suprematism—an art style that preserves the universality and materiality of zaum.



Figure 1.1 “Kazimir Malevich: *Morning in the Village after Snowstorm*.” Guggenheim Collection Online.

In the summer of 1913, Malevich, joined by Aleksei Kruchenykh and Mikhail Matyushin, began working on the Cubo-Futurist opera, *Victory Over the Sun*. It was this production that allowed Malevich to conceive zaum as a visual performance. He designed “anti-realist” costumes and sets that brought to life the Cubo-Futurist figures seen in *Morning in the Village after the Snowstorm* (“Victory

Over the Sun: Early Twentieth Century Russian Drama”). Both the costumes and sets are created to be spatially ambiguous, designed for a “disorienting and illogical spectacle” (Douglas et al. 10). Yet, this incomprehensibility produces a unified understanding. Malevich’s sketches for *Victory Over the Sun* are living precursors to his *Black Square*. By this point in Malevich’s career, his emphasis on materiality, geometry, and space are solidified.

By the time that Malevich unveiled *Black Square* at “The Last Futurist Exhibition: 0.10,” he had been toying with Suprematist style for at least a year. His modern, geometric approach to the canvas furthered the elevated consciousness of Cubo-Futurism into the materialistic form of painting. An “evolutionary state of mind” led Malevich to believe that Suprematism was the logical offspring of Futurism (Douglas et al. 10). So, Malevich denounced his Futurist comrades in pursuit of Suprematism (Galenson 237). He urged fellow artists to transition to Suprematism, using the rhetoric of evolution to convince his comrades that Suprematism was an improved and enlightened art form.

Ultimately, Malevich wholly rejects Futurism as yet another obstacle to the forward pro-

gression of ‘true’ art. To him, Futurism is merely a means to a Suprematist end. Futurism began the process of undermining the past, but only Suprematism could wholly reject the past by rejecting living form (Malevich 124). Futurism was a necessary but temporary stage along the path toward Suprematism, analogous to late stages of capitalism that littered the road toward socialism.

In his Suprematist manifesto “From Cubism and Futurism to Suprematism,” Malevich argues that with the development of revolutionary politics and aesthetics comes a refinement of artistic perspective. Malevich accepted art history as a malleable past, critiquing the Western artistic tradition as obsessed with naturalism. His dislike of Western art juxtaposes sharply to his proposed Suprematism: the “art of an ultimate state of being beyond objects” (Douglas et al. 13).

But what separates Suprematism from Futurism? Similarities exist between Futurist manifestoes and Malevich’s own – both disown the past as a means of offering a future. Echoing Mayakovsky’s words, Malevich encourages his reader to emerge from the “catacombs [of history] into the speed of contemporaneity.” (Mayakovsky 1; Malevich 124). Malevich defames the Academy as a “moldy vault” in which art is rotting, not a far cry from Mayakovsky’s “filthy slime” of antiquity (Mayakovsky 1). The past inhibits forward progression of art and aesthetics. Sim-



Figure 1.2 “*Victory Over the Sun: Early Twentieth Century Russian Drama*.” Northwestern University.

ply put, both Futurism and Suprematism condemn the past in order to promote their respective ideologies. Though Malevich accepted Futurist ideology just two years earlier, his work on *Victory Over the Sun* and the *Black Square* ushered in a new, Suprematist style that he would spend much of his career defining and justifying.

Once Malevich rejects Futurism, he delves into the true meaning of Suprematism, which revolves around the abandonment of living form; artists “should abandon subject and objects if they wish to be pure painters” (Malevich 130). He claims that objects have vanished “like smoke” among Cubist and Futurist painters; this movement is indicative of forward progression toward Suprematism (Malevich 132). Cubist art is made to provoke, seeking dissonance as a metric of success (Malevich 132). In Picasso’s *Les Femmes d’Alger*, considered to be

“the first Cubist painting,” one sees the abandonment of realism in the geometric patterns and impossible figuration of the human figures (Chave 597). Picasso’s Cubism was a “momentous act of destruction, but also one of creation,” inasmuch as it paved the way toward a more abstract art practice (Chave 597). To Malevich, however, Cubism is still rooted in naturalism; however radically Picasso paints women, he still imitates human form. Therefore, because it depicts human bodies, Cubism was merely a precursor to Suprematism.

In order to reach Suprematism, however, the artist must completely abandon living form. Instead of killing human subjects – as he accuses naturalist artists of doing – Malevich brings ‘dead’ objects to life; he claims that the “[black] square is a living, regal infant” (Malevich 133). The Square perfectly encapsulates Malevich’s creative process. The talented artist does not paint a human – he paints a square. Malevich calls this practice “absolute creation,” through which artists abandon visible subjects to create “new, nonobjective, pure” art (Malevich 131). The Black Square does not pose for a painting; rather, the square is conceived in the artist’s mind and birthed on canvas. To Malevich, this is the highest form of creation. Suprematism is the apex of artistic perfection in which man “[leaves] the level of single reason and reached one of double reason” (Malevich 133). The artist transcends the physical world to instead

paint that which cannot be seen – he is enlightened by the limitations of living form. Imitation is not beauty; imitation is merely repetition. To Malevich, there is no honor in painting human subjects, because animate subjects must be killed in order to be painted. A square cannot be killed: it can only be brought to life. Suprematism is the antithesis of naturalism; instead of trying to immortalize the human form, Suprematism glorifies the artist, whose ethereal ideas are conveyed on canvas and are thus immortalized.

According to Malevich, “in art it is not always a case of evolution, but sometimes also of revolution” (Malevich 130). The basis of Suprematism – that artists can breathe life into lifeless form – is revolutionary and almost religious in nature. The artist is the ultimate creator; he has power to resurrect inanimate form. By painting a black square, Malevich enlightens its viewers



Figure 1.3 “*Victory Over the Sun: Early Twentieth Century Russian Drama*.” Northwestern University.

to the objectiveness of objects; it is not the way in which the square is painted that makes it beautiful, but the square itself.

The progression from naturalism to Futurism informs the triumph of Malevich's Suprematism. One must wholly repudiate the past in order to dedicate oneself to the future. To Malevich, the forward progression of history produces Suprematism, in which the artist is the absolute creator. The destruction of the past results in a "mass of material. . . from which a new form will be built" (Malevich 133). In his Suprematist manifesto, Malevich makes clear his repudiation for Futurism; it is a part of the past that must be destroyed for the sake of evolution.

Concurrent with the birth of the Soviet Union, Malevich ingests principles of communality, accessibility, and destruction of individuality that were proposed by Marx. Since perceptions are individualistic, no human can see the ultimate reality, or truth, when placed in front of a work of art. We are, essentially, tainted by our own humanity. This claim is the crux of his ideological Suprematism; there exists an ultimate truth that is inaccessible to human senses.

It is important, however, to remember that Malevich did not view his art as political. Suprematist art is, by definition, separate from the humanism. Art exists for its own sake, and its form is not dictated by existing forms. Individual-

ist or humanist perspectives tear at the seams of Malevich's 'perfect' art. Normative distinctions become harmful, as Malevich believed that "the world is the world, not spirit or matter" (Douglas et al. 14).

Between 1920 and 1927, Malevich became enamored with the theoretical and philosophical implications of art and design. It was during this period of time that his concept of art was refined, and he began teaching at the Institute for Artistic Culture in Petrograd (Douglas et al. 14). But how did Malevich explain his Suprematism? His theoretical writings reveal a familiarity with philosophy, and he offers a unique metaphor through which the reader can view his art.

Malevich's Suprematism is best understood through the kaleidoscope metaphor; that is, the idea that the infinite possibility of forms available to the art-



Figure 1.4 "Victory Over the Sun: Early Twentieth Century Russian Drama." Northwestern University.

ist is comparable to the infinite possibility of forms seen with each turn of a kaleidoscope. Suprematism is the "mirror that reflects the higher world, rather than the changing objects in the human kaleidoscope" (Douglas et al. 14). This theory, introduced in *The World as Objectlessness*, advanced a radically anti-materialistic and non-representational way of seeing art. Malevich combines his earlier critiques of human perception with his justification for painting non-representational, geometric figures. The emphasis is placed on the artist, whose job it is to convey the 'truth' by painting raw forms, such as a deceptively simple black square.

Malevich's kaleidoscope is an artistic-philosophical metaphor that explains his disposition toward human perception. Art is subjective, as are our individual perspectives of the world. Since humans rely on our senses to perceive the world, our perceptions cannot possibly be accurate; human senses are subject to emotion, irrationality, and flaw. Malevich uses the kaleidoscope metaphor to show how flawed individual perspectives can be. Albeit beautiful, kaleidoscope lenses do not offer an objective view of the surrounding world. To see into Malevich's 'objectless reality' would require destroying the kaleidoscope, or "smashing your own brain" (Douglas et al. 14). There is not a way that the human brain can conceive a world without objects – a world without space, color, or form. Only in a state of unconscious-

ness can the brain perceive a nonsensical, objectless world. The irony in this philosophical makeup is the need to be unconscious to achieve consciousness.

Malevich did not invent the separation between object and reality. His theory can be traced back to the metaphysical applications of Neoplatonism and Immanuel Kant. Malevich's Suprematist manifesto was "modeled on, and in some ways respond[s] to" Arthur Schopenhauer's aesthetic perception of existence laid out in *The World as Will and Representation*. Known as the "artist's philosopher," Schopenhauer views the world as representative (Wicks). Schopenhauer expanded on the Kantian conception of appearance versus *ding an sich*. *Ding an sich* is a Kantian concept that separates objects from observation – that is, objects as they 'truly' are, independent from observation. This concept underlies Malevich's *Against the Consensus among German Idealists* that *ding an sich* was the weakest premise of Kant's theory. Schopenhauer promulgated this theory in his own theory of metaphysical voluntarism: "the world as 'Will' is the world as it is in itself. . . and the world as representation is the world of appearances" (Wicks).

Here is where Malevich and Schopenhauer collide. To these theorists, the greatest fallacy a person can commit is thinking that the world is not a "finite form of reality" (Douglas et al. 13). The material world is but an image of perfection – it is



Figure 1.5 "Victory Over the Sun: Early Twentieth Century Russian Drama." Northwestern University.

not perfection itself. Our perceptions of the world, and of art, differ; there cannot be a universal agreement on what comprises the world, since people experience it differently. Since perceptions are individualistic, Malevich says, people have no access to the ultimate reality. This ultimate reality is an objective, Neoplatonic disposition toward objects: "true nature lies beyond emotion or reason" (Douglas et al. 14). Malevich's purest nature is not a traditional nature, as in a forest or stream, but rather a natural world of "momentary timelessness," in which the perception of reality is undisturbed by the kaleidoscope of the human mind (Douglas et al. 14).

Malevich's *The World as Objectlessness* most clearly defines his conception of Suprematism as a manifestation of 'true' reality. This work, his "magnum opus," was one of the last grand epics of Suprematism (Douglas et al. 14). Malevich eventually fell out of

favor with the state; whereas his peers, such as Mayakovsky, achieved great Soviet acclaim, Malevich refused to align his art with Marxism. After Lenin's death in 1924, Malevich wrote about the "quasi-religious cult" that emerged from the preservation of Lenin's body (Douglas et al. 14). During his stint at the Petrograd State Institute, he continually refused to adopt Socialist Realism, the State's *en vogue* artistic philosophy. Along with leaving Russia for Germany and Poland, he virtually abandoned painting in pursuit of "utilitarian Suprematism": practical applications of his philosophy to architecture and design (Douglas et al. 14). Upon his return to Russia, Malevich was arrested in 1930 due to suspicion about his German connections ("Kazimir Malevich"). Only later in his life would he begin painting again, though his latest work would return to representative figures (Douglas et al. 18-21).


The Leningrad Union of Artists conducted a state funeral for Malevich in 1935, during which an open car bearing a black square led mourners down the length of Nevsky Prospect. His grave in Nemchinovka bore a cement cube with an emblem of the *Black Square* (Douglas et al. 21). His main contribution to art history is the enigmatic and encapsulating *Black Square*; it lives on as a remnant of Malevich's revolutionary approach to art, aesthetics, and perception.

There is more to Malevich than the Black Square. His radical shift from Futurism to Suprema

tism made him an avant-garde icon; his theoretical writings harken back to Kant and Schopenhauer. Suprematism, though arguably his greatest feat, is just one piece of the narrative of Kazimir Malevich.

Written by Grace A. Vedock





PEREDVIZHNIKI: ART THROUGH FOLKTALES

INTRODUCTION: PEREDVIZHNIKI

THE Society for Circulating Art Exhibitions (1870-1923) was a democratic association of realist artists that brought together the most talented and progressive personalities in the field of Russian art during the second half of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century. The members of the Society sought to popularize realist art and use it to empower the struggle for the social progress and a better life for all. To achieve this goal, they organized joint exhibitions of their works in St. Petersburg and Moscow, then moved them to many of the country's major cities, such as Kiev, Kharkov, Orel, Kazan, Odessa and others. These displays came to be known as itinerant or circulating exhibitions, and the Society's members as the Peredvizhniki, Itinerants, or the Wanderers (Lebedev 1982). In 1863, a group of fourteen undergraduates headed by Ivan Kramskoi applied to the Council of the Academy to have their common diploma assignment replaced by individual themes more suited to their personal inclinations. In line with tradition, they had all been originally offered a subject from medieval Scandinavian mythology – *The Feast of Valhalla*. When their application was rejected, the young artists resigned from the Academy in a body, thus forfeiting their diplomas, studios and would-be commissions (Lebedev 1982). These fourteen artists were inspired by the

ideals of bringing art to all people - those in cities or those in the countryside. Similarly to their contemporaries, such as the writers Dostoevsky, Tolstoy and Turgenev, and the composers Mussorgsky, Borodin and Rimsky-Korsakov, these artists sought to justify their activity by making their art useful to society. They repudiated the philosophy of art for the art's sake, which was, at the time, the motivation for most artists. Centered in the St. Petersburg Academy, this mindset resulted in productions predominantly derived from the international neo-classicism, tempered by the introduction of German romanticism in the 1820s. The Peredvizhniki defied this tradition, saying that art should be primarily concerned with, and subordinate to, reality (Gray 2000).

The Peredvizhniki interpreted the current idea that art should influence social reform by laying an emphasis on the subject matter of their work. In their art, they embodied the leitmotifs of humanity, freedom, and the Russian Enlightenment. In the eyes of the Itinerants, ethical and aesthetic ideals were inseparable. The noble and the beautiful they saw fused into a single whole. They strove to produce paintings that would make the viewer more virtuous and socially active. These artists transferred to canvas the actuality of Russian life. They painted both town and country, capital cities, and remote provincial corners; all circles of society – peasants, commoners, landowners, clergy; people of every profession – officials,

traders, doctors, lawyers, university students; every condition of life – work, political exile, crime, heroic deeds, and peaceful family relations; all the aspects of everyday life surfaced as the subjects for painting, and genre, which lately had occupied a secondary position, now monopolized public attention. Religious subjects were no longer able to inspire the artists who also seldom succeeded in creating good historical pictures. However, when they could stand on the firm ground of reality, when their art had to be true to life, they often achieved true success (Milikiuv 61).

However, some artists strayed from the dominant path to encompass folk tales, beliefs, and symbols in their artwork. Famous painters such as Ilya Repin and Viktor Vasnetsov, at some point in their art career, deviated from the Peredvizhniki norm of gloomy colors and mundane scenes to create works that reached out to the more traditional aspects of Russia. National heritage embodied in folklore largely contributes to national identity, and these artists chose not to ignore it. However, more than simply recreating real history, they also resorted to Slavic fantastical history, the legends and folktales from long gone times that are still a part of national consciousness. “While fantasy and fairy tales are often not explicit in Russian art, they remain an important presence within it, lying beneath the surface,” and make up an import-

ant part of the wealth Slavic art offers (Wageman 31). Some contemporaries believed that these themes posed a setback to Peredvizhniki's objectives, and discredited their masterpieces and collections. They argued that "a true artist...must live as an active citizen, struggling against social inequality and life's cruelties and injustices" (Wageman 31). However, I believe the contrary. I believe that if this group of artists had left out folktales from their art, they would not have been as true to representing Russia as they aspired. It would have been wrong to lose their individual cultures by leaving out *folklore* from their works, especially when one considers that these artists came from a variety of backgrounds. Furthermore, the expanse of their interest shows that these artists' tal-

ents really had no limits, and that they used their imaginations in diverse ways. I use *Sadko* by Ilya Repin (1876), and *The Bogatyrs* by Victor Vasnetsov (1898) to demonstrate that these portrayals of fairy tales really did have a place in the repertoire of the masterpieces of Peredvizhniki, and how each painting showcases and highlights each artist's talent and mastery of the arts.

ILYA REPIN

BORN in 1844 into the family of a servicemen in Chuguev, Ilya Repin began his artistic journey as a local icon painter. This training led him to appreciate the meticulous detail that went into iconography, which would then transfer into his later work. It also gave him the initial taste of what it felt like to do art for a purpose, as he achieved a sense of fulfillment communicating with believers. Then, from 1864, he trained at the Academy of Arts until 1871, leaving the institution to join the Peredvizhniki in 1874. In this time period, he created one of his most famous artworks, *Barge Haulers on the Volga*, a painting displaying the



The Bogatyrs by Victor Vasnetsov, allart.biz

drudgery and mundaneness typical of the real world. It was one of the first paintings that garnered such wide attention and respect that did not focus on the neoclassical or rich lifestyle, but instead captured life as most of the population saw it (Layton 1956). His contempt for *kazenshchina* came from birth, as Chuguev was home to many Cossacks, who greatly valued their personal liberty. Ukrainians were considered "less supine and more independent-minded than the Russians", which would explain why Repin stood out so much amongst his peers. Ukraine also offered a solid foundation to Repin's background and early upbringing, as the light and vitality left only fond impressions in the artist's memories (Valkenier 1990). However, eventually he wanted to explore more than just Russia and his Ukraine and decided to travel through the rest of Europe from 1873 to 1876. It was then, in Paris, while he was so fascinated by the beauty of the city and inspired by its contrast from all of his previous Russian exposures, that he began painting his piece *Sadko in the Underwater Kingdom*.

SADKO: FAIRYTALE

According to the Russian legend, Sadko is a Novgorod merchant who has a knack with music and playing the Russian instrument, *gusli*. Everyday, he finds employment by playing for various nobles, entertaining them at dinner and providing tunes until suddenly his luck ends, and he can no longer find anyone who wants to hear him sing. Every evening, he ventures out to the sea and sings sad, beautiful songs about life and his current situation. But on the third day of Sadko's melancholy state, the Sea Tsar rose from the water, applauding the young man's talent. In return for his performances, the Tsar promised Sadko that he would win a wager with all the Novgorod nobles and thus acquire an immense of wealth, but only if Sadko returned occasionally to play his *gusli* for the underwater kingdom. The bargain was carried out, and Sadko became a wealthy merchant with a loving wife named Lubava. Then one day, while out at sea, a huge storm hit Sadko's ship. He realised he had forgotten his promise, and jumped overboard with his *gusli* in order to save the crew and the world. After this event, there are two alternate endings to the tale. The first one, which Repin chose to paint, centers around Sadko having to choose a wife from an array of ones chosen by the Tsar. Only if he picks correctly can he return to land. Thankfully, he makes the right decision, claiming the plainest one, and can thus return home to his old life.

In the other version, he plays the *gusli* so magically that he stirs up a storm underwater by making everyone dance. The only way he can save everyone is by breaking his instrument and ending the music. Once it is broken, he returns again to land to be greeted by his wife.

SADKO: ART ANALYSIS

WITH this background, one can see why Ilya Repin chose this tale for a subject. Even though this piece deviates from the usual motifs of the Peredvizhniki, the morals of the story stick true to their aims. Just as the artists wanted to capture the simple life of Russian people in their pictures, here too the idea that humility is the best option is retained. One can see the girl in the top left corner, with her traditional Russian clothing and lack of grandeur, reflecting the simplicity of life many Russian peasants faced on a daily basis. However, the influence of his European travels are also evident in this painting, as Repin unintentionally became beguiled with the beauty of France and Paris. These effects are visible in the extravagant gowns the other brides are wearing. Repin, unlike his contemporary Kramskoi, was known to be very proud of his humble background, bragging that he never hired a valet and constantly reminding people of his barefooted childhood in Ukraine (Valkenier 1990). But just like many artists who ventured for the first time to Europe, he was hit with an extreme case of culture shock. And even though


it wore off relatively quickly, it did reverberate in some of his paintings, another one being *A Negro Woman* (1875).

However, the cultural overload had an unexpected effect as well. To counter how lost he felt in this unknown world, he sought out to paint this piece right away when he arrived, and give life to this familiar Russian *skazka*. But Repin did eventually run into trouble doing justice to this work, as he felt he could not "achieve [his] art spontaneously," and thus, when funding ran low, he had difficulty finding enough inspiration to finish the picture (Valkenier 1990). He also began to feel lost amongst Parisian society, believing that he was losing track of his original goals. However, even without models he managed to retain many aspects of the realism that the Peredvizhniki were known for, ranging from the sea creatures, to the people, to the palette used for the overall mood of the painting. The shells and starfish and dirty seabed all exemplify the attention Repin paid to his work. The lobster especially stands out, as every detail is present, from the gleam of the little sunshine that reaches the depths to the whiskers extending from its head. This use of lighting is reflected all throughout the painting in various other aspects. Though the glowing women can be expected not to be fully realistic as they are fantastical, the rest of the work adheres to real standards. The fish swimming above closer to the surface



Sadko by Ilya Repin, abcgallery.com

are lighter, as they approach the distant sunshine, while all the life on the bottom, including Sadko, are submerged in a musky darkness. Lighting is also used to further strengthen the moral of the story; even though all these brides are bathed in golden light, Sadko is able to look past these facades to find the correct bride at the far end. This is reflective of Repin himself, in that even while



Victor Vasnetsov, wikiart.org

he was surrounded by the wonderful, entrancing world of Europe, his heart stayed true, dedicated to his Slavic home. Just like Sadko realised that the only place he truly desired to be was home, in Novgorod, next to his beautiful wife, even after visiting countless beautiful countries, so did Repin realise that no place could ever be more perfect for him than Russia. Many artists also adopted this Slavophile attitude as a sense of nationalism took Russia by a storm. Interestingly, a young artist who was also impacted by these new ideas posed as the merchant Sadko in Repin's painting. Victor Vasnetsov was greatly inspired by his friend's works and talents, eventually joining him amongst the ranks of some of Russia's greatest artists.

VICTOR VASNETSOV

VASNETSOV was unique amongst the Itinerants, as his skills covered various fields. Not only was he a noted portraitist, but he was also active

in architecture, theater decoration, book illustration, monumental frescoes work and a variety of "art and craft." He pursued in his works a vision of nationalistic sentiment, patriotic pride and a love of Russia's folk culture which made him a favorite artist to many generations. Born in 1848 as the first son of a clergyman, he was largely expected to follow in his father's footsteps but instead chose a very different path. After being an apprentice for a lithograph, he left to study in St. Petersburg Academy where he joined the Peredvizhniki during its early stages. However, he did not share the cynical, often pessimistic view of the world that many of his colleagues shared. Instead, he chose to focus on other aspects of Russia, such as its rich folklore history, infusing his works with a "lyrically harmonized moral tone" (Layton 1956). He loved presenting Russian history to people, showing them all the stories, lessons, and values it had to offer. His upbringing

also impacted his viewpoint. Not only did he believe in painting *bylini* and *skazki*, but he also painted religious subjects as well. He, like many others in his time period, fell under the Slavophile influence that was prevalent at the time, and believed that people should be proud of not only their present lives, but also their heritage. "Like Vrubel, [a contemporary artist], he found fruitful inspi-

ration in the epics telling of the deeds of valour performed by warriors of long ago," and aspired to bring out the values they represented in his art (Rice 1990). He felt particularly strongly about Russian *bylini*, and the tales they told of famous *bogatyrs* and warriors, for the strength and virtues they represented appealed to many. They were the subject of many of his paintings, another famous one being the *Knight at the Crossroads* (1876). Even here one can see the care to detail and attention he paid to the overall atmosphere of the painting. Above all, he prioritised retaining the nobility and timelessness of his characters, so that any viewer at any point in time could see them with the respect he did.

BOGATYRS: BYLINAS

IN Russian folklore, *bylinas* are traditional heroic poems. Three famous characters in these tales were the *bogatyrs*, or warriors, Dobrynya Niki-

tich, Ilya Muromets, and Alyosha Popovich, who were the subject of Vasnetsov's painting *Bogatyrs*. Together and separately they "defended the Russian lands, attempted to unite the country, helped the weak and downtrodden, and fought national enemies and the forces of evil" (Gusyev 2001). One can see how these noble causes line up well with the principles of the Itinerants. While the art group wanted to showcase the struggles of the commonwealth, they also wanted to remind the people of the core values that Russians hold in high regard, thus employing *bylinas* and heroic narration for this cause. Dobrynya Nikitich, seated on his white horse, was known for his kindness and courage. Alyosha Popovich, the warrior on the right, was known for his wit and cunningness. The last *bogatyrs*, Ilya Muromets, is considered the most noble and bravest of all the warriors. With his large, black steed, he has always been an idol to the Russian people. Unlike their Western European counterparts, *bogatyrs* represented the very same common folks they were protecting. Ilya Muromets was a peasant, Dobrynya was born to a poor family in small village and went to serve Kievan Prince Vladimir, and Alyosha was a priest's son. In this sense, *bylinas* preserved the history and passed on tales about life of old Rus'. However, *bylinas* are not a historical documentary, but rather legends that strove to captivate audiences and provide a sense of hope and pride for their country.

BOGATYRS: ANALYSIS

FOR fifteen years following his joining of the Peredvizhniki in 1871, Vasnetsov worked on *Bogatyrs*. He could not rest until he felt what he created was as close to perfection as possible. As he wrote in a letter to his fellow painter Pavel Chistyakov: "*Bogatyrs...* reflected my debt to the creativity of the Russian people, it was my obligation to fulfill". One cannot deny that he did great justice to the legends and everything they stood for. At first glance, a viewer immediately notices the three figures in the middle, but then, stepping back, sees them in the context of the entire painting. The bold green color of the grass draws the eye, yet it also blends into the steppe hills in the background. A native Russian immediately settles into a sense of familiarity when seeing the vast fields encircled by forests, or *leci*. The landscape is painted with bold, broad strokes; however, the rare insertion of tender field flowers in the foreground adds a bit of lyricism to its monumental appeal. Then, with closer inspection, one begins to appreciate the distinctiveness behind each *bogatyrs* and the expressions on their faces, only to recognize how much thought Vasnetsov put into his work. Alyosha looks carefully around him, a sly look on his cunning face; one can just sense the deviousness and potential to mischief he has. His choice of weapon, the bow and arrow, also reflect on his character, as he must rely on a quick hand and on even quick-

er reflexes to use it most effectively. A calmer look adorns his companion's, Dobrynya's, face. He seems protective of whoever he is looking out to defend, his hand ready on his sword's handle and courage emanating from his composed demeanor. Lastly, Ilya, often seen as the leader of the three, scouts the problem in the distance, seemingly calculating what they will have to do. His traditional mace hung over his wrist, his sturdy, stout physique gives an impression of strength and assertiveness. Yet regardless of all these differences, all still hold the intensity and strength of the *bogatyrs*. The three of them combined radiate a sense of power that is impossible to miss; it is not hard to imagine how intimidating it would be to face them in battle. The painting itself, too, is hard to miss, as it spans across a 295,3 x 446 cm canvas. The canvas looms over the audience, the warriors standing taller than any real human ever could. The size alone draws a sense of awe, as one marvels at the size of the heroes. They appear to be on a pedestal, causing the viewer to look upward in order to take in their magnificence. The spectator is at the feet of their gallant steeds, far from meeting them at eye level. Nevertheless, despite this difference in stature, one does not feel like the *bogatyrs* are kings or sovereigns (Paston 30). They are simply legends whose main goal was to protect the land, their people, and their Prince, Vladimir the Great. Even without the great feats of the *bogatyrs*, just a simply re-

minder of Novgorod and Vladimir creates a spark of nationalistic pride within the average Russian, as they remember what some consider the peak of old Russian civilization. Finally, the viewer's gaze reaches the helmets of these characters pointing towards the skies, overcome with a sense of calm as they feel protected by these great warriors.

CONCLUSION

THE purpose of the Peredvizhniki was to draw an eye to the problems of the Russian people during their free time, and to make art feel more inclusive and democratic. This motif included, towards the latter half, instilling a sense of nationalistic pride behind their artwork, a feeling anyone and everyone could appreciate and rejoice in. *The Wanderers* achieved this goal, even in their more fantastical works. All these paintings drew inspiration from Slavic folklore, which, in turn, drew from real life. People of all classes grew up listening to these tales, and now, by illustrating them in their realistic styles, the Russian artists brought to life topics to which all viewers could relate. Even *Sadko*, with its bright colors and overly optimistic palette, unlike *Bogatyr*s, achieves the ultimate goal of bringing reality to focus, as Repin's reality had changed accordingly when he visited Paris. The differences between France and Russia, and their respective impacts on the artists, are visible in the paintings.


Lastly, *The Bogatyr*s acts as a beacon for all future folklore artists to look up to. Vasnetsov's work captures traditional Russian values. These paintings, along with their artists, will go down in history as masterpieces, and make a grand addition to the Peredvizhniki repertoire.

Written by Anya Kulikov

"WE SEE OUR MISSION AS IMMORTALIZING IN METAL THE BRIGHT EVENTS OF HISTORY AND MODERNITY, NOT ONLY IN OUR COUNTRY BUT OF THE WHOLE WORLD."

FROM THE ZINE OF:

KSENIA LESHCHENKO



POPLINS

RUSSIA'S GLASNOST

NEW

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE 1999, 2011, AND 2016

DUMA ELECTIONS

Luke Panciera

INTRODUCTION

ELECTORAL dominance and media supremacy has characterized Putin and United Russia's 16 year tenure in power. The post-Soviet era has experienced momentary flashes of legitimate political competition. The fall of the Soviet Union destroyed the Communist Party's hegemony among traditional mass media platforms, like television and print. This phenomenon facilitated real political competition among multiple parties in the 1999 Duma elections.

In this case, social media played a key role in organizing, legitimizing, and broadcasting dissent. Does Russian internet opposition represent a viable alternative to United Russia's post-Soviet media dominance? Will this recent challenge to Moscow's agenda-setting ability foster legitimate electoral competition? This study answers these questions through a side-by-side comparison of the media climate, media preferences, and vote distribution in the 1999 and 2011 Duma elections. In this way, internet media challenged the Kremlin's agenda-setting ability.

These two elections represent rare moments of real political competition in post-Soviet history. Did media diversity facilitate legitimate electoral competition in 1999 and 2011? What effect, if any, do internet and commercial opposition sources have on the Kremlin's agenda-setting authority? To

answer these questions, the following study first situates the presence (or lack thereof) of post-Soviet media diversity in its historical context. After highlighting the unique relationship of media and citizen in post-Soviet Russia, the paper illustrates the effect of commercial media in the 1999 election through Ruben Enikolopov's voter choice theory. To compare commercial competition with internet opposition, the paper utilizes polling analysis of the internet's unparalleled growth in Russia, primary source language analysis of this phenomenon's impact on 2011 protests, and how this growth compares with the Arab Spring's "Twitter Revolutions." As this paper will demonstrate, the recent growth of internet sources in Russia mobilized dissent and legitimized opposition in the 2011 election, particularly among younger generations.

POST-SOVIET MEDIA OBJECTIVITY AND THE 1999 DUMA ELECTIONS

RATHER than acting as an impartial check on government power, Soviet journalism served as a coercion tool. In many cases, Western journalism is able to pursue truth without suffering the consequences. For example, the American Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ) believes that "public enlightenment is the forerunner of justice and the foundation of democracy [...] ethical journalism strives to ensure the free exchange of information that is accurate, fair,

and thorough" (SPJ 2014). With this conception of the media, journalists prioritize objectivity and the truth above outside interests or personal biases. In this way, journalists "serve as watchdogs over public affairs and government" (SPJ 2014).

In contrast, Soviet media sought to "support the aims and objectives of the Communist Party" (Oates 2006). Throughout the Soviet period, Moscow enforced this journalistic model from above through censorship and the repression of dissent. Scholars of Soviet media, like Thomas Remington, point out that "with terror restricting unguarded private communication and censorship surrounding the media, it became close to impossible for unsponsored opinion to gain public expression" (Remington 1981). Kremlin leaders defined official media as representing the interests of the working class, in order to gain favor with the Soviet populace. As a consequence, journalists often practiced self-censorship in solidarity with working people (Oates 2007). Thus, as a state based on a fundamental and inherent ideology, the Soviet Union survived and thrived on this conception of media as a tool rather than a spotlight.

Although the Soviet Union's demise formally ended this censorship, Russian media struggled to find objectivity and balance in a post-Soviet context. After the fall of communist state ownership, Russian leaders like Boris Yeltsin privatized industrial and financial assets.

Without government funding, independent journalists lacked newsprint, ink, cheap labor, and distribution capabilities. Furthermore, although the 1993 Russian Constitution guaranteed free speech, this document did not create accompanying democratic institutions which could protect and promote freedom of expression (Oates 2007).

In fact, due to conflicting local and national laws regarding funding for TV sources, independent media sources often faced the threat of closure (Oates 2007). In this vacuum of enforceable laws and firm institutions, news media quickly became the prey of oligarchic ownership. As a result, rather than acting on behalf of one government interest, journalists represented multiple commercial interests. In this way, journalists acted as political players representing their particular “political patron” (Oates 2007).

This is unsurprising, since scholars like Daniel Treisman (1998) note that new democracies characterized by weak party institutions, inexperienced voters, and weak regulatory processes are particularly vulnerable to this kind of top-down commercial influence. In Russia’s case, media privatization preserved a neo-Soviet conception of media, where journalism lacks on objectivity, laws weakly protect free speech, and the government

is subjugated to media outlets. Rather than opposing this neo-Soviet media environment as anti-democratic, many Russian citizens embraced and accepted biased media coverage. According to analysis from scholars like Ellen Mickiewicz (2008), Russians in the 90s largely recognized and accepted bias as inherent in the system. This phenomenon is likely a result of Soviet political and cultural socialization. Russians often prefer a strong leader (Carnaghan 2007) and favour order over chaos in the media realm.

Through focus group analysis, scholars, like Sarah Oates, point out that “Russians reject the idea of ‘objectivity’ or even ‘balance’ in their mass media” (Oates 2007). In fact, surveys show that Russians preferred state-run over commercial media in the 1990s. According to citizens, like the 59 year old Lidia Ivanova, negative coverage and disagreement on the TV simply left a “bad impression” (Oates 2006). Thus, in many cases, Russians viewed a lack of media objectivity as maintenance of a neo-Soviet status quo.

Although this environment lacked objectivity, coverage among commercial sources represented divergent interests. Russians predominantly relied on TV sources in the 1990s. According to a survey spanning 1990s Russia, over 81% of

Russians watched TV for news daily (Oates 2006). In the given time period, NTV and ORT served as the two primary TV news stations. Founded by several defectors from state-run television, NTV often expressed anti-Kremlin sentiment in the mid-1990s, particularly in response to the First Chechen War. In 1997, oligarch Vladimir Gusinsky acquired NTV and formed his Media MOST group, which represented the interests of the Fatherland All-Russia Party (CNN 2001). Statistics from the European Institute for the Media indicate that NTV favored Fatherland All-Russia in both time given and tone portrayed. In fact, Evgeny Kulistikov, chairman of NTV, unabashedly stated that “we are sympathetic with Unity’s enemies and we give them the floor” (Oates 2006).

In contrast, ORT survived as a remnant of Soviet public television. After the fall of the Soviet Union, oligarchs like Boris Berezovsky acquired the station’s holdings. As the direct predecessor of today’s Channel 1, this station backed the Kremlin and the Unity Party in the 1999 Duma election. ORT utilized black PR and kompromat to smear Unity’s enemies. For example, Sergey Dorenko, the late night talk show host, asserted that Fatherland’s Primakov was too old for office, and included a video of hip surgery to scare voters into not voting for him. Similarly, Dorenko reported that Fatherland’s Luzhkov was complicit in the assassina-

tion of American businessmen. Russian news used “compromising materials gathered about a candidate or a party that probably has some basis in fact, but the material is presented in a biased or incomplete way in order to damage the image of that individual or organization as much as possible” (Oates 2006). Although these commercially-backed TV channels were biased towards government-owned media from the Soviet era the mere presence of alternative sources (regardless of accuracy) fostered media diversity.

According to Ruben Enikolopov (2011), diversity of media biases among NTV and ORT predicated diverse voter choice in the 1999 Duma election. This theory is uniquely applicable to post-Soviet Russia, since media diversity is not likely to affect the political choice of any democratic country defined by competitive media and stable party systems (Oates 2006). However, in relatively new party systems like post-Soviet Russia, voters have little prior information about candidates, and therefore rely on new information from media outlets. Given this post-Soviet phenomenon, Enikolopov assumes that Russian voters use the coverage of NTV and ORT as their primary source of information.


Since the largest constraint in Russian TV access is geographic location (Oates 2006), Enikolopov compared cities where NTV and ORT were both present to provincial areas where ORT dominated.

In his statistical regression of these two areas, Enikolopov (2011) found that raising the availability of NTV by 10% increased the vote for opposition parties by 1.1% and decreased Unity by 1.5%. In Enikolopov’s sample, ORT lost over 25% of its potential voters due to NTV. This means that the mere availability of an alternative news source like NTV increased support for opposition parties by over 60%. In fact, after controlling for party persuasion in survey data, Enikolopov even found that NTV was able to persuade significant numbers of Unity supporters to vote for Fatherland All-Russia. This phenomenon created one of the most bitterly contested Duma elections in the Russian Federation’s history. The Communist Party maintained a narrow majority at 24.3%, while Unity and Fatherland All-Russia followed close behind at 23.3% and 13.3%, respectively. Thus, the 1999 Russian Duma elec-

tions reaffirmed Enikolopov’s voter choice theory, since the presence of alternative media sources was highly predictive of real political competition among multiple parties.

INTERNET MOBILIZATION: A RE-BIRTH OF MEDIA DIVERSITY?

WHILE Putin legally consolidated and censored commercial TV alternatives after 2000, internet usage in Russia grew exponentially. Despite Russia’s 2000 population of 146.6 million, the largest in Europe, only 1.98 million of these individuals had access to the internet. However, according to figures from the International Telecommunications Union (2012), internet usage in Russia grew over thirty-fold from 2000 to 2012. By 2012, 63.8 million out of 143.2



[1] Figure 1 provides a side-by-side comparison of Russia and Germany’s internet saturation over time, demonstrating how quickly Russia caught up to the rest of the continent.

million Russians could access the internet. This represented the second largest internet community in Europe to Germany's 82.3 million and the largest growth percentage increase [1].

Scholars like Sarah Oates attribute this phenomenon to significant rises in household income, the spread of internet access to rural areas, and government policy which encouraged information and communication technologies (ICTs) (Oates 2013). As these policies promoted the spread of access, more and more Russians relied on the internet in everyday life. According to the Russian Federal Agency (RFA), daily internet usage grew from 34% to 72% (RFA 2011).

Most important, unlike access to commercial TV in the 1990s, this growth in internet penetration was not geographically restrictive. According to RFA, internet usage grew in villages (towns of 100,000 to 500,000) by

47% (RFA 2011). As the Agency's report points out, the growth outside of major cities like Moscow and Saint Petersburg represents a major opportunity for further ICT market expansion. Thus, due to economic growth and government investments, Russia's use of and reliance on internet sources grew significantly after Putin's ascension to power in 2000.


Since much of this growth in internet access occurred among younger generations who prefer online media over state-run TV, Russian internet penetration represents a gradual distancing from traditional sources of government control. According to figures from the RFA, 90% of Russians aged 12-24 reported using the internet in 2012, compared to only 12% of citizens 55 and over. In fact, citizens aged 12-44 represented 84% of the entire Russian internet-using population in 2012 (RFA 2011) [2]. Furthermore, many of these youth choose

internet sources over state-run television. According to the RFA, Russians aged 12-54 chose First Channel and Rossiya 1, two government-owned TV channels, as their favorite sources of news information.

Russians aged 12-17 listed internet sources like Yandex, STS, and VKontakte in their top three; state-run television's highest ranking channel, Channel One, was eighth on the younger generation's list (RFA 2011). Percentages of Russians who watch television confirm this trend, since citizens aged 12-24 make up only 17% of television viewers, compared to 31% for 55 and over. Although younger generations use internet media, these figures do not confirm the existence of greater online political participation. Nonetheless, internet usage draws attention from traditional state-run TV.

As a result, scholars like Sarah Oates (2014) believe that "the preference of younger people for the internet over state television suggests a fundamental shift in the information 'high ground' in Russia," whereby the "lack of attention to state-run television signals a significant shift in political communication," challenging the state's ability to set the "dominant news agenda and control political outcomes to the same degree in Russia" (Oates 2014).

Figure 2: Russian Internet Saturation by Age 2003-2011



[2] Figure 2 demonstrates the differences in internet penetration among age groups.

[REDACTED]

In this way the presence and usage of alternative internet media sources challenged the state's agenda-setting ability. After a decade of unprecedented internet growth, young Russians utilized the internet to protest against the 2011 Duma elections. Until 2011, the Kremlin retained the power to "manipulate the media, elections, parliament, and the regions for its self-interest" by demanding strict journalistic obedience and self-censorship on TV (Oates 2014). However, after the Duma elections on December 4, several thousand protesters flocked to Moscow's Bolotnaya Square to demand free and fair elections.

Unsurprisingly, given this act's defiance of the law on public protest, police quickly arrested 600 demonstrators. Public discontent with government fraud and dishonesty grew slowly throughout the month, culminating with a meeting of 80,000 people on Bolotnaya Square on December 24 to hear Alexei Navalny speak against corruption. As a popular LiveJournal opposition blogger, Navalny is both an outspoken critic of Putin and a product of internet growth. Navalny also coined the now-popular phrase "party of crooks and thieves" to describe Putin and his party, United Russia (Englund 2011).

As a representative of the liberal People's Freedom Party, Navalny narrowly lost the 2013 Moscow mayoral election

amid allegations of fraud. In these ways, Navalny embodies the growing internet-led opposition against perceived corruption and authoritarianism. In a Levada survey of 791 protesters at Navalny's demonstrations, researchers found that 37% of protesters regularly discussed the Duma elections on the internet prior to the demonstration while 31% periodically did, and 32% did not. Thus, 68% of protesters were politically engaged on the internet prior to the protests (Levada 2012). Of those not engaged online, a majority supported the CPRF. This is likely due to Soviet socialization and a lack of internet penetration to older generations, described in the previous paragraph.

Nonetheless, during Russia's 2011 protests, protesters largely emanated from the younger, online sphere. This represents the first break of Kremlin-sponsored media censorship since 1999, since those engaged in online discussion were considerably more likely to support anti-establishment liberal parties like Yabloko and political leaders like Navalny (Levada 2012). Thus, Moscow's 2011 protests were marked by younger, politically-engaged, and opposition-oriented Russians. This protest demonstrated that the internet could momentarily break the Kremlin's stran-

glehold on media narratives.

Within these protests of younger citizens, the internet served as a source of irrefutable evidence and a tool for mobilization. First evidence of the internet's facilitation of public discontent became obvious during Putin's appearance at a wrestling match on November 20, 2011. After calling the victorious Fedor Emelianenko a "real man," the crowd began to noticeably boo Putin. According to reports from fans at the stadium, the Prime Minister struggled to speak (EuroNews 2011).

Immediately following the incident, state-run television edited the booing out on national broadcasts (Oates 2014). However, the government could not control private YouTube content which used the unedited footage to portray the event as an embarrassment for the Prime Minister (EuroNews 2011). Here, the internet provided citizens with irrefutable evidence, previously unattainable in a media landscape dominated by Kremlin narratives. Similarly, during the 2011 Duma protests, Golos, a Russian internet NGO, allowed citizens to report and provide evidence of voter fraud across the country. This directly confronted a government narrative of free and fair elections (Oates 2014). In an attempt to silence Golos, the government detained its leader, Liliya Shibanova, in Moscow and only released her after she

[REDACTED] that foreign agents, Hillary Clinton in particular, funded these protests to destabilize Russia (TV Rain 2011). After questioning these protests' legitimacy, Putin later trivialized protestors by "describing them as attending useless demonstrations with condoms pinned to their chest as they sought the downfall of the motherland" (Guardian 2011). By denigrating the symbol of the opposition (a white ribbon) in this way, Putin sought to publicly trivialize the thousands of Moscow protesters.

In order to silence this dangerous dissent, the government utilized denial of services (DDoS) hacking attacks, which flood the bandwidth of a targeted system (Soldatov 2011). As a result, Sarah Oates (2014) asserts that "the December protests were the first time that the state's agenda-setting power was undermined by the online sphere," since "the credibility gap between the public knowledge [...] and the dearth of coverage was simply too great." In addition to this usage of the internet as a broadcaster of evidence, internet mobilization on social networking sites like Twitter provided protesters with "portable, immediate and working communicative features" to facilitate mobilization (Oates 2014). In this way, the Center for the Study of New Media & Society concluded that the internet served as an "echo chamber that could reinforce group solidarity" (Greene 2012). Thus, during the 2011 Duma protests, the internet simultaneously challenged the government's agenda-setting authority through alternative sources and served as a mobilizing tool for these alternatives.

In response to these internet-led protests, the Kremlin dismissed public opposition as illegal, foreign, and trivial. Rather than responding to protesters' concerns in any real way, Putin alluded to the fact

[REDACTED] that foreign agents, Hillary Clinton in particular, funded these protests to destabilize Russia (TV Rain 2011). After questioning these protests' legitimacy, Putin later trivialized protestors by "describing them as attending useless demonstrations with condoms pinned to their chest as they sought the downfall of the motherland" (Guardian 2011). By denigrating the symbol of the opposition (a white ribbon) in this way, Putin sought to publicly trivialize the thousands of Moscow protesters.

Generally seen as more friendly to democratization and reform, Medvedev did not shy away from this strategy. The President's twitter account posted that "Today it became clear that a person who writes in their blog the words 'party of crooks and thieves' (referring to Navalny) is a stupid, c*ck sucking sheep" (Elder 2011). These strategies of denigration and trivialization are embodied in NTV's documentary *Anatomy of a Protest*, where NTV describes the protests as "much smaller than expected" (NTV 2011).

[REDACTED] As a result, organizers encouraged bystanders to participate by distributing money and cookies. As evidence for these accusations, the documentary merely shows zoomed in business transactions and people scrambling to grab cookies from a box on the road. The documentary also notes the presence of "foreign agents" from a nefarious "fifth column." For exam-

ple, a man of color is pictured yelling with a sign in Russian, as the narrator ominously says "even students from Kenya showed up" (NTV 2011).

In addition, the documentary notes how immigrants from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan participated in order to be "provocative" (NTV 2011). By associating the protest with racialized fears of foreign influence, NTV trivialized the protestors' real demands and instead focused on why protests of this kind are fundamentally harmful to Russia. Thus, rather than publicly acknowledging and responding to protesters' demands, the government responded with deflection, denigration, and trivialization.

In response to this government portrayal, free internet sources like TV Rain and bloggers like Navalny publicly provided commentary on voter fraud and government corruption. According to Sarah Oates (2014), the "pace of growth of internet use, the rise in information sources online, and the increasing trust in information online all combined to undermine the government's information dominance via television." With respect to internet opposition voices during the 2011 protests, this trend is reflected best when [REDACTED] analyzing TV Rain, where site usage grew five-fold during the December period, and again tripled during the subsequent presidential elections (Alexa 2011).

On TV Rain, newscasters acted not as government mouth-

pieces, but independent commentators in both tone and content. In response to Putin's first comments on the protests' "legality," the anchor, wearing a white ribbon on his chest, replied by questioning why Putin would defend his position and refuse to even investigate the claims of the protesters (TV Rain 2011). Here, TV Rain publicly demonstrates solidarity with the protestors and uses its website as a platform from which opposition voices present their concerns. Through this same critical lens, a different anchor provided a statement by Solidarity leader Ilya Yashin to combat the falsified assertions of foreign influence in *Anatomy of a Protest*.

Similarly, opposition blogger Alexei Navalny refuted NTV's documentary on his blog (TV Rain 2011, this specific blog post has since been deleted). In fact, two years later, Navalny published an e-book entitled *Anatomy of a Protest*, in which he responds to the documentary's incorrect assertions and assesses the future for political opposition in Russia (Navalny 2013). These popular voices publicly highlighted government corruption and media censorship. In these ways, Russian internet sources challenged the Kremlin media narratives.

Just as the internet facilitated the 2011 Duma protests, social media and internet penetration in "Arab Spring" countries like Tunisia and Egypt fostered mass mobilization against perceived government oppression. In the 2010 Jasmine Revolution,

Tunisian protesters ousted President Zine El Abidine in just 28 days. After the well-publicized self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, the internet provided "dramatic visual evidence that turned a local incident into a spectacle" (Lim 2013). Furthermore, the internet crystallized and gave voice to Tunisians' "collective identities," framing these identities in direct opposition to a repressive government (Lim 2013). As news of protest spread online, the Tunisian government was unable to silence dissent and dull the growing momentum of opposition.

In many ways, Egypt also followed Russia's trajectory of internet penetration, since internet users grew from 450,000 in 2000 to 17 million in 2010. As a result of this phenomenon and growing public discontent, Egyptian protesters mobilized against Hosni Mubarak through social media platforms like Twitter and Facebook. These sites "organized the protests" and "disseminated information about them, including publicizing protesters' demands internationally" (Stepanova 2011). In response, the government attempted to censor dissent on a massive scale. After blocking Twitter and Facebook, Mubarak's regime "ordered all major telecommunications providers to block internet access" (Stepanova 2011).

Although these policies negatively impacted Egypt's economy, preexisting fiber-optic routes rendered this censorship ineffective. Thus, just as El Abidine could not stem the tide of

protests, Mubarak was unable to stop the Egyptian internet's oppositional momentum. In both of these cases of countries with recent growths in internet penetration, scholars like Merlyna Lin and Ekaterina Stepanova agree that the internet catalyzed and organized dissent in the face of censorship. Thus, these cases mirror the mobilizing and informational effects of the Russian internet in 2011.

CONCLUSION

ON March 20 of 2017, an assailant doused Alexei Navalny in green paint as a threat against Navalny's continuing anti-government rhetoric. In response, Navalny posted on Facebook and Twitter that he wore this green as a badge of pride, making him look like an anti-government superhero. Navalny used the incident as a rallying call for his supporters to organize a protest on March 26 (Bilevsky 2017). In response to this defiant stance, Navalny's supporters posted messages on Twitter which read "Alexei, Kazan headquarters is with you! We support you!" (Bilevsky 2017). Other supporters caught up to Navalny on the street and took selfies with his green face (Bilevsky 2017). This recent example demonstrates the power of the internet in Russia as a mobilizing force for group solidarity. However, do localized incidences of defiance serve as legitimate alternatives to the Kremlin's agenda-setting ability?

Given its studied impact as a growing tool for critical discussion and oppositional mobilization in the December 2011 protests, internet media represents an emergent alternative political sphere in Russia. Similarly, commercial media diversity precipitated diverse vote choice and political competition in 1999. Do the effects of Russian internet sources from 2011-2018 mirror this phenomenon? In a 2009 interview with the radio station Echo Moscow, Vladimir Putin remarked that “contrary to common perception, mass media is an instrument, rather than an institution” (Echo Moscow 2009).

This belief represents the So-

viet conception of all media as a tool. Despite the positive potential of the internet in legitimizing dissent, polling data indicates that this Soviet conception survives as an acceptance of internet censorship and public preference for order over chaos (Levada 2016). Due to this persistent preference for authoritarianism, current scholarship on the internet’s role in Arab Spring protests would caution against any belief in the internet as a democratizing force. For example, in his study on the role of the internet in democratization, Erik Nisbet found that “internet use may play a more meaningful role in strengthening and enhancing young democracies through im-

pacting citizen attitudes rather than promoting outright democratic transitions among autocratic regimes” (Nisbet 2012).

In Russia’s case, then, internet mobilization must be accompanied by both a willingness to accept democracy and the tools to achieve limited government. Thus, given the recent electoral success of Russian authoritarianism, internet sources without democratic institutions that promote liberal values do not represent a viable alternative to state-run TV. Nonetheless, the growth of internet accessibility in Russia will likely continue to enhance connectivity and democratic mobilization.



INTERVIEW WITH A HUNGARIAN FREEDOM FIGHTER

Gréta Bedekovics,
University of California,
Berkeley



“THIS WE SWEAR/ THIS WE SWEAR,
THAT WE WILL BE SLAVES/ NO LONGER.”

-Refrain from the poem, “National Song,”
written by Petőfi Sándor during the 1848 Revolution,
which was chanted by students on the day the 1956 Revolution began

Isit next to him at a dinner table surrounded by Hungarians eating meats and cheeses, and drinking wine. The meats are Hungarian and have been specially ordered, while the cheese is Dutch, in honor of his late wife, Méta. The host is István Kiss: a husband, father, grandfather, engineer, freedom fighter, refugee, and traveler. His Christian name, István, was the name of the first Hungarian king who ruled 1,000 years ago, but most people call him Stephen, the English equivalent. I have known him for 11 years, a period over which I have come to think of him as family. Not long after we first met, we discovered that his father taught my grandmother in elementary school in a small Hungarian village, which, even today, only has 4,300 residents. István is now 87, but one would never know it by his lifestyle. I ask him where he is traveling next, to which he answers he’s taking a cruise to Cuba. I am always eager to hear his next destination; he often revisits the same places but is still checking off new cities like Singapore and Hong Kong. He lives life on the move, with enough of a break in between trips to repack his suitcase. He loves taking his grandchildren to Mexico, and when he visits his daughter in Alaska, he buys an extra seat on

the plane for the salmon they caught. This is the beautiful life István has built for himself.

István was born in 1930 and was 26 when he became a freedom fighter in the 1956 Hungarian Revolution against the Soviet Union, which will commemorate its 62nd Anniversary this year. Like many freedom fighters, he became a refugee, and eventually settled in Rochester, Minnesota. I interviewed him about his experience during the revolution, his escape, and life as a refugee.

He began by telling me, “The Hungarian Revolution started on the 23rd of October in 1956. My older brother was a part of the protest in front of the radio house in Budapest that ignited the conflict.” After gathering and marching from the statue of József Bem - a hero of the 1848 Hungarian Revolution - about 200,000 people, mostly students, stormed the state controlled radio station in order to broadcast The 16 Points for a free Hungary. Among these points were demands for the evacuation of Soviet troops, secret ballots, the right to strike, freedom of speech and press, and the removal of Soviet symbols and monuments. When students were detained in the station, demonstrators demand-

ed their release and were fired upon by the Államvédelmi Hatóság (State Security Police). One student was killed; the demonstrators wrapped him in a Hungarian flag and held him above the crowd.

“At the time I was living in Szombathely, close to the Hungarian-Austrian border,” said István. “I had read anti-communist papers and books, but like many, was blindsided by the events to come.” Events that would include the destruction and defamation of Stalin statues, the ripping of the Soviet coat of arms from the Hungarian flag, urban street fighting, and the executions of party members and freedom fighters alike. The violence became equally focused on the physical and symbolic presence of the Soviets. Everything that reminded Hungarians of the regime had to be toppled, destroyed, or burned.

István then told me how he became involved with the revolution. “After the events at the radio station, I was elected head of the Revolutionary Committee in my region. I was in charge of the fate of over 700 freedom fighters. For days, I traveled between Budapest, Győr, and Miskolc to coordinate with other leaders; we discussed where to hide people, what our next move would be, and things like that. By this time, my faction had taken over the state security building in my town.” What the rebels found inside shocked them. “Upon ransacking the place, we found that letters

we had sent in the mail had been copied and filed away. We released all the prisoners held there, not knowing which were enemies of the state and which were real criminals. I let a young girl out of her prison cell only to find out later that she and her lover had killed her husband. But it was wartime and so mistakes were made and forgotten.” When he said the phrase for a young girl, “lány” in Hungarian, my mind intrinsically went to one of my favorite photos from the Revolution - a girl standing in the streets, holding a small Russian machine gun, staring down the camera in a fur hat, with impeccably curled hair. I always try to put myself in her place; how she must have woken up early to style her hair and pick out an outfit in which she would defend her country and fight the Ruszkik (derogatory term used for Russians). Later, I researched the photo and discovered her name was



Hansen, Vagn. “Erika, Hungarian Freedom Fighter 1956.” *The Daily News Hungary*, 17 Oct. 2016.

Erika - she was only 15 years old when it was taken (Vajta). Her father had died in a concentration camp, and she was killed not long after the photo was taken; she died in the streets after being shot in the neck. I can’t un-imagine her lying on the cobbled streets alone, her curls drenched in her own blood, her body waiting to be cleared away; the image of a girl who gave her life before she even lived one; the emblematic tragedy of fresh curls stained red. Erika’s mother went insane from the grief, while she posthumously became an icon for the revolution. For a few days, the Hungarian people were able to take back control of their country, until the Soviets rolled in with their tanks on November 4th. István recalls, “That morning, I awoke to a deafening blow. A Soviet tank had just fired on the city police station not a quarter kilometer from my room.”

We took a small break and got refreshments from the kitchen. When István returned to his chair he told me, “On December 23rd, I took a train to Budapest to visit my family for Christmas. The fighting was now largely over since the Soviets had killed many of the freedom fighters and arrested the remaining rebels. I told the lady who I was renting my room from to turn the flowerpot outside the house if anyone came looking for me while I was away. Sure enough, when I got back the flower pot was turned. I never went back into that house. I simply turned around and headed for a village

almost on the Hungarian-Austrian border.” In one moment, István decided to leave behind everyone he knew, everything he owned, and the life that the state had planned out for him, before he was even born. “I walked 24 or 25 kilometers in the snow carrying only a bottle of wine I had bought in case anyone asked me where I was headed. This way, I could tell them I was going to a friend’s house for the holidays.” I thought to myself how clever this was; how even when fleeing for his life, how well he had planned out the situation.

He continued, “Upon arriving in the village, I spent the night at a friend’s house. His father told me that the barbed wire fences on the border has been cut when the Revolution began, and the Soviets hadn’t had time to reconstruct them. He also warned me about the 500-meter-wide minefield strip surrounding the fences. At three in the morning, I set out for the border. It was so cold, and the ground was so frozen, that the mines were almost impossible to activate, and probably the only reason I survived.” Whether or not he knew this when crossing, or assumed it later, I don’t know. I didn’t ask because I was speechless. Here I was, drinking tea, sitting in front of a man casually recalling himself walking over a minefield. Leaning in a bit, as if to tell me a secret, he said, “sneaking past the guards positioned near the fence was the easy part, because the guards walked up and down large stretches of the border. I knew

I had to be careful not to walk straight for long, because it would mean I would be going back into Hungarian territory. I tried to veer to my left until I saw a sign reading halt. But it was not in Hungarian; it was in German, and so I knew I had reached Austria.” Even though I knew he made it out, my body couldn’t help but further relax into his yellow-green 70’s style velvet armchair.

He began motioning a bit with his arms, saying, “I kept waking and saw a man milking his cow. I said ‘good morning’ to him in German, to which he replied ‘good morning’ in Hungarian.” In this comedic moment, he began laughing and I joined him. Here we were, two Hungarian-Americans, laughing at the irony of it all. “The man told me where I could register as a refugee. I wasn’t surprised by him speaking Hungarian, after all, this land had belonged to Hungary before the 1st World War. I walked to the refugee camp; there I saw a man in a Soviet uniform standing in a tower and for a moment thought that I had been tricked and that I was going to be taken back home. But then I saw two Austrian guards standing at the door and knew I was safe”. The Soviet guard had most likely been a man who took the opportunity of the cut fences to escape the oppressive regime that sent him to fight, and even die in a foreign land, for a battle he must have known little, if anything about. István went on, “Inside the building, people gave me identity papers and put me on a train. It was

now the 29th of December. I arrived in Oberwart, where I, and 20 other refugees, slept on straw beds in a school until the 3rd of January. From our straw beds in this school, we watched Austrians having the time of their lives that New Year”. I looked up at him, trying to share in the melancholy moment he had just re-created.

Then he excitedly continued, “Next I went to Gráz; there, for the first time in my life, I got to pick where I wanted to live. Never had I thought of such a thing, because in a country on communist lock down, such an idea was unimaginable. I had a choice between the United Kingdom, United States, New Zealand, and Germany. The Swiss had stopped accepting Hungarian refugees by this point. At the time, everyone wanted to go to Switzerland- it was such a peaceful country. I decided to go to Germany since I already knew the language and could more easily find a job as an engineer.” English was a very uncommon language at the time in Hungary; it was viewed by The Party as too Western, and mostly known in academic circles. Over 20 years later, my parents were still forced to learn Russian, and only received the opportunity to learn English in college. They have almost completely forgotten Russian, but my dad always thanks our Ukrainian butcher with its remnants. Whenever I think of learning Russian to advance my career, I can’t help but ponder the irony of learning the language that was



“TIME Magazine Cover: 1957 Man of the Year.” *TIME*, Web.

forced upon my family. Jamaica Kincaid wrote, “isn’t it odd that the only language I have in which to speak of this crime is in the language of the criminal who committed the crime?” (Kincaid, 53). This quote from one of my anthropology classes at Berkeley haunts me in the back of my mind, when I think of myself speaking Russian.

István then recounted how he left Austria, “I went to the Red Cross office; a friend of mine had escaped and I wanted to see if I could find him. As soon as I stepped into the building, an English-Hungarian lady approached me and asked if I wanted to go to England. 500 men were being chosen to work in a coal mine there. I told her I was an engineer, and so I did not want to work in a mine. She told me that engineers were even more needed than miners. I asked her when I was to leave, to which she replied: 15 minutes.” István began laughing again and through

the laughter said, "I couldn't believe it; for 26 years I could not go anywhere, and now I was supposed to say yes to going to England in 15 minutes. I told her I would go even though I could not speak a word of English. I never did find my friend Miklós that day, but I did find him years later. He had chosen to go to Germany where he later got married and had a family." Until recently, these Hungarian refugees composed the largest wave of refugees in post-war Europe. 200,000 people fled after the revolution and were taken in by other nations across the globe; Austria's interior minister, Oskar Helmer, announced in 1957 that every Hungarian refugee would be granted political asylum. The UN later estimated that 3,000 people died and 13,000 were wounded; another 10,000,000 wouldn't be liberated for another 33 years.



Toppled Stalin statue that was vandalized in Budapest in 1956



"Russians go home!", painted onto a window display in 1956

A few train rides and one boat later, István arrived in London on the 7th of January, 1957. "Many other Hungarian refugees and I received a three-day orientation in the city, after which we were sent to Blackpool. There, 600 of my fellow countrymen and I took 3 months of English classes, which meant 8 hours of learn-

ing each day. Blackpool was a big city; it was a cheap vacation destination, so we were housed in bed and breakfasts. It was the first time I was around the sea; when I arrived, the first thing I did was walk into the ocean- it was freezing."

István described what life as a refugee looked like. "The English classes I took were taught by a 30-year-old, very smart woman, who volunteered her time and came from an English aristocrat family. She began by pointing and saying: I, you, he, she. All the young men hated the English food, but after four years of my university's café in Miskolc, I could eat anything,

There were very few girls, because they had been afraid to cross the border by themselves, and those that were there, were already married. I often went to dances with some boys - we had fun. Everyone went alone, and you could dance with any and as many girls as you wanted. I'll never forget, after one of the dances, my friend asked one of our teachers what the phrase 'don't touch me' meant." I burst out laughing, and while laughing himself, István added, "He had heard it all night at the dance from girls, and didn't know what they were saying to him." I don't think I had ever truly realized what a natural storyteller he is; here he was reliving the most difficult time of his life, and yet sprinkling in jokes effortlessly as if it was a well-timed skit he had perfected over the years.

Then he told me what realizing he was free felt like. "After three months in Blackpool, I began attending job interviews. As it turned out, I didn't

have to become an engineer for the coal mining company, even though those were the pretenses I came under. This came as a surprise because at home, whatever the communists told you to do, you had to. Here, you were free to do what you wanted and to change your mind, and then to change it again. I received three job offers; I longed to live in a big city, so

I accepted an offer at a motor company in Birmingham. I began my job on the 7th of May."

In Birmingham, István rented a room in a house that he shared with an English man, a Swiss man, and an Indian man. "I found I was not very fond of the city; it was different than what I expected. It was like a big village; people didn't build up, they just built out. One night a friend from work invited me over for dinner. His wife offered me orange juice, which I politely refused even though I craved it immensely. In Hungary, oranges were very rare, and I only refused it out of my Hungarian manners. In Hungarian culture, when someone offers you something, you refuse;



Hungarian Flag with a Hole

then they offer it to you again, and then you politely accept." This is a dance I also know all too well, and we share a nod of acknowledgement to this fact. "But that's not how it is in England; if you want something, you just say yes. I think his wife thought I didn't like orange juice, and so she never



Cities Istvan traveled to throughout his journey.

offered it again. That evening, I told my friend how much I liked England, and he being Welsh replied: Good, because I do not!. My next goal was to find a place of my own. Many advertisements I looked at said colored skinned people need not apply and only accepts English. I found an apartment I really liked, and so I had my English friend call to secure it for me, so that they could not tell I was a foreigner; and that's how I got my second place."

During the summer of 1958, István traveled to the World Exposition in Brussels and around Europe with his cousin. "On one of our trips we could either travel through Luxembourg or Germany; if we went through Luxembourg, we were to pick up a young lady who

would then travel with us. My cousin showed me a picture of her - it was her passport photo- and after seeing it, I decided we should take the route through Germany. However, the paperwork needed was too extensive, and so we decided to go through Luxembourg anyway and pick up the young lady. We arrived, and I saw her, and thank God she looked nothing like her photo, because I ended up marrying

her!" Again, we laughed together; how well he had led up to this surprise; it was the first time I heard how he had met his wife, Méta, whom I never had the honor of meeting. At the World Exposition, many states from across the world had their own pavilions - the USSR being one of them. They had displayed a model of Sputnik and the Americans -behind in the space race -were desperately trying to put together a better display; both superpowers used the occasion for mutual surveillance. Amid this cold-war, stood a man, taking in everything the modern world had to offer; straddling his past as an enemy of the Soviet Union and his future as an American citizen. István finished telling me his

story by saying, “Later Méta and I would come to America together, raise two daughters, and travel the world like we never imagined possible. I now realize I did not flee to escape a life that seemed to be coming to end, I fled in order to live a better life. A life I wasn’t aware I could have, until the day I started living it.” We chatted a while longer and said our farewells for the time being; he gave me two hugs, because he said one just wasn’t enough.

I recently found a pamphlet in my family’s basement among my mother’s things. It was wrapped in old Hungarian magazine pages; it was a pamphlet issued by the communist government in 1957 titled: The Uprising in Baranya Province. Its objective was to denounce the freedom fighters, uphold the puppet regime, and praise the memories of Lenin and Stalin. This was something that had been saved by my grand-

parents, given to my mother, shipped to America in a container, and was now sitting in our American Mid-west style basement. It was falling apart and all I could think of was, I’m holding a piece of history. But to István, and people like my parents, this pamphlet was an everyday reality. What I saw as a primary source to be studied, is to them a paper to be wrapped and put away in a box along with my great grandparents’ documents commemorating their over-fulfillment of grain quotas, the list they made of the items the state seized, my mother’s badges from her communist youth group, and my dad’s Bible that was illegally printed and given to him. It’s a box of both our history and present reconciling themselves; a box we take out to remember and put away to forget.

A box we will never be able to throw away, but one we wish we had never been given.



MONTENEGRO'S ACCENSION

A HISTORIC TURN IN THE FUTURE OF NATO'S ENLARGMENT PROCESS

Denisa Elena Vlăsceanu

National School of Political Studies
and Public Administration (SNSPA)
Department of International Relations
and European Integration (DRIIE)

ABSTRACT

THE purpose of this paper is to analyse Montenegro's accession to NATO through a constructivist lens in order to reinforce the idea that NATO enlargement is a process based on promoting democratic values, peace, and multilateralism in its eastern zone. The current paper tests whether the reasons for Montenegro's accession are linked to its national identity, which transformed it into a collective identity based on Western values and security organizations such as NATO.

INTRODUCTION

SINCE NATO's creation in 1949, its "open door policy" has been a central component of its treaty, allowing its membership to increase from 12 to 29 countries, with Montenegro becoming the newest member on 5 June 2017. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are still aspiring to obtain NATO membership. Even though Ukraine agreed at the 2008 Bucharest Summit to become a member in future, it has not been formally pursuing membership since 2010. By taking into account the recent developments in the area including Russia's annexation of Crimea, the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, and the challenging dynamics in the Western

Balkans, future actions in the event of an accession are highly unlikely to be taken soon.

Based on its historical experience, NATO membership has grown significantly over the years, leading us to the following statement: The enlargement of the Alliance is an ongoing and dynamic process. (NATO Fact Sheet) This is the reason why the focus of this paper is on the complexity and on the importance of this policy, as part of NATO's "essential goal of enhancing security and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area within the context of an European Security Architecture." ("Study On NATO Enlargement") The purposes and principles of enlargement are strictly linked to the mission, values, norms, and strategic concept of the Alliance.

The aim of this paper is to outline the rationale for the enlargement process in general, and the current membership of Montenegro in particular, which is based on collective identity rather than self-interest and relative gain. In other words, this paper will focus on analysing the Montenegrin accession to NATO, from a constructivist point of view.

Applying the constructivist theory instead of the realist theory, which may seem more approachable because of its leading status within the international relations field, is due precisely to the fact that realism failed to predict why NATO (as an organization and its policies, i.e. the enlargement)

did not cease to exist after the end of the Cold War; in other words, it failed to explain the dismantling of the Soviet Union, including the demise of the Warsaw Pact. Instead, constructivist scholars offered a persuasive alternative regarding the new environment in the post-Cold War era, in which NATO plays a decisive role in Euro-Atlantic security. Consequently, I chose this theory because constructivism is a useful tool in understanding foreign policy and the way in which actors currently behave or interact in the international system.

The accession of Montenegro is a suitable case to be explained through the lenses of interest-identity, one of the central themes in constructivism. In the context of Russia's military invasion in Ukraine, analysts rushed to label Montenegro's accession as a "test case" for NATO's open-door policy. (Hunter, 2017) However, this leads us to ask the following question: *What is in fact the real rationale behind the accession of Montenegro to NATO?* The answer can be divided into the following hypotheses:

1: Montenegro's decision to become a member of NATO is due to a shared understanding of security, social practices, identities, and role, that perceives NATO as a "Western family," which brings social, economic and political benefits.

2: NATO membership gives Montenegro a motivating force to further seek democratic values and integrate

them successfully in its domestic law, while overseeing the security environment in this area, on the basis of multilateralism and international law.

3: The accession is a sign of NATO's strength, showing Russia that the "open door" policy remains a reality and represents (now more than ever) a real commitment.

These are possible reasons behind Montenegrin membership. They emphasize the idea that a more thorough analysis is necessary because such an important topic requires a more in-depth analysis, as will be presented later in this paper, through a theory-testing case study methodology. (van Evera, 1997)

The paper is organized as follows: an introduction with the background and the research purposes presented, a discussion of the main theoretical realms of constructivism, and a brief overview of NATO's enlargement process. Montenegro's accession to NATO will be analysed from various points of view, by using the constructivist theory. In the conclusion, a summary and evaluation of the hypotheses of the research questions of this paper will be provided, according to the case-study analysis.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

ONE of the newest theories in international relations (IR), constructivism was at first

questioned, being considered an approach rather than a theory. Although it is argued that it does not offer substantial solutions for specific issues in IR, constructivism offers different views over some central themes, such as the anarchical nature of the international system, the considerations of balance of power, the relationship between state interest and its identity, etc. (Flockhart & Trine, 2012, p. 6) Moreover, with its roots in the critical and postmodern theories, constructivism, traced back to 1980s, becomes a 'full-time' theory only after the Cold War, when the concept of "security community" was introduced by Emanuel Adler and his associates, based on Karl Deutsch's empirical research. (Flockhart & Trine, 2012, p. 6) This term is usually referred to as "groupings of states, tied together through common values and transnational links, that reject violent conflict resolution as unthinkable", which stands as evidence to the fact that a process, such as the enlargement of NATO, is influenced by trust and shared identity. (Ikenberry, 2017) Hence, constructivists argue that "the world is of our making," (Onuf, 1989) being socially constructed by "a mix of history, ideas, norms, and beliefs which scholars must understand if they are to explain State behaviour." (Slaughter, 2011) But, in order to know what action or policy to choose, an understanding of the context, shared knowledge, and dominant practice is required. This is how rules and norms appeared, being of immense

importance to social relations between states. For instance, if a state wants to join NATO (constituting a social group), it has to follow the rules and norms of the group (Western liberal and democratic principles, values), leading to a creation of new identities and social relationships. (Flockhart & Trine, 2012, p. 6) So, the social norms and identities accepted by the state can significantly affect worldwide relations, making the interest of the state more inclined towards universal cooperation rather than rational materialism. In other words, "interests (and threats to them) are not self-evident derivatives of position, but are shaped (constituted) by identity." (Hinnebusch, 2003, p. 360) So, the focus on identity and belief is a core feature of the constructivist theory because "identities strongly imply a particular set of interests/preferences" in the actions, attitudes and foreign policies mentioned above. (Flockhart & Trine, 2012, p. 6) What is more, the acceptance of certain international norms and rules is based on the state identity, not on their utility (or, at least, not always). According to March and Olsen, these two reasons of choice designate two different logics of action: logic of consequences (rational interest) vs. logic of appropriateness (norms and identity). (1984, p. 734-749) For Hopf, political pioneers view states as "friends" or "enemies" and act based on the identity of the state, a fact which points to the impossibility of making universal and clear claims about the source of threat in world poli-

tics. This concludes that identity represents a decisive and relatively steady factor in foreign policy, empowering us to investigate "why" states act the way they do in ways that propose a causal connection between identity and interests. (1998)

Thus, within the constructivist approach, the key concepts for the analysis section can be summarized as follows:

1. A belief in social construction of reality;
2. A focus on ideational as well as material structures (the importance of norms, rules and shared values);
3. A focus on the role of identity in shaping political action and the "logic of action" associated with interests;
4. A mutually constitutive relationship between agents and structures through institutionalization. (Flockhart & Trine, 2012, p. 15)

OVERVIEW OF NATO ENLARGEMENT PROCESS

AS a material structure, NATO is an organization established in 1949 with the aim of promoting security and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. On the other hand, moving to its ideational manifestation, the Alliance is "a social fact constituted by a social relationship, shared prac-

tice, and common understandings" established and agreed by all the members. (Flockhart & Trine, 2012, p. 6) NATO is first and foremost a military alliance, but its role, especially after the Cold War, cannot be reduced only to this characteristic. It has managed to adapt, to reconstitute its own identity and maintain it, to socialize norms or rules, and to establish new relationships (Flockhart & Trine, 2012, p. 15). These new 'roles' are consistent with the process of enlargement, undergoing the following steps, as expressed in NATO's 2016 Fact Sheet:

I. Based on Article 10 of the founding treaty and on the basis of consensus among all Allies, European nations that desire to join NATO are at first welcomed to start an Intensified Dialogue with the Alliance about their goals and related changes.

II. Aspirant countries are invited to join the Membership Action Plan, a program which enables countries to get ready for conceivable future accession. Here, it is important to note that: participation does not guarantee membership, but is a key preparation mechanism.

III. Taking into account when and the way in which aspiring countries meet certain political, financial, and military criteria set out in the Alliance's 1995 Study on Enlargement, they receive the membership after the formal accession process is finished. ("NATO Fact Sheet")

The main aspect to be considered in the process of accession

is the level of involvement in respecting the values of the Alliance as well as incorporating: a working rule of law in view of a market economy; reasonable treatment of minorities; a peaceful conflict-resolution attitude; a capacity and eagerness to make a military commitment to NATO operations; and a promise to democratic military and organizations relations. ("NATO Fact Sheet")

"Once admitted, new members would enjoy all the rights and assume all the obligations of membership. This would include acceptance at the time that they join of all the principles, policies and procedures previously adopted by Alliance members." (NATO. "Enlargement", 2017) Hence, the process of enlargement can be seen as a reinforcement of internal and international socialization of Western norms, rules, and values, which requires a NATO member to follow a logic of appropriateness.

Starting with the first three rounds of enlargement during the Cold War (Greece and Turkey, West Germany, and Spain) and continuing with other twelve rounds among which, most importantly, were countries of Central and Eastern Europe (former Warsaw Pact members "determined to escape their historical fate as the playthings of Russia and Germany" (Braithwaite, 1970)), the history of the process of enlargement over the years has shown us that states with different social, political, economic and cultural backgrounds suc-

ceeded in acquiring new norms and behaviour patterns within the Alliance (in reference to the institutionalization process).

On the other hand, no matter how much NATO has tried to reassure Russia that this process of enlargement is purely for the sake of a strong, secure and stable Europe, the Kremlin seems to view it as a “threat” (a constructivist matter of representation) and acts accordingly (e.g. launches its own military actions in Georgia, Crimea, and Ukraine). Whether the NATO - Russia connection has important implications in the case of Montenegro’s membership will be discussed further on in the analytical section.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

THIS chapter will provide a constructivist explanation for the accession of Montenegro, focusing on three main points of view corresponding to the three hypotheses mentioned above:

1. The road to NATO membership

Part of formerly communist Yugoslavia, Montenegro regained its independence in June 2006, separating from Serbia. This separation constitutes a turning point in the construction of the state identity. With great Russian influences (especially cultural and economic ones) the country’s decision to ‘take control of its destiny’ had an impact on the identity that has

shaped its foreign policy over the years, leading the country to join the Membership Action Plan in December 2009. The following statement from Montenegro’s Prime Minister Dusko Markovic also supports a shift towards a NATO collective identity: “the Balkans for centuries has been the scene of a struggle between the West and the East. Like other states in the region, Montenegro has strong links with the East, but in 2006 we made a key decision that we would like to adopt Western standards and values.” (Sekularac Budva, 2017) This also supports the logic of appropriateness because the interest of this small country (only 650,000 people with 2,000 military personnel (Sekularac Budva, 2017)) was not only sustained by material/strategic value, but also by a symbolic association with liberal, democratic, and transparent values that is shared by the Alliance members. Also, we should not omit the fact that almost all the neighbouring countries of Montenegro are NATO members, meaning that there is a clear sense of collective shared understanding of the security environment.

Montenegro was invited to start accession talks in December 2015, after the 2010 first MAP cycle, and the Accession Protocol was marked by NATO foreign ministers on May 2016. (NATO. “Relations with Montenegro”, 2017) The “invitee” status gained was more than ever a way of telling the Montenegrin population as well as the other European countries

that there is no way of turning back. In other words, in accordance with the principle of solidarity which applies in NATO, Montenegro accepted the obligations arising from membership. (NATO. “Relations with Montenegro”, 2017) This can easily be associated to the process of institutionalization and socialization that the constructivist theory emphasizes.

Following the ratification of the Accession Protocol by all parliaments of NATO member states, on 5 June 2017, Montenegro became a full member of the Alliance, when the instrument of accession was deposited in Washington D.C. By joining NATO and developing relations with this organization, Montenegro has now become an autonomous state, attempting to be a state with a liberal administration, emphasizing the free movement of individuals and the exchange of merchandise, expertise, and skills, as it is presented on Montenegro’s official site. (Montenegro Independence, 2017) Hence, the process of accession was complex but steady, and revolved around the construction of the Western identity, since there are arguments on behalf of the Montenegrin Ministry of Foreign Affairs that states: “NATO is viewed as a very capable organization for ensuring security, enabling Montenegro to promote its image of a stable democracy, accelerate economic development by attracting foreign investment, and participate equally in relevant decision-making.” (Official website of Montenegro’s

Foreign Affairs Ministry) We can observe that this indicates the constructivists’ focus on identity as a basis of state interests and focus on ideational as well as material structures.

2. The significance of the membership

Since regaining its independence, Montenegro has been undertaking a wide-ranging program of structural and institutional reforms. (NATO. “NATO Summit Guide- Warsaw, 8-9 July 2016”, 2016. p. 260-263) They are all connected with the norms and rules that the country agreed to enhance and promote, part of which became national security aims or actions. For instance, “in February 2010, Montenegro decided to contribute troops to the NATO-led International Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, which were deployed there together with a Croatian unit. Following the completion of ISAF’s operation at the end of 2014, Montenegro is currently supporting the follow-up mission and pledged financial support for the future development of the Afghan National Security Forces”. (NATO. “Relations with Montenegro”, 2017)

But the prospects of integration in NATO reflects more than this. In the case of Montenegro, “NATO membership is closely tied to its integration into the EU” because it is about two parallel and compatible processes that have the same source: an openness towards Western institutionalization, suggesting the importance of NATO norms

and values through international law. (Official website of Montenegro’s Foreign Affairs Ministry) “Democratic institutions, the rule of law, market economy, a stable security situation, are necessary preconditions of any country that wants to join the EU or NATO” as the Montenegro’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents on their official website.

The development process was also noticed by the U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Thomas Shannon, who stated: “The promise of NATO membership and broader Euro-Atlantic integration has served as an incentive for nations to pursue difficult reforms and has advanced our security, our democratic values, and our respect for the rule of law”. (Saine, 2017)

Moreover, the membership of Montenegro had a historical but most importantly a strategic component. Again, Thomas Shannon supports this idea by stating that “Montenegro’s accession sends a strong message of strength to the region and makes clear to our allies that the United States remains as committed as ever to the principle of collective defense as enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty”. (Saine, 2017) Undoubtedly, in accordance with the determination of the US to advance an expansion of NATO towards Russia, Montenegro plays a constructive role in the Western Balkans region, a fact that brings us to the following point of analysis.

3. The relation between Montenegro and Russia

According to the Prime Minister Dusko Markovic: “Nearly a hundred years after it was deleted from the political map of Europe at the end of the World War I, and 11 years since restoration of its independence, Montenegro is again a part of global politics. It will never happen again that someone else decides instead of us and our state, behind our back, as it was the case in the past”. (Saine, 2017) This statement sends the subtle message that, over the years, the representation of “we” (Montenegrins) is associated to NATO, implicitly to the West, not anymore to Russia. It seems that Montenegro perceives security threats as no longer coming from Russia, or if they do, the state together with NATO will take independent decisions that will protect “us” (the citizens). Thus, a new role of NATO - that of a protector of the Montenegrins - was promoted in the public discourse.

Obviously, a hostile reaction of the Russian government to Montenegro’s desire to join NATO appeared, “culminating in an attempt to stage on 16 October 2016, on the day of the parliamentary election, a presumed coup d’état that should have included the assassination of Montenegro’s prime minister Milo Dukanović, according to the statements made by Montenegrin officials”. (Associated Press in Podgorica, 2016) But even though, the split between Montenegro’s pro-Western and

pro-Russian factions has been deepening over the years, with the “aid” of several incidents such as the one mentioned previously, Montenegro continued its path towards independence and democratic rule of law, constructing a Western identity. As Milo Đukanović said on the day of Montenegro’s membership ratification: “After long suffering and roaming through history, [Montenegro] is finally in the position where it logically, historically, civilization-wise, and culturally belongs”. (Associated Press in Cetinje, 2017) Thus, it can be observed that the Russian threat has been eliminated from Montenegro’s foreign political discourse as the Alliance has become the new guarantor of stability, security and cooperation.

On the other hand, the improvement of relations with Russia is still in question since the pro-Russia opposition in Montenegro might argue that Montenegro’s identity is not or at least should not be linked to NATO’s core values if we are to evoke NATO’s operation in Yugoslavia in 1999, which included the bombing of Serbia and Montenegro. (Associated Press in Cetinje, 2017) What is more, the “mutual understanding in international politics testifies the importance of fostering good cooperation between Montenegro and the Russian Federation” as officially expressed by Montenegro. (Official website of Montenegro’s Foreign Affairs Ministry)

CONCLUSION

MONTENEGRO’S identification with NATO’s values, norms, and identity has been present in its foreign policy actions ever since Montenegro restored its independence in 2006. By considering the key points analysed above, we can see that this paper’s hypotheses were confirmed through the lenses of constructivist approach and by using analytical techniques. Even though limitations to this study (such as the single theory approach which makes us consider that the case-study can be further analysed from neoliberalist or neorealist perspectives) are traceable, the present paper focused on determining the reasons for the NATO enlargement process and the Montenegrin accession from a collective identity-based interest.

As seen above, Montenegro’s desire to join NATO has been guided intensively by NATO norms and values since 2006, indicating clearly that Montenegro’s national and security identity has gone through an integration and adaptation process vis-à-vis NATO. This is reflected in the active participation of Montenegro in the PFP programme, which the country considered at the time a useful vehicle for the future membership in NATO (e.g. “Montenegro has provided troops for the training mission in Afghanistan and financial support to the Afghan security forces”). (Marcus, 2016)

Nevertheless, as NATO expansion grew over the years, different views on this process have been expressed. The case of Montenegro membership is seen by NATO and Montenegro as having the aim of modernizing the alliance itself and ensuring security in Europe. This points to another aspect, which is Montenegro’s perceived value as a NATO member, the first new member in nearly ten years. (Marcus, 2016)

Although Russian leaders do not consider Montenegro’s accession a “defeat,” (Sputnik, 2017) we can say that NATO’s enlargement process poses significant questions for Russia as its recurrent perception over the enlargement process seems to be associated with a threat because, through this process, Russia might be “confronted” by NATO. (Hunter, 2017)



OP ED

AFTER the 2017 Eastern Partnership (EaP) Summit held in Brussels last November, it is appropriate to reflect upon the role of the European Union in its Eastern vicinity and if its good governance model is pragmatic enough for the partner countries' realities.

The Eastern Partnership is an umbrella which comprises 6 partner countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine) which differ greatly on their political association and economic integration in relation with the European Union. This situation poses various challenges as the EaP – the common denominator – should ideally satisfy all the parts involved. For this reason, numerous critiques have risen regarding the efficiency of this mechanism. Moreover, after Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the start of the conflict in the Eastern Ukraine, the Eastern Partnership has become more a geopolitical rather than a technical mechanism.

Considering the European Union's current internal problems (from the influx of refugees, terrorists attacks, negotiations on Brexit, the rise of Euroskeptic, anti-European, and populist parties), one might raise the question if it's not too idealistic to assume that the European Union can be a promoter of stability, prosperity and security to its vicinity. In this regard, and with the purpose to present the EU as a normative power, the European External Action Service launched

a working plan in December 2016, intended to guide the implementation of 20 key deliverables that must be completed by the Eastern Partnership countries by 2020, milestones that were also highlighted during the 2017 EaP Summit.

These 20 deliverables will focus on four key priority areas. In this regard, the European Union will support the part-

EU'S GOOD GOVERNANCE MODEL IN THE EASTERN NEIGHBORHOOD WHAT'S NEXT?

ner countries to make progress toward diversified and vibrant economies, to strengthen the institutions and good governance, to promote transport interconnections between the union and the EaP states, and to further the mobility and people-to-people contacts.

One might notice that this document represent an answer from the European Union to all the remarks that criticize the Eastern Partnership as a failed policy initiative. Built on the mistakes of past policies,

the EU is trying to rebrand itself in the region. The promotion of its values, norms, and reforms are still the core drive of its initiative, but the mechanism of delivery is changing. In the past, the EU was condemned by having a “top-down” strategy when dealing with its partners. Thus the inability to be better connected at the local or regional levels led the European Union to inefficiently intervene in the political crises that affected the partner countries. We see now that the approach has switched towards a “bottom-up” strategy, where a stronger role is placed on local ownership and tailor-made objectives.

From engaging with civil society organizations to working on better, clearer and tailored-made strategic communications, the European Union is working on increasing its visibility and outreach in the region. We can see a pragmatic revitalization of the Eastern Partnership as the “one size fits all” approach that has not functioned, thus the discrepancies between the six partner countries have increased in relations with their reform status, the progress of the political dialogue, the economic integration, and adoption of the EU values and norms.

Another change in the renewal of the Eastern Partnership is the abandonment of the idealism that characterized the way the European Union conducted its objectives in the region. We see a streamline of the union's goals to small, realistic and

specific ones according to the key priority areas that were accepted by all partner states. All these changes prove that there is a willingness of the European Union to keep the political commitment active within the Eastern Partnership. By stimulating the partner countries to agree and continue their involvement in reaching new objectives, the European Union tries to preserve the vitality of this initiative.

Nevertheless, there are a lot of challenges ahead as the Eastern Partnership has become more and more internally divided into two camps. On one side we have the countries which follow a deeper political dialogue and economic integration as they have signed the Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with the European Union (Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine). The countries on the other side – Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan – are at various stages in their cooperation with the European Union. Armenia declined to sign the Association Agreement with the EU in 2013 and joined the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015, but for the past two years has negotiated a separate agreement with the European Union. During the 2017 EaP Summit, the two parties also signed a Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement. Azerbaijan has started the talks with the EU on a future agreement and there are hopes for a Belarus-EU framework as the relations grew warmer after the fall of 2015.

As this discussion of the dynamics and complexities of the Eastern Partnership has unfolded, more and more questions arise. Should the European Union preserve a unique model of good governance towards all the partner countries of the European Union? Should it adopt country-based models? How much is the EU willing to compromise on its values of human rights, rule of law, and free elections in order to preserve a political dialogue with the partners who are accused of violating them? The answers are contested.

WHAT IS THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP?

THE Eastern Partnership is the Eastern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy, an EU initiative of promoting peace, good governance, stability and security at its borders. Created as a technical instrument in 2009, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) was based on the need to have good relations with the new neighbours of the Union (after the 2004 and 2007 waves of enlargement) by fostering bilateral relations to increase the political association and economic integration with 6 partner countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine).

Written by Ionela Maria Ciolan, a Fulbright Visiting Student Researcher at ISEES, UC Berkeley

CLASSICIZATION: THE AVANT

THE concept of the avant-garde can be defined in the context of the belle époque failure, during the last years of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. European values were depreciating due to a facade of cultural assets that were developing as intellectual standards. The avant-gardists formed under a general manifesto against the present, promoting a future based upon modernity and vitality.

The initial meaning of the *avant-garde* was a military one; the inner logic of which was defined by finding new ways forward through provocative actions. The shift between the military meaning (*vanguard*) to the artistic one (*avant-garde*) was made by Henri de Saint-Simon, in 1825, who believed that artists have a social role to play. Saint-Simon defined the artists with the slogan, "We, the artists, are the ones who will be our own avant-garde", seeing them as creators of the new world and destroyers of the cultural remnants of the past. This motto was intended to create a preface for the societies of the future, which would be born from this type of cultural awakening. It must not be forgotten that an avant-gardist

represents a rebel, for whom the creative process demands the dismantling of any known structure of knowledge and perception of the present. Thus, Saint-Simon created the heritage of a militant division of artists, whose sole purpose was to create chaos out of order, only to reshape it into the perfect society built upon their own idealistic views of life.

Horst Waldemar Janson echoes Saint Simon's 19th century view. He coined the definition of avant-garde for the 20th century: "avant-garde needs, as a basic context for its emergence, a traditional fixed society which is publicly protecting the common sense; therefore, the society becomes easily offended by any form of art which leaves behind any canonic perspective of the mainstream values."

A better view, from a critical perspective, is provided by Paul Mann, who brings forward a methodological approach in identifying and defining the avant-gardes. His analysis is based on three criteria. The first one is represented by the status of the produced art, which has to break the main frame into a completely new form of creation. The second aspect is giv-

GARDE PARADOX

en by an asset which is beyond the control of the artists: time. If the supposed avant-garde passes the first two stages, then it can be analyzed through the third criteria: the value of the resultant anti-model of art. Thus, seeing the avant-gardes through Mann's model, it can be stated that their evolution reveals a cyclical paradox that takes them from antagonists of the old world to creators of a new tradition.

Doesn't this mean the actual death of the avant-garde spirit? A potential answer is given if we pay attention to the artistic movements that developed in the first half of the 20th century. Almost every movement, starting from futurism and ending with constructivism, built their values on revolutionary contexts or identity crisis, which demanded new approaches towards society and art. Therefore, by putting modernism between the mythology of self creation and the need for a firm ideological structure, it becomes clear that all these movements had an inner calling to become a part of the vast panoply of literary and art history.

Harold Rosenberg widens the

paradox of the avant-gardes by seeing the common trigger of counter cultural movements in the binomial relation between *past* and *tradition*. Thus, the concept of *trend* becomes an important aspect in explaining the background and the outcomes of each intercultural action. The way of dealing with the conflict between *old* and *new* ensured the survival or condemned the artistic trends, depending on their values and purposes.

Not every avant-garde intended to be ephemeral, as was the case for the Dadaist movement. Most of them became new cultural trends that classicized their art towards a fixed type of expression, consequently auto-limiting their freedom. The art of Kandinsky, Klee, Brâncuși and Picasso is proof that classicization is not actually the end of an avant-gardist, but it can be a process of anchoring the values in the present, and therefore a way of permanently creating a new tradition.

Written by Alexandru Groza, a Fulbright Visiting Student Researcher at ISEES, UC Berkeley



CROSSED PATHS: A REFLECTION

GHOSTS wander Warsaw's reconstructed streets.

The capital of Poland hums with a robust and divided political ecosystem ignited by Hitler's 1939 invasion. With help from the East, Nazis crushed the Polish opposition. In response, a resistance was forced underground that became split by political, ethnic, and religious allegiances. Gender also divided partisans; many still do not recognize the women of the resistance as soldiers, even though they fought alongside the men.

These women's stories can be found buried in the memoirs of Polish Jews, nationalists, and communists. A little digging and these heroic lives rise to the surface: Cezaria Ilyin Szymańska, who shared her passion for architecture in underground universities; Zofia Kubar, who abandoned her deeply rooted cynicism after her friend saved her life; Vladka Meed, who escaped from her home country, disappointed in her neighbors' inaction. Leokadia Rowińska, who, starving and wounded, watched her beloved city burn and wondered how the West could abandon Poland.

Through dust-covered mem-



oirs in the depths of underground university libraries, you can trace these women's paths; you can map out their hideouts, secret schools, locations for hidden ceremonies, and the sites of their sacrifices. On this street, one woman lost her brother. Some blocks away, a whole Ghetto was destroyed. Another partisan later darted across its ashes to light a candle for her murdered friend.

Many of the streets they fought on have been reconstructed to pre-World War II standards. I can only hope that these women's ghosts find these replicas

to be worthy of their sacrifices.
Written by Kasia Metkowski



ORIGINAL COMPOSITIONS

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ДВА БРАТА

Вениамин Эпштейн



ЖИЛИ-БЫЛИ два брата в лесу очень далеко отсюда. Жили в маленьком коттедже с матерью, кто была беременна. Каждое утро, братья вышли из дома в лес собирать грибы.

Один день, когда погода была приятная, братья отправились из дома найти грибы и ягоды для ужина. По тёмному лесу они ходили и искали до вечера.

К сожалению, братья не могли найти ничего. Они забоялись потому, что было поздно и стемнело. Младший брат спросил старшего «Ты знаешь дорогу домой, дорогой старший брат?» Старший ответил, «Ну, конечно я знаю. Я старший брат, и моя работа – знать ответ.» «Конечно, прости меня» ответил младший брат.

Старший брат водил младшего по лесу, а они ещё не нашли ничего. «Старший брат», сказал младший, «я думаю, что я видел дачу там сквозь деревья. Может быть, нам лучше спросить про дорогу?» «Ни в коем случае!» ответил старший брат, «Нам ничего не надо спросить! Я старший брат, и моя работа – знать ответ.» «Хорошо, прости меня» ответил младший брат. Братья

шли всё прямо и вперёд, а ещё не нашли ничего. В этот момент, младший брат видел птичку, которая летела над его головой.

«Можно спросить птичку про дорогу?» спросил младший брат. «Больше мне не спрашивай этот вопрос! Я – старший брат, и моя работа – знать ответ» ответил старший брат. Молодой замолчал потому, что он был очень устал. Братья ходил и бродил, и всё стало темнее. Через некоторое время, молодой брат понял, что он не мог видеть его старшего брата. Он искал и громко назвал старшего, но он ничего не слышал.

Молодой брат отправился обратно к птичке, которую он раньше видел. «Извините Птичка, я потерялся! Я не могу найти ни грибы, ни ягоды, ни дорогу домой, ни моего старшего брата... Помогите мне, пожалуйста!» плакал мальчик. «Не бойся, мальчик» ответила Птичка, и дала ему карту. «Я нашёл эту карту, но мне не нужна. Теперь, ты можешь найти дорогу домой.» «Спасибо, спасибо большое, дорогая Птичка!» сказал мальчик. «Не за что!» ответил Птичка, и улетела.

Скоро он понял, что было так темно, что не мог видеть карту. Он испугался потому, что ему было очень холодно. Он вдруг увидел ту дачу, которую он раньше видел. Он подошёл к даче, постучал в дверь, и старуха открыла дверь. Она спросила «кто там?»

«Это я, младший брат. Я потерялся и очень боюсь! Я не могу найти ни моего брата, ни дорогу домой. У меня эта карта, но я не могу её читать потому, что сейчас так темно!» плакал мальчик. Старуха передала ему керосиновую лампу. Мальчик сказал «спасибо», долго смотрел на карту, и потом отправился.

Через два часа, мальчик видел, сквозь мрак и деревья, своего маленький коттедж. Наконец, он пришёл домой. Там в спальне стоял доктор. «Здравствуйте, молодой человек, ваша мама рождает ребёнка!»

Мальчик ждал в зале. Когда ребёнок родился, Птичка прилетела через окно и приложилась на его плечо. Она прошептала ему в ухо, «Теперь ты – старший брат, и твоя работа – знать ответ!»



TWO BROTHERS

Benjamin Epstein



THERE once lived two brothers in a forest far, far away. They lived in a little cottage with their mother who was with child. Every morning, the brothers left their home and went into the forest to gather berries and mushrooms.

One day, when the weather was nice, the brothers set out from home to find mushrooms and berries for dinner. They trekked through the dark forest and searched until evening.

Alas, the brothers couldn't find a thing. They grew worried because it was late and had grown dark. The younger brother asked the older, "do you know the way home, dear older brother?" The older brother replied, "Well of course I know! I'm the older brother and my job is to know the answer!" "Of course, forgive me," answered the younger brother.

The older brother led the younger through the forest, and still they found nothing. "Older brother," said the younger, "I think I saw a cabin over there through the trees. Maybe we'd be better off asking for directions?" "Out of the question!" answered the older brother. "We don't need to ask anything. I'm the older brother and my job

is to know the answer!" "Alright, forgive me," answered the younger brother. The brothers walked through forest, on and on, and still they found nothing. At that very moment, the younger brother saw a little bird who was circling above their heads.

"Can we ask the bird for directions?" asked the younger brother. "Don't ask me that question again! I'm the older brother, and my job is to know the answer," answered the older. The younger brother fell silent because he was weary. The brothers continued to wander, as it grew even darker. After some time, the younger brother realized that he had lost sight of his older brother. He looked around and shouted out to his older brother but he heard nothing.

The younger brother headed back toward the little bird, whom he had seen earlier. "Excuse me little bird, I am lost! I can't find any mushrooms or berries, I can't find the way home, and now I can't find my older brother. Please help me!" cried the boy. "Don't worry child," answered the little bird, handing him a map. "I found this map, but I don't need it. Now you can find your way home." "Thank you! Thank you so much, dear little bird!" exclaimed the boy.

"It is nothing, young man," the bird replied, and flew off. Soon he realized that it was so dark that he couldn't read the map. He was frightened because it had grown very cold. Suddenly, he saw the very dacha from earlier. He knocked on the door and an old woman opened it and asked, "Who's there?"

"It's me, the younger brother. I'm lost and I'm really scared! I can't find my brother nor the way home. I have this map, but I can't read it because it's so dark out!" cried the boy. The old woman handed him a kerosene lamp. The boy thanked the woman, took a long look at the map, and set out in the direction of his home.

After two hours, the boy made out through the darkness and the trees his little cottage. Finally, he had arrived. There in the bedroom stood a doctor. "Greetings young man, your mother is giving birth!"

The boy waited in the hall. When the child was born, the little bird from before flew in through the window and landed on the boy's shoulder. She whispered into his ear, "Now you are the older brother, and your job is to know the answer!"

ДЕВЯТЬСОТ ДЕВЯТНАДЦАТЬ ЛЕТ

Алексей Исаев

I.
Валькирии спускаются с небес.

Разбита первая печать; в конец,
Начало. Иконописный, белый конь,
Царственным галопом, спешит к тебе.
Трубят рога! Зовут тебя наверх.

Но Боже! Кто же на коне?
Лицо не как у христианки!
Хватай свой крест, что на груди;
Лицо Христа сожжёт твоих врагов!

Но как-же?! Что за чудо!?
Валькирия взяла тебя, и усадила на коня.
С прекрасной девой ты помчался ввысь,
И приземлился на небосклоне.

Все, кто надеялся в конец,
Увидеть бога, или дьявола, как дано
Идут теперь сквозь великолепные Врата,
Расписанные подвигами, битвами, и славой.

Меж них лежит дорога, и там, в дали,
Ты видишь Древо,
Чьи корни наполняют мир, чьи ветви
охватывают всё, чего не ждал.

Сидишь теперь за трапезным столом,
А на груди все тот же крест, и тот христос.
И думаешь, рай не таков, возможно ад?
Но сладок мёд, и радостно веселие.

Сомнения нет - Валхалла.

NINE HUNDRED NINETEEN YEARS

Alexey Isayev

I.
Valkyries descend from the skies.

The first seal is broken; in the end,
a beginning. A white horse, iconic,
With a Kingly gallop, hurries to you.
The Trumpets sound! They call you upwards.

But, God! Who is on the horse?
It is not a christian face!
Grab your cross, that's on your chest;
Christ's face will burn your enemies!

But how?! What's this!?
The valkyrie took you, and sat you on the horse.
With the beautiful maiden you rushed heavenward,
and touched down on the horizon.

All who hoped, in the end,
To see the god, or devil, as was deemed
Walk now through magnificent gates,
Painted with heroic deeds, battles, and fame.

Between them lies a road, and there, in the distance,
You see the Tree,
Whose roots fill the world, whose branches
Cover all of which you did not expect.

You sit now at the banquet table,
And on your chest is still that cross and still that christ.
And you think, this can't be heaven, could it be hell?
But the mead is sweet, and the company is joyful.

There is no doubt - Valhalla.

Всю жизнь ты прожил в чистоте и правде,
И вот настал твой шанс!
Изгнать из праведной земли
Неверующих: араб и басурман.

Твой князь призвал тебя, и с ним пошёл ты.
Великий крестный ход, весь мир христианский охватил,
И толи Папа Римский, толи Византийский,
Праведных христиан повел, в священную войну.

Парус белый ликовал, над вашей баржей.
Красный крест резвился на ветру.
И видел ты, о божье создание,
Как сам господь бежал к враждебным берегам!

Сошли на берег, и дружную толпой,
Вы поплелись.
Сожгли Никею и Антиох,
И вот! Врата Иерусалима!

До них рукой подать!
Но заперли прославленную дверь.
За ней сидел Иуда,
Сам дьявол подтолкнул засов.

Скорей! Вперед! На стены!
Ты лез вверх, с тобою братья.
Залез на бастион, вступил ты в бой.
Рубил, колол, кромсал врага!

Но что-то по спине отдавало,
И жаром тело оббежало.
Упал.
Братья твои, не взошли на вал.

Your entire life you lived in purity and truth,
And then came your chance!
To drive from the holy soil,
The Unbelievers: Arabs and Pagans.

Your king called upon you, and with him you went.
A great holy procession, which roused the entire Christian world,
And either the Roman Pope, or the Byzantine Pope,
Led the righteous Christians into holy war.



The white sail rejoiced above your barge.
A red cross froliced in the wind.
And you saw, oh god's creation,
How God himself ran to the enemy shores!

You stepped ashore, and in a friendly crowd,
You trudged.
You burned Nicaea and Antioch.
And there! The gates of Jerusalem!

They were within arm's reach!
But they locked the illustrious gate.
Behind it sat Judas,
The devil himself pushed the bars closed.

Quick! Forward! To the Walls!
You climbed up, your brothers with you.
You climbed the bastion, you entered battle.
Hacked, speared, mangled the enemy!

But something hit you in the back,
And your body exploded in heat.
You fell.
Your brothers did not reach the rampart.





Лежишь теперь ты на земле святой, валькирии спускаются с небес.

И видишь ты, то лико басурмана,
Что праведным мечом ты разорвал,
Чье тело проклял-надеясь в ад.

И видишь ты, спускаются валькирии.
Они возьмут тебя за меч, и уведут с собой.
Внесут в божественные хромы,
К столу, где Один сам, мед, пиво пьет.

Смотри! Смотри ты вниз!
На поле ратном бой идет.
Друзья твои взяли Иерусалим!
И красный, божий крест подняли над землей.

А видишь, вон! Лежит твой враг,
Его берет на грудь валькирия, влечет к вот этому столу.
Тот, чей путь столь злостно ты пресёк,
Глядит в глаза твои, теперь.

Когда сидишь, за праздничном столом,
Ты понимаешь: Ад - Валхалла.


You lay now on the holy land, the Valkyries descending from the sky.
And see the face of the foreign pagan,
Whom with your righteous sword you cut down,
While cursing him, damning him.

And you see the Valkyries descending.
They will take you up by the sword, carry you away.
They will bring you into the godly rooms,
To the table, at which Odin himself drinks mead and beer.

Look! Below!
The battle still rages.
Your friends have taken Jerusalem!
Now stands the red, godly cross they raised over the earth.

And still you see below! There lies your foe,
A Valkyrie takes him on her breast and leads him to this table.
He, whose path you so maliciously cut short,
Now gazes into your eyes.

As you sit behind the festive table,
You understand: Hell is Valhalla



FROM THE ZINE OF:
KSENIIA LESHCHENKO

THUS SPOKE TZARATHUSTR

(or a short and naive surreal incursion in pre-war Romania)

Călina-Maria Moldovan

*War. They want war, now,
when the birds have started
to fly again...*

The birds started to fly again indeed. All around the country, young poets and artists were terrorized by them. Every line or paint brush that touched the canvas, every philosophical thought, became a delightful drudgery.

“Hold me,” said Vinea one day, while writing something about fishermen with stars on their arms. “Hold me! I have something inside my heart, inside my soul; it’s trying to get out! It hurts!” Then a bird popped out of his mouth and they knew it was true: the birds were back.

“Samuel, is it real?”

“I’ve been waiting for you, why did you come so late? I’ve

written a new poem about you, you should read it.”

“But is it true?”

“What?”

“The birds!”

Pensively, Samuel looked at her with bleak, tormented eyes, and then sighed loudly.

“It is. Look.”

He walked to his writing desk, took out a pen and a sheet of paper, and began to write. Each letter that emerged would cause tiny iridescent particles to sprout to Samuel’s eyes, carrying with it an underlying feeling of agonizing pain, of being tortured. His hand was sliding furiously over the paper, convulsive and spasmodic. Then, he began coughing violently. Seeing this, the girl looked at him and began to cry. But, after a few moments, there it was: a tall, mighty, and pristine egret.

“Open the window.”

The girl rushed to let the majestic bird fly freely, then grabbed Samuel’s hand and, smiling brightly, said:

“But this is wonderful! Oh, dear God, so, so wonderful!”

The reappearance of the birds was tremendously marvelous for the people who knew how to tame them, since the beasts were wild and reckless. They used to fly up into the sky until it fractured and split apart. Each new fracture that emerged was further proof that the country was not yet ready for the birds.

The sparrows and other small birds used to sneak into people’s houses and wreak unimaginable havoc. Windows did not stop them from entering homes. They would tap the



glass with their beaks, turning the transparent surface into a damp steam that would dissipate into thin air, then enter the dwelling and, sitting peacefully on the inner window sill, begin to sing. The melody crawled up on walls and down onto the floor, until the house became full of microscopes and human eyes. Then the creatures would become bored and leave.

When Samuel “experienced” his first bird, he became morose. He knew that, in a country where most of the population was unable to read a poem (not to mention write one), the birds could not survive. Romania burned from conflict. The peasants had no power. They were, in fact, owned by the wealthy, who controlled everything and ruled everywhere. As if that weren’t enough, charlatan doctors and personal faith were often a sick man’s only hope, since hardly any hospital could be found in the countryside. And then the birds came.

Samuel knew he couldn’t survive there. His lungs were full to the brim with all kinds of birds, each struggling to be free. They used to climb into his head where you could see them – pelicans, storks, nightingales – behind his confused eyes, each desperate to fly, to become an endless and everlasting frenzy. And then there was the war.

“I am leaving. I’ve changed my name and I am living. The birds are dying here and so am I.”

The girl looked bewildered. The blood in her right ven

tricle drew a wildflower on the wall of her heart. Samuel wrote her many beautiful poems, and even though she could understand only a few of them, she knew they were lovely and that Samuel loved her very much.

“Leaving? Where?
Will you come back?”

*Tristan Tzara (born Samuel Rosenstock) left Romania when he was 19. He was one of the central figures of the Dada movement. Today, his name is used in Romanian to mean “sad in the country”.



Ծնունդ
Մէկ օր, ամէն կին հասկանում է
Որ իր մարմինը իրեն չի պատկանում:
Իր մազերը, անձանոդ-
Իր շորերը, օտար-
Իր ժպիտը, տարօրինակ-
Ինչպէ՞ս հասաւ այստեղ, որ իր էութիւնը իրեն զգուելի է:
Քո հայելիիդ առաջ կանգնիր, սիրելի,
եւ մկրատող բռնիք քո ձեռքիդ մէջ:
Առաջ, մազերը, անձանոդ-
Երկար, գեղեցիկ, սարգուած մազերդ հաւազիր,
եւ կտրիր:

Յետոյ, շորերը, օտար-
Սուղ, համեստ, կանաչի շորերդ
կտրիր քո մարմնի վրայից:
Վերջապէս, ժպիտը, տարօրինակ-
Մկրատով բերանիդ կոխքերը կտրիր
ժպիտը, քաղցր, գրաւչական, սիրուն
թող ընգնի երեսիցդ գետնի վրայ:
Բայց դեր անհանգիստ ես զգում, ա՛յո, անձանոդ քո մորդի մէջ:
Մկրատը վերցրուր, համով,
եւ մորդտ քանդիր քո մարմնից
որ պատեանի մը նման բացուի:
Քիթը, աչքերը, արմունկները, ծունգերը,
Մատերը, ձեռքերը, ոտքերը, թուշերը,
Սիրտը, խելքը, ուղեղը, խիղճը,
կտրի՛ր, կտրի՛ր,
եւ ազատուի՛ր:
Վերջապէս, կ՛երեւաս,
կամ ուժեղ, կամ թոյլ,
կամ մազոտ, կամ անմազ,
կամ երկար շորով, կամ կարճ փէշով,
կամ զարդարուած, կամ պարզ:
Եւ այսպէս, առաջի անգամը քո կեանքում
դու քո հետ կը ծանօթանաս:
Բարի գալուստ:

Ծնունդը

մահ

ծնունդ

նշտաջ

արյունը

Birth

death

birth

blood

birth

birth

is natural

Birth

One day every woman understands
That her body does not belong to her
Her hair, unknown-
Her clothes, foreign-
Her smile, strange-

How did she reach this place, where her very existence is repulsive to her?

Stand in front of the mirror, dear,
And hold the pair of scissors in your hand.

First, the hair, unknown-
Gather your long, beautiful, styled hair,
And cut it off.

Next, the clothes, foreign-
Cut the stylish, modest, feminine clothes
From your body.

Finally, the smile, strange-
Cut the corners of your mouth with the scissors

Allow the smile, sweet, seductive, pretty
To fall from your face onto the floor.

But you still feel uncomfortable, yes,
A stranger within your own skin?

Take the scissors, darling,
And tear the skin from your body
So that it opens up like a shell.

The nose, the eyes, the elbows, the knees,
The fingers, the hands, the legs, the cheeks,
The heart, the brain, the mind, the conscience,

Cut them off! Cut them off!
And liberate yourself!

Finally, you will appear,
Either strong, or weak,
Either hairy, or hairless,

Either in a long dress, or a short skirt,
Either decorated, or plain.

And thus, for the first time in your life,
You will know yourself.

Welcome to the world.

Written by Lillian Avedian

FORCED EVICTIONS

Photographs by
Ioana Marinescu



"It all happened so fast... We only had time to gather a few small things, a few necessities and get out... We lost our home..." These are the common phrases whispered by victims of homelessness and forced evictions.


Such is the case for many people, especially in my motherland, Romania. On this matter, many articles and reports have been written, but unless we talk directly to someone who has gone through a horrible situation like this, it is hard to comprehend and empathize.

My project tackles these issues and the horror of such situations. Because - it's the small things that make the home...but what if you don't have a home?

Ioana Marinescu



Anna Akhmatova's



*Oh no, and not above an alien skydome,
Not under foreign wing-sweep's shroud - But stood
together with my people,
Where my sad people were then found. – 1961*

Instead of Preface

During the frightful years of Yezhovshina, I spent seventeen months within the prison lines of Leningrad. One day, there was a moment when someone "identified" me. And that's when a woman with blue lips who stood directly behind me and who, naturally, had never in her whole life heard of my name awoke from the stupor which came so organically to all of us and, leaning close to my ear, asked me (there, everyone spoke in whispers): "And all of this, are you capable of describing?"

And I said:
"Yes, I am."

That's when something slightly resembling a smile quickly slid over what was once her face.

Around April 1957,
Leningrad

Dedication Introduction

Before this sorrow mountain's bend, This took place when the only ones smiling
The one great river fails to flow; Were the dead ones, for stillness too glad -
But toughly-latched are prison gates While, a useless appendage, meandered
Across them are the slave-dug holes By its prisons our own Leningrad.
And a deathly yearning falls. And when, growing insane from their tortures,
Sure, for some of us the winds still blow The convicted ones started to move,
And the twilight bares its tender faces - And when whistles of trains kept on breaking
But we're the same all over, we don't know, Into quick separation-steamed tunes.
Only hear that keys are scraping coldly When the deadliest stars hung above us,
And the heavy steps that soldiers left. When so blamelessly grimaced the Russ
When we would rise as if to early supping, Under wheels of dark convict-filled train-cars,
When we would tread across a capital debased And beneath all the blood-covered boots.
And there would reconvene
More breathless than the dead ones.
So while the sun sinks fast
And Neva River dons more fog,
Why, in the distance keeps on singing hope...
The sentence drops... At once the tears would shoot;
And from everyone I've become far,
As if with my pain all of life they'd remove,
Would remove from inside of my heart.
Or would push me askew, to my back,
Push me down.
But still walks, walks along,
Though wavering, she steps.
Walks alone, but walks ahead.
And where are they, unwilling girlfriends,
Of those two, my most bedeviled, years?
What do they envision, sense,
Within Siberia's swirled storms?
And what do they hallucinate
Within the circle of the moon?
For it is to them that I send out
My farewell hello.
- March 1940

I
They were walking you out in the dawn time,
As if carried, behind you I stepped.
In dark pantries the children were crying,
By God's altar the candle wax wept.
On your lips is the cold of an icon
Deathly sweat on your face...
Can't forget!
And I will, like the guard archers' wifeys,
Howl beneath Kremlin towers, lament.
- November 1935, Moscow

II
Softly flows the quiet Don,
Yellow month enters the home.

Enters in a hat astray,
Sees that yellow month the shade.

III, this woman feels all wrong
And this woman is alone.

Husband buried, son in jail.
Would someone for my sake pray?
- 1938

III
No, it isn't really I,
No, it's someone else who suffers,
Not this way,
Just couldn't I,
And that thing,
The thing that happened,
Let black branches hide with growth,
Let the streetlamps nights cart off.
- 1939




IV
If someone could then show that
Mocking girl,
That lovely favorite of friends,
That jolly Royal Village sinner gal,
What some far day your life
Would have become.
Show how, three-hundredth in a line,
And with a package
Beneath the Crosses you would stand,
And how a falling tear, while growing heated,
Your New Year's ice would burn away.
There,
Where a prison poplar wavers, bends,
And not a sound.
While just how many crimeless lives
There end right now...



V
For seventeen months now
Do I yell and yell...
Back home I call you,
To executioner's toes fell,
My son and horror.
Forever all became confused,
Can no more say,
Just who's the person, who the beast,
How soon the execution's day.
And only flowers brightly flash,
The incensed ring,
And then the steps that somehow stray,
Stray into nothing.
Into my eyes directly stared
And threatened of impending death
A star grown bloated, vast.
- 1939

VI

Weeks are lightly fleeting by,
What took place I can't divine...
How, my son, into your prison
These white nights would keep on peering,
How these nights would glare, would look
With the hot eyes of a hawk
And of your exalted cross
And of death would surely talk.
- *Spring 1939*



VII

The Sentencing
And then they dropped a word,
Fashioned from stone,
Right onto my still-living chest.
It's okay for, after all, I was ready;
Somehow I'd take care of all that.

Today I must finish, oh, so many things:
To slaughter my memory dead,
Embalm my old soul, make it turn into stone,
To learn how to live yet again.

And if not...
The summer's heated rustling
Behind my window, like a holiday,
So long ago, I first foresaw within me
This empty dwelling and this shining day.
- *June 22nd, 1939, The Fountain House*

VIII

To Death


I know you'll come for me one day - So why not now?
And I await you -
It is so hard to carry on.
I dimmed the lights and open the wide door
For you, so simple and from wonders forged.
So, take upon whatever form you want,
Commit a break-in with a poisoned gunshot
Or slide by with a metal weight,
Just like some steely bandit,
Or poison me with a typhoid disease...
Or with a faerie tale,
Incessantly Imagined by you thus,
And nauseatingly well-known
To all of us - So that I'd see
Above the sky-blue hat
Of a pale cowardly old housing head,
That I no longer care.

Still swirls and swirls the River - Yenisey -
And shines, so luminous, the Northern star;
Now those beloved eyes, their clear blue glimmer,
A final-most of horrors covers up.
- *August 19th, 1939*
The Fountain House

IX

Already madness
With its wing
Half of my soul
Is covering.
Intoxicates with wine of flame,
Invites into a blackened vale.
I understand now, that to him
I must give up this victory.
That to my alien, by now,
Such alien nonsense
I must continue listening.

And it won't let me take away
Nothing at all
Into that vale
(No matter how much I could ask it,
No use, however desperate my pleas)...
For neither the son's eyes,
So frightening
With stone-turned pity,
Nor the day when finally the thunders came,
Nor that lone hour of a prison date,
Neither his hands,
With all their darling coldness
Nor nervous shadows of the lindens,
Nor distances
Nor even easy-sounding words
Of final-most of comforts.
- *May the 4th, 1940*
The Fountain House



X

The Crucifixion

1

"Weepeth not for Me, oh, mother,
While in a casket Me seeith..."

A choir of angels the great hour
Proclaimed and blessed,
And heavens melted down in flames.
And unto Father did he say:
"Why have you, thus, forsaken me?!"
And to the Mother: "Oh, but do not weep for me..."
- 1940, The Fountain House

2

While Magdalene would toss and weep,
The pupil, favorite, would slowly turn to stone,
But where, in silence, did the Mother keep,
Why, no one dared to glance there,
Not at all.
- 1943, Tashkent


The Epilogue

1

I learned how faces shed themselves,
How 'neath the eyelids fear would glance,
How cuneiform's hard parchment pages
Upon the cheeks would sorrow trace,
How locks of hair from black and ashen
Would turn to silver in a flash,
On lips, resigned, would wilt a smile,
In small dry laughter shivers fright.
And all my prayers are not just for myself,
But for each of the people
Who would with me there stand,
Within those cold July's
Or in that merciless cold,
Beneath the red and blinded wall.

2

Again the hour of remembrance has neared.
I see you and I feel I heard:
Both her, whom almost to the very window they would walk,
And also her who would no longer tread her homeland's earth.
And also her who, with her pretty head a'flaunt,
Would say:
"When I come here, why,
It now feels like home."
I'd wish each one of them by their true name to call,
But they have confiscated all the lists,
Nowhere can one now learn such things.
For them such broadened tapestries I wove
Out of these poor words
That I from them had overheard.
And I remember them wherever runs my way,
In every time and place,
And can't forget them anyways
Whatever may be
All these new calamities.
And if they shut again my tortured mouth,
With which a hundred million people now shout out,
Let them recall me as I stood back then,
And think of me on anniversaries
Of my remembrance day.



And if, one day, within this very country
A statue they would wish to build for me.
In favor of such celebrations,
I can't help, but happily agree,
But with a sole condition - Please do not build it
Where I was once born, beside the sea,
For my last link to sea I have now ripped,
Nor by my Royal Village garden's tree stump of belief
Where, so disconsolate, a shadow seeks and seeks for me,
But build it here,
Where for three hundred hours I would stand,
Yet, they refused, in spite of all my wait,
To open for my pain that latch.
For, even in the midst of blessed death,
I fear that I'd forget the rumble of the black Marusya trolleys,
Forget the shutting of that heavy,
Hate-constructed door,
And how, just like a wounded beast,
An aging woman wailed and wailed some more...
And let it be that from the still and bronzed orbs
Like tears would stream that slightly melted snow,
And in the distance let him coo,
That prison dove,
While on the Neva River
Silent ships still make their path.
- Around the 10th of March, 1940.
The Fountain House

appendix

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