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



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Dear reader,

This edition of Troika is the result of a year's worth of diligent work culminating in our 2019 undergraduate publication in Slavic, East European, and Eurasian studies. Having received submissions from students at universities around the world (including Dartmouth College, The University of Chicago, The University of Pennsylvania, The University of Regina in Canada, and Kazan Federal University in Russia), we are proud to continue the legacy of this magazine.

Founded in 2011 at U.C. Berkeley, Troika has undergone a tremendous metamorphosis over the years. In 2018, the magazine underwent a Revolution which completely transformed its style, depth, and character. As a continuation of that endeavor, may this issue inspire you as much as it does us.

Lastly, I would like to dedicate this edition of Troika to the memory of my father, Zbigniew Lasek, whose love of the outdoors was unparalleled. His youthful adventures in the Polish Tatra Mountains motivate me now more than ever. Kocham cię, tato!

Thank you for picking up this issue of Troika. We hope you enjoy it!

Kevin Lasek + the Troika team
Spring 2019

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

Women in Russia in the Period of Trans-ition 1985-1999

"Owing to her work in the house, the woman is still in a difficult position. To effect her complete emancipation and make her the equal of the man it is necessary for the national economy to be socialized and for women to participate in common productive labor. Then women will occupy the same position as men." - V. Lenin, *Speech Delivered At The Fourth Moscow City Conference Of Non-Party Working Women*, Sep. 23, 1919

On March 8th, 2017, Russian feminists were arrested for holding up a sign that read "Men have been in power for two hundred years. Enough!" ("*200 лет мужчины у власти. Долой!*") in front of the Kremlin. At the same moment, Russian president Vladimir Putin was giving a speech to mark International Women's Day, in which he thanked women for "filling this world with their beauty" and "warming [it] with their tenderness"[1]. These events, though anecdotal, reflect the dual nature International Women's Day holds in contemporary Russia, where it is mostly perceived as a commercial opportunity for florists and jewelers.

The word "feminism" is broadly rejected in contemporary Russia by both women and men, and perceived as an Occidental hatred of men. Such a rejection has complex historical roots: the "woman question" (*женский вопрос*) was a fundamental part of USSR politics, from its proclaimed "resolution" by the Bolshevik revolution's emphasis on work and political representation of women to its reopening in the Gorbachev era and subsequent depictions of women as primarily mothers and home-makers. In order to understand the resistance feminist activism meets today in Russia, it is crucial to examine with particular attention the period of transition from communism to a market economy[2]. The reduced censorship this period allowed for critiques of the inequalities of the Soviet regime to surface, and concepts like Western feminism were incorporated into public and political debates. One could therefore argue that such a time could have been conducive to claims of equality between women and men in Russian society. However, by 1999, the few organizations promoting gender equality received little to no support, while the mainstream discourse depicting home as the natural place for a woman was broadly accepted.

In order to understand why claims of equality struggled to emerge in the period of transition, this essay will first consider crucial aspects of women's experiences in Soviet Russia, before analyzing the consequences of transition-era reforms on women's lives, and the obstacles faced by feminist activism in this period.

The "woman question" in the USSR

In the beginning of the 20th century, the "woman question" was central to Marxist- Leninist struggles. A specific section of the Communist party dedicated to the emancipation of women, the *Zhenotdel*, was created when the Bolsheviks took power. Soon, several rights were granted with this goal in mind: women could vote in 1917, abortion was legalized in 1920, and quotas were put in place to ensure women's political representation. The integration of women into the national workforce was central to the Bolsheviks' goal of dissolution of private and public sphere and of the creation of a single class of equal workers[3]. Thus, women were encouraged to take on full employment as the figure of the emancipated woman worker became a symbol of the Socialist state. When Stalin came to power, he declared the "woman question" resolved, and debates on women's conditions in the Soviet state ceased until Gorbachev rose to power[4].

However, most women did not experience the Soviet period as liberating. Rather, Soviet women were expected to be "superwomen," serving a dual function for the State as both full-time workers *and* home-keepers[5]. Hedrick Smith, in 1991, reported a popular joke among Soviet women:

"Under capitalism, women are not liberated because they have no opportunity to work. They have to stay at home, go shopping, do the cooking, keep house and take care of the children. But under socialism, women are liberated. They have the opportunity to work all day and then go home, go shopping, do the cooking, keep

house and take care of the children."[6]

Moreover, the rights granted to women in the early 1920s proved to be ineffective. Voting rights were made obsolete by the centralization and monopolization of political power by the Party, few women sat in powerful political institutions[7], and women workers were concentrated in jobs with small wages and little recognition[8].

Political discourses championing the Party as a liberator of women were seen as political instrumentalizations denying the double-burden imposed on women in the Stalinist era. When Gorbachev rose to power and launched policies of restructuring (perestroika), transparency (glasnost) and democratization, critiques of the Stalinist impact on women's lives were more widely accepted, and the "woman question" was officially reopened. However, during this period, patriarchal discourses about women's roles in society re-emerged, partly due to the restoration of the Christian Orthodox Church – which the Communist state rejected[9]. According to these discourses, the Stalinist state had put women in a worker's position that shouldn't have been theirs to assume. Indeed, they argued that a woman's place was at home, and that the "over-emancipation" of women had caused a "crisis of masculinity" by stripping men away from their role as breadwinners[10]. Moreover, a decline in fertility rates encouraged discourses of women's "patriotic duty" to give birth and care for children first and foremost[11]. In this climate, the ideology of women as vulnerable and in need of protection re-emerged, and Gorbachev's goal of returning women to "their purely womanly mission" received widespread support[12].

The ambivalent impact of transition-era reforms on women's activism

At the same time that women's place in society was being debated, working women suffered a terrible blow because of the economic reforms undertaken in Gorbachev's *perestroika* and Yeltsin's "shock therapy". Under *perestroika*, the reduction in state-afforded social benefits for women workers, coupled with high layoff rates in predominantly female-operated sectors, such as the textile industry, led to economic hardship for women[13]. Women often found themselves in precarious situations, working jobs with little recognition and pay. This prevented most of them from playing an active role in the privatization process that allowed the public to purchase shares of state-owned firms. When Boris Yeltsin began his "shock therapy" reforms, which combined deregulation, privatization and macroeconomic stabilization, hyperinflation hit, and women, who by then represented 72% of the unemployed population, suffered from decreased buying power and had to spend significantly more time seeking affordable goods[14]. The state did not try to remedy the gendered effects of these economic reforms, and instead prided itself on having liberated women from their worker duties. In effect, economic hardship compelled women to work in precarious conditions, while dealing with increasingly difficult home-related duties[15].

The transition area also saw significant changes for women's participation in the political sphere. In 1988, the system of quotas established during the Soviet era to ensure minimum representation of women in political institutions was suppressed, leading to a sharp decrease in the number of female representatives. In 1991, after the first free elections, only 5,6% of representatives were women (whereas they were 33% elected in the Supreme Soviet in the 1970s)[16]. While some voices emerged calling for the increased representation of women, especially with the impact of economic reforms, the societal consensus around the image of the mother and home-maker deterred most women from running for office. Those who did participate politically had to navigate through conflicting expectations; the perfect female candidate had to prove she would not let her home and family suffer from her political role *without* alienating the part of the electorate that believed women should and must play a full role in the political system[17]. This double burden effectively prevented many women from becoming political candidates. However, some groups succeeded at such maneuvering. The political group "Women of Russia," was born out of the newly-emancipated Soviet Era "Union of Women of Russia" and two other women groups, but refused to call itself "feminist" while demanding economic protection of women, and obtained 8% of the votes cast in 1993[18].

Women of Russia illustrates the emergence of women's groups in transition-era Russia after the *glasnost's* liberalization. As statistics detailed the wage inequalities between men and women, a desire for change began. In 1990, a law on voluntary organizations granted women's organizations legal personality and right to publish. Anastasia Posadskaia, member of the Moscow Center for Gender Studies, describes this opening of new possibilities:

"[…] all of a sudden, you realize that this is the moment when you can bring all your passion to the possibility of a kind of social change in your own country which matches your vision. […] This is tremendous excitement when you find others think in the same way, not because they are supposed to or because the party says they should."[19]

Therefore, though the transition years brought hardship to Russian women, they were also a time of opportunity for grassroots organizations to form and fight for increased equality. Still, like "Women of Russia", many of the emerging women's organizations followed the dominant discourse depicting women as primarily mothers, home-makers, and vulnerable citizens, furthering the naturalization of gender inequalities[20].

Resistances to the formation of solid women's movements in post-Soviet Russia

As discussed above, the first roadblock faced by women's activism in post-Soviet Russia was the strength of the essentialist discourse of women as mothers and home-makers. The hardships of the Soviet era detailed in this essay, combined with the rapid diffusion of pornography after *glasnost*, lead to a rejection of what was considered the "over-emancipation" of women and to a broad support of conservative genderdiscourses[21]. This

ideology was bolstered by the resurgence of traditionalist religious institutions after the restoration of the Christian Orthodox Church[22].

In addition to this, some structural aspects of the transition era were not favorable for the advancement of women's living conditions. With the development of capitalism came a growing individualism. Emerging women's group took on different approaches to issues of gender, thus making it difficult for multiple organizations to rally around a common goal. Moreover, these organizations struggled to reach popular support because many of them surfaced in particular social spheres such as the academic and intellectual milieus.

The most significant obstacle to women's organizations in the transition era was obtaining resources[23]. Faced with difficult economic conditions, some organizations such as the Moscow Center for Gender Studies chose to associate with the state in order to access funding and meeting spaces. These groups were often met with distrust from other women's organizations because of the state's history of political instrumentalization of the "woman question"[24]. Therefore, some activists chose strict independence from the state, and had to find resources for their organizing efforts elsewhere. For instance, the group *Zhenskii Svet*, created during *perestroika*, refused as "a matter of principle" to seek official registration[25]. Such groups often competed for funding from foreign associations, which were eager to participate in the "development" of post-Soviet Russia[26]. These organizations then faced other hurdles, as they became dependent on international actors who tried to influence their political stances and activities[27]. Many organizations found themselves promoting what Chandra Mohanty calls "free-market feminism", i.e. a "neoliberal, consumerist (protocapitalist) feminism concerned with 'women's advancement' up the corporate and nation-state ladder"[28], which did not resonate with most Russian women. This created a paradoxical situation in which as the international recognition of these women's organizations increased, they lost local relevance and support, and could not create the kind of change they set out to[29].

In conclusion, although the transition era opened up dialogues around women's place in Russian society, few demands for equality managed to gain support. After the declared "emancipation of women" in the Soviet era, many women understood the term "equality" as a synonym for the double burden they had to bear during that period, as workers and home-makers. However, some women's groups did emerge because of the hardships suffered from economic reforms during the transition period. Still many women adhered to the traditionalist gender discourse promoted during the Gorbachev era. The few organizations that did demand equality between men and women suffered from lack of political and popular support and from the scarcity of resources, therefore struggling to have a lasting influence. The transition era therefore gives important insight into the persistence of essentialist patriarchal discourses in Russia today, and the difficulties feminist movements still face in finding support in the broader population.

Soviet Poster 1926, (Liberated Women, Build Socialism!)

voroh.com

"Over the years [...], we failed to pay attention to women's specific rights and needs arising from **their role as mother and home-maker,** and their indispensable educational function as regards children [...] This is a **paradoxical result of our sincere and politically justified desire to make women equal with men in everything.** Now, in the course of perestroika, we have begun to overcome this shortcoming. That is why we are now holding heated debates in the press, in public organizations, at work and at home, about the question of what we should do to **make it possible for women to return to their purely womanly mission**" - Mikhaïl Gorbatchev, *Perestroïka*, New York, Harper Collins, 1987, p. 117

Jeanne Gissinger,
U.C. Berkeley
Sciences Po, Paris



"The point is that even the best communist, does not know how to carry on trade, because he is not a businessman. There is a great deal that can and must be learned from the capitalist."
- Vladimir Lenin.[1]

The New Economic Policy

In 1920, the Soviet government was forced to take a step back from rapid industrialization and implemented a policy that would leave a long-lasting mark in the history of the Soviet Union. Through an evolving taxation system, the New Economic Policy was able to restrict the expansion of an emergent private sector and free trade, while at the same time raising agricultural production and advancing the project of a communist state. Its invaluable significance can be found in the history of its conception and implementation.



Fig. 1.
Gross output of industry in real terms, 1916-1919. Group A industry refers to capital goods (producer goods) and Group B industry refers to consumer goods (including industrially processed food products)

Source: Davies, R. W., Mark Harrison, and S. G Wheatcroft. *The Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union, 1913-1945.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

War Communism

When the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917 they had no economic plan. With an ongoing Civil War that would last until the 1920 defeat of the White Army, the Bolsheviks adopted harsh measures against private property and the free market. In 1918 they implemented a policy that consisted of three main elements: requisition of grain by force, abolishment of money, and payment of workers in kind.[2]

The massively negative effects from this policy can be majorly attributed to three factors: lack of incentives for the peasantry to increase production, an ineffective distribution of the food supply by the government, and the state of fragmentation in which factories and heavy industries found themselves after the war. The situation reached a critical peak with the famine of 1921 when major uprisings took place throughout the country

The Soviet government was forced to *temporarily* retreat from rapid industrialization and extreme centralization in order for their vision of an industrial socialist society to get a second opportunity. Due to its inability to produce enough food supply for the population, War Communism was thus replaced by The New Economic Policy from 1921 to 1929.

Personal Incentivisation

Lenin himself called it State Capitalism. Since War Communism had failed to effectively incentivize agricultural production, the need for a free market that would encourage competition became essential. Under state supervision and close regulation, capitalism would be used in the Soviet Union as a connection bridge between small-scale manufactured goods production and socialism by increasing the productive forces[3]. In his pamphlet *The Tax in Kind* (1921), Lenin argued that capitalism was not an evil in all circumstances. Compared to small-scale production, it was an improvement –the last step towards socialism.[4]

One of the key elements of The New Economic Policy was the reestablishment of private property. In order for plan and market structures to be able to coexist in the fragmented Russian economy, there had to be a free market with private property that would incentivize productivity. The challenge was determining how much private enterprise to encourage as an incentive force with the treat of capitalism corrupting the ideals of the revolution. The result was the tax in kind, that is, agricultural output could be traded in the local market for profit.

However, it is important to note that although it was agreed upon that state enterprises would operate on principles of profit-and-loss accounting and adapt to the needs of the market, the Soviet government fixed the desired outputs of production and did not allow for major liberal reforms to take place.[5]



Fig. 2.
GDP per capita from 1885 to 2005.

Source: Davies, R. W., Mark Harrison, and S. G Wheatcroft. *The Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union, 1913-1945.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Economic recovery

Material encouragement resulted in improved labor discipline and a rise in labor productivity. By 1920, grain production reached two thirds of the pre-war 1909-1913 level, and by 1928 it exceeded it.[6] The New Economic Policy helped the Russian economy recover incredibly fast. As V.S Groman, an officer from Gosplan[7] puts it: "there was not a single mind in the USSR which would have foreseen this."[8]

The extent of the recovery has not yet been agreed upon by historians due to the lack of reliability of Soviet statistics, but according to the lowest estimate, in 1928 Soviet national income hit 93% of the 1913 pre-war level; according to the official Soviet estimate it reached 113%.[9] Regardless of the exact percentage number, The New Economic Policy had restored economic growth and stability to Russia (see figure 2).

The state budget deficit also showed unexpectedly rapid signs of improvement. In nine months during the year 1922, the state budget deficit amounted to 43.2% of GDP. By 1923, only two years from the implementation of the New Economic Policy, it amounted to 27.1%. By 1924, it was further reduced to a minimum level.[10]

International trade

The Soviet Union signed a bilateral trade agreement with the United Kingdom in 1921.[11] Nonetheless, exports and imports never reached pre-war levels with the implementation of The New Economic Policy. Why is it that the New Economic Policy was so effective at fostering accelerated growth in most sectors of the economy, but failed in doing so with regards to International trade?

In spite of the need of more imported technology to industrialize rapidly, this was partly due to a general widespread fear of allowing capitalism the space to further impose on the communist ideology.

Year	Exports	Imports
1913	1506	1375
1918	8	105
1919	0.1	3
1920	1.4	29
1921	20	211
1922	82	270
1923	217	143
1924	329	260

Fig. 3.
Foreign trade from 1913-1940 in millions of gold rubles.
Source: Nove, Alec. An Economic History of the U.S.S.R.. Repr. with revisions. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1984.

An essay by Preobrazhensky, an influential Russian revolutionary and economist of the twentieth century, observes this phenomenon:

> No accumulation within the bourgeois encirclement is capable of amassing such an amount of merchant capital that it could in a historically brief period take control of production in our large-scale industry. The only candidate for seizing that control is foreign capital.[12]

Thus, the Soviets followed a policy of importing essential elements for the rapid industrialization of Russia, as well as the limitation of foreign capital entrance and trade expansion (see figure 3).

Taxation

The Soviet Union´s taxation system during the implementation of the New Economic Policy consisted of two main components: first, the replacement of requisitioning of food production by a tax in kind; second, the progressive income taxation of small to medium sized businesses owned by the emerging class of capitalists, referred to as *Nepmen*. The *Prodnalog*[13] (tax in kind), which was introduced on March, 1921 by a decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, had the purpose of strengthening the *smychka* (the bond of economic cooperation between the proletariat and peasantry).[14] Additionally, it led to an immediate raise in agricultural productivity. With the reintroduction of money in 1922 and the further decentralization of the economy, the tax in kind was abolished in 1924 and replaced by a monetary tax.

The situation was considerably different for the *Nepmen*. In 1921, the Business Tax was introduced and consisted of a license fee that would have to be paid every six months, as well as a leveling tax of 3% of revenue monthly.[15] In addition, the Income Tax of 1922 demanded that small to medium-sized businessmen and managers pay 14.6% of their profits to the Soviet government.

As the private sector reached out for more room to expand and develop, businessmen and managers of small to medium size stores saw their incomes further restricted by the taxation system. By 1925, taxes took 35 to 52 percent of the entire income of a private businessmen.[16] This taxation on the income of Nepmen therefore restricted the expansion of capitalism and prevented the accumulation of economic surplus for capitalist purposes. Due to a *progressive taxation policy* that increasingly targeted the emergent class of businessmen and managers, NEP shrunk the expansion possibilities of a resurgent private sector.[17]

Similarly, NEP was characterized by the accumulation of economic surplus by the state. Taxation contributed largely to state revenue, which would be later invested in projects supportive of the communist aim.[18] By 1924, 34% of state revenue came from taxation.[19] By 1928, most industrial production had either returned to pre-war levels or increased.

Furthermore, with the introduction of NEP, the gap in income between higher-paid and lower-paid workers declined substantially from 1914 to 1928, and NEP also brought more job opportunities and less income inequality to women workers.[20] By progressively increasing taxation on the private sector and reducing the burden on the peasantry, the taxation policy deliberately seeked to achieve income equality. Hence, advancing the project of a communist state.

Legacy

The New Economic Policy has often been praised for the immediate positive effect that it had on an economy vastly damaged by War Communism and its ability to bring together "petty capitalist commodity production and large scale industry development by the Soviet State" for almost a decade.[21] However, perhaps even more impressive than its economic results and capacity to elicit growth in almost all realms of heavy industry in record time was its dynamic adaptability.

Although The New Economic Policy implemented in the Soviet Union from 1921 to 1929 came to an end due to ideological differences between factions of the party following Lenin's death in 1924 and Stalin's ascension to power, it continues to foster discussion and inform the debate on the limits of State Capitalism and other hybrid alternatives to capitalism.

By gradually incentivizing higher levels of production and labor productivity in the agricultural sector and conveniently adapting its taxation policy to the pace of economic growth pertaining to the private sector, The New Economic Policy achieved food security, pre-war levels of industrial production, and overall economic growth and stability.

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University of Pennsylvania

Baba Yaga by Frederik Boumeester, U.C. Berkeley

One Swallow Makes a Film: Comparison Between the Film "Twelve" and the German Sadulaev Tale "One Swallow Doesn't Make a Summer"



In the Russian film "12" based on the American film "12 Angry Men" twelve jurors work to decide the fate of a Chechen boy accused of killing his father. Throughout the film there appear to be several indirect references to the tale "One Swallow Doesn't Make a Summer" from the book "I am a Chechen!" by German Sadulaev, which was published a year before the film. The film appears to use the symbolism of Chechen culture outlined in Sadulaev's tale, as well as a similar style of short fragmented events to convey the real story of the boy's life, just as Sadulaev writes in fragments of his own childhood in Chechnya. Whether the movie took Sadulaev's book into consideration during production or not, it is nevertheless helpful in interpreting the film's message that despite having a corrupted legal system, the compassion of the Russian jurors and people can rise above and serve true justice.



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

Сравнение между фильмом «Двенадцать» и повестью «Одна ласточка еще не делает весны» Германа Садулаева

В фильме «Двенадцать», двенадцать незнакомцев пытается разобрать вместе доказательства, чтобы установить, виновен ли чеченский мальчик в убийстве своего приемного русского отца. Фильм представляет интересный взгляд, особенно на российское право и правосудие. По всему фильму нам показывают короткие фрагменты жизни мальчика в Чечне во время Чеченских войн. В начале фильма у каждого из двенадцати есть своя правда и история, и все, кроме одного, уверены в том, что мальчик виновен. Примерно в середине фильма, когда пять голосовали за то, что мальчик невиновен, и семь еще за виновен, одна ласточка влетает в спортзал и все молча глядят на нее[1]. Этот момент особенно важен для фильма. Чтобы понять символизм ласточки, надо рассмотреть книгу Германа Садулаева *Я Чеченец!*, а именно часть называется «Одна ласточка еще не делает весны - Осколочная повесть». В повести Садулаева, он нелинейно пишет про свою жизнь и детство в Чечне и про свою семью, живущую в Чечне во время войны, пока он одновременно живет в Санкт-Петербурге. С самого начала есть много сходства между фильмом и повестью Садулаева.

В начале фильма мальчик катается на велосипеде, пока показаны фрагментированные изображения зала суда, матери мальчика, особой мертвой собаки и затем мертвой матери мальчика[2]. Подобным же образом Садулаев начинает осколочную повесть его, пиша о своей матери и о важности матери в чеченской культуре. Он пишет о том, как он боится неминуемой смерти матери, говоря: «Я давно хотел убежать. Потому что я знал, ты должна умереть, и ты будешь умирать мучительно, долго. Я не мог этого видеть. Во мне жил страх, страх, мама!».[3] Фильм тут задает тот же тон, как он в книге на тему своей матери. Образ собаки в этой сцене также будет важным позже, но сначала давайте вернемся к ласточке. «Я расскажу вам о ласточках»[4] , пишет Садулаев. Он продолжает:

Ласточки — это души предков. Моя мама никогда не умрет, она станет ласточкой, она прилетит ко мне из далекой страны, через моря и горы, она будет ангелом, следящим за мной с небес, но близких, очень близких, высотой не более стрехи над моим порогом.[5]

Садулаев объясняет, что ласточки являются важным символом в чеченской культуре. По словам Садулаева, никто, включая кошек, не убивает ласточек[6] и в чеченской культуре мигрирующие ласточки - символ прибывающего лета[7], [7]возвращаясь домой, принося новую жизнь. В фильме «Двенадцать» ласточка также является уникальным символом чеченского бытия. В тот момент после того, как ласточка влетает в спортзал, сцена переходит к мальчику в Чечне. В этой сцене мальчик лежит на земле с щенком между двумя зданиями, пока над ним происходит перестрелка.[8] Во время перестрелки часть шрапнели убивает собаку, которая покрыла мальчика. Это та же собака, образ которой нам показали в фрагментах в начале фильма. Но самое интересное, что эта сцена очень напоминает то, что происходит в повести Садулаева:

И в один день это случилось. Папа стоял во дворе, рядом бегал Пуштун, огромный пес светло-рыжего окраса. Бомба залетела прямо в наш двор. Когда самолеты еще только появились в небе, Пуштун стал беспокоиться, он прижимался к моему отцу и скулил. Раздался грохот взрыва, и пес в мгновение ока прыгнул на хозяина, сбил с ног. Накрыл его своим телом. Потом, когда папа поднял его на руки, он был весь в крови, израненный поражающим материалом фугаса. В нем были десятки этих металлических шариков. Предназначавшихся моему отцу. В тело папы попал только один, в плечо.[9]

В повести Садулаева щенок, которого он спас ранее, теперь спас жизнь своего отца в том же порядке, как это произошло в фильме. После перестрелки нам кратко показали клип другой собаки, бегущей с отрубленной рукой во рту.[10] Образ этой собаки также будет важным в конце фильма. Затем эта сцена сразу возвращается от собаки к ласточке, сидящей в спортзале.

Это очень значительная и переходная сцена в середине фильма. Вскоре после этой сцены они воссоздают место преступления и большинство двенадцати теперь верят, что мальчик невиновен. А после того, как все рассказали свою историю, двенадцать вместе решают, что мальчик не виновен. Но даже когда все согласны, председатель Николай объясняет, что, хотя мальчик невиновен, «в тюрьме он дольше проживет, чем в свободе».[11] Он дальше говорит, «мы в своем решении сейчас вместо того чтобы парня отправить в тюрьму подпишу ему смертный приговор и его убьют тупо страшно как собаку».[12] По словам Николая, если они так решат, тогда мальчик уже мертв. А Садулаев пишет, что он больше не чувствует страха после смерти своей матери и что такие чеченцы, как он, уже мертвы:

Меня зовут Садулаев Герман Умаралиевич. Я чеченец. Я не умею бояться. У нас этот участок мозга, который за страх отвечает, атрофирован напрочь. Можете меня убить — раньше или позже, вы или другие, мы все уже мертвые, мертвые смерти не боятся. Но за каждого нашего — десять ваших положим, так принято.

И дальше написано:

Я сумасшедший, вы разве этого еще не поняли? Только сумасшедший может так много думать о ласточках. Иногда я думаю, что я сам — ласточка. Может, потому, что я уже давно умер.[14]

Тут можно увидеть, что мальчик, потерявший свою семью, живущий сейчас в России, похож на Садулаева. Он уже мертв, и поэтому он уже ласточка.

Ближе к концу фильма, судья зачитывает приговор в зале суда и теперь показаны клипы мальчика, танцующего в детстве, а сейчас в тюрьме.[15] После освобождения мальчика, мальчик сидит с Николаем. Николай тут говорит мальчику, «У меня будешь жить. Пойдем отсюда».[16] Затем в последний раз нам показали клип матери мальчика, и тут клип матери медленно и без перерыва переходит от матери и старого дома в спортзал; окно дома становится дверью спортзала.[17] В спортзал входит человек, который первым ощутил, что мальчик невиновен. Открыв зарешеченное окно спортзала, он целует икону и говорит ласточке, «В общем так. Хочешь лететь, лети. Будь свободен. Будешь остаться, оставайся. Только решай все это сам. Никто за тебя это не сделает».[18] В этом фильме мальчик – ласточка. А так как именно первый присяжный убедил всех одиннадцати

передумать, он освободил мальчика. Когда он освобождает ласточку, это символизирует его освобождение мальчика, поддерживая темы сострадания и милосердия. С изображением иконы здесь мы также видим понимание или солидарность между традиционными российскими вероучениями.

В конце фильма первый присяжный уходит, и ласточка улетает.[19] Заключительная сцена перед титрами снова возвращается к образу собаки, бегущей с отрубленной рукой во рту и показана следующая цитата: «'Закон превыше всего, но как быть, когда милосердие оказывается выше закона' - Б.Тосья».[20] В самом начале фильма также показана аналогичная цитата: «'Не следует искать здесь правду быта, попытайтесь ощутить истину бытия' - Б.Тосья».[21] Как интерпретировать смысл этих цитат? В начале, как уже упоминалось, у каждого из двенадцати есть своя правда быта и история. Но после того, как они услышат историю и рассмотрят правду каждого человека, они могут ощутить истину бытия мальчика. Это видно когда Николай предлагает отправить мальчика в тюрьму на защиту, и другой говорит, «проделана огромная работа, потливая, трудная, мы установили истину!».[22] Работая вместе, они могут различать правду, представленную доказательствами в суде, от истины, т.е., что было на самом деле.

Когда в Москве по дороге в больницу ФСБ обвиняет пострадавшую сестру Садулаева в том, что она является боевиком, а Садулаев говорит:

Ах вы, маленькие мои, недоумки московские. Вы не ведете, да? Вы, наверное, читаете правительственные газеты и смотрите телевизор. И ничего не знаете, правда? Ваша крысиная контора ничего не знает, да? Пойдемте в самолет, там все из Назрани, там вам расскажут, весь город полон изувеченных детей, в больнице раненые лежат в коридорах, все старые, да малые, да женщины. Может, они все боевики, раз вы с ними ведете войну? Или грудные младенцы тоже участвуют в боевых действиях? [23]

Он пишет о том, как правительственные газеты и телевизор демонизируют чеченцев как террористов, и зрители воспринимают это как правду. Это предубеждение видно в следующей цитате из фильма:

Это уже не Москва... я коренной Москвич здесь в своем городе чувствую себя чужим я чувствую себя как в гостях... Помните там был разговор о том, что он накануне поссорился с отцом. Да давайте представим русского пацана. Что делает в этом случае русский пацан? Но он может нагрубить, обидеться в конце концов, я не знаю, сбежать из дому. Но он не берёт в руки нож. А дикарь ваш мальчик, дикарь, и ведь он прячет обиду для того, чтобы вернуться и перерезать горло и всадит нож.[24]

Они часто называют мальчика уродом или дикарем, им трудно понять правду вначале о том, что мальчик не тот, которого средства массовой информации представляли им. Человек, который сказал предыдущую цитату, уверен, что в случае освобождения мальчика, он убьет граждан в своих домах как какой-то хищник.

В случае, подобном чеченским войнам, информация, которую получают люди, живущие в Москве, тщательно отбирается и предвзята. Трудно получить информацию из истерзанной войной Чечни. У них в Чечне нет писателей, кроме Садулаева, который пишет:

Я снова пишу. Снова зима, холодно, и я снова пишу. Теперь я пишу много. Знаю, бессвязно, отрывочно, скомканно, спутанно, разбито, расколото... Нет сквозного сюжета. Трудно читать такую прозу, да? Легче читать сюжетную прозу. Чтобы хотелось перевернуть страничку, узнать, а что было дальше. [25]

У страдающих чеченцев вообще нет голоса. Все, что у них осталось, - это фрагменты из их прежней жизни, такие как у Садулаева есть. Но Садулаев точно не написал фактическую автобиографию, он написал повесть. Конечно, фильм вымышленный, а даже осколочная повесть Садулаева частично вымышленная автобиография. Но дело в том, что как и предполагает цитата из начала фильма, и, как и двенадцать, мы можем собрать эти фрагменты правды, чтобы ощутить истину бытия.

Может быть фильм - дань уважения книге Садулаева, может быть фильм частично основан на его книге, или может быть это не так. Но если рассматривать фильм в связке с его книгой, мы можем понять центральную идею фильма и окончательную цитату Б.Тосья в конце. Здесь реальность такова, что государство и институционализированная справедливость не смогли исправить такие ситуации. Но несмотря на то, что государство далеко от совершенства, люди сами могут пытаться найти истину и сделать разницу в повседневной жизни, а не полагаться на сам закон, чтобы исправить положение. Может быть это так, что русским не нравится жить по закону и человечество превыше закона. В любом случае, кажется, что фильм является призывом к типу правосудия, который превосходит закон, основанный на человеческом сострадании. Если правительство неспособно служить правосудию через закон, все равно, потому что как в фильме милосердие может оказываться выше закона. Недостаточно прислушиваться к вводящим в заблуждение доказательствам и информации, представленной государством; русские должны пытаться ощутить истину каждого бытия. На самом деле они обязательно должны, потому что, как и Садулаев в Санкт-Петербурге, чеченский мальчик здесь в Москве, чтобы остаться. Именно эти ласточки не вернутся домой, или по словам Садулаева, «одна ласточка еще не делает весны».[26]

Cade Hermeling,
U.C. Berkeley

Хорошо здесь: и шелест и хруст;
С каждым утром сильнее мороз,
В белом пламени клонится куст
Ледяных ослепительных роз.
И на пышных парадных снегах
Лыжный след, словно память о том,
Что в каких-то далеких веках
Здесь с тобою прошли мы вдвоем.

Анна Ахматова 1922

'Tis fair here: both crunching and rustling;
With every morning comes stronger frost,
Into white flames tends the bush
of icy and dazzling roses.
And on the magnificent and stately snows
The tracks of skis, as if a memory of then,
where in some far-distant centuries
You and I, passed here together.

Translated by Frederik Boumeester

Inconsistencies of

Intercourse between interiority and exteriority is a paradoxical quality—generally only possessed by a third-person omniscient narrative voice—capturing the movement from an exterior physicality into the interior of a permeable mind. The conflict of access within an externally shared reality is especially prominent in the narrative qualities of Mikhail Lermontov's "The Fatalist" and Nikolai Gogol's "Nevsky Prospect," both of which capture interplay between a limited and a fully omniscient narrative voice. The journalistic structure of "The Fatalist" presents an autodiegetic narrative voice (first person protagonist), for which the movement from an assessment of exteriority to a knowledge of interiority is inherently impossible. The denial of this movement to the infamous Pechorin, the protagonist ultimately defined by a central set of his own contradictions, is lost unto him. Despite such ignorance, Pechorin writes himself as the pinnacle of the character hierarchy, and thus constantly oversteps his narrative boundaries by endowing himself with omniscient qualities. Similarly problematic, the narrative voice in "Nevsky Prospect" shifts between generalities and specificities, constantly resorting to the metonymic construction of the body. With the introduction of Nevsky Prospect comes the introduction of Piskarev, an idealistic artist meandering the streets, much as Gogol meanders with sentence structures. Piskarev's ability to assess even the external is questioned, ultimately confounding that which is reality and that which is simply another overstepping of narrative boundaries. Both forms of overstepping constantly subvert access to other characters' authentic interiorities. The narratives elicited from Pechorin and Piskarev require a counter-focalizing realization of the human incapabilities of foresight and abstraction, which are demonstrated by these narrative oversteppings and conflations of the external with the internal.

The fragmentation of the body in "The Fatalist" serves as a purported means for accessing interiority, thereby exposing an overstepping of boundaries in the first-person narrative. Pechorin's diligent journaling plays with the cusps of convergent autodiegetic and homodiegetic (first person non-protagonist) narrations, in which the eyes of other characters are conflated with their interiorities, in a presumptuous manner that minimizes authentic access. Neither narrative mode possesses the ability to move reliably from exterior to interior, as legitimate knowledge is limited to the narrator's gaze. The progression of the syuzhet, the discursive representation of events, is therefore focalized through Pechorin. The text must be counter-focalized whenever an external assumption transcends Pechorin's viewpoint and grants apparent access to another character's mind. This overstepping is exemplified in Pechorin's introduction of Lieutenant Vulich: "His looks matched his character perfectly. He was tall, dark-complexioned, with black hair and black, piercing eyes … unable to share his thoughts and feelings with those into whose company he was thrown" (149). Lacking the omniscience of a heterodiegetic narrator, Pechorin is witness only to Vulich's external qualities and has no way of measuring his assumptions against Vulich's internal composition. However, Pechorin writes as if endowed with omniscient qualities, heightening his narrative powers and writing of others as mere characters. Again, Pechorin assumes that his gaze—an inherently limited system of perception, based solely on his facial expressions—can discern Vulich's fate: "I looked him hard in the eyes, but he met my searching gaze with a look of steady calm … I fancied I saw the mark of death on his pale face … Anyone with an eye for it is rarely mistaken" (150). In reading Vulich's face, Pechorin surmises that future events will be revealed by accessing Vulich's interiority, synecdochally substituting Vulich's eyes for the entirety of his being. Pechorin's narrative authority must be questioned on the fundamental principle that humans are constrained by a concrete separation between their interiority and exteriority, and thus cannot be all-knowing. Pechorin gravely oversteps his narrative limitations in his unjustified elevation into omniscience and in his belief in other characters' lack of enlightened foresight. Pechorin's narrative authority and omniscience is further brought into question when he learns of Vulich's death later that evening. Because Pechorin is not witness to Vulich's slaughtered body, "split […]



Narrative Gaze

from the shoulder almost down to the heart," he must insert himself as a witness to the telling of a story: a lesser mode, devoid of interiority, and subtly undermining Pechorin's narrative superiority (155). Pechorin's retelling does not grant Vulich's fate any major significance, contrary to his previous premonitory reading of Vulich's exteriority. Such a structural layering of a story embedded within a diary entry is denied a greater sense of importance because it subverts Pechorin's previous narrative overstepping.

Whereas Pechorin relied upon the fragmentation of the body as a means of access to interiority, the narrative voice in "Nevsky Prospect" constantly regresses to metonymic means, contriving environments of misperception. At times, the limited third person narrative voice oversteps into omniscience; however, its accessibility is unpredictably confronted with forgetfulness and limitations. This use of skaz personifies the narrative voice, although the rendering of orality does not equate with the unreliable nature of Pechorin's narrative command. Instead, this anonymous narrator's human qualities of storytelling parallel Piskarev's insistence on conflating his external assumptions with his internal desires. This ignorant compulsion leads to Piskarev's constant subversion of expectations, which is ever more ironic in light of his career as an artist, rooted in the study of observation and portrayal. The eponymous setting of "Nevsky Prospect" is a result of manufactured progress and "does not constitute anyone's goal, it serves only as a means" (246). Piskarev is only introduced towards evening, at the moment when "lamps endow everything with some enticing, wondrous light" (250). The natural light of day provides a universal clarity, emanating from the sun. In the evening, lamplight provides an artificial illumination of Nevsky Prospect, furnishing a substitute in the absence of the shared light of day. This significant temporal moment emphasizes Piskarev's regression into an idealistic reflection of what he wants to see, failing to realize it was wholly and always misperception. Piskarev first neglects to question his assumptions when his gaze briefly catches "the colorful cloak … now bathed in bright light as it approached a street lamp, now instantly covered in darkness" (251). The moment Piskarev catches sight of his anonymous beauty, he stipulates that "'she must be a very noble lady … her cloak alone is worth eighty roubles!'" (251). But this metonymic moment is dangerous, because Piskarev assumes that the woman's cloak is a substitute for her status and demeanor, and that her exterior correlates with her pure interiority. After learning that she is in fact a prostitute, Piskarev is overcome with thoughts of what might have been, and yearns to see her as he first did. To fulfill this wish, Piskarev dreams of her, and the narrative access to this dream is another form of overstepping boundaries. Another recursive layer of intimate access occurs within Piskarev's dream, when his construction of her interior corresponds to his view of her exterior: "her devastating eyes expressed this sign so subtly that no one could see it, yet he saw it, he understood it" (260). Only in his dream does Piskarev willingly see, with clarity, her thoughts. In meeting her gaze with his own, Piskarev can penetrate her mind and confirm, for his sake, what he wishes her to become. However, this is all a falsification, because Piskarev's unconscious self constructs the qualities he wants to impose on the young prostitute. He accepts only the perception inspired by the sight of her, and conflates this perception with constructed meaning. These conflated interior assumptions do not resolve Piskarev's internal conflict; rather, they represent an overstepping of boundaries to superimpose a desirable, though unattainable, reality. Nevsky Prospect, which grants the narrative voice with a means to render the tale, serves an analogous purpose to the woman's coat, which is the inspiration for Piskarev's misperception.

The lack of foresight underlies both "Nevsky Prospect" and "The Fatalist," with narrative overstepping serving as a common thread. Whereas Pechorin assumes omniscience based on his gaze into another's eyes, Piskarev assumes that his metonymic gaze confirms his objectification of a random woman. Both these premises pertain to a limited—or perhaps a total lack of—understanding of the human inability to possess the complete powers of knowledge or determination. Entering into another character's mind is problematized, and the purported movement into a mirrored interiority demonstrates a flawed overstepping of narrative boundaries. Pechorin conflates omniscience with the knowledge to which he justifiably has access. In this style, the text necessitates a counter-focalization to expose Pechorin's unreliable regurgitation of events. In contrast, Piskarev's misperceptions of exteriority endow determined and self-imposed restrictions on his ability to discern true interiority. His metonymic assumptions inhibit his ability to read and process the external. Both Pechorin and Piskarev create an artificial assessment of the totality, regressing into the instability of their own interiorities and leaving the physical as opaque and misperceived as it began.

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

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

Viktor Orbán: the face of new authoritarianism

Viktor Orbán is the face for the new authoritarianism that dominates Hungary today. As prime minister, Orbán has built his ascent over the last eight years on a platform of right-wing national conservatism. He unabashedly called for the building of an "illiberal democracy" along with an aggressive anti-immigration stance and assault on the rule of law.[1] Ironically, young Orbán would hardly be able to recognize himself today. In 1988, young Orbán helped found the youth movement called "Federation of Young Democrats", or "Fidesz".[2] Within a 30-year period, Orbán transformed from a liberal revolutionary into a conservative autocrat. The evolution of Orbán tells the story not only of a personal transformation but the story of how Hungary has emerged from post-Communism only to re-embrace elements of its authoritarian past. In the process of linking his personal ambitions with his vision for his country, Orbán has created a new right-wing, anti-establishment regime. This regime has united Hungary under the values of tradition, law and order, and nationalism, all while unfolding a new version of authoritarianism for his country.

Emerging from Communism: 1988 to 2002

A year after Orbán helped found Fidesz in 1988, communism came to an end in Hungary.[3] The country began changing to a market, export-oriented economy and underwent rapid privatization. The creation of a smaller state through privatization reduced social expenditures and pensions, negatively affecting the majority of Hungarians.[4] In addition, market changes such as foreign investment benefited only a fraction of the population and began driving the state sector towards bankruptcy.[5] The pace and type of changes resulted in greater inequality and worse conditions than the communist years, culminating in an economic collapse.[6] Witnessing these problems as Hungary emerged from communism, Orbán became disillusioned with the idea of democracy. Demonstrating an ability to adapt to changing circumstances, which he would repeatedly resort to throughout his career, Orbán used these poor economic circumstances as one of the reasons to shift Fidesz to the right. He started to appeal to Hungarian voters who saw the transition to democracy as a burden rather than a cathartic moment. Since the economic changes negatively impacted a majority of the population, Orbán appealed beyond his party base to a broader group of people, who saw him as a possible solution to Hungary's post-Communist struggles. By the time MSZP, the successor of the state socialist party, won the 1994 parliamentary elections, Orbán had nudged Fidesz far enough from the center that it was no longer the liberal party of Hungary.[7]

During the post-communist years, Orbán continuously modified his political agenda to distinguish himself from opposition parties and attract supporters disenchanted with democracy. He gradually shifted from being a pro-democracy liberal leader to an increasingly right-wing figure who embraced nationalism and exploited people's fears. His deliberate steps and strategic moves paid off. In 1998, after four years of socialist government, Orbán won his first term as Hungary's prime minister. In the ensuing four years, Orbán spoke of correcting the failed transition. Capitalizing on the flailing economy and embracing Csurka's view of a "stolen transition," he moved Fidesz ever farther from its origins as a liberal party. Orbán's narrow loss to the rival socialist party in 2002 catalyzed his radicalization, launching a nationalist movement to mobilize right-wing followers under Fidesz. Despite the sting of the loss, Orbán was only beginning to discover the power of his winning formula – seize upon polarizing issues and transform himself and his party as necessary to appeal to the general populace.

Stagnation and Unrest: 2002 to 2010

After the socialists returned to power in 2002, Orbán and his Fidesz party were forced into the opposition. The economy continued to sputter along without improvement. In 2006, the socialists again beat Fidesz with promises of a "100 Days Programme," which sought to raise wages and repay pensioners, among other economic incentives.[8] By the time the financial crisis hit the country in 2008, deep divisions dominated Hungary, creating an opportunity for Orbán to present himself as the alternative for those searching for a better life. Following losses in the 2006 election and revelations that the then Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány had purposely lied to the public about the state of the economy, the liberal-left political party in Hungary collapsed.[9] This incident became a political opportunity for Orbán to present a hero-like front to rid Hungary of its corrupt Communist past and deceitful politicians. Furthermore, Hungary became the first European country that needed a bailout from the International Monetary Fund in 2008, giving support for Fidesz to take back power from the failing Socialist government. A PEW survey showed that Hungary had the highest level of economic dissatisfaction, with 94 percent believing that the economic situation was bad. In 2009 only 46 percent approved the transition to capitalism, compared to the 80 percent in 1991.[10] Gyurcsány did not resign until March 2009, and Orbán continued to undermine Hungary's nascent capitalism. He campaigned against the government's strategies to fix the economy, which appeared to have cheated the Hungarian population out of equal opportunity by further dividing the country between the rich and the poor. By 2010, Hungarians were so disenchanted with the lack of economic progress that they were ready for any alternative to the existing government. This set of circumstances helped set the stage for Fidesz, and Orbán, to win the 2010 elections.

In addition to offering himself as the solution to Hungary's ongoing economic problems, Orbán also presented his party as the sensible alternative to the extremism of the right-wing Jobbik party, which had come closest to taking voters away from the Fidesz. Since 2002, Jobbik had won increasing support through successfully promoting anti-Semitic and anti-Roma positions.[11] The Roma had migrated to Hungary for centuries and made up the largest minority in the country at 3.18 percent, yet they were unable to integrate into Hungarian society even after the transition to democracy.[12] The Hungarian constitution directly discriminated against the Roma, as exemplified by the passage of the 2002 Status Law. This clearly depicted Hungary's approach to ethnic and national minority

rights as defined by ethnic Hungarians' Diaspora-rights, not the Roma's.[13] Such legislation showed Hungary's feelings of irredentism towards ethnic Hungarians lost to other countries in the 1920 Treaty of Trianon that divided the Kingdom of Hungary. Jobbik fueled its momentum at the end of 2006 with public outrage over the lynching of a non-Roma teacher by a group of Roma in Olaszliska.[14] Jobbik exploited the incident by framing it as inter-ethnic conflict, even establishing the now outlawed paramilitary Hungarian Guard (Magyar Gárda) in self-defense from their notion of "Roma criminality."[15] To counter the increasing power of Jobbik, Orbán cunningly employed a combination of the popular ideology of Csurka's anti-Semitic "stolen transition" and Jobbik's extreme right views to create his own centrist-right platform that would appeal to voters. In doing so, he presented himself as someone who upheld Hungarian conservative traditions without going to the extreme of the Jobbik party. This was an example of how Orbán carefully identified the appeal of a rival party, adapted his own party's messaging to incorporate the attractive aspects of the rival, and then presented his party as the more viable alternative to the extremist views of the rival.

The economic and social problems that beset Hungary created an opportunity for Orbán to present an alternative to the status quo, appealing to voters sufficiently to enable him to return to power after an eight-year absence. Orbán also utilized the lies and corruption of Gyurcsány as a means to rebrand the Fidesz party as Hungary's saviors. Following Gyurcsány's resignation in 2009, Orbán offered Fidesz as a less radical and divisive solution to Jobbik. In 2010, eight years after Orbán's initial loss to the socialists, Fidesz won 53 percent of the vote and 68 percent of the seats in Parliament.[16] Orbán's victory was largely seen as an anti-establishment response to the corruption in Hungary, rather than a vote for Orbán's agenda. Orbán benefited from these volatile conditions and used the Fidesz party to promote a narrative that provided a vision for Hungary following the defeat of the corrupt Socialist party. Furthermore, Orbán took advantage of winning the two-thirds majority needed to make sweeping constitutional changes, including repressive media laws that gave the government the power to curtail political dissent. In an effort to ensure he did not lose power as in 2002, Orbán lowered the judicial retirement age to 62, which forced judges to retire and allowed Fidesz supporters to fill court positions that decided whether parliamentary legislation was constitutional.[17] He also redrew and gerrymandered district lines so that the Fidesz party received the most support.[18] Collectively, these maneuvers constitute Orbán's careful effort to create lasting institutional changes that would enable him to remain in power for the long term. These changes exemplify how Orbán took deliberate steps to ensure the achievement of his overarching strategy, which was to not just win one election, but to retain lasting power.

Orbán's Illiberal Democracy: 2010 to Present

Since winning the 2010 elections, critics have claimed that Orbán has moved Hungary to a model of "crony capitalism" that has created economic regulation and distributed resources on the basis of personal relationships rather than the public good.[19] Orbán has taken advantage of Hungary's accession to the EU to enrich his associates while ignoring the EU's liberal democratic principles and emphasis on rule of law. The Corruption Research Center in Budapest examined contracts issued by the Orbán regime from 2010 to 2016 and found that five of Orbán's associates won $2.5 billion of government and EU contracts.[20] One of these, Lőrinc Mészarós, a childhood friend of Orbán, accumulated around $392 million in less than ten years under Orbán's government.[21] In contrast, another Orbán friend, Lajos Simicska, was winning government contracts until 2015, when he had a disagreement with Orbán and thereafter stopped receiving government business.[22] Meanwhile, EU officials have not received payment for 228 million Euros misspent in building a new metro line in Budapest. The anti-fraud office of the EU, OLAF, found "serious irregularities – fraud and possible corruption … in all phases of the project."[23] Orbán has also enacted furtive methods to ensure the dominance of Fidesz by withholding government advertising money from the media to marginalize opposition groups.[24] In short, all economic moves in Hungary today seem to be aimed at benefiting either Orbán or his associates.

After 2010, Orbán built upon the anti-Semitic and anti-Roma platforms that has helped him in the past and adopted an even broader xenophobic agenda, all of which were aimed at exploiting fears to widen his appeal.[25] The rising migrant crisis led to more refugees arriving in Europe, some of whom used Hungary as a transit country. Such migration raised tensions between Hungarians and migrants, especially Muslims who were coming from war-torn places like Syria and Afghanistan. Orbán capitalized on fears that Muslims brought an "invasion" of "crime, disease, and terrorism" to make a political point.[26] The creation and criminalization of the "Muslim other" ultimately became law in September 2015, prohibiting migrants and asylum seekers from crossing the border.[27] Orbán and other politicians and publicists close to him used the media to promote Islamophobia and anti-immigrant agitations.[28] The use of Facebook as a propaganda tool became the most important tool to spread right-wing ideas, with Orbán promoting nationalist messages such as, "Hungary will not become an immigrant country; Hungary will remain a Hungarian country."[29] Orbán has led Hungary to become a leader in xenophobic sentiments, inspiring countries like Italy and Austria to take similar anti-immigrant paths.[30]

In 2018, Orbán secured his second consecutive term and the Fidesz party's two-thirds control of the national legislature to further his political dominance. In 2014, Orbán first defined Hungary as "a non-liberal state. It does not deny foundational values of liberalism, as freedom, etc…but applies a specific, national, particular approach in its stead."[31] In the same speech, Orbán asserted his goal of becoming the illiberal force in the European Union. In 2018, Orbán demonstrated his ruthlessness in maintaining power over his illiberal democracy, creating fake opposition parties during parliamentary elections to divide the anti-Fidesz vote.[32] Orbán has become increasingly authoritarian, expanding beyond immigration reforms to change the developing minds of the country. He target-

ed school textbooks to shape Hungary's democracy from within the education system. High school graduates could now be tested on a new preamble to the Hungarian constitution that implied that Hungarian nationalism was exclusively Christian, directly excluding the Jewish minority in Hungary.[33] In December 2018, Orbán's administration officially closed down the Central European University (CEU), which is an ongoing development that highlights Orbán's new authoritarian rule.[34] The CEU President Michael Ignatieff declared, "This is unprecedented: a U.S. institution has been driven out of a country that is a NATO ally, a European institution has been ousted from a member state of the EU."[35] Orbán's transformation from a champion of democracy and free elections to the leader of an illiberal democracy showed his desire for power. Orbán has received praise from the Trump administration and Vladimir Putin and serves as an inspiration for other European countries to implement anti-immigrant, right-wing policies.[36] Orbán capitalized on the Hungarian populace's desire for a strong leader, gradually consolidating his power and thereby becoming arguably the leading voice for the rise of Europe's right-wing.

Hungary's path to its current authoritarianism began as a result of post-Communist socioeconomic challenges that coincided with Orbán's political opportunism. Although he started his political life as a liberal idealist, the deteriorating economic and social conditions after 1989 disillusioned Orbán with democracy and led him to embrace the right-wing views of nationalists such as István Csurka. His party's losses to the socialists in 2002 and 2006 caused Orbán to move even further to the right. Economic issues such as the failure to adjust to rapid marketization, rapid economic contractions, and the 2008 financial crisis led to a divided country wrought with inequality. The failures of the socialists to fix the economy and the extreme views of the Jobbik party gave Orbán the opportunity to present himself and his party as a moderate alternative and sensible answer to the country's ills. Even as Orbán adopted broader discriminatory views to blame others for socioeconomic problems, more Hungarians saw the appeal of a strong leader who defined a clear vision and assured solutions to their problems. Orbán united people under nationalism and applied tangible political, legal, economic, and administrative changes that ostensibly protected the Hungarian people, but were in fact deliberate steps aimed at securing power. As a result, Orbán has now successfully embarked on fulfilling his promise of an illiberal Hungary as well as leading other countries in the world to emulate his vision of a new authoritarianism.

Caitlin Cozine
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

Like Milky Way, inside my heart,
Your love is twinkling - starry droplets,
In mirror dreams over the aqua
It veils the diamondness of hurt.

You're teardrops' light in iron darkness.
You're bitter starry juice. And me -
I've turned to turbid faded brinks
Of dawn so blind and fully useless.

And I feel sorry for the night…
Is that because the ageless stars
By coming death will make hearts harder?

My day's like blue ice… Here, watch!
And fades the starry diamond flutter
In painless coldness of the dawn.

March, 1907
Petersburg

Как Млечный Путь, любовь твоя
Во мне мерцает влагой звездной,
В зеркальных снах над водной бездной
Алмазность пытки затая.

Ты слезный свет во тьме железной,
Ты горький звездный сок. А я —
Я — помутневшие края
Зари слепой и бесполезной.

И жаль мне ночи… Оттого ль,
Что вечных звёзд родная боль
Нам новой смертью сердце скрепит?

Как синий лёд мой день… Смотри!
И меркнет звёзд алмазный трепет
В безбольном холоде зари.

Марте, 1907
Петербурге

Poem by Maximilian Voloshin

Translated to English by Murat Kamarov,
U.C. Berkeley

Basnya Principle

To A. Kusikov

Sunset has lost its wind. One overdriven fox.
The moon floated out like a sun-dried ice-fish.
Meanwhile a trotter stood by the porch.
Horse, simply horse. With two white hair scorchings.

His legs are all buried in glassfulls of hooves.
His ear absorbs outer air like sponge.
Then suddenly eyes became man-like aloof
And something fell flopping down on the dirt.

And hark! Golden thread of the sparrows' voyage
Keeps stretching with chirping noise in the air.
By peckers they dig the warming up dung
To delve in the mush for the grains.

The elder was louringly teaching the youth:
- Aw! Now the food's not as good as it used to be.
While the horse with no feeling observed all the burr
That goes over pies laid down on the street.

Hey, people! You are two-footed sparrows,
That sweep over with chirping and blubbering
To dig up in my private verses of love.
How can I look at you otherwisedly?!

I am here by the porch of the upcoming age,
For the rider I wait with the beggar's despair,
And my tail I lift up like a construction crane
To make you come for food each time cap in hand.

Spring, 1919
V. *Shershenevich*



А. Кусикову

Закат запыхался. Загнанная лиса.
Луна выплывала воблою вяленой.
А у подъезда стоял рысак
Лошадь как лошадь. Две белых подпалины.

И ноги уткнуты в стаканы копыт.
Губкою впитывало воздух ухо.
Вдруг стали глаза по-человечьи глупы,
И на землю заплюхало глухо.

И чу! Воробьев канитель и полет
Чириканьем в воздухе машется.
И клювами роют теплый помет,
Чтоб зернышки выбрать из кашицы.

И старый угрюмо учил молодежь:
— Эх! Пошла нынче пища не та еще!
А рысак равнодушно глядел на галдеж,
Над кругляшками вырастающий.

Эй, люди! Двуногие воробьи,
Что несутся с чириканьем, с плачами,
Чтоб порыться в моих строках о любви,
Как глядеть мне на вас по-иначему?!

Я стою у подъезда придущих веков,
Седока жду отчаяньем нищего
И трубою свой хвост задираю легко,
Чтоб покорно слетались на пищу вы!

Весной, 1919
В. Шершеневич

“Принцип Басни” by Shershenevich
Translated to English by Murat Kamarov,
UC Berkeley



Sve su moje razbludne rane

Sve su moje razbludne rane
Zacijelile te noći.
Tajnovito.
Intimno.
Ali te noći su se nove rane otvorile.
Neizlječive. Bolnije.
Njihovo krvarenje ostavlja trag
Po ulicama, Plahtama.
Primjećuju ga i ljudi i psi.
Čine korake unatrag.
Moju sasušenu krv
Mirišu,
A onda odlaze.
S gađenjem.
Novim mislima.
Ulaze u tramvaje,
Skreću u Frankopansku ulicu
Dok ja
Uzaludno
I beskrajno
Pokušavam pronaći svoju nevinost
Umotanu u baršun
Na Trgu maršala Tita.
Ali prolaznici kažu
Da su je zadnji put vidjeli
Kako se izgubljeno kreće
Tamo negdje
Oko Krvavog mosta.

All my wicked wounds
were healed that night.
Secretly.
Intimately.
But that night new wounds opened.
Incurable. Even more painful.
Their bleeding leaves a trace
On the streets, on the sheets.
People notice it, dogs notice it.
They take steps backwards,
They smell
my dried blood,
And exit
In disgust.
New thoughts.
They get on trams,
turn on to Frankopanska Street
While I
Futilely
And endlessly
Try to find my innocence
Shrouded in velvet
On Marshal Tito Square.
But passersby say
That they saw it last,
How aimlessly it roams about,
Somewhere there
By the Bloody Bridge.

Two Poems by Michaela Ljubičić

Translated from Croatian by Samantha Farmer, University of Texas

Cosmo savjet

Drage moje,
Prije prvog seksa s novopečenim muškarcem
Obavezno obucite komad donjeg rublja
Koji nećete skinuti
Dok čin
(Vjerovatno lošeg seksa)
Bude trajao.
Za takvu prigodu najbolje su
Samostojeće čarape.
Dobro će sakriti koji nedostatak,
I onako,
Sačuvati jedan dio vaše osobne intime.
Obucite ih svaki put,
Olakšat će iščekivanje njegove poruke
I utažiti želju za Normabelom
Dok ćete se nadati će doći
Do
Drugog
Seksa.

Cosmo advice



My dears,

Before the first time with a new guy
You must wear a piece of lingerie

That you won't take off
While the act
(Probably bad sex)

Lasts.
For such an occasion
Thigh-highs are best.

They'll hide flaws well,
And in doing so,

Preserve a piece of your own intimacy.

Wear them every time,

They'll ease the feeling of suspense caused by his messages

And relieve the desire for diazepam

While you hope
That he'll come
Back for

Seconds.

pavlensky fixed in history

On the chilly day of November 10th, 2013, most Russian policemen surrounded themselves with the warm presence of those close to them to celebrate National Police Day. Unfortunately, a hapless few did not get to enjoy serenity – worried calls about a case on the Red Square put a damper on those policemen's plans. Petr Pavlensky, an infamous actionist, found the national occasion to be an opportune moment for his art performance *Fixation* (2013). In broad daylight, the artist went for a stroll on the Red Square, found an unpopulated spot in front of Lenin's Mausoleum and stripped his clothes in under a minute. Soon after, he sat on the cold, icy cobblestoned spot, took out a long nail and hammered his scrotum to the ground (See Fig.1). Unsuspecting onlookers loitered around the performance with either curiosity, disgust or second-hand pain. When the clueless policemen arrived, they ordered Pavlensky to stand up in order to take him for interrogation. Pavlensky did not speak. Once the policemenk realized in horror that the man was fixed to the ground, they threw a blanket over him dumbfoundedly. They called for an ambulance prior to taking him into questioning. Pavlensky's *Fixation* is a seminal artwork that has pushed Russian performance art towards radicalism.

Contextualizing Pavlensky's art education and his view of modern Russia helps better understand *Fixation*. *Fixation* is one of the many radical art performances Pavlensky has executed. Pavlensky dropped out of the Saint Petersburg Art and Industry Academy after having described it as a "disciplinary institution that aims to make servants out of artists."[1] His attitude towards the art school should not be written off as a denunciation of the school's traditional approach – a common trope among forward-thinking artists in history. Instead, Pavlensky laments the clerical ideology his classmates unquestionably absorbed. The artist believes that "art is [being] used as an instrument for ideology and propaganda."[2] As he aptly says himself, "I realized that I don't want to allow the instrumentalization of art and to allow myself to be used to execute someone else's ideological goals."[3] It is under this light that one understands how Pavlensky has come to create his emblematic anti-establishment performance artwork. While the artist acquired international fame during the Pussy Riot trial when he sewed his lips shut in solidarity with the punk group, his body of work includes wrapping himself naked in barbed wire in front of Saint Petersburg's Legislative Assembly, cutting off his earlobe on the roof of the psychiatric Serbsky Center and setting FSB doors on fire. Pavlensky is interested in engaging in his performances those who are indifferent to art and/or politics. As he points out in his artist statement for *Fixation*, he tugs at "the apathy, political indifference and fatalism of contemporary Russian society."[4] He likens the country to a big prison that sustains itself through the indolence of its own inhabitants:

As the government turns the country into one big prison, stealing from the people and using the money to grow and enrich the police apparatus and other repressive structures, society is allowing this, and [sic] forgetting its numerical advantage, is bringing the triumph of the police state closer by its inaction.[5]

People are complicit through their inaction, which allows the government to strengthen the police's grasp of its people. This situation results in the government's enforcement of other repressive structures that diminish the freedom and rights of citizens.

Pavlensky's metaphor of Russia being a large prison helps clarify why the artist nailed his scrotum to the ground. While accounts vary, the most plausible explanation for the artist's inspiration is rooted in his brief stay in a prison cell after his Carcass performance in 2013. During his overnight stay, he met a fellow inmate who shared stories from his gulag experience. By this man's account, prisoners would resort to nailing their scrotums to trees when prison authorities would not respond to their more peaceful protests against the inhumane conditions.[6] Pavlensky's work is best understood as a play on the gulag tradition – the Russian government has imprisoned all of its inhabitants and the artist nails himself to the ground in desperation. Of course, the symbolism of the Red Square onto which he fixes himself amplifies Pavlensky's cry. While Pavlensky's predecessors, such as Pussy Riot, Voina, and Ekspropriatsiia territorii iskusstva, tapped into the Red Square's ideological potential to attack

Fig 1. Pavlensky's Fixation (Zmeev, Maxim Calvert Journal

Fig 2. Kulik's Pavlensky Sculpture (Kostyanov, Andrey Radio Svoboda

the government with art, Pavlensky is a hopeless gulag inmate symbolizing the last straws of defiance.[7] In Pavlensky's opinion, "political art means revealing the levers and mechanisms of power."[8] He elaborates, "I show the relationships between those in power and society. My task is to articulate what is going on." This performance is not directed towards the government, but to society at large as a reminder that it is impossible to live in the middle – the choice for citizens is to leave, go to prison, or join those in power either directly or through inaction. As the prolific Russian art collector Igor Tsukanov notes, "In Russia you have to be either brave, or be silent. There is no middle."[9]

Pavlensky's apt date selection demonstrates intentionality in implicating the police, but it is crucial to understand how and why Pavlensky makes policemen active participants in *Fixation*. While other "artivists" like Pussy Riot try to run away from the police, Pavlensky extends his performance to incorporate the policemen's reaction. As Pavlensky claims himself, "Whenever I do a performance like this, I never leave the place. It's important for me that I stay there. The authorities are in a dead-end situation and don't know what to do."[10] Pavlensky's approach places police officers in comical predicaments. For instance, in Stitch (2012), Pavlensky is physically unable to answer police officers during interrogations with his mouth sutured, thereby forcing the officers to become participants in his performance.[11] This idea of incorporating authorities into the performance is also manifested in *Fixation*. When policemen come and order the artist to stand up, they are baffled when they realize that he is fixed to the ground. The confused officers throw a blanket over the artist and call an ambulance. When Pavlensky is brought to the police station after, they discharge him in the evening, but open a case days later of "hooliganism motivated by hatred of a particular social, ethnic or religious group." This article is the one under which three Pussy Riot members have been convicted.[12] Pavlensky's performance, however, does not end at the detainment. Since Pavlensky refuses to give a testimony, the prosecutor is inevitably required to grapple with his art and ruminate on art's goals in general when toiling away at the paperwork for court cases. Pavlensky believes that:

The task of art is the destruction, discrediting and disabling of the decoration behind which the administrative grimace of power hides itself. We have to force these machines to work for the goals of art, and against the narrative of power.[13]

The prosecutor is required to construct a story through Pavlensky's actions and the paperwork becomes part of the storytelling. Former chief investigator Pavel Jasman, who was fired for being unable to contain the Pavlensky fiasco, says of the artist: "I think he is unique. There are many dissenters, but none of them would go to the Red Square to nail themselves to it."[14]

While Russian intelligentsia and dissenters predictably welcome his performance with open arms, most of the Russian public view his performance as an insult to their motherland or as a debasement of art.[15] Paradoxically, the opposing stance to Pavlensky's performance is best captured within his own performance. During one of Pavlensky's court hearings, the artist paid three sex workers to act as his defense witnesses.[16] According to the sex workers, they were sitting in a café, when a stranger (Pavlensky's friend) approached them to show videos of Pavlensky's performances.[17] The man asked if they would be willing to testify in a court hearing. When the first sex worker, Elena Posadskih, walked into the court room extravagantly dressed and with heavy make-up, jaw-dropped bailiffs and police officers exchanged glances and chuckled in disbelief. The judge, bearing her deadpan composure, asked: "Скажите, пожалуйста, где вы работаете?" ("Tell me, please, where do you work?") Posadskih answered tongue-in-cheek, "В сфере продаж" ("In sales").[18] The three women, who a priori were supposed to defend Pavlensky, were supporting the prosecutor's case with their middle-school level knowledge of Russian. As the court hearings unfolded, the implications crystalized: Pavlensky brought the sex workers as part of his performance. The court hearings culminated when Dana Konstantinovna, a sex worker who surprised the judge by not being able to recall her home address, was being interrogated by Pavlensky's lawyer, Dimitriy Dinze. When Dinze asked, "Вы считаете Петра Павленского художником?" ("Do you consider Petr Pavlensky an artist?"), Konstantinovna simply answered "Нет, [...] художник должен на стенах ромашки рисовать" ("No, [...] an artist must paint daisies on the walls").[19] While neither the sex workers nor the prosecutors were wittingly in loop on the farce, Pavlensky pridefully demonstrated that the prosecutor's arguments could be distilled in the words of an uneducated sex worker. The opposition's flimsy case, armoured in intimidating legal jargon, was ridiculed. As a result, Pavlensky was able to achieve his goal cited earlier: to destroy, discredit and disable "the decoration behind which the administrative grimace of power hides itself."

Pavlensky's *Fixation* establishes a necessary turning point in Russian performance art by making Russians reflect upon their government. Pavlensky's contribution is best captured in Kulik's commemorative sculpture of the artist. Kulik is a renowned actionist best known for his 90s performance "Human-Dog," in which he nakedly enacted a rabid dog on a leash in the streets of Moscow. His practice today has gravitated towards sculpture. Kulik decided to venerate Pavlensky in a plaster miniature of him in his *Fixation* performance pose, nailed to the ground and fist in the air. However, as Kulik put the sculpture in the kiln, Pavlensky's testicles and fist grew disproportionately big (Fig. 2). This fortuitously botched sculpture captures Pavlensky's essence – Pavlensky's large fist in the air symbolizes his will and determination, whereas his testicles demonstrate the proverbial balls the artist has to execute his radical performances. In Kulik's words:

This is not even a portrait of [Pavlensky]. This is a portrait of the state. A commentary. The fist - a revolutionary gesture: arise, vast country! And suddenly, we see that this fist is not directed anywhere: we are nailed, we cannot do anything. This is a very strong statement.[20]

Pavlensky's simple gesture is a potent symbol of protest. His art is driven by desperation rather than experimentation. He forces Russians to confront their apathy that empowers the repressive government. With this trend of radicalism in Russian art, Russians will have no choice but to reflect and change the status quo.

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FORMING THE DEVIL

Introduction

"Conflict between belief and disbelief is sometimes such torture to a conscientious man... that it's better to hang oneself at once."

(The Brothers Karamazov 11.9 "The Devil")[1]

If Fyodor Dostoevsky were conjured from the grave to describe his role as a writer of Realism, he would also be describing the role of the devil in his novel *The Brothers Karamazov*. The function of both roles, consequently, is to grant plausibility to the presumed implausible and to suspend mankind in the torture "between belief and disbelief". This plausibility is not especially rendered in what Dostoevsky and his devil choose to dictate, but how that dictation functions within the text. Dostoevsky and his devil do not follow a strict formula, per say, but the likenesses they pose and the parallels they draw can be mapped and interpreted like facts in a court case. The effect is two-fold, as the devil's agency is not only called into questioned by dissenting readers of *The Brothers Karamazov*, but also by characters within the plot itself: chiefly, Ivan Karamazov, the second of the Karamazov brothers. The reader's devil exists insofar as the devil's name is conjured before the readers' eyes into words on the page. The conjuration, however, is not enough to convince a doubting reader of the existence of the devil beyond the literary form. Likewise, Ivan's devil exists insofar as the devil is present in Ivan's immediate culture, but cultural presence alone is not enough to

Conjuration, Possession, & Incarnation in *The Brothers Karamazov*

convince doubting Ivan that the devil is actually functioning in real-time as a force of mal-intent. When, however, the devil is finally given a human likeness and form in Book 11, Chapter 9 of *The Brothers Karamazov* (a chapter whose title indicates a conjuration in and of itself: "The Devil"), the disbelieving reader and Ivan Karamazov can then trace how this new, actualized devil might have been influencing the plot all along and possessing characters. The consequential plausibility of the incarnation of Dostoevsky's devil in *The Brothers Karamazov*, therefore, rests in a carefully crafted literary and meta-literary persuasive process of conjuration and possession between the four Karamazov brothers.

Conjuration: Dmitri Karamazov and "The Old Buffoon"

"'Your reverence!' he cried with sudden pathos, 'you behold before you a buffoon, a real buffoon! I introduce myself as such. It's an old habit, alas!'"

(2.2 "The Old Buffoon")

The devil's literary agency is irrefutable in that the word "devil" appears over seventy-five times throughout the entire novel. Again, the devil exists insofar as the devil is written– or conjured– onto the page. This conjuration is similar in function to the way Fyodor Pavlovich Karamazov, the notorious father of the four Karamazov brothers, insists to the elders that he is a "buffoon." The conjuration on his buffoonery (2.2.40) makes his subsequent "playing the fool" (2.2.41) appear grounded in truth. Whereas the elder, Father Zosima, dissuades against Fyodor's pretense, "The man who lies to himself and listens to his own lie comes to such a pass that he cannot distinguish the truth within him" (2.2.42), both the reader outside the literature and the other parties present within the literature are ready to accept that Fyodor Karamazov is, in fact, a "buffoon". If Fyodor Karamazov can make others believe he is who he is says he is through the simple conjuration of a name, then he successfully asserts his agency as a character and a force capable of action. The devil will operate in the same way.

Dmitri "Mitya" Karamazov, the oldest of the Karamazov brothers, is the first of the brothers to call the devil by name, however he is strategically not the first character to do so. Conveniently, the first character to cause those around him and the reader to ruminate on the presence of the devil is Dmitri's father, the self-proclaimed buffoon. The brutal fate of the notorious father of *The Brothers Karamazov,* then, might attest to the plausibility of the devil's presence– a presence that might just be the result of his own (and his sons') conjurations. The same causational logic can also be applied to Dmitri's fate. Could it be that those who use the devil's name in vain suffer tragic endings?

After all, Fyodor Karamazov speaks of the devil and hell in flippant, dissenting terms. When Fyodor bluntly questions the concreteness of the devil, "It's impossible, I think, for the devils to forget to drag me down to hell with their hooks when I die. Then I wonder—hooks?" a seed is further implanted into the reader's consciousness not only as to the plausibility of the devil, but how the devil actually functions as an entity capable of action. Ironically, Fyodor attempts to make the devil and hell seem implausible, "Now I'm ready to believe in hell, but without a ceiling" (1.4.27), however his attempt backfires. Regardless if hell has a ceiling or not and regardless if his futile logic holds or not ("if there's no ceiling then there can be no hooks"), musing over the devil's plausibility gives agency to that plausibility.

The story of Dmitri, then, reinforces this plausibility. Not only does Dmitri have a habit for invoking the devil as a curse word, "Devil take it!" (3.3.94), but he also describes himself as a casual follower of the devil, similar in function to his father's "buffoon" claim. Though Dmitri pathetically tries to assure his youngest brother, Alyosha, that "though I may be following the devil, I am Thy son, O Lord" (3.3.97), Dmitri's fate– a wrongful "guilty" verdict for his father's death– transforms

this literary statement into evidence of eschatological tension. If the devil and the Lord are not real, then this statement should hold no credence beyond the literary form. If, however, the devil and the Lord are real, then it is plausible to render Dmitri's fate as possessed by forces he imposed –through conjuration– onto the literary consciousness. His later assertion that "God and devil are fighting (...) and the battlefield is the heart of man" could even function as the closing argument for his wrongful conviction.

Whereas it might be a stretch to consider that the conjuring of the devil is directly correlated to the subsequent fates of Fyodor and Dmitri Karamazov, the agency of the devil is nonetheless granted through the literary form. Moreover, by granting a voice to the complex eschatological musings of these two characters, an otherwise secular literature appears to be possessed.

Possession: Smerdyakov and Alyosha's "Little Demon"

"If anyone had touched him he would start and look at one as though awakening and bewildered (...) if asked what he had been thinking about, he would remember nothing."

(III.vi, "Smerdyakov")

Momentary possession of lines within *The Brothers Karamazov* possibly reflect momentary possessions of Dostoevsky's characters. This is the next step of asserting the devil's plausibility both inside and outside the literature. Making a place for the devil in the literary imagination consequently requires physical agency within the literature, just as the characters themselves have been granted physical agency. Is it, however, plausible that literary characters (operating within the realistic genre) can be fully themselves and yet fully possessed by something greater than themselves? How does possession function, and how does the devil operate within that possession?

Possession functions as development of conjuration. One can think of possession like one's relationship with a given name– even if that name is self-given. There are both entitlements and caveats that come with a given name. One's name, as the character Rakitin argues, inherently possesses their function: "Alyosha, you're a saint, I know, but the devil only knows

what you've thought about (...) you're a Karamazov" (2.7.74). Rakitin argues that the darkness inherent in the Karamazov name[2] is equally as inherent in Alyosha, as if to indicate that his name precludes him to the functions of darkness (and, possibly, the devil). What, then, can be said of one whose name curiously means "to stink"?

Pavel Fyodorovich "Smerdyakov,"[3] the bastard fourth son of Fyodor Karamazov, appears to be possessed by many other influences besides an unfortunate name. Not only is Smerdyakov possessed by fastidiousness, but this fastidiousness is then exploited by a father who ironically possesses him as a servant and not a son. Not only is Smerdyakov possessed by epilepsy, but this epilepsy requires that others physically possess him, so he does not destroy himself during his seizures. Not only is Smerdyakov possessed by impressions and contemplations, but these impressions and contemplations are then exploited by his own brothers as stupidity: "you've thought no more of me than if I'd been a fly, not a man" (11.8.531). Not only is Smerdyakov possessed by Ivan's theory that "everything is permitted", but this fruitful theory then possesses Smerdyakov with a kind of brash destructiveness. He is a contradiction. Is it not possible, then, that one who is so susceptible to the exploitations, possessions, projections, and ideas of others may also be susceptible to the possession of an unseen devil?

With this in mind, can a change in temperament happen without any deeper explanation? Arguably, not in the framed world of *The Brothers Karamazov*. It is not enough to say that changes in temperament occur as nat-

urally as seizures to an epileptic. There is something else happening– at very least, literarily. Possessions appear to be a deliberate function of a greater force, a force that leaves a trail of shared symptoms on the page. For instance, the chapters entitled "The Little Demon" and "The Third and Last Meeting with Smerdyakov" begin the same way– under the under the auspices of two characters having undergone a "great change" (11.8.528).

"The Little Demon" is both jarring yet strangely expected. When Alyosha goes to visit his ex-fiancée Liza Khokhlakova, she is not how he (or the reader) last saw her– or is she? When the young girl of fourteen is introduced to the plotline nearly 450 pages earlier, she– like Smerdyakov– is the product of many possessions. Not only is Liza possessed by hysterical paralysis, but this paralysis poetically confines her to a chair that other people must push around. Not only is Liza possessed by those pushing her chair, but this chair also functions as a kind of possessive (or re-possessive) tool by her mother. Not only is Liza possessed by her mother, but her mother leads her to a group of men (the Elders) who seek to possess her out of her possession– through prayer and blessings.

Lastly, not only is Liza possessed by her "love" of Alyosha, but this love violently turns into a desire to be possessed. Liza, like Dmitri and Fyodor Karamazov, conjures the devil– only it is a developed conjuration. "I wanted to tell you of a longing I have," Liza says to Alyosha in the "The Little Demon" chapter, "I should like someone to torture me, marry me and then torture me, deceive me and go away" (11.3.490). When Alyosha tries to explain to Liza, "You take evil for good; it's a passing

crisis, it's the result of your illness, perhaps" (11.3.491), Liza does not understand that she is already dappling in her desire. She does not understand that she is merely a tool for yet another entity that is working upon her, that her "feverish look" (11.3.489) as observed by Alyosha, is near-identical to that of Smerdyakov's when observed by Ivan in "The Third and Last Meeting with Smerdyakov". Is it not all-too-convenient that Smerdyakov is possessed by "some hidden inner force" (11.8.528) when a few chapters earlier, Liza dreams of "devils that seize (her)" (11.2.91-92)? There is a relationship here– possibly through possession.

Admittedly, however, there is a complication with both of these observations. Alyosha admits to Liza that he has had her same devilish dream (11.3.492). What, then, prevents Alyosha from acting in the same "feverish" manner as his ex-fiancée? Accordingly, when Ivan begins to mirror the physical torments of Smerdyakov, "'You are ill (…) You eyes are yellow,' Smerdyakov commented, without the least irony, with apparent *sympathy* in fact" (11.8.531), how can the reader know for sure that Ivan is not also possessed?

Relationships in *The Brothers Karamazov* attest to little more than a shared set of possessions. Those whom are possessed by a force greater than themselves either through name-sake, jealousy, longing, or even love may, in-turn, be vulnerable to other, unimaginable possessions. The devil– given a name on the page (conjuration) and a trackable, physical presence (possession)– can now be thoughtfully incarnated, but, again, can he be believed?

Incarnation: Ivan Karamazov and the Narrator

*"I have the same philosophy as you (…) **Je pense, donc je suis** (…) all the rest, all these worlds, God and even Satan (…) Does all that exist of itself, or is it only an emanation of myself?"*

(11.9 "The Devil. Ivan Fyodorovich's Nightmare")

The hallucinated devil of Book 11 is, in a word, suspicious. In the genre of Realism, is it appropriate to consider a devil as an independent being? Even when Ivan supposedly throws a cup of tea on the devil and the devil shakes tea drops off of "himself" (11.9.547), the devil's physical agency, his incarnation within the scene may just be an "emanation" of Ivan. In other words, it is possible that the devil does not exist in human form, and that the devil is not a thinking, breathing entity. It is possible that the conjuring of Renée Descartes, "I think therefore I am" is directed to Ivan by Ivan: that Ivan thinks of the devil, and, in-turn, that thought takes on a shape and dimension– albeit, a shape and dimension that is subject to Ivan's consciousness.

`If, hypothetically, the devil is real and exists beyond the conjuration of the chapter's title "The Devil," then perhaps that incarnation is merely the "incarnation of myself" (11.9. 535)– the one that Ivan proffers as a debate to his

hallucination. Perhaps, the entire scene is not to be read in terms of fantastical plausibility, but the danger of ordinary thought. The narrator never asserts that there is a devil in this scene. Indeed, the narrator appears to disappear when the devil begins talking.

After all, in terms of content, the anecdotes that the hallucinated devil offers are anecdotes that Ivan already knows. Ivan catches his devil on this mistake: "I caught you! That anecdote (…) I made up myself!" (11.9.542). In terms of physical appearance, the hallucinated devil mirrors the looks of Ivan's father– which might be why Ivan calls his hallucination a "phantom" (11.9.535). In terms of speech, the "orator's" (Narrator's word) speech is possessed by French phrases– and yet, curiously, Smerdyakov was also learning French (5.3.197). Lastly, the setting: Ivan and the metaphysical devil are occupying the same physical space, but why is that space Ivan's vaguely-described second bedroom?

There is nothing to distinguish the sofa upon which the devil sits and the sofa upon which Ivan sits. The lack of distinction between the two sofas may actually suggest that the devil and Ivan are not only occupying the same physical space, but that, in fact, the devil and Ivan are one in the same– that they are sitting in the same place, on the same sofa. Their perspectives are dissonant and then shared, like looking away from a mirror and then back into it: "Ivan Fyodorovich jumped up from the *sofa* (…) Ivan wanted to rush to the window (…) The knocking at the window grew louder. At last the chains were broken, and Ivan Fyodorovich leapt from the *sofa*" (531). Either, there is fault of the narration, or the narrator purposefully does not offer the information necessary for a proper deduction. The narrator's lack of detail leaves room for doubt. The sofas are undefined for a reason, and that reason is to render a space between belief and disbelief. There could be two sofas, and there could be a devil sitting on one of those sofas– but then why does Ivan, without ever sitting down, jump from a sofa twice on the same page? Even if there were two sofas, this action does not make sense.

To digress– who, then, truly conjures the devil into fruition in this scene? The first appearance of the word, "Devil," after all, is in the chapter title (alongside that word is "Ivan's Nightmare"). What other chapter titles are given proper names? Surely, the ones listed for purposes here were not picked at random: "The Old Buffoon," "Smerdyakov," and "The Little Demon" are but some of the many people singled-out and granted a chapter of their own.

This is another deliberate function of the narrator. The narrator functions as a vessel for the voices of all the other characters. Though the narrator exists within the same place and time of the narrative action,[4] nothing is otherwise known about them. Contrary to the popular contributions of a literary narrator, Dostoevsky's narrator does not serve to advance the plot. In fact, the narrator sounds like a man possessed by the voices of every other character, especially the Karamazov brothers. Without even a proper name, the unnamed narrator's motivations for telling the story of *The Brothers Karamazov* rests on faulty credibility– credibility that a conjured devil might exploit through possession. This is the ultimate argument for the devil's plausibility. If the devil exists and requires a form to exist– who is to say that that form is not the novel of *The Brothers Karamazov* itself?

The "conflict between belief and disbelief" is carefully crafted through the use of conjuration and possession. Just as the devil is intricately woven into Ivan's apartment, albeit through a hallucination, the devil is concurrently woven, full-formed, onto the written page. It is also crucial to understand, in a nod to Dostoevsky's epigraph from John 12:24, that seeds had to be planted before the devil could plausibly manifest in both the consciousness of Ivan and Dostoevsky's readers. The incarnation of the devil at the end of *The Brothers Karamazov* is but a culmination of many conjurations and possessions, rooted in the literary form, and hold no credence outside the literary form. The devil is real in so far as he exists within the conjurations of the written word, and the devil is not real in so far as he does not exist without a form.

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0100111000
1 *Mama, 0
1 sit down 0
1010100100
МАМА...
САДИСЬ...

Вилка царапает тень.

Стою на холме, иль может скале,
Вокруг меня горы, синеют вдали.
Вижу я берег, зелёную близь,
На нём небоскрёбы скребутся о высь.
Закат мрачноватый, и кажется мне,
Что вижу всё это во сне.

Вода журчит и пахнет море,
Как будто слышен шум прибоя.
Киты плывут по небесам,
И львы хвостами бьют по скатам.
Спустившись к пляжу вижу я,
Делфин лежит, хвостом крутя.

Протер глаза, поставил чайник,
Во мне проснулся некий вестник..
Зову друзей, они идут
И вместе строим мы редут.
Защита чайника важна,
Империя повержена.

Имперский чай, не самый вкусный
Зато во благо дела русский.
И львица издали кричит,
Быстрее надо сделать щит.
Зачем нам щит, мы пролетарий,
Враг народа ведь гербарий.

Но вдруг вода назад отпала,
Как будто бы она устала.
И вспомнил я тот пятый вал,
Как сам тогда то я отстал.
Не пересилил он тогда
Глухой гвардейский строй.

Ревет вперед девятый вал,
До боли уши прокричал.
Что делать лучше нам, увы
Уж нету бывшей простоты.
Незыблемый редут подняли,
И вместе с валом побежали.

Зацеп, скольженье, момент,
Волна как златоглазый Энт.
Соленым вдарило в глаза,
И по щеке бежит слеза.
Вездесущий белый вал
Какой жестокий твой оскал.

Ракета пробивая купол
Должна разбиться лбом.
Лбом встречаю я скалу,
Снова глянув на луну.
Не лучше ль чёрно-белый сон
Раскрасить в красный тон?

The fork scrapes the shadow.

I stand on a hill or maybe a cliff,
Around me are mountains, blue in the distance.
I see the shore, green proximity,
On it skyscrapers scrape the heights.
The sunset is gloomy, and it seems,
That I see all of this in a dream.

The water bubbles and the sea exhumes a smell,
As if the surf resounds.
Whales fly across the sky,
And lions beat the incline/stingrays with their tails.
Descending to the beach I see,
A dolphin lies, its tail wagging.

I rub my eyes, and put the kettle (to boil),
In me awakened some sort of herald.
I call my friends, they come,
Together we construct a redoubt.
The kettle's defence is paramount,
The Empire defeated.

Imperial tea, is not the greatest,
But for the good of the mission it is Russian.
And lionesses cry from afar,
The shield requires swifter building.
Why do we need the shield, we are the proletariat,
The herbarium is the enemy of the people.

But suddenly the water broke away,
As if it tired.
And I remembered that fifth swell,
How I myself fell back back then.
It did not overpower then,
The watertight formation of the Guards.

The ninth swell roars forth,
Its scream is painful for the ears.
What should we do, alas
No more is the old simplicity.
Picked up the unshakable redoubt,
And with the swell we ran.

Hook, slide, moment,
The wave like a golden eyed Ent.
Salt hits the eye,
And a tear runs down the cheek.
Omnipresent white swell,
How cruel is your grin.

A rocket breaking through the dome
Has to break its forehead.
My forehead meets the cliff,
Once again I look to the moon.
Isn't it better that the black and white dream
Is colored red?

APPENDIX

Women in Russia in the period of transition (1985-1999)

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[5]Racioppi and See O’Sullivan, “Organizing Women”: 822.
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[16]Anastasia Posadskaia and Elizabeth Waters, “Democracy Without Women is No Democracy : Women’s Struggles in Postcommunist Russia” in The Challenges of Local Feminism: Women’s Movements in Global Perspective, 351-373. Edity by Basu (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 362.
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Pavlensky Fixed in History

[1]Walker, "Petr Pavlensky: Why I Nailed My Scrotum to Red Square."
[2]Bachina, "Rebel Artist Pavlensky Says Inspired By Pussy Riot, Russian Church."
[3]Bachina
[4]Walker, "Petr Pavlensky: Why I Nailed My Scrotum to Red Square."
[5]Eshun and Ekow, "The Naked Truth: Art World Reacts to Pyotr Pavlensky's Red Square Protest."
[6]Walker, "Petr Pavlensky: Why I Nailed My Scrotum to Red Square."
[7]Eshun and Ekow, "The Naked Truth: Art World Reacts to Pyotr Pavlensky's Red Square Protest."
[8]Langemann, Pavlensky - Man and Might.
[9]Langemann, Pavlensky - Man and Might.
[10]Walker, "Petr Pavlensky: Why I Nailed My Scrotum to Red Square."
[11]Langemann, Pavlensky - Man and Might.
[12]Walker, "Petr Pavlensky: Why I Nailed My Scrotum to Red Square."
[13]Spieker, Destruction. pg. 220
[14]Langemann, Pavlensky - Man and Might.
[15]Bachina, "Rebel Artist Pavlensky Says Inspired By Pussy Riot, Russian Church."
[16]"Russian Performance Artist Pavlensky Avoids Jail After Vandalism Verdict."
[17]Azar, "Дурной Урок Нашей Молодежи Художник Петр Павленский Привел В Суд Проституток. Репортаж Ильи Азара."
[18]Azar
[19]Azar
[20]Dennisovna, "Павленский И Путин – Одно Целое."

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1. Pavlensky's Fixation from: Zmeev, Maxim. "The Body Politic: How Pyotr Pavlensky's Performance Art Is Breaking the Mould." *Calvert Journal,* 13 Nov. 2014.

2. Nenasheva's Cargo 300 from: "A Major Was tearing down the police report, one page after another, and throwing them on the floor." *Ministry of Counter-culture*, 19 Sep. 2018.

3. Kulik's Pavlensky Sculpture from: Kostyanov, Andrey. "Павленский и Путин – одно целое." Radio *Svoboda*, 19 May. 2016.

Forming the Devil: Conjuration, Possession and Incarnation in The Brothers Karamazov

[1]Epigraphs and in-text citations will purposefully omit the name "Dostoevsky" and, instead, include the poignantly named chapter titles. This decision seeks to serve the overall argument of the paper.
[2]The roots of the name, "Karamazov" are Kará – the Turkish root for black; maz – the Russian root signifying tar/grease; and mazat – a variation of maz meaning to smear/soil. (From "Names in The Brothers Karamazov", xix)
[3]Smerd in Russian: a bad smell, a man of low origins, a slave or serf. Smerdet: to stink. (From "Names in The Brothers Karamazov", xx)
[4]First sentence of The Brothers Karamazov: "Alexey Fyodorovich Karamazov was the third son of Fyodor Pavlovich Karamazov, a landowner well known in our district in his own day (and still remembered among us)" (1.1)

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