Rethinking the Alliance
NATO is searching for a new role in 21st century. But is it still relevant?
DAN STEPANICICH
On April 4th, towards the end of President Barack Obama’s weeklong diplomatic jaunt in Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) celebrated its 60th anniversary. In recent years many critics have condemned the Cold War alliance, which was initially established to protect Western Europe from Soviet Union expansion, as irrelevant in today’s multi-polar world. However, the leaders of the alliance—including President Obama—are determined to show that it has not outlived its purpose. Over the course of the two decades following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, they have been making attempts to revamp NATO to improve its ability to address the complex threats of the 21st century.
Most notably, NATO’s original purpose of providing security to Europe has been extended to include addressing important crises in other parts of the globe. Prior to NATO’s strategy review last year, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer defined the organization’s role as “an alliance that provides us with both immediate protection against immediate threats, and with an instrument to shape the strategic environment in a way that is conducive to our interests and values.” But in order to fulfill this promise NATO must tackle two important challenges: the twin perils of expanded membership and the recalcitrant conflict in Afghanistan.
After the fall of the Soviet Union, European leaders initially saw NATO expansion as a way to keep the alliance relevant to the 21st century. The idea was that it would bring emerging eastern European states under a stable military alliance that would encourage the spread of democracy.
However, current NATO members are now hesitant to expand membership to such countries, including tiny but conflict-ridden Georgia. NATO expansion must meet three conditions: promoting the continued stability of member states, ensuring the functionality and integrity of the alliance, and providing security to the North Atlantic and European region. In a report on NATO’s new strategy, Stephanie Hoffman of Cornell University gave voice to this hesitance, arguing that the “same concerns [as in Ukraine] around the tentative democratic transition arise in the case of Georgia, and are compounded by trepidation about the wisdom of extending Article V protections to the country given unresolved ‘frozen conflicts’ between the government and separatist regions.” Expansion complicates internal disagreements since it increases the chance of dissenting views on policy. The feared result would be more cumbersome decision making and slower responses to crises.
However, the US, under President Bush, and the Eastern European members of NATO, actively and persistently pushed for expanded membership. Among the practical elements of expansion is that increased membership would bring more resources into the alliance. Some scholars and politicians see expanded membership on more ideological terms. James Goldgeier of the Council on Foreign Relations argues that “membership should be extended to any country that shares NATO members’ commitment to human rights, democracy, and open markets.” NATO would essentially become what Senator John McCain, another supporter of expansion, envisioned during his presidential campaign as a “League of Democracies” which would have represented an effort to contain the spread of autocracy, especially from Russia and Iran.
Meanwhile, the expansion of NATO is most contentious in the potential candidates for membership—the former satellite states of the Soviet Union. Russia still views many of these states, especially countries such as Ukraine and Georgia, as being within its sphere of influence. The presence of any significant foreign (that is, western European or American) influence is viewed as a national security risk. As NATO expanded eastward in the 1990s, Russia responded with increased militarization of its border and closer military integration with Belarus. A report by the NATO Research Fellowship in 2001-2003 suggested that Russia’s move toward stronger ties with Belarus was primarily due to the NATO question and the loss of the buffer zone created by the USSR following World War II.
NATO does not want to antagonize Russia, which would destabilize the region’s collective security—a fact which Russia is cognizant of as well. The country has recently made overtures to US and European leaders for improved relations with the alliance. A report by the Atlantic Council of the United States stressed that “Russia is not the Soviet Union, and dusted-off policies of containment are inappropriate to the challenges and opportunities we face with Moscow today.” There is an argument to be made that expanding membership based on ideological considerations will not bring stability to the region and will only undermine NATO’s relevance.
But even while the debate over expansion continues, NATO is being tested by a much more trying conflict: its involvement in Afghanistan through the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). It is the alliance’s first “out-of-area” mission beyond Europe, which has raised a host of problems. For one, many NATO members simply do not have the capability to fight a prolonged conflict in a distant country. They lack the airlift capabilities or the logistical support to be an effective fighting force.
As of February 2009, the ISAF consists of 58,390 troops from NATO members and partners. Of these troops, 26,215 are American soldiers. No other alliance member has deployed more than 8,300 troops, which has raised ire in the US. However, on his European tour, President Obama was able to extract a pledge from NATO members to send an additional 5,000 troops alongside the additional 21,000 that the US has pledged to send.
One of the most significant problems plaguing NATO in Afghanistan is that members have different views and interpretations of the mission of nation building and counter-terrorism. For example, many nations have taken issue with the US’ handling of prisoners, insisting that torture and abuse must not occur under any circumstance. As a result, NATO commanders have found it difficult to raise troop levels, as member nations are hesitant to send more troops to a war that is becoming increasingly unpopular on the home front.
There is also no uniform structure for the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which are civilian-military units tasked with extending the influence of the weak Afghani central government. Member nations have near complete discretion in how to use their PRTs, and the greatest difficulty facing battlefield commanders is that member nations have imposed various caveats on what their forces can do. Some troops lack the appropriate equipment to engage in operations with other NATO forces while other troops are not permitted to leave or enter certain regions. The end result is that coordination is difficult and fragmented.
NATO has made its mission in Afghanistan a possible model for future “out-of-area” interventions. The ISAF’s mission is to assist the Afghan authorities in “providing security and stability and creating the conditions for reconstruction and development.” The two-pronged approach emphasizes state building by first providing security and then reconstructing society and governance. NATO leaders hope to apply the stabilization and reconstruction approach to other conflict areas where the alliance may become involved. But the ISAF’s track record does not bode well for future attempts at nation building. According to Coalition documents, violence in Afghanistan rose by 30 percent in 2008 alone. A failure in Afghanistan will undermine future missions and possibly make NATO turn away from “out-of-area” security missions. Thus, NATO’s credibility is on the line.
Expansion and the outcome in Afghanistan will dictate NATO’s future, and answer the looming question in the air: is the alliance a regional or a global entity? Given the international nature of terrorism, the organization will be unable to provide security and protection to its members without acting abroad. Yet, due to internal flaws, the alliance has struggled in its first test abroad.
It is important to remember, however, that the alliance was founded under the assumption that the US would provide the bulk of the protection through nuclear deterrence. The other members of the alliance inherently played a secondary role, which they continue to occupy. As in the past, the current success of NATO will depend on the leadership of the US.
This means that the burden of reform is sitting squarely on our shoulders. President Obama has begun to do his part by renouncing the unilateralism that marked the past eight years. At the NATO summit this April, he proclaimed that “America cannot confront the challenges of this century alone, but Europe cannot confront them without America.” The president promises a stronger commitment to European concerns and the US’ own European obligations. The results of the summit seem to be pointing to a renewal of US leadership within NATO, which would serve to strengthen the alliance as it redefines its role.
For the past two decades NATO has struggled to find its place in global politics. Despite accusations by its detractors, the alliance has managed to remain relevant in the 21st century. Currently the organization is at a crossroads that will dictate its future. The course it takes in expansion is still uncertain. On one hand it can slowly integrate the rest of Europe as the remaining states become politically stable with functioning militaries. Such an approach would uphold the alliance’s traditional role of providing security to the region. On the other hand NATO can be used as a political tool to encourage the spread and protection of democracy among the fledgling democracies.
Scheffer’s March 2008 speech makes no distinction between the two roles. Yet there may come a time when providing greater collective security and spreading democracy and the values of the Euro-Atlantic region will prove to be mutually exclusive. That is the dilemma that is currently playing out in Afghanistan. Should NATO’s goal be to foster and support democracy or should it focus on providing security and preventing regional destabilization?
The course NATO takes may very well be in the hands of President Obama as he attempts to foster a renewed American-European partnership. His first actions suggest that he will proceed on the latter course of action. He has begun to engage Russia in discussions of cooperation with Europe and nuclear disarmament. In Afghanistan he has emphasized the need for more troops to bolster the security situation so stabilization and reconstruction can occur. In China he has allowed human rights issues to play a secondary issue to concrete geopolitical, economic, and environmental improvements. The US is the key component of NATO and the two are tightly linked. If President Obama is able to reestablish American leadership in world politics, then NATO will also find its role and purpose.
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One Response to “Rethinking the Alliance”
said on September 12th, 2009 at 5:24 pm
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