I wrote the following article for the first issue of a newsletter I published at the time, _The Indochina Newsletter_, October 1979. It is a bit dated now, but nevertheless might serve as historical interest with regard to the changed public posture -- before and after April 30, 1975 -- of DRV and NLF representatives on the issue of human rights and the 1973 Paris Agreements. - Steve Denney sdenney@uclink.berkeley.edu ************************ The Indochina Newsletter Issue No. 1 October, 1979 The Paris Agreements and Human Rights in Vietnam Today by Stephen Denney The "Open Letter to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam" that was signed by Joan Baez and other anti-war activists and published in various newspapers last May 30 has renewed a three- year old controversy within the anti-war movement over the subject of human rights in Vietnam. One of the presumptions involved in the debate involves the question of what standards by which the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) is to be judged on the issue of human rights. Those who have defended the SRV's policy on human rights have tried to set very low standards -- referring to worse cases of repression that have occurred in other countries or arguing that the massive bloodbath that some predicted (in order to justify U.S. involvement) has not occurred. However, few people involved in the anti-war movement believed in such predictions about a bloodbath. On the contrary, many who opposed the war professed to believe in the strong verbal commitments to human rights made by the communist side during the war; particularly with regard to Articles 9 and 11 of the 1973 Paris Peace Agreements. Those who protest the violation of human rights in Vietnam today are merely asking the SRV leaders to abide by the same principles of human rights that these leaders advocated before they took power over South Vietnam in 1975. The Paris Agreements was signed by representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Republic of Vietnam, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam and the United States on January 27, 1973. On March 2, 1973, twelve governments signed, in the presence of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the "Act of the International Conference on Vietnam", in which they expressed their commitment to the implementation of the treaty. In addition to the U.S. and the three Vietnamese parties, these governments includes: the USSR, the United Kingdom, Canada, China, France, Hungary, Indonesia and Poland. The treaty was hailed by the PRG and the DRV as a "victory" and the Saigon government was severely criticized, beginning immediately after the signing of the treaty, for alleged violations of the treaty; with particular attention given to Articles 9 and 11, which were highly praised. In Article 9, the governments of North Vietnam and the United States pledged to respect the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination as "sacred" and "inalienable", including their right to "decide themselves the political future of South Viet Nam through genuinely free and democratic elections under international supervision." In Article 11, "all acts of reprisal and discrimination against individuals or organizations that have collaborated with one side or the other" during the war were prohibited. Furthermore, the South Vietnamese people were ensured the following rights: "personal freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of meeting, freedom of organization, freedom of political activities, freedom of belief, freedom of movement, freedom of residence, freedom of work, right to property ownership, and right to free enterprise." In an address to the DRV National Assembly on February 20, 1973, less than one month after the signing of the treaty, DRV Premier Pham Van Dong claimed that "with the approval and support of the United States, the Saigon administration has openly and systematically sabotaged the implementation of the most important and urgent provisions of the Agreement, in the first place, those concerning the ceasefire, democratic liberties, the return of captured and detained persons... Here, we must underline and denounce the violations of the provisions regarding the ceasefire which aim at ensuring the restoration, maintenance and consolidations of peace, as well as the provisions on democratic liberties and national concord." The Chairman of the NLF Central Committee, Nguyen Huu Tho, made the following statement in an interview with Hanoi's _Thong Nhat_ magazine (reprinted in the NLF's _South Vietnam in Struggle_, April 11, 1973): "The NLF and PRG are resolved to mobilize the South Vietnamese people and armed forces to this effect, and to demand the same from the US and Saigon side, particularly their observance and enforcement of the ceasefire, Saigon release of all political prisoners, ensurance of all the democratic liberties of the people, cessation of all terror, reprisals and discrimination against those who have collaborated with either side, meaningful negotiation in the spirit of national reconciliation and concord on the eventual holding of really democratic and free elections under international supervision to make it possible for the South Vietnamese to shape their own political future." This theme, or pretense, of high commitment to the human rights provisions of the Paris Agreements was further elaborated in _The Paris Agreement on Vietnam: Fundamental Juridical Problems_, a book published by the Institute of Juridical Sciences/Committee of Social Sciences in Hanoi in 1973 and circulated throughout the world. In one article, by Pham Hong Linh, Article 11 was said to be "in perfect agreement with international law, particularly with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of December 10, 1948, and the two international Pacts, one relating to civic and political rights, and the other to economic, social and cultural rights, both dated December 16, 1966." (page 126) Pham Hong Linh argued that the democratic liberties of Article 11 "must be the prelude to everything on the political and social planes." (page 126). He also quoted PRG leader Nguyen Van Hieu, who said: "..democratic freedoms are man's fundamental rights, ardent aspirations of all social strata, of all political and religious forces and tendencies of South Vietnam. Only a full and total exercise of democratic liberties can serve as a basis for the realization of national reconciliation and concord, the settlement of the internal affairs of South Vietnam, and the exercise of the South Vietnamese people's right to self- determination." (page 128) The same book published another article, by Pham Ngoc Thuan and Pham Giang, titled "National Reconciliation and the Settlement of the Problem of Power in South Vietnam." They also emphasized that "Democratic liberties should be considered the essential groundwork on which national reconciliation and concord are to be built." (page 161) In discussing the "free and democratic" elections ensured to the South Vietnamese people under Article 9, Thuan and Giang argued: "The South Vietnamese population hold that the exercise of democratic liberties is a crucial problem, an essential condition for the realization of their right to self- determination, the carrying into effect of the spirit of national reconciliation and concord and the organization of general elections. In other words, without guarantee for democratic liberties, without the human and civil rights, the right to self- determination would be an empty word, national reconciliation and concord would remain dead letter, and the general elections would be postponed indefinitely." (page 169) Those who speak out against the violation of human rights in Vietnam today can certainly agree with the above statement. The communist side was very specific in the demands they made of the Thieu administration with regard to human rights. In the 17th Consultative Conference of the two South Vietnamese parties at the La Celle St. Cloud Palace, held in Paris in July 1973, PRG representative Nguyen Van Hieu presented a list of demands, with seven chapters and twenty-two articles, detailing how the Thieu government should implement Article 11. For example, the 12th article of Hieu's list called upon the Thieu government to "cancel all forms of censorship; cancel all measures aimed at restricting freedom of the press, such as seizures, compulsory posting of money with the government, fines, etc." Article 13 demanded that the Thieu government "respect and guarantee the freedom of assembly. No authorization is necessary for gatherings, meetings and demonstrations." Article 10 said that "Doctors, pharmacists, engineers, journalists, lawyers and intellectuals engaged in other liberal professions should be guaranteed freedom of practice." In contrast to the South Vietnam government, Thuan and Giang claimed in their article that "Public opinion, both at home and abroad, has been able to see that there is no problem concerning the exercise of democratic liberties in the zone administered by the PRG... In particular, the revolutionary power pays constant attention to the democratic liberties and fully ensure their exercise in daily life." (page 170) If one were to take the statements that have been discussed in this article at face value, then it would be logical to conclude that the Spring Offensive of 1975 would result in the end of political and religious repression and the beginning of a new society based upon the human rights provisions of the Paris Agreements. After all, the Spring Offensive was officially launched in order to "enforce" the Paris Agreements. Even during the last days, when General Duong Van Minh replaced Thieu and his Vice-President, there was hope for a coalition government set up in accordance with the Paris Agreements. However, after all of South Vietnam was taken over in violation of the Paris Agreements, it soon became obvious that the purpose of this offensive was not to enforce the treaty, but rather to abolish permanently the rights accorded to the South Vietnamese people under this treaty. Immediately upon taking power, the new regime issued a 10- point program that included the dissolution of all parties and organizations regarded as "reactionary". It also issued guidelines prohibiting history, philosophy and civic books written from "the American or puppet point of view," and foreign literary publications that were of an anti-revolutionary or "existentialist, depraved nature." The Vice-Minister of Culture of the new regime, Cu Huy Can, said in 1976 that "Reactionary and decadent culture should be swept clean, and the venom of extremely reactionary and decadent culture and arts of the U.S.-puppet regime should be eliminated within five years." To this effect, responsible officials should "proceed to seize books, newspapers, movies, pictures and tapes that violate the disciplines of propaganda." (from "The Cultural Policy of Unified Vietnam, by Nguyen Dinh-Hoa, _Asian Thought and Society_, Winter 1977, page 324). It was none other than Nguyen Van Hieu, the same man who had spoken so eloquently for human rights and made so many stringent demands on the Thieu government in this respect, who was appointed to the position of Minister of Culture by the new regime. In a report delivered on October 5, 1976 to the Cultural Conference of South Vietnam, Hieu called for a "struggle to eradicate the poison of reactionary and decadent thought and culture." (ibid, page 324). In June of 1975, hundreds of thousands of people were ordered to report to re-education camps, including lower ranking officers and even leaders of opposition political parties. All this was directly in violation of Article 11 of the Paris Agreements. It must be kept in mind, however, that these events occurred during the early stages of the newly established "dictatorship of the proletariat", at a time when it was being praised by some outside commentators for its "moderation". During the last four years, the Hanoi regime has become increasingly harsh in its repressive policies against the Vietnamese people. In 1973, PRG leader Xuan Khanh pointed out that "the third force favours the implementation of the Paris Agreement which ensure its right to live and democratic liberties." (_South Vietnam in Struggle_, Oct. 22, 1973). Yet no third force exists in Vietnam today precisely because no democratic liberties are allowed. Because no opposition newspapers, political parties or other bases of organized dissent are tolerated, the only recourse left to those who disagree with the policies of the government is to remain silent or to engage in "illegal" resistance and risk imprisonment. While those in Vietnam who protest repression are imprisoned, those outside who protest the same are accused of intervening in Vietnam's internal affairs. In a 1976 visit to Vietnam, Senator George McGovern asked a Vietnamese official, Xuan Thuy, if the elections scheduled for April 25, 1976 (which led to the official reunification of Vietnam) were to take place in accordance with Article 9 of the Paris Agreements. Xuan Thuy replied that "those provisions no longer conform with the realities of South Vietnam and Vietnam in general... the general election is now a totally internal affairs." (_Vietnam: 1976_, report by McGovern to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, March 1976). Such contorted reasoning is contrary to established principles of international law. The changed circumstances of Vietnam resulted from the military takeover of South Vietnam and the elimination of one of the signing parties to the treaty, both obvious violations of the Paris Agreements. As Article 62 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on Treaties states, one cannot argue that a party is not obligated to adhere to a treaty due to a fundamental change of circumstances if this change "is the result of a breach by the party invoking it either of an obligation under the treaty or of any other international obligation owed to any other party to the treaty." While Xuan Thuy denied any obligation to adhere to Article 9, PRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh stressed the forthcoming national elections as a fulfillment of Article 9 (ibid, page 7). Let us recall that under Article 9, the U.S. and North Vietnam agreed to respect the right of the South Vietnamese people to determine their future through free and democratic elections held under international supervision. Yet in the national elections held on April 25, 1976, there were a total of 606 "candidates" for 492 seats in the National Assembly. All of these candidates were chosen by the government and none were allowed to make speeches that might indicate differing policy positions. All of this occurred in an atmosphere where none of the democratic liberties of Article 11 existed. Yet despite the obvious lack of choice, the government claimed a 98% voter turnout. Nguyen Huu Tho, NLF President, the same man who had demanded that the Thieu government allow the "South Vietnamese to shape their political future" through the "holding of really democratic and free elections under international supervision" (see earlier citation in this article), praised these mock elections as a "brilliant success." (_Vietnam Bulletin_, edited by Peggy Duff, May 1976). Thus we can see that the eloquent words of praise by the Hanoi leaders for the human rights provisions of the Paris Agreements were in fact empty words, designed to prop up a false image and deceive the world. Yet while the leaders of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, established in violation of Article 9, have refused to recognize any legal or moral obligations they might have to respect the human rights ensured the Vietnamese under the Paris Agreements, these rulers have continued to maintain that the Paris Agreements is still legally binding -- but only upon the United States. I am referring to Article 21, in which the U.S. pledged to provide reconstruction aid to Vietnam. It is certainly true that the U.S. did a tremendous amount of damage to Vietnam during the war and that this damage continues to cause much suffering and poverty among the Vietnamese people. However, when the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and its supporters abroad ignore the human rights provisions of the treaty, they demonstrate that their true concern is not the welfare of the Vietnamese people, but rather of the government that rules Vietnam.