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Topic: Newcomb's Dilemma (Read 9511 times) |
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Deedlit
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Re: Newcomb's Dilemma
« Reply #50 on: Jun 15th, 2005, 8:14pm » |
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on Jun 15th, 2005, 10:56am, JocK wrote:
Ok, no problem... you are allowed to write down this nonsense. (Having no free will whatsoever.... )
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So you agree that your "free will exists because causality does" reasoning is nonsense?
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Deedlit
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Re: Newcomb's Dilemma
« Reply #51 on: Jun 15th, 2005, 8:19pm » |
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on Jun 15th, 2005, 3:29pm, towr wrote:
And I still disagree the computer would have to be able to predict the whole universe. You're not that complicated. If just one or a handfull of particles from space hitting your brain would change your behaviour into the opposite, then you'd be a lot more wishy-washy. (Although that's going far too far into the physical for a thought experiment anyway. ) |
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Well, there's a problem with the butterfly effect. The typical example is the weather, although it applies to just about anything: even the most minute change in the initial conditions can have drastic changes in the long run.
So maybe a stray particle would cause a storm to occur, which causes your spouse to get killed in a car crash. This would obviously have huge consequences on your metal state, and would certainly affect your decision on which boxes to pick.
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towr
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Re: Newcomb's Dilemma
« Reply #52 on: Jun 16th, 2005, 1:41am » |
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on Jun 15th, 2005, 8:19pm, Deedlit wrote:| Well, there's a problem with the butterfly effect. The typical example is the weather, although it applies to just about anything: even the most minute change in the initial conditions can have drastic changes in the long run. |
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Long run, yes. But not within a minute. Besides it depends on how stable the system is. Chaos doesn't really apply in computers for instance, there is no butterfly effect in them, we need them stable. (Even in some new chips where the butterfly is exploited, the chip behaviour remains stable. We couldnt' use it otherwise.)
Quote:| So maybe a stray particle would cause a storm to occur |
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It's very doubtfull the creation of a storm depends on one particle. If anything, it will only change when the storm occurs, not if.
But I suppose you're right that deterministic chaos may make prediction of any behaviour difficult if not impossible.
However, we're dealing with a thought experiment. We can imagine a world were all this is not an issue; where the computer simply does make the correct prediction assuming you ever make a decision.
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JocK
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Re: Newcomb's Dilemma
« Reply #53 on: Jun 16th, 2005, 10:57am » |
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on Jun 15th, 2005, 3:29pm, towr wrote:
And I still disagree the computer would have to be able to predict the whole universe. You're not that complicated. If just one or a handfull of particles from space hitting your brain would change your behaviour into the opposite, then you'd be a lot more wishy-washy. (Although that's going far too far into the physical for a thought experiment anyway. ) |
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on Jun 15th, 2005, 8:19pm, Deedlit wrote:
Well, there's a problem with the butterfly effect. The typical example is the weather, although it applies to just about anything: even the most minute change in the initial conditions can have drastic changes in the long run.
So maybe a stray particle would cause a storm to occur, which causes your spouse to get killed in a car crash. This would obviously have huge consequences on your metal state, and would certainly affect your decision on which boxes to pick.
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on Jun 16th, 2005, 1:41am, towr wrote:
Long run, yes. But not within a minute. Besides it depends on how stable the system is. Chaos doesn't really apply in computers for instance, there is no butterfly effect in them, we need them stable. (Even in some new chips where the butterfly is exploited, the chip behaviour remains stable. We couldnt' use it otherwise.)
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I agree with Deedlit. My previous remark about the fact that the phase space of physical systems show strongly mixing behaviour is the same as saying: small causes have big effects.
And yes, the butterfly effect only applies long-run, but compared to the 'clock-frequency' of the human brain any macroscopic time (and certainly a minute)is huge.
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| « Last Edit: Jun 16th, 2005, 11:01am by JocK » |
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JocK
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Re: Newcomb's Dilemma
« Reply #54 on: Jun 16th, 2005, 11:06am » |
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on Jun 16th, 2005, 1:41am, towr wrote:
But I suppose you're right that deterministic chaos may make prediction of any behaviour difficult if not impossible.
However, we're dealing with a thought experiment. We can imagine a world were all this is not an issue; where the computer simply does make the correct prediction assuming you ever make a decision. |
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What a strange thought that you would be able to exist in a world that is incapable of complex behaviour.... 
But I am happy with the end-conclusion: we all seem to agree that a computer capable of predicting human behaviour can not be constructed in the universe we live in.
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solving abstract problems is like sex: it may occasionally have some practical use, but that is not why we do it.
xy - y = x5 - y4 - y3 = 20; x>0, y>0.
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towr
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Re: Newcomb's Dilemma
« Reply #55 on: Jun 16th, 2005, 11:25am » |
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on Jun 16th, 2005, 10:57am, JocK wrote:| And yes, the butterfly effect only applies long-run, but compared to the 'clock-frequency' of the human brain any macroscopic time (and certainly a minute)is huge. |
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The 'clock frequency' of the human brain isn't even 1000 Hz.
And it's too large scale for a few stray particles to change the global state that quickly, if at all. (I'd sooner believe the effect ripples out than explodes)
Chaos isn't magic. The flap of a butterfly's wing can't create storms in places were storms can't exists. It only changes where in orbit around the strange attractor we are.
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| « Last Edit: Jun 16th, 2005, 11:28am by towr » |
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towr
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Re: Newcomb's Dilemma
« Reply #56 on: Jun 16th, 2005, 11:27am » |
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on Jun 16th, 2005, 11:06am, JocK wrote:| What a strange thought that you would be able to exist in a world that is incapable of complex behaviour.... |
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Where did I ever say there couldn't be complex behaviour?
Quote:| But I am happy with the end-conclusion: we all seem to agree that a computer capable of predicting human behaviour can not be constructed in the universe we live in. |
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I don't remember ever agreeing to that. It may be difficult or impossible, it might also turn out to be quite doable. Really depends on how predictable we are. And what we limit ourself to in the prediction.
You seem quite adament to take both boxes, for example.
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| « Last Edit: Jun 16th, 2005, 11:30am by towr » |
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rmsgrey
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Re: Newcomb's Dilemma
« Reply #57 on: Jun 16th, 2005, 11:56am » |
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Let's see if I have this straight: JocK is convinced that the device capable of predicting a single human decision is physically (or possibly logically) impossible.
I'm curious as to just where he draws the line - which of the following are and aren't possible when the subject is faced with a simple choice with well-defined consequences:
1) predicting someone's behaviour when they have no reason to try and be unpredictable and don't know you've made a prediction
2) predicting someone's behaviour when they have no reason to try and be unpredictable and do know you've made a prediction
3) predicting someone's behaviour when they have no reason to try and be unpredictable and know what you predicted
4) predicting someone's behaviour when they have reason to try and be unpredictable but don't know you've made a prediction
5) predicting someone's behaviour when they have reason to try and be unpredictable and do know you've made a prediction
6) predicting someone's behaviour when they have reason to try and be unpredictable and don't know what you've predicted
Among other things, this suggests that time travel is impossible (a device capable of sending information back in time can easily be used to predict someone's decision)
On the other hand, last I heard, Quantum effects include the potential existence of time loops, wormholes, etc (all small enough not to have practical applications, but hinting at possibilities) - unless something new has come up in the past 5 years or so to rule it out, it looks like the physics says "It doesn't happen" not "It couldn't happen" - in fact, there are a number of devices that could theoretically be constructed that, according to known physics (as of 10 years ago or so) would work as time machines. Since the simplest involve manipulating large masses of super-dense material so that they approach the speed of light, it seems unlikely that they'll be built any time soon, but they are theoretically possible.
The interesting thing about time travel under current (again as of about 10 years ago) theory is that, if you look at it closely, all the apparent paradoxes go away - if you try to shoot your grandfather, you'll fail for some (intuitively) low probability reason - your freedom to act is limited by your knowledge of the future, and you can't actually create a paradox.
Related, to my mind, it's not the existence of predictions about the future, or even knowledge of the existence of predictions that causes paradoxes, but knowledge of the content of predictions of our own actions that can lead to paradox.
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rmsgrey
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Re: Newcomb's Dilemma
« Reply #58 on: Jun 16th, 2005, 11:59am » |
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on Jun 16th, 2005, 11:27am, towr wrote:
You seem quite adament to take both boxes, for example. |
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Yes, if you are known to dis-believe in the correctness of the machine's predictive capabilities, then your actions are easy for a machine to predict - even as simple a machine as a slip of paper...
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JocK
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Re: Newcomb's Dilemma
« Reply #59 on: Jun 16th, 2005, 12:54pm » |
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on Jun 16th, 2005, 11:59am, rmsgrey wrote:
Yes, if you are known to dis-believe in the correctness of the machine's predictive capabilities, then your actions are easy for a machine to predict - even as simple a machine as a slip of paper... |
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Known by whom or what?
Let me get this right: you are referring to a slip of paper knowing I don't believe in its predictve capabilities?
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solving abstract problems is like sex: it may occasionally have some practical use, but that is not why we do it.
xy - y = x5 - y4 - y3 = 20; x>0, y>0.
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JocK
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Re: Newcomb's Dilemma
« Reply #60 on: Jun 16th, 2005, 1:11pm » |
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on Jun 16th, 2005, 11:27am, towr wrote:
<predicting human behaviour> might also turn out to be quite doable. Really depends on how predictable we are. And what we limit ourself to in the prediction.
You seem quite adament to take both boxes, for example. |
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1) Apparently you are now referring to the circumstance in which one and the same person (me) is subjected to a repeat experiment? And in doing so you have made the transition from 'predicting future human behaviour' into 'extrapolating trends in human behaviour'. An entirely different subject that is not under discussion.
2) Would I be subject to a repeat experiment, as a disbeliever I would expect that the computer is pre-programmed to put nothing in the boxes. So I would definitely once in a while select a single box. Just to prove the claim is absolute nonsence.
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| « Last Edit: Jun 16th, 2005, 1:13pm by JocK » |
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solving abstract problems is like sex: it may occasionally have some practical use, but that is not why we do it.
xy - y = x5 - y4 - y3 = 20; x>0, y>0.
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JocK
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Re: Newcomb's Dilemma
« Reply #61 on: Jun 16th, 2005, 1:32pm » |
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on Jun 16th, 2005, 11:56am, rmsgrey wrote:
... which of the following are and aren't possible when the subject is faced with a simple choice with well-defined consequences:
1) predicting someone's behaviour when they have no reason to try and be unpredictable and don't know you've made a prediction
2) predicting someone's behaviour when they have no reason to try and be unpredictable and do know you've made a prediction
3) predicting someone's behaviour when they have no reason to try and be unpredictable and know what you predicted
4) predicting someone's behaviour when they have reason to try and be unpredictable but don't know you've made a prediction
5) predicting someone's behaviour when they have reason to try and be unpredictable and do know you've made a prediction
6) predicting someone's behaviour when they have reason to try and be unpredictable and don't know what you've predicted
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I assume you are referring to some simple choice between alternatives that are more-or-less equally attractive so that free will indeed comes into action? Well, in that case in all of the 6 cases above a machine can not make an accurate prediction.
on Jun 16th, 2005, 11:56am, rmsgrey wrote:
Among other things, this suggests that time travel is impossible (a device capable of sending information back in time can easily be used to predict someone's decision)
On the other hand, last I heard, Quantum effects include the potential existence of time loops, wormholes, etc (all small enough not to have practical applications, but hinting at possibilities) - unless something new has come up in the past 5 years or so to rule it out, it looks like the physics says "It doesn't happen" not "It couldn't happen" - in fact, there are a number of devices that could theoretically be constructed that, according to known physics (as of 10 years ago or so) would work as time machines. Since the simplest involve manipulating large masses of super-dense material so that they approach the speed of light, it seems unlikely that they'll be built any time soon, but they are theoretically possible.
The interesting thing about time travel under current (again as of about 10 years ago) theory is that, if you look at it closely, all the apparent paradoxes go away - if you try to shoot your grandfather, you'll fail for some (intuitively) low probability reason - your freedom to act is limited by your knowledge of the future, and you can't actually create a paradox. |
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Lots of people are playing with various concepts, but there is no widely accepted quantum gravity theory.
I am very interested to get a reference to a paper that describes the mechanism by which my knowledge of the future would limit my free will.
on Jun 16th, 2005, 11:56am, rmsgrey wrote:
Related, to my mind, it's not the existence of predictions about the future, or even knowledge of the existence of predictions that causes paradoxes, but knowledge of the content of predictions of our own actions that can lead to paradox. |
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If it is possible to predict the future, you can also predict the content of such a prediction. (See my example of the 2nd computer.)
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| « Last Edit: Jun 16th, 2005, 1:45pm by JocK » |
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solving abstract problems is like sex: it may occasionally have some practical use, but that is not why we do it.
xy - y = x5 - y4 - y3 = 20; x>0, y>0.
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towr
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Re: Newcomb's Dilemma
« Reply #62 on: Jun 16th, 2005, 1:47pm » |
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on Jun 16th, 2005, 1:11pm, JocK wrote:| 1) Apparently you are now referring to the circumstance in which one and the same person (me) is subjected to a repeat experiment? |
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No. Unless that's what you were talking about while making your case for taking both boxes.
You pretty much said what you would do; that makes it very easy to predict, unless you don't know what you'd do either.
Quote:| And in doing so you have made the transition from 'predicting future human behaviour' into 'extrapolating trends in human behaviour'. An entirely different subject that is not under discussion. |
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Predicting according to a trend seems a very valid method imo. Prediction is not necessarily foreseeing truth, after all.
And if the trend is incredibly strong, the prediction will be incredibly accurate. Just on that cue alone.
The better you know someone, the better you can predict his/her behaviour. And in general there are all sorts of limitations and guides influencing peoples behaviour.
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JocK
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Re: Newcomb's Dilemma
« Reply #63 on: Jun 16th, 2005, 2:00pm » |
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on Jun 16th, 2005, 1:47pm, towr wrote:
You pretty much said what you would do; that makes it very easy to predict, unless you don't know what you'd do either.
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Aha.... that incredible machine can predict my future behaviour if I honestly tell it in advance what I'm gonne do...?
Ok, I think I can build such a machine...
But what does this have to do with Newcomb's paradox
on Jun 16th, 2005, 1:47pm, towr wrote:
Predicting according to a trend seems a very valid method imo. |
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So, you never had a girlfriend..? 
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| « Last Edit: Jun 16th, 2005, 2:03pm by JocK » |
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solving abstract problems is like sex: it may occasionally have some practical use, but that is not why we do it.
xy - y = x5 - y4 - y3 = 20; x>0, y>0.
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rmsgrey
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Re: Newcomb's Dilemma
« Reply #64 on: Jun 19th, 2005, 10:52am » |
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on Jun 16th, 2005, 1:32pm, JocK wrote:
I assume you are referring to some simple choice between alternatives that are more-or-less equally attractive so that free will indeed comes into action? Well, in that case in all of the 6 cases above a machine can not make an accurate prediction.
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Actually, I was thinking of a situation where there is a clear "better" outcome - as in Newcomb's Dilemma, where your best course of action is clear if you believe in the machine's predictive capabilities, and clear if you disbelieve in the machine's predictive capabilities.
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Lots of people are playing with various concepts, but there is no widely accepted quantum gravity theory.
I am very interested to get a reference to a paper that describes the mechanism by which my knowledge of the future would limit my free will.
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"Billiard Balls in Wormhole Spacetimes with Closed Timelike Curves - Classical Theory" by Fernando Echeverria Gunnar Klinkhammer and Kip S. Thorne to be found in Physical Review, D44, #4, pp1077-1099 (15th August 1991) - which I haven't read myself, but I have read one of its sources, the Science Fiction novel "Timemaster" by Robert L Forward, and the same author's later treatment of the same concepts in his mixed Science Fact/Fiction book "Indistinguishable From Magic" published 1995 (ISBN 0-671-87686-4). In the years since encountering the idea first, I have kept half an ear on popular science publications, and have yet to encounter a reported theory that reliably prohibits (very) short-term reverse causation - I do remember seeing atleast one TV appearance of an excited physicist explaining that every time they tried allowing time travel under Quantum Mechanics, the dtailed calculations showed cancellation of the probability waves for paradoxical sequences, and reinforcement for non-paradox (in exactly the same way as the position wave of an electron cancels out between allowed orbits).
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If it is possible to predict the future, you can also predict the content of such a prediction. (See my example of the 2nd computer.)
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So consider Schrodinger's Cat with time travel available. After opening the box to find out whether the cat survived, you put one of two cards into a sealed envelope and send it back in time to just before you began the experiment. Until you open the envelope or the box (assuming the envelope was sent back in a foolproof fashion, so there's no chance of its contents being wrong) the contents of each are in quantum superposition. Opening either one will then tell you the state of the other.
It's not the fact of the prediction that constrains your free will, but knowledge of its contents. Until you know what has been predicted, your future actions exist in a superposed state of all possible futures. Discovering a solid fact about the future hen collapses the superposition down to a much narrower range of possibilities.
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JocK
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Re: Newcomb's Dilemma
« Reply #65 on: Jun 20th, 2005, 1:40pm » |
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on Jun 19th, 2005, 10:52am, rmsgrey wrote:
Actually, I was thinking of a situation where there is a clear "better" outcome - as in Newcomb's Dilemma, where your best course of action is clear if you believe in the machine's predictive capabilities, and clear if you disbelieve in the machine's predictive capabilities.
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This is a mis-conception. I tried to explain that before, but maybe I was not clear enough.
I definitely disbelieve the machine's predictive capability, and therefore would reason as follows:
the makers of the machine know - just as I do - that their claim is absolute nonsense. So, if they would put money in one of the boxes they would lose out. Hence, their only hope can be that all candidates - when given the choice between opening one box or both boxes - will open both. That way, they get away with preparing empty boxes and still maintaining their false claim about the machine's predictive capabilities.
Therefore, I would certainly not exclude the possibility that a disbeliever would open one box only. Definitely, if the experiment repetitively 'confirms' the machine's predictive capability due to all candidate opening two boxes and getting nothing, a disbeliever would be very tempted to open one box only. After all, he has nothing to loose, and the only thing to gain is the satisfaction of demonstrating these guys are selling snake oil...
on Jun 19th, 2005, 10:52am, rmsgrey wrote:
"Billiard Balls in Wormhole Spacetimes with Closed Timelike Curves - Classical Theory" by Fernando Echeverria Gunnar Klinkhammer and Kip S. Thorne to be found in Physical Review, D44, #4, pp1077-1099 (15th August 1991) - which I haven't read myself, but I have read one of its sources, the Science Fiction novel "Timemaster" by Robert L Forward, and the same author's later treatment of the same concepts in his mixed Science Fact/Fiction book "Indistinguishable From Magic" published 1995 (ISBN 0-671-87686-4).
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Interesting paper. However, it only demonstrates that in one simple case a time-travel paradox can be 'repaired'. (It discussed a bal that moves in solitude, enters a wormhole, comes out at an earlier time, and collides with its younger self at that earlier time thereby (potentially) preventing the ball to enter the wormhole. The paper demonstrates that there are infinitely many solutions that allow for a consistent (paradox free) course of action in which the ball indeed enters the wormhole after a glancing collision.)
The paper does not demonstrate that 'something' prevents the ball to collide with its younger self in such a way that both balls don't enter the wormhole.
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| « Last Edit: Jun 20th, 2005, 1:48pm by JocK » |
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solving abstract problems is like sex: it may occasionally have some practical use, but that is not why we do it.
xy - y = x5 - y4 - y3 = 20; x>0, y>0.
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rmsgrey
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Re: Newcomb's Dilemma
« Reply #66 on: Jun 21st, 2005, 3:42am » |
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on Jun 20th, 2005, 1:40pm, JocK wrote:
This is a mis-conception. I tried to explain that before, but maybe I was not clear enough.
I definitely disbelieve the machine's predictive capability, and therefore would reason as follows:
the makers of the machine know - just as I do - that their claim is absolute nonsense. So, if they would put money in one of the boxes they would lose out. Hence, their only hope can be that all candidates - when given the choice between opening one box or both boxes - will open both. That way, they get away with preparing empty boxes and still maintaining their false claim about the machine's predictive capabilities.
Therefore, I would certainly not exclude the possibility that a disbeliever would open one box only. Definitely, if the experiment repetitively 'confirms' the machine's predictive capability due to all candidate opening two boxes and getting nothing, a disbeliever would be very tempted to open one box only. After all, he has nothing to loose, and the only thing to gain is the satisfaction of demonstrating these guys are selling snake oil...
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The two box version I know has $1000 in box B, and the choice between opening box A alone ($1,000,000) or opening both (box A empty) - in such a situation, a disbeliever believes you're paying $1000 for the pleasure of proving their predictions wrong.
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Interesting paper. However, it only demonstrates that in one simple case a time-travel paradox can be 'repaired'. (It discussed a bal that moves in solitude, enters a wormhole, comes out at an earlier time, and collides with its younger self at that earlier time thereby (potentially) preventing the ball to enter the wormhole. The paper demonstrates that there are infinitely many solutions that allow for a consistent (paradox free) course of action in which the ball indeed enters the wormhole after a glancing collision.)
The paper does not demonstrate that 'something' prevents the ball to collide with its younger self in such a way that both balls don't enter the wormhole.
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As I said, I haven't read the paper myself, and can't remember actual references.
10 minutes with google turns up:
Time machines: the Principle of Self-Consistency as a consequence of the Principle of Minimal Action
and
Time machines and the Principle of Self-Consistency as a consequence of the Principle of Stationary Action (II): the Cauchy problem for a self-interacting relativistic particle
refined and more extensive googling also uncovers:
Cauchy problem in spacetimes with closed timelike curves
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Ajax
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Re: Newcomb's Dilemma
« Reply #67 on: Jun 21st, 2005, 5:09am » |
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First of all, let's assume that our "software" (like bios or windows, am not sure which one is more suitable) is continuously changing as it is affected by external (sound, images, smell etc) and internal (emotions, thoughts) factors. This would make almost impossible to create an identical clone of us (if you've seen "The boys from Brazil" nazis tried to raise a new Hitler, by trying to give to young clones of him similar experiences of his). Even the slightest experience could be crucial to one's future; a thought caused by a minor incident could ignite a series of other thoughts that could end up to a great discovery (doesn't the legend say that Newton came up with the Universal Law of Gravitation because of an apple? ok maybe too much of a myth and less of truth).
However, let's say that from the moment that you are born, sensors have been attached to your brain, your spinal cord and in general to any spot needed so as to receive all the external data that you get. Let's also assume that there exists a certain decoder that is capable of transforming this information into a signal fully comprehensible by a computer and that thoughts and emotions can be read. Then, let's finally assume that there exists a computer with structure like a human brain and with intelligence identical to yours (My belief is that eventually there will be artificial intelligence equal and maybe greater than ours). This "brain" will believe that it is you and with continuous rectifications and program adjustments could eventually become very much a second you.
Now, if it were disconnected slightly before you took your final decision (so that it doesn't know) and for this part of time you were isolated, would it be able to make the same guess? Even the random picking of a box is not that random (if you don't use a coin, but you guess it).
I'd say yes.
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JocK
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Re: Newcomb's Dilemma
« Reply #68 on: Jun 21st, 2005, 3:51pm » |
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on Jun 21st, 2005, 5:09am, Ajax wrote:
... would it be able to make the same guess? Even the random picking of a box is not that random (if you don't use a coin, but you guess it).
I'd say yes. |
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This is remarkable. That amazing machine can predict the behaviour of a system as complicated as a living human being, but fails to predict the outcome of a simple coin toss...?
Interestingly, that brings me to to the following argument against the possibility of predicting the behaviour of a human:
A physicist enters the stage to participate in "Newcomb's Quizz". At the moment supreme she first opens the small shielded cage she carried to the stage. This cage - prepared just before the quizz by the physicist herself - contains Schrodinger's cat. When the cat is dead she opens two boxes, and when the cat is alive she opens one box.
How will that predictive machine handle the fundamental uncertainty caused by quantum superposition?
[Of course she doesn't really need to sacrifice a cat for this experiment. Any microscopic system (e.g. an electron) in a superposition of two quantum states (spin-up or spin-down) subjected to a measurement to determine the actual state (the Stern-Gerlach measurement) will do.]
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| « Last Edit: Jun 21st, 2005, 4:05pm by JocK » |
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solving abstract problems is like sex: it may occasionally have some practical use, but that is not why we do it.
xy - y = x5 - y4 - y3 = 20; x>0, y>0.
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Ajax
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Re: Newcomb's Dilemma
« Reply #69 on: Jun 22nd, 2005, 12:20am » |
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That's why I wrote not to be influenced by some external factor (coin flip, cat, electron, whatever), but at that moment make a selection after some thoughts or impulsively. Do you believe that if you were asked to choose between one or two, just by chance, your choice would have been taken totally by chance? Are there unknown factors that would push you take one of the two choices (if you ask someone to pick a colour quickly, most probably he'll tell red)? Is it really 50-50? I'm only suggesting, I have not any well based opinion on that.
Anyway, as for the problem itself, assuming that the computer may be able to predict which box you'll open, but not predict or understand what you're thinking of, I'd say "I select box A and my prize is the opposite of what the box B has, which I open to show you". It reminds me of a riddle in a comic novel "The Technopriests" (Les technoperes in French) by Alexandro Jodorowsky and Zoran Janjetov (I think it is in vol 2)
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mmm
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towr
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Re: Newcomb's Dilemma
« Reply #70 on: Jun 22nd, 2005, 12:26am » |
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on Jun 21st, 2005, 3:51pm, JocK wrote:| How will that predictive machine handle the fundamental uncertainty caused by quantum superposition? |
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It needn't bother. It is in superposition itself, entangled with the cat and the content of the boxes.
Observation of any of the three entangled elements fixes the state of the other two to something consistent.
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| « Last Edit: Jun 22nd, 2005, 12:30am by towr » |
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JocK
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Re: Newcomb's Dilemma
« Reply #71 on: Jun 22nd, 2005, 10:14am » |
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on Jun 22nd, 2005, 12:26am, towr wrote:
It needn't bother. It is in superposition itself, entangled with the cat and the content of the boxes.
Observation of any of the three entangled elements fixes the state of the other two to something consistent. |
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How do you get your computer in a quantum-entangled state with my carefully predicted spin-1/2 system that I brought to the scene from a far away location? Are you basically saying that your computer can be brought in entanglement with the whole cosmos? A few postings ago you claimed that to predict human behaviour the computer needn't bother about the whole universe, and now you claim the computer even to be in quantum superposition with the whole universe?
Anyway, we are making progress: to predict human behaviour, initially claims were made that we need just a powerful classical computer; now - in a last (?) attempt to defend the suggestion that predicting human behaviour might theoretically be possible - we find ourselves heavily relying on quantum computing at a scale covering the whole universe...
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| « Last Edit: Jun 22nd, 2005, 10:18am by JocK » |
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solving abstract problems is like sex: it may occasionally have some practical use, but that is not why we do it.
xy - y = x5 - y4 - y3 = 20; x>0, y>0.
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rmsgrey
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Re: Newcomb's Dilemma
« Reply #72 on: Jun 22nd, 2005, 11:08am » |
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on Jun 22nd, 2005, 10:14am, JocK wrote:
How do you get your computer in a quantum-entangled state with my carefully predicted spin-1/2 system that I brought to the scene from a far away location? Are you basically saying that your computer can be brought in entanglement with the whole cosmos? A few postings ago you claimed that to predict human behaviour the computer needn't bother about the whole universe, and now you claim the computer even to be in quantum superposition with the whole universe?
Anyway, we are making progress: to predict human behaviour, initially claims were made that we need just a powerful classical computer; now - in a last (?) attempt to defend the suggestion that predicting human behaviour might theoretically be possible - we find ourselves heavily relying on quantum computing at a scale covering the whole universe...
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I still believe a time-loop would work - by forcing self-consistency (though it appears self-consistency is only one of several hypotheses advanced to cope with pre-emptive matricide - and the only one that allows genuine time loops rather than invoking parallel universes or some form of cosmic censorship)
Anyway, you and towr appear to be at cross purposes - towr is apparently talking about an infallible black box and the consequences of its ability to predict, while you are attempting to prove the impossibility of such a device (when the relevant underlying issues are still open questions).
Establishing the behaviour of such a device may help settle the question of whether it's (logically) possible, but establishing (physical) impossibility doesn't settle questions of behaviour if you assume such a device.
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towr
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Re: Newcomb's Dilemma
« Reply #73 on: Jun 22nd, 2005, 11:30am » |
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on Jun 22nd, 2005, 10:14am, JocK wrote:| How do you get your computer in a quantum-entangled state with my carefully predicted spin-1/2 system that I brought to the scene from a far away location? Are you basically saying that your computer can be brought in entanglement with the whole cosmos? |
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Well, if that's what it takes before you'll assume the premises and consider the problem, sure.
Quote:| A few postings ago you claimed that to predict human behaviour the computer needn't bother about the whole universe, and now you claim the computer even to be in quantum superposition with the whole universe? |
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The whole universe is one large superposition. There is no one outside it to observe it after all.
If we put the box with schrodingers cat in a room, and lock schrodinger in there. Not only don't we know if the cat is alive or dead, but neither do we know if schrodinger opened the box or not. All combinations are possible, and have some likelyhood. It's one big superposition which won't collapse until it is observed by someone 'outside the box'.
Of course you can repeat this as many times as you have observers. The waveform changes dramatically with everything you add, but it will remain in some superposition for a potential outside observer.
Quote:| Anyway, we are making progress: to predict human behaviour, initially claims were made that we need just a powerful classical computer; |
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Oh I still believe we can for all practical purposes, with a sufficiently sophisticated computer(+software), predict peoples' behaviour. As long as they are themselves the source of the behaviour, and not just doing what a random particle tells them to.
For that we'd need either time-travel, supernatural forsight, or discover some deterministic level beneath quantum mechanics.
Quote:| now - in a last (?) attempt to defend the suggestion that predicting human behaviour might theoretically be possible - we find ourselves heavily relying on quantum computing at a scale covering the whole universe... |
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Heh, prediction (some) human behaviour is very easy. I predict this won't be the last post.
(By all means, post if you disagree with that prediction )
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JocK
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Re: Newcomb's Dilemma
« Reply #74 on: Jun 22nd, 2005, 1:09pm » |
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on Jun 14th, 2005, 12:15pm, JocK wrote:
Hmmm.... have the feeling that this will not be the last post in this thread... 
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on Jun 22nd, 2005, 11:30am, towr wrote:
I predict this won't be the last post.
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Copycat predictions don't count!
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solving abstract problems is like sex: it may occasionally have some practical use, but that is not why we do it.
xy - y = x5 - y4 - y3 = 20; x>0, y>0.
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