


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A Letter from the Editor:

Dear reader,

This edition of Troika is the first after a two year period of dormancy. Our 2022 undergraduate publication in Slavic, East European, and Eurasian studies is the culmination of a year's worth of effort and the continuation of a legacy that began at U.C. Berkeley in 2011.

When we started the endeavor of bringing Troika back to life midway through the Fall 2021 semester, none of our team expected what was to come in the following months.

We are saddened by the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Though many of our pieces touch on Russian politics, authors, and identities, this is in no way indicative of a preference towards Russia. We publish pieces selected through a thorough review of what has been submitted, we do not “commission” work to fit any political agenda; Troika is first and foremost a celebration of distinguished undergraduate work.

Thank you to everyone who made this issue possible: all who had a hand in Troika's revival and all who submitted to our magazine. We are so excited for you to read our 2022 issue and we hope you enjoy it!

Wyatt Singh + the Troika Team
Spring 2022

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
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Putin's Cult of Personality

Rachel E. Ervine | *Durham University, England*

As with any other modern conflict, Vladimir Putin's so-called 'special military operation' in Ukraine requires the combination of both 'hard' and 'soft' power — the former taking the form of pure military force, whilst the latter relies on information wars and a domestic and international 'hearts and minds' campaign (Kizlova and Noriss 2022). Patriotism and unwavering support for a leader can have powerful results, making soft power nothing to be overlooked. Surveys, whilst of course subject to self-censorship (especially in oppressive states) and response bias, indicate that a majority of around 60% of Russians supported the war prior to the conflict breaking out (Kizlova and Norris 2022). Levada, a non-governmental research organization, similarly to other research organizations, saw approval ratings of the activities of Putin rise by 14% between January and March 2022, to 83% (2022). Therefore, examining Putin himself becomes crucial to understanding the use of soft power in this conflict, and whether it be under the title of 'cult of personality', 'the Putin phenomenon', 'Putin mania' or 'Putiania' (Cassiday 2010), it is difficult to ignore the sensationalism around Russian president Vladimir Putin. This essay will explore his personality cult—taken to mean the 'excessive glorification of self-aggrandizing political leaders, using the modern mass media' (Plamper 2004a: 22) —by breaking it down into its key aspects, and comparing it to historical personality cults. This will forward the argument that it has acquired new characteristics, principally in instances where their acquisition benefits the cult's standing in Putin's Russia.

The Cult of the 'Strongman'

Given the general tendency to equate a strong government with domestic stability in Russia, it is unsurprising that Putin's presentation as a 'strongman' became key to his personality cult. Sexual-cultural metaphors and gender norms, such as machismo and homophobia, coupled with an emphasis on military power, i.e., army base visits, PR photographs with weapons and remembrance services, imply Putin's 'personal strength' (Beale 2018: 141), re-establishing a sense of the leader as 'Father', through increasingly paternalistic and patriarchal tendencies (Mikhailova 2013: 65). These are not novel within personality cults—Napoleon was known as 'fatherly' (Pisch 2016: 72), and Stalin was 'Father of the Nations', appearing to provide stability and continuity (Cassiday 2013: 39); for example, by wearing military clothing in peacetime to suggest his power (Goscilo 2013c: 193).

One 2010 poll revealed that 52% of Russians thought that all power should be given to Putin and almost 80% responded that Russia's leader needs a 'strong hand' (Azar 2010). This perhaps explains the positive correlation between acts of power, like the 2014 annexation of Crimea and continued military activities in Syria with subsequent high approval ratings: 89% in 2015 (Beale 2018: 134). The appearance of personal strength justifies the glorification of leaders; hence, it is not uncommon in personality cults. For instance, China's Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong swam the Yangtze River at the

age of 72 and Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet used to break bricks in public. Both acts served to project the personal strength of each leader (Sperling 2015: 21).

Considering that Russians are looking for a 'strong hand' in leadership it is understandable that creating an image of Putin as a 'strongman' would guarantee support. Nevertheless, it demonstrates little improvement to the strategies of historic personality cults, which also encouraged glorification through presenting leaders as powerful and paternalistic.

Legitimation Strategies

Putin has employed established strategies to increase his popularity and appearance as the natural choice for President. Modeling the likes of Tony Blair and Bill Clinton, Putin made an effort to 'appear presidential' (Rose 2002:174). In the leadup to the 2000 elections, Putin refused to take part in debates with political opponents, gave no speeches nor held rallies; he acted as though he was already elected.

In other respects, Putin's strategies are similar to Donald Trump's. Scholar Ben Judah contends that 'Putinism is apocalyptic' and has shown, after the USSR's dissolution, to be 'nothing less than Russia's last chance to survive as a state' (2013: 89). The Kremlin contrasted Yeltsin's failings with Putin's achievements to exploit the uncertainty of post-Soviet Russia—in Putin's speeches, phrases like 'incapable parliament' [nedeesposobnyi parlament], 'impossible to decide' [nevozmozhno reshit] and 'it wasn't passed' [priniato ne bylo], pin blame on Yeltsin (Ryazanova-Clarke 2013: 116). This alone parallels America's former President Trump, who

condemned actions of his predecessor to bolster his own campaign. Yet Judah's comments can be furthered: not only does Putin appear to be Russia's lifeline, but a chance to restore the superpower status it once held. Like Trump's Make America Great Again campaign (Byford 2021), Putin has worked to domestically and internationally justify Russia's position as a world player from the Sochi Olympics to the FIFA World Cup (Beale 2018: 134). Another interesting case is Putin's interaction with Edward Snowden in 2013. Whilst the US sought to arrest Snowden for charges of him leaking highly classified information from the National Security Agency — including details about global surveillance programs — Russia offered him asylum. This therefore marked a key instance where Putin attempted to highlight the West's hypocrisy: how could they so easily criticize Russia's mass surveillance and 'free speech', whilst they simultaneously ran global surveillance programs and tried to apprehend the man behind sharing this information with the public? Putin has shown he will use and critique Western forces to improve his own appearance in a bid for greater legitimation.

Finally, legitimation came through writing Putin's life into the lives of the population. Like Stalin, Putin had his 'likeness and biography' embedded into the Russian school curriculum (Cassiday 2013: 37), making it seem that Russia's history was Putin's, and that he thus held a clear leadership claim. Similarly in Turkmenistan, President Niyazov had historians write his personal history into that of the state, making close connections between himself and Turkmen heroes, so that he appeared the most important person in the country's history (Polese 2015).

Although various legitimation strategies seemingly justify Putin's position in power—thereby strengthening his personality cult—as before, these are in no way unique to Putin, Russia, or to the twenty-first century. However, they remain effective: playing on the emotions and insecurities of the Russian people, especially the feeling of an unfair loss of superpower status, in order to justify Putin's glorification.

The Twenty-First Century Cult

Observing the cult within the context of the twenty-first century reveals an expected natural progression to exploiting technological advances for its development. Scholar Robert Strunsky noted in 1956 how radio and television 'convey the total dimensions of personality' into the majority of Russian households (268). This can only be taken further today with mobile phones, computers and the internet, but shows nothing unique to Putin, since this technology is used for political glorification globally. It is hard to imagine that Stalin, Hitler and Mussolini, among others, would not have made equal use of them, had they been available.

Perhaps most interesting is Putin's evolution of tactics from historic personality cults. For instance, authoritarian leaders often placed their busts, portraits, and statues across their state to take on 'a proxy role' and remind the populace of the omnipresence of their leader (Pisch 2016: 67). This is seen as early as the Roman emperors but is noticeable throughout history; for instance, the planned 100-meter-high Lenin statue (Pisch 2016: 68) and the 40,000 statues of Kim II-sung in North Korea (Cha 2013: 73). For Putin, the strategy has simply become modernized, capitalized and fit for a consumer

society—it is possible to buy bed linen, shower curtains, key rings, clocks and pajamas, all with Putin's face on them. Hence, identical to earlier personality cults, 'Putin is (everywhere/always) with us' [Putin [vezde/vsegda] s nami] (Goscilo 2013b: 14).

Technological development also adds a strand to Putin's personality cult outside of official Kremlin actions. Capitalism and the Internet, whilst 'notoriously resistant to central control', (Cassiday 2013: 49) still allow for the wide-scale dissemination of Putin images and propaganda. Whether it be a YouTube video of Putin laying a wreath on the Day of Memory and Sorrow in the pouring rain (Russia Insight 2017), or one of the many pro-Putin goods available, technological advances and the rise of consumer culture have blurred the line between 'official and unofficial speech' (Cassiday 2013 :48). Since the Kremlin's portrayal of Putin is mirrored in channels outside of its control, there is a sense of 'legitimacy and genuine popularity' (Beale 2018: 146) to Putin's cult. It is worth noting that without the complete isolation from modern technology and capitalism, Soviet era control will be unattainable (Cassiday 2013:57). This means that criticism of Putin appears along with support for his cult of personality.

Nevertheless, genuine appreciation of Putin and a degree of choice in supporting him, unlike in other personality cults, are notable. Putin's cult is not wholly within 'official coercion': generally it is appreciated that attendance at pro-Putin demonstrations, and buying Putin products, is done either for personal profit or out of genuine desire, not force (Cassiday 2013: 48). Unlike Stalin—who generated not only enthusiasm, but also fear (Cassiday 2010: 694)—supporting Putin is

not necessary to access higher education or better jobs in modern Russia (Cassiday 2013:48). It is hard to imagine that Putin's face would feature on coins, cakes, saltshakers, playing cards, notebooks and bath towels solely as a result of official actions, and hence their existence is suggestive of an authentic admiration.

Additionally, Putin generates public respect from his linguistic capabilities. Interestingly, both Stalin and Hitler were 'from the periphery' of the empires they commanded (Plamper 2004b: 310): Stalin from Georgia and Hitler from Austria. This meant they spoke with marked accents—Stalin especially was reluctant to address the population. Contrastingly, Putin is recognised for his linguistic proficiency (Judah 2013: 49) and frequently cites facts and exact figures in his speeches to demonstrate his suitability as leader (Beale 2018: 137).

Although Putin's personality cult has generally acted in a predictable way (given the technological advances), new characteristics are notable. The inevitable freedom of speech that came with Russia's access to the internet and increasing consumerism not only signified that Putin's personality cult could never come close to Stalin's, but also hints at a genuine approbation of Putin, to be explored later.

Becoming God

The deification of a leader, in an attempt to replace God, is common in personality cult construction. The manufacturing of Stalin's quasi-god status was condemned in Nikita Khrushchev's 1956 Secret Speech but the 'death' of God as 'precondition for the deification of man' was also apparent after the French Revolu-

tion and Enlightenment period (Plamper 2004a: 19). This also manifested itself in such personality cults as that of Adolf Hitler, Albania's Enver Hoxha and Zaire's Mobutu Sese Seko (Plamper 2004a: 19), who carried out secularizing acts to create a void for the leader to assume, and then be revered as God-like. For Putin, this is not the case. Putin came to power an Orthodox Christian, without rejecting the Church in his presidency, but rather enjoying a good relationship with it: for example, in advancing the Act of Canonical Communion with the Moscow Patriarchate in 2007 (religionfacts.com 2021) and being praised by Russian Patriarch Kirill I as 'a miracle of God' (Judah 2013). Putin demonstrates compatibility with his personality cult and his faith, appeasing the Russian Orthodox members of his populace in a way unseen in the Soviet period. Perhaps this is simply Putin refusing to surrender his beliefs, but perhaps there is something more tactical: Putin may have recognised that he can appeal to the 71% of his population who are Russian Orthodox (Sawe). If true, Putin does not simply deviate from standard personality cult practices by avoiding his personal deification, but demonstrates an awareness of, and adaptation to, his target audience of supporters.

'There is already a cult... but there's no personality'.

The above quotation, from a caption to the 2004 cartoon by Aleksei Merinov (116), widely reflects the conclusions of scholars about Putin's personality cult. Upon Putin's rise to office, very little was known about his history, family and, indeed, personality. From talks of the 'unknown Putin' (Rogatchevski 2010: 161), his 'ambiguity and dialogic, polyvalent character' (Cassiday 2013: 55) and 'this gray, ordinary man' (Gessen

2013: 22), classifying Putin under a singular personality-type challenged many. Putin seems to be an expert in everything—whether it be driving Formula One cars or singing Blueberry Hill at a charity dinner (Beale 2018: 132)—and he is able to appeal to many different groups. The lack of a single label to Putin’s personality—he is a politician, a linguist, a sportsman, a sex symbol, an action hero—means that to appease an incredibly broad group of people, Putin simply has to never appear too unlike the type of person they want him to be (Gessen 2013: 31). It is therefore the population who instigate the ‘production’ of Putin (Goscilo 2013a: 2) through seeing in his personality the things they wish to. Whilst Michel Foucault suggests creating oneself as a work of art, for Putin, ‘the entourage plays the king’ [svita igraet korolia] (Goscilo 2013b: 21). Putin therefore has a distinguishing aspect to this personality cult—the population choose what they see in him, making his cult ‘inherently polysemantic, highly mobile and easily individualized’ (Cassiday 2013: 40). This, unlike typical personality cults, demonstrates an awareness of the consumer culture of the present-day state: the people wanting to ‘buy into’ an idea of Putin, making their relationship with his personality

cult distinctly unique.

Conclusion

The Putin cult of personality at times reiterates characteristics from other personality cults: the presentation of a ‘strongman’ leader and his legitimization strategies are not too distinct from those seen in world history. Nonetheless, these characteristics have been combined with new ones, such as the fluidity of Putin’s personality and a genuine support for him, in order to make the cult most effective within the environment of a consumer-driven, capitalistic, and technologically advancing state. The Putin cult of personality has moved with the times, evolving, to determine which aspects of standard cults are worth continuing, and what more needs to be introduced in order to allow for the glorification of President Putin most effectively, given the political and societal climate of present-day Russia. As Russia’s war against Ukraine continues, and the need for soft power and the population’s backing becomes more important than ever, it can only be concluded that Putin’s cult of personality has begun to have real-time consequences.

Man with a Movie Camera: Camera that Inspires

Yangfan Lin | *Stanford University*

Introduction

Man with a Movie Camera (1929) is Russian director Dziga Vertov’s ninth film, and undoubtedly one of the director’s most well-known, critically acclaimed films (Vertov, *Defining Documentary Film* 78). The film was a forerunner of Vertov’s Kino-Eye, or Cine-Eye movement. Vertov himself published many writings to formulate and clarify the ideas of this movement, and Vlada Petric’s 1978 essay, *Dziga Vertov as Theorist*, provided a comprehensive and insightful overview of Vertov’s most important theories. I will now draw from these sources to summarize key contentions of the Kino-Eye Movement. First, the Kino-Eye Movement utilized the film camera to achieve aesthetic and ideological purposes. Vertov argued that the film camera should capture what the audience would not have realized otherwise. There were two dimensions of the materials that the film camera should reveal: external reality - “life as it is” and “naked truth” - and the internal thoughts of individuals (Vertov, *Kino-Eye* 31). On the one hand, Vertov believed that the camera should organize reality authentically, without “masking problems.” The Kino-Eye should depict “leather shoes” rather than “shoeshines” (Petric 30). It opposed the films that imitate literary and theatrical manipulations and propaganda-oriented films, which, according to Vertov, were filled with clichés and “blinds the masses” (30). On the other hand, as

Petric observed, Vertov’s insistence on the “ontological authenticity” of the film image rendered him equally interested in people’s cognitive processes and intellectual realizations (30). Vertov noted in his essay, *The Birth of Kino-Eye*, that the camera would “catch [people...] in a moment when they are not acting, to read their thoughts, laid bare by the camera” (Vertov, *Kino-Eye* 41). These aesthetic approaches and concerns contributed to the Kino-Eye’s political vision: Vertov considered it a battle against the bourgeois taste, which sought to enlighten and inspire the masses to perceive new visions of reality.

The second important contention of the Kino-Eye Movement lay in its innovation in the film audience’s relation to technology. The word “kino”, which means cinema in Russian, highlights Vertov’s conception of cinema as a medium of perception. Petric observed that Vertov’s famous montage method is two-pronged: it defies logical sequences of everyday life to expose its truths, and it also creates thoughtful self-references in films like *Man with a Film Camera*. The instrumentality of filmic visions is a prominent theme of *Man with a Movie Camera* and assists in the achievement of other goals for this movement.

This essay uses *Man with a Movie Camera* as a case study to explore the complications in the Kino-Eye Movement’s aesthetic and political

programs. It discusses tensions between the film's intention to inculcate and the creative, anti-indoctrination essence of its vision. On the one hand, *Man with a Movie Camera* cannot escape the typecast as a visual propaganda. Vertov himself declares that the cine-eye movement is a "campaign," a prospect of the "cinematic October" that "must begin in the USSR" to counter European and American tastes (Vertov, *Kino-Eye* 39). On the other hand, as Vertov remarks, "*The Man with the Movie Camera* is straightforward, inventive, and sharply contradicts the distributors' slogan: 'the more cliches, the better'" (Vertov, *Kino-Eye* 83). *Man with the Movie Camera* generates a surging energy of creativity that ultimately trains the audience to perceive and even create their own visions.

Petric has astutely pointed out Vertov's attention to the individuals' inner worlds - the cognitive, psychological, and creative processes of forming and modifying visions of reality. Building on Petric's argument, this essay discusses ways in which *Man with a Movie Camera* shows these interests. It argues that the film, with its self-referential depictions of the cinematic medium, establishes the camera as an analogy of the individual's inventive capacities: the images captured by the camera are representative of people's idiosyncratic perceptions of reality. Then, this essay proceeds to show that the camera's relation to the activities of urban life and the crowd reflects Vertov's vision of the creative individual's relationship with Soviet ideals. For Vertov, an individual partly conforms to the moral standards and rhythm of collective life and partly draws inspiration from it to construct original visions. Eventually, Vertov upholds artistic originality to be more precious, more commendable than mere replications and imitations after the

products of a singular, authoritative ideal.

The individual's distance from Soviet ideologies

In his shots of athletic activities, Vertov highlights people's physical and cognitive participation while also portraying their distance from a political agenda. He utilizes slow motion to depict moving bodies. As shown in fig. 1 and fig. 2, under his camera, the actions of throwing a spike and high jumping (as well as hurdling, swimming, and diving in similar shots) are slowed down (Vertov, *The Man* 1:06:29). We see the bodies in their full potential, conquering external obstacles or their inherent corporeal limits. The triumphant note in these shots elevates athletics from a planned segment of Soviet social life that only aims at pleasure or health. Instead, doing sports is an aesthetic expression. People's bodies become aesthetic objects, and the various feats that these bodies accomplish before the camera become cinematic spectacles. It is also worth noting that Vertov does not shun away from showing the hardships in sports: slow motions highlight the intense muscular movements as well as the faces that manifest the pain that the bodies endure. This means that Vertov does not intend to present these shots as a cumulation of still photographs, in which the beauty of the physique is captured and frozen into a symbol. He emphasizes the process of production, the process through which beauty emerges, rather than the fruit. The bodies do not naturally possess aesthetic value. It is the human labor of athletic engagement that brings beauty into manifestation.




Fig. 1



Fig. 2

Vertov further suggests that this labor of creating artistic objects does not merely belong to the athletes, but it also belongs to the viewers. He edits shots of the viewers' reactions into his depictions of athletes, as shown in fig. 3 and fig. 4 (Vertov, *The Man* 45:53). For Vertov, the expressions of concentration and amazement on the viewers' faces are signs of appreciation, which is part of the moment of beauty. The effort lies in both generating and understanding, getting moved by aesthetic objects. Portraying the viewers, Vertov diverts attention from the bodies on screen and thus from the representational potential of these images. These images are not presented on screen to symbolize a vibrant, prosperous society or a productive way of life promoted by an ideology. Rather, Vertov cares about people's engagement in the emergence of

these images. Similarly, he does not intend to convey his subjects' self-aware enthusiasm in athletic participation. Under his camera, people seem to be relatively unaware that they are being filmed; even if they may be aware of the camera's position, they do not show a deliberate effort in appearing passionate or devoted. The reason is that passion may signify a parallel dedication to collective causes, and Vertov, at least in these shots, does not want such a manifest allusion. He precisely wants his subjects to be unaware. In these shots, being unaware of the camera—being unaware of the message that one's appearance in film can embody—points to an insulation from political motives.



Fig. 3



Fig. 4


What, then, is people's relation to the societal changes happening at the time? Vertov seems

to believe that people are adapting to, instead of generating and propelling, these changes. He uses accelerated shots to depict groups of athletes chasing after a ball. He also assigns individual low-angle shots to the ball flying in the air, as well as individual shots of the goalie desperate to catch it. Throughout the accelerations, the camera never loses track of the ball, which thus becomes a center around which people revolve. The energy generated by such movements is the primary concern of Vertov's camera. People's tracks are not traced, for what matters is their impulses and immediate reactions to the ball. These shots together can be read as a powerful metaphor of people responding to movements and adjusting to changes in their surroundings. Vertov suggests that people are not following a political agenda that designates individual roles and calculated steps. It is more accurate to say that they are receiving and following the signals from the transformations around them, and such signals are not always clarified and orderly, as indicated by the blurred views of accelerated shots. Therefore, Vertov does not intend to instill in his audience particular messages about their social and economic conditions, their roles in the ongoing societal transformations, or the connection between their daily lives and the ideals of a Soviet society.



Fig. 5

The dialectical Soviet reality



Figs. 6 - 9



Figs. 10-13



Figs. 14 - 15

The previous section has argued that Vertov seeks to inspire an aesthetic awakening—one that has to do with original observations and contemplations of daily life. Portrayal of the Soviet urban scene in *Man with a Movie Camera* shows that Vertov is not celebrating a singular, superior vision produced by these processes. Fig. 5 to Fig. 15 is a sequence of shots where Vertov's camera shifts between the faces of several individuals – three children and one old woman. These scenes were not scripted, and there was no plot, even though the subjects of these shots were clearly reacting to something in their surroundings (Vertov, *The Man* 22:16-23:44). For Vertov, a plan might have pointed to a stable, consistent inherent logic of the Soviet city life, whereas his intention is to avoid the presentation of such a logic. This makes the film a departure

from a typical propaganda film, where there is a designated plot, and where events form a narrative that effectively provokes expected emotional and intellectual responses. Instead, in this film, events happen arbitrarily, and people produce immediate, improvised reactions to them. There are multiple directions in which the current conversation or interaction could go at any given moment in these shots. Life in a Soviet society is thus portrayed to be disordered but invigorating, with an energy for changes at its center. Meanwhile, the purpose of each shot remains ambiguous. I will further discuss what Vertov seeks to inspire in the audience in the next section.

In this sequence, Vertov also depicts blurred distinctions between public and private lives. Fig. 14 is a bird's eye view of crowded streets inserted into the shots of human expressions (23:38). Vertov suggests that each individual consciousness is part of a collective consciousness, and that private life is inevitably embedded into the flow of public life. The boundaries are obscured by the fact that individuals are simultaneously reacting to public events and creating, changing, and propelling them. It is in this process, Vertov argues, that individuals become capable of constructing their private realities, which are not only distinct from one another but also constantly evolving with the ever-changing public life. In other words, Vertov's presentation of reality is one that inspires imaginations, conjectures, and other cognitive responses to the existent one, so that they converge into new and various versions of reality. For Vertov, the realities conceived by individuals, like the Soviet city life under his camera, are arbitrary, improvisational, and full of surprises.

Vertov thus demonstrates his commitment to the

creative potential in an individual's attempts at watching, processing, and understanding events around them. By focusing on the faces, Vertov highlights the individual perceptions of external stimuli: the camera successfully probes into the internal sphere of private feelings. Yet, the children's smiles, laughs, and shocks are responses to something not captured by the camera, and the woman is arguing with someone similarly outside of the frame. Since the subjects' attention is constantly on objects that are not on the screen, Vertov suggests that the internal perception is never solely fueled by the inner thoughts and feelings of individuals. Rather, it is shaped by the evolving situations surrounding the subjects. An individual's perceptions are always contextualized, and responses to the ever-changing contexts are hardly predictable and inevitably multiply themselves.

For Vertov, self-generative, whimsical visions of reality are what constitute ideal artistic perceptions. Through a sequence of shots, he has both modeled the processes through which his subjects internally produce such visions and presented these perceptions. Therefore, Vertov points out that the fluidity of idiosyncratic realities not only stems from the arbitrary nature of Soviet city life but also from people's creative capacity. He believes that it is the movie camera's mission to cultivate and enhance perceptive talents in its audience.

Camera as a Medium, individual inventiveness, and collective life

In *Man with a Movie Camera*, Vertov explores the camera's instrumentality to pursue the ambition of aesthetic training. His eagerness to inspire the audience is evident in shots where

he shows his subjects on strips of films (22:56-23:39). As people's faces alternate between the still shots on the films to moving pictures in the frame, Vertov draws attention to the camera's limits in exposing the psychological realm in its entirety. The camera bears resemblance to the eyes as instruments of seeing, of capturing and creating realities. Thus, the shortcomings of the camera can only be compensated by the powers of the naked eye. In other words, as Vertov gestures at the time and space beyond the frame, he is suggesting that they are accessible to the imagination of viewers sitting before the screen. He encourages viewers to engage with the shots by imagining the scenarios to which his subjects are reacting. Essentially, Vertov aims at creating a cinematic awareness in his audience, the ability to suspend immediate acceptance of external realities and to explore a variety of interpretations.

The analogy of the camera and the eyes also manifests in shots of a film editor working with the films (fig. 22-26) (21:56-23:49). In these shots, Vertov illustrates the camera as a medium. Along with the sequence of human faces on film and then in action, they present almost the entire process in which films are produced. The production of film, Vertov suggests, is analogous to the human perception of reality. The camera's eye is analogous to the human eye. Therefore, in this film, shots that explicitly feature the camera's work should be read as Vertov's exposition of how an individual develops inventive ways of seeing and interpreting the world.



Figs. 16 - 18

For Vertov, the camera first and foremost carries a judgmental function of people's daily lives. As shown in fig. 16, Vertov uses double exposures to place the cameraman above the city scene of buildings and a street (54:00). The triangular structure of the camera tripod gives the cameraman a stable stance in the sky, where he can watch—and therefore assess—the activities of city residents. In the next shot, the cameraman

with his apparatus rises from a mug of beer, neatly framed into the size of the mug. On the one hand, the cameraman's rise indicates the camera's vigilance not to thoughtlessly immerse himself in the subjects of its observation. On the other hand, these two shots juxtaposed suggest the camera's full access to aspects of the city life: the comprehensive view seen from above, and the attention to details as demonstrated by the beer mug.



Figs. 19 - 21

Meanwhile, the camera's positions in these two shots point to its evaluative function. The camera becomes an instrument of moral evaluation that looms above and rises from the everyday lives of city residents. It condemns drinking alcohol as a form of entertainment, shaking erratically while approaching people that are sitting at a table and taking drinks (fig. 16-18) (54:00-55:29). On the contrary, it praises sports as leisure, such as chess and shooting, as manifested by the fast, decisive alternating shots between the woman and the shooting target in fig.19, fig.20 and fig.21 (56:34-56:42). There is thus an underlying code in these shots, which renders the camera didactic. It meditates on the inherent values and merit of people's deeds and encourages the audience to adopt and internalize a similar set of standards.

The camera's commitment to passing assessment on leisure reflects an important view that Vertov holds: individuals cannot live in complete detachment to public life. The camera becomes a symbol of introspective examinations that aim at shunning entertainment and embracing intellectual, productive activities. With its capacity to judge, the camera aids an individual in making wise decisions for themselves as they navigate through Soviet social life. Vertov regards the ideal Soviet social life as constituted by individual choices of some collective actions over others. These individual choices, he believes, are monitored and regulated by an individual's cautious, judgmental faculty, which the camera imitates.

However, Vertov eventually contends that the original, individualistic creations are superior to society's demands of collectivity, and that aesthetic perceptions of reality should be incorporated into daily life. The focused portrait of the film editor, as shown in fig. 22-26, resonates

with the depiction of other laborers in the film, like the workers at around 36:00 (22:56-23:49). The latter is filled with focuses on the workers' hands and the tools that they are using: in fig. 27, we see the profile of a female worker using the telephone. In fig. 28, the camera shows a row of workers manipulating the levers and allows their busy arms to be the center of action. These shots contrast with shots that depict people in leisure: in fig. 29 and fig. 30, both women are styling themselves and are shown with close-up shots that cast light on their facial expressions. Like the shots in fig. 27 and fig. 28, the shot of the film editor depicts her from the side and leaves room within the frame to show the movements of her hands at the table (36:15-42:58).



Figs. 22 - 23



Figs. 24 - 27



Figs. 28 - 30

While the film editor is contrasted to the laborers, Vertov also makes sure that she stands out among them. The camera angle shifts from a tilted low angle to a distant, high angle, placing the subject further from the camera, while the lighting throughout places the film editor in a dark corner, as opposed to the fully lit faces of the workers. These contrasts suggest that Vertov is not depicting the film editor as an individual


worker, but as a representation of all workers. Filmmaking is represented as an equal to the various kinds of labor that Soviet citizens performed. Seeing with creativity—in the way that this film promotes—is not a privileged talent, but something as common and natural as making telephone calls. The action of seeing and the engagement with labor illuminate each other: seeing, and the perception of individualized, constantly evolving realities, is part of the collective commitment of the new Soviet society. Meanwhile, Vertov suggests that this methodology of understanding and interpreting the world should not be limited to the creation of films. It should be applied to every aspect of daily life, from work to leisure.

Conclusion

This paper has analyzed Vertov's explorations of the tension between individual inventions of reality and the external reality of the Soviet society. *Man with a Movie Camera* carries a didactic mission to cultivate its audience's perceptive, creative capacities. Vertov rejects the inculcation of political ideals, portraying citizens of the Soviet society to be insulated from political narratives. Rather, he is committed to the cognitive, aesthetic reconstruction of reality and commends a view of reality that adapts to changes, constantly evolves, and never settles on one superior vision. Through depictions of an arbitrary, improvisational Soviet social life and the similarly inventive visions produced by individuals, this film seeks to inspire creative powers in its audience to embrace this generative perception of reality. Using the camera as an analogy of the individual's perceptive faculties, Vertov states his view of the relation between idiosyncratic productions of reality and reality of the public life: on

the one hand, individual perceptions are based on stimulations of the external reality. Individuals not only draw from the external reality to create their own visions of reality but actively shape events with their choices and actions. On the other hand, he celebrates artistic creativity,

as manifested through the individuals' creations of reality, to be a unifying and illuminating power of the Soviet daily lives of labor and leisure. While this film promotes a particular aesthetic vision, it eventually upholds originality and diversity.



Soviet Hockey as a Socio-political Tool

Caden Carter | *Vanderbilt University*

The Soviet Union began directing sport among its population immediately following the October 1917 revolution in an effort to attain socio-political objectives. The Soviets' level of excellence in sports ranging from weightlifting to gymnastics to hockey was framed to promote the socialist system. It fostered a sense of nationalism, unity among Soviet states, and confidence in socialism. Sports generally became propaganda that advertised the greatness of the Communist Party, but one sport rose to the top as the most essential to the Soviet Union's ability to sway the masses. Through its state hockey team, the Soviet Union accomplished three connected goals essential to statecraft and foreign policy: showing its dominance as a world power, fostering unity within the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc while maintaining its vanguard position, and displaying the disparity between the fruits of socialist and capitalist systems.

While the Soviet Union attempted to use all international sporting competitions to accomplish its socio-political objectives, no sport had the propaganda effect that hockey had for several reasons. First, hockey provided an objective score, unlike some sports such as gymnastics or figure skating. Therefore, the results could be more directly tied to the successes of the Soviet system. Hockey was a "fair, objective measure of different societies' ability to develop talent" (Soares 2014). Second, hockey was "popular in geopolitically important nations" such as coun-

tries in Europe and North America and Japan (Soares 2014). Hockey could serve as a testing ground for which system was best among world powers. When the Soviet Union played well, it could claim that it was because its political system was the best. Third, there were "close parallels between national hockey programs and their nation-states" for communist states, while capitalist states like Canada and the United States of America ran their national hockey programs independently from the state (Soares 2014). If the Soviet national team, which was largely run by the state, outperformed a capitalist team like the U.S. or Canada, which was independent from the state, the Soviet leaders could craft a message attributing the team's success to the country's difference in political ideology (Soares 2014).

Further strengthening the claim that the Soviet hockey team was good because of the socialist system is the fact that the Soviet hockey team was considered a microcosm of the larger society. The team exhibited "a distinctive communist style of play" (Soares 2014). For example, failure to work for the common good of the team, according to the first Soviet national hockey coach Anatoly Tarasov, was "a violation of one of the main principles of communist morals" (Polsky 2014). In addition, according to a Canadian government report, the Soviet style of play was "characterized by team play, discipline, precision-passing, superb conditioning, the masterful execution of fundamentals of

skating, puck and body control, and an emphasis on clean body contact" ("Interim Report on Minor Amateur Hockey in Canada"). The principles of team play, common good, discipline, and a focus on the fundamentals were similar to the principles of Soviet ideology. The Soviet State could further strengthen its position by explaining its hockey team's superb performance as a result of its adherence to Soviet principles.

Lastly, hockey was a particularly strong form of propaganda because the Soviet Union could fully claim its success. While other sports saw their roots in Imperial Russia, ice hockey was not played in Russia until the Soviet team was formed in 1948. The team rapidly ascended from a new team to a world power, as it won its first world championship in 1954 and then medaled in every international competition until the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Soviet hockey team became a strong piece of propaganda because it was seen as a fully socialist product that could be displayed on the world stage.

As mentioned before, the Soviet Union used its hockey team to unify the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc without giving up its vanguard position. While the hockey team was displayed internationally, the majority of its games were between the Soviet Union and nations within its sphere of influence (e.g. East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland). These sporting contacts "[helped] to strengthen fraternal cooperation and friendship and develop a sense of patriotism and internationalism among people of the socialist states" (Riordan 1974). The language of sport became a language of comradeship. Playing hockey against each other as united socialist states created a sense of fraternity among the Soviet Union and its satellite states. It encouraged people to move

beyond nationalism to internationalism. Hockey taught people that they were no longer just Polish or German but Communist. Some countries even began to use the Soviet hockey team's success to galvanize their populations to support communism. For example, "Czechoslovak authorities even used Soviet hockey victories as proof of communism's superiority" (Soares 2014).

The Soviets would often further solidify their bond with the satellite states through hockey by sending their players and coaches to help improve the Eastern Bloc teams (Polsky 2014). In so doing, the Soviet Union helped to improve the hockey teams of all socialist states. Consequently, all of the socialist states could succeed at an international level and become further propaganda for the merits of communism. However, despite the Soviet Union helping improve its Eastern Bloc states, it was careful to maintain its position at the top. Other countries could do well thanks to the Soviets' perceived benevolence, but the Soviets would always remain at the top. This created a power dynamic within the hockey world that the Soviet Union hoped to mirror in the socio-political world -- the Soviet Union at the top, followed by other socialist states, and then followed distantly by non-socialist states.

The Soviet Union's hockey team was undeniably dominant. It dominated the world, winning nearly every world championship, for about four decades. This unfathomed success precipitated a population that was proud to be Soviet. Socialism, which was portrayed as inextricably connected with Soviet hockey, began to warrant more respect within already socialist states and in nations throughout the world. The Soviet Union used its creation, the Soviet hockey team, to accomplish three related goals: establish-

ing its position as a world power, engendering unity within the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc,

and denouncing the evils and weakness of capitalism in contrast with communism's success.



Daniil Kharms: Analysis of a Poem in Russian

Varduhi Sargsyan | *University of California, Santa Barbara*

Анализ стихотворения:

<<Из дома вышел человек>> Даниила Хармса

**Из дома вышел человек
С дубинкой и мешком
И в дальний путь,
И в дальний путь
Отправился пешком.**

**Он шел все прямо и вперед
И все вперед глядел.
Не спал, не пил,
Не пил, не спал,
Не спал, не пил, не ел.**

**И вот однажды на заре
Вошел он в темный лес.
И с той поры,
И с той поры,
И с той поры исчез.**

**Но если как-нибудь его
Случится встретить вам,
Тогда скорей,
Тогда скорей,
Скорей скажите нам.**

1937 г.

АВССВ- <<Почти Кольцевая>>

Стихотворение <<Из дома вышел человек>>

Даниила Хармса было опубликовано в 1937 году. Оно имеет размер четырёхстопного ямба и имеет рифмовку в АВССВ, которая почти кольцевая. Поскольку это стихотворение синквейн, или пятистрофное, кольцо не совершенное. Хармс употребляет Эзопов язык и совмещает визуальную форму и звук с содержанием, чтобы сделать его работу ещё эффективнее и мощнее. Он заманивает читателей всесторонностью своего стихотворения упомянув таких тем как Советская власть, чистка, эмиграция, стукачество, бегство из родины и т. д.

Снаружи, стихотворение <<детское>>, и оно о человеке, который покинул дом и исчез. Но это совсем не конец истории этой литературной работы. Вторая половина 30-х годов знатна Большой чисткой, которая также известна как Большой террор или Ежовщина. В эти года сталинской репрессии, цензура, ссылки, казни и аресты были неизбежны: особенно таким поэтам как Хармс. Эта работа пример тому, как многие авторы стали писать детям в место взрослой аудитории. Таким образом они могли маскировать то-что хотели бы высказать. Этот, на первый взгляд невинный стишок, например, с помощью Эзоповского языка, мог скрыть истинную мысль. Многие старались избегать подставленные <<антисоветские>> обвинения путём иммиграции на запад, за пределы железного занавеса. Интересно подумать об этих словах,

<<И вот однажды на заре вошёл он в темный лес>>. Зара обычно ассоциируется со светом и востоком. А человек идёт в сторону тёмного леса. Это значит на противоположную сторону СССР. В <<тёмную>> сторону, туда, куда запрещено идти. Может быть, стишок написан от имени Советской власти и <<нам>> обозначает аллюзию к НКВД или секретную полицию, которая пропагандирует донесение информации о беглых соседей. И таким образом, эта серьёзная проблема, погубившая судьбы миллионов людей, передаётся читателю на языке Эзопа посвящённой детям и защищённой от цензуры взрослой литературы.

В этом стихотворении, также можно увидеть связь между формой и содержанием. В первую очередь, стишок короткий, мелодичный как слова песни, очень легко читается, имеет стабильную рифму четырёхстопного ямба и мужскую рифмовку в АБССВ. Такая форма легка для запоминания детьми и для устной традиции русскоговорящего народа. В нём также много повторений, которые передают интенсивность этим строфам. Только в одном месте слова меняются местами, <<Не спал, не пил, не пил, не спал>>. Это, совпадает с <<почти-кольцевой>> рифмой, передовая ощущение прошедших дней и времени, цикла дня и ночи на пути человека покинувший дом.

Звук этого стихотворения тоже связан с его содержанием. В связи с тем, что оно написано в ямбах, каждая строфа начинается с безударной стопой и оканчивается ударной. Этот звук напоминает шаг человека от пятки до носка. И опять, имеется цикл движения. Но, кроме этого, четырёхстопный ямб сам звучит как шаги, как секунды часов, как лошадиный топот и как сердцебиение. Эти

вещи могут означать время, дистанцию, торопливость, стресс, беспокойство и давление покинуть страну быстрее, чувство что кто-то догоняет, и в конце концов, жизнь. Хармс, таким образом применяет звучание и рифму своего творения для добавления к смыслу и для усиления устного языка.

Напоследок, Даниил Хармс ловко употребил несколько литературных методов в его- на первый взгляд- детском стихе <<Из дома вышел человек>>, сделав его намного глубже и намного серьёзнее чем кажется. С помощью Эзоповского языка поэт скрывает истинный смысл стихотворения про советские репрессии. Поэт также усиливает чувство торопливых шагов с рифмой которую он выбрал для этой литературной работы. В стихотворении также присутствуют ощущения круга или цикла, повторения и пройденного времени. Так Хармс совмещает все эти методы в этом произведении и делает его намного богаче.

andrei before troy: an elegy

Grace Clifford | *Columbia University*

here is a sound that men have called fireworks
here it is ringing all over the plain
here is prince andrei, hero of troy -
eyes ringed vermillion in fluorescent light.
here is a match. strike it anywhere
watch moscow burning up. walk barefoot
in the soft-fallen new-winter snow.
you tantalus who has loved before and
fallen out of love before,
pretended you have never loved before,
here is the heart that has fallen out of your chest.
sew it back, watch the neon lights of the city snuffed out.
nothing is wrong, and nothing is real.
come to find that snow and ash are the same thing
in different colors,
falling over your city
smothering it
so nothing can grow. find comfort
in the t.v. light flickering over the walls. you,
shooting star; you, excellent; you
wrenched from the sky.


you wonder at nothing
you wonder at the infinite,
the oblivious. fall upon yourself,
a dagger unsheathed, point to your heart.
here are your eyes ringed purple-ghost-red
a sunset-circled sky
here is the path you have traced into the earth
three times around the city limits just to quell
your shaking hands.

Sunny Day

Katharina Hass | *University of California Berkeley*

Sanguine Ablution

Jeffrey Roach | *University of Notre Dame*



I figured it was dawn, but the sky was so dark and grey it was hard to tell. Foreboding hemlocks and spruces sprang up all around me as I stood up in a wooded sea, meeting a ghastly headache. Warily, I glanced down at my bedraggled body to see strange garb in place of the usual overcoat. Brushing off the leaves and sticks and red mud matting my hair, I found myself wearing a clinging, finespun brown gown, with a dove emblazoned in the center, surrounded by sun rays. I noticed a leathery ushanka with a feather tied up along the side lying on the muddy ground beside me. I smelt of death, but my throbbing head overpowered the stench. I sat up on a nearby rock and tried to recall the last night piece by piece, praying for the headache to end, and as I gathered myself, it slowly came to me in pieces.

A forlorn, squat, sad old wooden building stood at the end of a dirt road amidst rolling hills, jutting up against the precipice of the pitch-black forest of conifers. Its white paint was chipping, revealing the dark, cracked wood underneath that looked like sores on a plague-ridden face. Dim rays emanated from the cracks, illuminating fields of dry, dead crops of a long-failed harvest. The rays of light seemed to be agitated as they changed directions frantically, peering across the vast crepuscular horizon, like an eye seeking prey. Melancholy whispering could be overheard everywhere amongst the hills, chanting in cadence with the ebbing and flowing of the relentless gusts. Sometimes I heard a voice behind me, but when I looked back, only gloomy Likhov stood frozen under the grey cloudy

heavens above. Curious, I sauntered along the dirt road and stumbled upon a bathhouse.

Veering around towards the porch, the little man in the rocker wearing a feathered hat and a Buddhist-looking robe had fallen asleep at his post, so I knocked on the dark oaken door to no avail. Interested, I tugged the rusted metal rings hard, and as the door swung open, a burst of steam and odd smells rushed forth, engulfing me. Stifling smells attacked the nose from all directions in a choking fume. I inhaled incense and eastern spices, sweat, blood, and other bodily fluids, even a hint of the smell of a feathered bird lingered in the air. This melange of smells coagulated with the mist to form a salty, damp air, as if the sea had arrived at the doorstep of the bathhouse, except instead of a sea, it was a swamp. Illuminated only by the queer smelling candles glowing in red and sometimes green shades, the white tile walls frantically flickered, resembling weeping blood as the hissing steam coalesced upon the shadowy surface. It was dark. Not darker than the grey twilight, but nearly.

I moved forward apprehensive, and suddenly it seemed the whole town appeared. All the townsfolk were in the same embroidered gown I was wearing when I woke up, trudging in circles around the center, heads bowed solemnly, muttering some chant that sounded more like a hex than a prayer. Men and women, some fat and some old, some bony and some robust and healthy, all were present. I heard children's laughter, but no child could be seen. The faint

green and red light emanating from the center circle made them all appear as decaying, pallid, and sickly as the dead harvest, while the gowns clung provocatively to their soggy looking flesh. Their leather hats sat loose upon each head like a thornbush, distending faces and heads into monstrous proportions under the hazy light. Underneath each thornbush, I beheld wide grins of satisfaction and carnal pleasure as they muttered in sync, looking into the candles, placed down to make the shape of a dove. Their hands spliced together tightly, threatening to rip the gowns and let the flesh beneath spill out. The crowd was one, as hands seized upon flesh, their shadows and voices melded on the wall, and the human spirit was rendered down to no more than an apparatus of the ritual. At first, I thought it was some Mongol funeral procession, until I heard a whisper-like prayer, praying for the savior, praying for the woods and the dove to descend.

A large man who they called Kudreyarov towered over the tall red-green candles in the center with a sly smile, making wide gestures with his calloused hands, whirling over the steamy candles as if he was bewitching a cauldron. While not a fat man, his gown fit awkwardly. Layers of suet spilled out from his frame in a sad expression, indicating a once powerful man reduced to nothing more than bones and luggage. However, his hands had not yet fallen victim as he whirled them about mightily, and the very air below screeched in a whirlpool of hues and shades of all types. But as he turned around, his wide grin gave way to a brooding face, darkened by his distended, disfigured ushanka, somehow even larger than the other hats, with an aluminum dove ornament on top. This was no whole man but rather two put together, with a face for each. As he invited me to join the procession, he turned to the right, so that

his glowering side shone radiantly in the sickly light, beads of green sweat dripping off his unshaven brow. Here was the eye of the predator, for wherever he looked, the perched metal dove would follow. And wherever the dove pointed, the tainted rays would peer. So serious a scowl it was, it looked like the stone face of a prophet on a sacred errand, yet all the sincerity of the lord was lacking in that lecherous leer behind.

The large man, obviously their leader, at one point made a silent gesture to stop the procession, opening his embattled mouth to cry out “O Messiah, we are in dire need. Come to us, descend unto the world and make it pure again. Fly to us, so that we may return to your flock, fly to us...” He started swaying rhythmically to the song of his plea, and in due time the bathhouse itself appeared to be swaying steadily to the beat of gowned figures cutting through the dark. Shadows stirred as the drum room gyrated about the center candles, and clanking shingles from the wind-ridden outside world seemed to laugh at us wickedly. Behind Kudreyarov’s tangled hat, there were only beady, vulturous eyes perched upon his protruding bulbous nose glaring down as the others prayed, as if he agreed with the wind. Wordlessly, he passed around a cup, as I joined the others supplicating, not wanting to stand out. It seemed like sacramental wine, but smelled salty, even burnt. It had ripples of red running through it, thick as blood. I was hesitant, but this looked like a man I dare not refuse. Not wanting any trouble, I gulped it down.

Then we rose. Within the fog, I could hardly discern the doves clad in their spun gowns before, yet now it was nigh on impossible as screaming colors and vagabond, wandering silhouettes danced upon the wall, overtaking any human

semblance. Vibrant, languorous shapes shuffled unpredictably through this darkened room almost in an amble, a ballet of sordid prayer. Bodies of all shapes and sizes eloped to corners to partake in the zealotry, devious acts of love and prayer concurrently, as I stood incredulous. Odd words of an ancient eastern tongue filled the hall with a cacophony of moaning and prayer, louder than before. Perhaps it was a religious service in a long dead epoch, but it was now harsh and guttural, lacking all grace. The steam hissed wildly, as the wind laughed on. Those bodies around me sang violently with the choir of noise, seemingly yearning for something, grasping at the air with their pleas...only to be met by the laughing outside and the shadows on the wall.

The room spun, and twisted shadows began to take on aspects of beasts, their heads twisting into genuine monsters. All types of animals could be seen, but birds were the most common by far. Doves fluttered along the wall in red-green fervor, and the silhouettes of the disfigured people followed them, wandering towards the birds as the Berber aimlessly wanders to the oasis. Yet the oasis was never found, and the stunted birds on the bloody wall always lacked the elegance of the dove upon my spun gown. Soon the rotting shapes around the weeping drum room blended together until the beast became indistinguishable from man, as the birds amalgamated with their pursuers into cosmic horrors of blood red and diseased green. As the incantations and moaning escalated, the room grew warmer and more putrid, the laughing grew louder, and the

shadowy, sickly birds remained ever uncaught, out of reach of the horrific figures in the dark, lashing out in desperation only to grasp the rotting shadows in their clutches. When I finally thought I could see no more, Kudreyarov stood alone before me amidst a sea of deathly shadows and woodlands and green, poisonous steam, staring directly into my soul with fiery red eyes, his face split in two. He proclaimed in a guttural cry, completely monotonic, “Old powers waken. Shadows stir. An age of wonder and terror will soon be upon us, an age for a new God, and a new kingdom in His forest.” At some point the swamp had finally drowned me, and I woke up here, in the infinite woodland, a new garden. Was he right? Am I alive just outside of Likhov, or am I merely another spirit in this new, enlightened realm? My clothes certainly point to the latter, but I would sorely miss the gostinitsa bar. I will soon find out. Or at least I think, for that was a very strong drink I would not recommend.


As my head finally began to clear, an aluminum dove appeared above the crest of a hill, meant to look silver on the outside, but false beneath. Kudreydov soon followed below, his face now sewn together. A Murder of crows came from behind him, quorking incessantly, almost muttering with the same canter of the doves in the house. Wordlessly, his terrible half grin told me, “Welcome to Eden.” The grey sky stirred as the grey and brown leaves blew through the wind. The rank of death only grew as Kudreydov drew near. Was this a garden or a graveyard?

Я вас любил

Alexander Pushkin

Я вас любил: любовь ещё, быть может,
В душе моей угасла не совсем;
Но пусть она вас больше не тревожит;
Я не хочу печалить вас ничем.
Я вас любил безмолвно, безнадежно,
То робостью, то ревностью томим;
Я вас любил так искренно, так нежно,
Как дай вам Бог любимой быть другим.

1829



I Loved You Once

Translation By Varduhi Sargsyan | *University of California Santa Barbara*

I loved you once: the flames of love perhaps,
May still not be extinguished in my heart,
But please do not be bothered or distraught,
I wouldn't want your heart's abrupt collapse.
I loved you once: but mutely, hopelessly alas,
I languished filled with jealousy and doubt,
I loved as gently and sincerely as one aught
By God, may you be loved that way at last.



Culture As Queer

William Blastos | *Middlebury College*

Divergent Associations between Queerness and High Art and Culture in *Wings* and *Winter Journey* (2013)

An affinity for arts and culture has often been used as a marker of queerness in film and literature by queer and heterosexual authors and filmmakers alike. The intimate connection between high culture and art and queerness is simultaneously a figment of the heterosexual imagination and an authentic cultural touchstone for queer men. As queer men search for a coherent queer history, echoes of homosexual love from antiquity are particularly alluring as preserved texts describe queer sex and love. Likewise, queer historical figures tend to come from high-culture circles, figures like Tchaikovsky, whose mainstream notoriety overwrote his queerness in the broader cultural context. For queer men, these small details intimately connect them to a broader history, and love for antiquity or classical music, or other similar iterations of art and culture is often used to mark characters in film and literature as queer. Likewise, the heterosexual imagination often connects male queerness with high art and culture; only this is often more a negative association with decadence and femininity than it is a connection with a broader history.

In *Wings*, a novella by Mikhail Kuzmin, aspects of high culture and art like classical music and a preoccupation with antiquity are used to mark the central character Vanya and his mentor and lover, Stroop, as homosexual. This associa-

tion is used as a tool to develop and frame their eventual love story in a positive way. Likewise, in *Winter Journey* (2013), directed by Lubov Lvova and Sergey Taramaev, the central figure Erik is coded as queer through his profession as a singer and his love for music in the film he is preparing to audition to sing Schubert in competition. This connection is coded as queer and therefore decadent, and in the face of a figure of masculinity and violence, Erik's queerness is inherently negative. Although quite distinct from one another in terms of medium, time period, and cultural context, these two works illustrate the diverging legacies of high art and high culture as queer. One is itself queer, and the other is mapped onto queerness by the heterosexual eye.

Unsurprisingly, as Kuzmin was both queer and a symbolist, *Wings* is full of classical references, to music, to art, and perhaps most centrally to antiquity. These allusions scaffold the story and explicitly frame the discussions of queerness that take place. Early in the novella, Vanya is with his Greek teacher Daniil Ivanovich, who is also coded as queer, discussing love in ancient Greek texts. The teacher argues that by the fifteenth century, the Italians "had an already firmly established view of the friendships of Achilles and Patroclus and Orestes and Pylades as sodomatic love, and yet in Homer, there are no direct indications of it" (Kuzmin 23). In drawing on two oft-cited examples of queer love from antiquity, Vanya's Greek teacher captures the search for a coherent queer history through classicism. The broader argument at stake is that queerness has

existed throughout history, and using these antique references not only proves this for Kuzmin but marks queerness as culturally significant. Beyond the cultural and historical ties to queerness, or "sodomatic love," as he calls it, this scene takes place early in the novella, before Vanya is able to explore his sexuality and before Daniil Ivanovich is confirmed to be a homosexual. As such, this moment functions as a de facto confirmation of Daniil Ivanovich's sexuality and hints at Vanya's queerness as well. This scene also mirrors the standard structure of ancient Greek homosexual relationships, which were often organized around age—an older man usually with higher status with a younger man or boy with lower status—this is reproduced in Daniil Ivanovich as Vanya's teacher. Although the two men do not have a relationship in the novella, this mirroring, whether intentional or not, subtly links the queerness that Kuzmin is writing about with the queer history Daniil Ivanovich mentions to Vanya.

This intersection between the queerness in *Wings* and high art and culture is pervasive throughout the novella. This connection between "‘*utonchennost'*—artistic refinement—and homosexuality" (116), as Brian James Baer names it in his book *Other Russias*, becomes a lens through which the reader can view and understand Stroop and Vanya's homosexual relationship. Baer observes that this connection "is made at the expense of actual physical passion" (116). Indeed, the novella is not explicit in the sexual side of Vanya and Stroop's mutual attraction; instead, Kuzmin uses these linkages to '‘*utonchennost'*' as a way to mark passion in addition to the broader connection he attempts to create between history and queerness.

In the final few pages of the novella, Kuzmin references two different relationships from antiq-

uity, both of which mirror in some way Stroop and Vanya's situation. As Vanya eats dinner with a man named the Canon, the man reads him a piece of writing about Antinous and Hadrian, wherein Emperor Hadrian, so distraught over the death of his young lover Antinous, has the boy deified to honor his life (94-5). Only pages later, Ganymede, a mortal boy so beautiful that Zeus deified him and brought him to Mount Olympus, is quoted by Kuzmin: "Poor brothers, of those who flew up into the sky only I have remained there, because you were drawn towards the sun by pride and childish toys, whereas I was taken by raging love, incomprehensible to mortals" (98). In both instances, the same referencing to relationships between high-status, or older, men and lower-status, or younger, men is clear. Ganymede and Antinous can, at least in part, be seen in Vanya. Likewise, Zeus and Hadrian are reflected in Stroop. These connections are explicit and straightforward, but what, then, is the function of Kuzmin quoting Ganymede directly? He describes how a vast and incomprehensibly powerful love has kept him in the sky (with the gods) and contextualized within the novella and also within the broader myth of Ganymede. This quotation suggests a deep connection between homosexuality and high art and culture. This raging love, about which Ganymede speaks, seems to suggest something divine, and when mapped onto Stroop and Vanya, this divinity, which is already queer, becomes a marker of their mutual love. Baer is right, Stroop and Vanya's relationship may not be physically passionate, but there is passion; it is just contained within these moments of reference, wherein the novella's characters become, even just for a moment, mirrors of these figures of antiquity. Thus, Kuzmin constructs a relationship using the echoes of antiquity as a guide, one which is

informed by myth and high art and marks these things as queer to the very core. This inherent association between homosexuality in the novella and its references to *'utonchennost'* is one that Kuzmin establishes as wholly positive. Just as Kuzmin associates homosexuality with high art and culture, Lvova and Taramaev, the directors of *Winter Journey* (2013), create a parallel connection between the film's central character, Erik, and his connection with classical/romantic music. However, this connection is not one of positivity and a search for queer history, instead in the context of the film, it tends to function as a marker of decadence, weakness, and a lack of masculinity. Lvova and Taramaev mark this early in the film when Erik, drunk and stumbling through the streets, is brought back home by Ivan Sergeiich. Once they return home, his mother questions him and, during the conversation, begins to compare him to Ivan, saying how he "is the one who puts up shelves in the house" and that Erik "[doesn't] even have a tool box" (*Winter Journey* 15:58-16:03). This moment is certainly minor in the broader scheme of the film. However, it is one of the first instances where Erik's masculinity is questioned, his pursuits subtextually marked as decadent in some regard. Without explicitly saying so, his mother places a higher value on the manual labor Ivan Sergeevich can perform than she does on Erik's profession as a singer. Erik is in the process of rehearsing for a singing competition or audition in which he is performing a Schubert composition with the same name as the film, a fact intimately connects him with classical legacies and marks him as queer in a similar way that references to antiquity mark Vanya and Stroop as queer in *Wings*. Although the film uses a different cultural reference point, functionally, it marks Erik as queer in much the same way.

Lvova and Taramaev organize Erik opposite the film's other central figure Lyokha. If Erik is marked as decadent and queer, Lyokha is the opposite, a low-brow criminal whose violent tendencies and temperament are indicators of masculinity to the audience. Both men are introduced in the opening scene of the film: Erik is riding the bus peacefully listening to Schubert through his headphones, when Lyokha, having just finished a nasty fight in the front of the bus, steals Erik's headphones and cell phone in an attempt to blend in and avoid arrest (*Winter Journey* 01:27-03:22). In isolation, this scene is innocuous and highlights Lyokha as a criminal and Erik as an innocent victim, but beneath this initial response, this scene functions to establish the two men's roles within the film early on. When the scene is stripped down, Erik is indexed immediately as passive and weak on some level, while Lyokha is shown to be active and dominant. These characterizations pervade throughout the film, which establishes them early on with the audience. It is not that Schubert's music is inherently queer, but as "Winter Journey" plays in Erik's ears while Lyokha rips his headphones off and steals his phone, he assumes a passive role, in a sense submitting to Lyokha's dominance. The association with classical music as a genre marks him as queer, and in the scene's broader context, he is marked as weak.

One of the final scenes in the film follows a very similar trajectory, but the roles of each man by this point are much more clearly defined. After stealing an expensive necklace from Erik's friend Slava, during which they share a kiss, the two men run underneath a bridge. Up until this moment, their relationship has been characterized as homoerotic. Their shared kiss seemingly

confirms this in the previous scene, but as the two men talk under the bridge, this changes. Lyokha tells Erik that he is continuing on without him and asks Erik, "why the fuck [he is] looking at [him] like that?" "Like what?" Erik responds, "Like you're fucking in love. Are your faggots not enough for you?" Lyokha screams in his face (*Winter Journey* 1:26:05-1:26:39). This violent confrontation cements Lyokha's heterosexuality and masculinity as he embarks on a homophobic rant while simultaneously highlighting Erik's queerness as weak and negative. Erik is entirely passive in this scene, allowing Lyokha to run off with Slava's necklace, leaving him alone in the tunnel with nothing. Erik is a figure of decadence and queerness. Even as his voice elicits tears from Lyokha's eyes earlier in the film (*Winter Journey* 1:06:40-1:07:10), his inherent connection with high-culture and, thus, queerness is negative. He falls in love with Lyokha, the figure of really hardened masculinity and dominance, betraying his friends, only to be left behind in the end. This follows an unfortunate trajectory of queer infatuation with masculinity and heterosexuality in film and literature that marks queerness as decadent, lesser than, and inherently tragic. In the following scene, as Erik stumbles drunk through the streets, lies down on a cold corner, and presumably dies, another classical song plays in the background (*Winter Journey* 1:28:22-1:29:45). Even in death, Erik is marked as decadent. His queerness becomes tragic, leaving him alone in death as the heterosexual man triumphs in masculinity.

High art and culture become markers of queerness in both *Wings* and *Winter Journey* (2013), linking their central queer characters to culture as a way to index their sexuality and link them to a broader queer or homosexual culture. Each work offers a different view of these links to culture and art; one is positive and affirming, and another is negative and tragic. Yes, Kuzmin marks Vanya and Stroop as queer in much the same way that Lvova and Taramaev mark Erik as queer, but this queer indexing functions quite differently in each instance. Perhaps Kuzmin's own queerness is why *Wings* offers a more optimistic and positive view of homosexuality. In contrast, *Winter Journey* (2013) offers a negative view of homosexuality in connection with high art and culture that is decadent in nature. The film looks at queerness through the lens of dominant masculinity and heterosexuality. This view allows for the decadent queer character to die alone and drunk on the street left behind by his masculine heterosexual foil. Indeed, Lvova and Taramaev's film relies on the heterosexual idea of queerness as decadent, and thus they connect Erik with art and culture and create Lyokha as his heterosexual antithesis. Kuzmin, however, uses this same connection to culture and art to construct Vanya and Stroop as figures of queer love. These works offer two divergent understandings of queerness as it relates to art and culture, one inherently queer, the other a heterosexual imagining of queerness.

Dostoevsky's Underground Man

Sofia Ocherednaya | *University of Cambridge*

A Successful Case of an Overarching Theory

The negating nihilism of the 1840s generation promoting “a critical attitude to outworn, received ideas and to life in general” (Peace 136) became a productive power when reinforced in practical attempts to conquer the criticised inequalities of life. Similarly, Nikolay Dobrolyubov’s theoretical interest in education motivated Lev Tolstoy’s engagement in improving peasant education. In his *Notes from Underground* Dostoevsky, too, interacts with preceding concepts and demonstrates how ideas develop if re-examined from another perspective. Banished as a child of the “forties,” Dostoevsky writes *Notes from Underground* upon returning into the altered world of the sixties. In his 1864 novella Dostoevsky throws the idealists of the forties, including his own youthful self, overboard. Most evidently, however, he scathingly rejects Chernyshevsky’s theory of rational egoism. The following essay aims to explore how Dostoevsky’s hero, on a microlevel, represents a successful case of an overarching theory. Bakhtin’s analysis of the dialogization in Dostoevsky’s novella provides the necessary theoretical framework to account for the Underground Man’s opposition to Chernyshevsky. Although the Underground Man displays inconsistencies in his psychological mechanisms, all actions are rooted in his belief in evil human nature, ultimately rejecting rationality in favour of emotionality. While his relationship toward the other’s consciousness is made up of an internal polemic, the Underground Man’s self-con-

sciousness is also dialogized. What leads to an eternal fight against himself becomes the only mode of existence for the Underground Man: suffering intentionally just to exert his free will.

In *Problems in Dostoevsky’s Poetics* Bakhtin analyzes the dialogization in *Notes from Underground*. There is “not a single monologically firm, undissociated word,” as the hero’s speech breaks “under the influence of the anticipated words of another” (Bakhtin 227-228). The observation that the Underground Man engages in a polemic with “another” mirrors the development of thought in the 1860s, as Dostoevsky writes his 1864 novella in response to Chernyshevsky’s *What Is to Be Done?* (1863), who himself reacted to Turgenev’s *Fathers and Sons* (1862). Furthermore, these authors relied on intertextuality to develop their script. Dostoevsky’s Underground Man, for instance, often alludes to one of Chernyshevsky’s brightest symbols of a perfect future society, the Crystal Palace which, according to the Underground Man, encloses the individual and eliminates all possibility to exert free will. While the Palace’s deterministic and rational features are “wall-like”, the wall in *Notes from Underground* symbolizes the paradox of the Underground Man’s psychological mechanisms, as its protection feature is played out against the barrier it puts between the Underground Man and his expression of the self (Matlaw 167). On the one hand, the wall has similar deterministic qualities in both novels, the wall gains an additional psychological layer in *Notes from Underground*, as the wall now illustrates the degrad-

ing effects of a rationally calculated life instead of only being a representation of determinism. The metaphor of the wall thus demonstrates how Chernyshevsky’s concept is re-evaluated from the perspective of the Underground Man.

Reason and free will are central themes in *Notes from Underground*. Although human psychological inclinations, the Underground Man argues, have not yet been discovered in their complexity, he believes their discovery will prove that “reason alone will always be empty talk without any real importance” (Rozanov 140). As the Underground Man enjoys the so-called “tortures” Apollon inflicts on him, he further emphasizes his belief in the irrational evil inclinations of human beings. Wachtel argues that the Underground Man engages in degrading and masochistic actions which are rooted in his paradoxical attempts to find an outlet for his free will (Wachtel 140). In other words, the Underground Man would inflict self-sabotage solely for the purpose of exerting his personal right to do so.

On the one hand, the Underground Man defies all calculations. He prefers to act in incomprehensibly strange and irrational ways, attempting to prove that it is impossible to find a rational formula that could account for human nature. Arguing that the existence of laws of psychology or history would destroy the essence of humanity, reducing people to piano keys or organ stops, the Underground Man’s mere existence aims to defy Chernyshevsky’s overarching theory of rationality triumphing over emotionality. He further blames rationalism for leading human beings to subjugate their free will to predetermined laws. Inertia, “вытекающей из этих законов” (Dostoevsky 49), essentially renders any behaviour of these affected human beings

futile. The Underground Man argues that people would even create problems where there are none out of boredom, up to the point where they genuinely believe in their self-inflicted tragedy. “[И]нерция задавила” (Dostoevsky 58), the Underground Man continues to rant about Chernyshevsky’s ideal of society. Reducing rational egoism to mere concern for “одна капелька твоего собственного жиру” (Dostoevsky 54), the Underground Man also “rebels against the notions of utilitarian self-interest and perfection” (Jones 74). To uncover Russia’s social vices in 1860s literature suggests the unceasing need for political reform. While Chernyshevsky portrays the perfecting of political institutions in *What Is to Be Done?*, the permanent rebellious state of Dostoevsky’s Underground Man could never be satisfied with any political structure.

Moreover, according to the Underground Man, Chernyshevsky’s idealist model of humanity does not account for the evil in human nature. “[Ч]еловек мстит,” the Underground Man starts to explain, “потому что находит в этом справедливость” (Dostoevsky 59). To be vengeful presupposes a sense of morality, justifying the person’s act in the name of righteousness. Vengeance, however, the Underground Man argues, is an evil act to begin with. Taking revenge thus always comes “из злости” (Dostoevsky 59). Spitefully criticizing the ideal of rational utopians based on his alleged knowledge of human nature that he acquired through a seemingly profound observation of himself and of history, the Underground Man withdraws from the outside world. Pointing, for instance, to the refined cruelty of Cleopatra, the Underground Man, makes an argument against civilization itself.

On the other hand, the Underground Man’s be-

haviour is less impulsive than he wishes it to be. His actions, too, are calculated, as he subjugates them to his theory of evil human nature. His acts, Matlaw argues, are “calculated to antagonize the other participants and elicit their disdain” (Matlaw 162-163). When the Underground Man, for instance, presses money into Liza’s hand, he explains this deed of cruelty “была до того напускная, до того головная, нарочно подсочиненная, книжная” (Dostoevsky 178); it was not an impulse from the heart but came from his evil brain. Opposing Chernyshevsky’s theory, the Underground Man does evil things not because he does not know what his best interests are. Quite the contrary, he can never lose his sense of self-awareness; his suffering, “усиленно создано”, is a “сознательное погребение” (Dostoevsky 53). As self-awareness is a severe illness according to the Underground Man (Dostoevsky 47), he lives up to his self-identification as a sick man. However, being possessed by a concept of humanity and acting according to a set of beliefs defies the notion of free will just the same.

There seems to be no middle ground for the Underground Man; his personality follows the principle of an overarching, absolutist theory. The paradox of the Underground Man who defies a calculated theory to account for human nature, but is possessed by a set of beliefs himself, however, points to the limitations of absolutist thinking. Bakhtin argues that the inescapable dialogic opposition of the Underground Man’s extraordinary dependence upon the other’s consciousness and his extreme hostility toward it at the same time has narratological significance (Bakhtin 230). Not only does the Underground Man engage in a polemic with another, but his self-consciousness is also dialogized. “Либо герой, либо грязь” (Dostoevsky 102), he describes his per-


sonality which is based on extremes. The Underground Man finds himself in an eternal dialogue with himself – an endless cycle “where one reply begets another, which begets a third, and so on to infinity, and all of this without any forward motion” (Bakhtin 230). Notes capturing an “internally endless speech which can be mechanically cut off but cannot be organically completed” (Bakhtin 235) can thus only end with commenting on the tendency toward eternal endlessness.

Embodying the psychological dialectic by constructing “a prison from which there can be no escape” (Wachtel 140), the Underground Man hopelessly fights against himself. The “abrupt dialogic turnaround” (Bakhtin 228) after confessing “Я человек больной... Я злой человек” (Dostoevsky 43), as Bakhtin points out, replaces the initially plaintive tone with a more enraged tone, as if realizing that he does not seek any sympathy in another person. However, his belief system crushes in moments where he falls prey to societal pressures and betrays his primary social purpose of being an outsider. Although he intends to thrive in isolation from the outside world, he occasionally desires human interaction and decides, for instance, to visit a former classmate. Furthermore, he begins to display concern about his external appearance as he strives to improve his wardrobe before Liza’s arrival. At first, such inconsistencies of the Underground Man’s psychological mechanisms question the genuineness of his disdain for his social contacts. However, every social interaction turns out to be unsatisfying for the Underground Man, and thus, it only adds to his state of misery. Although he considers his old dressing gown a symbol of poverty, he wraps it around himself when Liza appears. Similarly, he decides to visit a former classmate, with

whom every interaction turns into a humiliation.

To conclude, overarching theories devour individuals living to a set of beliefs, especially when they are confronted by a society that does not correspond to the likes of their internal self. The paradox between the Underground Man’s self-analysis, self-comprehension, and his behaviour, which at times contradicts such analysis reflects the tension between individual supremacy and social stratification and questions the possibility of free will. The follower of a theory, possessed by its tenets, inevitably shows inconsistencies in his psychological mechanisms. In the case of the Underground Man, however, these inconsistencies cater to his desire of permanent rebellion and

support his stance against rationalism. While the masochistic practices he succumbs to are rooted in his attempts to exert free will, intentional suffering allows the Underground Man to live according to his belief in the evil nature of human beings. On a microlevel, the Underground Man embodies a philosophy that comprises a complete theoretical framework. As the personality of the Underground Man resembles the logic of an absolutist theory, Dostoevsky’s hero thus represents a successful case of an overarching idea. On the wider scale, the emergence of Dostoevsky’s novella demonstrates how overarching theories inspire other theories to arise. Thus, rather than demonstrating the failure of overarching theories, the novel of ideas is their product.



Writing the Kreutzer Sonata

Grace Clifford | *Columbia University*

Sonya transcribes by candlelight
another of her husband's works.
This one makes her flush—
with anger, shame, embarrassment,
the recognition of her role in this
stupendous man's life. She begs him
to recant—like Steisichorus in the end
changed his mind. Like Euripides thought
that Helen can only be good
if Helen never goes to Troy at all. Like her suffering
can't be forgiven unless she is good. Let
Pozdnyshev's wife wake up in Egypt and realize
she's done nothing wrong. Sonya knows
a woman can only be loved if she's done
nothing wrong.

It's not begging. Not how Helen spoke
to Steisichorus, at any rate—that ancient
woman speaking not from below, as a suppliant,
but above, a voice from the clouds,
apotheosized. Here
is where the Palinode fails. Steisichorus
won't take it back. Helen stays in Troy,
the blame stays Helen's. She throws the page into the fire,
ashes blow across the room and rain down
on her like snow.

Finding “Losian” in Harbin

Kenneth Wang | *UC Berkeley*

Understanding the Harbin Russian Identity through Interactions between Russian Refugees and Chinese Settlers in Harbin from 1898 to 1931

Introduction

From the initial establishment of the city of Harbin in 1898 all the way to the late-1980s, both Russians and Chinese living in the city of Harbin did not know the meaning or origin of their city's name. Both groups believed that the name of the city originated from the other group's language. Harbin Russians believed the name to mean “happy grave” in Chinese, despite not having even a similar-sounding phrase in Chinese with this meaning (Gamsa 82-83). Chinese inhabitants, most of whom had migrated there for economic reasons, were also unaware of the meaning of the name, with some believing the “happy grave” interpretation of the name to be Russian in origin. The misinterpretations from both Chinese and Russian inhabitants regarding the origins of the name “Harbin” – which likely originates from a Manchu word for “a place for drying nets in the sun” (Carter 16) – offers a window into the nature of this city as a foreign “hometown” for Russians and Chinese alike. Moreover, the almost comic misunderstanding, which is likely a result of a lack of in-depth communication and exchange, shows how limited the interactions were between the two groups.

During the period of 1898 to 1917, this initially rural settlement located in Manchuria quickly

grew into a booming city due to the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway, Tsarist Russia's first imperialist expansion into China. The Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) was meant to connect the Trans-Siberian Railway to Vladivostok, a city located in the Russian Far East, and the administration overseeing this construction project was headquartered at Harbin (Moustafine 144). Initial Russian migrants to Harbin primarily sought the economic opportunities that the CER provided. As such most of these “first generation” migrants that worked as builders and employees of the CER did not believe they would stay in Harbin for very long. Following the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, a second wave of White Russians (in opposition to the Red Bolshevik Russians that triumphed in the 1917 revolution) arrived in Harbin as political refugees. As thus, Harbin Russians, or *kharbintsy*, primarily consisted of the smaller subset of first-generation Russian migrants that decided to stay in Harbin and the White Russian émigrés who were forced to live in Harbin due to the Soviet control of their Russian homeland (Bakich, “Émigré Identity” 53).

This paper focuses on this group of Harbin Russians who define their émigré identity around Harbin, even long after leaving Harbin due to the Manchukuo puppet-state occupation by the Japanese of Manchuria, the eventual transfer of the CER (and by proxy, the political control of Harbin) from Soviet Russia to imperial Japan in 1931, and the later transfer of Harbin to a communist Chinese government in 1946 (Moustafine 142). This “post-Harbin” Harbin Russian iden-

tity is evidenced by the various Harbin alumni associations created overseas to remember their time in Harbin, including the 1952 establishment of the Association of Former Residents in China in Israel and the 1953 formation of the Association of the Alumni of the CER Harbin Commercial Schools in San Francisco. Other overseas Harbin Russian associations, such as the Association of Harbin YMCA Alumni and the Association of the Harbin Polytechnic Alumni in Sydney, started their own journals to publicize articles, memoirs, poems, and other writings to remember and cement their identity as Harbin Russians (Bakich, “Émigré Identity” 67-69).

From these nostalgic accounts, an initial narrative emerges regarding the inhabitation of Harbin Russians from 1898 to 1931: the multicultural city of Harbin was an idealistic example of Sino-Russian cooperation in developing the relative “wilderness” of Manchuria. However, this heartwarming narrative is contradicted by historical evidence of general insularity between the Russian and Chinese ethnic groups. Mark Gamsa and Olga Bakich, leading scholars regarding the Sino-Russian history of Harbin, repudiate this narrative and instead argue that the two groups had a limited range of interactions, some of which were characterized by their hostility to each other, and that only a minority of Harbin Russian residents appreciated the multicultural nature of Harbin. Harbin Russians generally sought to insulate themselves from most Chinese influences and did not stay in Harbin for a particularly long time, with essentially none of the modern-day Russian residents in Harbin originating from the early 1900s Russian émigrés. As such, an open question remains regarding how and why the Harbin Russian identity persisted, given that the simplistic and convenient narrative of multi-

cultural cooperation and flourishing is largely a result of revisionist history and that Harbin seemed to be an unwanted, foreign, and temporary stop in the migration of the Kharbintsy.

This paper seeks to understand the various factors that explain why the Harbin Russian identity persisted by analyzing the limited daily interactions that led to positive cultural exchange in Harbin as well as the political statuses and nationalist ideals held by Russian émigrés. In analyzing the daily interactions between Chinese and Russian groups, this paper focuses on the development of Sino-Russian Pidgin language in Harbin and Harbin-unique experiences in food, leisure, and festivities, especially among the Harbin youth. Thus, this paper will demonstrate the potential for a “middle ground” of cross-cultural exchange between full insularity and multicultural cooperation as a partial explanation for the unique Harbin Russian identity alongside the general explanation of the Harbin Russian identity resulting constant political persecution and classifying of émigrés by various states as they fled the Soviet Union from a desire to return to a Russian homeland.

Historical Background of Manchuria and the CER

The city of Harbin is located within the Heilongjiang (“Black Dragon River”) province of northeastern China. Heilongjiang (the Han Chinese word) is derived from the Manchu name, “Sahalian Ula,” for the Amur River which forms the border between China and Russia. The northeastern region of Manchuria was the historical home of the reigning Manchurian-originated Qing Dynasty. As the homeland of the Manchu emperors, Manchuria was both historical-

ly and politically significant, and as thus there was a general ban of Han Chinese settlers in Manchuria from 1668 to 1878. Despite this significance, due to its relative distance from the rest of China, Manchuria was ceded in 1860 to Russia and, to counter Russian aggression, the ban of Han Chinese settlement was lifted (Gamsa 26-28). As such, by the time the Russian Chinese Eastern Railway came to Manchuria, Han Chinese migrants began to populate Manchuria (even before the lifting of the ban) and were formed a large majority of the populace, outnumbering the Manchu bannerman¹.

The Chinese Eastern Railway, which began construction in 1898, was a part of tsarist Russia’s first imperialist ventures in China. From a “History of the Chinese Eastern Railway”, written in 1929 from a Chinese historian named Liang Chia-Pin, the CER was constructed as a result of a secret treaty negotiated between China and Russia to construct the CER through Manchuria as an extension of the Trans-Siberian Railway, originating from Vladivostok. In exchange for the sole ownership and construction of the railway, China would receive a secret alliance in the case of “further Japanese aggression” (Chia-Pin 1-4). The construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway presented an enormous economic opportunity for both Chinese and Russian migrants alike, and with Harbin being the headquarters of the administration for the project, Harbin naturally attracted Russians,

¹ The Manchurian people used a caste system in their military (that formed the basis for their social structure) known as the “Eight Banners”. Thus, to the Han Chinese and the Manchu themselves, Manchu people were actually known as *qiren*, or “bannerman” (Gamsa, *Harbin: A Cross-Cultural Biography* 81).

Han Chinese, and the various different ethnic groups living on either side of the Amur river.

Social Groups in Harbin and their Reasons for Migration

Although this paper primarily focuses on the White Russian émigré and Han Chinese migrant worker groups as the main two groups due to forming the majority of the population, special attention will be paid towards the various other ethnic groups that made up Harbin’s population as well as the non-ethnic differences within the “Russian” and “Chinese” groups, which were broken up even further based on religious, political, and “jiaxiang” (“hometown” in Mandarin Chinese) distinctions. In Mark Gamsa’s *Harbin: A Cross-Cultural Biography*, his section on ethnic groups within Harbin divides the ethnic groups into “Chinese/Manchurian side” and the groups originating from the “Russian side,” complicated by the fact that various groups lived on the borders of Inner Mongolia, Russia, and China. For example, the Orochen, Hezhe, and Giliak ethnic groups that lived in various parts of Manchuria alongside the Manchu ethnic groups, were split up by the Russian annexation of Manchuria, as the Hezhe group was split along the new border and the Orochen group, now under imperial Russian control, began to adopt “Russian clothing and food along with Russian names” (Gamsa 17). The difficulty that arises from trying to classify just these indigenous groups using the binary simplification of “Chinese vs Russian” should demonstrate that this simplification does not do justice to the true representation of ethnic groups within Manchuria and Harbin in general. Rather, this binary simplification and focus on Han Chinese migrants and Russian émigrés, common in scholarship surround-

ing Harbin, is indicative of the majority that these populations presented in Harbin and the greater amount of historical record surrounding the daily lives of these two majority groups.

In addition to the indigenous Manchurian groups that were already there, there also existed various other ethnic groups that migrated to Harbin. Koreans arrived to Manchuria in the 1860s due to various floods in northern Korea, while Buryat Mongols migrated to Manchuria due to the Bolsheviks driving them out of their native Siberia after 1917. Russian Cossacks, a caste within the tsarist empire system, were moved to Manchuria to help the tsarist colonization efforts. Ukrainian migration to Harbin was partially motivated by Ukrainian nationalists seeking an identity outside of the Russian empire (Gamsa 19-22).

In fact, to drive workers and settlers from the Russian empire to Manchuria (and to Harbin in particular), ethnic minorities throughout the Russian empire were intentionally targeted by Tsarist officials. As Moustafine explains in “Russians from China: Migrations and Identity”:

Keen to attract entrepreneurs and private investors to drive the rapid economic development of Manchuria, the St Petersburg authorities deliberately created an environment of tolerance, equal opportunity and actively encouraged minorities of the Tsarist Empire to come and live there. Settlers of various cultures and religions flocked there in search of a better life, among them Jews, Poles, Tatars, Georgians, Armenians and Ukrainians. (145)

Alongside the economic opportunity provided by the CER, these ethnic groups sought to migrate to Harbin to escape political suppression. Other

ethnic groups that were part of the tsarist Russian empire but distinguished themselves from ethnic Russians include Lithuanians, Latvians, and Baltic Germans. Furthermore, religious differences provided further motivation for Russian migration to Harbin. For instance, the Old Believers, a sect that resulted from the schism between Russian Christian that accepted the reforms of 1654 and the Old Believers (otherwise termed as *raskol'niki*), sought religious refugee in the Far East, eventually migrating to Harbin. In fact, a further division within the “Russian” ethnic group involved the various sectarian distinctions, including “Russian Orthodox, Polish Roman Catholics, and German Lutherans” (Gamsa 21).

Among the outwardly “monolithic” Han Chinese group, there were further “jiaxiang” or hometown distinctions that paralleled the heterogeneous religious identities among the “Russians”. While most Han Chinese migrants came from the Shandong and Hebei provinces, “Harbin also had people from Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Hubei, and Guangdong” (Gamsa 21). Although most Han Chinese migrants moved to Harbin for economic opportunity, the differences in hometowns contributed to further social group divisions, as different hometowns had their own unique dialects, food staples and unique dishes, and generally distinguished social circles. This concept of hometown identity persists till today among Han Chinese as the main form of social identity, showcasing the further heterogeneity of the Chinese migrant workers (Joniak-Lüthi 2-4). Since most of the Chinese migrant workers moved to Harbin for economic reasons and were not native to the Manchurian lands, the insistence on forming social circles within their own hometowns likely became stronger out of homesickness.

The general migration reason for the first wave of ethnic Russians (before the 1917 revolution) consisted of taking advantage of the economic opportunity by either working directly on the Chinese Eastern Railway or by providing commerce and other auxiliary services to the rapidly growing town of Harbin. In 1917, the Bolshevik Revolution resulted in the creation of the second wave of Harbin Russians, which would form the majority of Harbin Russians. These White Russians ranged from ordinary Russian citizens to former officers and aristocrats (Moustafine 146-147). Their motivation for migrating to Harbin primarily consisted of seeking political refugee in a place that resembled their Russian home. This concept of “reconstructing Russia” while being away from the Russian homeland would later contribute to the focus on Harbin in the Harbin Russian identity.

Daily Life

The daily interactions between Harbin Russians and the Han Chinese workers were limited. The city of Harbin was divided into four main sections, with one part of town known as “Fujiadian,” which was essentially a segregated Chinese part of town. In general, the residential areas of the various ethnic groups in Harbin were largely segregated, and interactions between the two majority cultures were primarily in relation to commerce and trade activities. This analysis will focus on three main aspects of the limited interactions between Russians and Chinese in Harbin: the development of the Harbin Sino-Russian Pidgin language, the cultural exchange of food staples and dishes, and the celebrations and festivities shared by all identities in Harbin.

The Harbin Sino-Russian Pidgin (SRP) language

both demonstrates the level of insularity within Harbin as well as the unique Harbin culture that left its imprint on both Chinese and Russians alike. Russians generally refused to learn Chinese while in Harbin, as the Russian control of Harbin led to a general expectation that Chinese people would learn Russian in their encounters (Gamsa 79). SRP developed out of pragmatism, as the relatively few encounters in commerce or trade between Chinese and Russians required some level of understanding. As such, SRP was viewed as either “chattering in Chinese” or “speaking in Russian,” with SRP adopting phrases from both and simplifying them based on the opposing perspective. For example, one of the most common phrases in SRP known by most Russians was *fanza*, which is based on the word for “house” (*fanzi*) in Chinese. This word was used in “The Refugee,” a poem by the Russian Leonid Eschin, who wished for “*fanza, kurma, and chi fan*,” SRP words that meant “shelter, clothing, and food” (Gamsa 241). *Fanza* was also adapted to be used in a Russian prisoner song, where the original song in Russian was altered to include the SRP phrases as both Russian and Chinese prisoners sang it (Bakich, “Did You Speak Harbin Sino-Russian?” 33). SRP’s development generally reflected the perspective that each side had of the other, with *manza* being the preferred (and later derogatory) word Russians used to refer to all Chinese people, even though this word is based on the term for the Manchu ethnic group. In general, SRP both represented an identity trace unique to Harbin Russian émigrés and demonstrated the limited exposure and unwillingness by the majority of Harbin Russians to engage in cross-cultural learning beyond the pragmatic necessities.

After establishing their staples within the Har-

bin regions, both Russians and Chinese inhabitants began to try and borrow different foods from the other culture. The Russian demand for bread as a main staple led to the word *khleb* being commonplace among Chinese residents. In Xiao Hong's *Market Street: A Chinese Woman in Harbin*, a semi-autobiographical novel detailing a Chinese woman's perspective of Harbin in the early-1930s, the few Russian words referred to by the main character include a mention of eating "black *khleb* and salt" for dinner. In addition, various dishes of Sino-Russian creation exist till today as unique cultural artifacts of Harbin, including *guobaorou*, which is a sweet and sour potato-starch fried pork dish created by a Chinese chef to better fit Russian appetites, as well as *hongchang*, which translates to "red sausages" (Wang). Harbin Russian journals write about remembering *bingtanghulu*, or "sugared frozen apples," as well as eating *jiaozi* and other Chinese dishes at Chinese restaurants (Gamsa 128). While Russian restaurants didn't serve Chinese food and Russian families often told their children not to eat Chinese food, a common pattern across young Harbin Russian memoirs is that they would discreetly buy Chinese food from street vendors and restaurants despite cultural barriers imposed by their parents. In other words, much of the insularity between cultures was put in place by the older generation of Harbin Russians, who sought to preserve their distinctly non-Chinese heritage in this multicultural city, while the younger generation (with much less of an impression of their old Russian homeland) broke this barrier and engaged in cross-cultural contact.

This pattern of Russian Harbin youth breaking the cultural barriers between the Russian and Chinese sides of the city repeats itself when

looking at festivities and leisure activities. In Xiao Hong's *Market Street*, the main character describes Russian and Chinese youth celebrating both the Western and the Chinese New Year. Various Russian writers, primarily youth, remembered being curious about Chinese festivals and wondering about the parallels between the Russian *Radonitsa* and the Chinese *Qingmingjie*, which both served as remembrances of the dead (Gamsa 133-134). During the winter, Hong describes another scene in which youth from multiple cultures engage in the same activity: ice skating. As Hong writes:

After we saw him out, we went over to take a walk on the frozen pond at the park. Children were ice-skating when we arrived – Japanese children, Russian children, Chinese children.

Other leisure activities that involved both cultures included mahjong, sports, attending concerts, circus performances, and horse races. Particular examples of cultural cross-over include both Chinese and Russian stable owners as well as a combined circus performance of Russian and Chinese acrobats (Gamsa 133-134). Despite the general insularity and barrier between the two cultures, the multicultural nature of this "migrant city" shines through when inspecting the ways in which "harbinsty" had fun.

There are multiple conclusions to be drawn regarding the impact of cross-cultural interactions on the Harbin Russian identity formation. While the Russian and Chinese halves of the city were geographically and linguistically separated, the various limited points of contact between the two cultures clearly left a distinct mark on both sides of the exchange. In particular, the ones who were most likely to cross this cultur-

al barrier were the Harbin youth. The Russian Harbin youth, who were also the ones who attended the Harbin Polytechnic and various CER schools, would go on to emigrate out of Harbin, create the overseas alumni associations, and write and publicize various journals and memoirs with their recollections of their past Harbin days. As such, while the Harbin Russian identity didn't solely survive because of open interaction with the Chinese residents, the few positive aspects and unique cultural exchanges in the form of SRP, food, and leisure activities meant that the Harbin Russian émigrés had something to reference as evidence for their identity. In addition, this paper hypothesizes that this effect was magnified because many of the Harbin Russian émigrés that claimed such a strong tie to Harbin were part of the younger generation of Harbin Russians. This younger generation didn't have many memories of the Russian homeland and were more willing to cross cultural lines than their parents, resulting in a stronger tie to Harbin as their childhood hometown.

Political Status and Russia Reconstructionism

While the daily interactions of cultural exchange help to explain the cultural aspect of the Harbin Russian émigré identity, the political status and aspirations of Harbin Russians to reconstruct tsarist Russia also played a big role in cementing the Harbin Russian identity. According to Olga Bakich's "Émigré Identity: The Case of Harbin", the White Russians who arrived in Harbin after 1917 faced persistent political persecution from multiple sides. *Kharbintsy* became a separate national category that divided Harbin Russians from Soviet Russians. Harbin Russians were persecuted (through executions and camps)

in the USSR, with accusations that they were Japanese spies from Manchuria. Furthermore, Harbin Russians could only receive "surrogate passports" that distinguished their identity from other Russians, preventing many of them from actualizing their goal of returning to the Russian homeland. Harbin Russians experienced increasing levels of persecution and denial of citizenship under Soviet control in the 1920s, the 1930s occupation by the Japanese, followed by the Soviet takeover of Harbin in 1945 and the consecutive transfer of Harbin to Chinese control (56-67). In all these cases, the Harbin Russians were forced to wear their identity as *kharbintsy* émigrés and suffered oppression at the hands of the reigning government. One of the reasons why the Harbin Russian identity survived was because of the political identity that various governments imposed upon the Harbin Russians through the *kharbintsy* label, forcing them to emigrate from their homeland and from Harbin.


As such, Harbin, a planned city with distinct Russian architecture, represented the last remainder of the tsarist Russian empire. As the émigré hope of returning to the homeland was further and further removed from reality, the Harbin Russians shifted towards reconstructing their Russian homeland. Mikhail Shmeisser, a Harbin Russian poet, writes that "When the most Russian image of Harbin / Reconciles us to the bitter exile." (Bakich, "Émigré Identity: The Case of Harbin." 59). Shmeisser shows that the city remained quintessential to the émigré identity because Harbin, in its simulation of "home", became the closest thing to home the émigrés could look forward to.

Conclusion

The Harbin Russian émigré identity, as it sur-

vives in the modern era through the assorted memoirs and journals, is uniquely identifiable from cultural exchange with the Harbin Chinese workers through the shared food, SRP language, and leisure activities. Albeit limited, these interactions and their lasting impact on the Harbin Russian identity were amplified by the fact that the younger generations were more willing to engage with the other culture and create those unique cultural experiences. After all the Harbin Russians left Harbin, this identity survived because of the consistent political labeling of them as *kharbintsy* and the remembrances of Harbin as their last encounter with tsarist Russia.

These nuanced aspects to the Harbin Russian émigré identity can best be summarized by the modern-day émigré practice of calling each other *losian* (Gamsa 234). *Losian* is the SRP word for the Chinese word of *laoxiang*, which is a Mandarin phrase used across all of China to refer to someone who is from your hometown. In this sense, the Harbin Russian émigré identity is perfectly encapsulated by the gentle impact that coexistence with Harbin Chinese had upon their language as well as the one shared commonality among all Harbin Russians: their hometown of Harbin.



The Sakhalin Korean Migrant Experience

Sam Heimowitz | *Yale University*

Generational Privilege, Repatriation, and Media Representations

Beginning on November 27th, 2021, approximately 260 Sakhalin Koreans began arriving in their ancestral homeland, South Korea, according to an article published by *The Korea Herald*,¹ an English-language daily newspaper published in Seoul (Ahn). Sakhalin Koreans are described as Russian nationals of Korean descent living in Sakhalin, the largest island of the Japanese archipelago, administered as part of the Russian Sakhalin Oblast in the Russian Far East. Most Sakhalin Koreans can trace their lineage and roots back to migration during the latter half of the 1930s. Initially brought over as forced labor migrants and controlled under Japanese imperial administration, many also experienced the Soviet takeover at the end of World War II, and only now have they been able to reclaim their Korean citizenship and move back to their homeland. Within this narrative of historical displacement, it has been difficult for Sakhalin Koreans to navigate their fractured identity as ethnic Koreans living in a Japanese—and now Russian—territory. In this paper, I will show that two journalists, one in a *New York Times* article, rife with personal and emotional stories and another in a short *Yonhap News*² article, to

¹ The Korea Herald is an English-language daily newspaper published in Seoul, South Korea, founded in 1953. It draws from both domestic and international news agencies.

² Yonhap News Agency is a Seoul-based news agency founded in 1980.

of precarity, with repatriation only available to a select few. While repatriation is only available to a privileged subset of ethnic Koreans, through a brief comparison with a Russia-based article, however, I will argue that this viewpoint stereotypes all migrants as experiencing the same predicament, minimizing the voices of the younger generations of ethnic Koreans in Sakhalin.

Ayşe Parla, a professor of anthropology at Boston University, provides a useful framework with which to discuss an aspect of the Sakhalin Korean experience. In her research on Bulgarian migrants from Bulgaria into Turkey after the collapse of the Soviet Union, she explains how different types of hope motivate migration back to one's homeland—in her research, Bulgarian-Turks wishing to return to Turkey in the decades following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Parla argues that while a general sense of hope is certainly a motivating factor for Bulgarian-Turk migrant perseverance and persistence in the complicated migration and repatriation process, it is also accompanied by a broader migratory regime that “selects, rewards, discriminates, and deports according to a rigid hierarchy of belonging that is based on ethnic and religious kinship,” giving a form of preferential treatment to “soydaş,” or racial kin (Parla 22, 44). A rigid hierarchy of this sort also exists in Sakhalin. However, it is not based on religious or ethnic kinship, and does not afford special privileges and treatment to those of certain ethnic backgrounds. Rather, it is constructed on the lines of generational distinction—only first-generation Sakhalin Korean migrants, likely those who were

brought over as forced laborers by the Japanese, along with their spouses and one dependent, are currently allowed to return (Troianovski). Most of these first-generation Sakhalin Koreans are in their late 80s, if not in their 90s already (Kamalakaran). In other words, a majority of Sakhalin Koreans do not actually qualify for repatriation, especially those of younger generations, leaving them in a state of perpetual limbo. Instead of ethnic or religious privilege, this is perhaps best called a “generational privilege.” This type of quasi-privileged migration embodies a sense of precarity, in which the migration process is shrouded with uncertainty, unpredictability, and insecurity (Parla 104).³ In order to explain more thoroughly how Sakhalin Korean migrants’ hope for repatriation can be described in similar terms to Parla’s concept of “precarious hope,” it is necessary to provide some historical context. The southern half of Sakhalin was under Japanese rule starting at the end of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, and was returned to the Soviet Union in 1945. After the Soviet capture of Sakhalin at the end of World War II, a very large number of people were left stranded on the island who were neither Japanese or Russian—these were ethnic Koreans that had been forcibly resettled to Sakhalin during the War (Kamalakaran). These ethnic Korean residents of Sakhalin were suddenly subsumed by the Soviet Union having lived just previously as laborers for Japan.⁴ In his article “What’s

³ There is a difference here, though, that is worth noting. The hope held by the Sakhalin Koreans cannot easily be characterized through expectation and entitlement, as is the case for *soydaş* in Parla’s work (see pg. 175). While the older generation is privileged, they do not necessarily expect an easy repatriation process.

⁴ Madeleine Reeves (2014) depicts a similar predicament for Tajik nationals living in an Uzbek exclave surrounded on all sides by Kyr-

in a Name? For the Koreans of Sakhalin, an Anguished History,” Anton Troianovski calls this predicament “statelessness”: while ethnic Japanese were allowed to return to Japan, “many Koreans were left behind and became stateless residents of the Soviet Union” (Troianovski). They were not Japanese, they were not Russian, and yet they were still noy fully Korean, either, having been stranded in Soviet land.

After years of advocacy work, and despite Russia and South Korea having eventually established diplomatic ties in the post-Soviet era, repatriation did and still does not apply to everyone with ethnic and ancestral ties to the Korean peninsula. Although it was not solely first-generation Koreans in Sakhalin who experienced Japanese imperial control and statelessness after the Soviet takeover, it is only this group that can enjoy the right to repatriation. Even with this generational privilege, Troianovski describes that the line at the South Korean Consulate in the Korean Cultural Center continues to grow as more and more Sakhalin Koreans seek information and ask about the possibility of leaving Sakhalin, in spite of the rigidity of the qualifications required.

One of Troianovski’s interviewees explains that “there will be more broken families” than before, as decisions of who gets to leave Sakhalin creates fighting within families—siblings and other dependents must decide who will return with an elderly parent to the “homeland” (Troianovski). Another interviewee recounted that families began having “funerals of the living” as they said farewell to the thousands of elderly first-generation Sakhalin Koreans who were allowed to repatriate (Troianovski). For the gyz territory—akin to the ethnic Japanese living in Russian territory having been controlled by the Japanese.

younger generations of Sakhalin Koreans, this creates an air of precarity: they live in a state of insecurity, uncertain of whether they will be allowed to return. And for those first-generation Sakhalin Koreans, even while more and more migrants are being approved for return to South Korea, they cannot predict whether the consulate will approve their repatriation application.

Yet, a different perspective on Sakhalin Korean identity and the wish to return home emerges in a Russian perspective, one that embodies less “precarious hope” as it does multiethnic identity, akin to Parla’s discussion of *soydaş* in Turkey. In Ajay Kamalakaran’s “Sakhalin’s Koreans: Russians at Heart” printed in *Russia Beyond*,⁵ the situation does not sound as alarmingly dire as in Troianovski’s piece for the *New York Times*. Even from the title alone, it is clear that the narrative is different—it posits Sakhalin Koreans as anything but Korean, as having embraced a Russian identity, as a “community that has assimilated into Russian society” (Kamalakaran). One of the interviewees in this article, a student of Sakhalin State University claimed that “the only thing Korean about them is their blood... [they] have a totally Russian mentality” (Kamalakaran). Kamalakaran recounts that second- and third-generation Sakhalin Koreans have fully embraced a “common identity, distinct from an inherent Koreanness,” and also distinct from fully Russianness—a multiethnic “Sakhaliner,”

⁵ *Russia Beyond*, launched in 2007, is a subsidiary of the *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, a newspaper published by the Government of Russia. I am wary to believe everything that they report on as it has been accused of being state-run biased propaganda by British and US news outlets, but this article relied primarily on interviews and on-the-ground firsthand experiences, so I am inclined to believe it is not factually incorrect.

as one young Sakhalin Korean described herself. Put another way, these Koreans, if having not fully assimilated into Russian society and culture, have found themselves most comfortable occupying a multiethnic spatiality, and identifying in the in-between space between full Korean and full Russian. This description evidently does not depict Sakhalin Koreans as living in a constant precarious state, full of insecurity—moreover, these younger generations of ethnic Koreans do not appear to be thinking about migration at all.

In Parla’s ethnography, “*soydaş*” is an endonym describing racial and ethnic Turkish kin who lived in Bulgaria during the Soviet era and who are now seeking repatriation to and citizenship in Turkey (Parla 44). While not explicitly related to migration, the term “Sakhaliner” may better describe the younger generation of ethnic Korean inhabitants of Sakhalin than “Sakhalin Koreans,” as non-Korean and non-Russian hybrid identity. I emphasize younger generations, as those who are given repatriation rights and those who are actively seeking repatriation to South Korea are—or seem to be—first-generation ethnic Koreans, or entirely composed of the older generation. This is somewhat in opposition to the *soydaş* occupying a privileged position in the migration process, in that those who have *not* embodied a hybrid identity in Sakhalin are actually those being afforded the privileged migration to Korea. Nonetheless, Kamalakaran’s article, while not as current as Troianovska’s albeit just as relevant to the conversation, is in stark contrast to Troianovska’s (both young and old) interviewees’ descriptions of broken families, funerals of the living, family in-fighting, and an overwhelmingly strong wish to return to Korea—these Sakhaliners are content with their situation and apparently do not seek repatriation.

Kamalakaran's article's depiction of the Sakhalin Korean experience is also in stark contrast to what the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs has publicly released. In a public statement given to *Yonhap News*, a South Korean publication, the Ministry said that "[they] hope the return of Sakhalin Koreans... [will] somewhat heal wounds from the heart-wrenching history" (Kim). This heart-wrenching history refers to their continual displacement from their ethnic homeland, alluding to their persistent stateless identity. The Ministry has also promised to provide services to assist in the repatriation process once in Korea, seeking to "help heal their pain from the dark history" (Kim). The language the Ministry used and the language which was published in South Korean national newspapers to characterize the migrant experience is somber in tone—it operates under the assumption that repatriation is a desire for all Sakhalin Koreans. In Kamalakaran's article, this does not seem to be the case for all generations of ethnic Koreans in Sakhalin, and the situation is not as grave or as serious—with festering wounds and a sorrowful atmosphere—as the western and native Korean news make it seem.

Thus, Troianovska and the press coming out of South Korea predicate their narratives on an assumed picture of collective trauma and a "wound [that] is being opened up again" (Troianovs-

ki). However, the Russian article assumes that Sakhalin Koreans have wholeheartedly embraced multiethnicity in Sakhalin, having formed a sense of belonging to somewhere that is not Korea. These articles are only a few among many and obviously do not represent the entirety of public opinion among Koreans, Russians, and ethnic Koreans living in Sakhalin. Yet, it is worth noting that these types of totalizing narratives which characterize the entirety of a population, while likely unintentionally, do marginalize voices of contrast. Indeed, the older generations of Sakhalin Koreans do live in a state of precarity, harboring hope for repatriation, and those who wish to repatriate with them do as well—especially the single dependent who is allowed to come with the first-generation migrant and their spouse. It is worth noting that Troianovska does touch on the pre-established Sakhaliner community relatively implicitly in one sentence in his article, writing that early first-generation Sakhalin Koreans "often [leave] the family they had formed in Russia behind" in the process of migration. However, it is in this single line that he alludes to the Sakhaliner community that was created in Sakhalin in the postwar era. It is, of course, unfeasible to expect journalists to analyze every aspect of migration out of Sakhalin—yet, these articles do in fact buy into the greater tropes of lumping all migrant experiences into one, diminishing voices of contrast.

Russian Identity: A Collection of Interpretive Poems

Eva Nemirovsky | *UC Davis*

The Knights of the Mortar

Laughter dances through the forest winds:

Blazing, brazen white, his blinding pride's astride an
Alabaster stallion
In pearl plate
With a marble lance in a vice like grip;
He plucks wandering boys for his mistress in the light of Bright Day.

Cries wail through the autumn leaves:

Drunken burgundy, her anger blazes viciously upon the back of a
Crimson horse,
Encased in garnet splint,
Brandishing a rose sword, thorns digging into her bloody grasp;
She steals little girls away at the end of the day in the Red Sun.

Songs whistle through the night air:

Weary darkness mounts the nightmare—
Onyx mare—
Weighed down by spinel mail,
Hefting a delicate obsidian spear,
Collects the stragglers the others left behind in the Black Night.

Mariners

The honest Sea is a merrier place for those willing to drown.
Their ghosts bubble to the surface for sweet Persephone
But they are ungrateful, lashing out at the queen of the dead,
floating there, amidst their ship's debris
And so are left to dragons to be their cannon fodder
Though, really, they didn't deserve it.

The beginning is anchored;
It's the end that can yet be explored.

They roam listless, passionless:
Ghosts that float betwixt lives—
An opportunistic tragedy: Icarus laughed as he fell
Killed by his yearning for more,
Burning as he plummeted towards the ocean floor,
But at least he was happy.
At least he'll find his place amongst the cannonballs,
The monsters and monstrosities,
The warped miracles.

Moscow

A place I only see in my dreams, I am always hitting my head on the memory of it:
Of the snow,
Of the apartment,
Of the desperate hugs and comforting teas,
Of games played and long forgotten,
Of teddy bears won and left behind.

A place of nightmares to one,
A place of wonders to some,
Moscow, your candy-drop spires and red square elude me,
Yet I feel as if I have known them always,
Through the laughter of agates and towering hugs of estranged family
I know it all.

So much history is written in your streets,
Like veins,
So much history written in my veins,
You echo through me.

Peter: Journey into Madness

The new air of these crisp winter winds is a balm to my aching soul,
And as I walk the streets of this urban necropolis
I feel at home, peace.

The stale smell of beer and week-old pastries grate on my too few nerves
And I hear voices on the wind, calling to me
I no longer feel safe.

The whistling cacophony of desperate cries on the breeze ring out in my ears today,
And did you know this city was built on bones?
I've been invited to join.

I am dancing with the reapers and the builders beneath the streets, until I drop,
For I've quite forgotten what it was that worried me,
I feel at home, peace.

And so imprisoned, so forgotten.


Duel

“On Guard!” Cries the Romantic Man,
But the Ridiculous Man is louder, giving double
For every doubloon he gets
The Romantic gets 4 rubels,
For every girl the Romantic traps,
The Ridiculous man loses 2.

“On Guard!!” Cries the Ridiculous Man—
This is his 26th duel—
So loud the Romantic's eardrums burst!
Louder than a gunshot he cried,
Quieter than a feather he died,
And in his funeral, only, he lacked.

Bright Pool Day

Katharina Hass | UC Berkeley



Let it All Burn: IC3PEAK and the Aesthetics of Protest in Putin's Russia

Anna Tseselsky | UC Berkeley



Fig. 1 (Source: "Death No More")

IC3PEAK: Echoes of Actionism?



Fig. 2 (Source: Radio Free Europe)

Totalling nearly 60 million views, the music video to *Смерти Больше Нет/Death No More* is by far IC3PEAK's most watched and politically charged composition. In less than a week after its publication in 2018, the video would amass over seven million views, attracting both resounding praise and harsh criticism, and eventually would be attributed as the reason their concerts

began to be shut down by Russian authorities (Mikhalkov 2018). Even a cursory viewing of the video gives a good sense as to why it became embroiled in controversy. The clip begins with the aforementioned scene of Nastya standing at the steps of the Russian White House, preparing to self-immolate. This act alone, accompanied by the lyrics, "I pour kerosene into my eyes. Let it all burn. Let it all burn. All of Russia is watching me. Let it all burn. Let it all burn," is incendiary, literally and figuratively (Kostylev and Kreslina 2018). The image of the Russian White House on fire would become the most recognizable visual representation of the 1993 constitutional crisis, in which a power struggle between Boris Yeltsin and the Russian parliament resulted in Yeltsin authorizing the storming and shelling of the Parliament building (Figure 2) (Wood 27). As such, the clip immediately begins by poking at a sore spot in recent Russian political memory. Moreover, the act of publicly setting oneself on fire as an act of protest has an equally contentious history behind it, recalling the wave of self-immolations that would serve as the catalysts to the Arab Spring, particularly the suicide of Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia (Lageman 2020). While seemingly "geographically and politically distant," the mass uprisings that rapidly spread across the Middle East and North Africa would become a significant source of anxiety for Russian authorities as earlier waves coincided with the 2011-2012 anti-Putin protests,

and later waves would renew concerns of democratic movements reviving at home (Gel'man 19). Whether or not IC3PEAK intended to allude to these revolutions is unclear, but they would certainly not be the first artists to do so. In 2011, Pussy Riot famously declared, “Do a Tahrir Square on the Red Square” in their ‘Raze the Pavement’ action (Jonson 180). While perhaps not intentional, the connections to Russian actionist performances of the past do not stop there. The Russian White House was also the site of one of Voina’s actions whose title ‘Storm of the White House’ explicitly recalled the 1993 crisis; their projection of the image of a skull and bones onto the face of the building using lasers is pictured below (Figure 3) (Jonson 152).




Fig. 3 (Source: Actipedia)

Visual echoes to actionist performances continue as the video progresses. The next scene shows Nastya and Nikolay seated at a table eating raw meat in front of Lenin’s Mausoleum. The visual on its own is extremely provocative. Even without the Soviet political context, Lenin’s Mausoleum remains an extremely powerful symbol and point of contention in contemporary Russian society. As Alexei Yurchak notes in his scholarship on Lenin’s mausoleum, “the Russian state...cannot decide how to treat Lenin’s legacy,” not just where his physical body should

remain but also what place the legacy that he represents should occupy in official historical narratives (Yurchak 148). Olga Malinova has likewise observed that Putin has, through various memory initiatives surrounding events like the Great Patriotic War, attempted to construct a “usable” Soviet past that can coexist alongside a simultaneous revival of the Orthodox Church (Malinova 85). The consumption of raw meat juxtaposed onto the image of the mausoleum is especially significant for this reason, recalling those that have decried communist leaders, particularly Stalin, as “bloodthirsty cannibals” (Harding). Within the context of these fraught memory politics, these visuals amount to a rejection of any attempt to rehabilitate the Soviet past. As previously discussed, the location of the Red Square has also been the site of numerous actionist performances that similarly used the symbolism of the Mausoleum and the adjacent Kremlin building in their political statements, from Osmolovskii’s “Khui” to Pavlensky’s “Fixation” (Jonson 666). The accompanying lyrics, with references to internet jail and the image of a



Fig. 4 (Source: “Death No More”)

cat being run over by a cop car, simultaneously direct a critique towards Russia’s oppressive present and the vehicle through which that repression is carried out: the police. The visual that follows shows the pair sitting on the shoulders of two riot-gear police officers and playing pat-

ty-cake while the infamous Lubyanka building, the headquarters of the FSB, looms in the background. Here, we can see the most direct connections to what Jonson identifies as the characteristic features of dissent art— “plays on...the absurd, and laughter.” In the spirit of the actionist tradition, IC3PEAK openly mocks the most violent, coercive apparatus in contemporary Russian society and invites their audience to laugh with them. In a clear denunciation of the hypocrisy of Russian state officials, political repression, and corruption, Nastya sings “Wrapped up in gold chains, I’m sinking in this swamp. My blood is purer than the purest drugs. You and the others will get arrested on the square. While I’ll be rolling a cigarette in my new apartment.” The video continues to subvert Soviet imagery, in a sequence of visuals showing the pair in front of various locations in the VDNKh, a site regarded as one of the crown jewels of Stalinist architecture, clapping to the rhythm of the music in a manner so exaggerated that it almost seems to now mock the viewer (Schonle). One moment in this series of shots presents itself as particularly evocative. The pair are pictured in front of the iconic Friendship of Nations fountain in a visually striking arrangement: Nastya stands on top of Nikolay’s outstretched arm, rotating a hula-hoop around one hand while passing a pixelated object to Nikolay with the other who proceeds to inhale and let out a billow of smoke. The visual recalls what Jonson observes as another characteristic of dissent art: “This art also refers back to the carnival culture of medieval times of jokes, mocking, parodying and laughing at everything sacred and established represented by the authorities, church or state” (130).

Yet again evoking the actionist tradition, Nastya and Nikolay intentionally profane a sacred place, smoking an illicit substance in front of a Soviet monument in the manner of circus performers.



Fig. 5 (Source: “Death No More”)

The highly exaggerated and theatrical qualities of their visuals also recall what Jonson notes about how actionists “played the role of the jester according to the tradition of carnival culture” (28). In another scene, the camera lingers on Nastya and Nikolay sitting side by side, the former donning a haunting smile while the latter adopts an aggressively blank expression (Figure 6). The juxtaposition of their contrasting facial expressions recalls the image of the sock and buskin, the Greek symbols of comedy and tragedy, the combination of which embodies their creation of political satire through dark humor. If one wanted to explore this avenue of analysis even further, one could argue that Nikolay’s red lipstick recalls the makeup of a clown while Nastya’s grimace slightly resembles Jacob Cornelisz van Oostsanen’s famous painting of a medieval jester, “Laughing Fool” (Figure 6). These resemblances are admittedly more tenuous than other more obvious visual references but nevertheless provide an interesting angle through which to consider their exploitation of laughter.



Fig. 6 (Source: "Death No More")

The use of exaggerated performance in order to openly mock that which is deemed sacred by the state presents itself as a consistent theme throughout the video. As the opening verse about self-immolation repeats, Nikolay is shown sawing Natalya's head off in a magic casket in front of St. Basil's Cathedral, an act of mutilation in front of an orthodox church that brings to mind both Pavlensky's and Pussy Riot's performances. In a comically macabre scene, the pair are then shown downing shots of blood on the banks of the Neva River before plunging into its depths. In a video that I will analyze in greater detail later on in this essay, Nikita Mikhalkov, one of Russia's most eminent and notably pro-Putin filmmakers, highlights one Youtube commentator's analysis of this scene, particularly useful and incisive in its distillation of this image: a visual representation of Russia's vampire-like politicians who run the country by leaching of its blood, a metaphor for its natural and financial resources (Mikhalkov 2018). Combined with the overwhelmingly gothic aesthetic of IC3PEAK's imagery, this visualization of the "totalitarian rule of the vampires" is something scholars like Dina Khapaeva have noted as a prominent phenomenon in post-Soviet visual culture, one that directs a critique at both the Soviet past and Putinist present (Khapaeva 134). As the third stanza repeats, the pair are pictured riding around a carousel; the same

Youtube comment interprets the cyclical movements of this shot as representative of the cyclical nature of Russian politics and the lack of political progress or change. The video concludes with the pair drowning as the refrain, "There is no more death. There is no more death" repeats, the image visually inverting the accompanying lyrics. While more cryptic than other parts of the song and less easily translated into an explicitly political message, the ending clearly evokes nihilism and hopelessness in the form of tragic irony, themes that Jonson notes actionists regularly employed in their works as well (Jonson 167). Released this year, *Марш* (March) is an equally provocative composition, not as evocative of the actionist tradition but striking in its display of IC3PEAK's skillful use of Soviet imagery to produce poignant commentaries on two highly sensitive topics in contemporary Russian society: militarism and the memory of WW2. The video opens with Nastya and Nikolay in Smolenskaya metro station among a group of other Komsomols (Soviet youth scouts) chanting in unison in an eerie falsetto "La la la la la" to the beat of their drums (Kostylev and Kreslina 2020). The drums are very quickly taken away, replaced with kalashnikovs, and pointed directly at the camera. This visual immediately touches on a controversial issue in Russia, the policy of requiring military service for male citizens between the ages 18-27, something young Russian men regularly attempt to avoid through bureaucratic loopholes (Braw). The Komsomols' pronounced change in facial expressions after their drums are taken away, from cheerful to somber, also implies the robbing of innocence through militarism as young children are groomed into soldiers, a theme extrapolated later in the video as well. Characteristic of their audio-visual productions, this opening shot is followed by

an abrupt switch in beat and audio, as the next scene shows Nastya at a three-quarter view, dressed in military attire and a headscarf, raising a bull-horn into the air in an image extremely reminiscent of Soviet propaganda posters (Figures 8-11). As one Youtube commentator points out, this visual is particularly evocative of the ubiquitous image of Mother Russia, who "leads her people to the front," ordinary men and women, "to die for other people's ideals" (Figure 7).

Здесь расписано мое личное восприятие, имхо.
Самое начало клипа, когда люди направляют автоматы на нас, зрителей - это прямое обращение к нам. Рупор - заявление.
Здесь песня без клипа не работает вообще. Поэтому надо связывать довольно буквальный визуальный ряд с текстом и считать метафоры.
Образ девушки - это очень распространенный образ матери России, она проводит на фронт свой народ, своих мужчин/мужей/отцов, которые умирают за чужие идеалы. События происходящие в клипе могут касаться абсолютно любой страны. Но Матюшка роднее к нам, основной аудитории исполнителя, поэтому такой образ.

Fig. 7 (Source: Youtube)

To the beat of a military drum, Nastya then chants in her distinctive haunting whisper, "Your face is exactly the same. And there is this same building in every city. Instead of garlands, there are barbed wires. And there is no horizon behind the fences." Along with the visual of Nastya cheering on soldiers participating in a military drill, this scene implies the repetitive and predictable nature of war.



Fig. 8 (Source: "March")



Fig. 9 (Source: Smashing Magazine)



Fig. 10 (Source: Pinterest)



Fig. 11 (Source: Pinterest)

The targets the soldiers shoot at are cartoon illustrations of a rainbow, a bunny, a swan, a flower, and a heart, images typically associated with innocence, childhood, and utopia, suggesting that war is destructive to all of those things. In the following scene, Nastya and Nikolay are shown being married in what appears to be a play as the camera pans out to reveal a stage and an audience full of tearful military officers. No longer reminiscent of a military march, the music now resembles a somber violin melody as Nastya sings, “I feel like a stranger in my own family. But I’m not afraid and I’m not lying to myself. My body is in scars, and my hand in dirt. I’m searching for my home and my roots, just like you” saluting the soldiers who interrupt the ceremony to take Nikolay away with them suggesting that he has been called to war. These lyrics directly speak to a sense of alienation from

society, a clear expression of discontent with the surrounding status quo. In the next scene, the stage is split; one side depicts Nastya attempting to comfort a baby while the other shows a highly dramatized re-enactment of trench warfare with soldiers shooting pantomimed guns, eventually concluding with Nikolay being fatally shot. As the camera pans back to the audience, we see the military officers clasp their hearts and shaking their heads at this tragic scene, indicative of the painful sacrifices that war forces people to make and evocative of the particularly destructive toll WW2 had on the Soviet population which resulted in such a severe demographic gender imbalance that it persists to this day (Gao 2015). The following scene shows Nastya entering the stage with her now older child who is dressed as a Soviet soldier. Here, Nastya delivers the central message of the song: “With each year the air becomes more suffocating. I don’t want to kill people. Without invitation they come into my home. With a new word and a new law,” as the young boy jumps off the stage and begins firing his finger gun at the audience who react as if they are actually being shot. Together these lyrics and visuals produce a resounding rejection of war and those who peddle it in contemporary Russian society, denouncing those who know exactly how tragic and destructive war but still stoke its flames. The next sequence of shots contain a similar indictment of an educational system that indoctrinates militarism.




Fig. 12 (Source: “March”)

The chanting Komsomols and the military beat returns, seated in front of a chalkboard with a sad face drawn onto it, their makeup and coloring creating a distinctly unsettling and almost demonic appearance (Figure 12). This visual is a striking and deliberate inversion of the image of the happy Komsomol, the iconic representation of an idyllic Soviet childhood and the source of a significant amount of cultural nostalgia in contemporary Russian society. IC3PEAK instead shows these unnerving Komsomols flipping their textbooks in unison which are then taken away and replaced with grenades, recalling the opening sequence of the clip. The next scene shows the same group now in the back of a military truck being driven off to a battlefield; the succession of these images produces a clear criticism of a society that rears young people into soldiers. One of the most popular Russian comments under the video succinctly summarizes this sentiment: “They need live babies, so that they make them into dead soldiers,” a quote attributed to the late George Carlin, an American comedian. The video clip concludes with a series of




Fig. 13 (Source: Youtube)

chaotic and violent shots showing the explosion of a teddy bear, a swan, and finally a marble statue, which can be interpreted as symbolic destructions of innocence/childhood, beauty, and culture. The video as a whole amounts to a clear condemnation of militarism and the way the memory of war, specifically WW2, is used in contemporary Russia as a patriotic project. The duo’s most recent audio-visual production, Плак Плак (Boo Hoo) deals directly with the equally taboo subjects of domestic violence and gender

roles in Russia. The video opens with a young girl styled in the manner of Nastya’s signature look (blonde dutch brains, black attire, and black lipstick) entering a room where she “opens a blood-red diorama and mimes her parents (played by Kreslina and Kostylev) in doll form fighting,” as NM Mashurov describes in an article for Pitchfork (Mashurov). What’s notable about this scene is that it also contains a visual hallmark of the table and the platter of raw meat Nastya and Nikolay dine on in their Death No More video, an intentional easter egg clearly included to be spotted by loyal fans. The girl eventually frightens and backs away from the diorama “when the Kreslina doll comes to life and takes vengeance into her own hands by murdering her husband with a butcher knife” (Mashurov). This visual along with lyrics such as “I was always good, I was never bad. All my life like a good girl I obeyed the rules. I’m tired of crying, tired of suffering. Either way I won’t be able to predict my own death” and “Mama always told me: ‘Obey your husband’, I’m not obedient, I do worse. I don’t do as my father commands either. Instead of a star, I grab a grenade,” produce a clear rejection of gender roles in Russian society as well as a sharp critique of domestic violence, which was notably decriminalized in 2017 by a bill that sparked outrage not only within Russia but internationally as well. Mashurov’s analysis identifies another key thematic and aesthetic element that is particularly prominent in this video but is present throughout their productions. Mashurov notes the wealth of “necro-imagery” as Nastya sings about visualizing the murder of her husband in her dreams and kissing corpses while cradling Nikolay’s dead body which is followed by an image of a funeral procession (Mashurov). Death shows up as a repeated lyrical and visual trope in almost all of their compositions; their videos and

pictures consistently emphasize “pale skin, black formalwear, and red accents (lipstick, blood).” Their gothic appearance is one of the most striking elements of their productions and while Khapaeva understands this trend in post-Soviet culture as a commentary on totalitarianism, Mashurov draws a connection to postcolonial scholar Achille Mbembe’s concept of “necropolitics” which “discuss[es] how state power renders some lives disposable, thus creating ‘death-worlds, new and unique forms of social existence in which vast populations are subjected to conditions of life conferring upon them the status of living dead’” (Mashurov). Mashurov continues, explaining how “with a mouthful of dirt and blood, IC3PEAK weaponizes this already-dead positionality, conjuring the silenced, repressed, and murdered subjectivities that haunt the autocratic patriarchal regime.” Scholars like Maryna Romanets have similarly read a relationship between “postcoloniality and neo-Gothic fictions in the post-Soviet space” (Romanets 373). In this way, IC3PEAK’s seemingly less explicitly political gothic aesthetic can be understood as nevertheless just as subversive as some of their more explicitly provocative lyrics and visuals.



Fig. 14 (Source: “March”)

Boo Hoo additionally showcases another notable theme that runs through their productions, the use of traditional Slavic folklore imagery in combination with surrealist visuals. In one scene, Nastya is shown crawling up the young girl’s cheek in order to join a Nikolay and group of other women dancing on top of her head in an arrangement that recalls the khorovod, a pagan and East Slavic circle dance (Figure 14). IC3PEAK’s skillful creation of surrealist folk imagery is most clearly showcased in their music video *КАЗКА* (Fairy Tale) which depicts an evil Baba Yaga character that chases Nastya and Nikolay out of a typical grey Soviet apartment complex, accompanied by disturbing and psychedelic animations of body horror reminiscent of Frida Kahlo’s surrealist works (Kostylev and Kreslina 2018). The otherworldly and fantastical visual elements present throughout IC3PEAK’s works recalls what Jonson identifies as dissent art’s play on not just the absurd but also on “phantasmagoria” (Jonson 130). In sum, IC3PEAK’s musical repertoire is filled with aesthetic and political provocations, both subtle and overt.



Fig. 15 (Source: “Fairy Tale”)

APPENDIX

Putin’s Cult of Personality, *Rachel Ervine*

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