

Music and Imperialism

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Edward Said's two recent books *Culture and Imperialism* (1993) and *Musical Elaborations* (1991) are variations on common themes, and both are made more resonant by being read in relation to each other. The reasons for this are not simply circumstantial, but emanate from the internal logic of the texts and from the ways each can be seen to comment upon the ideas and methods of the other. Each operates within an explicitly musical mode of discourse, and each contributes to a cultural critique which is premised upon specifically overlapping aesthetic and hermeneutic understandings. This essay reads each text separately for its particular illuminations and then reads both together as integral parts of a comprehensive whole. It seeks to trace some of the deeper correspondences between the two texts and, in extrapolating from this polyvocal reading, to argue for a similarly polyvocal aesthetic and methodology in music and in musicology, as well as in expressions and interpretations of imperialism and post-colonialism.

Culture and Imperialism calls for a new methodology for studying the relationship between the expression of ideas and the spread of European power around the globe. Terms like *culture* and *imperialism* are vague and tend to be used jargonistically; defining them, and doing so in relation to each other, constitutes Said's entire book. But in his preface he comes close to formulating working definitions:

Imperialism means thinking about, settling on, controlling land that you do not possess, that is distant, that is lived on and owned by others. For all kinds of reasons it attracts some people and often involves untold misery for others. ... The struggle is complex and interesting

because it is not only about soldiers and cannons but also about ideas, about forms, about images and imaginings. (*CI*, 5-6)¹

Here Said construes imperialism as a form of cultural expression, and cultural expression as something determined by the context of its creation in an imperial world. He is not interested simply in "imperialist culture": the often jingoistic literature of Rider Haggard or Rudyard Kipling, the domineering architecture of the British Raj in India, the "pomp and circumstance" found by some in aspects of Elgar and Verdi.² Imperial propaganda is not his subject. Rather, he is interested in the subtle intertwining of cause and effect in *all* cultural products of European societies which, from the fifteenth century through the present, have dominated parts of the globe not initially under their aegis. With particular respect to Britain and France, the great European empires of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Said encourages an awareness that any book or painting or piece of music or idea generated by a society based on an imperial economy and ideology can be considered and interpreted in that light. As an example, he rereads Jane Austen's *Mansfield Park* in the light of the imperial plantocracy which has paid for it—novel, home, social

1. Quotations from Said's books will use the following abbreviations:

CI: *Culture and Imperialism* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1993; New York: Knopf, 1993).

ME: *Musical Elaborations* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1991; New York: Knopf, 1993).

See also *CI*, 8: "Imperialism...lingers where it has always been, in a kind of general cultural sphere as well as in specific political, ideological, economic, and social practices." Said's vastly influential book, *Orientalism* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1978) helped to develop these ideas in the general context of critical theory and practice.

2. An extensive and richly suggestive reading of *Aïda* and the circumstances surrounding its commissioning and first performance in Egypt to celebrate the opening of the Suez Canal comprises chapter 2, section 4 of Said's book. Some of Said's arguments have been challenged by Paul Robinson in "Is *Aïda* an Orientalist Opera?" *Cambridge Opera Journal* 5, no. 2 (1993), 133-140.

system³—and asks that this sort of rereading happen more often. Said goes further to say that we *must* begin revising our understanding of cultural expression to include this awareness at all times. He says that we have generally “avoided the major, I would say determining, political horizon of modern Western culture, namely imperialism.” To continue such an avoidance “is to disaffiliate modern culture from its engagements and attachments” (*CI*, 70-71)—it is to perpetuate a blindness which has generated cultural as well as social and political abuses of an intensely immoral nature. The book strives to demonstrate the cultural, critical, and moral blockage which is caused by, and which *is*, imperialism.⁴

Revisionary paradigms—such as those in studies of gender, sexuality, class, and race—have influenced previous developments in criticism. Perhaps it is true that all these ideas converge in the paradigm of a consummately oppressive imperialism, as Said suggests: empire dictates and imposes one whole culture upon others, and in doing so generates first an opposition among the displaced cultures, and eventually a resistance among its own creators. (It is worth remembering, as we shall discuss below, that aspects of Said’s imperial paradigm themselves might be seen to insist on a certain species of “wholeness” in interpretative theory, the application of which carries risks of its own and generates new forms of opposition and resistance.) Resistance cannot afford to be a static, conservative force, however; reinstating respect for cultural aspects which have been displaced or disrupted by imperialism is never simple or clear-cut. The influence of the imperial culture changes the displaced culture essentially. English and French are now official languages in India, Africa, and Southeast Asia;

3. “Right up to the last sentence, Austen affirms and repeats the geographical process of expansion involving trade, production, and consumption that predates, underlies, and guarantees the morality [that questions the desirability of imperial expansion]” (*CI*, 111).

4. An extremely clear and useful summary of these ideas can be found in the opening paragraph of chapter 3 in *CI*, 230-1.

European capitalism and jurisprudence are dominant forces on the planet; and such concepts as the novel, artistic realism, and the tonality of Western music are often received standards in the so-called "third" world as well as the "first." Such ideas can be exchanged by means other than imperial domination, but the historical facts of the past few centuries indicate that in most cases they were not. A significant lesson to be learned from these facts is that resistance to any given form of imperial expression is often less effective, desirable, or even possible than resistance to the ideology of imperialism in general.

Also, of course, the historical facts point to intimate influences of the marginal cultures upon the central (or as the current jargon would have it, metropolitan) cultures. One of the most obvious examples of this is specifically musical: the jazz, rock, pop, and rap musics that are so prevalent in the world and that are consistently distributed as part of the dominant "American" culture have their roots in the culture of the African diasporic populations in the Americas. In another example, the Indian food industry now constitutes a larger sector of the British economy than did the textile industry a hundred years ago when it was a staple of the imperial economy. Generally, the diaspora of Asian and African populations to Europe and America is a vastly significant factor in present-day politics and social understandings, and the general intellectual revisionism resulting from such cross-cultural exchanges, of which Said's book is a self-conscious part, is a vibrant and positive foundation of contemporary culture.

What is most interesting to Said, though, is the interpenetrative character of this cultural exchange. He develops the idea that because culture and imperialism overlap and intertwine—in terms of both territory and history—the appropriate interpretive mechanisms for approaching this understanding similarly overlap and intertwine:

Yes, Austen belonged to a slave-owning society, but do we therefore jettison her novels as so many trivial exercises in aesthetic frumpery? Not

at all, I would argue, if we take seriously our intellectual and interpretive vocation to make connections, to deal with as much of the evidence as possible, fully and actually, to read what is there or not there, above all, to see complementarity and interdependence instead of isolated, venerated, or formalized experience that excludes and forbids the hybridizing intrusions of human history. (*CI*, 115)

Throughout the text there are passages both discussing and enacting the overlapping, intertwining subject matter of culture and imperialism and the equally overlapping, intertwining methodology of interpreting it—as for example, when Said describes C. L. R. James's *Black Jacobins* (a seminal “post-colonial” text) as “a conscious attempt not only to write history saturated in, taking maximum account of, the struggle between imperial Europe and the peripheries, but to write it in terms both of subject matter and of treatment or method, from the standpoint of and as part of the struggle against imperial domination” (*CI*, 337).

Early on in his text, Said begins to use musical models of structure and hermeneutics to enrich his analysis: the overlapping, intertwining terms are construed as a sort of “polyphony,” the voices of which are empire itself and cultural artifacts that owe their existence, social vision, and actual generic structure to the economics and politics of empire. Furthermore, in sketching out his perception of the relationship between culture and imperialism as polyphony, Said construes a paradigm for interpreting this perception itself as polyphony along the lines of James's text. In the following passage, Said is writing “from the standpoint of and as part of the struggle against imperial domination.” Notice the play of opposite terms intertwining to create and argue for a sense of a whole:

There is more to be done.... The procedure entails reading the canon as a polyphonic accompaniment to the expansion of Europe.... So vast and yet so detailed is imperialism as an experience with crucial cultural

dimensions, that we must speak of overlapping territories, intertwined histories common to men and women, whites and non-whites, dwellers in the metropolis and on the peripheries, past as well as present and future; these territories and histories can only be seen from the perspective of the whole of secular human history. (*CI*, 71-2)

Said ultimately proffers the term “counterpoint” to describe both this perspective and a revised mechanism for interpreting it: “We should try to discern... a counterpoint between overt patterns in British writing about Britain and representations of the world beyond the British isles” (*CI*, 97); again: “whereas the whole of culture is a disjunct one, many important factors can be apprehended as working *contrapuntally* together” (*CI*, 234).⁵

This musical rhetoric and musicological hermeneutic become one of the most conspicuous modes of Said’s discourse. I will not say that this is a governing or dominant mode of his criticism because the point in employing it is to evade the tendency in Western critical theory always to impose some sort of administrative or executive authority on a text, either extracted from within or grafted on from without, as innovations in post-structural theory such as deconstruction and “new historicism” have demonstrated. Said’s endorsement of this musical mode is another such evasive strategy, probably employed in an attempt to approach critical revision in a more positive and less alienating manner. Still, the jargon of music and the jargon of literary theory are equally obscure to people unfamiliar with either field, and music has the disadvantage of being founded upon an alphabet even less familiar to most people than that from which literature is composed. In order for Said’s musical ideas to be useful for literary and cultural critics, and for his literary and cultural ideas to be useful for music critics and

5. The use of the term “polyphony” in a critical context originates, of course, with Bakhtin, whom Said does not discuss in this context. While the term “counterpoint” has a mixed pedigree, Said’s meaning for it is quite specific, as is shown here.

musicologists, the discourse of each distinct “field” must be seen to elucidate the discourse of the other. Again, the model for this interpretive paradigm is the overlapping, intertwining model of a post-colonial critical methodology, inspired by the contrapuntal history of culture and imperialism. Appropriately, then, it is in the overlapping, intertwining territory of his own polyphonic work that Said’s suggestions and expansions are richest.

In this spirit, then, I suggest reading *Culture and Imperialism* not on its own, but in reference to another text—subject and countersubject. Said produced *Musical Elaborations* one year before *Culture and Imperialism*, based on his Wellek Library Lectures in Critical Theory given in May 1989 at the Theory Institute in Irvine, California; this text evinces a much bolder use of the counterpoint paradigm, which is not surprising given its more overtly musical context. The largest lesson of the book, perhaps, is that cultural critics too often forget the value of studying music in the general context of culture; Said is quite right in trying to expand his cultural-critical vision through this mechanism which he, as a pianist and a music critic (for *The Nation*, since 1986) is more than usually qualified to integrate with the rest of his writing and thinking. As he says, “the roles played by music in Western society are extraordinarily varied, and far exceed the antiseptic, cloistered, academic, professional aloofness it seems to have been accorded” (*ME*, xii). A more specific lesson is that it is possible to juxtapose the concept of counterpoint in a musical context and in a cultural/imperial context. Reading Said’s two books together—books close to each other in intellectual time and space, and sounding the same keynote—one can perceive the strongest elements of the concept and reinforce its weaker ones with the vitality of overlapping, intertwining ideas and terms.

An initial observation, drawn from Said’s protestations for the value of the study of music outside its “antiseptic cloister,” is that music itself inhabits a margin and suffers under the domination of other modes of thought and expression that are

historically more resonant. Music is, as it were, a weaker nation in the empire of academic and critical discourse. To include musical discourse more respectfully in any analysis of culture and imperialism—and the complex imperialisms of culture—is to approach a more useful methodology for interpreting the relationship between culture and imperialism.

A second preliminary observation concerns the purpose of this pursuit of counterpoint: it is to achieve order and communication—liberty—so that more productive and less retributive activities may be pursued. Basically, the hope is to move beyond combative binarisms, even while learning from them, so that we can do other things: as Said says, “by looking at...different experiences contrapuntally, as making up a set of what I call intertwined and overlapping histories, I shall try to formulate an alternative both to a politics of blame and to the even more destructive politics of confrontation and hostility” (*CI*, 19). Terry Eagleton, that great establishment radical, writes:

Our grudge against the ruling order is not only that it has oppressed us in our social, sexual, or racial identities, but that it has thereby forced us to lavish an extraordinary amount of attention on these things, which are not in the long run all that important. Those of us who happen to be British, yet who object to what has been done historically to other peoples in our name, would far prefer a situation in which we could take our being British for granted and think about something else for a change.⁶

Seamus Deane clarifies: “Any politics that has transformative power has to envisage, if in a negative way, the freedom and self-autonomy that would make such politics unnecessary. This is not merely a theoretical paradox. It is a condition that has to be passionately lived.”⁷ This notion of passion is taken from

6. Terry Eagleton, “Nationalism: Irony and Commitment,” in *Nationalism, Colonialism, and Literature*, ed. Seamus Deane (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990), 26.

7. Seamus Deane, introduction, *Nationalism, Colonialism, and Literature*, 4.

Kierkegaard, and Eagleton ends his article with it: "As Kierkegaard might have said, it is a matter of trying to live that dialectic passionately, ironically, in all of its elusive impossibility, rather than merely providing an elegant theoretical formulation of it."

But how much of an impossibility is this, how elusive is the goal of changing the world instead of merely interpreting it, and can this notion of counterpoint help? Said himself says that

it is more rewarding—and more difficult—to think concretely and sympathetically, contrapuntally, about others than only about "us." But this also means not trying to rule others, not trying to classify them or put them in hierarchies, above all, not constantly reiterating how "our" culture or country is number one (or *not* number one, for that matter). For the intellectual there is quite enough of value without having to do *that*. (*CI*, 408)

Said ends *Culture and Imperialism* with that passage, and it is a passionate plea indeed, to which one can hardly be unsympathetic—but it is a plea which is made all the more resonant when read in counterpoint with much of what he says in *Musical Elaborations*. Said's musical discourse, then, can be read as an enactment of his own call for a more contrapuntal and more accessible post-colonial criticism.

Said's use of counterpoint implies an interest in wholeness constructed out of interlocking fragmentation—a unity of effect built out of multiplicity. To a great extent, Said's perspective on this derives from Adorno, with whose writings Said is intimately familiar.⁸ Fairly little of the recent commentary on Said seems to explore this aspect of his work, which is revealing not least because both men are supremely interested in music as part of their cultural-critical philosophies. Without going into more than superficial detail about Adorno, it is worth

8. See especially *ME*, 12-17 and *CI*, 403-4.

mentioning that his interest in counterpoint is acute and crucial, particularly with respect to the moderns of the Second Viennese School (with whom Adorno was closely associated), who experimented consciously with the contrapuntal techniques of Bach. Two points are significant for the development of Said's notion of counterpoint. First, Adorno stresses that all of Bach's counterpoint contains moments when the perfect rigidity of ideas is loosened—when aberrations, often passing dissonances, in the thematic material or its contrapuntal treatment infuse the intellection with humanity and transform it into art instead of mathematics. Also, Adorno places his particular stamp on this idea and links it to some of the Marxian social ideas germane to (and of common derivation with) post-colonial notions of resistance and opposition: Bach “attempts to parry the impoverishment and petrification of musical language, the shadow-side of its decisive progress. Such traits represent Bach's effort to resist the inexorable growth of the commodity character of music, a process which was linked to its subjectivization.”⁹ The notion that Bach's music can be said to resist commodification or reification through certain inherent traits is expounded through a discussion of the fugue, which Adorno reads as the supreme manifestation of contrapuntalism:

The art of fugue composition is one of motivic economy, of exploiting the smallest part of a theme in order to make it into an integral whole.

9. T. W. Adorno, “Bach Defended against his Devotees,” *Prisms*, ed. and trans. Samuel and Shierry Weber (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981), 142; see also “Arnold Schoenberg,” 150, and “Cultural Criticism and Society,” 26, both in *Prisms*; and “On the Fetish Character in Music and the Regression of Listening” (1938) in *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader*, ed. Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt (New York: Urizen Books, 1978), especially 286-99. I am grateful here to the particularly erudite advice of Gregory Dubinsky. Clearly there is much room for expansion of these ideas in reference to Adorno and the aesthetic experience of Darmstadt-era integral serialism; this, it seems, gives formulations such as the “integral whole” a complex of associations.

It is an art of dissection; one could almost say, of dissolving Being, posited as the theme, and hence incompatible with the common belief that the Being maintains itself static and unchanged throughout the fugue.

Adorno goes on to propose a “social deciphering” of Bach, which, he says,

would have to establish the link between the decomposition of the given thematic material through subjective reflection on the motivic work contained therein, and the change in the work-process that took place in the same epoch through the emergence of manufacturing, which consisted essentially in breaking down the old craft operations into its [*sic*] smaller component acts. If this resulted in the rationalization of material production, then Bach was the first to crystallize the idea of the rationally constituted work, of the aesthetic domination of nature; it was no accident that he named his major instrumental work [*The Well-Tempered Clavier*] after the most important technical achievement of musical rationalization. Perhaps Bach's innermost truth is that in him the social trend which has dominated the bourgeois era to this very day is not merely preserved but, by being reflected in images, is reconciled with the voice of humanity which in reality was stifled by that trend at the moment of its inception.¹⁰

Manufacturing emerged as a system that consolidated artisanal skills as relatively small components in one large process of assembly. This development, according to Marxian social theory, had the effect of stifling the value of human labor under the value of the commodity produced. However, its rational efficiency can be regarded as innovation if the process of consolidation is never allowed to immolate the individuality of the smaller components that constitute it. Bach's contrapuntal technique has the effect of constantly heightening awareness of the basic building blocks of material and labor out of which the total effect is produced. His rationale of counterpoint as a total

10. Adorno, “Bach Defended,” 139. In contrast, see Frederic Jameson, “Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture,” *Social Text* 1 (1979), denying that such resistance to commodification occurs before late capitalism.

social understanding is predicated, then, upon an innate awareness of its integral parts.

Bach's license with contrapuntal forms and any given thematic material is, again, the key to this awareness. Deliberate dissonances call attention to the voices in which they occur, and to the importance of line and motivic drive over mere conformity to harmonic rules. Dissonance keeps a listener attentive, in other words, and also has the effect of debilitating the authority of technique, or even of the dominant subject in play—the longer such an authority goes unquestioned, the more innate it becomes, the less it is listened to, the less "rational" it is able to be. Such static authority creates an illusion of its own unanswerable pre-eminence, even of its own permanence, for unchallenged dominance is incapable of imagining its own end. As this illusion of permanence must necessarily be flaunted at the conclusion of the piece, such a situation can essentially undermine any aesthetic. However, subverting that situation with judiciously applied dissonances reinvestigates the aesthetic—and in this case, the whole notion of counterpoint.

Bach's achievement, as interpreted by Adorno, is in this way crucial for an understanding of how Said derives a similar contrapuntal aesthetic for interpreting culture and imperialism. It is possible to see Adorno's influence on Said in this notion of an integral whole made explicit by its dissonances. Adorno presents a social trend which, "by being reflected in images," begins to approach the intertwinings and dissonances which Said is trying to establish in his own "social deciphering" of the relationship between culture and imperialism. Furthermore, Adorno's rhetoric—his actual language and manipulation of words—is itself constituted to evoke the same series of questions and understandings, unifying the method with the message. Adorno's innovation, loosely understood as this notion of a "social deciphering," is predicated upon the translation of an arcane discourse (fugue) into one directly relevant to the conditions of human existence. While Adorno applies a

certain hermeneutic to Bach, his reader is expected to apply a similar hermeneutic to his involuted text. "Subjective reflection" on Adorno's elliptical language ultimately reveals basic motifs at work. Just as a fugue insists on a listener apprehending the individual parts out of which it is assembled, so too does Adorno's language insist on an understanding of the historical circumstances of manufacturing in early capitalism. Thus one can extrapolate from the culture of Bach to the culture of imperialism: empire is a culture of emerging and apparently perpetual "manufacturing" of states and other politics; it is based on the consolidation of smaller constituent parts sublimated into an authoritative whole and denied individual voices.¹¹ Thus we observe that just as a musical theme can assert itself as "static and unchanging throughout the fugue," so too can empire assert itself as valid and unchanging throughout the counterpoint of society and history. Bach's "art of dissection" resists this tendency—call it commodification, reification, or totalization—"through subjective reflection," in other words, by dismembering and then "tempering" the thematic material with dissonances, and implying that any authority can be shown to be questioned from within its own logic. So too can a critic armed with the properly reflective methodology locate instances of "dissonance" in an imperial culture—aesthetic expressions from the marginal cultures which are strongly resistant of imperial domination, and also (more interestingly) aesthetic expressions from within the dominant, metropolitan culture which also question that

11. See *CI*, 91 (emphasis mine): "In the main, the nineteenth-century European novel is a cultural form *consolidating* but also refining and articulating the *authority* of the status quo." See also *CI*, 82 (emphasis mine): "Without empire, I would go so far as saying, there is no European novel as we know it, and indeed if we study the impulses giving rise to it, we shall see the far from accidental convergence between the patterns of narrative *authority* constitutive of the novel on the one hand, and, on the other, a complex ideological configuration underlying the tendency to imperialism."

dominance, or refuse to perpetuate it in subtle or not-so-subtle ways. Put simply, “no vision, any more than any social system, has complete hegemony over its domain” (*CI*, 225). Furthermore, “the culture of opposition and resistance suggests a theoretical alternative and a practical method for reconceiving human experience in non-imperialist terms” (*CI*, 333). Thus the contrapuntal paradigm, with its essential component of dissonance, operates in direct support of a social imperative by being directly associated with an aesthetic *and* methodological concern to show dominance “reconciled with the voice of humanity”—as it were, with the voice of individual dissent.

But there is a problem here. Instead of “dissonant,” Said ultimately comes to privilege the word “atonal” (which he derives from Adorno):

This global, contrapuntal analysis should be modeled not (as earlier notions of comparative literature were) on a symphony but rather on an atonal ensemble; we must take into account all sorts of spatial or geographical and rhetorical practices—inflections, limits, constraints, intrusions, inclusions, prohibitions—all of them tending to elucidate a complex and uneven topography. A gifted critic’s intuitive synthesis, of the type volunteered by hermeneutic or philological interpretation (whose prototype is Dilthey), is still of value, but strikes me as the poignant reminder of a serener time than ours. (*CI*, 386)

While dissonance is useful within a contrapuntal system for resisting the commodification of any given ideology—that which Adorno, in his article of the same title, calls the “fetish character in music” and which accounts for the “regression in listening”—the substitution of “atonality” for “dissonance” in an attempt to figure culture in a more explicitly sociopolitical context is not strictly legitimate. Atonality is itself a distinct compositional paradigm of the same basic degree as counterpoint, atonal ensemble being characterized by a linear interplay in its independent parts which is not governed by the domination of a concept of tonal harmony or traditional counterpoint. Dissonance, furthermore, is irrelevant in such an ensemble—

an atonal paradigm obviates the need for constructively resistant dissonances. Thus an atonal paradigm renders superfluous those earlier parts of Said's books privileging dissonance. While Said introduces atonality in an effort to replace the "symphonic" paradigm popular in earlier generations of scholarship and criticism—in which voices blend into a single, ultimately collaborative voice—he confounds his own earlier inspirations concerning counterpoint and thereby muddies his analysis.

Essentially, the problem is that a conciliatory analysis so redolent of politics, especially of imperial or totalitarian politics, can be construed as accommodation—or, in the vocabulary of occupied territories (as much as of symphonies), as collaboration. Vichy France, many Native States associated with the British Raj in India, varieties of client states in Asia, Africa, and the Americas—all are collaborative political systems functioning cacophonously, but still collaboratively, within the imperial paradigm. In cultural terms, such reconciliation can produce art and artists of high quality and dubious intellectual integrity: examples include some of Orff's and Strauss's music from the 1930s and '40s, Céline's and Strindberg's more misogynist and anti-Semitic poetry and plays, and the more infamous aspects of Wagner. When the reconciliation between dominance and individual dissent results not in an amelioration of whatever oppressive structures have provoked the dissent, but instead in a perpetuation of them in some subtler form, then dissent has been co-opted and the dialectic of power remains essentially unchanged. Said's contrapuntal paradigm inclines towards this almost insidious situation in which the possibility for effective change is lost or forgotten. His argument itself seems to succumb to something of the same force, under the pressure of the univalent and impassioned political stance of *Culture and Imperialism*. While one can see where he is leading, some of his conclusions ultimately lack credibility because of this univalence.

In general, the effect of his argument is to demonstrate that culture (literature, music)—understood as a signifying process

and not a system, as a discourse and not a canon—is supremely useful in avoiding what Socrates called the unexamined life. Without its loosening of the chains of oppression, life, unfree for being unexamined, would not be worth living. Such knowledge, Said says, must be eternally and loudly obvious to those oppressed because of race, sex, capital, whatever; that it is not so obvious to the rest of us signals the need to make it so. But this does not in the end constitute a practical argument, only an ideological one: if we fail to scrutinize its potential weaknesses we are once again relegated to the power of a dominant idea—co-opted by it, collaborating with it—and the cycle perpetuates itself. In *Musical Elaborations*, as we shall soon see, Said addresses this problem and offers an alternative paradigm. In *Culture and Imperialism*, however, percolating throughout Said’s essentially contrapuntal argument and rhetoric, the problem persists.

To recapitulate: Through the notion of dissonance, Adorno’s understanding of counterpoint ultimately resists dialectical, binary, or combative tendencies and prepares the way for a greater degree of artistry (or “passion” as Kierkegaard and Eagleton would have it) in any methodology premised upon a simultaneously social and aesthetic criticism. This artistry becomes an essential component of Said’s notion of the counterpoint of culture and imperialism, by which he insists that any methodology for interpreting them must accommodate an awareness of their contrapuntal relationship. This in turn comes to weaken the initial purpose of the paradigm of counterpoint and points the way toward some of Said’s own later revisions.

Examining exactly how Said undertakes this “social deciphering” of a contrapuntal paradigm clarifies the ligatures of his more successful methodology for interpreting the relationship between culture and imperialism. We turn now to *Musical Elaborations*, which elaborates, both musically and socially, upon the ideas presented above.

open to suggestion and variety and moves toward an effect of wholeness. (This is essentially a matter of “letting go,” of being released from internal concerns and called to witness the universal—with which theme Said will end his book.) Consider the diction of the above passage and apply it to the relationship of culture and imperialism. Recall that there have always been voices within the imperial voice, the literature of the governing politic, which do not simply propagandize the imperial ideal. These dissonances oppose its claims and attempts to become totalizing. This implies the need for a redefinition of counterpoint, one which devalues binarism and acknowledges that the countersubject “derives from and relates to” the principal subject, and is meditated upon through imitation, repetition, and ornamentation—a definition, that is, without an assertive identity of its own, unlikely to become authorial and ultimately reified. It is merely, but somehow powerfully, “an antidote”—and here is the most felicitous turn of phrase in Said’s passage—“to the administrative and executive authority.” He could well be referring directly to a civil service bureaucracy and politically executive establishment culture; unexamined official attitudes and policies; government educational syllabi; other imperial structures such as the army and the Church; the whole gamut of prejudices which contribute to and support official, “monophonic” policy—in short, to imperialism. Said is “intellectually impressed” by the contrapuntal action of forces which resist that authority by emanating out from it with neither confrontation nor a tendency toward co-optation; he is interested, at least here, in the dissonances within the imperial subject-theme, and the effect of their being interpreted as an aggregation of oppositions. This is Said’s most suggestive use of the concept of counterpoint of culture and imperialism—somewhat ironically, perhaps, it occurs not in *Culture and Imperialism* but in *Musical Elaborations*.

Furthermore, the contrapuntal interest in method is also present in *Musical Elaborations*. Gould’s interpretive method is offered as a paradigm for listening as well as playing.

Said's use of the concept of counterpoint, I said above, "implies an interest in wholeness constructed out of interlocking fragmentation—a unity of effect, built out of multiplicity." This is well in evidence in the introduction and three essay-lectures of *Musical Elaborations*: "Performance as an Extreme Occasion," "On the Transgressive Elements in Music," and "Melody, Solitude, and Affirmation." Said revises the notion of counterpoint as a paradigm for interpretation in which fragmentation, or more specifically elaboration, operates in the service of wholeness as an overtly social utopia.¹² A useful summary of the ideas occurs in the third essay. Said states quite openly what sort of cultural artifact he most values, and for what reasons. It is interesting that the ideas concern opposition and resistance operating in non-radical ways, neither by Marxian dialectic nor Adornian negative dialectic, but in the best sense of what Said intends by contrapuntalism. In this passage there is no sense of the oppositional character of ideal and resistance that Said and Eagleton worried about earlier:

I am intellectually impressed by the richness of what I have called the alternative formation in music, in which the nonlinear, nondevelopmental uses of theme or melody dissipate and delay a disciplined organization of musical time that is principally combative as well as dominative. Glenn Gould, I think, understood the potential interest in this essentially contrapuntal mode—that is, you think of and treat one musical line in conjunction with several others that derive from and relate to it, and you do so through imitation, repetition, or ornamentation—as an antidote to the more overtly administrative and executive authority contained in, say, a Mozart or a Beethoven classical sonata form. (*ME*, 102)

The value here is on meditation, not on structure, on what Said soon calls a "deepening of scrutiny" (*ME*, 103). Contemplation of the widest variety of detail—elaboration—is ever

12. The particular development of the term is worked out in an assessment of the idiosyncratic, "self-conscious and spirited" careers of Arturo Toscanini and Glenn Gould. See especially *ME*, 21-34.

Specifically, the ability of contrapuntal forms to subvert without antagonizing the combative and dominative mode of authority is posited as the source of their value. This echoes Said's discussion from *Culture and Imperialism*, which can now be read as a contrapuntal revoicing of the passage from *Musical Elaborations* quoted above. In this passage, Said is "impressed by" the post-colonial historiography of younger scholars such as Ranajit Guha and S. H. Alatas,¹³ who

choose to focus on rhetoric, ideas, and language rather than upon history *tout court*, preferring to analyze the verbal symptoms of power rather than its brute exercise, its processes and tactics rather than its sources, its intellectual methods and enunciative techniques rather than its morality—to deconstruct rather than destroy. (*CI*, 312)

Three significant levels of correspondence exist between these two passages. In each passage, Said privileges some form of overlapping, intertwining mode of proceeding, as well as a similarly overlapping, intertwining method of interpreting. In addition, each passage comments upon the fragmentation of a dominant, consolidated ideal through the elaboration of constituent detail—so that ultimately, cultural artifact and critical method are seen to coalesce; expression and interpretation themselves overlap, intertwine. Finally, the result is a body of cultural expression and a methodology for interpretation which together constitute an "antidote," a new historiography or musicology, a mode which speaks in counterpoint with other, older, more established forms.¹⁴ Therefore, even the idea of reading these two passages in counterpoint with each other is suggested by their own themes and methodological recommendations.

13. Ranajit Guha, *A Rule of Property for Bengal: An Essay on the Idea of Permanent Settlement* (1963), and S. H. Alatas, *The Myth of the Lazy Native: A Study of the Image of the Malays, Filipinos, and Javanese from the 16th to the 20th Century and its Function in the Ideology of Colonial Capitalism* (1977). See *CI*, 296-7, 300-303, 305-309.

In the second essay of *Musical Elaborations*, Said discusses Wagner and Thomas Mann's *Doctor Faustus*, and revises his reading of Adorno. The major elements of the change alluded to above also occur in this essay, as here Said's use of the concept of counterpoint is altered significantly and shifts away from his position in *Culture and Imperialism*. This motion accelerates throughout the essay, even as the detail of the revision expands usefully—especially by connecting music to the social and political context more immediately accessible in literary and historical readings of imperialism. What follows in Said's text is extremely complex, but essentially the text works toward strengthening the bond between the parallel agendas in the critique of music/culture and in musicological/culture-critical discourse—that is, between the overlapping, intertwining territories of cultural artifact and methodology of interpretation. In doing so, Said directly presents patterns which resist commodification and totalization, for various compelling social reasons which elucidate the connections between music and the social world and which seem no longer to confine music to the ghetto of its own esotericism. Furthermore, he indicates cultural and critical moments when counterpoint is complicitous with the process of totalization—in ways similar to those by which counterpoint exposes its own tendency to decay (or in the parlance of much critical theory, to deconstruct) as an interpretative paradigm. He also posits counterpoint as being vaguely analogous to “theory” by discussing the difficulty of perceiving how either abstraction comments upon the social world—necessitating interpretative apparatuses that degrade the immediacy of whatever is being communicated. I will attempt to elucidate each of these ideas in turn, although it is

14. A fourth level of correspondence is to be found in the fact that each passage occurs in close proximity to the following similar statements: in the first case, “Obviously I'm *not* saying that classical forms like the sonata are neurotically un-beautiful,” (*ME*, 120); and in the second case, “I do not mean to suggest that oppositional scholarship must be shrill and unpleasantly insistent” (*CI*, 312).

difficult to separate the various overlapping strands from each other.

To accomplish his revisions, Said uses a new trope for the sort of creative and critical understanding he is proposing: instead of “counterpoint” his term here is “transgression.” He confronts the degradation of his own use of the concept of counterpoint through an exploration of its more unstable qualities in the work of Wagner and Mann. Thus, he is able to use a more “elaborated” definition of counterpoint by defining its weaknesses and its totalizing tendency, not by relying less on it and more on transgression as an aesthetic and methodological paradigm. In other, more familiar words, he is able to articulate in the shared space between *Musical Elaborations* and *Culture and Imperialism* his most useful methodology for interpreting the interpenetration of culture and imperialism.¹⁵

The disruption of counterpoint as a paradigm and the substitution of transgression occurs by exposing a tendency in counterpoint itself to become totalizing—which we must first explore before defining transgression further. Counterpoint both strives to be and fails to be totalizing, depending upon the degree of dissonance accompanying it, and this is both good and bad. Interpreting Mann, Said says that for Adrian Leverkühn in *Doctor Faustus*, “the canon form [i.e. counterpoint] in its repeated permutations is [a] symbol of a historical time ruled over by God, and has exhausted all the possible combinations of notes” (*ME*, 46). The potential for counter-

15. Although I occasionally seem to imply that *Musical Elaborations* was written after *Culture and Imperialism*, some readers will have noted that the lectures which comprise *Musical Elaborations* were delivered in 1989 and that the book was first published in America in 1991—approximately two years before *Culture and Imperialism*. It is still safe to argue, however, that Said’s thinking for *Musical Elaborations* postdates the bulk of his thinking for *Culture and Imperialism*. The intellectual implications are borne out, I hope, in the analysis which follows—and which assumes for rhetorical purposes that *Musical Elaborations* is a subsequent elaboration (intellectual and temporal) on certain themes, terms, and devices of *Culture and Imperialism*.

point to fail as a totalizing force is evinced by the fact that it can “exhaust” itself. This phrase shows a skepticism as to whether counterpoint actually has the ability to achieve totality even before the point of exhaustion: it is “ruled over by God,” who is no longer believed in—i.e., it is predicated upon false first principles. Thus Adrian’s pact with the devil is a move in the opposite direction, an alternative “attempt at transcendence” of a world in which God is dead. But of course it is intimately, negatively related to what it rebels against: Adrian receives infinite mastery over all the old techniques, not a new genius pressing forward beyond previously explored boundaries, because “parody and critique propose themselves as the only true novelty in so overripe and exhausted a period.” The devil seduces Adrian in the same way that he seduces anyone, by promising vast worldly rewards and success, not release from the world’s outworn structures: “an untruth of a kind that enhances power holds its own against any ineffectively virtuous truth.” Thus, in the tension between mastery and ineffectuality lies the illusion of a dichotomy between the powerful and the oppressed—which does not amount to opposition or resistance, nor to dissonance. Counterpoint is posited in this model as a form of the Old, an untruth of the kind that enhances power. It is placed squarely in the camp of power, and is no longer seen as an interpenetrative mechanism, merely a reified, dominant one.

Said then yokes this understanding of counterpoint to a social imperative when he links a mastery of counterpoint to the political ambitions of Nazism:

To this promise [of mastery] Mann assimilates the horrific fate of modern Germany, perhaps even of Western civilization itself. Music’s fundamental muteness allows Mann, as it allows Leverkühn and Adorno...to see in the imitative, contrapuntal, and intoxicating knowledge of music an allegory for the catastrophic collapse of a great civilizational achievement. (*ME*, 48)

Counterpoint, in short, amounts to a form of totalitarianism, of imperialism. Mastery of technical sophistication is used to perpetuate forms of domination—and this is all the more insidious because it perpetuates the illusion that dominance is being subverted. Counterpoint tends toward totality according to the momentum of its own esoteric vision and has the effect of absorbing and co-opting any “virtuous,” “ineffective,” or individual dissonance or dissent.

This last notion is part of what Adorno means by negative dialectic and is similar to ideas central in Foucault. Said departs from Adorno when he says that “precisely because in its rebarbative complexity, without time or pleasing harmony, it can no longer serve as a reflection of human activity, music is a negation, a blotting-out of the society that gave rise to it” (*ME*, 48). For Adorno, the high modernism of the Second Viennese School, with its strong roots in Bach, was a way of parrying the rising social oppressiveness of Nazism, as discussed above. For Said, this “rebarbative complexity” actually reflects that oppression, separates itself from any human roots, and refuses to face the challenge of social responsibility—as it were, denying the otherwise incontrovertible rise of Nazism and Pan-German imperialism. This Said reads as dangerously close to complicity, according to the inspiration of Foucault, who says that any dissent or transgression will be “incorporated by the system, thereby confirming its power.”¹⁶ This incorporated dissent, like the presence in society of sexual deviance or of prisons for confining transgressors—or, in this case, for example, even the supposed unpleasant quality of contrapuntal twelve-tone serialism—will “incriminate the system both for its inhumanity and for its inevitability” (*ME*, 51). In other words, the more complex the counterpoint, the less it performs the functions

16. See Michel Foucault, *Surveiller et Punir* (Paris: Gallimard, 1975), trans. Allen Lane (New York: Pantheon, 1977). See also Said, “Foucault and the Imagination of Power,” in *Foucault: A Critical Reader*, ed. David Couzens Hoy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 149-55.

for which it was originally intended—to resist musical petrification—and the more it perpetuates the inevitable, inhuman power of any given system. That system, whether musical or social, advances into power unquestioned, unhindered.

Thus we see the notion of counterpoint deconstructing, and we prepare to broach the issue of transgression, through a turn to Foucault. The other sources of the debate have weakened their own usefulness, and Said himself states this:

It hardly matters whether we criticize Mann and go back to Adorno, or use Adorno to understand Mann: the terms of the discussion have largely been shut down by an overlapping theory of history and of music that relies on the occult, transgressive aspect of music to interpret history and conversely, the deterministic and “objective” character of history to interpret music. (*ME*, 49)

Counterpoint had at one point been construed as constituting a “transgressive aspect of music” due to its manipulations of dissonance; the more “masterful” that facility imagines itself to be, the harder its transgressions are to detect. It becomes “occult,” hidden in complexity. History—or at any rate historians’ occasionally “deterministic” drive to be “objective” in their interpretations of the social and temporal world—tends to regard such music as a unitary moment of complexity, no longer as a polyvocal resistance to a dominant system. In making this caution Said begins to heed the critique leveled by early readers of *Doctor Faustus*, that that book is “based on a false ‘master premise’ (the antithesis between harmony and counterpoint), and that far from being justified, Mann’s ‘fantastic faith in history and fantastic distortion of it’ seriously flaw the book and its attempt to link compositional techniques with the *Zeitgeist*.”¹⁷ In other words, Adorno’s and Mann’s use of high modernist contrapuntal music to resist the

17. Said is quoting from Joseph Kerman in Robert Fitzgerald, *Enlarging the Change: The Princeton University Seminars in Literary Criticism, 1949-1951* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1985), 81.

intellectual oppressiveness of Nazism is not only ineffectual but distorting and dangerous. Although Said says there is no point in accusing Adorno and Mann of any sort of complicity with Nazism, nonetheless their attempts to resist it run the danger of becoming co-opted into the larger engine of oppression and turned against them—as it were, the resistance fighters not only fail to combat the occupying power, but actually aid the efforts of the enemy.

To avoid the pitfall himself, Said briefly applies the notion of transgression to the model of Foucault: since Foucault's formula ends with inevitability and inescapability, Said feels "there is a very good reason for asking why the theoretical model abstractable from, or perhaps imputable to, this account of the present (our 'disciplinary society') should be so irresistibly total" (*ME*, 50). In other words, does not Foucault's sophisticated fatalism also amount to yet another form of totalization? And beyond this, where will the cycle end? By way of answering these questions, the act of reading Said's two books together at least implies that neither can purport to be irresistibly total. *Culture and Imperialism* relies strongly on a contrapuntal paradigm, but when read in conjunction with *Musical Elaborations* it is seen to present a paradigm of totalization, its "dissonances" merely illusions co-opted into a larger dominance. Counterpoint is thereby discredited, rendered unstable—just as the counterpoint of the two texts read together has the ironic effect of exposing not their mutual strengths but the totalizing tendency of one and the transgressive response of the other. Again ironically, *Musical Elaborations* offers an intentionally less musical and more innately "resistible" paradigm, transgression, which in turn reinforces the rhetoric of the other book's development of a polyvocal methodology for interpreting the relationship between culture and imperialism.

We turn at last to this essential notion of transgression, to explore its own resonances and effects. Transgression is far less capable of being commodified and reified than counterpoint; it

not think it is an accident that the one major twentieth-century composer who intransigently (some would say heedlessly and irresponsibly) followed his own studiously self-devised path despite the innumerable opportunities offered him by serialism, neoclassicism, nationalism, etc. is Richard Strauss" (*ME*, 102). Said then goes on to emphasize that this particular sort of large-scale, career-defining level of transgression is "premised upon not asserting a central authority.... In the perspective of such a work as *Metamorphosen*, music thus becomes an art not primarily or exclusively about authorial power and social authority, but a mode for thinking through or thinking with the integral variety of human cultural practices" (*ME*, 105).

A problem here, though, is that Said does not overtly consider Strauss's associations with National Socialism. Comments about his "not asserting a central authority" might seem either highly ironic or unfortunately ill-considered. One suspects, however, that Said has chosen the example of Strauss to emphasize the message of transcendence with which he will very soon end his essay and book. Strauss's late, elaborative music does somehow seem to resist the petrification of other musical language from his time, and furthermore, to engage in transgressions of the social and moral implications of his complicity in the Nazi will-to-power. Placing emphasis on its non-teleological, elaborative qualities, as Said does, serves to make this point by implication—significantly Said states nothing here with any "central authority." If Strauss can redeem himself through such means, and offer as a legacy to others the possibility of such transcendence, then other dominance can ultimately be resisted as well; not all attempts at resistance can be co-opted.

In all of the above examples of elaborative forms of cultural transgression against a dominant authority, one finds tropes of "moving from one [physical or mental] domain to another" (think of the titles alone: *Passage to India*, *Metamorphosen*); of the "testing and challenging of limits"—social, geographical,

intellectual, and canonical; and of the “mixing and intermingling” of heterogeneous forms—again social, historical, literary, musical, (we can include the various “modernisms” of Döblin, Joyce, Mahler, Stravinsky, even Messiaen). While imperialism and totalitarianism can certainly be understood as forms of movement and the challenging of limits, they cannot be understood as promoting the “mixing and intermingling” of heterogeneous forms. Racism is of course the most ghastly expression of the imperial drive for unitary authority. Transgression against such authority often takes the form of racial blindness, miscegenation, sitting in the front of a bus, infusing a symphony with farmyard noises or “primitive” colors and rhythms. These devices awaken the complacent, expand awareness, and strive toward sympathy with the oppressed.

Transgression improves the pleasure of reading, of listening, of being—it connects aesthetics to aesthetic experience and lets nothing ossify as theory. Sympathy for the oppressed—by power, by gender, by race—can enlarge the vision and strengthen the ability to resist the total theory of any dominant social, aesthetic, or interpretive norm, and can reinforce the strength to transgress. This sympathy contributes to, but also emanates from, a “deepening of scrutiny” combined with a “magisterial” catholicity of vision—and from a confidence that challenges will always emerge from the alternative, the transgressive, the dissonant voices in culture. In the end, we are left with a concept of wholeness, not totality, in which alterity (a rallying concept for post-colonial aesthetics and criticism) is impossible; nothing, in Said’s words, can claim “simple apartness.” We are left with the actual inability to feel threatened by what we see as brute invasion of our hegemony by the subaltern—or as Said might repeat, some “reflection of coarse reality.” Finally we are left with patience and tolerance and vision and, most of all, beauty: all of these comprise life as it should be lived. We are left closer to literature, or music, or experience—rather than the endless debate.

Baldly stated, the decay of counterpoint into any form of totalitarianism—Nazism, imperialism—is the driving imperative behind the intentional subversion of its status as both a creative and an interpretive paradigm. Said himself seems to suggest this when he writes:

It hardly needs saying that all of these immensely influential theories of cumulative and apocalyptic force—Thomas Mann, Foucault, Adorno, et al.—elevate admittedly discernible patterns in Western society during the modern period to the level of the essential and the universal. To call theories therefore Eurocentric or imperial is, I believe, not an exaggeration, especially since in their combination of extreme detailed articulation, of self-reflexive self-centeredness, of inevitabilism and aesthetic pessimism, they resemble each other in projecting no escape from, and no real alternative to, those patterns. (*ME*, 51)

Thus, in order to avoid this totalization, this sense of inevitability and defeat, aberrations in the system—dissonances, transgressions—must be studied and emphasized: “Not only must the resistance to fascism be given correlative attention, but so too must the dynamic of non-European history occurring simultaneously with events in Europe” (*ME*, 51). Furthermore, this is a methodological imperative as much as a socio-political or historical one.

An example for all this abstraction is a passage in which Said comments on Wagner, but which might just as well refer to his own work in *Culture and Imperialism*:

As for Wagner’s neurotic closure whereby holy German art is affirmed in its foursquare establishmentarian virtue, we can take that as the merest crude attempt to grab once and for all what has already been proved to be a possession far in excess of, therefore transgressing, the clutches of one owner, be that owner an individual, a town, or nation. Boulez is quite right to say that Wagner’s “music by its very existence, refuses to bear any ideological message that it is intended to convey.” *Die Meistersinger* cannot really be reduced to the nationalist ideology its final strophes stress. It has set forth too much in the way of contrapuntal action, character, invention. (*ME*, 61)

So too with Said—it would have been crude, even neurotic of him to offer a closure to *Culture and Imperialism* simply by “affirming” contrapuntalism (even of a “Wagnerian” sort involving the overlapping, intertwining action, character, and invention of the culture of post-imperialism). The notion is only posited as the best creative and critical mode for a post-imperial era when it is seen not to constitute closure but rather “deepening scrutiny,” when it is discomposed, as it were, in *Musical Elaborations* by Said’s own elaborated, transgressive understanding of counterpoint. Said himself demonstrates the deconstructive tendency of counterpoint, which, as a paradigm, “refuses to bear” at least some of “the ideological message that it is intended to convey.” In this way, however, it evokes and enacts one of its own central arguments—that it can function as an aesthetic or an interpretive methodology only to the degree that it contains essential dissonances. This deconstructive tendency is itself a species of dissonance, of an order large enough to be both aesthetic and methodological. Only with such an essential dissonance—a dissonance with itself—can counterpoint be said truly to operate within its own highest aesthetic potential and according to its own privileged methodology. This potential and privilege become evident only by reading the concept of counterpoint in *Culture and Imperialism* in relation to its transgressive, dissonant deconstruction in *Musical Elaborations*.

Coda

Said ends his elaborations, musical and otherwise, on this note of hope. As we have seen, he speaks of Strauss’s last “poignantly summational” works—Four Last Songs, *Metamorphosen*—and their striving for transcendent consummation. And what he says strongly suggests a social vision of a post-imperial world

where dominance by one nation, or group, or narration, or attitude, or idea, over any other has been let go and ended; where the counterpoint of debate—that is, the transgressions and then the resistances and oppositions—have all resolved into and enlarged an immensely polysemous heterophony, or even harmony, which is atemporal, ahistorical:

[Strauss's music is] radically, beautifully elaborative, music whose pleasures and discoveries are premised upon letting go, upon not asserting a central authorial identity, upon enlarging the community of hearers and players beyond the time taken, beyond the extremely concentrated duration provided by the performance occasion. In the perspective of such a work as *Metamorphosen*, music thus becomes an art not primarily or exclusively about authorial power or social authority, but a mode for thinking through or thinking with the integral variety of human cultural practices, generously, noncoercively, and, yes, in a utopian cast, if by utopian we mean worldly, possible, attainable, knowable. (*ME*, 105)

“Theories of salvation do not save,” Indian cultural critic Ashis Nandy writes:

At best, they reshape our social consciousness. Utopias, too, being ideas about the end-products of salvation, cannot hope to do more. They, too, can only promise a sharper awareness and critique of existing cultures and institutionalized suffering—the surplus suffering which is born, not of the human condition, but of faulty social institutions and goals.¹⁸

Before imperialism truly vanishes from the earth, we must work through the elaborate distractions of all our myriad retellings of the same stories and songs, never quite achieving Nirvana, or true self-knowledge, or something which we tend to call love and which we—to evoke Forster's vision of social harmony frustrated by imperialism in the last line of *A Passage to India*—do not yet, not here, understand.

18. Ashis Nandy, *Traditions, Tyranny, and Utopias: Essays in the Politics of Awareness* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987), 20.