Randomized Evaluations

Introduction, Methodology, & Basic Econometrics using Mexico's Progresa program as a case study

(with thanks to Clair Null, author of 2008 Notes)

Sept. 15, 2009

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  - simultaneity X $\rightarrow$ Y and Y $\rightarrow$ X
  - omitted variables / confounding Z $\rightarrow$ X and Z $\rightarrow$ Y
  - spurious correlation

Practice Correlations

Think about the following correlations and be skeptical of causality. Which of the other 4 types of correlations would you want to rule out before you would be confident that the relationships were causal? In the case of omitted variables, what are some "Z" factors that you're worried about?

1. reverse causality $Y \rightarrow X$
2. simultaneity $X \rightarrow Y$ and $Y \rightarrow X$
3. omitted variables / confounding $Z \rightarrow X$ and $Z \rightarrow Y$
4. spurious correlation

- Job applicants with names that are common among African Americans are less likely to get an interview.
- In a country with few women leaders, voters have low opinions of a woman's ability to lead.
- As the planet heats up, there are fewer and fewer pirates.
- The chronically ill are usually poor.

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- Actually, yes, and it's remarkably easy. Two economists (Bertrand & Mullainathan) did it by sending out fake resumes.
- The results are disturbing - those with white-sounding names were 50% more likely to be called for an interview.
- Even worse, while the likelihood of getting an interview is increasing in a "white" applicant's credentials, experience & honors mattered much less for "black" applicants. This sort of discrimination could turn into a vicious cycle.

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- Is it possible to design an experiment that would let us observe that?

In a country with few women leaders, voters have low opinions of a woman's ability to lead.

- India's policy of requiring that some leadership positions be filled by women gives us a "natural" experiment (Beaman et al.).
- The essential aspect of this policy (in terms of determining a causal relationship between exposure to female politicians and opinions of them), is that the local governments didn't get to choose whether or not they wanted their position to be reserved for a woman. The positions to be reserved were randomly assigned.

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- Perceptions of women leaders' effectiveness did improve after randomly-assigned exposure.
- Almost twice as many women won unreserved positions in places where the position had been reserved for a woman in the prior two elections relative to places where the position had been reserved only once or never at all.

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

- The point here is that theory helps. If there's not some reasonable explanation, it's not very likely to be causal. (Be wary of unreasonable explanations.)

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- Again, to explore causality in either direction, would want to see how health responds to an exogenous change in wealth (or vice versa).
- Probably going to need an experiment for this one.
    - need to make some people rich and see if they get healthier than otherwise identical people
    - or make some chronically ill people healthier and see if they get richer than otherwise identical chronically ill people
- In principle, a natural experiment could work (e.g. lottery winners? people who live near new medical facilities?), but a field experiment is a sure bet.

The Real Issue: Finding the Right Counterfactual

- To determine the causal effect of X on Y we want to observe what happens to Y when we change X *without changing anything else* (i.e. Z).
- In the resume experiment, this was easy to do, because the people didn't really exist.
- But what if we need to change X in real people's lives? (call these people the treatment group)
- To make the comparison we need someone else whose X didn't change but who was otherwise identical to the treatment group. (call these people the control group)
- We can't observe the same person both with and without the change in X (the treatment)–the counterfactual is unobservable.

Randomization to the Rescue!

- With a large enough sample, by randomly assigning people to treatment and control groups we can make the two more or less identical (e.g. their X's & Z's should be the same on average).
- IMPORTANT: If people get to choose whether or not they want to be in the treatment group, then there's no way to make sure that the people in the treatment group are identical to the people in the control group.
    - Even if they look the same in every other characteristic, the fact that the treatment people chose to be treatment people and the control people chose to be control people means that something about them was different (there's some piece of Z that we're not able to measure).

In Math...

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- Y_i^T was a school that was observed with textbooks, so having textbooks and being treated are not identical.
- Add and subtract $E[Y_i^C | T]$
- $E[Y_i^T | T] - E[Y_i^C | T] - E[Y_i^C | C] + E[Y_i^C | T] =$ $E[(Y_i^T - Y_i^C) | T + E[Y_i^C | T] - E[Y_i^C | C]$

More Math

- $E[Y_i^T|T] - E[Y_i^C|T] - E[Y_i^C|C] + E[Y_i^C|T] = E[(Y_i^T - Y_i^C)|T + E[Y_i^C|T] - E[Y_i^C|C]$
- First term is the treatment effect (i.e., what we want.)
- Second and third terms are the selection bias. "It captures the difference in potential untreated outcomes between the treatment and the comparison schools; treatment schools may have had different test scores on average even if they had not been treated."
- Briefly, randomization solves this.
- "Since the treatment has been randomly assigned, individuals assigned to the treatment and control groups differ in expectation only through their exposure to the treatment. Had neither received the treatment, their outcomes would have been in expectation the same. This implies that the selection bias, $E[Y_i^C|T] - E[Y_i^C|C]$, is equal to zero."

Add Z of Mystery

- For simplicity, suppose we're interested in the effect of $X = 1$ relative to $X = 0$
- The outcome Y is a function of the treatment (X) and some other characteristic (for simplicity let $Z = 1$ or 0)
- We write this relationship in mathematical notation as

$$Y_i = a + bX_i + cZ_i + \varepsilon_i$$

  where the i subscript refers to a specific person and the ε is a white noise "error / disturbance" term that averages out across the population
- What that says in words for the Progresa case study is:

school attendance (Y) depends on whether or not the child gets a scholarship (X), the child's ability (Z), and whether or not the child woke up on the right side of the bed (ε)

Z of Mystery

- To measure the effect of $X = 1$ relative to $X = 0$, taking into account Z, we compare the expected values (averages) of Y conditional on the levels of X and Z

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbb{E}[Y|X,Z] &= \mathbb{E}[a + bX + cZ + \varepsilon|X,Z] \\
&= \mathbb{E}[a|X,Z] + \mathbb{E}[bX|X,Z] + \mathbb{E}[cZ|X,Z] + \mathbb{E}[\varepsilon|X,Z] \\
&= a + b\mathbb{E}[X|X,Z] + c\mathbb{E}[Z|X,Z] + 0
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\end{aligned}$$

- So, for our 4 possible combinations of X and Z, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbb{E}[Y|X=1,Z=1] &= a + b + c \\
\mathbb{E}[Y|X=1,Z=0] &= a + b \\
\mathbb{E}[Y|X=0,Z=1] &= a + c \\
\mathbb{E}[Y|X=0,Z=0] &= a
\end{aligned}$$

  and as expected, the effect of X holding Z constant is b (the effect of Z holding X constant is c)

Omitted Variable Bias

- What if we hadn't been able to control for ability in the relationship we were just discussing?
- In that case, we wouldn't be able to calculate $\mathbb{E}[Y|X=1,Z]-\mathbb{E}[Y|X=0,Z]$
- Instead, all we'd be able to calculate is $\mathbb{E}[Y|X=1]-\mathbb{E}[Y|X=0]$
- Writing out the gory details, we'd have

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbb{E}[Y|X=1]- \quad &= \quad \left(a+b+c\mathbb{E}[Z|X=1]\right) - \\
\mathbb{E}[Y|X=0] \quad & \quad\; \left(a+0+c\mathbb{E}[Z|X=0]\right) \\
&= \underbrace{b}_{\textit{true effect}} + \underbrace{c\left(\mathbb{E}[Z|X=1]-\mathbb{E}[Z|X=0]\right)}_{\textit{OVB}}
\end{aligned}$$

Omitted Variable Bias

$$\mathbb{E}[Y|X=1] - \mathbb{E}[Y|X=0] = \underbrace{b}_{\textit{true effect}} + \underbrace{c\big(\mathbb{E}[Z|X=1] - \mathbb{E}[Z|X=0]\big)}_{OVB}$$

- In words, if average ability is different for the kids in the treatment & control groups, then we won't be able to separate the effect of the treatment from the effect that their different ability levels are having on their attendance rates
- Randomization assures us that $\mathbb{E}[Z|X=1] = \mathbb{E}[Z|X=0]$ so that there is no omitted variable bias

OVB is What Ails Us

- OVB is the real problem. You can sometimes get clues about the sign/magnitude.
- Given a true model $Y_i = a + bX_i + cZ_i + \varepsilon_i$, if you leave out Z, your estimate of b come out as $b + c * \frac{cov(X,Z)}{var(X)}$
- In a word, if there exists any variable Z that's correlated with your variable of interest X and your outcome variable Y, you're screwed.
- Some think that means the solution to *Omitted* Variable bias is to not omit anything. While that may help a little, there are always things to omit, so it's better if you can find an X that's uncorrelated (ie, random).

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- Can you prove that you randomized? (Can you prove that there exists no Z that's correlated with Y and your X?)
- That's a universal negative, so no, you can't prove it.
- But you can gather a whole bunch of Z's before the program and show they have the same average across treatment and control groups, and that might assuage some fear.

Program Design

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- Economics is all about *incentives* and *constraints*...
  - What sort of incentives could the government provide to households?
  - What sort of constraints could the government relax for households?

Alternatives

- Supply approaches
  - Build schools near where kids live (reduce cost of getting to school)
  - Increase school resources (teacher salaries, meals, etc.)
  - Might not affect enrollment gap between poor & non-poor students

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- Demand approach: conditional cash transfers (CCT)
  - Subsidies targeted to poor ("means tested")
  - Compensate families for opportunity cost of child's labor
    - school itself is free
  - Minimize disincentive to work (conditioned only on pre-program income)

Program Implementation

- Initial census to determine eligibility status
  - about 2/3 of households qualified
  - Do we care at all about the non-eligible households?
- Monthly educational grants
  - children enrolled in grades 3-9
  - conditional on 85% attendance rates (confirmed by teacher)
  - increasing in grades and extra bonus for girls in secondary school
    - 70-255 pesos
    - girl in 9th grade $\sim$ 44% of day-laborer's monthly earnings

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- Fertility
  - program initially for 3 years only, but if viewed as an entitlement, bigger effect among eligible mothers
  - for teenage girls, staying in school could reduce fertility

What Z's are observable?

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- Community level
  - school quality (proxied with # kids/teacher)
  - distance to secondary school
  - distance to urban labor market
    - farther away $\rightarrow$ lower opportunity cost of time
    - farther away $\rightarrow$ less info about returns to schooling
- Household level
  - parent's education
  - PRE-program poverty index (what problem with concurrent income level?)
- Child level
  - age
  - sex
  - grades completed

What Z's are unobservable?

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- Community level
  - "cohesiveness"
  - local returns to schooling
- Household level
  - parents' preferences for schooling
- Child level
  - child's preferences for schooling
  - ability

Deep Thoughts on Randomization

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- You can't ignore "political" consequences.
- The idea is that the researchers want to compare participants - but participants are also likely to compare themselves to one another in cases where the treatment is observable.
  - Randomizing at the household level might solve some of these problems associated with child-level randomization, but is it the best solution?
- Ultimately, Progresa randomization was at the village level.
  - Does this solve all the problems we might worry about?
- Localities phased-in: treatment got it starting in 1998, controls got it starting in 2000

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- "Within-group"
  - treat subgroups
  - caution: is control group contaminated?
- Encouragement design
  - treatment available to everyone, but take-up rate varies
  - randomly assign some people encouragement to receive treatment
  - analytically difficult (only changes probability of treatment)

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- Reduced inequality between poor & non-poor kids

So, should we expand Progresa everywhere?

- Behrman & Todd estimate that increases in earning power from more education exceed costs of program by 40-110%!
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- But what about ***external validity***?

Re-cap

- Correlation is not causation
- Goal of impact evaluation is to identify ***causal*** effects of X on Y
- Omitted variable bias is a big problem
- Randomization is the safest way to avoid OVB
- Progresa case study
  - randomized at locality level (phased-in pilot)
  - conditional cash transfers increased school attendance
  - concern w/ any randomized evaluation is external validity

Return