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Letter from the Editors

Dear Readers,

We are happy to present the Spring 2018 issue of Clio’s Scroll. This issue contains three wonderful essays that each remind us of history’s continuing relevance to the present.

In his essay, “The Privileges of Parity: Rome’s Senatorial Oligarchy and Its Institutionalized Mechanisms of Self-Regulation During the Middle Republic,” UC Berkeley senior, Brian Tsui, takes a novel, theoretically inflected, approach to the study of ancient Rome. He explores the institutional rules, both spoken and unspoken, of the Roman Senate, demonstrating how the Senate worked to preserve itself as an institution by regulating and policing the behavior of its members. These rules became so institutionalized that, as Tsui argues, they endured even as the Roman Oligarchy’s power began to wane.

In “Savage Tories: Britain, Loyalists, and the Development of American Racial Identity in New York and Pennsylvania, 1776-1779,” recent Stanford graduate, Zachary Brown, examines anti-British and anti-Loyalist sentiment during the American Revolutionary War, arguing that such rhetoric was inherently racialized. Indeed, he demonstrates that, as the war progressed, colonial depictions of the British and their Native American allies began to blur together as the British began to take on many of the same “savage” characteristics as the well-established Native American Other. As such, Brown makes an important contribution to our understanding of the origins of American racial and national identity.

Finally, in his senior thesis, “‘For the Peasant to Profit, He Must Be Freed’: David Barrows’ Egalitarian Education Reforms in the Colonial Philippines, 1903-1909,” recent UC Berkeley graduate, Jeffrey Myers, examines David Barrows’ tenure as a colonial official in the Philippines. In contrast to many of his colleagues, Barrows advocated an educational program for the colony that privileged building literacy over inculcating technical skills, putting him at odds with the American business community. As such, Myers sheds light on the highly contested nature of American educational policy in the colonial Philippines and, in doing so, compels us to reckon with the complexity of Barrows’ legacy as both a pedagogical progressive and a colonial official with racial views that we would today view as abhorrent.

As all three authors demonstrate, the legacies of the past are almost
never simple. Whether it be the regulatory mechanisms institutionalized by the Roman Senate, the racial discourse produced by American colonists in rural Pennsylvania and New York during the Revolutionary War, or the educational policies of the American colonial project in the Philippines, the interpretations and narratives that we glean from historical study are never predetermined. In this sense, the essays contained in this issue remind us of why we study history: to interpret (or reinterpret) the past, not simply chronicle it.

The Editorial Board would like to thank the Associated Students of the University of California (ASUC) for their generous funding that makes this publication and editorial process possible. As always, we are indebted to the Berkeley Department of History for its steadfast support, guidance, and encouragement. Finally, we would like to thank the contributors; we hope their essays will inspire our readers and perhaps provoke thoughtful discussion.

Sincerely,
The Editors
Contributors

ZACHARY BROWN recently graduated from Stanford University with a major in History and concentration in United States history. His research interests include the American Revolutionary War, anti-Indianism in the early American frontier, and the development of Federal Indian Policy in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

JEFFREY R. MYERS recently graduated from the University of California, Berkeley as a double major in Political Science and History and a minor in Political Economy. His research interests range from gerrymandering and early US elections to late modern Europe and Southeast Asian history.

BRIAN TSUI is a senior at UC Berkeley pursuing a major in History with an intended concentration in the Roman Republic, and a minor in Public Policy. His research interests include ancient Rome, U.S. foreign policy, democratization, and the resiliency of international institutions. He wishes to thank Professor Michael Taylor for his inspiring and insightful support throughout the research and writing process.
I. Introduction

For centuries, the Roman Senate governed the Republic’s vast dominions, and those outside its chambers listened. But to this charmed clique of three hundred senators, its authority was only as powerful as the willingness of each individual member to abide by certain norms of conduct—norms designed to safeguard the Senate’s overarching goal: to never lose its oligarchical control over Rome to the people, or worse, a tyrant sprung from its own ranks.

So when Tiberius Gracchus, an aristocrat and senatorial magistrate of the most Roman blood, infringed upon the Senate’s authority and violated its norms of conduct, he paid a terrible price. Senators, fearful of their internal rules cascading down a slippery slope, stormed the Capitoline to forcefully arrest what they saw as Tiberius’ illegal re-election for plebian tribune. As confusion descended into violence, Tiberius and some three hundred of his supporters were killed, bludgeoned with “hastily-improvised” clubs and broken bits of furniture from senators and their retainers.

If Tiberius Gracchus overstepped the Senate’s internal precedents and principles in 133 BCE, his successors in the following decades of the Republic would outright trample over them. The Senate from 88 - 82 BCE saw open civil war between legions fighting over Rome under the Sullan and Marian factions, and from 49 - 44 BCE saw Julius Caesar destroy his senatorial enemies and declare himself dictator perpetuo, dictator for life. For

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2 Ibid., 19.2-19.5; David Stockton, The Gracchi (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 76. For a careful consideration and reconstruction of surviving accounts on the confrontation, see Alan Edgar Astin, Scipio Aemilianius (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 218 - 225. Although Plutarch notes that “more than three hundred were slain by blows from sticks and stones,” Astin proffers that a number were most likely killed or crushed in the flight of the panicked crowd in the midst of the congested assembly grounds. Plutarch, The Life of Tiberius Gracchus, 19.5; Astin, Scipio Aemilianus, 224.
a state that had functioned under internally non-violent senatorial rule for centuries, the overt use of violence between senatorial elites to address political issues and the destructive civil wars in the late Republic were horrifically unprecedented. A common rationale among narratives of the Republic’s descent into Augustan monarchy is that increased factionalism, among other causes, stretched an insurmountable chasm between elites that fractured oligarchical cooperation.

But although violence may have been novel to Roman politics from 133 BCE onwards, factionalism, intrigue, and ambition were endemic to the lives of senators since the Republic’s founding. Understanding the Republic’s death, then, compels the corresponding question of how such an oligarchy lived at all. How was the Senate, composed of three hundred self-interested individuals vying to out-compete their peers, able to collectively maintain internal stability over the most expansive and dominant state in the Ancient Mediterranean for the span of the Middle Republic? Much of historical scholarship has primarily looked toward international or economic factors propelling the success of the Roman elite, with studies on the internal politics of the Senate often gravitating toward concerns over its connections to the other branches of Republican government. Consequently, this paper seeks to address the seeming success of senatorial collective action in the face of pervasive individual ambition by examining the internal functioning of the Senate, specifically through the regulatory mechanisms—formal and informal rules—employed by and against its own members.

This paper finds that the senatorial oligarchy wielded four primary mechanisms of self-regulation against the threat or damage to its stability from a member seeking to expand his own power at the expense of the senatorial oligarchy. The Senate utilized 1) a rigidly defined system of checks and balances within the *cursus honorum*; 2) constraints over the military and the autonomy of its members abroad; 3) restrictions on wealth inequality; and 4) a set of flexible but informal mechanisms that slashed at the influence and authority of a defector. Through case studies of Scipio Africanus and

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5 The number of senators serving at any one time was determined by the censors, and is suggested to have been roughly around 300. Lintott asserts that ‘effective membership’ would have been less than 300. Andrew Lintott, *The Constitution of the Roman Republic* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 72.

6 Informal mechanisms were actions taken by the Senate against its members that were neither constitutionally nor forcefully binding—e.g. senatus consultum, public denunciations of character. For more, see pages 15-16.
Tiberius Gracchus, two prominent threats to senatorial supremacy during this time, this paper concludes that the strength of the Senate’s constraints over foreign service and its hierarchically defined roles allowed for the oligarchy to aptly curtail elite defection supported by popularity or military power. However, the weaknesses of the Senate’s internal economic regulations and the reliance of its informal methods of self-policing on senatorial soft power over the Republic failed to properly respond to both the internal shock of the influx of wealth in the late second century BCE, as well as the combined use of a tribune’s legislative powers and an agitated mob to defy the oligarchy’s propriety and power.

**Historiography of the Senate as an Oligarchy**

Before embarking upon an analysis of the oligarchy’s mechanisms for self-regulation, I will first situate this paper in the context of a longstanding debate on the extent to which the public (*populares Romanus*) played a role in the political functioning of the Republic, and secondly provide a theoretical framework for understanding the tenor and character of oligarchies upon which this paper’s analyses will be grounded. Currently, much of historiographical perspectives on Roman politics fall between the conflicting poles of Fergus Millar’s “radical” thesis that democratic elements of the people’s will were central to Rome, and the “traditional” interpretation from Friedreich Munzer and Ronald Syme that citizens played a minimal role under the oligarchic rule of the senatorial elite. This paper will acknowledge that while there was undeniable interplay and substantial give-and-take between aristocratic politics and the will of the public, the overwhelming majority of lasting policy developments were produced through the political initiative, leadership, and hallowed *auctoritas* of the elite senatorial class, a social circle that wielded immense political power and influence in dictating and dominating matters of state. The Senate and its

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8 “Auctoritas (from which the English word ‘authority’ derives) [...] was the quality that makes others feel they should pay special attention to what they say [...] *auctoritas* helps account for
magistrates possessed formal control over the state purse, national security, the administration of Italy, and foreign relations;\(^9\) and wielded considerable soft power over the functioning of the Republic through its outsized role in advising and approving legislation and the command of vast patronage and clientele networks under patrician and plebeian leaders in the Senate.\(^{10}\) Moreover, the discourse of scholarship in recent years has re-converged at an understanding of the Senate as the predominant political institution of Rome and as an apparatus for the oligarchical rule of its members over the Middle Republic. Such an understanding of the Senate as an oligarchy will serve as the bedrock of this paper.

Finally, this study’s considerations of the senatorial oligarchy will be limited to the period from the late second century BCE to 133 BCE, during which the oligarchy’s legal, constitutional, and informal mechanisms of self-regulation were both legally instituted and more expressively exercised. Centuries prior to the Middle Republic (264 - 133) saw greater intra-political and inter-elite conflict within the state through the Conflict of the Orders, how an advisory body [the Senate] could be the heart and soul of Roman government [...] it was conceived as a body of fathers, with all that entailed for Romans.” Michael Burger, *The Shaping of Western Civilization: From Antiquity to the Enlightenment* (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 2008), 95.

\(^9\) Polybius, *The Histories*, trans. Fridericus Hultsch and Evelyn S. Shuckburgh (London and New York: Macmillan and Company, 1889), 6.31. The actual decision of war and peace was determined through the vote of popular assemblies but the entirety of the nuances and the carrying out of policies in terms of peace terms, who would be responsible and sent to administer regions, etc., military funds, were all absorbed within the domain of the Senate.

\(^{10}\) Popular assemblies were a part of the political process but held limited influence on matters of state. Frank Burr Marsh and H.H. Scullard, *A History of the Roman World, 146 to 30 BC* (London: Methuen & Co, 1963), 24-35; North, “The Constitution of the Roman Republic,” 260-266; Holkeskamp, *Reconstructing the Roman Republic*, 76-97. Marsh and Scullard decisively write, “The Roman people offered no serious opposition because under the circumstances they were helpless [...] Roman law permitted public meetings only when called by a magistrate and gave to him complete control over all proceedings. Thus private citizens could not meet or speak in public except with the consent of some magistrate, and when all of these were the tools of the machine the people were not only helpless to act but gagged as well” Marsh and Scullard, *A History of the Roman World, 146 to 30 BC*, 24. “Without a magistrate or a candidate to give voice to their grievance [...] the citizenry was left with primarily symbolic forms with which they could express their desires and their grievances.” Daniel J. Gargola, “Mediterranean Empire (264 - 134),” in Rosenstein and Morstein-Marx, *A Companion to the Roman Republic*, 162. On a senator’s role in office, see Michael H. Crawford, *The Roman Republic* (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1978), 32-37. The Senate’s role in approving legislation was immense; see Polybius, *The Histories*, 6.13-6.17. On the clientele and patronage networks of the senatorial elite and the loyalty of clients to their patrons, see Crawford, *The Roman Republic*, 35-37; Matthias Gelzer, *The Roman Nobility* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969), 63-86
and the hegemony of the Senate as an institution had not been as solidified as it was during the mid-second century. Historians, including Cicero himself, view the second century as a golden age of senatorial rule. My first case study will begin in 205, when the oligarchy of the second century faced its greatest internal test of regulation against the immensely well-supported and powerful Scipio Africanus. This paper will end in 133 with Tiberius Gracchus’ successful violation of senatorial power that resulted in what the field taxonomizes as the beginning of the Late Republic: an almost hundred-year span wherein the Roman Senate faced a series of threats to its power, legitimacy, and authority that resolved with the dissolution of senatorial power and the establishment of imperial rule under the principate.

**Theoretical Framework of Oligarchy**

This paper will base its view of the Roman Senate’s oligarchical anatomy through the theoretical lens of Matthew Simonton’s study of oligarchical politics in Classical Greece. Simonton posits that successful oligarchies employ internal mechanisms against their own members in order to curb “defection,” a process in which an oligarch, in pursuit of greater personal power, breaks rank from his peers to overthrow the oligarchy. Defection often occurs through demagogic appeals to the suppressed citizenry, conspiracies with foreign powers, or the inciting of factional violence among oligarchs. Simonton notes that successful defectors oust the oligarchy and establish monarchical or democratic rule, but even failed defectors permanently damage the oligarchy’s legitimacy to the people. Consequently, stable oligarchies must prevent individual oligarchs from believing that greater power can be gained from defection, and have the capacity to surgically subdue defections should they arise. Although Simonton’s study of oligarchies is based upon classical Greek oligarchies, Rome’s senatorial leaders possessed similar characteristics of oligarchical rule that allow its system to be examined under the same theoretical rubric. Gated by intensive barriers of entry, the Senate was an institutionalized

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11 All years will be in BCE unless otherwise denoted.


13 Simonton notes that most oligarchical institutions are unable to regain their former influence after a particularly public power-struggle against a defector. Matthew Simonton, *Classical Greek Oligarchy: A Political History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), 266, 270-273.

14 Twenty six major families maintained regular possession of the highest offices in the Republic and were concentrically involved through internal marriages and possession of concentric patronage networks that allowed for them to govern much of the Republic. Leading
chamber of power-sharing that held disproportionate and overt dominance over a massive citizen body. In understanding the senatorial elite as an oligarchy and drawing upon Simonton’s considerations, this paper’s examination of the Senate’s laws, customs, and internal behavior yields four dominant means that the senatorial oligarchy used to intervene against or curtail possible defection.

II. Oligarchical Methods of Self-Regulation

Mechanism #1: The Cursus Honorum and Defined Political Office Roles

Perhaps the most enduring of these mechanisms was the constitutional system of power-sharing and regulation induced by the defined roles of each senatorial office and the internal structure of the oligarchy. The senatorial elite, as the collection of all magistrates and ex-magistrates selected by the censor for senatorial membership at a given year, was organized under a rigid hierarchy of power ranked through the status of civil offices each member currently held or had held in their respective careers. Each office, in addition to its terms lasting for only one

members in the upper crust of the aristocracy are specifically demarcated as nobiles. Gelzer, The Roman Nobility, 27-40, 49-50; At least 70% of consuls possessed consular ancestors at all times from 179 – 49 BCE. E. Badian, Foreign Clientelae (264-70 B.C.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), 441; Moreover, education, wealth, and pedigree barriers made it very difficult for a novus homo, a new man without aristocratic ancestors, to succeed. Cicero’s viewed his own particular success in attaining the consulship as no small feat, and often discusses the lineage of his senatorial colleagues. Gelzer, The Roman Nobility, 32. “From the very early times the families already ennobled began to draw together into a narrow and exclusive circle.” Marsh and Scullard, A History of the Roman World, 146 to 30 BC, 17.

15 Members of the elite held formal levers of advantages over their less endowed rivals through the public displays of ancestral masks in funerals, ceremonial displays at the forum showing a senator’s ambitiones, where candidates were accompanied and often received patronage from prominent senators. Gargola, “Mediterranean Empire (264-134),” 162-3; Harriet Flower, Roman Republics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 60-70.

16 Magistrates serving their terms of office will be considered in league with the rest of the Senate despite the Senate’s official role as an advisory body, given the high degree of cooperation between the Senate and magistrates, and the confluence of goals, motivations, and backgrounds the members who staffed the positions shared, “Not only did [magistrates] consult it [the Senate] on all important questions of administration, but they almost invariably submitted all bills for its approval before taking them to the assembly for formal ratification […] any administrative act in Rome itself […] could be stopped at once by the veto of a tribune, and the machine could almost always find at least one among the ten ready to defend its interests.” Marsh and Scullard, A History of the Roman World, 146 to 30 BC, 24.

17 The majority of offices were held for one year, with censors serving five year terms. Oligarchs could only hold a magistrate post once so if they failed to further ascend the political summit in that service, that was the highest post they could reach, and the end of their career. The only office available to be held repetitively was that of the highest office in the Republic, the consul, and even then there was a mandatory ten-year hiatus between
The Privileges of Parity

year, possessed a variety of constitutional powers that checked the actions of other offices. A tribune of the plebs could exercise its veto over another tribune’s proposals, the censors could strum members out of the Senate during the census conducted every five years, and multiple praetors and consuls prevented any one consul or praetor from possessing control over too many soldiers or citizens. Moreover, the Senate unambiguously systemized its internal order of authority (cursus honorum) in a series of laws from 197-180 that held elites to a clear understanding of the procedure for acquiring power within the oligarchy. In 196, plebeian aediles were constrained through an imposed one year wait before their campaigns for praetor; in 184, a Senate ruling made official a previous tradition against simultaneous office-holdings; in 181, the Senate’s passage of the lex Baebia cut down the number of praetorships available from six to four in alternating years, and in 180, the comprehensive lex Villia Annalis demarcated age requirements for the candidacy of each curule office and is speculated to also have implemented further time-gaps between the holding of offices. Such laws proposed by the law-makers to govern themselves are clear steps the oligarchy took to mollify the competition for power among its members; competition for the high offices of praetor and consul was spaced out through time gaps and limited through downsizing the number of possible candidates for office in a given year. Age minima further served to ensure opportunities to run for the office. North, “The Constitution of the Roman Republic,” 256-278.

18 Ibid., 266
21 Ibid., 40.44.2; T. CoreyBrennan, The Praetorship in the Roman Republic: Volume 1: Origins to 122 BC (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 170; Evans and Kleijwegt, “Did the Romans like Young Men?,” 181. The lex Baebia’s stipulation of limiting praetors in alternating years would be repealed (‘derogued’) in 177 most likely due to a desire to extend praetorships in Spain, but its passage in 180 indicates a clear senatorial desire to limit praetor candidates and an internal concern over excessive levels of competition for the highest magistracies. Brennan, The Praetorship in the Roman Republic, 625. Cato would write that the Baebian law should not be “derogued.” Ibid., 170.
22 Livy, History of Rome, 40.44.1; Flower, Roman Republics; Gargola, “Mediterranean Empire (264 - 134),” 162. Age requirements have been determined from the scholarship through tracing the timeline of political careers: “thirty-six for aedileship, thirty-nine for praetorship, and forty-two for the consulship.” Evans and Kleijweght, “Did the Romans like Young Men?,” 182. Unfortunately, Flower writes that Livy glosses over the details and much of the legal details or ramifications has been pieced together through analysis from historical scholarship. Flower, Roman Republics.
23 The cursus honorum was noted to have become crowded in the demographic recovery that followed the Second Punic War. Charles Goldberg, Priests and Politicians: rex sacrorum and
a long institutionalization of new members in understanding the functioning of the oligarchy, and a need to demonstrate their loyalty and character before obtaining responsibility acquiring power. Ultimately this series of laws and customs, along with minor revisions made afterwards, effectively allowed the Senate to limit potential discord by providing a system of checks and balances between offices, regulating competition, promoting ample power-sharing opportunities, and preventing threats to the stability of the senatorial/magistrate system by barring people from leapfrogging the staircase of power. The persistence of these laws until dictatorial revocation under Sulla a century afterwards demonstrates the importance of these laws regulating the *cursus honorum* as a linchpin of the Senate’s desire to police internal disruption.

**Mechanism #2: Restraints over the Military and Service Abroad**

One of the most sought-after shortcuts for aristocrats to scale the heights of power and circumvent the rigid hierarchy of the oligarchy was to personally earn the mass favor of the *populares* through military *gloria* and prestige. But because of the Republic’s cultural infatuation with military *virtus* and its prevalence in Roman politics, the oligarchy was finely attuned to the possibility of its members abroad with military and relative political autonomy acquiring influence that could threaten the Senate’s undisputed authority. First, consuls and praetors were beholden to the approval of the Senate for the assignment of not only their provincial region of authority, but also the extent of their military manpower and resources.

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24 Given the power dynamics of age, young magistrates often needed to oblige the interests of those holding higher offices to receive support in future elections. This also provided a means for magistrates to have to demonstrate their loyalty and character to the entrenched ranks of the oligarchy before ascending the heights of power. Gargola, “Mediterranean Empire (264 - 134),” 162.

25 The fact that a once informal ladder of ascent had to be formalized three centuries since the founding of the Republic demonstrates the clear need and recognition of oligarchs to want to police themselves.

26 Nathan Rosenstein, “Aristocratic Values,” in Rosenstein and Morstein-Marx, A Companion to the Roman Republic, 365-367; Polybius, *The Histories*, 31.29.1. Additionally, when comparing Carthaginian and Roman values, Polybius uses the ostentatious veneration of bravery in a man’s funeral oration to state that the republic was composed of “men ready to endure anything to win a reputation in their country for valor.” Ibid., 6.52.11.

27 On military allotments, see Polybius, *The Histories*, 6.15.5-6.15.8; On provincial assignments, Brennan writes, “Once there was a college of more than one or two praetors, they received their provinces by lot.” Brennan, *The Praetorship in the Roman Republic*, 4. See also North, *The Constitution of the Roman Republic*, 267.
provincial governorships (prorogation), the Senate wielded the authority to retain or replace its magistrates should they contravene senatorial interests. Moreover, in addition to their conduciveness for power-sharing, short office-terms allowed for the Senate to punish magistrates through prosecution after the sanctified legal shield of their one-year terms had passed. Finally, senatorial endorsement and funding were necessary for the triumph, the greatest opportunity an aristocrat could possess in garnering the attention and favor of the people and amassing extraordinary cultural distinction, prestige, and gravitas as a public figure of consequence. Thus despite the oligarchy’s endowment to its magistrates abroad with imperium and auctoritas, the oligarchy wielded a clear arsenal of effective mechanisms that bounded the parameters of its members’ abilities to obtain excessive influence through the increased freedom of overseas autonomy. Individuals aspiring for power through military glory effectively needed to cooperate and maintain the support of the entrenched elites, and consequently the particular type of systemic threat posed by the popular support for outstanding military leaders like Scipio Africanus, Flamininus, Aemilus Paullus, and Scipio Aemilianius was one that the collective elite aptly and capably addressed.

**Mechanism #3: Curbing Economic Inequality**

Thirdly, the Senate instituted statutes to govern potential disruptions to the socio-economic equity between its members. Laws were implemented against bribery of voters by senatorial elites (electoral bribery, ambitus), and against senators accepting bribes from clients or allies abroad for political favors. Bribery between officials, especially in service abroad,
was regulated after 149 through the *lex Calpurnia*, which set up extortion courts staffed by senatorial jurors (*quaestio de repetundis*) for the first time.\(^{34}\) The *lex Oppia* of 215, *lex Orchia* of 181, *lex Fannia* of 161, *lex Didia* of 143, and *lex Licinia* of 142/1 were a series of sumptuary laws passed by the Senate that curtailed individual members’ spending on the ostentation of their wives, the number of guests allowed at entertainment events, and the exact sums to be spent on festivals. Moreover, the laws increased penalties for attendees of overly expensive entertainment events.\(^{35}\) Together the bribery and sumptuary laws criminalized abuses of economic power from senatorial elites and excessive displays of affluence, demonstrating the Senate’s self-awareness of the need to combat both its own increasing levels of corruption and rising socio-economic security dilemma competitions over financial status.\(^{36}\) But although the laws represented clear strides of oligarchical economic self-regulation, these mechanisms primarily aided in mitigating excess, and lacked the comprehensiveness and depth of the

certain modicum of penalty and public fear of being caught with bribery. Polybius’ statement in book 31 indicates that he believed there had been an increase in the number of officials accepting bribes. Ibid., 31.25.3; Crawford, *The Roman Republic*, 79.

\(^{34}\) Regarding the bribery of other officials, the *lex Calpurnia* of 149 set up the republic’s permanent court where members of the oligarchy operated for the first time as jurors (*quaestio de repetundis*) in policing extortion from their peers serving in provinces abroad. Such a law legally bequeathed oligarchs with the responsibility to police their own peers’ financial activities abroad. Flower, *Roman Republics*. On the level of extortion, see Lintott, *The Constitution of the Roman Republic*, 141. Practically, however, the courts changed little of the Senate’s crackdown on extortion. Crawford writes, “petitioners still had to plead through senatorial patroni, who might be reluctant to press charges against members of their own order [. . .] it was not until Gaius Gracchus was able to] institute a stiffer procedure and to introduce a penalty.” Crawford, *The Roman Republic*, 81. A magistrate was instructed to investigate with senators as the jury and judges. Lintott, *The Constitution of the Roman Republic*, 133. Prior to this law, special investigations of misconduct through ad hoc quaestiones were conducted by magistrates. For example, the misconduct of a Spanish governor in 171 and Lucius Scipio’s trial in 187 were conducted through magistrates and the appeal of tribunes of the plebs. Ibid., 140.


\(^{36}\) A security dilemma can be observed within the various actors of the Senate, given the aristocrats innate need to compete with each other. On security dilemmas, see Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2017). When one member of the oligarchy had acquired wealth the rest had no serious alternative but to attempt to follow suit or lose face by comparison and run the risk of [the most heinous fear of an oligarch] losing status.” Crawford, *The Roman Republic*, 88. A socio-economical security dilemma over status and power presents spiraling effects of excessive concern over the wealth of others and a desire to resort to methods detrimental to the collective to acquire that wealth.
oligarchy’s methods used to maintain political or military order.\textsuperscript{37} The improperly managed influx of overseas wealth in the late second century would have grave impacts on economic inequality and elite unity in the late second century.\textsuperscript{38}

**Mechanism #4: Informal Modes of Self-Regulation**

Of lesser authority but perhaps employed to a greater extent were the informal instruments of self-policing that oligarchs used against each other. Although lacking in the force of law, such methods had the *de-facto* capacity to thwart popular support for fellow members of the oligarchy by opposing their intended policies or discrediting their character. First, laws or actions taken by magistrates that the Senate did not approve of could be counteracted through a decree of a *senatus consultum*, which discharged a collective advisory directive that held substantial binding power to magistrates.\textsuperscript{39} Moreover, the Senate’s structured debate format based on seniority and its unbounded, vast expanse of advisory power over other offices ensured that the interests of the senatorial elite were always asserted.\textsuperscript{40} Additionally, political alliances between senators\textsuperscript{41} and powerful clientele and patronage networks further contributed to the ability of entrenched oligarchs to stifle and oppose political enemies to the established order.\textsuperscript{42} Finally, influential or well-spoken senators were afforded the ability

\textsuperscript{37} See discussion of Mechanisms 1 and 2 on pages 10-13.

\textsuperscript{38} Such consequences will be discussed further in Section IV of this paper, Evaluating the Oligarchy’s Methods: Exogenous and Endogenous Shocks. For further discussion on the importance of preserving elite economic equality, see Simonton, *Classical Greek Oligarchy*, 89-93.

\textsuperscript{39} “In republican times, [a senatus consultum] did not have legislative force, but, de facto, it was binding.” Robert C. Byrd, *The Senate of the Roman Republic: Addresses on the History of Roman Constitutionalism* (Honolulu, HI: University Press of the Pacific, 2001), 44.

\textsuperscript{40} “Power of the senate was really based on the fact that it did not have any formally defined or precisely circumscribed responsibilities.” Holkeskamp, *Reconstructing the Roman Republic*, 26. “Roman institutions [the powers of the Senate] were defined as much by custom and mos [...] it was the very lack of positively defined ‘rights’ that was the real reason for its immense authority.” Mouritsen, *Politics in the Roman Republic*, 143.

\textsuperscript{41} Factions that opposed Scipio in the Hannibalic War, factions over military strategy, and factions in the 180s show that elites have always organized themselves into factions to get their collective views across, consequently making it difficult for defectors to gather storm or to acquire power without disrupting the institutional inertia of the Senate. H.H. Scullard, *History of the Roman World From 753 to 146 BC* (London: Methuen & Company, 1980), 325 - 328.

\textsuperscript{42} “The ties that connected the leading men of the cities of Italy or the provinces with the members of the Roman ruling class provided the Romans with multiple sources of information and various means of action.” Elizabeth Deniaux, “Patronage,” in Rosenstein and Morstein-Marx, *A Companion to the Roman Republic*, 410. On clientele and patronage abroad, see Crawford, *The Roman Republic*, 76.
to leverage the ample avenues of airing public and senatorial critique to denounce, humiliate, and reduce the influence of political opponents. The Senate’s cumulative influence and informal political weight thus allowed for a less-bounded penumbra of means with which senators and their collective jealousy could subdue the popularity or political threat of their peers. However, given these methods’ less precise or definitive nature, their success was ponderously reliant on both the cohesive unity of the Senate to oppose defectors as well as the Senate’s overwhelming dominance of influence in the Republic. Both components would be chipped away as exogenous and endogenous factors from Rome’s imperial expansion impacted its internal political and economic integrity.

III. Evaluating the Oligarchy’s Methods: Case Studies of Prominent Defectors

Having identified the oligarchy’s major mechanisms of self-regulation and evaluated their theoretical potency, it is necessary to dissect the way these mechanisms were employed in practice against threats. The following section will analyze the ability of these mechanisms to subdue and disincentivize defection through a careful study of their application toward the two most prominent threats to the oligarchical establishment during their respective time periods: Scipio Africanus in the midst of the Second Punic War’s tumult, and Tiberius Gracchus in the wake of domestic challenges from Rome’s imperial expansion.

Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus—Conqueror, Consul, Censor

Following a string of decisive victories in Spain during the alarm of the Hannibalic War, Scipio Africanus possessed an inordinate amount of popular support and political allies under his name that made him a major threat to the hegemony and stability of the senatorial elite.


On other opportunities for elites to peacefully resolve issues, see Mouritsen, Politics in the Roman Republic, 110-111.

44 “The formation of senatorial policy thus relied on a high degree of consensus [...] when the elite were split [over defectors], the senate became paralyzed and powerless.” Mouritsen, Politics in the Roman Republic, 143.

45 Polybius and Livy, the two eminent historians on this period, both liken Scipio’s influence at the time to that of a king. Polybius writes, “He again and again rejected what Fortune had put within his grasp [...] the power of a king.” Polybius, The Histories, 10.40. Livy writes, “People had come together from all over, not only to vote, but just to get a glimpse of Publius Scipio.”
regardless of his willingness to disrupt the stability of the senatorial order, the Senate’s internal mechanisms aptly proved to be successful in overpowering his influence by undermining his career militarily, politically, and personally. The Senate’s concerns over his popularity were first exerted with their clearly politically-motivated denial of Scipio’s request for a triumph upon his return to Rome in 205, despite the overwhelming degree of his military success in Spain and its importance for Rome’s life-and-death struggle with Carthage. Although his appointment as proconsul to Spain in spite of his youth marked an exception to the *cursus honorum*, its rigid hierarchy of qualifications for ascension still carried tremendous weight. The stripping of his triumph is thus a clear display of the Senate’s unwillingness to reward his splendid success at the expense of the political system.

By that time, however, his popularity had reached such heights that much of the public and the lower ranks of the oligarchy believed he had the power to defy the senatorial machine and ably declare his consular assignment to Africa by submitting the vote for his command to the people should the Senate not rule in his favor. The oligarchy, possessing influence over and represented through loyal tribunes of the plebs, was able to counter Scipio’s popularity by threatening the use of a tribune’s veto against any attempt from Scipio to bring the vote to the people. The threat of a veto, reinforced by Fabius Maximus’ public remarks on Scipio’s self-centered and un-republican assault of senatorial rule, effectively deterred Scipio from taking an intra-oligarchical issue to the people as an avenue of

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47 H.H. Scullard, *Scipio Africanus: Soldier and Politician* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1970), 220. Scipio’s military successes were immense and met standard Roman qualifications for a triumph: “He had gone to Spain to face four commanders and for victorious armies [...] and had not left a single Carthaginian in the land.” Livy, *History of Rome*, 28.38. Scipio instead was compensated only with games he put on which he vowed during the mutiny of troops in Spain, and out of his own finances. Ibid., 28.39.

48 “He did not pursue the matter earnestly, since it was well known that, to that day, no man who had not been in office at the moment of his success [at the age of 31] had ever celebrated a triumph.” Livy, *History of Rome*, 28.38.

49 Livy, *History of Rome*, 28.40 “Scipio’s address was less favorably received: word had got round that, if he failed in the Senate to have Africa assigned to him as his area of responsibility, he would immediately bring a proposal before the people.” Ibid., 28.45.

50 “The tribunes then delivered the following judgement: ‘If the consul permits the Senate to decide on the assignment of responsibilities, it is our wish that the decision of the Senate be binding, and we shall not allow the matter to be brought before the people.” Livy, *History of Rome*, 28.45.

51 Ibid., 28.45
circumventing oligarchical power. Scipio can thus be seen as a Simontonian _defector_ that sought to leverage his popularity against the oligarchy, but was prevented from doing so when the oligarchy’s constitutional mechanisms stifled the success of his strategy. Nevertheless, because Scipio did receive the Africa command via the Senate, we are ultimately precluded from knowing whether the general would have been willing to defy the oligarchy and push the vote to the people had he been unsuccessful in receiving senatorial approval. Despite such a lapse of knowledge, we are made incontrovertibly aware of Scipio’s surrender of the vote to the Senate, his pledge to accept its results, and his compliance with the Senate’s insufficient allotment of troops. Moreover, Scipio had also acquiesced to receiving his consular command by sortition earlier in the year. Ultimately, whether because the general was unwilling to push the Senate’s boundaries and sacrifice a loss of prestige, or because his acquisition of the Africa command at the expense of fewer military resources was a good compromise, we can see that the capable binds of the oligarchical machine successfully prevented outright defection. The oligarchy’s mechanisms over provincial assignments, military allotments, and its legislative maneuvers through the tribunes of the plebs thus provided it with the bandwidth to determine the shape and magnitude of Scipio’s access to power despite his personal influence.

Moreover, despite the popular support Scipio received following his resounding victory over Hannibal in 202, his hold on influence and power within the oligarchy itself would be tenuous and come under constant scrutiny until his retirement and death in 184/3. Senatorial factions, notably the Fabian group led by Cato the Elder, utilized tribunes of the plebs to legally and publically prosecute his brother in 187 and Scipio himself in 185 on allegations of bribery. Although Scipio was able to draw upon the support of the mob to successfully denounce the charges on the basis of his character and illustrious history of service, senatorial attempts to bring him to trial continued, and much of his political influence had been successfully

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52 As a consular candidate Scipio would have had no means of countering the veto from a tribune of the plebs, unlike Tiberius who would be able to use his legal powers to depose a vetoing tribune.
53 Scipio would have needed a sizable force to defeat Hannibal, yet he was apportioned by the Senate only the defeated veterans of Cannae and volunteers. Livy, _History of Rome_, 28.45.
54 He was fortunate to receive Sicily because his co consul was the pontifex maximus and had to remain in Rome. Livy, _History of Rome_, 28.38. Once again Scipio’s fortune precludes us from knowing whether he would have been willing to leverage his popularity to defect had the final outcomes not played out in his favor.
56 Livy, _History of Rome_, 38.50 – 38.52.
The Privileges of Parity

diminished through the Senate’s informal mechanisms of leveraging public scandal or political obstruction against him and his allies.  

57 Scipio Africanus’ repeated concessions to each of the Senate’s regulations and procedures even when they assailed his interests, and ultimate decline in power despite his continued popular support, are unambiguous demonstrations of the oligarchy’s triumph in self-regulation.

Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus — Tribune of the People

In the late second century, an oligarchical defector whose background and pedigree mirrored that of Scipio would far more successfully elude the mechanisms of the oligarchy.  

58 As a tribune of the plebs in 133, Tiberius Gracchus enacted legislative proposals that earned him wide-ranging support from the rural and urban plebs, the burgeoning equestrian class, and Italian allies.  

59 Not only did Tiberius’ programs dilute the Senate’s hold over the republic by striking at its wealth and institutional power,  

60 but the machinations he used to execute his agenda directly

57 “Cato prevented Minucius Thermus, a supporter of the Scipios, from celebrating a triumph over the Ligurians. The next year he introduced scandal as a political weapon in the elections for censorship […] against Glabrio, Scipio’s friend and the most popular candidate […] In the same year the Scipios were superseded, Asia being allotted to Manlius Vulso and Aetolia to Fulvius Nobilior.” Scullard, History of the Roman World, 329.

58 Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus was the maternal grandson of Scipio Africanus through Cornelia Africana, the son of Tiberius Gracchus the Elder, who “had been a censor […], twice consul, and had celebrated two triumphs”, and the son-in-law of Appius Claudius Pulcher, princeps senatus. Plutarch, The Life of Tiberius Gracchus 1.1, 4.1. In addition to achieving renown in the Third Punic War under Scipio Aemilianus and having served in the Numantine War, Tiberius’ background as a nobiles is indisputable. He was privy to the educational upbringing, political connections, and opportunities for power afforded to the most entrenched members of the oligarchy. Stockton, The Gracchi, 85; H.H. Scullard, From the Gracchi to Nero: A History of Rome from 133 B.C. to A.D. 68 (London: Routledge, 1988), 26.

59 The Lex Sempronia Agraria of 133 sought to redistribute land from senatorial elites possessing more than 500 jugera (and 1,000 should there be two sons), empowering rural plebians to claim greater ownership of land with state support. The law struck at the wealth and power of senatorial elites and wealthy equestrians. Tiberius’ other laws aimed at “reducing the time of military service, granting appeal to the people from the verdicts of the judges, adding to the judges, who at that time were composed of senators only, an equal number from the equestrian order.” Plutarch, The Life of Tiberius Gracchus, 16.1 - 16.2. Such laws are clear strides toward empowering the aforementioned demographics, garnering their support for Tiberius’ political career. Moreover, Tiberius had disregarded normal procedure by taking the bill straight to the people instead of bringing it first to the Senate, and so the oligarchy was also motivated by a desire to assert its authority over misbehaving magistrates: “The Senate was unwilling to acquiesce in his blatant disregard for its traditional rights.” Scullard, From the Gracchi to Nero, 28; Stockton, The Gracchi, 82.

60 The Senate clearly lost substantial holdings and wealth from having it seized by Tiberius’ Agrarian Commission. The possibility for equestrians to acquire power in the courts
threatened the oligarchy’s internal order and stability.

To counter the passage of Tiberius’ agrarian law, the oligarchy drew upon its influence over the *cursus honorum* and the power of tribunes of the plebs to veto legislative bills proposed to the popular assembly. Because there were ten tribunes of the plebs and only one veto was needed, the senatorial establishment was readily able to produce a veto against the *lex agraria* from a dependable tribune, Octavius. Unfortunately, the effectiveness of a tribune’s veto in Rome’s past rested on a technicality that had since the founding of the Republic not been exploited, perhaps due to the inability or unwillingness of tribunes to gather votes to depose their colleagues: a tribune could constitutionally apply his power to enact laws through a majority vote from the popular assembly to ratify the deposition of the vetoing tribune and vote in a friendly tribune to pass the previously vetoed bill. Tiberius’ uses of the assembly to both bypass the Senate and then depose Octavius, a fellow member of the oligarchy, were thus unprecedented and grievous violations of the rules of the game. His success in drawing a mass of voters ardently supportive of his law, given the bill’s centrality to their economic interests, allowed for Octavius’ deposition and the voting in of an allied tribune for the passing of the law to capably receive a majority vote from the attendees with little difficulty. Such a contortion of the Senate’s (customary) rules of procedure and exploitation of a legal weakness built into the power of the tribune of the plebs to propose and enact any law with the people’s support, a lingering legacy of the intra-city conflicts of the Roman Republic, thus effectively allowed Tiberius to threatened senatorial authority as well.

61 Much of the aristocracy relied on its landed economic holdings. Upending aristocratic control over large tracts of land cut at the economic prospects of the senators since they weren’t allowed to pursue commercial pursuits (especially abroad) as avidly as the Equestrians. Empowering the poor would cause them to cede a lesser share of their dominance over the Republic economically.

62 The Senate drew upon the vertical order of power in the *cursus honorum* and the diverse powers of each office as a means of checks and balances.


64 “No other instance of the deposition of an officer of state was ever cited apart from the apocryphal case of Tarquinius Collatinus […] in the very first year of the Republic.” Stockton, *The Gracchi*, 82.

65 “The tribunate of the plebs had been in its origins a ‘revolutionary’ office, designed to champion the commons against a repressive and exclusive aristocracy. But those origins were centuries old, and the small central-Italian town of the fifth century which had given birth to the tribunate, and the fourth century central-Italian state which had institutionalized it, were unrecognizable in imperial Rome of the late second century. Times had changed and the resuscitation of long-forgotten traditions and powers and enactments was a severe shock, and contrary to the long accepted and established rules of play.” Stockton, *The Gracchi*, 83.
wriggle past the oligarchy’s dominance over its internal politics and the trappings of the *cursus honorum*.66

Tiberius further breached oligarchical boundaries when he assaulted the Senate’s authority over state finances and international relations, and conferred the decision over the use of the Attalian inheritance to the people instead.67 The tribuneship’s sacrosanct ability to propose bills before the assembly coupled with the *populares*’ clear self-interest in ratifying the bill was again an exploitation of custom that the Senate was unable to constitutionally arrest,68 save for informal methods of public haranguing and the consolation of punishing Tiberius once the political protection provided through his short term of office was lifted.69 Tiberius’ most unforgivable assault of the oligarchical system, however, would come in the form of his declaration of candidacy for a second term of office. Not only would a re-elected tribune be able to bypass both the principles of oligarchical power-sharing and the ability of the Senate to hold its magistrates accountable after their terms in office (as there were many that sought to hold him accountable for ‘crimes against the state’),70 but the possibility also raised concerns within the Senate that Tiberius could indefinitely hold administrative power and operate outside the boundaries of the oligarchy as an inviolable threat.71

Although examples of contrarian tribunes are pointed out by Badian, *Foreign Clientaele*; and Scullard, *History of the Roman World*. Stockton notes that the stark differences in the circumstances of their opposition makes “their activities trivial and temporary” compared to that of Tiberius Gracchus.

66 However, it is worth noting that despite being overruled by the masses, the oligarchy was still able to exercise other powers (Mechanism #1) to at least express its disapproval and erect guardrails when it had the opportunity to. The land commissioners were voted a paltry salary—Tiberius’ daily allowance was fixed to nine obols, or nine sestertii, equivalent to roughly $5 in 2018, and Tiberius was deprived of a customary tent, “although other men had often obtained one for less important purposes.” Plutarch, *The Life of Tiberius Gracchus*, 13.3.  
68 The custom of tribunes, despite their law-proposing powers, to not violate the Senate’s role in finances and international relations through the people. Stockton, *The Gracchi*, 69; Polybius, *The Histories*, 6.13.7.  
70 Discussed in Mechanism #1; Stockton, *The Gracchi*, 74.  
71 “The nobles of the late second century were understandably appalled at the vista which seemed to be opening up of a demagogue’s holding office indefinitely and directing the affairs of Rome without fear of serious impediment from colleagues and without reference to Senate and consuls. This was to strike at the roots of the security of the oligarchy.” Stockton, *The Gracchi*, 84. “Re-election [for a tribune] was not illegal, but the last important case belonged to
senators’ lack of measures to counter the technically permissible vote for an iterative tribuneship tied their hands; and for the first time in its history, the Senate resorted to thuggery. The fact that the oligarchy was willing to break the veneer of its carefully maintained legitimacy and stability as a governing institution over the people, and rupture the boundaries of its own rules regarding intra-oligarchical conduct is a glaring indication of the lack of mechanisms the oligarchy had left to counter Tiberius’ defection, and its desperation to neutralize his threat. Consequently, Tiberius’ successful defiance against the traditional modes of oligarchical regulation in 133 exposes crucial weaknesses inherent to the Roman oligarchy’s self-governing system. The legislative powers afforded to the office of the tribune of the plebs, Rome’s lack of a codified constitution, the mob-esque nature a period two hundred years earlier when the function of the tribunate was very different.”

Scullard, From the Gracchi to Nero, 29. As harvest time prevented some country-voters from coming to Rome, Tiberius may have expanded his programme to appeal to more of the city population to gather votes.” At the same time also many of his friends on the Capitol came running to Tiberius with urgent appeals to hasten thither, since matters there were going well. And in fact things turned out splendidly for Tiberius at first; as soon as he came into view the crowd raised a friendly shout, and as he came up the hill they gave him a cordial welcome and ranged themselves about him, that no stranger might approach.” Plutarch, The Life of Tiberius Gracchus, 17.5.

Because so much of Rome was governed by custom in the second century, re-election was never forbidden by the law owing to Rome’s political past as a city-state. Donald C. Earl, Tiberius Gracchus: A Study in Politics (Bruxelles-Berchem: Latomus, 1963), 103. The lack of a binding constitution is an acute weakness of the oligarchy’s hold on power, but conversely the Senate might not have gotten so informally powerful if it was bounded by a constitution in the fourth and third centuries.

Senators even asked the consul for permission for the use of violence, but were denied on the grounds that no citizen could be put to death without a trial. Plutarch, The Life of Tiberius Gracchus, 19.3.

Murdering a tribune of the plebs in cold blood at the center of Rome’s voting assemblies without trial was not only without precedent, but legally baseless, and a religious sacrilege (especially as one of the murderers was Rome’s religious leader, Scipio Nasica). Appian, The Civil Wars, 1.16. Violence was now on the table and seen as a method for oligarchs to use against each other, permanently disrupting the stability and norms of oligarchical rule. For more on the political impacts of elite-on-mass violence and elite-on-elite violence, see Simonton, Classical Greek Oligarchy, 112-120, 263.

The legacy of Rome’s city-state roots had left dangerous legislative privileges in the office of the tribune of the plebs that senatorial custom and de facto power alone were not able to eradicate. Stockton, The Gracchi, 5, 62-65. Syme writes, “the tribunate, an anomalous historical survival given new life by the party of the Gracchi and converted into a means of direct political action.” Syme, The Roman Revolution, 16.

Regarding senatorial rules on iterative tribunships, it is interesting that iterative consulships were lawfully addressed but not tribunships, most likely because custom had been enough to deter abusers of the office up until 133. Syme, The Roman Revolution, 82. For extensive discussion on the legality and unprecedented nature of an iterative tribuneship, see
of popular assemblies, and the interests of an increasingly manifold denos could, when exploited and leveraged concomitantly by a defector like Tiberius Gracchus, pose an insurmountable challenge to the second-century system that none of the oligarchy’s self-established methods of legitimate regulation were able to subdue.

Case Study Limitations
This paper acknowledges that differences in personal character between the two defectors may have impacted their ultimate willingness, effort, and ability for defection. Many historians, both ancient and contemporary, have commented on the continence of Scipio or the daring of Tiberius Gracchus. Reasons beyond self-interest in power may have also had a far greater impact on the rationale for their decisions, for Scipio may have truly been a proponent of the Senate’s role even when it constricted him, and Tiberius’ political behavior may have been spurred by a genuine dedication to the people. Ultimately, however, the two case studies aim to analyze not the defectors themselves, but the oligarchical system and the means with which it was able to regulate violations to its order. In that regard, it is evident that Tiberius Gracchus possessed more powerful and more numerous levers at his command than Scipio Africanus to successfully breach the oligarchy’s hull.

IV. Evaluating the Oligarchy’s Methods: Major Endogenous and Exogenous Shocks
Although the strength of the oligarchy’s four mechanisms against the individual actions of two defectors has been measured, this study would be incomplete without analyzing the mechanisms’ abilities to defend oligarchical power in the face of the changing circumstances of the time. Simonton posits that there are two types of shocks to an oligarchy’s “stable cooperative equilibrium” that precipitate internal change or regime breakdown. Exogenous (external) shocks are unanticipated forces outside the control of oligarchs, such as sudden wealth increases for individual members, the presence of foreign entities seeking to back members, or damage from war. Endogenous (internal) shocks are damaging forces

Astin, Scipio Aemilianus, 351 - 352. “Origins [of the tribunate of the plebs] were centuries old [...], and the fourth century central-Italian state which had institutionalized it, were unrecognizable in imperial Rome of the late second century. Times had changed, and the resuscitation of long-forgotten traditions and powers and enactments was a severe shock, and contrary to the long accepted and established rules of play.” Stockton, The Gracchi, 83.

77 Simonton, Classical Greek Oligarchy, 249.
78 Simonton discusses how the possible support of the Persian Empire led many Greek
generated from the actions of oligarchs themselves, which were unrestrained due to weaknesses in the oligarchy’s institutional rules. Simonton discusses how internal shocks, in the form of a unified and impassioned mob, often enticed individual oligarchs to defect and aid in an uprising against the oligarchy in order to be the uprising’s leader. Both exogenous and endogenous shocks not only attract oligarchs to defect, but also contribute greatly to their success if they choose to.

Exogenous and Endogenous Shocks during the Second Punic War, 218 - 201 BCE

Understanding Scipio Africanus’ threat as a defector requires a scrutiny of the exogenous shock that Hannibal’s havoc in Italy had induced, and the disarray it had left within the system that afforded Scipio the opportunity to leapfrog into the consulship and obtain exorbitant popular support. Hannibal’s damage had harrowed the internal ranks of the Senate, engendered fear among the public, and left a brew of urgency and desperation in the Republic that allowed Scipio to bypass much of the traditions of the cursus honorum without facing the oligarchy’s traditional obstruction. The oligarchy’s begrudging approval of his transgression of the system thus derived in large part from its need for military success. Despite such trying internal times, however, the underlying chassis of the oligarchy’s mechanisms over the cursus honorum and foreign service were both precise and multitudinal. Control over his opportunities for service as a magistrate, the location of his provincial assignment, the allotment of troops, and the prevention of his ability to maintain power for long allowed the Senate to shape much of the way a defector, even in the midst of the national stresses of war, could comport himself militarily.

81 Although the Senate had candidates in mind to lead the army in 209, the exogenous shock of the war had left it far more willing to comply with the untraditional election of the underage, twenty-four-year-old Scipio Africanus. Livy, The History of Rome, 26.18.
Furthermore, the Senate’s visible and capable protection of the people during this trying period allowed it to maintain a strong share of power, informal influence over the Republic, and popular approval. By the close of the war, especially following Hannibal’s departure from Italy, socio-economic circumstances for the populares had improved, and there existed far less resentment against the Senate from the demos than there would be in 133. Scipio’s success among the mob was thus far less robust than that of Tiberius Gracchus. Tiberius’ supporters were not only personally aggrieved by the Senate, but had interests intrinsically tied to the outcome of his laws. Consequently, it is clear that although the exogenous shock of Hannibal’s devastation had exposed cleavages within the system which allowed for members to bypass some of its traditional boundaries, the Senate’s capable handling of the disarray from 209-202 that netted it loyalty, or at very least a lack of ire, from the demos, conjoined with the intrinsic sharpness of its mechanisms against defectors using military means to obtain power, allowed it to aptly bring the oligarchical violations of Scipio Africanus to heel.

**Endogenous and Exogenous Shocks from the Challenges of Imperial Expansion, late second century BCE**

By the time of Tiberius Gracchus’ tribuneship in 133, the exogenous shock of the influx of wealth from imperial expansion compounded with the endogenous shock of Rome’s widening economic disparity was far more corrosive to the oligarchy’s integrity as a governing body than the disorder Hannibal’s soldiers wrought. The rapid succession of Rome’s victorious wars across the Mediterranean had exponentially expanded the number of subjects (demos), provinces, and interests the oligarchy managed.

82 Simonton discusses that it is primarily when the people clamor for a deposition of the oligarchy that they will rally around a defector’s cause. Simonton, Classical Greek Oligarchy, 256-258. The Senate’s success in engendering stability and increased welfare for the people following the Second Punic War gave the demos much less reason to seek the Senate’s demise.

83 The exogenous shock of Hannibal’s war also made many ambitious oligarchs funnel their ambition and pursuit of power into outlets non-threatening to the Senate—e.g. military service against Hannibal.

84 For more on the imperial expansion of the Roman Republic in the second century, see Arthur M. Eckstein, Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009). The Roman Republic grew tremendously in the second century, having fought and decisively defeated powerful rival states, such as Carthage, Macedon, the Seleucid Empire. Rome’s major wars during this span were numerous: the Second Punic War (218-201), Second Macedonian War (200-196), the War of Antiochus (192-188), Third Macedonian War (171-168), Third Punic War (149-146), the Achaean War (146), and Rome’s wars in Spain: First and second Celtiberian Wars (181-179, 154-151), Lusitanian War (155-139), Numantine War (143-133).
the Senate’s growing scope of administration, one of the most destabilizing exogenous shocks as a consequence of conquest was the inundation of foreign riches into the ranks of the elite.

The oligarchy’s inability to authoritatively regulate the acquisition of wealth among its own members, however, further inflamed inequality within both the oligarchy and the state by engendering what Simonton would term as an unbridled “all against all” game of aristocratic competition for the pursuit of wealth. The byproduct of the oligarchy’s absence of regulation thus fomented the endogenous shock of systemic economic inequality and political agitation between the elite and the urban poor, the rural plebeians, and Rome’s Italian allies. Such an endogenous shock would carry with it a litany of issues that diluted the Senate’s monopoly of power and influence in the late second century. Rising levels of bribery had caused many senators to be tied to non-oligarchical interests, and an increasingly politically active and wealthy equestrian class cut away at the Senate’s socio-economic influence. The Senate’s loosening hold on real power, a consequence of its inability to keep abreast of expansion, stands in contrast to its political dominance in the wake of the Second Punic War. Thus, when Tiberius Gracchus leveraged the popular assembly as a political weapon, he could confidently rely upon an impassioned and loyal throng of demos to gather at the Campus Martius for support, despite the unprecedented and defiant nature of his proposals.

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85 Exacerbated of course by the culture of concern over prestige within the aristocratic class. Aristocrats competed for increasingly large landed estates and compromised on political interests abroad to acquire personal wealth from foreign clients or interests. Simonton writes on the dangers of unregulated oligarchical competition: “The system works only so long as the oligarchs are able to monitor one another’s individual resources and maintain an equilibrium of rough parity. If any one member of the oligarchy becomes too powerful [...] oligarchs then fall into mutually destructive distrust and betrayal.” Simonton, Classical Greek Oligarchy, 249. For more on the impacts of unregulated oligarchical competition, see Ibid., 247-273; Oversights of Mechanism #4 discussed on pages 15-16.

86 Simonton discusses the impact public outrage can have when stoked by oligarchical greed: “If oligarchs can only refrain from outraging the people [rather than seeing the oligarchy increasingly take advantage of them economically], the ‘greediness’ of the poor will naturally keep them locked into the oligarchic status quo.” Simonton, Classical Greek Oligarchy, 137.

87 These demographics contributed to the expansion of Rome’s imperial project, but intense intra-aristocratic competition had diminished the attention these demos received with regard to their desire to also reap the benefits of Rome’s growing prosperity. Appian, Civil Wars, 1-2; Polybius’ discussion on the worsening inequality of times reflects this. Polybius, The Histories, 31. Mouristen adds, “Traditional factional politics played a part, as powerful senators lined up behind the tribune in a challenge to rival sections of the elite” Mouritsen, Politics in the Roman Republic, 165.

88 Game theory envisages such calculations of risk between players as a “Stag Hunt.” For more sociological discussion, see Simonton, Classical Greek Oligarchy, 254-256.
mechanisms of character defamation and leveraging public fears of tyranny were also rendered far less effective as a result, for whereas Scipio drew his support on the basis of his reputation and sensational *gloria*, Tiberius' support was rooted not in the masses’ adoration, but their ire. In that respect, Tiberius' clout as a defector stands in stark contrast to influence achieved through prominence from men like Scipio—Tiberius' was a type of influence largely immune to character assassination, even in Rome's character-obsessed culture. Tiberius' exploitation of the weaknesses of the oligarchical customs, therefore, was significantly buttressed by the destabilizing impacts to the oligarchy from exogenous and endogenous developments that had, with inadequate regulation, progressively worsened in the late second century.

V. Conclusion

The senatorial oligarchy’s four major mechanisms of defined hierarchical intra-oligarchical roles, constraints over autonomy from members abroad, laws against the display of wealth, and an assortment of indirect measures provided ample means to regulate and administer the acquisition, sharing, and parity of power among the hyper-competitive members of the oligarchy during the second century. The specificities of the oligarchy’s control over ascent in the *cursus honorum* and over the independence of its members serving abroad were especially powerful measures to reel in defection. The most popular and inspired threat to senatorial stability, Scipio Africanus, was subdued into complying with the demands of the establishment. Other elites possessing disproportionate popular support from military accomplishments fared no better in defying oligarchical stability.

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89 That is not to say Tiberius’ character and influence were not critical for his success and popularity. His renowned reputation was critical for his ability to garner support, as were his political affiliations.

90 While certain senators and factions undoubtedly commanded more or less power than others during this period, there existed a rough parity of power between senators that was distinct from the inequitable power dynamics of the late Republic, where political behemoths such as Pompey, Caesar, Octavian, or Antony wielded undue support from the mob, military, and members of the aristocracy.

91 Scipio Aemilianus’ military, political, and oratory skills won him great personal fame and clout, and even commanded enough popular support to override constitutional procedure. Nevertheless, he, like Scipio Africanus, did not seek to overstep the Senate's authority. Astin, *Scipio Aemilianus*, 12-17, 67-69. Titus Flamininus and Aemilius Paullus are additional similar examples of military leaders commanding extensive popular support that complied with the senatorial establishment throughout the course of their careers. Due to the limited scope of this paper, considerations or case studies of these possible defectors were not made in deference to Scipio Africanus, who was undoubtedly the most popular military and political
The Senate’s other mechanisms, however, were built upon unstable foundations that restrained its response to defection via demagoguery, backed by the law, to an increasingly diverse demos. The lingering constitutional provisions of the Early Republic imbued in the tribune of the plebs, the oligarchy’s inability to regulate the imperial influx of wealth to its members, and the informal mechanisms’ dependence on the Senate’s support base within the Republic were critical weaknesses the oligarchy failed to address, and are exposed to us by the success of Tiberius Gracchus in 133. From that year onward, many more defectors would capably leverage and exploit these weaknesses, further tearing the opening Tiberius had punctured in the oligarchy’s legitimacy and order.92

Nevertheless, the oligarchy’s loss of its power was an impressively tedious process. After Tiberius Gracchus exposed the oligarchy’s infrastructural weaknesses, the Senate endured four generations of intermittent intra-oligarchic conflict with defectors before finally falling under the shadow of Julius Caesar. The oligarchy’s governing mechanisms, for all their weaknesses, were a resilient defense against the multitudes of ambitious oligarchs seeking to capitalize on the increasing challenges of the Republic’s governance over world empire. But perhaps the greatest testament to the strength of the oligarchy’s rules comes from its overthrowers themselves. Sulla, Caesar, and Augustus, despite holding absolute control over Rome during their respective eras, each officiated elections for their own consulships, sought for senatorial ratification over provincial commands and military allotments, and presided over discussions on the Senate floor to enact policy.93 The oligarchy’s rules of play leader during the Middle Republic.

92 “The year [133] is also identified with birth of a new kind of radical politics which reflected deep and irreconcilable ideological differences within the elite.” Mouritsen, Politics in the Roman Republic, 111. Fulvia Flaccus, Gaius Gracchus, and Livius Drusus would challenge the oligarchy’s power in much the same way as Tiberius Gracchus: through legislative proposals appealing to similar demographics as Tiberius did (rural Italians, urban poor); each of them would be violently killed by senatorial forces. Clodius Pulcher, Titus Milo, and Lucius Catiline sought to undermine the Senate through involvements with thuggery and the urban mob; each fell under a cloud of domestic intrigue that ended their plans. A third and perhaps the most dangerous breed of defectors would be that of military dynasts who could wield greater power than the generals (Scipio Africanus, Aemilius Paullus) of the Middle Republic, due to the Senate’s loss of its authority over the military under the Marian Reforms: Gaius Marius, Lucius Sulla, Pompey Magnus, Julius Caesar, Marc Antony, Octavian Augustus; each would fall only to the strength of another dynast, except in the cases of Sulla’s willful retirement and Caesar’s assassination. Such a categorization of these influential figures is entirely my own, and based upon the levers and avenues of power these individuals utilized in expanding their own power at the expense of the senatorial establishment.

93 Werner Eck, The Age of Augustus, trans. Deborah Lucas Schneider (Oxford: Blackwell
had become so institutionalized that its institutions, even when bereft of their original purpose, stood tall long after the oligarchy’s power itself was cut down.

Publishing, 2007), 50. Mouritsen comments on the detailed attention paid by Pompey, Cicero, and Caesar to senatorial procedures and laws despite the departure of real power from the Senate: “This attention to proper form and procedure, even in the midst of complete social and political breakdown [...] shows] the mass of accumulated rules and conventions served to regulate who could claim legitimacy.” Mouritsen, Politics in the Roman Republic, 2-5.
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On January 1, 1776, an anonymous writer in a New Year’s Day edition of the Pennsylvania Packet reflected on a world he believed to have been entirely transformed by the “remarkable events in the year 1775.” As the mid-Atlantic colonies of Pennsylvania and New York entered what would be the final year of British imperial rule, the language of revolution, and soon enough independence, was reaching a fever pitch. Patrick Henry had famously claimed before the First Continental Congress in 1774 that “the distinctions between Virginians, Pennsylvanians, New Yorkers and New Englanders, are no more. I am not a Virginian but an American.” What had then appeared to be jingoistic hyperbole now seemed to reflect a growing sentiment among Patriot writers.

As the Pennsylvania Packet writer put it, in the face of British tyranny and especially with the beginning of armed conflict at Lexington and Concord, the “Thirteen Colonies, differing from each other in laws, religion, manners and interests united to oppose the British.” For the first time, the colonies overcame their petty and unnatural distinctions which had characterized colonial society under monarchical British rule. This newfound unity of purpose through their resistance to British imperial rule, as the romanticized American national mythos suggests, fostered a national identity among American colonists with the principles of Whiggish republicanism at its core. Historians’ traditional emphasis on the republican ideology of the elite founders, however, belies the fact that the meaning of the burgeoning revolutionary project, and how Anglo-Americans understood their role in it, was very much in flux well into the Revolutionary War.

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1 Pennsylvania Packet, January 1, 1776.
3 Pennsylvania Packet, January 1, 1776.
Even in its most nuanced and expansive form, this understanding, as seen in Gordon Wood’s seminal reevaluation of the revolutionary project, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution*, elevated the novelty of revolutionary ideology as the critical force undergirding American identity.\(^4\) As Wood explains, the ethnic heterogeneousness of the new republic meant that “to be an American could not be a matter of blood; it had to be a matter of common belief and behavior. And the source of that common belief and behavior was the American Revolution.”\(^5\) This view of the Revolution is a persuasive approach to understanding how the founders attempted to create a new society along classical republican lines and the intended and unintended social transformations this project unleashed. Nevertheless, its overemphasis on revolutionary ideology and elite political history neglects important and long-lasting colonial tensions that had little connection to republican thought and far more to do with the role of racial distinctions in the development of American politics.\(^6\) Similarly, inhabitants of the


\(^5\) Ibid., 336.

backcountry have too long been marginalized as reactive consumers of metropolitan ideas and politics, rather than central actors who understood the Revolution in their own terms.

Wood suggests that the American mid-Atlantic, the former middle colonies of New York and Pennsylvania, are an ideal testing ground for understanding how the Revolution shaped how Americans defined themselves. If ethnic diversity was the defining characteristic of American society, as intellectual historians like Wood have traditionally supposed, no region other than the racially and culturally heterogeneous mid-Atlantic is a

Robert Sayer and John Bennett, *A General Map of the Middle British Colonies, in America. containing Virginia, Maryland, the Delaware Counties, Pennsylvania and New Jersey. With the addition of New York, and of the Greatest Part of New England, as also of the Bordering Parts of the Province of Quebec, improved from several Surveys made after the late War, and Corrected from Governor Pownall’s Late Map 1776. (with) A Sketch of the Upper Parts of Canada* (London: Printed for R. Sayer & J. Bennett, 1776).


A map of the American mid-Atlantic, Chesapeake and New England in 1776 including important sites in the backcountry.

better premonition of the character which the new republic would take on in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Ultimately, an analysis of events in the Pennsylvania and New York backcountry suggests that the role of the American Revolution in shaping American identity is not as straightforward as Wood and other scholars have suggested. Instead, it was often a messy nexus of new revolutionary language reflecting distinctly colonial tensions. While the ideological forces unleashed by the Revolution would help shape the development of a distinctly American society following independence, during the first years of the republican project, particularly for the ethnically and religiously diverse Anglo-American populations in the mid-Atlantic backcountry, the upheaval of the Revolution was often more reminiscent of colonial rather than revolutionary struggles.

One need only return to the reflections of the New Year’s Pennsylvania writer who, when meditating on the transformations of 1775, saw threats to the American project from familiar enemies. Pennsylvanians and New Yorkers had long feared Franco-Indian plots. Now, however, American liberty, civility, and unity, according to the Packet, faced an unprecedented coalition of “savage” enemies hired by the British to crush the rebellion. While echoing the emotional language of Thomas Paine’s Dialogue with the Ghost of General Montgomery, the writer explained, “Great Britain called upon Hanoverians, Hessians – Russians – Irish Roman Catholics – Canadians – Savages [Indians] and Negroes to assist her in enslaving the Americans.” Yet, as the British were demonized for their savage plans, their Native allies were described as comparably civilized to emphasize the unprecedented nature of the British threat. As the writer claimed, the most fearsome enemy was not “the Savages and Negroes” who were in fact “struck with horror at the cruelty and injustice of the proposal and refused to assist her [Britain].” Buoyed by a list of stock colonial bogeymen, the British threat was so sinister, and independence consequently necessary, not because it was monarchical or aristocratic—concerns that would not stop Patriots from celebrating their new republic’s alliance with Bourbon France in 1778—but because it was “savage.”

While most important in the colonial south, the role of African Americans, particularly the enslaved, and their ties to Native Americans in the mid-Atlantic is a critically important topic that will by and large fall outside the scope of this study which emphasizes the central role of anti-Indianism. There is a rich historiography on the important role of African slavery in shaping Anglo-American racial identity, which can be consulted. For example, see Winthrop Jordan, White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro 1550-1812 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013); Theodore Allen, The Invention of the White Race: Racial Oppression and Social Control, Volume I and II (New York: Verso 1997); Edmund Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003); Alan Taylor,
final observation, the “bloody mindedness of the King…and the inhumanity of [his] brethren [the British and their Loyalist proxies]” exceeded that of, and supposedly disgusted, the great colonial savage: Native Americans. While the British themselves were the primary targets of Patriot writers in the metropolitan centers between 1776-1777, as war erupted in the backcountry, colonists focused on Britain's local proxies, particularly the internal threat of American Loyalists derisively labeled Tories. Ironically, as the language of anti-Indianism was increasingly invoked to demonize the British and Tories, Native Americans were reimagined as only servile savages whose violence could be traced to the more sinister British threat that even they often viewed with derision.

This study situates the drama of how Americans understood their cause not in the intellectual debates of Boston and Philadelphia elites, but in events taking place in the distant backcountry during the carnage of war. In doing so, this paper expands upon a deep historiography tracing the development of identity in contrast to an enemy “other” in early America. In particular, this study builds on the scholarship of Jill Lepore, Peter Silver, Philip Deloria, Gregory Knouff, Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, Robert Owens, and Robert Parkinson. These scholars, however, have largely described the emergence of American identity as a top-down process in which metropolitan elites capitalized on backcountry anxieties for political purposes. This simplified narrative, however, ignores a far more haphazard reality. Particularly as the Revolutionary War intensified in the American interior, republican elites lost control of the language they unleashed. The crucible of frontier war, rather than the actions of American elites, did the most to transform revolutionary rhetoric of colonial newspapers. They became bastions of racialized backcountry fear and loathing, which subsumed the complex subtleties of republican politics into the explicitness


*Pennsylvania Packet*, January 1, 1776.

of racial difference and forced revolutionary leaders, propagandists, and the Patriot press to do the same.

To understand how ideas of American identity were shaped in this way, this study will first explore how the threat of Anglo-Indian plots, both real and imagined, fueled an emotional anti-Indian rhetoric common in revolutionary era newspapers and led to its adaptation as an anti-British critique. Then this paper will explain the centrality of this language to how backcountry Americans understood and associated with the revolutionary republican project as it was dominated by press coverage of British and Loyalist “atrocities” along the frontier. As the exploration of such rhetoric reveals, rebellious colonists far from the centers of revolutionary activity began to conceive of themselves as Americans by thinking of their former fellow British subjects as not just non-American politically and culturally but also racially inferior and inherently prone to savagery. Once the Revolutionary War arrived in the mid-Atlantic backcountry between 1777-1778, fueled primarily by propagandists who stoked fears of Tory-Indian plots and violence, Patriots most often defined their identity in explicitly racial rather than ideological terms, justifying their project primarily by demonizing and dehumanizing their enemies. If generations of Anglo-Americans fearful of cultural isolation and degeneration used “so-called savage Indians,” as Philip Deloria claims in Playing Indian, to define “the boundaries and character of their civilization,” during the first years of the revolutionary experiment, the Indians’ supposed masters—the British and their Loyalist proxies—would, for a short period, usurp this role.

Just as anxious backcountry settlers saw the colonial era’s imperial and Indian wars as necessary to protect themselves from Indian degeneration, they began justifying the revolutionary project as a necessary response to British and Loyalist savagery which they saw as inimical to their newly-found American identity. Exacerbated by regional, social, and cultural tensions—e.g. resentment of Quaker elites and German pacifists in Pennsylvania and Loyalist control of New York City in New York—these American republican racial distinctions developed slightly differently in the two new states. Nevertheless, in each case backcountry Patriots defined themselves as republican Americans not in opposition to claims of monarchical and aristocratic corruption highlighted in the popular pamphlets of leading revolutionary intellectuals. Instead, they did so using coded and explicitly racial language that contrasted Patriots with internally

10 Most importantly the murder of Jane McCrea, and the Wyoming and Cherry Valley Massacres.
11 Deloria, Playing Indian, 23.
savage enemy others, the British and their Tory and Indian proxies, continuing earlier organic processes of identity formation during the imperial and Indian conflicts of the colonial period.  

While this hatred of the British and Tories would soon wane as a force shaping American identity in the nineteenth century as Loyalists either gradually re-integrated or left the new United States, its role in shaping what it meant to be an American would have a lasting and troubling legacy. A unique ethnic and religious diversity made the mid-Atlantic particularly well suited for this kind of rhetoric. Over time, the Revolution created a new language of identity and exclusion that, while far subtler than the contemporaneous development of republican racial identity in the slaveholding south, was arguably even more pervasive and similarly problematic. As Smith-Rosenberg details in her analysis of the connections between Anglo-Indian relations and republican masculinity, by the end of the Revolution “the rigid hierarchy of...fundamental racial distinctions established identities and social orders” lay at the core of the new revolutionary American psyche.  

Yet, while Native and enslaved people were the most obvious and persistent victims of the social, cultural, and physical violence this language facilitated, they were not the only ones. What exactly it meant to be a civilized “white,” and how whiteness and political identity converged, would continue to be a critical point of contention among Americans for decades to come in the early republic and beyond.  

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By the summer of 1777, the American Revolutionary project for independence had survived its first year. The astounding changes that the New Year’s Day Pennsylvania Packet writer celebrated in early 1776 and his claims of colonial cooperation paled in comparison to the transformations and unity brought about by the arrival of independence. Yet not all of his claims appeared so prescient. While the Packet writer warned of a savage coalition of Catholics, Canadians, and Indians ravaging the mid-Atlantic backcountry, this threat had thus far failed to materialize. Instead, most Indians, while intensely skeptical of the benevolent claims of the revolutionaries and reliant on the British Navy for material supplies, were internally divided and remained hesitant to openly declare for Britain, hoping to remain neutral. In clear contrast to the Chesapeake, which had

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12 See, primarily, Lepore, *The Name of War*, and Silver, *Our Savage Neighbors*.  
been plagued with Indian war as early as Lord Dunmore’s War in 1774 and despite ever-present backcountry anxieties, the actual fighting of the Revolutionary War remained confined to the mid-Atlantic coast rather than the interior. While Patriots in the backcountry feared a return to the Indian war that had disturbed the Pennsylvania and New York interior during the French and Indian War (1754-1763), their fears of savage carnage on the frontier remained unfounded. It appeared, at least in the mid-Atlantic, that the Revolutionary War would not be an Indian war.\textsuperscript{15}

Yet, the Pennsylvania Packet writer’s claims, though almost entirely fictitious, were in no way unique. Throughout this period, the specter of Anglo-Indian alliances and British savagery itself continued to grow in intensity as Patriot propagandists worked to proliferate reports of Anglo-Indian aggression both real and imagined to capitalize on Americans’ deep-seated fear of Indian War.\textsuperscript{16} The most important sources for this rhetoric were propagandized accusations of Anglo-Indian conspiracies that revived the emotional and graphic anti-Indian language first made famous by colonial captivity narratives.\textsuperscript{17} The metaphorical argument made was purposeful and obvious. As John Boyle, a Patriot printer in Boston, described in the preface of William Hubbard’s \textit{A Narrative of the Indian Wars in New England}, the current revolutionary struggle required Americans to “defend [their] lives and properties against the incursions of more distant savages”—British tyranny.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{15} Silver, \textit{Our Savage Neighbors}, 229.

\textsuperscript{16} See Silver, \textit{Our Savage Neighbors}, for a detailed discussion of how these fears, often taking the form of a largely fictitious victimhood to Indian attacks, developed during the Indian and imperial wars of the eighteenth century. Jill Lepore’s \textit{The Name of War} situates its origins even earlier in the late seventeenth century particularly King Philip’s War in New England.

\textsuperscript{17} For a particularly illustrative example of this rhetoric in a captivity narrative, see A Plain Narrative of the Uncommon Sufferings, and Remarkable Deliverance of Thomas Brown (1760) in Frederick Drimmer, \textit{Captured by Indians: 15 Firsthand Accounts 1750-1870} (New York: Courier, 2012), 61-72.

\textsuperscript{18} William Hubbard, \textit{A narrative of the Indian wars in New England: from the first planting thereof in the year 1607, to the year 1677} (Boston: Nichols, 1803), VIII.
This rhetoric worked, as old Puritan captivity narratives resurfaced in popularity, with publishers and readers subsequently reinterpreting them as secular tales of both lurid Indian savagery and as metaphors for American cultural distinctiveness and its resilience in the face of tyrannical captivity.  

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19 Greg Sieminski, “The Puritan Captivity Narrative and the Politics of the American
In fact, editions of Mary Rowlandson’s famous captivity narrative published in the 1770s often featured anachronistic woodcuts depicting Rowlandson not as a pious and obedient Puritan accepting her divinely ordained fate, but instead dressed in Patriot garb violently resisting the advance of Indian attackers who fought more like redcoats than stereotypical “savages.” Until the beginning of the Revolutionary War, the connection between Indian savages and British tyranny was entirely metaphorical, serving to connect the burgeoning revolutionary struggle to ancient colonial anxieties. Once knowledge of Anglo-Indian plots, both real and fictitious, emerged between 1776-1777, anti-British language took on a new intensity that struck deep into the mid-Atlantic interior.

While Virginia’s royal governor Lord Dunmore, his emancipation proclamation, and the Ethiopian Regiment were the most infamous targets of anti-savage Patriot ire during the first two years of the war, they did not strike Patriots in the American interior as isolated events. Instead, as reactions to contemporaneous Anglo-Indian plots in Pennsylvania and New York suggest, mid-Atlantic backcountry Americans understood these threats as part of a broader framework of Anglo-savage violence. While enslaved “negroes” and the threat of slave rebellion most frightened southerners, in the mid-Atlantic it was Native Americans and the horrors of Indian war which inspired the most powerful antipathy. Following Dunmore’s plotting in Virginia, revolutionary military and political officials uncovered a series of supposed Anglo-Indian plots during the first months of 1776. These discoveries would transform anti-Indian metaphors into a full-fledged argument for independence that, while deeply entrenched in the anxieties of the mid-Atlantic backcountry, had little connection to the republican ideology of coastal revolutionary elites. While the subsequent reporting on these alliances by Patriot writers far exceeded the actual scale and success of British and Native cooperation, which was in fact almost non-existent in 1776, the resulting inflammatory stories created an entrenched narrative of Anglo-Indian collaboration that would only intensify as the war progressed.

Though mid-Atlantic Patriots could only dread developments in the Chesapeake from afar for much of 1775, by the end of the year these fears would emerge in a form much closer to home. The letters of Pennsylvania Loyalist and Dunmore agent Dr. John Connolly were discovered after his Indian agent in Pittsburgh, John Gibson, refused to deliver his messages to White Eyes, a Lenape Indian leader, and instead reported the letters to the local committee of correspondence. Promptly transcribed in various newspapers across America, Connolly’s messages described a nightmare Revolution,” *American Quarterly* 42, no. 1 (1990): 35-36.
scenario for backcountry Americans. Connolly attempted to recruit the Shawnee and other Ohio Indians in support of the Royalist cause in cooperation with Loyalists in New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia and who would meet up with Dunmore’s recruited escaped slaves.\footnote{20} While this discovery resulted in Connolly’s arrest and imprisonment and no such alliance as he proposed ever materialized, the resulting, and largely unfounded, rumors that dominated Patriot newspapers confirmed backcountry fears of British, Loyalist, and Indian conspiracies. The power of this emerging narrative was particularly potent in Pennsylvania, exacerbating the ardently pro-revolutionary Scotch-Irish settlers’ long-standing resentment over the Quaker Penn family’s proprietary rule and their well-known goodwill with Natives since the colony’s founding.\footnote{21}

Perhaps even more frightening than Connolly’s ill-conceived plot was a troubling report from General Philip Schuyler detailing the Continental Army’s failed invasion of Quebec and the death of charismatic commander Richard Montgomery. The General reported that Guy Johnson, the new British Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the northern colonies, and his Loyalist supporters had “delivered to each of the Canadian tribes [Iroquois] a war belt and a hatched, who accepted it. After which they were invited to FEAST ON A BOSTONIAN AND DRINK HIS BLOOD…The famous belt they delivered up [is] full proof that the [British and Tories] have attempted to engage the savages against us.”\footnote{22} Once again, while Johnson’s overtures were not reciprocated with any real Indian action and Patriot leaders themselves sought to court these very same Natives groups to their side, this mattered little to revolutionary propagandists who filled newspapers with hyperbolic claims of an Anglo-Indian threat, associating the British and Loyalists with savagery for political purposes.\footnote{23}

In conjunction with Dunmore and Connolly’s plotting, this report accusing the British and Tories of encouraging not just Indian war but cannibalism, a claim later immortalized in Hugh Henry Brackenridge’s

\footnote{21} For instance, Episcopalian Reverend William Smith calling Quakers and German Catholics “our haughty” oppressors who as “their country was bleeding beneath the Outrages of a savage Enemy,” had become “[T]he bloodiest people in our land…[behaving] so cruelly because they did not care about other [whites] at all.” Silver, Our Savage Neighbors, 197-198 and 238-239.
\footnote{22} New-York Gazette, January 1, 1776. See discussions of the report in “To John Adams from Samuel Adams, 22 December 1775,” and “To George Washington from Major General Philip Schuyler, 15 December 1775.”
\footnote{23} Parkinson, The Common Cause, 187.
virulently anti-British play *The Death of General Montgomery* (1777), unleashed an unprecedented wave of anti-British rhetoric. This anti-British language decried Anglo-Indian savagery, culminating with Thomas Jefferson’s denunciation of King George III’s savagery in *The Declaration of Independence*. As the year progressed, these plots and the Anglo-Indian connection they suggested would inspire a series of justifications for independence. While long overshadowed by the elegance of revolutionary republican ideology, these justifications capitalized on backcountry settlers’ worst fears, producing a compelling demonstration of the inherent distinctions between Americans and Britons and the necessity of separation.

As arguments for independence emerged in 1776, this rhetoric became a powerful tool for Patriot propagandists. Perhaps most famously, in his immensely popular and influential pamphlet *Common Sense*, Thomas Paine declared, borrowing the rhetoric of anti-Indianism to refute Britain’s metaphorical role as the mother country and warn of Anglo-Indian plots, that unlike Britain, “Even brutes do not devour their young, nor savages make war upon their families.” An “Honest Farmer” followed this tack in the *Pennsylvania Journal* spelling out the necessity of independence in even starker terms. The Honest Farmer used especially emotional and lurid Indian-hating language that emphasized the intrinsic racial rather than religious inferiority of Native Americans, a style Peter Silver has termed the...

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24 [Paine], *Common Sense: Addressed to the Inhabitants of America* (Boston: J.P. Mendum, 1856), 32.
“anti-Indian sublime,” to denounce the British:

What device to ruin us, tho’ never so mean, barbarous, and bloody such as no heart, but that of a Devil and a tyrant can refrain shuddering at, have they not pursued? Have not all the powers of Europe been meanly courted and bribed not to supply us with means of resistance...[and to] assist [savages] with...their intended massacre...to spirit up Indian savages to ravage our frontiers, and murder, after their inhuman manner, your wives and children?...and were not the poor Canadians made slaves, that they might be made fit instruments, with other slaves and savages, to make more slaves and more wretched beings than savages of us?

While this excerpt reads as typical of what can be called the “anti-British sublime,” typified by the use of the lurid language and the grotesque violence of anti-Indian rhetoric against the British, that was increasingly pervasive in Patriot published newspapers throughout 1776, it is indicative of two important developments. First, as Robert Parkinson has suggested, while popular opinion and scholars of the Revolution often emphasize Paine’s political arguments against monarchy and his pragmatic economic arguments, the “Honest Farmer” and Paine himself incorporated negative claims in favor of separation. Effectively, rather than emphasizing the political or even socio-cultural divisions that made America a distinct society, the writers who employed the “anti-British sublime” were returning to the longstanding fears of the colonial backcountry as the central justification for independence.

While first emerging in 1776, these negative arguments would grow in importance as the war moved toward the mid-Atlantic backcountry. Once the Americans came to believe that the British and Loyalists had allied themselves with savages, promoting their barbarity...

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25 As Silver describes the anti-Indian sublime, “the anti-Indian writings of the 18th century differed sharply from that of...[earlier Indian wars]...[which previously had been] deeply concerned with the difference between the material...[and] spiritual.” Instead, “the anti-Indian sublime...[manipulated]... emotions of the heart ...[using] the shocking images of Indian assault,” to clearly depict the importance of irreconcilable racial differences. Silver, Our Savage Neighbors, 338.


27 Importantly, while less important on the popular level, the founding fathers took the project of positive justifications for the Revolution very seriously often in direct contrast to the negative arguments. As Holger Hoock explains, John Adams and the other founders believed that Americans “must out-civilize the British.” Holger Hoock, Scars of Independence: America’s Violent Birth (New York: Crown, 2017), 19.

and in coming years practicing it directly, they rationalized independence as a natural consequence of intrinsic and irreconcilable differences between the British and their supporters and republican Americans, marking a critically important shift in how backcountry Americans conceived of their identity.

The second, less apparent, consequence of this rhetoric, as the previous argument suggests, is that Patriots now described Indian proxies who threatened the backcountry as “instruments” and “slaves” rather than independently acting threats. They chose to instead accentuate their role as supposedly powerless underlings who were merely tools of the true base savages: the British. The only thing that separated the British from their Native proxies, this argument suggested, was that they inflicted their cruelty through more sophisticated and powerful means allowing them to recruit and enslave others of a savage disposition. Hidden under a false veneer of civilization, this Patriot narrative implied, in British hands oppressive taxes, muskets, bayonets, and cannons were little different than, and facilitated, the Indian hatchet and scalping knife. Patriots thus no longer saw Indians as just improper allies for the British according to the civilized rules of war. Instead, Americans now imagined Indians and the savage violence they supposedly practiced as a literal proxy for British intentions and character. Consequently, while most Native groups remained neutral in early 1777, this reality did little to stop rumors and propaganda in the Patriot press. Beginning with the fraudulent reports of Iroquois atrocities at Battle of the Cedars in Quebec less than two months before independence, Patriots consistently described Indian savagery as a subsidiary of the even more threatening British menace. Importantly, however, two proxies were conspicuously absent from this line of thought in Patriot propaganda—German Hessian mercenaries and Tories.

As evidenced by their inclusion in Jefferson’s list of grievances in the Declaration of Independence, the Hessians were by no means excluded from general Patriot ire. Hessians were perhaps the one proxy that rivaled Anglo-Indian alliances as a source of revolutionary anxiety because of their reputation as cruel soldiers spawned from despotic lands unaccustomed to civilized norms. Ironically, while claims of British control over Native populations instigating Indian savagery were more often fiction than fact, Hessians mercenaries, who largely avoided this charge, far better fit the bill. Hessian deserters would later report that British officers had instructed them

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29 For reports of Indian savagery at the Battle of the Cedars see New York Gazette, June 10, 1776, Pennsylvania Evening Post, June 15, 1776 and New York Journal, June 20, 1776. For a detailed discussion of how the Battle of the Cedars impacted debates over independence see Parkinson, The Common Cause, 236-244.
to “give no quarter” at the Battle of Long Island and had indoctrinated them with fears that “rebels cannibalized soldiers they took captive.” Regardless, once their reputation, as described in the Patriot press, as brutal and invincible “monster men” was shattered by Washington’s stunning victory at the Battle of Trenton, the Hessians became just another deluded proxy failing to inspire the deep-seated antipathy that backcountry Americans felt for Indians. Instead, Americans reimagined Hessians as “equal victims who could—and would—come over to the [revolutionary] cause,” providing the opportunity for other British proxies and the fears of backcountry Americans to dominate the Patriot press in the years to come as the war’s center shifted to the mid-Atlantic and the backcountry itself.

While Tories eventually received similar sympathy as deluded victims of British oppression, their treatment in the Patriot press of the late 1770s would prove to be uniquely harsh. At the same time that Hessians dominated Patriot newspapers, individual Loyalists, like Royal Governor of New York William Tryon, faced denouncements as “the bloody tool[s] of a sanguinary Despot [King George III and his ministry],” often-reflecting local social tensions. Nevertheless, until the eruption of anti-Tory atrocity literature in 1778, Loyalists as a collective group remained a secondary focus for Patriot propagandists, usually converging with the British themselves if mentioned at all. While American newspapers were flooded with reports of Anglo-Indian savagery, the political treachery of Tories was a comparably muted theme. Before these arguments violently converged in 1778, Loyalists’ position as political traitors to the revolutionary cause was simply a less compelling argument for Patriot writers than the emotional racial language of anti-Indianism.

The origins of this intense anti-Loyalist thought were already present in early 1777. Paine, as always, modeled the direction Patriot propagandists would follow in the coming years. While the famous opening line, “These are the times that try men’s souls,” in Paine’s first American Crisis essay is most often connected to the nadir of Patriot morale as the center of war shifted to the mid-Atlantic before the shocking reversal of Washington’s victory at Trenton, it is telling that far more space and venomous censure is afforded to Tories than Hessians. As Paine details:

31 Parkinson, The Common Cause, 315.
32 New York Journal, April 4, 1776.
Why is it that the enemy have left the New England provinces, and made these middle ones the seat of war? The answer is easy: New England is not infested with Tories, and we are. I have been tender in raising the cry against these men, and used numberless arguments to show them their danger, but it will not do to sacrifice a world either to their folly or their baseness. The period is now arrived, in which either they or we must change our sentiments, or one or both must fall. And what is a Tory? Good God! What is he? I should not be afraid to go with a hundred Whigs against a thousand Tories, were they to attempt to get into arms. Every Tory is a coward; for servile, slavish, self-interested fear is the foundation of Toryism; and a man under such influence, though he may be cruel, never can be brave.\textsuperscript{33}

In short, for Paine and others to follow, Tories were an embodiment of what every American Patriot was not—a claim that captured the essence of the racializing argument which would undergird anti-Loyalist atrocity literature in 1778. Consequently, the erstwhile political distinctions from which the Whig and Tory labels emerged took on an explicit, and now thought to be intrinsic, social and, eventually pseudo-racial, dimension. Put simply, Whigs could be Americans while Tories could not. In contrast to civilized Whig Americans who prized liberty above all, Tories were typecast as Paine first described them: cruel, base, and cowardly, delighting in both savage barbarity and the comforts of servile slavery. By this logic, support of British tyranny and the savage violence through which it was maintained, came naturally to a perverse Tory in the same way it disgusted a proper Whig. If America was to be a republic, Paine’s argument suggested, Tories were by definition an internal malignance that combined the worst of tendencies of British aristocratic despotism with the ignoble cruelty of an Indian. While the explicit racial language that would characterize later anti-Loyalist tracts in 1778 and 1779 was not yet present, Paine made clear that the Tories’ opportunity to rid themselves of their “servile, slavish, self-interested fear” was quickly expiring.

Furthermore, seemingly writing directly to the backcountry, Paine supplemented these emotionally charged insults with more direct criticisms and threats. A claim that combined the rumored plots of 1776 with memories of the terrors of Indian war, Paine asserted that Tories would “not be sorry” if “the back counties were to give up their arms [and] fell easy prey to

Indians, who are well armed.” He claimed that the necessary response to this treachery was, like the savage Indians the Loyalists allied with, that the Continental Army “expel them from the continent, and the Congress appropriate their possessions.” Paine still noted that he hoped that Loyalists could reintegrate into the revolutionary republican project; nevertheless, his own words suggested that this belief was remarkably quixotic. Paine, an immensely skilled and clever propagandist, likely framed his language purposefully in this fashion for dramatic effect. That said, he had modeled what would not only become a very real thought process for Americans in the backcountry, but also eventually reverberate back to metropolitan centers of revolutionary activity as reports of Anglo-Indian violence from the backcountry began to dominate urban Patriot newspapers. White Loyalists’ role as an enemy other through which backcountry Americans could understand their new identity in negative terms would harden as the reach of the anti-British sublime expanded in the late 1770s.

As Paine bristled at Loyalist treachery, however, the Revolutionary War was entering a new phase. General Washington’s victories at Trenton and Princeton had salvaged what had otherwise been a successful campaign for the British commanders Sir William Howe and Henry Clinton in New York, but the occupation of New York City remained a source of Patriot anxiety that captivated metropolitan writers. In his third *America Crisis* essay, Paine, once again presaging a point of Patriot emphasis to return in 1778, blamed the loss of the city on the “fear and indolence” of Tories. He claimed, in a line that converged the anti-British sublime with a generous dash of moralistic misogyny, that all the “prostitutes in New York were Tories; and the schemes for supporting the Tory cause...were concerted and carried out in common baudy-houses, assisted by those who kept them.”

In the spring of 1777, Paine and others ruminated over the fate of the mid-Atlantic coast, which had been the center of the Revolutionary War throughout 1776. Their control over the narrative of Anglo-Indian alliances and convergence began to weaken as a new threat had emerged deeper in the American interior. The critical turning point in the development of the anti-British sublime, however, would begin not with a metropolitan Patriot propagandist like Paine, but in the mid-Atlantic backcountry.

British General John Burgoyne’s ambitious plan to seize the Hudson River Valley with a force descending from Quebec presented a new troubling threat in early 1777. Most worrying of all was that Burgoyne was

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34 Ibid., 98.
35 Ibid., 96.
36 “The American Crisis Number III,” in *Paine: Collected Writings*, 133.
accompanied by a force of 7000 British, German, Tory and, most importantly, Indian troops led by the infamous Iroquois leader Joseph Brant, who had denounced early promises of neutrality. If backcountry fears had been stimulated by the rumored plots of 1776, Burgoyne, in a move that would prove profoundly misguided, would attempt to capitalize on them by waging a war that used the terror of Indian War without the violence. As he put it, he wanted a force that “spoke daggers, but employed none.” While Burgoyne’s culpability for the actions of his Indian proxies is debatable, at the very least he had very little insight into how to control them. As Bernard Sheehan caustically described Burgoyne’s inability to manage his Indian allies, “one would find it difficult to conceive of a character less likely to gain insight into Indian culture or less likely to succeed in changing the native way of making war.” While Burgoyne hoped to wage a campaign that psychologically terrorized “rebels” so effectively that no real terror would be necessary, he was unsuccessful.

Regardless, the ever-confident “Gentleman Johnny,” as Patriots mockingly labeled Burgoyne for his pretensions as a refined poet and playwright, earned early successes, like reversing Ethan Allen’s famous 1775 triumph at Fort Ticonderoga. Not just a symbolic defeat, the loss of Ticonderoga was a critical strategic blunder after which the arrival of war to the mid-Atlantic backcountry was undeniable and the resulting consequences were dramatic. Most importantly, this defeat set off a wave of panic as the British now accompanied by very real Indian proxies had a base of operation from which they could launch attacks directly into the American interior.

Yet what appeared to be a crucial victory for the British cause in the colonies would quickly unravel as Burgoyne followed up his triumph with a critical blunder. In an attempt to rally Loyalists and intimidate “rebels,” Burgoyne issued a proclamation that seemed to confirm backcountry America’s worst fears, promising to bring “devastation, famine, and ever concomitant horror” to those who opposed his advance. Even more troubling, he declared in a remark that would be widely reprinted across American newspapers, “I have but to give stretch to the Indian Forces under my direction, and they amount to Thousands, to overtake the harden’d Enemies of Great Britain and America (I consider them the same), wherever

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37 Parkinson, The Common Cause, 331-332.
39 Ibid., 121.
they may lurk.” This proclamation, interpreted as a threat to unleash unmitigated Indian war in the backcountry, was immediately subject to intense Patriot censure. While Burgoyne’s proclamation was more bluster than real intention, his actions reflected a profound ignorance of the current state of the mid-Atlantic backcountry and its history. Burgoyne hoped to encourage hidden Loyalists to see him as a conquering savior and inspire fear in his enemies. Instead, he announced to the backcountry that the British were exactly what Patriot propagandists had said they were. As frightening as the return of Indian war was, Burgoyne had proved that the British presence on the American frontier was unacceptable, lest Patriots allow the savage Anglo-Indian threat to remain.

The famously acerbic Pennsylvanian writer Francis Hopkinson captured the resistant tone of the resulting anger and anxieties well. He mocked Burgoyne for “having collected an amiable host of savages, and turning them loose to scalp our wives and children,” adding sardonically, “We humbly offer our heads to the Tomahawk...Give not a stretch to those restorers of constitutional rights—the Indian forces under your direction.”

Once again, and in an unprecedentedly pointed form, racially charged depictions of violence and degeneracy were connected to a political argument, mocking Burgoyne’s and British claims more broadly to be the restorers of constitutional rights in the face of rebel tyranny. While Hopkinson’s criticisms were an impassioned but rhetorically unremarkable use of the same anti-Indian language seen in earlier Patriot writings, the increased anxiety generated by Burgoyne’s military successes and his unabashed use of Indian proxies created a powder keg that would erupt into an unprecedented wave of anti-British hysteria. Extending arguments developed in the Patriot press, in the wake of the soon to be discovered murder of Jane McCrea, Americans cast off any subtlety remaining in their denunciations of the British. Revolutionary propagandists explicitly demonized and dehumanized their former imperial overlords as not just the masters of savages, as was typical of anti-British rhetoric in 1776 and early 1777, but as the worst savages of all. While the British became the most direct targets of this language, their increasingly violent demonization in the form of describing them using lurid anti-Indian language provided the roadmap for the anti-Tory atrocity literature of the following years.

40 The Newport Gazette, October 30, 1777.
42 Francis Hopkinson, “An Answer to General Burgoyne’s Proclamation (1777)” in The Miscellaneous Essays and Occasional Writings of Francis Hopkinson (Philadelphia: T. Dobson, 1792), 146-150.
The critical turning point in this development was a single incident in the New York backcountry. Jane McCrea, a young woman and the intended bride of David Jones, a Loyalist officer in Burgoyne’s army, was captured, killed, and scalped by a group of British-allied Indians in July 1777. This incident, which first appeared to be a minor obstacle for Burgoyne’s campaign in the distant New York frontier, quickly turned into an unprecedented windfall for Patriot propagandists. Ironically, in this tragedy, revolutionaries found the perfect opportunity to show a visceral example of British and Indian savagery that spoke to Americans’ deepest insecurities in a way that even the Anglo-Indian plots of 1775-1776 could not match. Entirely ignoring their previous denouncements of Tory baseness, Patriot propagandists, turned McCrea into a valuable metaphor as they took advantage of the deep-seated language of racial and gender stereotypes: a captive white woman, reimagined as innocent beauty personified, ravaged at home by a savage captor, a proxy for Britain in a very literal sense. What the memory of Rowlandson provided figuratively, McCrea made real in the eyes of backcountry Americans. Her status as a Loyalist now only served the rhetorical purpose of demonstrating the horrid consequences of Anglo-Indian cooperation even for individuals that the British promised to protect, a point that Patriot propagandists would return to throughout the year.43

By the end of 1777 the McCrea incident became, perhaps even more so than the American triumphs at Bennington and Saratoga, the final coup de grace for British credibility among Americans in the backcountry. McCrea’s murder convinced frightened frontier settlers that the British offered little protection from Indian savagery—if a Tory woman could be victimized what hope was there for any Whig—and in fact, as Patriot reactions to the incident would describe, supposedly encouraged it. While the Tories themselves would become the victims of exactly this kind of demonization in the summer of 1778, for Patriot propagandists the McCrea incident was promoted a proof that British savagery, in this case in the form of employing, arming, and unleashing Indians, was so uncontrollable that it victimized even its supposed allies, friends, and family. In fact, in frontiersmen’s minds the British became the greatest patrons and practitioners of the savage practices that had haunted the backcountry for decades.44 Ironically, such an incident of Indian violence would lead to the decoupling of the supposed horrors of Indian war and Indians. Rather, Patriot writers reframed it as a natural symptom of British degeneracy into cruel savagery. Consequently, when Patriot newspapers published

43 Parkinson, The Common Cause, 345.
44 Ibid., 349.
emotionally charged eulogies for Jane McCrea, the Indian proxies who were actually directly responsible for her killing largely faded into the background.

Instead, their savagery simply became proof of British savagery in direct contrast to American civility. The first and most famous of these eulogies came from Burgoyne’s main adversary in the Saratoga campaign, Continental General Horatio Gates, who sent a remarkably scathing rebuke to his adversary:

> That the savages of America should in their warfare mangle and scalp the unhappy prisoners, who fall into their hands, is neither new nor extraordinary; but that the famous Lieut General. Burgoyne, in whom the fine gentleman is united with the soldier and the scholar should hire the Savages of America to scalp Europeans and the descendants of Europeans; nay more, that he should pay a price for each scalp so barbarously taken, is more than will be believed in England until authenticated facts shall in every Gazette, convince mankind of the truth of the horrid tale – Miss McCrea, a young lady lovely to the sight, of virtuous character and amiable disposition, engaged to be married to an officer in your army; [she] was … carried into the woods, and there scalped and mangled in the most shocking manner … [by] murderers employed by you.⁴⁵

These comments reveal that Burgoyne’s reputation as “Gentleman Johnny,” which Gates clearly capitalized on, made him a particularly suitable target for this critique. For Gates, reflecting the direction that anti-British literature had taken in the previous year, Burgoyne embodied everything that differentiated the British from Americans. While they possessed the veneer of civility and morality, this was only a sinister façade obscuring their true nature as people of admittedly clever disposition and possessing an intellectual fecundity who used these skills to further their true goals as depraved savages—a claim that various writers would continue in response to the McCrea incident. In a great irony, Gates’s letter, distributed and published in newspapers across America, turned a Tory woman into a revolutionary martyr and an icon of British savagery. Building off the development of the anti-British rhetoric since 1776, this argument provided

a fully realized model for defining American identity in negative terms that would be integral to the anti-Tory literature that would follow in 1778 and 1779.

While the implications of the language were clear, Gates’s letter only subtly suggested a direct connection between British and Indian savagery that built off earlier revolutionary propaganda. Predictably, Patriot writers who followed his lead were not as shrewd or understated. A correspondent in the Pennsylvania Journal claimed that the British were not just malevolent controllers of proxies as had been emphasized by Patriot propagandists in 1776, but were, in the crucial turn, equal participants in this savagery. The writer explained the connection directly: “by what I can learn there is very little difference between the regulars [British troops] and Indians, for when Miss McCrea was butchered and scalped a large number of regulars were at little distance spectators of the horrid act.”46 Others took this line of thought even further, declaring that while the murder was “transacted by four Indians,” it was done only “under the cover of three hundred British regulars” and that the Natives acted with such vigorous savagery because they had “received full liberty from the [even] more barbarous Britain, to murder and scalp all before them.”47 These claims of British mastery over Indian proxies were of course not new, but had reached an unprecedented level of intensity in the wake of McCrea’s murder.

Thus, no longer were the British the irresponsible alliance makers of 1775-1776 who had merely abrogated their ties to the colonies by letting savage tribesmen loose on their fellow Britons and supposed children. Instead, they had become something far more menacing, usurping Native Americans’ role as the central force promoting and practicing savagery and in direct conflict with American civilization. In the crucible of war, Patriot writers suggested, the British had been unmasked. While British wealth and power made them the controllers of Indian savages during the first years of the war, once exposed to the chaos of backcountry conflict in 1777 their own true savage nature was revealed. False claims of civility would have inhibited British enthusiasm from their distant seat of power, but in the heat of frontier violence they could watch McCrea’s murder in approval. Put simply, if the British had earlier in the Revolutionary War only worked to provide Indians with the hatchet and scalping knife from afar, as Patriot propagandists claimed, by the summer of 1777 these writers were asserting that they had proved just as eager to practice this savagery themselves on the front.

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46 Pennsylvania Journal, August 13, 1777.
47 Pennsylvania Evening Post, August 12, 1777.
In this sense, the central justification for independence in the backcountry was reimagined, reverting to an ancient colonial trope rather than an entirely new creation of the Revolution. The deep history rather than novelty of these claims was what made them so powerful. While the remarkable nature of this transformation of American identity should not be understated, and certainly no one would have thought to make these anti-British arguments even in 1775, it is best understood as an organic continuation of processes of identity formation through the racialization of an enemy other primarily developed in opposition to stereotypes of savage Indians. This development, as described by historians like Lepore and Silver, was as old as the colonies themselves.48 Thus, when Patriot propagandists needed to convince backcountry settlers to embrace the revolutionary project, they returned to the effective argument long used to justify excluding Native Americans from colonial society to now interpret the British and British sympathizers.

The British, whether due to their imperial hubris or ignorance of backcountry America, were not only slow to realize this and respond but repeatedly inflamed these tensions far more than even the haughtiest Patriot

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48 Lepore, The Name of War. Silver, Our Savage Neighbors.
propagandists of the previous year could hope to do on their own merits. As a result of the subsequent intense upsurge of anti-British rhetoric, however, the Burgoyne-allied Indians who scalped McCrea found themselves reduced from the colonial boogeymen of old into an extension of even more sinister British cruelty. Americans who once feared the degeneration of their Englishness in the face of Indian savagery now used descriptions of British cruelty during the McCrea incident to reapply this very same concept to the English themselves in a development that would not reverse itself until after the War of 1812. Fully realizing the implications of the captivity narrative metaphors of the early 1770s, Patriots, whether spurred by their own actions or British blunders, had entirely reimagined British rule as a savage canker that had been poisoning American civilization from the inside and thus needed to be excised.

Burgoyne and his Loyalist followers attempted to refute the wave of anti-British hysteria that followed McCrea’s scalping by claiming that the commander had tried to restrain his Indian allies. However, Burgoyne found little sympathy from the Patriot press which instead only increased the intensity of their use of the anti-British sublime to justify the necessity of British expulsion and exclusion from America. Synthesizing the development of the anti-British sublime into a short essay, a writer in the *New-York Journal* made an explicitly racial argument for why Burgoyne and the British could not be trusted:

"We are credibly informed that Burgoyne, the chief and director of the King of Great-Britain’s band of thieves, robbers, cut-throats, scalpers, and murders of every denomination, now infecting the northern and western frontiers, of several of the United States, has not only discontinued the reward he had offered and given to the Savage Tories, Indians, [and] Britons...[among] other profligate scum of the human race [currently] in his service, for the scalps they brought him from the murdered, and half murdered inhabitants. Burgoyne had laid aside his usual practice of scalping, and strictly forbid it for the future, but we did not before know his reason for the prohibition. It is not improbable he might be apprehensive that some of the dexterous hands about him, might take an opportunity, one time or another, and slip off his own night-cap."

Not only were Burgoyne and the British overseeing “thieves,” “murders,”

49 McDonnell, *Masters of Empire*, 283

and “scalpers,” but this author described Burgoyne and the British themselves as the worst scum of the human race who had purposely acted to murder Americans in a savage fashion. The British were no longer just the enablers of cruel savagery as early Patriot writers had described them while justifying independence, but essentially practitioners themselves who had converged with their Indian allies if not exceeded them. American conceptions of Indian war had become, for all intents and purposes, indistinguishable from British war.

If the prospect of Indian war horrified backcountry Patriots, being subjugated by the British, an arguably even more sinister and capable race of savages, was even more unacceptable. Independence was not just preferable, it had become absolutely necessary because the British and, as would become apparent in the following year, their Loyalists supporters were unable to ever integrate into American society. For better or worse, the violence of the frontier had become, or arguably remained despite the pretensions of the founders, the central axis across which backcountry Americans understood who they were and, more importantly, who they were not. This had direct and dire consequences; if enemies both external and internal were defined by their high capacity and depraved enthusiasm for violence, forceful retribution became the reflexive response.

Regardless, if America by the end of 1776 was a nation transformed, this was all the more true as the nation staggered, perhaps now with a little more confidence and enthusiastic purpose, to its third year of a thus far fraught existence. By the end of 1777, the anti-British sublime, which emerged first in response to rumors of Anglo-Indian plots beginning in 1775 and then exploded following the murder of Jane McCrea, had reached its apex. In its new form, Patriot writers dropped any remaining pretense of British humanity and unambiguously criticized the intrinsic savagery and resulting violence of the British. The constitutional and ideological debates of the imperial crisis had fully faded from the concerns of backcountry Americans and writings of Patriot propagandists. In their place, Patriot writers celebrated the American project by explicitly denouncing the horrors and immutability of British savagery. Yet as remarkable as the transformations of 1777 were, the next two years would see these trends transform once again.

By 1778, these anti-British attitudes had developed into a sophisticated language of racialized anti-British critique. Initially chided as the cruel masters of barbarous proxies during the first years of the war, in the wake of McCrea’s murder, Patriots now denounced the British themselves as enthusiastic participants in the savage violence of the
backcountry. As the war in the northern colonies subsequently began to turn in the Patriots favor, American separation politically and culturally from the British had solidified in a way that would have been unthinkable decades earlier. After Gates won a stunning victory at Saratoga in October 1777, the Continental Congress finalized an alliance with Bourbon France in early February. No clearer sign of disaffection for the British could be imagined. Any chance of peaceable reconciliation was shattered. With this alliance, in the eyes of British and Loyalist audiences alike, the Patriots had revealed the duplicity of their cause. The same Americans who championed liberty and decried the despotism of the mother country, including attempts to accommodate French-Canadians, abandoned the protections of the British Constitution to become friends with the papist tyrant of France himself—Louis XVI.51 That self-styled Whigs could find common ground with a despot that in the British mind embodied everything they claimed to despise, puzzled even the most francophile English Tories. So-called Whig rebels, as the British and Loyalists imagined them, had revealed the vacuity of their cause and the demagoguery which they believed the American founders aspired to. They were no better than Stuart Jacobites in false Whigs’ clothing.52

While these British and Loyalists criticisms seem like nothing more than sour grapes due to their suddenly deteriorating position, especially after Howe was forced out of his short-lived occupation of Philadelphia in the summer, the strangeness of this alliance cannot be understated. How Patriots justified it as an extension of their project thus is worthy of particular attention. Most importantly, the fact that Americans were willing to celebrate an alliance with the absolutist Bourbon regime in France suggests the rhetoric of revolutionary republicanism had far less sway than the backcountry-centric language of the anti-British sublime.

New Jersey Governor William Livingston captured this development well in his May 1778 speech to the state’s General Assembly celebrating the Franco-American alliance. Largely ignoring any positive justifications for separation as reason for finding themselves in league with a country all too recently seen as their greatest enemy abroad, Livingston instead told the assembly that the alliance was necessary because “their [British enemies’] unparalleled cruelties both in the eastern and western

51 Hoock, *Scars of Independence*, 270. Lord Germain, the British Secretary of State for the Colonies, used the Franco-American alliance to gain support for harsh military measures, claiming that it was evidence “the Americas…were become[ing] Frenchman…[now acting as] the dagger of France [against Britain].”
52 For a discussion of how the Jacobite Rebellion of 1745 impacted how British leadership imagined the American revolutionaries see Hoock, *Scars of Independence*, 78-80.
world...[had] over[taken] the most impious and irreligious of any [people] in Christendom.”\textsuperscript{53} The British were, frankly put, “an enemy too savage to be humanized...a race of murders before unequalled, and without competition.”\textsuperscript{54} Then Livingston made the crucial turn, both converging the positive republican arguments for independence with his earlier racializing rhetoric and turning to a new target, the Loyalists: a “Tory is by any human means absolutely inconvertible having so entirely extinguished the primitive virtue and patriotism natural to [Americans]...[they have] arrived at the highest possible pitch of degeneracy preferring tyranny to free government.”\textsuperscript{55} Through this claim, making more explicit a point of emphasis that had first emerged in the Patriot press following the murder of Jane McCrea, Livingston had subsumed the positive ideological justifications for separation into the older negative tradition of defining identity through ideas of racialized civilizational difference. American republicanism and British and Tory despotism were, as Livingston expressed, the natural products of racial difference.

In the eyes of Livingston and others to follow, this distinction based on race had unmistakable consequences. As racial difference had justified the exclusion, displacement, and murder of Native Americans, British and Tory degeneracy similarly required a “general effort to expel [them]...from the continent.”\textsuperscript{56} As the revolutionary experiment approached its third year, the republican ideology of the founders had become only a subsidiary element of the backcountry-derived rhetoric of racializing, converging independence with a far more ancient colonial project, namely the effort to remove the threat of savages from the Anglo-American world, which had begun as early as the late seventeenth century. While backcountry Patriots did not articulate their support for the Revolution in these exact terms, the prevalence of this racial rhetoric suggests that in truth, at least psychologically, for them the Revolution had far more in common with the Indian and imperial wars dating back to the struggle with King Philip than a fissure in Anglo-American constitutionalism. The founding fathers would continue to romanticize the Revolution as the break from the unnatural and irrational tenets of British colonial society; however, the prevalence of this anti-British racial rhetoric suggests that for most Americans the break was not so clean. The Revolution may have reinvented how colonial Anglo-Americans in the backcountry understood their identity but it was unable to

\textsuperscript{53} Pennsylvania Packet, June 11, 1778.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.
offer a viable replacement. Effectively, revolutionary republican ideology only obscured the revival of a continuing conflict between American civility and the threat of savagery that had been waged in the colonial mind since its very inception.

On July 3, 1778, for instance, the *Connecticut Gazette* made exactly this kind of anti-British argument when it celebrated the second Fourth of July with a seemingly unremarkably titled poem “A Short Reflection on the Anniversary of American Independence.” The poem, however, revealed that as the Revolutionary War entered its third year, the tensions unleashed by the war reached new heights and, as a result, the divisions between American and British and Patriot and Loyalist were not just solidifying but in fact still radicalizing. The very same Americans who had merely a decade earlier celebrated their British identity and delighted in calling themselves “his majesty’s most loyal subjects” now celebrated their new nation’s independence by portraying their former fellow subjects as the very embodiment of colonial evil—the inhuman savage. As Robert Parkinson puts it, the poet sought primarily not to praise “America’s ‘illustrious Characters!’” but instead to detail the horrific character of “British crimes”; most serious among these was the sponsor and more importantly the practice of “savage” Indian violence.57 As the poet recounted in gruesome detail:

> The British Court in this important strife employ the tomahawk and scalping knife; but least these gentle humane measures fail to show they are determined to prevail, instruct their soldiery to practices, till now unknown to other savages. To plunder Women’s rings is not enough...they cut their fingers off, delighted with husbands wrongs and cries they ravish his dear wife before his eyes...and force her Virgin daughters in her sight...their Indian Allies shock’d at British wars...these brutal actions they with shame disown, Britain such glory must thine alone.58

Rather than revel in American patriotism or heroism, for the Connecticut poet, the celebration of the new republic’s second anniversary was an opportunity to vilify the British for their barbarity, supposedly so abominable that it disgusted even the worst savages of them all, their Indian comrades. This was not the first time that Patriots had described savage Natives as civilized in comparison to the British. In the aftermath of

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58 *Connecticut Gazette*, July 3, 1778.
McCrea’s murder in 1778, however, this argument took on an increasingly literal form. No longer were the British just demonstrating their savagery by encouraging the cruel violence of their proxies as had been emphasized by Patriot writers in 1776. Instead, they were “employ[ing] the tomahawk and scalping knife” themselves. Effectively, the British had been so thoroughly Indianized in Patriot propaganda that they made the true savage Indians look humane in comparison. These denouncements, done on a scale unthinkable even just a year earlier, had become commonplace following Burgoyne’s use of Indian proxies during the Saratoga campaign. Once again for the poet, like countless Patriot propagandists following the murder of Jane McCrea, it was primarily the cultural and racial degeneration of the British themselves, rather than Anglo-Indian alliances, that justified American independence.

The continuing uptick in anti-British literature did not reflect an organic effort of Patriot propagandists to capitalize on ancient colonial fears as it had earlier in the war. Instead, it had taken on a far more developed and institutionalized form. As historian Holger Hoock has explained, by late 1777-1778 gruesome accounts of British violence, which began flooding Patriot newspapers following the murder of Jane McCrea, were no longer merely isolated incidents of fear mongering or local anxieties typical of early American warfare. As typified by the Connecticut Gazette’s poem, the leaders and supporters of the new republic, employing what Hoock calls the framework of “moral war,” used reports of British violence and the rhetoric of the anti-British sublime for two main purposes. Not only did they continue to directly compare British savagery to American civility as the central justification not just for independence, but they also promoted this comparison as evidence of the global importance of the American revolutionary project.

For instance, by the summer of 1778, the Continental Congress founded an investigatory committee led by John Witherspoon to find, record, and disseminate accounts of British violence during the New York and Saratoga campaigns.59 Once recorded and distributed to Patriot presses, accounts of atrocities could be purposely manipulated by writers and printers in order to denounce their enemies and justify independence by implicitly and explicitly depicting the British and their allies as racially, and thus culturally and ethically, incompatible with civilized Americans. As Hoock details, in the wake of the events of 1777 and early 1778, Patriot leaders were aware that “telling a plausible, well-evidenced story of enemy atrocities…[was a] critical tool [in] the project of forging the new American

nation.” Consequently, they used Congress, the Continental Army, and the press to denounce British barbarity as “part of a broader pattern of British excessive violence” justifying independence domestically and internationally. Simultaneously, these same “quasi-national institutions” which recorded and disseminated accounts of British and Loyalist violence promoted an image of American civility as an enlightened alternative to savage barbarity and revealed “Britain’s [and Loyalists’] moral inferiority [thus demonstrating] the righteous urgency of America’s cause.” Ironically, the flow of revolutionary thought had reversed itself. The revolutionary elites, whose agitation had proved so effective in reviving and unleashing backcountry anxieties that such fears had unintentionally supplanted their central republican arguments, were now compelled to take advantage of what they had created.

Perhaps even more importantly, while highly emotional anti-British language to the extent evoked by the Connecticut poet had focused almost entirely on backcountry concerns, it appeared that American’s efforts to win the “moral war” through their new use of the “anti-Indian sublime” had become a pan-American phenomenon. In fact, the outpouring of racially charged anti-British rhetoric that followed in the coming months would make the Connecticut poet’s claims, and even the reactions to the murder of Jane McCrea, look profoundly tame by comparison. At the exact same time that the Gazette’s readers were enjoying “A Short Reflection on the Anniversary of American Independence,” a peace commission led by the Earl of Carlisle had arrived to make the last serious attempt at Anglo-American reconciliation. Little did the Carlisle commissioners know that their arrival could not have been more poorly timed. Just a month after they arrived in New York, another incident of supposedly “savage” British violence took place in neighboring Pennsylvania that would dominate the American Patriot press: the so-called Wyoming Massacre.

60 Ibid., 156, 267.
61 Ibid., 162. This rhetoric also demoralized the pro-British public in both the mother country and abroad. Some English writers began to openly denounce a critical part of British military policy in the New World, questioning Britain’s alliances with Indians as a moral crisis, which was threatening to undermine the empire’s prestige and reputation. For instance, Edward Long, a slave-owner and colonial administrator in Jamaica, was compelled to write a 1778 book, English Humanity No Paradox, or An Attempt to Prove that the English Are Not a Nation of Savages to defend the empire’s flagging reputation. Yet harshly criticizing British military policy in America, he claimed that, among other crimes, the British had become “patrons and abettors of Wanton Homicide,” by inciting “Cannibal Indians to scalp, tomahawk, and torture, with undistinguishing fury...[leading to] killings in cool blood, rapes, torturing, rapines, and devastations.” Edward Long, English humanity no paradox: or, an attempt to prove, that the English are not a nation of savages (London: Printed for T. Lowndes, 1778), 81-82, 90.
Following Burgoyne’s disastrous defeat to Gates at Saratoga the previous year and in an attempt to prevent the newly founded Franco-American alliance from reestablishing control of the North American interior, British military policy shifted towards an increased emphasis on the role of proxies, primarily Native Americans and especially Loyalist paramilitary groups. Among the most important of these new agents of British grand strategy was a backcountry Loyalist from the Mohawk Valley. Major John Butler and his paramilitary group the Rangers—a mixed force of white Loyalists from upstate New York and Iroquois (primarily Mohawk, Seneca, and Cayuga) warriors—would, by the end of the year, become synonymous with savage barbarity and a symbol of the power of the Patriot propagandistic press to capture and expound on backcountry anxieties.62 On June 30, 1778, this larger force of Tories and Iroquois, having invaded the Wyoming Valley in Pennsylvania from northern Iroquoia and Canada, were confronted by a smaller Continental force led by Zebulon Butler, of no relation to the Loyalist commander, accompanied by a Patriot militia group commanded by Colonel Nathan Dennison.

The resulting battle, fought along the Susquehanna River that afternoon, was brief and ultimately costly for the Patriots. By the end of the afternoon the Anglo-Indian force had enveloped the smaller Patriot militia, quickly routing them and forcing survivors to flee. That night, as John Butler

62 Silver, Our Savage Neighbors, 239.
would later report, the Loyalists and Indians collected “227 scalps, and 5 prisoners,” while only losing three men in the process. The aftermath of the battle was particularly disastrous for the Patriot forces and the residents of the Wyoming Valley themselves as some members of the Loyalist and Indian forces broke away from their commander and burned nearby dwellings. What was certainly a serious setback for Patriot forces in the American interior was to the Loyalist commander who oversaw the victory nothing particularly unusual. As Butler told his superiors, he had “the sincerest satisfaction” letting them know that “not a single person has been hurt of the inhabitants but such as were in arms.”

Yet once reports of the battle made their way to the Patriot press, its narrative would be entirely transformed. In the weeks and months that followed, this minor skirmish in the western Pennsylvania backcountry unleashed a wave of emotional and hyperbolic anti-Tory atrocity literature that would far exceed even the anti-British rhetoric that resulted from McCrea incident. While Tories had long been a secondary focus of Patriot propagandists—revolutionary writers had vacillated between one position that converged Loyalists entirely with the British and another which described them as servile proxies—in 1778 and 1779 they became the centerpiece of the new form of the anti-British argument which remained central to how American identity was understood. Accordingly, while the Iroquois leaders Joseph Brant, Sayenquerahta, and Cornplanter received harsh criticism for Indian scalping, it was Butler and his fellow white Loyalists who received the worst of Patriot condemnation.

Far from reporting that no unarmed individuals had been harmed, the Pennsylvania Packet, supposedly running the account of a Connecticut Patriot Solomon Avery, blamed “these villainous Tories [for] stir[ing] up the Indians...fighting [with them] against us...plunder[ing] the houses of every thing they could take away and destroyed the rest.” The Wyoming Valley, the Packet reported was “a scene of desolation and horror, almost beyond description, parallel or credibility,” which “were not the facts attested to be a number of unhappy sufferers...would be impossible to believe.” Worst of all, the Tories converged entirely with their Indian allies to a degree that greatly exceeded even the British regulars who supposedly

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63 Parkinson, The Common Cause, 411. This simplified account of the battle is derived from Parkinson and Paul Moyer, Wild Yankees: The Struggle for Independence along the Revolutionary Frontier (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007).
65 Pennsylvania Packet, July 30, 1778.
helped murder Jane McCrea. As the *Pennsylvania Packet* writer described the Tory forces, they were “painted like them [Indians],” “kill[ing], scalp[ing] and mangl[ing] in the most inhuman manner,” threatening that if the Patriots, both armed and unarmed, did not surrender they would ensure their fort was “stormed, plundered and burnt.” McCrea had been a powerful symbol, tapping into a range of deep-rooted colonial prejudices and stereotypes, but these reports from Wyoming Valley provided something even more valuable to the Patriot cause. While the McCrea incident could be explained away as the actions of overexcited Indians or the bumbling incompetence of Burgoyne, the reports of the desolation of the Wyoming Valley read like a nightmarish phantasm that even the most lurid captivity narratives could not match. In its aftermath, backcountry Patriots fearing the arrival of British-led Indian war appeared validated, after the Wyoming massacre there could be no doubt it had already come and the effects were disastrous. To Patriots in the backcountry, readily accepting such accounts’ authenticity, the fact that these reports were almost certainly entirely fraudulent simply did not matter.

Likewise, in complete contrast to his insistence of humane conduct, John Butler was particularly vilified by Patriot printers as the archetypal Tory savage to a far greater extent than even Burgoyne had been demonized the year before. In the *New-York Journal*’s account of the Wyoming Massacre, Butler, who was falsely described as Zebulon’s cousin, was reported as responding to Col. Dennison’s request for terms of surrender and quarter in two words—“the hatchet”—with a cold savagery that would strike even the most ferocious Patriot stereotype of an Indian warrior as uniquely cruel. Americans who were captured were reported to have suffered a fate that made the hatchet appear humane. As the *Packet* reported in a claim that stretches credulity, “Captain James Bedlock [was captured] by the enemy [Tories and Indians]. They stripped [him], tied him to a tree, and stuck him full of sharp splinters and pine knots…they set all on fire, put[ting] Durgee and Ranson [two other Patriot captives] into the fire and held them down with pitch forks.” While there was little to no evidence to corroborate these fantastical and grotesque accusations—a fact that Brant and the enraged Iroquois warriors would ensure had horrible consequences later that year in Cherry Valley New York—for backcountry American audiences it did not matter. After years of consuming and internalizing the language of the anti-British sublime and the consistent demonization of British proxies, even

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66 Ibid.
these outrageously violent claims were accepted without serious skepticism. Consequently, for years to come, Butler’s Loyalists, like Burgoyne’s Indians, would be synonymous with savage depravity, a clear representation of how Tories had degenerated away from anything backcountry Patriots imagined as American.

This said, the fraudulent accusation that John Butler was Zebulon’s cousin is indicative of a particularly interesting strain of anti-Loyalist atrocity literature that first emerged during the McCrea incident: that Tories were unabashedly parricidal. While Patriots employing fraternal and maternal metaphors to describe the scale of British treachery had a history older than the Revolutionary War itself, this language took on a very real and graphic form following the events of July 1778 with no precedent in earlier anti-British rhetoric. In the Packet, a Patriot writer accused the Tories of arriving in the Wyoming Valley with their sinister machinations already planned, having “formed the horrid design of joining the Savages in murdering and scalping their neighbors.” When they finally arrived, the same Packet report claimed, they exceeded even these horrid fears. Thomas Hill, a Loyalist from a Wyoming Patriot family, “with his own hands killed his own mother, his father in law, his sisters and their families.” His father, the report assured the reader, was only spared from his son’s savage rage as

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69 Silver, Our Savage Neighbors, 240.
70 Pennsylvania Packet, July 20, 1778.
he “was killed by the Indians, last Indian war.”\textsuperscript{71} Another Wyoming Loyalist, Partial Terry, was described in especially shocking language as an even more sinister monster:

\textit{Partial Terry}, the son of a man who bore a very respectable character, had several times sent his father word, that he hoped to wash his hands in his [father’s] heart’s blood. Agreeable to such a horrid declaration, the monster, with his own hand murdered his father, mother, brothers and sisters, stripped of their scalps, and cut off his father’s head.\textsuperscript{72}

The British regulars who had supposedly helped scalp and murder McCrea had acted with savagery against someone they were supposed to protect, but even this claim paled in comparison to the unrestrained depravity that Patriot writers assigned to Loyalists like Partial Terry. In this Patriot propaganda, Loyalists took the form of mindless brutes whose savage nature had become so uninhibited that they now delighted in destroying their own communities and even killing their families in a fashion that exceeded the worst monsters of colonial captivity narratives. While the evidence for any of these outrageously grotesque claims was fragmentary and unreliable, if not more likely almost entirely fraudulent, backcountry Americans, conditioned by years of anti-British rhetoric, found them compelling. As Patriot frontier Colonel John Piper summed up the state of the backcountry to Thomas Wharton, the President of Pennsylvania’s Supreme Executive Council, “between the Indians and the still more savage Tories, these backward counties [the backcountry] are in real distress.”\textsuperscript{73} The consequence of this rhetoric was that, as would become apparent in the following year, if the backcountry was to be secured for civilized Patriot Americans, both Indians and “the still more savage Tories” would have to be removed from the mid-Atlantic frontier by force. Loyalist violence would have to be met in kind or else Patriots would be overwhelmed from the west even if the Continental Army succeeded against British regulars in the east. If Britons and Tories had degenerated into such savagery, Americans, conceiving of themselves as a distinct and superior people, not only refused to be ruled by them, but also saw their presence in the backcountry as an immense and unacceptable threat like the Indians of the colonial period.

This process of identity formation was itself rife with irony in ways

\textsuperscript{71} \textit{Pennsylvania Packet}, July 30, 1778.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{73} G.D. Albert, \textit{The Frontier Forts of Western Pennsylvania} (Harrisburg: C.M. Busch, 1896), 345.
that Americans even well into the first years of the republic did not perceive, ultimately to their great detriment. Patriots, through their use of the anti-British sublime, did much to create the very same backcountry monsters they so feared. When Walter Butler, the son of the already infamous John Butler, and the Iroquois leader Joseph Brant raided the Cherry Valley in New York in November 1778, the attack quickly turned into a massacre.\textsuperscript{74} Despite Butler’s attempts to control them, Loyalists and Iroquois, certainly with the reports of the largely fictitious Wyoming Massacre in mind and enraged by fallacious accusations of atrocities as well as Continental Colonel William Butler (of no relation to Zebulon, or the Loyalist John and his son William) and the 4th Pennsylvania regiment’s recent destruction of the Iroquois village of Onaquaga, decided to exact their revenge.\textsuperscript{75} Now armed with reports of a real massacre, the Patriot press’s production of responses filled with lurid rhetoric was predictable. Reports of “inhuman barbarities” included the “kill[ing], scalp[ing] and most barbarously murder[ing] 32 inhabitants.” One settler’s “head was cut off, his skull bone was cut out with the scalp,” a child was “scalp’d,” and the belly of a pregnant woman was “rip’t up.”\textsuperscript{76} The Patriot outrage over the fraudulent Wyoming Massacre had become a self-fulfilling prophecy, enraging Loyalist and Iroquois Indian forces and motivating the very same atrocities that were once entirely products of American propagandists’ imaginations.

Like in Wyoming, Butler and the Tories, rather than Brant and the Iroquois, were the primary targets of Patriot criticism. The \textit{New-York Journal}, recalling the Loyalist monsters Thomas Hill and Partial Terry, similarly blamed the “horrid miscreants [who] were inhabitants of Cherry-Valley…whose parents were living there.”\textsuperscript{77} Like at Wyoming, the central theme remained Tory rather than Indian violence, particularly emphasizing the parricidal tendencies of Loyalists and justifying their forceful exclusion from backcountry communities. While the Indians were savages, their obvious racial and cultural distinctiveness meant that Patriots could easily exclude them from civilized communities. In contrast, the savagery of white Tories was not apparent from skin alone, presenting a far more troubling threat. If allowed to remain and conceal themselves among civilized Americans, as Patriot propagandists were suggesting, Tories would inevitably unleash their savage urges on their family and friends once

\textsuperscript{74} Parkinson, \textit{The Common Cause}, 422.


\textsuperscript{76} Pennsylvania Packet, December 19, 1778.

provided with the opportunity. The Indians were certainly barbaric at Cherry Valley, but their culpability in the minds of Americans was largely offset by what Patriots incorrectly assumed to be Butler’s complete control over Brant and the Iroquois. While the arrogant and incompetent Butler often clashed with the intensely independent and highly capable Brant, there was no place for such nuance in the American press.\(^78\)

Regardless, the fact that Patriot reactions in the backcountry to the very real Cherry Valley massacre were nearly identical, and in fact comparably muted, to the essentially fictitious Wyoming massacre is revealing.\(^79\) Conditioned by years of the anti-British sublime in newspapers and pamphlets, rumors of British and Tory violence were reflexively promoted and accepted as fact among backcountry settlers. When this recent history of defining American identity in the mid-Atlantic, and the ethos of American national culture, primarily in opposition to the British and their proxies, was combined with the violence, fear, and loathing of frontier war, the result was a climate of murderous hatred that subsumed the celebrated core ideological principles of the American project. This had dire consequences for the path the Patriot war effort would take in the final years of the Revolutionary War not just in the mid-Atlantic, but also in the increasingly important southern theater where Tory and Indian proxies would take on a similar importance post-1778. Most importantly, in the minds of backcountry Americans, as Tories converged with Indians so converged the Revolutionary War, at least psychologically, with the horrors of Indian war. This psychological transformation was significant. If the Revolution was Indian war, regardless of American claims to be waging a republican “moral war,” it would have to be fought as an Indian war.

In 1779, backcountry Americans and Patriot writers would celebrate Continental General John Sullivan’s expedition into Loyalist and Indian-controlled Iroquoia for this exact purpose. As Washington explained in a letter to Sullivan ordering him to assemble his forces, he was instructed to capture “Butler, Brant and the…mischievous Tories that have joined them or any other they may have in their power.”\(^80\) While Washington coded his orders in the language of “moral war,” despite the near genocidal implications of his commands for the “destruction and devastation of their settlements...[and] ruin of their crops,” Americans in the backcountry interpreted Sullivan’s expedition in simpler terms reflecting the new and especially lurid form that anti-British and Loyalist rhetoric had taken in the

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\(^78\) Taylor, *The Divided Ground*, 94.


\(^80\) “From George Washington to Major General John Sullivan, 31 May 1779.”
previous year. As a writer in the *New York Packet* summarized Patriot hopes, “we hear that General Sullivan’s army...[has] laid waste the Indian country...we hope [this] will impose a salutary check to those barbarian allies of Britain.” While the Iroquois and Brant were the most obvious enemies, it was the British, and especially the Tories, who remained the most troubling target. In the midst of Sullivan’s expedition, a writer styling himself “A Whig” in the *Pennsylvania Packet*, recalling the violence of the Wyoming and Cherry Valley Massacres, chastised what he believed to be American leniency towards Loyalists. In response, the “Whig” made a series of emotional accusations and a single demand:

Who prevailed on the savages of the wilderness to join the standard of the enemy? The Tories! Who have assisted the Indians in taking the scalp from the aged matron, the blooming fair one, the helpless infant, and the dying hero? The Tories! Who advised, and who assisted in burning your towns, ravaging your country, and violating the chastity of your women? The Tories! Who are the occasion that thousands of you now mourn the loss of your dearest connections? The Tories!...Who corrupt the minds of good people of these States by every species of insidious counsel? The Tories!...Awake, Americans, to a sense of your danger. No time to be lost. Instantly banish every Tory from among you...send them where they may enjoy their beloved slavery to perfection — send them to the island of Britain...Banishment, perpetual banishment, should be their lot.

The writer had spelled out what the anti-British sublime, and anti-Loyalist atrocity literature specifically, had long suggested—the Tories were not just the central cause of American misfortune in the backcountry, but intrinsically and irrevocably different from Patriots requiring their immediate removal from the continent. While banishment was a sensible option for those along the coast, in the interior this was logistically impossible. Consequently, for the mid-Atlantic backcountry the implication was clear—that Sullivan extinguished their presence by force along with their fellow savages the Indians.

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By the time hostilities were winding down in the mid-Atlantic, the
language of the anti-British sublime no longer seemed remarkable. Completely inverting the ancient colonial fear of degeneration, a writer in the Philadelphia *Freeman’s Journal* explained that British and Tory atrocities during the war were unsurprising as “in their national character the Britons are the same brutes and savages they were when Julius Cesar [sic] invaded them above 1800 years ago, for it is certain their mixture with the Saxons and other foreigners, has done very little toward their civilization.”

To complete the allusion, Patriots believed that the British, for all their cunning, power, and industry, were still at heart the blue painted Boudicca, a savage, while Americans were the inheritors of Rome. As Rome had humbled Boudicca more than a millennium earlier, so would America humble the present British savages.

Like the Roman conquest of the British Isles, by the end of the Revolution, Americans had, or at least they imagined they had, cleared out the Britons and Tories from their frontiers by force and excluded them and their fellow savage allies, the Indians, entirely from their new society. Although the Indians were the great other through which backcountry Anglo-American colonists understood themselves in contrast to, it was the British and Loyalists, for the very first years of the new republic in the mid-

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Atlantic, who usurped this role. While Indians would soon reclaim their
dominant role as American enemies, this process of identity formation
through the use of an enemy other left a troubling legacy of a racially-
oriented national culture and a language by which similar social cleavages
could be invented and implemented as Irish, German, Catholic, and Jewish
Americans among many others would eventually learn in the new republic.

The result was that American identity in Pennsylvania and New
York, traditionally defined superficially through republican civility, was in
truth a product of racialized fear, violence, and exclusion, both physical and
psychological. This idea in itself is not entirely new. As Gregory Knouff sums
up the long-standing position, “the frontier Revolution helped consolidate
white national identity” among backcountry Americans as they used “‘the
Indians’ as a negative reference point, making the latter group unfit by
definition for inclusion in their communities.” 85 Yet as Knouff himself
admits, this white national identity defined in opposition to savage Indians
was only consolidated by the Revolution’s frontier war, not created by it. For
all the transformations brought about by the American Revolution and the
devastations of war in the backcountry, ironically, the fundamental way in
which Americans understood their identity remained untransformed from
its deep colonial roots; the Revolution simply changed the primary enemy
other—from Indian to British and Tory—through which identity was
defined in opposition to.

However, at the same time, the processes through which Americans
defined racial identity were not only broadened in scope to an extent
unappreciated by Knouff and other historians to include the British and
Tories in addition to Indians, but also as result became increasingly flexible.
American identity was tied to national enemies at home and abroad,
meaning that future identity transformations were far more likely. The
consequences of this superficially subtle change were dramatic. The process
of identity formation through racializing an enemy was a pervasive feature
of the colonial period. While it was similarly localized and often fluid before
the Revolution, it was rarely, if ever, connected to a broader sociopolitical
identity shared among the colonies. However, in the wake of the
Revolutionary War, while American white racial identity remained in many
ways a product of the local fears of the backcountry, this fear now
undergirded an imagined shared national culture on the basis of a pan-
American opposition to savage threats whether that be Indians, or the British
and their Tory proxies. While backcountry Americans in the mid-Atlantic
still conceived of their identity in the language of colonial localism and in

opposition to the specific savages that threatened them and their communities and interests, they now understood this struggle as a common one against savagery of all kinds with other Americans.

It is from this new development that the fundamental difference between colonial and revolutionary American identity arose. What was once solely a local political identity as a Whig Pennsylvanian or New Yorker, and increasingly as a Whig American by the end of the Revolution, had entirely converged with racially defined identity as white Americans in opposition to Indians, the British, and Tories. If intrinsic, British savagery begat slavery, servility, and monarchical tyranny, while natural American humanity conversely allowed for liberty, civility, and egalitarian republicanism. Put simply, race and the racial conflicts of the backcountry intrinsically informed the politics, society, and culture of the early republic. As a result, race in itself became a usable catchall explanation not just for who someone was in America but whether they could ever be a member of American society at all. If the answer was no, Americans only had to look to the example of the Revolution’s frontier war to see clearly that exclusion and violence were an appropriate and in fact preferable response. While the power of this dynamic over American society and government policy would fluctuate throughout the nation’s history, in the first years of the republic, backcountry Americans hardened by years of violent frontier war and anti-British sublime propaganda found the symmetry and simplicity of this claim compelling.

With this in mind, perhaps the most important consequence of the transformations of 1776 – 1779 was that who exactly could be the other through which racial identity was defined, once confined almost exclusively to Indians and “negroes,” was now more expansive than ever. If the British, long celebrated as the American colonial ideal could be reimagined as its inherently savage antithesis, opportunities for further internal and external racial divisions and subsequent arguments for exclusion and violent elimination were far easier to rationalize and understand. This new reality would have troubling consequences for the new republic and haunt the nation for centuries.
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“For the Peasant to Profit, He Must Be Freed”

David Barrows’ Egalitarian Education Reforms in the Colonial Philippines, 1903-1909

Jeffrey R. Myers

When David Prescott Barrows announced before a Senate committee that “our whole treatment has been to regard the Filipino himself, to look to what is the best course for him, and how we give him the best opportunity for enlightenment and material improvement,” Senator Dubois nearly accused him of treason.¹ This may seem strange, given that President McKinley’s famous “Benevolent Assimilation” speech had promised that American governance would benefit Filipinos in a calculated attempt to undermine the armed resistance against American seizure of the archipelago. However, imperial officials recruited to create and operate that government brought a variety of intentions with them and sought divergent aims through competing policies. Barrows’ service as the third Director of Education from 1903 to 1909 demonstrates the brokered nature of U.S. policy-making in the islands. He rejected both the Spanish Catholic-school precedent and the American capitalists’ preference for “industrial” education. Instead, he favored academic education in hopes of radically reshaping Philippine society along Jeffersonian ideals, creating an intellectual and independent citizenry capable of national independence secure against internal and external threats.²

Drawn to the Philippines by the idea of doing “good service to civilization,” Barrows occupied a mid-level bureaucratic position just below the Philippine Commission (the executive branch of American government

¹ For the Senate proceedings, see “Statement of David P. Barrows,” May 12-14, 1902, 712, David Prescott Barrows Papers, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley (hereafter cited as Barrows Papers).
He believed that caciquismo—a feudal system perpetuated by both native and foreign elites—precluded social development, inflicted grievous social and economic harm, and enfeebled any Philippine nationalism. Barrows argued that Spain’s Catholic Church-run schools reinforced this social hierarchy, inhibiting national unity and impoverishing the masses for the benefit of the few. Similarly, he thought “industrial education,” which emphasized technical and physical training, would degrade the peasantry and exacerbate their economic exploitation. He thought that intellectual education would transform society, and by molding Filipinos into a citizenry that was “literate, able to keep accounts, [and] instructed in their rights,” he could “free” the masses from religious and economic elites.

Armed with relative autonomy over the public school system and repulsed by the alternatives, Barrows advocated “mass literary education,” making academic schooling in language, arithmetic, and civics universally accessible to Filipino youth. He believed that instilling a common language and shared civic spirit would unify geographically and linguistically disparate communities, while numeracy would enable the poor to protect themselves against exploitative businessmen. Leaving a paper trail of directives, letters, articles, and interviews, Barrows justified this mass academic education in terms of meeting America’s promises to Filipinos: improving Philippine society by empowering individuals to be self-sufficient and preparing them as a nation for independence. Furthermore, Barrows believed that such “benevolence” would demonstrate an American capacity to reinvent colonial dynamics in a superior form, in contrast with the oppressive “European leading which already promises to end in inadequacy and disaster.”

While military and religious conflicts disrupted schools during Barrows’ first years, American business interests proved more enduring and dangerous to his plans. Proponents of industrial curricula preferred that Philippine education facilitate U.S. capital’s exploitation of Filipinos by cheaply teaching technical skills and preparing pupils for economic domination. In contrast, Barrows viewed increased expenditures on schools

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3 Benjamin Wheeler to David Barrows, June 2, 1900, Barrows Papers.
5 Barrows, “Philippine Education,” 167.
6 Ibid., 166. He asserted this after leaving the islands, disillusioned by the rise of his rivals promoting business interests over education.
and delayed entry into the workforce as minor costs when weighed against
the prospect of all Filipino youth learning English, math, and civics,
regardless of socioeconomic or geographic background. He couched this
stance in terms of American benevolence, stating that the “attitude toward
schools and the intellectual development of the natives…determines the
character of a colonial policy.” His opponents either had not “considered
deply the needs of the Filipino people” or were greedily betraying
American promises in favor of facilitating economic exploitation.7 Barrows
enjoyed strong initial backing from the Philippine Commission for
prioritizing assumed Filipino interests over American business interests.
However, support for Barrows waned as his patrons retired and
industrialists led by W. Cameron Forbes took control, signaling the
ascendence of economic priorities and the demise of Barrows’ progressive
educational reforms.

The literature on U.S. imperialism in the Philippines features many
broad explorations of imperial ambition and indigenous agency, but more
granular analyses of Barrows form an especially key part of this paper.
Kenton Clymer argues that American imperialists in the Philippines came
for multiple reasons: desires to exploit the territory and its inhabitants,
deployment by the U.S. military, or a willingness to make a personal sacrifice
in “disinterested service to the Filipinos.”8 He further suggests that Barrows
joined this latter faction of “humanitarian imperialists” in the Philippines,
who espoused the idea that Western states should promote “‘equal justice,
personal rights, distributed government, [and] immanency of law’ across the
globe.”9 Glenn May develops a comparative framework that contextualizes
Barrows’ tenure, illuminating how his policies differed in intellectual
background and aims from his predecessors’ and unwound under his
successors. While Barrows sought to make schools produce citizens, those in
his position before and after his tenure saw schooling as a means to produce
laborers.10

Broader treatments of the imperial period often focus on
nationalism: the dissonance between American aims to both instill
nationalism and “Americanize” Filipinos, the conflict between American
and Philippine racial structures, and the nature of nationalism and

7 Ibid, 160, 165.
8 Kenton Clymer, “Humanitarian Imperialism: David Prescott Barrows and the White Man’s
9 Ibid., 501. Clymer uses Benjamin Wheeler’s framing of goals, noting that Barrows’ acceptance
and adherence to them.”
Philippine society. Adrianne Francisco examines the tension between ruling and “Americanizing” Filipinos, showing how American education efforts sought to simultaneously stimulate and redefine nationalism in an effort to unify the archipelago with loyalty to both “the Philippines” and the United States.11 Paul Kramer and Julian Go both analyze key elements of how Filipinos shaped colonial policy, explaining the unique circumstances under which Barrows worked. Kramer emphasizes the ways in which Filipinos (especially elites) pushed back against elements of the racial definitions Americans generated. For example, when US officials pointed to the “racial” differences between Christian and non-Christian Philippine communities and justified American presence as protecting both groups from the other, Philippine elites countered with arguments about their readiness to “uplift” their non-Christian neighbors and thereby shoulder the “white man’s burden.”12 Go questions the oft-cited “liberalism” of American imperialism and the role of political education, comparing the Philippines to other U.S. territories such as Puerto Rico.13 Benedict Anderson’s concept of imagined communities and subsequent analysis of the Philippines illuminates Barrows’ efforts to foster Filipino nationalism through a unified language and common understanding of a written language in addition to more direct elements of civic instruction. Anderson also addresses a more modern iteration of the cacique feudalism Barrows railed against as Director of Education, noting how modern political leaders are typically members of long-powerful families—the same families that Barrows sought to undermine.14

The literature documenting the multiplicity of motivations that led the United States to form an empire has not always translated well into analyses of how colonial administration functioned, due largely to a dearth of research into the motivations and character of the many mid-level imperialists on the ground. Barrows participated in debates parallel to the aforementioned authors, discussing American intentions while pursuing policies aimed at individual and collective agency for Filipinos. Crucially, he believed that universal intellectual education would prove socially transformative, eradicating the exploitative dynamics that both religious and industrial schooling reinforced. He asserted that the “original element” in the “American ideal of colonial government” was the “complete success of the system of schools” in advancing the colonized society, destroying economic servitude, and preparing a colony for independence modeled on the metropole. Barrows posited that he and his allies represented a uniquely benevolent approach to imperial governance, which sought to empower the Filipino peasant.

Barrows’ Approach to Philippine Education

Born in 1873 and raised in rural Ventura, California, Barrows had an unusually academic background. After earning a B.A. from Pomona College and an M.A. in Political Science from the University of California, he was one of the first Americans to earn a Ph.D. in Anthropology, attending the University of Chicago after finding Columbia’s law school too boring. He had spent his summers living with Native American tribes since he was 17, spurring him to write his dissertation on “The Ethno-Botany of the Coahuilla Indians of Southern California.” After teaching at the State Normal School in San Diego for two years, Barrows sought to travel abroad, “either to travel and study or for public service,” and contacted both William Howard Taft and Richard Immering, Empire for Liberty: A History of American Imperialism from Benjamin Franklin to Paul Wolfowitz (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010).

16 David Barrows, “The Prospects for Education in the Philippines,” The Philippine Teacher 1, no. 1 (December 15, 1904), 7, Barrows Papers.
17 Barrows, “Philippine Education,” 163, 167.
18 David Barrows to William Howard Taft, April 11, 1900, Barrows Papers. See also see Philippine Education, VI, No. 6 (November 1909), 12-13, Barrows Papers.
19 David Barrows, Memoirs, 12-16, Barrows Papers. One member of Cahuilla joined Barrows family “at the request of his brothers,” on account of their mother’s death and father’s incapacity. This “adopted son” lived with the Barrows family, proofread his dissertation, attended the “Americanizing” Carlisle Indian School, enlisted in the U.S. Navy upon graduation, and died in an explosion on the USS Texas.
(who, as Governor-General, was the chief executive for American governance of the Philippines) and Benjamin Wheeler (Barrows’ mentor and President of the University of California).\textsuperscript{20} Wheeler recommended him for a post in the American education system in the Philippines established after Spain ceded the archipelago at the conclusion of the Spanish-American War.\textsuperscript{21} The Secretary of Education, Bernard Moses, had himself not only been recruited from Wheeler’s UC, but also had supervised Barrows’ pursuit of a Master’s degree.\textsuperscript{22} Barrows received an appointment to work as the Superintendent of Public Instruction in Manila in 1900. After two years in this role, followed by one as chief of the “Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes” (an agency tasked with anthropologically defining the “races” of the Philippines), Barrows rose to the post of Director of Education in 1903.\textsuperscript{23}

From the installation of civil government in 1900 until 1913, successive Directors of Education had significant autonomy to chart courses navigating influences of numerous parties interested in Philippine education. The first officeholder, Fred Atkinson, favored replicating technical trade schools founded in the U.S. for freed slaves and Native Americans. However, the Philippine Commission removed him from office after two years of ineffective leadership, unsound fiscal management, questionable procurement decisions, and rising public anger at his poor management.\textsuperscript{24} Elmer Bryan succeeded Atkinson and continued his policies, but fell ill and died within a year. The Commission then installed Barrows in 1903.

Upon his accession, Barrows confronted a complex network of relationships that framed both his aims and his efficacy. Reporting directly to the U.S. Secretary of War, the Philippine Commission perched atop the governmental structure devised by the United States, with one of its constituent members—the Secretary of Public Instruction—responsible for overseeing Barrows’ Bureau of Education (among other agencies).\textsuperscript{25} The Catholic Church in the Philippines remained powerful during the American period, with its leadership populated primarily by Spanish émigrés who actively defended their prerogatives and occasionally sought to undermine

\textsuperscript{20} David Barrows to William Howard Taft, April 11, 1900, Barrows Papers.
\textsuperscript{21} Benjamin Wheeler to David Barrows, June 2, 1900, Barrows Papers.
\textsuperscript{22} David Barrows to William Howard Taft, April 11, 1900, Barrows Papers.
\textsuperscript{23} David Barrows, Memoirs, 60-72, Barrows Papers.
\textsuperscript{24} May, “Social Engineering,” 146-150, 154-155.
\textsuperscript{25} While the titles for positions here referred to as “Director of Education” and “Secretary of Public Instruction” fluctuated, I follow May’s approach of using standardized terms. It is key to note that the Secretary of Public Instruction was always the direct superior to the Director of Education.
American rule.\textsuperscript{26}

However, Barrows defined his opponents primarily not in terms of their national or religious backgrounds, but by whether they propagated dynamics he deplored between the elites—Filipino, Spanish, or American—and the Filipino masses. The social and economic subordination of the peasantry by political, economic, or religious figures contradicted what May characterizes as Barrows’ fundamentally Jeffersonian perspective that idealized a society based on small-scale independent farmers and held that stark disparities and domination were not only moral wrongs, but also would cripple the independence that the United States had promised to eventually provide. Americans who prioritized economic development were complicit, as “the problem of distribution will not arrange itself under the operation of natural laws.”\textsuperscript{27} Intellectually arming peasants would undercut elites, begetting an egalitarian society based on an “intelligent, independent yeomanry” that could share in an imagined community with elites.\textsuperscript{28}

Barrows jettisoned the “industrial school” model that his predecessors advocated, seeing an alternative to religious and vocational schooling. Believing that universal intellectual education could restructure Philippine society along Jeffersonian lines, he accelerated the school expansion that his predecessors began, emphasizing the rural “barrio” schools.\textsuperscript{29} Simultaneously, he broke from precedent and reformed curricula to encourage English literacy, numeracy, and civics lessons. He sought to simultaneously quantitatively expand and qualitatively alter education.

**Assessing Alternatives: Religious & Industrial Schools**

Nothing precluded the United States from maintaining the Spanish status quo in Philippine education and allowing the Catholic Church to administer all schooling. Indeed, Barrows believed that most clergymen preferred this approach because they would retain their dominant social position.\textsuperscript{30} This desire points to an institutional resistance to change, and suggests that if the United States sought to minimize its role in the archipelago it could have left schooling to the clergy. Doing so would have

\textsuperscript{26} David Barrows to Daniel R. Williams, Dec. 4, 1924; Carton 17 in the Barrows Papers contains numerous records of Catholic newspapers attacking the American government and Barrows’ Bureau of Education.

\textsuperscript{27} Barrows, “Philippine Education,” 163.

\textsuperscript{28} May suggests that Barrows sought to create this Jeffersonian-style citizenry. May, “Social Engineering,” 155-156. Anderson’s “Cacique Democracy” details how his concept of imagined communities applies to the Philippines.

\textsuperscript{29} May, “Social Engineering,” 156.

\textsuperscript{30} Barrows, “Philippine Education,” 159; Barrows, *History of the Philippines*, 251.
garnered mixed support from the populace, based on sharp divisions among Filipino elites regarding separating church and state.\textsuperscript{31} However, the American government quickly opposed reliance on church schooling, with the key division on the Philippine Commission being the necessary degree of separation. While two members favored banning any overlap, the other three fashioned a compromise that kept clergy out of public classrooms but permitted after-school religious activities and private church schools.\textsuperscript{32} This decision signaled that the United States would actively bear responsibility for providing public education.

In Barrows’ understanding, the Spanish Empire had left the task of Filipino education entirely to the Catholic Church to manage as friars saw fit.\textsuperscript{33} Predictably, religious leaders structured a system with the dual aims of maximizing the reach of their faith while, according to Barrows, “not tolerating the growth of native leadership” (thereby reserving the upper echelons of the church for Spanish missionaries).\textsuperscript{34} Ensuring widespread adherence to the faith while zealously guarding access to its leadership positions, friars perfected a system of social control and “sought to keep the Philippines a closed vessel, dedicated to the Church,” earning them the enmity of many revolutionary Filipinos.\textsuperscript{35} Rote memorization of religious teachings constituted the curriculum for most pupils, with a small subset of the populace attending institutions designed to educate and prepare children of the elite for their higher roles in society.

Barrows believed that this design ensured that the vast majority of Filipinos would never be able to compete with either the Spaniards or the ilustrados (Filipinos at the top of their social ladder and usually related to pre-colonial elites).\textsuperscript{36} The near-fusion of Church and state and complete reliance on religious schools in the Philippines contrasted with Barrows’ adherence to the Jeffersonian vision of secular education. Identifying caciquismo as a “Spanish feudalism” that persisted to the detriment of the people and prevented the “natural advancement” of Philippine society, Barrows

\textsuperscript{31} David Barrows to Daniel R. Williams, Dec. 4, 1924, and Barrows’ \textit{Memoir}, Carton 5, Barrows Papers; Barrows, “Education and Social Progress;” May, “Social Engineering,” 140.
\textsuperscript{32} May, “Social Engineering,” 140-141.
\textsuperscript{33} Barrows, \textit{History of the Philippines}, 247-249.
\textsuperscript{34} Barrows, “Philippine Education,” 158. Barrows believed the heavy emphasis on religious precepts instead of intellectual stimulation stunted rational thought. “Manila in 1901,” Aug. 9, 1901, Box 2, Barrows Papers.
\textsuperscript{35} Characterization of Church policy is from Barrows, “Philippine Education,” 158. Revolutionary opposition to the clergy discussed from David Barrows to Daniel R. Williams, Dec. 4, 1924, Barrows Papers. Greater context provided by Anderson, “Cacique Democracy,” 8.
\textsuperscript{36} Barrows, \textit{History of the Philippines}, 248-249.
believed the U.S. should eliminate these social and economic stratifications to prepare the Philippines for independent democracy.\(^{37}\) Allowing this social hierarchy to persist by restricting school access to foreign or domestic elites would be morally wrong and contrary to American intentions.\(^{38}\)

With little appetite to maintain Spanish-era religious education, American officials looked to other regional colonies and the metropole for models. Industrial education in schools for Native Americans and African Americans won support, including from Horace Taft—brother of William H. Taft, then President of the Philippine Commission—who promoted it as uniquely suited “for a race like the Negroes...in its effect upon character and race deficiency.”\(^{39}\) Consisting of vocational and manual training, industrial education promised to instill discipline while preparing students to produce saleable wares.\(^{40}\) The first Director of Education, Fred Atkinson, nominally adopted this curriculum as the template for the Bureau of Education, and his short-lived successor retained the policy.\(^{41}\) These early American attempts to impose preconceived racial beliefs on Filipinos presumed a “racial inferiority” similar to that ascribed to Indigenous and African Americans.\(^{42}\) Filipino elites—many of whom operated small businesses or owned considerable land, in contrast to a peasantry subsisting on small fields or by working for larger landowners—resisted this imposition of racial hierarchy and eventually succeeded in modifying its most egregious elements.\(^{43}\)

However, a second motivation for implementing industrial education proved more durable: that of American business interests seeking an uneducated, semi-skilled, and easily exploitable workforce. While the racist reasons provided for industrial education faltered in the face of sustained Filipino resistance, economic incentives proved far more durable among Americans and less objectionable to native elites.

The first phase of industrial education in the Philippines was brief

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\(^{37}\) Barrows, “Philippine Education,” 163, 159.

\(^{38}\) Ibid., 157-158.


\(^{41}\) May, “Social Engineering,” 148-149.

\(^{42}\) Francisco argues that while white Americans perceived Native Americans as lacking a sense of private property and African Americans as “naturally ‘shiftless,’” they ascribed Filipino inferiority to having learned laziness from the Spaniards. Francisco, “From Subjects to Citizens,” 38.

\(^{43}\) Kramer, Blood of Government. Kramer’s work is not only authoritative on the subject, but also notes the specific role Barrows played, such as his travels to and disillusionment with “Indian Reservations” in the U.S., 213-215.
and had minimal impact, limited by the incompetency and brevity of the first two Directors of Education. While Atkinson and Bryan shared Barrows’ goal of ensuring widespread schooling, the motivations for installing industrial education provided little impetus for expanding school accessibility. W. Cameron Forbes captured this sentiment in a speech upon his appointment to the presidency of the Philippine Commission, emphasizing economic development over educational expansion. Americans prioritized “addressing racial deficiency” among populations under the colonial regime. The economically-minded industrialists proved indifferent to what proportion of the population could attend classes, as long as schools focused on business needs. Increasing peasants’ exploitable value through vocational training seemed beneficial, as long as the industries seeking cheap labor did not have to bear the costs of schooling. This helps explain the near-complete lack of school expansion during the latter half of the colonial period.

The American use of this model demonstrates that early officials drew comparisons between Filipinos and minorities in the metropole, which Filipinos often resisted. While many pro-industrial officials spoke optimistically of instilling discipline and preparing natives for employment that would improve their lives, others focused on supposed “Filipino traits” that made them more suitable for economic exploitation, citing obedience and manual dexterity. Regardless of motivation, proponents of industrial education called for more instruction in “useful” fields, from agriculture and sewing to crafting and carpentering. Barrows himself had evolving views of the natives: while he originally characterized rural Filipinos as ignorant, violent bandits preying upon defenseless travelers, by the time he departed the Philippines he argued that their desire and ability to learn equaled or surpassed that of Americans. Within a decade he asserted that intellectuals had overstated racial differences. Although Barrows’ views evolved

45 Barrows bitterly attacked this indifference as it undermined his push for universal schools. Barrows to Benjamin Wheeler, November 30, 1908; Barrows to Jesse D. Burks, March 12, 1909.
46 May offers enrollment figures (see Appendix) that point to declining enrollments after Barrows’ departure. While Francisco does not directly state this, the statistics she provides suggest that this decline persisted at least until formal control ended and the Philippine Commonwealth inaugurated. “From Subjects to Citizens,” 153-154.
47 Kramer’s Blood of Government centers on such American comparisons and Filipino resistance to same.
48 Barrows’ conflicting and evolving views on race can be roughly traced as increasingly progressive over time. See for example, David Barrows to his in-laws, November 30, 1900, Barrows Papers; Barrows, “Education and Social Progress,” 77-78; “Philippine Education;” and Inauguration of David Prescott Barrows as President of the University (Berkeley: University of
through exposure, Americans drawn to the archipelago in search of business opportunities remained incentivized to ensure a large, uneducated, but semi-skilled population would remain easily exploitable. Barrows found himself greatly undermined not by revanchist friars but by economic elites, against whom he sought to intellectually arm the masses.

In 1907, pressure mounted for Barrows to emphasize technical activities in the primary grades, and he cannily added a fourth year of school concentrating on technical coursework. Barrows could claim that the curricula incorporated significantly more time on technical subjects (as his superiors desired) without really changing the typical student’s experience, since few pupils advanced beyond the second grade. While Barrows bemoaned the system’s inability “to hold the child steadily in school” and carry pupils to completion, he took advantage of this failing to mitigate the harm he perceived in increasing the industrial element of the coursework.

Expanding Education: (Re)Training Teachers, Spreading Schools

While estimates vary and evidence is scarce, it is plausible that by the end of the Spanish period roughly 200,000 pupils in a population of 7 million received at least some education each year. While the War of 1898 disrupted education, the U.S. prioritized restarting schools to pacify the populace. The U.S. Army became responsible for organizing classes and—despite mutual linguistic incomprehension—the government believed that the program quelled rebellious sentiment. This supported prioritizing efforts to expand schools. By the time Barrows took over the Bureau of Education, enrollment was back to 200,000, where it had peaked under Spanish rule. Dissatisfied with the low proportion of student-age youth attending, Barrows declared that “the greatest danger menacing the success of our schools is that, pleased with the... cleverness of the cultivated class,

California Press, 1920), 84. Interestingly, Barrows bemoaned the increasing isolation of U.S. soldiers from Filipinos, fearing this would engender hatred and misunderstanding that constant interaction protected against. Barrows to Bernard Moses, December 7, 1901, Barrows Papers.

49 May, “Social Engineering,” 156.
50 Ibid., 163-167. May does not ascribe this decision to Barrows’ continued aversion to industrial education, though he cites instances of Barrows’ rhetorical denunciations of such training.
51 Ibid., 167.
52 Ibid., 136.
53 Ruscetta, “Education for Philippine Pacification.”
54 Bernard Moses, “American Control of the Philippines,” Carton 1, Bernard Moses Papers, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
we may forget the primary and essential importance of educating the child of the peasant.” Barrows accelerated programs to expand the school system far beyond its previous apex, increasing resources key to school capacity. Top priorities were augmenting the ranks of teachers and further developing educational infrastructure, thereby enabling the bureau to draw more pupils in for longer educational careers.

The Spanish legacy bequeathed an inadequate number of Filipino teachers, and those with any pedagogical training had learned to only emphasize rote-memorization. An early and colorful American solution was to hire nearly 1,000 American teachers to come to the archipelago. However, Barrows viewed this as a short-term solution unlikely to work beyond the duration of American rule. While he had ample praise for the Americans who came to teach, he gradually shifted to recruiting Filipinos to the profession as they graduated from the system and training both new and old educators in pedagogy beyond perpetuation of memorization.

The first Director of Education had begun the practice of asking American universities to recommend graduates to the colonial education system, while more actively seeking experienced teachers from all types of schools across the United States. In contrast, Barrows scaled back efforts to find older, experienced teachers and instead sought young, recent college graduates. Barrow’s range of contacts in American universities aided his recruitment of metropole educators. In a letter to Benjamin Wheeler, then President of the University of California, Barrows wrote: “College graduates of sound character are by all means the most satisfactory…[their] superior culture compensates for the lack of experience, and I would rather have him than an experienced teacher who had not a college education.” Barrows did this for several reasons. He believed that college graduates would have a

59 Barrows, “Education and Social Progress,” 81-82, 77-78.
60 While Atkinson had a small academic network, Barrows’ education took him to institutions across the U.S. including Pomona College, Colombia, and the University of Chicago. Especially key was his relationship with Benjamin Wheeler, president of the University of California and eager ally in both sending graduates to teach in the islands and receiving Filipino students for education in the metropole. “David Prescott Barrows,” The Journal of Education 71, no. 1 (1910): 8; May, “Social Engineering,” 138-139, 155; Francisco, “From Subjects to Citizens,” 66. Barrows and Wheeler frequently discussed placing graduates as teachers, first mentioned in Wheeler to Barrows, Aug. 29, 1901; University of California (System), Office of the President, Records: Alphabetical Files, CU-5, Series 1, University Archives, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
61 David Barrows to Benjamin Wheeler, December 4, 1906, UCOP Alphabetical Files.
wider base of knowledge from which to instruct, better suiting them to academic instruction. Furthermore, he argued that older, more experienced teachers were more likely to bring preconceptions about the natives that proved counterproductive. Finally, he asserted that younger candidates would find it easier to adjust to life in the Philippines, lacking preconceived notions of how they would run their classrooms or how to educate their charges. These priorities grew out of challenges he had faced with his available pool of teachers, some of whom disparaged their Filipino coworkers and frequently left the Philippines as soon as they could escape their contracts.62

Barrows thought imported American educators worth their high cost, but perceived them as auxiliary support needed only during a period of reform. In contrast, he viewed training Filipino teachers to be the only long-term solution. He sought to use American teachers to train their Filipino counterparts, arguing that this would magnify the impact of imported educators.63 For similar reasons he tapped Americans to spearhead the increasing number of higher-learning institutions.64 Together, these indicate a fundamental distinction Barrows perceived between his aims and those of his counterparts in other colonies: the future of his Bureau could not rely on teachers from the metropole indefinitely. Using the American teachers at his disposal to train Filipino educators to provide all levels of education to future generations seemed most efficient and effective.65 This, in turn, underscores Barrows’ assumption that the United States would leave the Philippines on amicable terms, believing that the Philippine Commission embodied President McKinley’s promised “benevolence.”66 By ensuring that the availability of enlightened education outlasted a colonial relationship Barrows thought he could prove that the U.S. would eventually depart of its own volition, in contrast to other colonial powers. For example, the Spanish had reserved the highest echelons of religious education to Spaniards, thereby eliminating the possibility that native people could displace the imperial power.67

Barrows ranked the quantity and quality of school buildings second

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63 Barrows, “Education and Social Progress,” 77-78.
64 David Barrows to Benjamin Wheeler, June 24 and September 14, 1908.
65 Barrows, “Education and Social Progress,” 77-78. This contrasted with Atkinson’s decision to have American teachers handle all English instruction, although this was probably necessary until Filipino instructors could passably teach the new language. May, “Social Engineering,” 151.
66 David Barrows to Benjamin Wheeler, November 30, 1908.
67 Barrows, “Philippine Education,” 158.
only to the supply of teachers. Vivid descriptions of dire circumstances suggest the desperation some teachers felt upon seeing their assigned classrooms. In remote areas, many Filipinos had no access to any local schools, effectively precluding their participation. Despite paying the issue lip service, Barrows’ predecessors had done little to address these problems. Atkinson’s failure to do so contributed to his removal. In contrast, Barrows made facilities central to the work of the Bureau and made progress in expanding the reach of the school system. The manifold infrastructural challenges included dilapidated buildings, underbuilt campuses with overcrowded rooms, and an outright lack of accessible schools in rural regions.

Barrows developed a reputation for personally inspecting school buildings and addressing the shortcomings of existing infrastructure. Teachers’ writings about the improved quality of their buildings provide one of the most telling sources documenting his activity. Campuses expanded, overcrowded districts constructed new schools, and entirely new institutions were founded (such as the University of the Philippines) to bolster educational capacity at every level. May shows that Barrows’ tenure saw the number of primary schools grow 188% (from 2,233 to 4,194), secondary schools 442% (from 52 to 230), and Filipino teachers 227% (from roughly 3,500 to 7,949). This boom in school capacity occurred as monthly enrollment in primary schools rose 191%, from 227,000 students in 1903-1904 to 434,535 pupils in 1908-1909. While these numbers should be interpreted as suggestive rather than definitive, the education system roughly doubled in size under Barrows’ tenure, whereas his successors laid off teachers, closed schools, and dismissed the decline as “more apparent than real.” Barrows made strides toward his vision of universal schooling. Demand rose apace and overcrowding likely waxed and waned, but never disappeared.

Accurate statistics concerning enrollment and availability of schools during the first decade of American rule are difficult to generate, but suggestive estimates illustrate both the growth toward and the limits of

69 Bernard Moses to William Howard Taft, Aug. 1, 1902, Moses Papers.
71 David Barrows to Benjamin Wheeler, March 9, 1909, UCOP Alphabetical Files. Barrows was particularly enthusiastic about the university, helping base its foundation on the University of California model.
Barrows’ “universal” goal. Shortly after taking office, Barrows reduced the number of years comprising primary school from four to three, based on the rough calculation that this would enable his existing capacity to reach 33% more students, representing roughly 100,000 additional pupils.\(^74\) He carefully adjusted school career timeframes, and later cited his self-perceived success shortening educational tracks in the Philippines as evidence that American primary education could be comparably shortened.\(^75\) Barrows’ efforts to find an appropriate timeframe for educating each student in the Philippines (and then encourage its adoption in the United States) contrast with those officials who consistently sought to minimize education.\(^76\)

Barrows succeeded in establishing schools throughout rural regions in the archipelago. Bernard Moses, first Secretary of Public Instruction (a position immediately superior to Director of Education), argued against spreading schools to “places not of sufficient importance... for the government to support them in American teachers.”\(^77\) Atkinson opposed Moses’ plan of limiting schools to major population centers, but failed to make any progress on this issue as he squandered his budget importing supplies available locally.\(^78\) Moses’ departure quickly followed Atkinson’s, leaving Barrows less constrained to situate schools wherever necessary to expand access to education. While he sought to ensure that schools would be self-sufficient in terms of local tax revenue, Barrows did not view this as an immutable prerequisite.\(^79\) Disagreeing with his compatriots, who thought universal education unobtainable, Barrows sought to ensure “universal primary instruction for the Filipinos of all classes and every community.”\(^80\)

Believing that the Spanish had provided only minimal, religious instruction, Barrows sought to form a system that would provide non-sectarian, intellectual education to the masses.\(^81\) By Barrows’ account, he initially encountered little need to popularize schools among Filipinos. He

\(^{74}\) Ibid., 156-157.
\(^{75}\) Barrows, Memoir, Carton 5, Barrows Papers.
\(^{76}\) Atkinson and Forbes both warned in similar tones of “overeducating” Filipinos, especially in the “impractical” form Barrows advocated. May, “Social Engineering,” 150, 171-172.
\(^{78}\) Bernard Moses to William Howard Taft Aug. 1, 1902, Moses Papers.
\(^{79}\) Barrows, “Education and Social Progress,” 76.
\(^{81}\) Clymer, “Humanitarian Imperialism,” 511. Other key officials including Taft espoused such views. For the broader context of this American portrayal of Spanish methods, see Go, American Empire, 28-30.
rapidly came to admire the demand for education, calling rapid enrollment growth “the highest compliment to the ambitions of the Filipino people” and disparaging the Spanish for failing to provide it. However, the remaining Catholic institutions in the islands began agitating against public schools and threatened boycotts. Barrows realized that this could dangerously undermine his work, and simultaneously attempted to defuse tensions with clergy and proselytized the benefits of secular schools to the masses he wanted to “enlighten.”

Even though the trend was toward growing enrollment and attendance, sudden drops in funding led Barrows to retrench the system. Importantly, he put the brunt of these cuts on intermediate schools rather than the primary institutions that played a greater role in his quest to reorganize Filipino society. In the end, the growth Barrows oversaw failed to reach even half of the population. Education experts expected only one-third of children to attend the schools. Still, the Philippine school system had the widest reach among Southeast Asian states, with 11.54% of the total population enrolled by the late 1930s. While this is meager by modern standards and far below Barrows’ universal aims, Francisco notes that it slightly exceeds the rate found in independent regional states and more significantly surpasses that of other Southeast Asian colonies.

**Imagining Philippine Community: Linguistic, Civic, and Economic Unity**

Reshaping society required proper curricula to complement school accessibility. Barrows prioritized expanding popular and rural access to education, but not to the exclusion of comprehensive curricular reform. Under his leadership, the Bureau of Education prioritized teaching English, seeking to create a standard medium of communication throughout the archipelago. Civics lessons sought to instill a sense of national belonging and create a unified imagined community. Finally, math instruction aimed to enable peasants to ward off economic exploitation.

Go suggests that English language instruction may have been the

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82 Such rhetoric was typical for Barrows. See Barrows, “Prospects for Education,” 9; “Philippine Education,” 157-161; “Education and Social Progress,” 73, 77-78; and *History of the Philippines*, 79, 89-90, 248-252.  
83 David Barrows to Daniel R. Williams, Dec. 4, 1924, Barrows Papers; May, “Social Engineering,” 140-141.  
84 David Barrows to Benjamin Wheeler, June 19, 1908, UCOP Alphabetical Files.  
only common element shared across the education systems set up in American territories after the War of 1898. While true, this obscures the debate among early officials in the Philippines around two related questions: whether to teach a single tongue throughout the islands, and if so, which language to use. In addition to the dozens of pre-existing indigenous tongues, the Spanish era produced only an upper class literate in the language of the imperial power. Spanish priests had learned and preached in various local vernaculars, ensuring that Filipinos retained mutually unintelligible languages throughout the colonial period and that “only their rulers had a common archipelago-wide speech.”

This situation presented two options, each with practical and political dimensions: train an army of translators and engage with each language group individually, or impose a single, standard tongue across the archipelago. In addition to practical concerns about recruiting translators, Barrows feared that the persistence of mutually unintelligible communities would seriously undermine Philippine unity. He viewed linguistic unity as a prerequisite for national unity and vital for developing nationalism. Learning multiple vernaculars seemed impractical, while teaching a common language offered political advantages, leading American officials to break from Spanish precedent. However, this raised the question of which language to impose.

Despite his fascination with and considerable effort to learn indigenous languages, Barrows supported using English as the unifying language of the Philippines due to its comparatively low cost and affiliation with the western values he promoted. These considerations paralleled arguments for a single language: few translators spoke the right languages and were expensive, while using English offered further political benefits.

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87 Go, “The Provinceality of American Empire.”
89 Anderson points out that Spanish willingness to learn indigenous languages was absent in Latin America. Ultimately, less than 5% of Filipinos learned Spanish. Anderson, “Cacique Democracy,” 6.
90 This presaged Anderson’s insights into how shared language helps to form the imagined communities that underpin nations in his schema. Anderson, “Cacique Democracy.” Francisco provides other anecdotes of American officials espousing similarly motivated reasons for unified language. Francisco, “From Subjects to Citizens,” 23.
91 Atkinson originally advocated instruction in indigenous languages, but reversed himself over logistic concerns. Kramer notes the impracticality of this in discussing language instruction, Blood of Government, 200-205.
For example, Secretary of Education Moses promoted the use of English to distinguish U.S. imperialism from its contemporaries. American willingness to teach “the mother country’s tongue” and thereby place the colonial subject on an equal linguistic footing demonstrated its uniqueness and superiority. Barrows argued that teaching English made the public school attractive to the Filipinos demanding such instruction, asserting that Filipinos across socioeconomic classes expressed a “very large... almost universal disposition” toward learning English.

Barrows believed that widespread adoption of English would not only enable communication between Filipino communities, but also would linguistically incorporate them into Asia, noting that English was the lingua franca of the Far East. Barrows viewed English as a prerequisite if one wished to “travel, engage in business, or read the journals in which the great bulk of current thought is expressed,” all of which helped “liberate from social and mental bondage.” However, Barrows did not intend to threaten the existence of indigenous languages by spreading English, and believed a common tongue could unite the archipelago without crowding out traditional languages.

Another challenge complicated early efforts to teach English across the archipelago: Atkinson imported textbooks from the United States that depicted references and words bearing no resemblance to Philippine life. Filipino youth understandably struggled to connect words with pictures of “lily-white children” of prosperous Americans playing in the snow and eating strawberries. Barrows ordered more “culturally relevant” textbooks for Filipino children and had the new “insular readers” written by teachers in the Philippines to better connect with Filipino youth. These proved more relatable, as the characters in the books now had names such as Juan and

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93 Bernard Moses, “Use of the English Language in Schools and Official Business, Women Teachers in Philippine Schools,” Carton 2, Moses Papers. Independence movements in Southeast Asia often featured leaders united by the imperial tongue. Moses specifically noted the British and Dutch Empires for zealously guarding their languages.

94 Barrows, “Education and Social Progress,” 74; “Statement of David P. Barrows,” May 12-14, 1902, 700, 695, Barrows Papers. However, scholars disagree on accuracy of such claims. May suggests elites preferred Spanish. Francisco agrees, but posits that English rapidly became popular even among anti-American forces. Barrows and his compatriots emphasized those Filipino voices aligning with their own pro-English position.


96 Barrows, “Education and Social Progress,” 74; “Prospects for Philippine Education,” 6-7

97 “Statement of David P. Barrows,” May 12-14, 1902, 718-719, Barrows Papers; Barrows, History of the Philippines, 143. Indeed, Barrows asserted that the Spanish had attempted to destroy indigenous writing systems and denounced this alleged “decivilizing action.”
Maria, ate mangoes and coconuts, walked to school barefoot, and played with kites and dogs. Barrows justified the new textbooks in terms of their superior efficiency, and teachers attested to improved utility in teaching.

Instruction in civics, referred to as “political” or “civil” education, formed a crucial element in literary education, given Barrows’ mission to prepare Filipinos for nationhood. Such instruction took diverse forms. Geography lessons taught students what their “homeland” looked like, widening the world of many who previously identified primarily with a family or village. Formal civics classes sought to inculcate a dual sense of belonging and responsibility to “the nation,” augmented by after-school clubs formed to practice the concepts propounded in the lecture hall. Teaching Filipinos how to self-govern was often blunt and explicit, dramatically departing from other colonial models of education. For example, Barrows suggested that pupils should learn that “his town or locality is of less importance, from a patriotic standpoint, than his country as a whole,” and “that the interests of one section should never be placed above those of the Archipelago.” Establishing clubs for students to practice such activities represented a further departure in a time when other imperial powers dismissed such approaches as “naive” and “a very strange way to treat Malays.” Indeed, compared with literacy and numeracy, there were few economic reasons to provide civics lessons to the masses—instead, it was a political drive to prepare the population for independence in both the shadow and the mold of the metropole.

Civics classes paired with closely linked clubs provided an opportunity for pupils to learn their putative rights and obligations to the nation, and then serve part of their civic duty through pro-social activities. Textbooks covered issues such as voting and the Bill of Rights, with teachers expected to instill a sense of obligation to the nation in their students.

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99 Ibid., 157-158. Textbook reform also exemplified the tension between two contradictory American aims: “assimilating” Filipinos while fostering an independent nationalism. Teaching English throughout the schools balanced these aims, but the result is that while English remains an official language of the Philippines, its status is perennially controversial—as have been efforts to equate Tagalog with Filipino, thereby delegitimating other indigenous tongues. Francisco, “From Subjects to Citizens,” 156.
100 This dynamic has been well-chronicled across many empires. For more information on this dynamic in both the Spanish and American relations with the Philippines, see Francisco, “Subjects to Citizens.”
101 Barrows, History of the Philippines, 24. Note that this is from the 1st edition of the text, concluding the first chapter—which Barrows omitted from the second edition of the book, from which all other references are drawn.
However, this “colonial state-sponsored nationalism” also encompassed a loyalty to the United States as a benevolent intervenor, thereby mitigating the risk of patriotism developing into an anti-imperial force. Cognizant that skills left unpracticed beyond the classroom soon atrophied, Barrows structured a network of student groups that met after classes and practiced applying their civics lessons, such as by forming model municipal governments. Barrows made no effort parallel to sponsoring these “civics clubs” to further inculcate English or math, suggesting he prioritized political education over other subject areas for students who (at least nominally) had a grasp on basic skills.

Incorporating geography classes into Philippine schools subtly facilitated the growth of nationalism by attempting to broaden students’ worldview. Traditional communal bonds rarely extended beyond the confines of family, town, or tribe, but contemporary nationalism relies on broader identification with the “imagined community” of the country. While few details about teaching geography in the classroom exist in the existing sources, several items illuminate the issue. Bernard Moses owned a precise wall-sized map of the Philippines produced by the U.S. Department of War, and less-detailed replicas may have been distributed to schoolrooms to aid teachers in broadening their pupils’ horizons. Such a shift would transform students into people “of far different possibilities” than those who remained focused on their locale. Those students rising to grades beyond what their local schools provided traveled domestically or abroad to continue their education, gaining exposure to the archipelago and the world as they went. Giving pupils practical experience of the world in which they were all “Filipino” without regard to more personal identities seemed a positive externality.

Some evidence suggests that history lessons emphasized the contemporary incapacity of Filipinos for self-rule, faulting Spanish rule for failing to prepare the natives, and stressing the grand opportunities that would soon present themselves for the people. These themes resonate

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105 Anderson, “Cacique Democracy.”
106 Map of the Philippines, Oversize Folder, Moses Papers.
109 Interestingly, Barrows noted that institutions of self-government were “at best weakly established’ in much of Europe, arguing that the Philippines could plausibly surpass the “civilizational development” of such states—given “proper” American guidance, of course. Barrows, “Philippine Education.”
throughout a history book that Barrows wrote “for Filipino students seeking information not only of their own race and island home but of the place of that race in the history of the Far East and of Europe.” Similarly, Barrows occasionally wrote or lectured on various “heroes of the Malay race,” Jose Rizal preeminent among them. Barrows believed that promoting national heroes would inspire Filipino youth, and supported the use of Rizal’s likeness on currency with this aim. The history conveyed by Barrows emphasized evolutionary development, situating the Philippines well behind “western civilization” but opening the possibility of advancement—the oft-discussed “civilizational uplift.” He argued that over the course of 333 years, Spanish rule had helped Filipinos “increase… in civilization,” but its failure to countenance “the education of the native” and “the growth of native leadership” became inadequate and undermined colonial domination. Barrows framed this as a learning experience for other imperial powers, positing that the only way for the West to continue to advance civilization would be through “conciliation and sincere friendliness to Filipino aspirations.” Advocating education and the capacity for “backward peoples” to match (or exceed) their Western colonizers placed Barrows firmly in the liberal camp among his contemporaries and represented a break from the traditional Spanish assumption of an eternal patriarchal relationship between Madrid and Manila.

In contrast to language and civics, Philippine Commission officials took little interest in arithmetic instruction. However, math skills occupied a vital place in Barrows’ curriculum as the entrance to “thrift and economy,” thereby enabling the poor to protect themselves from unfair economic bargains and exploitation. Foreign capitalists, especially American businessmen, threatened the well-being of Filipino peasants. Barrows formed his education policy to undermine the goals of American businesses, which he accused of seeking to create “a great body of unskilled labor, dependent for living upon its daily wage, willing to work in great gangs, submissive to the rough handling of the ‘boss,’” willing to desert their

110 Barrows, History of the Philippines, iv-v.
111 Ibid., 319. For a broader discussion of American officials pushing to replace U.S.-centric curricula with material related to the Philippines, see Francisco, “From Subjects to Citizens,” 13.
113 Barrows, “Philippine Education,” 157-160.
114 Reinforcing this effort was the broader push for standardizing weights and measures. Barrows, History of the Philippines, 320.
families and labor under conditions set by foreign employers. Barrows accused British colonists of similar sins, “caring for nothing but…material interests from which he will derive the chief benefit… absolutely indifferent to the welfare and intellectual development of the peoples he rules.”

Foreigners held no monopoly on this motive. Barrows believed that economic servitude pervaded the Philippines in pre-colonial times and had developed further during Spanish control. By 1907, he found that “the great bulk of islanders are in a position of bonded indebtedness… and being ignorant of mathematical calculation, [the indebted peasant] is uncertain as to the amount of his debt… or how it might be decreased.” The ignorance and dependency of the poor made them vulnerable, and both religious and industrial education would reinforce this dynamic by limiting their critical thinking among the poor while teaching the wealthy how to oppress their inferiors.

Socially transformative education had to inculcate “enough knowledge of numbers and arithmetical computations to avoid being swindled and outdone in every commercial transaction.” Math textbooks incorporated this theme through questions asking students to calculate how much change they should receive when buying or selling crops produced in the Philippines. Optimistically, Barrows estimated that two years of universal arithmetic would “in a generation destroy that repellent peonage or bonded indebtedness that prevails throughout this country.” His curricula also incorporated short manual and vocational training sessions that he hoped would reinforce the lessons from arithmetic to value precision.

Beyond the moral and civilizational benefits of this development, intellectually arming the masses with numeracy and hampering elite exploitation would mitigate the hostility engendered by such dynamics. Class strife had divided nationalist movements from their inception in the Philippines. The divide between the Andres Bonifacio’s lower-class-based Katipunan rebels and Jose Rizal’s elite-based Propagandistas demonstrated

116 David Barrows to James LeRoy, Dec. 10, 1904, Barrows Papers. Barrows cited broader tensions between British and American imperialists over the liberal policies he supported, as in History of the Philippines, 329-330. Kramer provides excellent insight into the relationship between American and British empire, noting similar statements by Barrows and his allies. “Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons,” 75.
120 Barrows, “Prospects for Education,” 7.
the presence of this cleavage in the Philippine independence movement, well before the War of 1898. Preparing Filipinos—rich and poor alike—for unified independence thus required the erosion of economic domination, and Barrows promised that arithmetic would achieve this. Barrows’ egalitarian drive was both practical and political, seeking to rebalance the distribution of wealth in favor of the masses, which would reduce civil strife and thereby stabilize class relations in preparation for national autonomy. Familiarity and comfort with basic numeracy thus took on a significant role in literary education as a guarantee of individual self-sufficiency and national independence.

**Denouement: The End of Barrows and His “Mass Literary Education”**

Barrows perceived his vision of literary education as a morally superior and socially necessary method of schooling, aligning himself with a “humanitarian” faction competing with industrialists for control of the Philippine Commission. His Jeffersonian leanings led him to seek an egalitarian society dominated by well-informed, independent-minded citizens capable of self-government, united by their common language and sense of civic duty. Such a populace could preserve and defend their personal rights and collective independence. Elites would struggle to exploit an educated proletariat. A strong national collective, jealously defensive of its democratic institutions, would deter foreign countries—especially imperial powers greedily eying the archipelago. Barrows counseled that safeguarding Philippine progress required more civilizational than economic development: “the general well-being which everyone must regard as the object of our efforts in the Philippines cannot come by purely economic effort.”

Filipinos and Americans had varied reactions to Barrows’ policy of mass literary education, and responses from influential communities in the archipelago bear examination. The Catholic Church, American teachers, Filipino elites, and business interests all carried the potential to disrupt his education policy, and Barrows’ relationships with each evolved over the

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123 Barrows, “Education and Social Progress in the Philippines.”
124 Barrows’ estimated timeframe for independence shortened over the course of his career. He suggested “not during [his] lifetime” in his “Statement” before the Senate Committee in 1902, Barrows Papers. Two decades later he seemed significantly more optimistic, and while urging Filipinos to not opt for independence stated that America would respect their choice. Barrows, *History of the Philippines*, and “Philippine Education.”
125 Barrows, “Philippine Education,” 167.
course of his tenure as he sought to win support and mitigate opposition. May suggests that religious opposition to Barrows declined as he honored the compromise that allowed private church schools while restricting the Catholic presence in public schools. Furthering this détente, he consciously strove to defuse conflicts between secular schools and sectarian institutions. However, Barrows’ conviction that Catholic opposition had undermined his chances of ascending to a higher post in the Philippine Commission illustrates the limits of this partnership. Similarly, May cites religious opposition as disqualifying Barrows’ deputy for ascension upon his departure, leading to the elevation of Frank White and the “triumph of industrial education.”

Comparatively little documentation of the relationship between Barrows and his subordinates survives, but primary and secondary sources indicate that the educators working for Barrows supported him and his policies, despite some desire for more emphasis on industrial education to address “racial deficiencies.” Universal literary education and its promise to educate the citizenry challenged Filipino elites, who felt cross-pressures to expand or restrict access to schools. On one hand, Barrows claimed that “advocacy of schools is an almost indispensable pre-election pledge, and school support is the basis of many a town officials claim of public usefulness.” However, this political necessity clashed with elites’ reluctance to disrupt their own social position by strengthening the peasantry. This explains the disconnect between the Philippine Assembly’s emphasis on funding rural schools, even as elites comprising that body placed their children in private institutions away from the “rabble.”

Barrows’ alignment with business interests declined precipitously during his tenure. Shortly after his arrival in the Philippines he had encouraged a friend to come as a “good Christian businessman,” but after

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127 Barrows claimed to prioritize “constant tact” with clergymen. “Education and Social Progress,” 81.
128 David Barrows to W. S. Washburne, May 18, 1909; Memoirs, 108-109, both in Barrows Papers. Barrows’ involvement in Republican factionalism may have been to blame: Clymer, “Humanitarian Imperialism,” 516.
131 Barrows, “Philippine Education,” 160.
132 For the political importance of supporting mass education, see May, “Social Engineering,” 169-170, and Anderson, “Cacique Democracy,” 19. For the elite composition of the Assembly from its institution, see Anderson, “Cacique Democracy.” For the elite preference to keep their children segregated, see Francisco, “From Subjects to Citizens,” 59.
his travels through the country he advocated protecting the people and natural resources of the islands from exploitation. Barrows intended for his curriculum to eliminate the docility and exploitability that he and other Americans perceived in Filipinos—and which industrialists hoped to employ.

While Barrows interacted with numerous groups as the Director of Education, he relied most on support from his superiors on the Philippine Commission. Barrows’ tenure from 1903-1909 outlasted any other Director of Education’s, suggesting that the Commission insulated his position against periodic outcries from religious or business interests. Rumors regularly circulated suggesting Barrows might rise to the Commission himself, which Taft confirmed to Barrows in 1908. However, this promotion failed to materialize, and as pro-business figures gained influence Barrows found his autonomy reduced and his objectives undermined in the name of frugality and the return of industrial education. This culminated in 1909, when President Taft appointed pro-business W. Cameron Forbes to the Commission. Whereas initial support from the Philippine Commission had guaranteed Barrows the autonomy to make his mark on the Bureau of Education, the departure of key backers left him isolated, and the declining emphasis on education pushed Barrows to resign.

Conclusion

The competing policies promoted and debated by colonial officials reveal variegated intentions. The U.S. domination of the Philippines seemed nearly accidental to early colonial officials, who scrambled to translate lofty pronouncements from the metropole into meaningful and effective measures in the islands. Education reform provides one of the most insightful examples of the conflicted nature of policy-making in the early

133 Barrows to [?] Bailey, Jan. 8, 1901, Barrows Papers. For his pride in American conservation of Philippine natural resources, see Barrows, History of the Philippines, 292-293, 301-304. In cases where American monopolies developed, Barrows described subsequent unrest and banditry as “pursuing grievances of a solid character,” 313-315.

134 Undoubtedly helpful was support from both Theodore Roosevelt and William Taft (the two presidents during his tenure). Governor-General Taft had worked closely with Barrows, who met both men during their presidencies.

135 David Barrows and Benjamin Wheeler discuss the rumors around the former’s promotion in letters: July 6, 1907; Jan. 6, March 31, July 2, and August 10: 1908, concluding that Barrows would not be elevated by March 25, 1909. Barrows Papers and UCOP Alphabetic Files.


137 David Barrows to W. S. Washburne, May 18, 1909, Barrows Papers; Barrows to Benjamin Wheeler, May 14, 1909, UCOP Alphabetic Files.

138 Barrows, Lecture Notes, Barrows Papers.
colonial period. From 1898 to 1910, curriculum shifted focus from religious (under the Spanish) to industrial (under Atkinson) to academic (under Barrows) and then back to industrial (under Forbes). Barrows hoped that transplanting a relatively progressive school system would overthrow entrenched social stratification in favor of an egalitarian society inculcated with western knowledge and values. While more impactful than those of his predecessors, Barrows’ reforms lost momentum as the Philippine Commission changed composition, spurring his retirement and a subsequent return to industrial methods.

Barrows’ interest in the Philippines continued until his retirement from the University of California in 1943, evidenced by the frequent articles, college courses, and speeches he prepared concerning the archipelago. He kept abreast of developments in the islands, regularly trying to “recall the Government to its original policy in the Philippines”—that is, humanitarian imperialism—while discouraging Filipinos from seeking independence “prematurely.” He expressed no regrets about his tenure, arguing that the original benevolence of American rule was sincere but had been corrupted by greed and impaired by “the refusal of our statesmen to admit what we have done.” By the time he assumed the Presidency of the University of California, he argued that racial differences had been exaggerated by “experts,” but maintained that some societies could benefit from the imposition of another culture—so long as it brought “literacy and success in self-government.” Barrows believed intellectual education would be a civilizing force advancing pupils through stages of racial development. He asserted that he and his allies had implemented the “essentially liberal” policy McKinley prescribed in the Philippines, preparing the islands for autonomy.

Hawkins points out that Barrows sought to instill in Filipino youth a sense of their own “national” place in the world—distinctly subordinate to the United States. However, this carried a relatively liberal possibility for “civilizational advancement” and eventual equality, in contrast to racial conservatives who posited an irredeemable inferiority. When Senator

140 Barrows, Lecture Notes for Political Science 137B: Dependencies of the United States, 1927, Barrows Papers.
141 Barrows, History of the Philippines, 283, 352. Other officials also suggested that Filipinos may eventually opt to become part of the U.S. as a constituent state. Go, American Empire, 29.
142 Hawkins, “Perceptions of Historical Consciousness.” Go clarifies this debate through analogies to evolutionary theories, American Empire, 28-30.
Dubois disparaged Barrows as near-treasonous for prioritizing Filipino needs, he revealed divisions over the purpose of American imperialism and profound skepticism about “racial advancement.” These racial conservatives preferred to exit the Philippines (unilaterally or through sale to Japan or Germany) or implement industrial education with its promise to mitigate “racial deficiencies.” Barrows’ conflicts with officials favoring industrial education demonstrate the inadequacy of monolithic descriptions of the imperial government.

Education policy exemplifies the brokered nature of American rule: colonial officials sought divergent goals, reflecting the range of motivations that broadly drove American imperialism and specifically led some individuals to venture abroad. While some described the project as a “noble work” that would enlighten the world as to how to properly conduct imperial affairs, others saw economic opportunity hampered by foolish idealism. Colonial narratives of the U.S.-Philippine relationship inconsistently address this range of motivations. Barrows’ chief antagonist was not a Filipino revolutionary nor a Spanish priest, but the scion of a rich American family. Forbes’ rise to Governor-General augured changing priorities away from “civilizing” and preparing the masses for independence toward training and transporting them to labor markets that enticed foreign investment with promises of easily exploited labor.

Barrows epitomizes a challenge complicating the study of the history of imperialism. He both propagated racist ideology and earnestly sought to do good. His initial attitude toward the Philippines and its “savage” inhabitants could have been lifted from contemporary sensationalist newspapers. Yet by 1910, he condemned Forbes’ prioritizing economics over education as “fallacy,” and “paternalism,” lumping it with Spanish policies “devoid of statesmanship,” asserting that education delayed meant education denied for the Filipino peasantry. His inaugural

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146 Benjamin Wheeler described the “noble work” in a letter to David Barrows, June 2, 1900, Carton 2, Barrows Papers. Barrows used “enlightenment” rhetoric in “Philippine Education,” as well as “Education and Social Progress.” Forbes referred to Barrows as impractical and his ideas as obsolete: May, “Social Engineering,” 176.

147 May provides an exemplary analysis navigating the complexities of imperialist motives, “Social Engineering.”

148 Barrows, “Philippine Education,” 167, 157, 167-168. Barrows criticized Forbes unusually personally, calling him “unstatesmanlike” and dismissing his plans as “unjustified,” History of
speech as President of the University of California emphasized his optimism for trans-Pacific relations, stating that the “distinctions between the races... are more superficial than the men of letters and the men of science have heretofore led us to imagine.”\textsuperscript{149} In his context, Barrows “was more idealistic than most colonial officials” and epitomized the “humanitarian imperialist:” while convinced of Philippine backwardness, he viewed this as a temporary condition that obligated the United States to intervene, arguing with his compatriots who ascribed immutable racial inferiority to non-Caucasians both domestically and abroad.

Barrows indisputably played a willing part in the American government of the Philippines and spent six years fighting to impose his concept of “western values” on Filipino children. Yet he did so believing that by arming the masses with knowledge, the US could eradicate feudalism and improve the lives of the colonized. We may entirely disagree with the “appropriateness” of any imperialism while still acknowledging that Barrows represented a liberal voice among his contemporaries. Indeed, his chief antagonists bear a close resemblance to modern, neocolonial challenges to Filipino sovereignty—industries fighting to ensure the continued exploitability of labor and foreign governments seeking to dominate the archipelago for the benefit of their treasuries or militaries. Barrows saw himself in the vanguard of a faction pursuing civilizational uplift in the Philippines, pioneering a new and nobler form of colonial rule that could reshape the world in a more humanitarian image. Reality, of course, saw the stain of U.S. imperialism last until World War II. Barrows’ legacy and the ways in which we memorialize him today embody this challenge, and historians must continue to grapple with how best to reconcile good intentions with the evils of imperialism.

\textsuperscript{149} Inauguration of David Prescott Barrows, 84.
Appendix: Enrollment and Attendance in Primary Public Schools, 1901-1914

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Year</th>
<th>Monthly Enrollment</th>
<th>Daily Attendance</th>
<th>% of Enrolled Attending</th>
<th>Primary Schools</th>
<th>Filipino Teachers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>End of Spanish Rule</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901-02</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>---</td>
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<tr>
<td>1902-03</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1,593</td>
<td>2,882</td>
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<tr>
<td>1903-04</td>
<td>192,308</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>2,233</td>
<td>3,500 (est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904-05</td>
<td>227,600a</td>
<td>177,528</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>2,727</td>
<td>4,500 (est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905-06</td>
<td>311,843a</td>
<td>243,238</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>3,108</td>
<td>4,719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906-07</td>
<td>375,554a</td>
<td>292,932</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>3,435</td>
<td>6,141</td>
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<tr>
<td>1907-08</td>
<td>350,000a</td>
<td>279,977</td>
<td>79.9%</td>
<td>3,701</td>
<td>6,804</td>
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<tr>
<td>1908-09</td>
<td>374,600</td>
<td>298,600</td>
<td>79.7%</td>
<td>4,194</td>
<td>7,949</td>
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<tr>
<td>1909-10</td>
<td>434,735</td>
<td>354,574</td>
<td>81.5%</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>8,210b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910-11</td>
<td>428,818</td>
<td>343,054</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>---</td>
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<tr>
<td>1911-12</td>
<td>418,852</td>
<td>347,647</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>---</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912-13</td>
<td>348,087</td>
<td>288,912</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913-14</td>
<td>277,681</td>
<td>288,912</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures in bold are drawn from May, “Social Engineering,” 166. Figures in italics are author’s estimates based on May’s data, which align with figures suggested by Francisco, “Subjects to Citizens.”

a May and Francisco cite identical figures in 1904-1907, but diverge in that Francisco claims whether these are annual while May suggests they are monthly (which aligns better other sources, and I follow). May and Francisco diverge in 1907-08, with Francisco suggesting 467,253 pupils in place of May’s estimated 350,000. The former seems likely to be an overestimate, given Barrows’ talk of retrenchment in the face of budget cuts in 1907.150

b After returning to the U.S., Barrows wrote “What May Be Expected of Philippine Education?”, incorporating several school system statistics. While most of these align with May’s data, the 8,210 figure for Filipino teachers does not.

While these figures are speculative—as are the original records kept by the Bureau of Education—the clear trend suggests that Barrows’ tenure

150 David Barrows to Benjamin Wheeler, June 19, 1908, UCOP Alphabetical Files.
encompassed a rapid rise in enrollment and attendance, while White’s leadership witnessed steep declines. Even as White pointed to a slight rise in the percent of “enrolled students who attended classes” to claim that the losses were “more apparent than real,” the absolute numbers imply that Barrows took his universal vision with him when he departed.\textsuperscript{151}

\textsuperscript{151} Quoted in May, “Social Engineering,” 178.
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