Note: I prepared the following as an affadavit for the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, which was at the time legally challenging the Hong Kong government's policy toward Vietnamese asylum seekers. --------------------------------- HUMAN RIGHTS AND DAILY LIFE IN VIETNAM by Stephen Denney Report prepared for the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, March 25, 1990. Introduction Many Vietnamese are unable to lead ordinary lives because of certain conditions in Vietnam. These include family discrimination against people considered to have a bad political background, forced labor, new economic zones, reeducation camps, household registration and military conscription. These conditions, in many cases, are cumulative. Family discrimination often has resulted in unemployment leading to forced labor. Resettlement in an economically unviable new economic zone has led to flight to the cities where household registration is not available and therefore the affected persons are denied schooling, medical care and other daily necessities. Maltreatment of draftees leads to desertion or evasion, which is punished by forced labor. One kind of deprivation often leads to another, making it very difficult to lead a normal life. We will begin this survey with the issue of family discrimination against people considered to have a bad political background and follow with the topics of forced labor, new economic zones, household registration and military conscription. Family Discrimination Discrimination on the basis of family background exists in various areas of socio-economic life in Vietnam, most particularly in education and employment opportunities. Citizens of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam have been subjected to a system of treatment with highest preference given to families of soldiers who fought for the DRV/SRV and lowest to families of soldiers and officials from the former Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam, or RVN). According to Hanoi spokesman Hoang Son, some 6.5 million Vietnamese from the South (out of a total population of less than 20 million before 1975) are "compromised" because members of their families served in the government or army of the former regime or belonged to anti-communist political parties and mass organizations.1 Thus members of the family are treated as sharing the guilt of one of its members. In describing the role of state enterprises for the official journal of the Vietnamese Communist Party, Tap Chi Cong San (July 1986, pp. 36-43), Dao Thien Thi said: "The enterprise has the obligation of implementing the policy of the party and state of giving priority in its hiring of labor to the families of war dead, families who have served the revolution and wounded veterans and accepting in appropriate jobs persons who can meet the basic requirements of production and business."2 Discrimination on the basis of family background is most evident in admission to colleges. The rationale behind this policy was expressed by former SRV Prime Minister Pham Van Dong in a 1984 speech on education: "He (the student) should be filled with hatred for capitalism and imperialism and his heart and mind should be bound to socialism and proletarian internationalism."3 As noted by Murray Hiebert of the Far Eastern Economic Review, "Children of war veterans and government officials get first priority in getting places in universities -- and scholarships to study abroad, particularly in Eastern Europe."4 Hiebert cited Vu Can of Hanoi's Vietnam Courier as both acknowledging and defending this preferential treatment. On the other hand, according to Dr. Jacqueline Desbarats, the passing score on admission tests required for children of government officials and army officers of the former regime "..is set so high as to make the probability of passing virtually nil."5 Desbarats described five categories of discrimination concerning required test scores toward prospective college students based on their family background: Categories I and II (preferential treatment) for Party cadres and soldiers and their children; Category III children of common people; and Categories IV and V children of government officials and army officers of the former regime. According to refugees, discrimination goes back three generations, meaning, for example, that the grandson of an ARVN lieutenant who died in combat in 1962 could therefore be denied access to higher education.6 Beginning with the 1984-85 school year, membership in the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union was also required for those seeking admission to college. On Feb. 10, 1987, the SRV Ministry of Higher and Vocational Education issued Circular 02/ TT-BDH, amending this policy. Preferential treatment was maintained for Categories I and II, but children "..of persons who served the old regime, who have completed their re-education and have had their citizenship rights restored (by the date that the application to take the examination is submitted) will be placed in the priority 3 category as other ordinary students are." This would imply, however, that children of persons who served the former regime who have not yet been released from the camps, or have not finished their probationary period would still be placed in Category IV or V. There is also the question of children of people who have been arrested in subsequent years on political grounds or children of parents who have left the country (either illegally or legally). According to Desbarats children in this latter category are also subject to educational discrimination. With the greater latitude given to press criticism beginning in 1987, a few articles appeared in the Vietnamese press criticizing this policy of discrimination. Some have objected that this policy fosters mediocrity. An article by Huynh Van Tong and Le Vinh Quoc in Saigon Giai Phong, May 1, 1987 (pp. 1,2), said: "The practice of dividing examination candidates into many categories with many different passing scores, previously often with very great differences, eliminated some capable candidates and admitted many inferior individuals in their place... (this policy) caused the schools to select few capable and outstanding candidates; the majority of those selected were only the better among the poor." The authors called for a phasing out of this discriminatory admission policy. Another article, in Lao Dong (Hanoi) Oct. 1, 1987, by Thai An, complained of widespread misbehavior in the secondary schools of Ho Chi Minh City, including violent gang activity, by students who were children of high-ranking officials. He said: "All of the gangs are headed by the son of an official in a position of authority." Presumably, they felt secure in their educational future. A 1987 article in the Ho Chi Minh City journal Tuoi Tre (Youth) noted the case of a highly talented student in Nghe Binh province, Nguyen Manh Huy, who passed the college entrance exam with the second highest score in the province, but was refused entrance because his father was an ARVN soldier who died in combat in 1965 (when Huy was two years old). On this same basis, he was refused entrance despite extremely high scores in three successive exams. One exceptional student who managed to succeed despite her family background is Nguyen Mai Bao Tram. Before 1975 her father was a junior lieutenant in the South Vietnamese Navy and her mother worked for a newspaper in the South. Thus Bao Tram was classified in Category IV but managed to gain admittance because of her outstanding studies and received a scholarship of 50 dong a month (in comparison to her friends in Category Three with the same standards who received 1,500 dong a month -- financial support is crucial to college students in Vietnam). She was described by Saigon Giai Phong in 1989 as one of four outstanding students graduating from Hanoi University to be retained for research in organic chemistry, and has won twice the first price in the nationwide "political theory examination held for college students by the Ministry of Higher Education and the Central Committee of the Communist Youth Union." However, for most children of "compromised" families, higher education is not an option, however brilliant and diligent their scholarship may have been in primary and secondary schools. This policy has proven counter-productive to Vietnam's future development and has resulted in the emigration of many of Vietnam's brightest and most talented young people. Forced Labor There are various forms of forced labor in Vietnam. Basically they could be divided into punitive and non-punitive forced labor, although there is an obvious overlap when discrimination is applied against families because of their political background, for example in military conscription or sending people to new economic zones. The most basic form of non-punitive forced labor is ten days annual labor required of every able-bodied male from age 18 to 45 and female from 18 to 25. As defined by a decree issued Nov. 21, 1988 by the SRV Council of State, annual labor days are to be spent in public welfare work, such as building and maintaining dikes, water conservancy projects and "in supporting combat readiness." Exempt are soldiers, surviving fathers or spouses of "fallen heroes", those holding "professional religious positions" and sick and disabled people. Temporarily exempt are pregnant women, army medics, sole supporters of families, veterans who have been out of the service for less than three years, and those who have been in new economic zones for less than three years. The regulation allows those unable to personally engage in labor to hire someone else in their place or pay an appropriate sum to the mobilizing agencies. In addition to the ten days annual labor, able-bodied citizens are also required to work in emergency public welfare projects resulting from natural catastrophe, epidemics or war. The most extreme form of punitive forced labor is the re- education camp system to which over a million people from the south have been subjected since 1975, which I will discuss in a separate section. I will only mention here that the emphasis in the re-education camps, after an initial period of indoctrination and mandatory confessions, has shifted to hard labor as a means of redemption, often performed under dangerous circumstances, in an environment of widespread disease and malnutrition. Compulsory labor as defined by the SRV interministerial Labor-Interior circular No. 2-TTLB of Jan. 10, 1980 applies to those who are willfully unemployed "but whose action does not yet require concentration in re-education camps, reform labor or legal action." The circular set forth five categories of people to whom this would apply. The first three were "able-bodied persons who refuse to work" and (1) engage in black market activity; (2) live in the streets, form gangs or in other ways disturb the public order; (3) engage in "minor criminal activities." The fourth category was those who have returned from re-education or reform labor camps but who refuse to work and "do not obey the labor arrangements that the authorities have set up for them." The fifth category was those "..who have no official permission to live in the cities and towns and whom the authorities have sent back to the original home localities but who still persist in staying in the cities and towns with no legitimate occupations." This last category would appear to apply to people who have fled from the new economic zones, have refused to relocate from the cities, and/or do not have household registration permits. Temporarily exempt from this regulation are sick people (with doctors' certificates), pregnant women or mothers of young infants, and families in special emergency situations. The circular requires compulsory labor from six months to two years, subject to reduction for good behavior or extension up to two years for bad behavior. Those who complete the two year term "without giving proof of progress" will be transferred to reeducation and "reform labor camps." Mothers of children under three months or sole supporters of old and weak parents may stay at their residence and perform on-the-spot compulsory labor; the rest must go to compulsory labor camps. A subsequent circular, 12 TT/LB, said college and vocational school graduates who did not comply with the work assigned to them by the state and cadres and officials dismissed for corruption and who subsequently refuse to work would also be subject to compulsory labor. The circular as summarized in a Haiphong newspaper did not specify categories four and five of the previous circular but it is not clear whether these people are still covered under this system. It described the forced labor camps as installations capable of handling 100 to 300 people. An example of forced labor for small-time criminals appeared in Vietnam Courier, June 1984, "Former Offenders Build New Economic Zone". It described a new economic zone near Ho Chi Minh City as an "internment camp" housing offenders sentenced to less than a year of imprisonment, such as thieves, "hooligans", drug addicts and prostitutes. Under Article 209 of the 1985 SRV Criminal Code, the penalty for attempting to countermand or impede fulfillment of public labor obligations is re-education without detention for up to one year or imprisonment from three months to three years. Under Article 213 of the same code, the penalty for failing to comply with administrative decisions regarding compulsory residence, denial of residence, probation or compulsory labor is three months to one year in prison. It should be noted here that although unemployment is widespread in Vietnam, it would seem that those with a "bad family background" are most susceptible to unemployment, and, in the past, being sent to new economic zones from which many returned. Therefore, many could survive only by selling packages sent to them from relatives abroad. In past years this would make them subject to concentrated forced labor, as described above. New Economic Zones The massive relocation of people from densely populated areas to lowly populated areas, primarily in the highlands, began in the North in 1961 and by 1975 an estimated one million people had been resettled in "new economic zones". With the end of the war the new economic zones assumed a crucial role in the planned development of the country. Four million people were targeted for resettlement by 1980 however poor planning and extremely harsh conditions in the zones forced many to return to the cities. Thus only 1.5 million settled in new economic zones during this period. From 1981-1988, two million people relocated to new economic zones, according to Vietnamese officials, including 300,000 from the Red River Delta and 174,000 from Eastern Nam Bo of southern Vietnam. About half of those in northern Vietnam who have migrated to new economic zones in recent years have relocated to upland areas in their own provinces while the other half have transferred to the Central Highlands region of what was once South Vietnam. More recently the emphasis in the north has shifted toward moving people within the province rather than to the Central Highlands. From 1976-1984, an estimated 400,000 people moved to the new economic zones of the Central Highlands and about 70% stayed according to Vietnamese officials (60% in 1976-79, 80% in 1980- 84). From 1975-1988, Dac Lac province of the Central Highlands received 400,000 settlers, nearly half of the total provincial population of 850,000 -- thus the hill tribes (montagnards), once a majority in this province, have now been reduced to a minority. A similar pattern of displacement has emerged in the other provinces of the Central Highlands, Gia Lai-Con Tum and Lam Dong. At the same time, the government has attempted to resettle the montagnards into sedentary farming and end their slash-and-burn method of cultivation, which from their view is extremely destructive to the ecology of the highlands. However, as noted by correspondent Barry Wain, "Ironically, the approved invasion from the lowlands has accelerated the destruction of the dense forests that once covered the area, leading to even more serious soil erosion." The relocation of people into new economic zones has been justified on economic grounds, primarily to relieve densely populated areas, particularly around the Red River Delta of northern Vietnam and in the major cities; to reduce the high level of unemployment in the country; to provide a more rational distribution of the population and cultivate land which has been long fallow; and, particularly in the Central Highlands, to harvest industrial crops for exports, including coffee, rubber, tea and lumber. All of these arguments certainly have merit for Vietnam, one of the poorest countries in the world, with millions unemployed, yet the 12th most populous, with a relatively high population growth rate. Yet besides these reasons, it also appears true that the new economic zones have been used as a means of social engineering and repression, uprooting people from their ancestral lands to an alien environment in order to build the "new socialist man". Certain groups have been pressured or coerced for resettlement to poorly prepared areas, such as families of political prisoners, former South Vietnamese government officials and military officers, ethnic Chinese, former businessmen, and the unemployed; and the degree of police control over these areas made many zones seem like prison camps. Grandiose schemes for the role of these zones in transforming society were combined with little attention to the hardships experienced by those moved to these areas or whether the land to which they were moved was even habitable. These negative factors were most persistent during the first five year plan, 1976-80, and contributed significantly to the large scale exodus of boat people. By the early 1980's thousands of people had fled the economic zones back to the cities where they lived illegally. Over the last decade the regime has attempted to make the new economic zones economically viable and their role as an instrument of social control has been significantly reduced. Incentives and propaganda campaigns rather than coercion seem to be the chief method of moving people to these areas. However, at least as of November 1986 the Ho Chi Minh City public security service was still pressuring people in the city who did not have household registration to either move to their original residence, to a new economic zone or to a rubber plantation. Moreover, many who have moved to the zones voluntarily find that conditions are much worse than they expected. A poll reported by Pham Xuan Dai in the Hanoi journal Xa Hoi Hoc, Oct.-Dec. 1986 said 97% of the people leaving from the north for new economic zones were farmers and residents of the Red River Delta. It found over one-third left because of propaganda campaigns for the new economic zones. Other reasons, in declining order of importance: friction with people around them, scarce land, many friends and relatives had left, dissatisfaction with local cadres, and difficult working conditions on native land. Dai said excessive propaganda had created a rosy picture, bringing false optimism and eventual disappointment to the newcomers. He noted that farmers coming to the highlands from the delta "..actually are going from a region of high culture to one of low culture and from a place where farming techniques are high to one where the latter are lower. A series of difficulties that arise, such as illness, lack of schools, lack of cultural and recreational activities, even the fact that some zones are cut off from the outside world -- all this gives farmers the feelings of being abandoned." The poll found 86.1 percent felt abandoned by the administration and cooperatives in the old places, and 26 percent felt abandoned by the state. More recent articles in the Hanoi press indicate these problems persist. An August 22, 1989 Nhan Dan article said production in the new economic zones was still primarily of a subsistence nature in the zones, that arable land was being wasted, crop yields were low, natural resources depleted, and forests destroyed. It estimated 25% of people in new economic zones were suffering economic hardships. Despite government efforts to improve living conditions in these zones, numerous articles in the Hanoi press in recent years have reported that management, investment and the use of capital is still inefficient, and that the quality of schools, markets, hospitals and roads in these zones are poorer than at the settlers' original residence. A March 24, 1987 Nhan Dan editorial said some new economic zones were so poorly run that "...new settlers had to suffer many deprivations, even of drinking water, and this eventually promoted them to leave for other places or return to their home villages." Household registration A 1988 report on Vietnam by the U.S. State Department said: "The Government operates a nationwide system of population surveillance and control through a household registration system and party-appointed block wardens who use informants to keep track of each person's activities." Following the 1975 communist victory, each family in the south was required to declare their place of residence and the names of all members of the family living in the house as well as those who had moved elsewhere or were absent. Then each family member had to write a detailed resume of their past. Each family was issued a certificate signed by the district security chief listing each member of the family authorized to live there. Those who were imprisoned at the time were not listed on this certificate. Leaving their names off the list was later used to pressure them to move along with their families to the new economic zones. The family, or household, registration certificate has been required for almost all activities that require interaction with government services, such as going to a hospital, signing your children up for school, picking up a letter or parcel at the post office, or obtaining food rations. This certificate has also been used to restrict freedom of movement and changing residence, as no one is allowed to leave his house overnight or allow someone else to stay in his house overnight unless approved by the local security bureau. According to refugees, the family registration certificate system has also been used selectively, to pinpoint and pressure families with a bad family background. In addition, if someone in the household tries to escape from Vietnam or is arrested, his name will be crossed out of the certificate with the footnote: name deleted from certificate for illegal border crossing/criminal offense. This will affect the ability of the family to use this certificate in the future. Military Conscription/Draft Evasion Under the SRV Military Service Law, passed by the National Assembly on Dec. 30, 1981, all youth between the ages of 18 and 27 are eligible for the draft. Temporary deferments are granted to the medically unfit, sole breadwinners of families who have no other means of support, sole surviving sons of "fallen heroes' families," researchers on scientific projects (with certification), and college students (Article 29). Permanent deferments are given to the mentally ill and those suffering from incurable disease (Article 30). The Law says military service councils set up by people's committees at the village, ward and town level are to organize propaganda campaigns and draw up lists of people to be drafted or entitled to deferments, while the military service councils at the municipal, precinct and district level organize physical checkups in addition to the above duties. Military service councils at the provincial level hear appeals of citizens concerning the decisions of the lower councils on callups and deferments. (Articles 25-27). Under Article 69, those of military service age who attempt to evade the draft shall be punished by "nondetention reform" for a period of from three months to two years, or through imprisonment for three months to two years. In wartime, draft evaders shall be sentenced from six months to five years imprisonment. Article 70 states that deserters "shall be dealt with in accordance with the armed forces' regulations and discipline or sentenced to from six months to three years' imprisonment." In wartime the punishment is up to 15 years imprisonment. According to SRV Col. Nguyen Huu Tri, desertion is punished in one of three ways: "...the disciplinary action of remaining in the locality; that of being erased from military rolls and performing forced labor; and that of discharge or court trial." Remaining in the locality is applied to those who have served at least three years and have not done anything else wrong since returning to the locality. It is also applied under extenuating circumstances to those whose "family situation is too harsh or health too poor for the subject to be sent on forced labor." Forced labor is apparently the punishment for most deserters. During the period of forced labor the deserter's name is removed from the family registration book and he (or she) loses his citizenship rights. The length of forced labor required depends on the length of one's military service and when one joined the army, with punishment ranging from six months to three years. The reception point for forced labor is the Municipal Youth Assault Forces and the disrtice and ward youth units. Prosecution in court is to be applied only to deserters who have committed serious offenses, such as losing a weapon, firing a weapon or using a weapon in committing a crime. It is also applied to those deserters in forced labor camps who attempt to run away or disrupt work. Deserters brought to court are to be punished under Article 259 of the 1985 Criminal Code which provides re-education within an army disciplinary unit for up to two years, or from six months to five years in prison; and up to ten years in prison if the crime is committed by an officer, if another person is drawn into the crime, or if weapons, military technical equipment, or important documents are taken or thrown away during the act of desertion. Those attempting to evade the draft are normally subject to administrative punishment which ranges from a reprimand or warning to 36 weeks of forced labor. Serious cases or repeat draft evaders who have been subject to administrative punishment may be brought to court and sentenced under Article 206 of the Criminal Code to three months to two years in prison or up to five years imprisonment if it involves self-inflicted injury to harm one's health, if it is committed during wartime, or if another person is drawn into the same crime. Forced labor may also be applied to youth whose induction was deferred for health reasons or "deemed inadvisable because of infringements of political and ethical criteria." Youths in this category are sent to new economic zones, work sites, state farms and forests to join the youth assault forces. Military service councils at the village or local level are to use the system of household registration in order to attain an accurate knowledge of the political and ideological orientation of each draft age citizen and his family, as well as other qualities, and also to monitor any change of residence. On this basis rosters are to be drawn up dividing potential draftees into three categories: youths ready to join; youths who need to be encouraged and "have their thinking remolded" or need help in difficult family problems; and youth who might use family difficulties to refuse induction and might evade the draft. Mass organizations, particularly the Youth Union, are to play an important role in military conscription campaigns. This is how the induction process is to work ideally. In reality, however, there have been many problems and army spokesman have become increasingly vocal in their complaints. There seems to be a major conflict of interests here between an army that wants well-educated, politically correct, disciplined troops, and the local military service councils, party committees and other local branches of power who favor families with power. The army complains the councils have been more concerned with filling quotas set from upper echelons than finding quality recruits. An article in Quan Doi Nhan Dan March 16, 1982 (p. 2) by Dinh Huyen said most of those recruited were poor people with little education, that 18 to 21 year olds have been the main recruitment target and that some people of this age are attending school to avoid service. This would mean, incidentally, that young people denied access to higher education because of their family political background would therefore be more likely to be drafted. Almost no recruits in recent years are party members, according to army spokesmen, and few belong to the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union. Mass admissions to the youth union of people about to be inducted have been carried out in the localities, apparently for cosmetic purposes. The army complains that some localities view the army as a "big school" to educate wayward youth and even draft people with police records. Between five and ten percent of youths drafted by councils have been rejected because medical checkups were carried out improperly and they were later found to be in poor health. Meanwhile, families of cadres and wealthy or powerful families have used bribery and other ways to help their sons avoid the draft or serve in rear base units near their home. The unfair nature of induction and the declining quality of recruits (from the army's point of view) has made life worse for soldiers. A 1988 Quan Doi Nhan Dan article said cadres in basic units "have shown stark contempt for the rank and file." It said investigations at 61 companies found 50 percent of company cadres and 98 percent of platoon cadres believe today's soldiers are passive, refusing to budge unless prodded, that the young generation has no ideals and that therefore "the best managerial measures is to shout aloud, beat up and punish." Conclusion The ability of Vietnamese citizens to lead normal lives is subject to many of the impediments described in this report. Once caught outside the rigid system -- either by blood guilt, by fear of service in the army, by the hardships of the new economic zones -- a Vietnamese is denied the ability to live a normal life by the cumulative means of persecution imposed by the government of Vietnam. Endnotes 1. Vietnam: Which Human Rights?, p. 81, published by Vietnam Courier, Hanoi, 1980. 2. JPRS-SEA 86-193, p. 45. 3. "Education in Vietnam - Fundamental Problems" by Pham Van Dong, Vietnam Social Sciences 1/1985, Hanoi, p. 7. 4. Far Eastern Economic Review, May 26, 1988, p. 55. 5. "Class Struggle and Human Rights: An Unending Issue", p. 3, paper presented by Jacqueline Desbarats, for the International Conference on Vietnam Today: Assessing the New Trends, Bangkok, 1-3 Sept. 1988, co-sponsored by the Information and Resource Center, Singapore, and the Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn Univ., Bangkok. 6. Country Report on Human Rights Practices, U.S. State Department, 1988 edition, p. 966. 7. Nhan Dan June 1, 1984, Replies to Readers column, p. 2, JPRS- SEA 84-108, pp. 98-99. This article explained Circular No. 04- BDH-TT of the SRV Ministry of Higher and Vocational Education, dated Feb. 23, 1984, and based on the SRV Council of Ministers Resolution on educational reform, No. 73-HDBT, July 7, 1983. 8. Saigon Giai Phong, Feb. 19, 1987, pp. 1,2, JPRS-SEA 87-083, pp. 113-114. 9. One man I know fled Vietnam and then publicly denounced human rights violations in Vietnam. Consequently, his wife (still in Vietnam) was denounced before a public meeting. For the last ten years my friend has tried to get his wife and children out of Vietnam through the Orderly Departure Program, but his wife was specifically informed by local authorities in in 1984 that she could not receive an exit visa because of her husband's political activities. All of his children were excellent students but were refused entry to college because of their family background. Three have fled by boat to the U.S. 10. JPRS-SEA 87-049. 11. "Today's Privileged Children" by Thai An, Lao Dong Oct. 1, 1987, p. 5, JPRS-SEA 87-127, Dec. 10, 1987, pp. 42-43. 12. Tuoi Tre, Oct. 29, 1987, #125/87, p. 2, "Vai Cam Nghi Ve Viec Hoc Sinh Nguyen Manh Huy Khong Duoc Di Hoc", by Nguyen An Cu. The article was also noted by Hiebert in his May 26 FEER article and another article on the same subject from Tuoi Tre was reprinted in English translation in Vietnam Update, Winter/Spring 1988, pp. 7-8. 13. Saigon Giai Phong, Feb. 3, 1989, pp. 1,3, JPRS-SEA 89-14, March 31, 1989. 14. Text of regulation broadcast by HDS, Nov. 22, 1988, trans. by JPRS-SEA 88-048, Dec. 9, 1988, pp. 36-38. 15. The circular was explained in detail in Hanoi Moi, May 12, 1982, p. 2, "Explaining the Law" column, trans. by JPRS Vietnam Report. 16. "On the Forced Labor System", Hai Phong, May 31, 1985, pp. 2,4, JPRS-SEA 85-157, Oct. 11, 1985, pp. 151-153. 17. p. 147, Vietnam Since the Fall of Saigon (revised edition), William J. Duiker, Ohio University Center for International Studies, Athens, Ohio, 1985. 18. p. 147, "The Economy" by Tuyet L. Cosslett and William R. Shaw in Vietnam: A Country Study, edited by Ronald J. Cima. Prepared by the Library of Congress, published by U.S. Dept. of Army, 1989. 19. Hanoi Domestic Service (hereafter referred to as HDS), March 2, 1989, FBIS-EAS 89-041, March 3. 20. Information-Documents (Hanoi), No. 107, Aug. 1986, pp. 17-20, JPRS-SEA 86-192. 21. "Vietnam Keeps Its People on the Move", by Barry Wain, The Asian Wall Street Journal, July 20, 1987. 22. ibid. 23. "Fourth Precinct: Household Registration Completed for 1,709 Families Having Returned From New Economic Zones", by V.K., Saigon Giai Phong Nov. 7, 1986, pp. 1,4; JPRS translation on file at Indochina Archive. 24. "Some Psychological Problems Facing People Sent to New Economic Zones" by Pham Xuan Dai, pp. 54-59; JPRS-SEA 87-047, pp. 84-90. 25. JPRS-SEA 89-32, Sept. 28, 1989. 26. FBIS-EAS, March 26, 1987, pp. K7-K9. 27. p. 959, Country Practices on Human Rights, by U.S. State Dept., 1988 edition. 28. See Vietnam Today, by Vo Van Ai, published by Que Me 1985, pp. 10-16. 29. The text of this law was broadcast by Hanoi Domestic Service on Jan. 11 and 12, 1982, and translated by FBIS Asia-Pacific Daily Report, Jan. 13 and 15, 1982. 30. Interview, Saigon Giai Phong, SEpt. 23, 1986, p. 2; JPRS-SEA translation. 31. Answer to Readers Column, Saigon Giai Phong, Oct. 24, 1987, p. 2; JPRS-SEA 88-004, Feb. 8, 1988, pp. 4-5. 32. Col. Nguyen Huu Tri interview, Saigon Giai Phong Sept. 23, 1986, op cit. The text of the Criminal Code was published in Nhan Dan July 12,15,16,17, 1985, translated by JPRS-SEA 85-135, Sept. 3, 1985. 33. Ibid. 34. "Some Ideas on the Implementation of Military Obligation Law in the Past Three Years," by Phan Trung Hoai, Luat Hoc, Jan-March 1985, pp. 71-74, JPRS-SEA 85-167, Oct. 31, 1985, pp. 167-172. 35. "Some Innovations by Thai Binh in the Induction of Youths into the Army," by Sen. Col. Bui Quang Thanh, Tap Chi Quan Doi Nhan Dan, Jan. 1985, pp. 56-59, 66; JPRS-SEA 85-090, June 6, 1985, pp. 80-85. See also Quan Doi Nhan Dan editorial, April 25, 1984, pp. 1,4, JPRS-SEA translation; and "Good Results and Experience in Military Induction at Base Units" by Nguyen Van Hieu, Haiphong, Aug. 7, 1985, pp. 2,3, JPRS-SEA 85-174, Nov. 12, 1985, pp. 117-118.