I wrote the following article for a newsletter I published at the
time, _The Indochina Newsletter_, Issue No. 21, Oct-Nov. 1981. Of
course, much has changed in Vietnam in the 17 years since this
article was written, but some evidence of the repressive mentality
still persists in Vietnam's political leadership, as evidenced in
the 15 and 20 year prison sentences handed out to dissidents in
recent years. The Law on Counter-Revolutionary Crimes discussed in
this article is very similar to the "Crimes Against National
Security" section of Vietnam's 1985 Criminal Code.
 - Steve Denney
sdenney@uclink.berkeley.edu

-----------------------------

The Indochina Newsletter
Issue No. 21
Oct.-Nov. 1981

              THE OFFICIAL POLICY OF REPRESSION 
            IN THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

     An expression popular among many Vietnamese, when referring
to the dictatorship that rules their country, is "watch what they
do, not what they say." There is much truth to this expression, but
it is also important to consider what has been said by the
Communist leaders of Vietnam. By considering officially sanctioned
repression in Vietnam, we can arrive at a consensus on the minimum
degree of repression in the country. Repression is certainly not
unique to Vietnam, but the enthusiasm with which it is endorsed by
the Communist leadership clearly establishes their intolerance for
any form of dissent. 

     In this issue, we will examine the views of the Vietnamese
Communist leaders toward the right of dissent, as expressed in
commentaries and legislation. In subsequent issues, we will
consider the official SRV policy toward the non-communist culture
of the South, toward religions and toward those in re-education
camps. 

     Vietnamese communist leaders adopt an extreme double standard
on the right of dissent -- regarding it as a very important right
in non-communist countries, but negligible in communist countries.
This is well-demonstrated in the attitude of the National
Liberation Front toward the right of dissent in South Vietnam.
Beginning with its founding in 1960, and following in successive
declarations issued in March of 1965, May of 1969, September of
1970 and July of 1971, the NLF presented themselves as if they were
genuine civil libertarians, arguing for the right of dissent, along
with many other democratic liberties, for the South Vietnamese
people. In 1973, the Paris Peace Agreements was signed,
establishing a framework for peace and eventual reunification of
Vietnam, based on national reconciliation and concord. Article 11
of this treaty, which is virtually identical to point 5c of the 10-
Point NLF Peace Proposal issued on May 8, 1969, ensured the South
Vietnamese such rights as freedom of speech, press, movement,
organization, political activities, belief, and freedom from
reprisal for collaborating with one side or the other during the
war.

     Article 11 received much attention from the DRV and NLF
leaders -- until April 30, 1975. Consider, for example, Nguyen Van
Hieu, an NLF leader who said in 1973, "...democratic freedoms are
man's fundamental rights, ardent aspirations of all social strata,
of all political and religious forces and tendencies in South
Vietnam. Only a full and total exercise of democratic liberties can
serve as a basis for the realization of national reconciliation and
concord, the settlement of the internal affairs of South Vietnam,
and the exercise of the South Vietnamese people's right to self-
determination." (p. 128, _The Paris Agreement on Vietnam:
Fundamental Juridical Problems_, Inst. of Juridical Sciences,
Hanoi). In the 17th Consultative Conference of the two South
Vietnamese parties at the La Celle St. Cloud Palace, held in Paris
in July of 1973 (six months after the signing of the treaty), Mr.
Hieu presented a list of demands, with seven chapters and twenty-
two articles, detailing how the Thieu government should implement
Article 11. For example, the 12th article of Hieu's list called
upon the South Vietnam government to cancel "all forms of
censorship, cancel all measures aimed at restricting freedom of the
press, such as seizures, compulsory posting of money with the
government, fines, etc." Article 13 demanded that the South Vietnam
government "respect and guarantee the freedom of assembly. No
authorization is necessary for gatherings, meetings and
demonstrations." Article 10 said that "Doctors, pharmacists,
engineers, journalists, lawyers and intellectuals engaged in other
liberal professions shall be guaranteed freedom of practice."

     On the other hand, after 1975 Mr. Hieu became Minister of
Culture for the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. In that capacity,
he has led a campaign to confiscate all books, magazines,
newspapers, musical recordings and other cultural items which do
not conform to the Marxist-Leninist views of the ruling class. Mr.
Hieu and other NLF leaders who joined the ruling class of the SRV
have set out to destroy the very same rights they championed when
leading the NLF before April 30, 1975. 

     Pham Hong Linh, a jurist for the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam, said in 1973 that Article 11 of the 1973 Paris Agreements
was "in perfect agreement with international law, particularly with
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of December 10, 1948 and
the two international Pacts, one relating to civic and political
rights, and the other to economic, social and cultural rights, both
dated December 16, 1966." Furthermore, Linh continued, the
democratic liberties mentioned in Article 11 "must be the prelude
to everything on the political and social planes" (ibid, page 126).

     On the other hand, immediately after taking control over the
South in April of 1975, the new regime proceeded to tear up Article
11 by banning all non-communist political parties and
organizations, placing severe restrictions on religious groups,
launching a campaign to destroy the "neo-colonialist" culture of
the South and ordering over one million Vietnamese to register for
re-education. 

     For the next year, there were theoretically two governments -
- one for South Vietnam and one for North Vietnam. Actually, both
governments were ruled by the same power structure -- the
Vietnamese Communist Party -- which had controlled North Vietnam
for the previous 20 years. The repressive legislation of the new
regime, including that pertaining to re-education camps, was based
on legislation that had been enacted earlier for the northern
regime. 

     From the perspective of the Vietnamese Communist leaders,
South Vietnam was in the process of entering a new stage -- from
the "national people's democratic revolution" to the "socialist
revolution". During the national democratic revolution, the
emphasis was on winning national independence (from the United
States, not the Soviet Union) -- which might explain why the NLF
leaders appealed to the "third force" (non-communist dissidents)
of South Vietnam by protesting the suppression of dissent. After
taking control over the South, the new regime allowed some members
of the third force to join the new regime, but the power of these
former third force leaders was severely limited, and their value
to the new regime was seen mainly for propaganda purposes -- that
is, mobilizing support among the non-communist Vietnamese and the
outside world for the new regime. In other words, while some former
third force leaders were given token positions in the new regime,
no third force was allowed to exist. Most former leaders of the
third force have been imprisoned, either for opposition to the
Marxist regime, or suspected opposition to the regime. Others have
been placed under strict surveillance. 

     Socialism, that is Marxist-Leninist socialism, is the only
path for Vietnam, said the new rulers. An editorial broadcast by
Hanoi on Nov. 25, 1975 emphasized this viewpoint and commented on
a political consultative conference held the same month between
official leaders of North and South Vietnam leading to the formal
reunification of the country. At this conference, it was said
socialism, the "most magnificent image" of the Soviet Union, "must
be chosen for all of Vietnam because socialism means the people's
freedom and happiness, because the socialist system is one free of
man's exploitation by man, and because the socialist society is one
with a prosperous economy and developed culture, science and
technology." (article translated by Asia Pacific Daily Report of
the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, hereafter referred to
as FBIS, 12/4/75).

     The radio broadcast contrasted this form of socialism with the
"decayed, rotten and outmoded feudalist system which has been
brushed aside by history" and with capitalism, "the most noisily
advertised typical model of which is to be found in the United
States.. a place where countless evils such as unemployment,
crisis, recession and inflation mount and where human ideals of
life are selfish and mean."

     Thus, said the broadcast, scientific socialism is a necessity
in the present era. In fact, "Patriotism and love for socialism
cannot be separated" because only socialism can make the people
strong. 

     The political consultative conference on reunification held
in November of 1975 was an exercise in formalities, since there was
no representation of the large majority of Vietnamese in the South
who did not share the Marxist ideology of the ruling class. In any
case, the conference set the framework for other steps leading to
official reunification and the creation of the Socialist Republic
of vietnam (SRV) in June of 1976. Among these steps were the
"elections" held on April 25, 1976 for members of the National
Assembly of the soon to be created government. As we discussed in
the Sept. 1980 issue of this newsletter (#11), these elections did
not conform to Article 9 of the 1973 Paris Peace Agreements, in
which the U.S. and the North Vietnamese government pledged to
respect the right of the people to determine their future through
"free and democratic elections held under international
supervision." Instead, in these elections, all the "candidates"
were chosen by the government, with no opposition candidates
allowed to run and no campaigning allowed for the "candidates". In
the South, there were 280 "candidates" for 240 seats in the
National Assembly.

     The course for the reunified government was officially set
forth by the first session of the National Assembly, which met from
June 25 to July 3 of 1976, and the fourth Congress of the
Vietnamese Communist Party in December of 1976. The main themes
were that Vietnam was to make the transition from a backward
feudalistic society based on small-scale production to a modern
industrialized socialist society based on large scale production.
The capitalist stage (seen in traditional Marxist ideology as the
intervening stage between feudalism and socialism) was to be
bypassed. The country was to carry out simultaneously three
revolutions -- the revolution in production relations (class
struggle), the scientific and technical revolution, and the
ideological and cultural revolution. The scientific and technical
revolution (economic and technological development) was to be the
"keystone". The ideological and cultural revolution was to involve
the building up of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the new
socialist man -- since, as Ho Chi Minh said, "To build socialism,
first of all there must be socialist people."

     These themes were described in the statement issued by the SRV
National Assembly on July 3, 1976:

     "The essence of the socialist revolution and the building of
socialism thought the country is:
     "To firmly grasp the proletarian dictatorship, develop the
working people's right of collective mastery of society,
simultaneously carry out the three revolutions (revolution in
production relations, scientific and technical revolution and
ideological and cultural revolution, of which the scientific and
technical revolution is the keystone); step up the socialist
industrialization of the country and build a large-scale socialist
production system; build the regime of socialist collective mastery
of society and build a new-type, socialist man; abolish the regime
of exploitation of man by man, abolish poverty and backwardness;
constantly heighten revolutionary vigilance, strengthen national
defence and firmly maintain national security and order; resolutely
repress the counter-revolutionaries, promptly smash all their
schemes to rear their heads again; stand ready to defeat all
schemes and acts of aggression and sabotage by imperialism and its
henchmen; unite the entire people and strive to build our socialist
fatherland, Vietnam, into a country with modern industry, modern
agriculture, powerful national defence, advanced culture and
science and a happy and civilized life." (pages 69-70, _The
Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Structure and Basis_, Documents of
the National Assembly Session, published in Hanoi, 1976). This
theme was repeated almost verbatim by the General Resolution of the
4th Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party (see page 203-204,
_Communist Party of Vietnam: 4th National Congress Documents_,
published in Hanoi, 1977).

     In his address to the 4th Party Congress, Party leader Le Duan
said: "To achieve complete success for our revolutionary cause, the
first condition is to establish and unceasingly strengthen
proletarian dictatorship and to exercise and constantly bring into
full play the working people's right to collective mastery." (ibid,
page 43).

     Vietnamese Communist leaders often summarize the term
"collective mastery" with the slogan, "the Party leads, the State
manages and the people are the masters" (_Viet Nam Courier_, Hanoi,
1/81). In what sense are the people masters? Truong Chinh, the
second most powerful man in Vietnam (Le Duan is the most powerful),
commented on this in a Dec. 12, 1980 address to the SRV National
Assembly on the new constitution for the country. According to
Chinh, the people exercise mastery through the State (the highest
organ of which is the National Assembly), the mass organizations
and the grassroots (offices, factories, local communities). Yet we
have already discussed the 1976 elections to the National Assembly,
which were entirely undemocratic. So obviously the people cannot
exercise mastery through the State if they are not allowed any
meaningful choices in the State elections. 

     What about the mass organizations? The mass organizations
mentioned by Chinh in his address were groups such as the Ho Chi
Minh Communist Youth Union and the Viet Nam Worker's Union, groups
which are instruments of the Party to mobilize the public in
support of its policies. Members of these groups exercise mastery
only in the sense that soldiers exercise mastery in the army. That
leaves us with the third form of "mastery", the grassroots level -
- office factories, etc. Less is known about this level of power,
but, in any case one must ask if it is possible for people to
exercise mastery at any level in a "dictatorship of the
proletariat".

     In the concept of collective mastery, the "people" is not to
be understood as all 50 million people living in Vietnam, or even
a majority of the people. The "people" in this context is to be
understood in an abstract sense, as a popular force to which all
Vietnamese must conform. As stated by Le Duan in his address to the
4th Party Congress, "To build the system of socialist collective
mastery is to build our country into a society in which the genuine
master is the social community, the organized collective of the
working people with the worker-peasant alliance as the core and
under the leadership of the working class." (_4th National
Congress_, page 45). Or, as stated by an editorial of _Nhan Dan_,
broadcast by Hanoi on May 16, 1977 (FBIS, 5/24), "The fact that we
become collective masters through an organized social community
does not amount to each one of us becoming a master, but rather
means that only in this way do we become masters."

     Furthermore, according to the resolution of the 4th Congress
of the VCP, "A correct relationship between the collective and the
individual is a very important aspect of the building of the system
of socialist collective mastery. We must ensure identity of views
between the collective and the individual." (_4th National
Congress_, page 199).

     The means to ensure such an identity of views is the
"dictatorship of the proletariat". The word "dictatorship"
generally connotes negative images in most people's minds, but
according to the Vietnamese rulers, the dictatorship of the
proletariat is "a million times more democratic than the democracy
of the bourgeoisie and other exploiting classes." (_Nhan Dan_,
6/28/76, FBIS 6/28/76). From the perspective of these rulers the
only alternative to the dictatorship of the proletariat is a
bourgeois dictatorship.

     But what about the freedoms that exist in our country and
other "bourgeois" nations? According to an editorial of the Hanoi
newspaper _Quan Doi Nhan Dan_ on April 22, 1976, three days before
the rigged elections leading to formal reunification of Vietnam,
"bourgeois democracy is sham democracy." Freedom of the press and
freedom of speech "are only instruments for competition of
capitalist cliques... to win over the press and the writers in
order to distort the truth and rig up a so-called public opinion
favorable to the bourgeoisie." Freedom of worship "is nothing but
the bourgeoisie's freedom to use religion as a tranquilizer to rock
the masses to sleep and to use religion as a means to counter and
undermine the revolution." Freedom to vote and stand for election
is, at best, the right to "raise one ruling clique to power to
replace another." Such rights are illusory, according to the
editorial, used as an instrument to deceive the masses. Under the
capitalist system, "The absolute majority of the people continue
to live in bondage and under oppression and has no freedom other
than the freedom to sell its labor force and to remain unemployed."
(FBIS, 6/28/76).

     From such an extremely polarized perspective, the crucial
issue is not viewed as the universality of human rights, as
proclaimed by the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights and Amnesty
International, but rather "whose human rights?" Or, "which side
will win" -- capitalism or socialism? As long as there are
different classes in the country, or the world, the class struggle
will go on -- the battle between the champions of the proletariat
and the reactionary agents of the bourgeoisie. The essence of
proletarian democracy is "democracy for the overwhelming majority
of people and dictatorship over a reactionary minority" (ibid). As
stated by another editorial of _Quan Doi Nhan Dan_, 3/26/77 (FBIS
4/6/77):

     "The communist people consider the policy of respecting the
rights to freedom of thought, speech and creation not only as a
great achievement in human rights by our regime, but also as a
measure to continue the advance of the revolutionary undertaking.
Naturally one cannot confuse the rights of freedom to thought and
creativity with their abuse. We encourage the freedom to express
one's ideas for the purpose of accelerating the socialist
revolution. But we forbid the freedom to express one's opinion in
order to propagandize for capitalism and for neocolonialist
restoration. We advocate the freedom of creativity for a very
abundant life which must be vividly reflected in literary and
artistic works. However, we forbid the types of reactionary
literature and art that hope to poison youthful minds. We also
accept constructive criticism and criticism of shortcomings in
order to overcome them. However, we forbid all acts which oppose
the socialist regime and will deprive of all rights to freedom
those enemies who view socialism with a grudging eye or who
describe all aspects of socialism as being passive and having
shortcomings. 
     "With the counterrevolutionaries -- the spokesmen of the
revolutionary party factions who continue to oppose or sabotage the
revolution -- our people are determined to deprive them of freedom
of speech and to severely punish them. The lackeys of imperialism,
the war criminals and the counterrevolutionaries who refuse to
reform themselves cannot have freedom. This is done in order to
protect human rights, capture all remaining weapons and arms of the
reactionaries who have been toppled and check all their plots to
sabotage or oppose the right of ownership of the laboring people." 

     Such a double standard approach to human rights is also
brought out in Article 67 of the new constitution of the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam (ratified this year): "Citizens enjoy freedom
of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of
association, and freedom to demonstrate in accordance with the
interests of socialism and of the people. No one may use democratic
freedoms to violate the interests of the state and the people."
According to Truong Chinh, the "stipulations of the Draft
Constitution on citizen's right conform to the spirit of the
Declaration of Human Rights approved by the international
community" (_Viet Nam Courier_, Jan. 1981, pp. 10-11).

     But the UN Declaration is unconditional in its stipulation on
freedom of expression while Article 67 of the SRV Constitution is
not. It is the Communist leadership, of course, which decides what
is "in the interests of the State and the people" and which thus
has the right to prohibit any form of dissent in the country. An
editorial by _Nhan Dan_ on Dec. 10, 1978 (FBIS 12/11/78), the 30th
anniversary of the UN Declaration of Human Rights, attacked the
"capitalist class viewpoint" on a "type of abstract man": "There
is no such type of abstract man. Man is not a product of God, but
a natural entity with a nature which is the synthesis of all his
concrete and fixed social relationships. Man means society. Man
means the concrete, historic man who lives in a given society with
given social relations in a given socio-economic structures. The
independence and freedom of each individual is closely related to
that of the society where he is living." With the denial of man's
individuality, every value is placed on the evolution of society
toward the Marxist utopia -- and no value is placed on the rights
of the individual who does not conform to the Marxist goals.

     In scientific socialism, man -- all of man, heart and soul
-- is the object of science. As Nguyen Duong said in an article in
the Hanoi publication _Hoc Tap_ (2/10/76, FBIS, 2/12), "Grasp
Persuasive and Coercive Methods of Our State," persuasion and
coercion must be combined in the management of society: "If we know
how to coordinate these methods in a correct and scientific manner
and use coercion to consolidate and develop the impact of
persuasion while using persuasion to increased the effectiveness
of coercion, we will be able to achieve the set objective." The
persuasive method is used to "achieve greater unanimity and further
tighten relations between the state and the masses," said Duong.
The coercive method is combined with persuasion against "domestic
reactionary forces which collude with the imperialists." 

     The difference between state coercion in communist states and
coercion in non-communist states, said Duong, "does not lie in the
fact that coercion is or is not used but in what class uses it and
for whose interest it is used." Coercion in Communist Vietnam
"includes both opposition and building within each individual:
Oppose and eradicate negative attitudes and acts and hail and
improve positive aspects in order to turn the individual into an
active participant in the development of a new society." (ibid).

     As we will bring out later in this series of articles, the
combined persuasive and coercive method is exemplified in the
system of "re-education" imposed upon dissidents and those who had
previously occupied positions of authority in the non-communist
government of South Vietnam. Requiring inmates to write and rewrite
"confessions" and to participate in self-criticism sessions insures
greater control by the state over the mind of the individual. This
technique of combining coercive and persuasive methods of social
control distinguishes totalitarian from authoritarian regimes. 

     Internal dissent in Vietnam is linked by the government with
hostile foreign powers and Vietnamese who have escaped the country.
Following the military takeover of south Vietnam, the United States
received the primary blame for dissent in the country. In the last
two years, Communist China has joined the United States as
scapegoat for any dissent in Vietnam. 

     According to SRV leaders, dissidents in communist countries
aligned with the USSR and Vietnam are enemy agents in the worldwide
struggle between capitalism and scientific socialism. An editorial
in _Nhan Dan_ on Feb. 3, 1977 (FBIS 2/9/77), commenting on Western
support for the human rights movement among dissidents in
Czechoslovakia (Charter 77) and the Soviet Union said: "The so-
called opposition activists are acting consciously or unconsciously
as weapons of bourgeois dictatorship in its attack on proletarian
dictatorship on the world scale. They are simply the instruments
of the bourgeoisie to sling mud at socialist democracy and help
whitewash bourgeois democracy."

     A more recent editorial, this one in (Hanoi) _Quan Doi Nhan
Dan_ 7/28/81 (FBIS 9/1/81), described internal dissent as
ideological sabotage. The "U.S. imperialists", it said, have
promoted "present-day reactionary bourgeois philosophies and the
U.S. materialistic lifestyle in an attempt to corrupt and degrade 
-- ideologically and eventually, politically -- a number of our
people, especially the youth. They have promoted the role of a
number of bad elements among the various religions -- especially
Catholics -- and have provided more guidance to spies -- especially
the agents planted in our ranks -- the psychological warfare
personnel of the former U.S.-puppet administration and other
reactionary elements so that they may cause disturbances and stir
up rebellions."

     In order to combat this threat, the editorial said, "uniform
coordination must be achieved throughout the entire system of the
dictatorship of the proletariat." "Ideological saboteurs" must be
promptly suppressed, "assault elements" must step up their
ideological work in various sectors of the society, and legislation
must be developed to "define offenses and the degrees of punishment
for the crimes of ideological sabotage and its perpetrators." 

     The major piece of repressive legislation for Vietnam today
is the Law on Counter-Revolutionary Crimes enacted by the
government of North Vietnam on November 10, 1967, which we will
discuss below. Other repressive legislation, which we will discuss
in future articles, include Resolution #297 on Some Policies
Concerning Religion, enacted by the SRV Council of Ministers in
November of 1977 and Resolution 49-NQ/TVQH of the National Assembly
in 1961 dealing with the re-education of dissidents. It might seem
strange that laws originally enacted by the DRV have now become law
for the people in the South as well, but in any case this fact was
officially declared by the SRV Council of Ministers when it adopted
Resolution No. 76-CP (reported by _Nhan Dan_ on 3/21, 4/1 and
4/12/77; reported in an english broadcast by Vietnam News Agency,
4/8/77; reported by _Quan Doi Nhan Dan_ on 4/13/77; and discussed
by _Tap Chi Cong San_ in a broadcast of Hanoi Domestic Service on
6/13/77). The purpose of this resolution was to provide guidance
for the newly-created SRV during the interval before its own
constitution was ratified. The Council reviewed laws, decrees and
other legal documents that were enacted by the Provisional
Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam from 1975-76 and those
enacted by the DRV for the North. From this, a comprehensive legal
system for the entire country was to be established. According to
Tran Cong Tuong, chairman of the Legislation Committee of the
Council of Ministers, the list of current laws for the new regime
consists mostly of DRV documents. A delegation of Amnesty
International that visited Vietnam in December of 1979 was told
that PRG decrees were still valid but that the existing laws of the
DRV were paramount. (_Amnesty International Annual Report 1980_,
page 242).

                    ***************************

               The Law on Counterrevolutionary Crimes

     In an official memorandum sent to Amnesty International in
September of 1980, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam claimed that
those in re-education camps wee guilty of treason (since they had
led the opposing side during the war) and could be sentenced to 20
years to life imprisonment, or even death, under the Oct. 30, 1967
Law on Counterrevolutionary Crimes and under the PRG March 15, 1976
decree No. 03-SL/76. But because the regime was so merciful, it was
instead detaining these "traitors" in re-education camps, without
charge or trial. AI protested in a Dec. 1980 memorandum to the SRV
that this would be a retroactive application of the law (which
violates basic legal principles) since those in re-education camps
were not citizens of the DRV in 1967 and since the 1976 PRG decree
had been enacted after these alleged crimes of treason took place.
AI also pointed out that many of those detained in reeducation
camps had little or no association with the previous non-communist
government of South Vietnam. But the protest was to no avail (the
memoranda was published in the _Report of an Amnesty International
Mission to the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, 10-21 December
1979_, printed in June 1981). 

     The full text of the 1967 Law on Counterrevolutionary Crimes
was reprinted in the Oct. 16, 1979 issue of the Hanoi newspaper
_Nhan Dan_ (translated by FBIS Oct. 23, 1979). We are also
reprinting it in this issue of the newsletter, along with Article
3 of the March 15, 1976 decree 03-SL/76. We are reprinting this
part of the PRG decree because it essentially summarizes basic
details of the 1967 law and demonstrates that repressive
legislation previously enacted in North Vietnam was implemented for
the South even before the official reunification in June of 1976.

     The 1967 code appears to be the basic code for
"counterrevolutionary crimes" in Vietnam. Besides the citation in
the SRV memo to Amnesty International, it was also cited in a book
published in Hanoi in 1977, "Hoi Va Dap Phap Luat_ ("Questions and
Answers About the Law," translated by Joint Publications Research
Service #76287, 8/25/80). In answer to question 156, "What crimes
are stipulated as being counter-revolutionary crimes?", the book
cited Articles 3 through 17 of the October 30, 1967 Law on
Counterrevolutionary Crimes.

     This law is significant since it spells out severe penalties
for "crimes" which could easily be interpreted as nonviolent
dissent. For example, point 7 of Article 11 states that those
guilty of "stirring, inciting and coaxing others to undermine labor
and military discipline and the fighting spirit of the people's
armed forces and people" will be liable to imprisonment of 10 years
to life, or death, except in less serious cases, where the penalty
is 5 to 10 years imprisonment. Encouraging others to resist the
draft or protesting against Vietnamese military involvement in
Cambodia and Laos would appear to fall into this category of a
"counterrevolutionary crime".

     Articles 12 through 15 discuss the "counterrevolutionary
crimes" of "undermining all-people solidarity," "opposing or
sabotaging implementation of state policies and laws," "disturbance
of public order and security" and "counterrevolutionary
propaganda." Article 12 specifies imprisonment ranging from 5 to
15 years for those who carry out propaganda and organizational
activities aimed at causing disunity between the people and the
government or the people and the army. The same penalty applies to
those who propagandize against the religious policy of the
government, seeking to cause disunity between various religions,
between religious believers and non-believers or between believers
and the government. This could be applied to religious leaders
protesting the government's persecution or discrimination against
religious Vietnamese. 

     Article 13, on "opposing or sabotaging implementation of state
policies and laws" mentions penalties ranging from 2 to 10 years
imprisonment all the way to life imprisonment or death, depending
on the seriousness of the alleged act. An example of how this
provision can be applied was shown in an "Understanding the Law"
column that appeared in the Hanoi publication _Quan Doi Nhan Dan_
on June 27, 1977 (JPRS 69666, 8/23/77). Two Vietnamese, formerly
officials of the non-communist government of South Vietnam, were
found guilty of violating Article 13 by telling people in a village
that they would suffer hardship and possible disease if they went
to a new economic zone. 

     Article 14 specifies penalties ranging from 2 to 5 years for
those who disturb public order and security for
"counterrevolutionary purposes" and 5 to 15 years imprisonment for
those who urge others to do the same. The article would presumably
apply to those engaged in nonviolent demonstrations or strikes
against the government and its policies.

     Article 15, on "counterrevolutionary crimes" differs from
Article 12 in that it seems to be referring primarily to individual
rather than organizational "crimes" of spreading
"counterrevolutionary propaganda". Article 15 calls for
imprisonment of 2 to 12 years for those guilty of propagandizing
against the government and "distorting socialism"; "propagating
enemy psychological warfare themes" and spreading false rumors;
"propagandizing the enslavement policy and depraved culture of
imperialism"; and "writing, printing, circulating or concealing
books, periodicals, pictures, photographs, or any other documents
with counterrevolutionary contents and purpose." Article 15 could
be applied to virtually any form of dissent not covered in the
other provisions of this code.

     An "Understanding the Law" column in _Quan Doi Nhan Dan_,
March 9, 1979, described the case of a man guilty of violating
point 2 of Article 15, "propagating enemy psychological warfare
themes" and spreading "false" rumors. Soldiers in a work unit had
picked up information from "sidewalk sources of news" about
Vietnamese military losses. this news, which "had no basis
whatsoever", was traced to a "bad element in the locality" who had
"spread news of losses after he swallowed the psychological warfare
trash of the BBC, Voice of America and even Peking broadcasts."

     Point 3 and 4 of Article 15, "propagandizing the enslavement
policy and depraved culture of imperialism" and writing, printing,
circulating or concealing books, periodicals, etc. with
"counterrevolutionary contents and purposes", seems related to the
campaign to destroy the "neo-colonialist" culture of the South. In
the Sept. 1981 issue of this newsletter, we reported the life
imprisonment sentence given to Bui Dinh Ha, found guilty of
producing, possessing and circulating decadent and reactionary
works. These are just a few examples. There are many other writers
and artists who have been arrested in Vietnam during the last six
years, in conformity with this provision of the law on
counterrevolutionary crimes. 

     As for the boat people, and those aiding Vietnamese trying to
escape the country, there is Article 9 of this law on
counterrevolutionary crimes. The text of Article 9 was reprinted
and discussed in an "Understanding the Law" column of _Quan Doi
Nhan Dan_ on March 4, 1980 (JPRS 73600, 4/30/80). Those who flee
the country for "counterrevolutionary purposes" can receive 3 to
12 years in prison. Those who help them to escape (if the helpers
have counterrevolutionary purposes or are aware of the
counterrevolutionary purposes of those fleeing) can get 5 to 15
years in prison, with life imprisonment or death in serious cases.

     What is a "counterrevolutionary purpose"? Considering the
government's rigid ideology and concern about criticism from
Vietnamese refugees, "counterrevolutionary purposes" would likely
apply to anyone fleeing the country seeking freedom, that is anyone
who would meet the United Nations definition of a refugee as one
who flees for fear of political persecution. 

     There have been many cases reported by the Hanoi media of
prison sentences for Vietnamese trying to escape the country or
helping others escape. For example, Hanoi's Vietnam News Agency
reported on 7/19/79 the trial of Hoang Hoat, former director of
CARE in South Vietnam, who was given a life prison sentence,
accused of aiding intellectuals to escape the country (FBIS,
7/19/79). Most of the trials publicized by Hanoi are of escape
organizers and often involve alleged acts of violence. However, we
cannot evaluate these allegations since we have only Hanoi's
version and since no one in Vietnam today is allowed a fair trial.
Amnesty International has also reported cases it has adopted of
Vietnamese imprisoned for trying to escape.

     Article 17 calls for 2 to 10 years imprisonment of Vietnamese
who conceal or provide supplies to "counterrevolutionary elements".
In the summer of 1975, the new regime ordered over one million
South Vietnamese who had occupied positions of authority in the
army or government of the previous regime to report for re-
education. But many did not, and hid from the government instead.
To do so, they needed the help of sympathetic Vietnamese living in
the villages and countryside. But those who provided food and other
supplies to these "counter-revolutionary elements" risked prison
sentences for themselves, ranging from 2 to 10 years.

     The most serious "crime" in this code is Article 3, Treason,
which specifies 20 years to life imprisonment or the death penalty
for those "who collude with foreign countries to jeopardize
national independence, sovereignty and unity and to harm the
socialist regime." As we have already considered, the SRV claims
that all those in re-education camps are guilty of treason. It is
also conceivable that the SRV could place the treason label on some
dissidents arrested since 1975, since the Hanoi press has linked
internal dissent to hostile foreign powers.

     The use of Article 3 by the SRV in describing those in re-
education camps brings up an interesting point -- even when the Law
on Counterrevolutionary Crimes is not applied directly to political
prisoners, the threat of its application can be used by the SRV
regime to justify lesser forms of punishment -- in this case,
imprisonment without charge or trial.

     This argument is similar to the "bloodbath" argument, in which
Hanoi and its supporters point out that the bloodbath some
predicted did not take place, which apparently means that re-
education camps and other forms of repression in Vietnam are not
so bad after all. To its prisoners, Hanoi says: We could kill you.
We have the right to execute you under Article 3 of the Law on
Counterrevolutionary Crimes. But instead, because we are so humane
and progressive, we will only detain you without charge or trial
until you are thoroughly reeducated.