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*Clio’s Scroll*, the Berkeley Undergraduate History Journal, is published twice yearly by students of the Department of History at the University of California, Berkeley. The journal aims to provide undergraduates with the opportunity to publish historical works and to train staff members in the editorial process of an academic journal. *Clio’s Scroll* is produced by financial support from the Townsend Center for the Humanities, the Associated Students of the University of California (ASUC), and the Department of History. *Clio’s Scroll* is not an official publication of the ASUC or UC Berkeley. The views expressed herein are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the journal, the editors, the university, or sponsors.
Note from the Editors

We are proud to present the first issue of the seventeenth volume of Clio’s Scroll. This fall 2015 issue features articles on controversies in intellectual history. Connor Grubaugh walks us through the paradoxical nature of the De Rebus Bellicis and the scholarly disputes in interpreting the anonymous work of the fourth century. Stanislaw Banach explores the works of Helmold and scholars since in understanding the transformation of crusading warfare during the Wendish Crusade in the twelfth century. Meanwhile, Lauren Cooper discusses the problems faced by Jewish-German scholars seeking refuge in the United States from 1932-45, while Maiya Moncino presents her findings on the challenges that the University of California’s intellectual community faced in the 1970 shift away from the tuition-free principle. In sum, the articles offer insights into various controversies that intellectuals pose in their fields as well as those they experience as members of society.

The articles also draw collectively from a wide variety of sources including classical works, government documents, various archive collections, and their relevant literature. We thank the authors for their contributions to this journal, and are particularly proud in featuring former editor-in-chief Maiya Moncino’s senior thesis, which received high honors distinction in the Department of History at Berkeley.

In the past thirty-five years, Clio’s Scroll has produced seventeen volumes. We are thrilled to take the journal in a new direction this year with major renovations in style, editorial procedures, and greater attention to detail. We hope that you enjoy the articles, as well as the visual design and citation style.

Lastly, we are incredibly grateful for the hard work and feedback of our excellent associate editors. For financial support, we thank the Townsend Center for the Humanities and the Associated Students of the University of California. We would like to thank the incredible Leah Flanagan for all her guidance, as well as the Department of History at the University of California, Berkeley, for its institutional and financial support.

Sincerely,
The Editors
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MAIYA MONCINO is currently working with Dr. Khalid Kadir in researching governance structures at the University of California. She will be graduating in May 2016 with a degree in history and economics from UC Berkeley and plans to pursue a career in academia. In the past, Moncino has conducted behavioral economics research at the Institut für Entrepreneurship und Innovations-management, interned at the U.S. Consulate in Berlin, worked as a research assistant for Professor Emeritus Samuel Haber, and was editor-in-chief of Clio’s Scroll. She would like to thank her thesis advisors, Professors Waldo Martin and Mark Brilliant, as well as Dr. John Douglass, for their advice and support.
The Anonymous *De Rebus Bellicis* and the Ethics of Empire in Late Antiquity
*A Problem in Intellectual History*

Connor Grubaugh

The Anonymous and Contemporary Treatments of His Work
Scholars of the later Roman Empire have settled very little about the anonymous fourth-century treatise preserved under the title *De Rebus Bellicis* (*On Military Affairs*).\(^1\) Not only the pamphlet’s date and authorship but also the meaning and significance of its seemingly simple policy recommendations have been disputed ever since E. A. Thompson published the first modern edition of the text with an English translation in 1952. But fascination with the *De Rebus Bellicis* stretches back much further, to its first publication—with the *Notitia Dignitatum*, beside which it was discovered in the famous (though now lost) *Codex Spirensis*—by...

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Gelenius in 1552. Then as now, an inability to make sense of the text as a single, coherent work has led scholars to narrowly focus on certain of its more striking aspects. As Thompson documents, Renaissance readers (possibly including Leonardo da Vinci) took interest in the text chiefly for its practical and technical insights, while Enlightenment scholars tended to spurn it for its clumsy style; a few nineteenth-century German classicists reexamined the Anonymous’s fanciful machinery, but only in the twentieth century have historians attempted to place the *De Rebus Bellicis* in its fourth-century setting.

Unfortunately, such efforts have yielded little progress. Consider the dating of the treatise: The Anonymous’s allusion to the “age of Constantine” (*Constantini temporibus*) situates his text sometime after the emperor’s death in 337, and his view of the barbarian threat, as emanating from the frontiers, indicates that he crafted his treatise before the incursion of the Goths and their decisive victory at Adrianople in 378. Because the Anonymous addresses his work to two “most sacred emperors” with two or more sons, most scholars follow Thompson in dating the text to the joint reign of Valentinian I and Valens, sometime between the birth of Valens’s son in 366 and Valentinian’s death in 375. Yet there is anything but consensus on the issue. Santo Mazzarino favored the reign of Constantius II from 353 to 360, though Alan Cameron has argued convincingly against this possibility. Barry Baldwin and A.E. Astin, meanwhile, have defended the periods 384-387 and 383-395, respectively. For the purposes of this article, Thompson’s dating will suffice, though (as we shall see) precision on the matter is largely beside the point.

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2 Thompson, *A Roman Reformer and Inventor*, 17.
3 Ibid., 19-21.
4 *De Rebus Bellicis* 2.1, 6.1. Thompson translates “Above all it must be recognized that wild nations are pressing upon the Roman Empire and howling round about it everywhere, and treacherous barbarians, covered by natural positions, are assailing every frontier.” Thompson, *A Roman Reformer and Inventor*, 113. Throughout this article, gendered pronouns are used when referring to the Anonymous author of *De Rebus Bellicis* with the acknowledgment that works of this kind in their time come from spaces exclusively of men.
5 Preface to *De Rebus Bellicis* 1, 8 (“most sacred emperors”); Thompson, *A Roman Reformer and Inventor*, 2 (“dating the text”).
Even more disputed is the authorship of the treatise, particularly the Anonymous’s native language and locale. While numerous scholars, including Thompson, have argued for the western origins of the Anonymous at least partially on the grounds that he wrote in Latin, Cameron rightly points out the Anonymous could hardly have done otherwise, given that Valens certainly, and possibly Valentinian as well, did not know Greek. Con inversely, the Anonymous’s generally cumbersome and obscure Latin style is hardly evidence for eastern origins, as he himself denies membership in the highest strata of Roman society, and, calling himself only a “private citizen” (privato), engages in no small measure of rhetorical maneuvering to justify the boldness of his petition from such humble origins. Although the Anonymous must have been a man of some leisure in order to write such a treatise in the first place, it is unlikely that he achieved anything beyond the minimal level of education expected of late-Roman provincial elites. Cameron argues on the basis of the plural “usurpers” (tyrannos) that the Anonymous must be addressing primarily the eastern emperor Valens (who faced the usurpers Procopius and Marcellus) rather than the western emperor Valentinian (who faced only Firmus, a Moor who was more an ‘invader’ than a ‘usurper’ anyway).

Yet difficulties in assigning a date to the text and an identity to its author pale in comparison with the demands of interpreting its actual content, a brief summary of which now follows. In a lengthy preface, the Anonymous promises to reveal the “interests” (commoda) of various classes of persons under the emperors’ rule, including civil and military

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8 Thompson, A Roman Reformer and Inventor, 2-3; Astin, “Observations on the De Rebus Bellicis,” 399; Baldwin, “The De Rebus Bellicis,” 32-33; Wiedemann, “Petitioning a Fourth-Century Emperor,” 143 (“numerous schoolers”); Cameron, “The Date of the Anonymous De Rebus Bellicis,” 7. For two ancient accounts of the emperors’ linguistic ineptitude and general lack of education, see Ammianus, Res Gestae 31.14; and Themistius, Oration 6.71c. 9 Preface to De Rebus Bellicis 3-4, 10. 10 Thompson, A Roman Reformer and Inventor, 4; Baldwin, “The De Rebus Bellicis,” 32-33. Although in later in his writing (pp. 34-39), Baldwin defends the Anonymous’s style as classically inadequate, yet sufficient for the standards of the fourth century. 11 De Rebus Bellicis 2.3 (“usurpers”); Cameron, “The Date of the Anonymous De Rebus Bellicis,” 3-4. See Ammianus, Res Gestae 26.5-10, 29.5. Wiedemann, however, disputes these claims by pointing out the widespread use of the rhetorical plural in “Petitioning a Fourth-Century Emperor,” 142-43.
officials (*militiam clementiae vestrae tractantibus*), leisured elites (*otio privato contentis*), peasant farmers (*terrae cultoribus*), and merchants (*negiatoribus mercium lucra tractantibus*). He also pledges to show how “taxes can be reduced by a half” in such a way that “the amount of your gold and silver may be doubled without hardship to the taxpayer, and the soldier gratified by the heaping on him of rewards beyond your customary lavishness.” Chapters I-V then outline the Anonymous’s clever administrative reforms, while the greater part of the work in Chapters VI-XIX describes a variety of military machines designed to reduce expenditure and save manpower. Chapters XX-XXI, finally, conclude the work with a stereotypically stylized plea for strong defense and good governance.

The primary object of the Anonymous’s reproach is the imperial system of “public grants” (*largitiones*), subsidies paid by the emperor to civil servants and military personnel, as well as unruly tribes on the empire’s frontiers. Such grants, in the Anonymous’s view, have become “extravagant” (*profusa*) and “unrestrained” (*immoderata*) in recent years, sapping the resources of the taxpayer and inhibiting the emperor’s war efforts. A strange numismatic history follows, illustrating the decline of Rome from an austere age of bronze and clay currency to the present time of silver and gold. This decline began with the reign of Constantine and his introduction of the golden *solidus*, in part funded by his pillaging of the pagan temples. It is in commenting on this development that the Anonymous’s agenda becomes particularly impenetrable:

> This store of gold meant that the houses of the powerful were crammed full and their splendor enhanced to the destruction of the poor (*in perniciem pauperum*), the poorer classes of course being held down by force (*tenoribus vidilicet violentia opressis*). But the poor were driven by their afflictions (*afflicta paupertas*) into various criminal enterprises, and losing sight of all respect for law, all feelings of loyalty, they entrusted their revenge to crime.…Therefore, Most Excellent Emperor, you will take care in your

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12 Preface to *De Rebus Bellicis* 6.
13 Preface to *De Rebus Bellicis* 6-7.
14 The imperial *largitio* is first introduced at the preface to *De Rebus Bellicis* 2. For the dual internal and external nature of these expenditures, see Masatoshi, “What Kind of Largess did the Anonymous Author of the *De Rebus Bellicis* Want to Reduce?”
15 *De Rebus Bellicis* 1.1.
16 *De Rebus Bellicis* 1.2.
17 *De Rebus Bellicis* 2.1.
prudence to limit public grants (*repressa largitate*) and thereby look to the taxpayers’ interests (*collatori prospicere*) and transmit to posterity the glory of your name.\(^{18}\)

Additionally, the Anonymous recommends preventing the manipulation of currency by employees of the imperial mints, a corrupt practice which introduces “considerable difficulty into…contracts, so as to preclude the possibility of straight dealing in business transactions.”\(^{19}\) This can supposedly be resolved by concentrating the manufacture of coinage on a single island, cut off from all communication with the mainland.\(^{20}\) In a similar spirit of reform, neither crooked provincial governors nor their ruthless tax-agents (*exactores*) should be allowed to wring their subjects dry.\(^{21}\) Military expenditure can be reduced by accelerating the promotion and discharge of troops, a policy which would also contribute to the stabilization of the frontiers through the settlement of veterans on borderlands.\(^{22}\) Finally, the Anonymous seeks a clarification and consolidation of the laws, so as to “throw light upon…confused and contradictory rulings,” and “put a stop to dishonest litigation.”\(^{23}\)

The remainder of the Anonymous’s discourse consists of a series of descriptions of inventive military technologies, along with vivid illustrations—the seemingly most straightforward aspect of his work. Yet it is precisely at this juncture where the *De Rebus Bellicis* demands careful scholarly attention. For it is not at all clear, first of all, whether the Anonymous’s discussion of the machines should be read as a scientific report on a series of genuine mechanical inventions, or a literary overview of both previously existing and still unrealized military technologies, or simply an intriguing diversion to maintain the reader’s (now possibly waning) interest. Unsurprisingly, given the obscurity of the author and his milieu, scholars have found evidence in the text to support all of these theses.\(^{24}\) Second, the Anonymous is in no way transparent about the link

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\(^{18}\) *De Rebus Bellicis* 2.2-4.

\(^{19}\) *De Rebus Bellicis* 3.1.

\(^{20}\) *De Rebus Bellicis* 3.2-3. In Thompson’s words, “This proposal defies comment.” Thompson, *A Roman Reformer and Inventor*, 36.

\(^{21}\) *De Rebus Bellicis*, 4.1.

\(^{22}\) *De Rebus Bellicis* 5.1-4.

\(^{23}\) *De Rebus Bellicis* 21.1.

\(^{24}\) Liebeschuetz dismisses the Anonymous’s description of military machines as a rhetorical ploy, comparable to a “television advertisement.” Baldwin considers the Anonymous’s
between political commentary and scientific discourse in his pamphlet. These appear disparate subjects to the modern reader, but it must be assumed that for the Anonymous’s audience, this transition required no explanation.

Just as attempts to assign a date to the text and an identity to its author have been frustrated for lack of evidence, attempts to reconcile its scientific and administrative proposals have ended in unjustifiable prioritization of certain aspects of the work over others. Like the Anonymous’s Renaissance and nineteenth-century readers, contemporary commentators tend to understand the treatise through a narrow lens that fragments the text and renders it unintelligible as a coherent whole. Liebeschuetz, for instance, accepts the Anonymous’s playful preface at face value, but reads the remainder of the treatise as a veiled satire or cynical commentary on a very specific set of political developments in Themistius’s Constantinople. Astin and Wiedemann, in a similar fashion, take the Anonymous’s administrative (and particularly financial) reforms seriously, but dismiss discussion of the inventions, insofar as it deviates from the Anonymous’s stated political aims, as attributable either to the author’s private “enthusiasm” for popular mechanics, or to Valentinian’s propensity to tire without sufficient scientific stimulation.

A new approach is needed, specifically one which will (at least temporarily) cease following every word, every allusion in the Anonymous’s treatise to its logical conclusion, like diving down so many rabbit-holes, but rather attempt to engage with the text as a single, coherent whole. Fortunately, our arsenal is not yet exhausted. For often far more revealing than what an author says is precisely what he does not say. This is certainly true of the Anonymous: throughout the De Rebus Bellicis, we find no mention of the classic themes that preoccupied ancient

'inventions' unoriginal derivatives of longstanding themes in antique mechanical discourse, some already realized on the battlefield, others only hypothesized writing. Wiedemann believes the machines were included in the text primarily to catch the eye of Valentinian. Liebeschuetz, “Realism and Phantasy,” 125-32; Baldwin, “The De Rebus Bellicis,” 31; Wiedemann “Petitioning a Fourth-Century Emperor,” 145-46, citing the preface to De Rebus Bellicis 7.

commentators on political and economic affairs for centuries, even well after the sack of Rome and the subsequent decline of the western empire. It is precisely the absence of these themes, rather than any of the Anonymous’s particular policy proposals, that sets him apart as an extraordinary harbinger of the deep transformation of Roman society and political thought that began in the fourth century, but extended well into the sixth. What are these conspicuously absent themes, and why is their neglect by the Anonymous so noteworthy? It is to these questions that this essay now turns.

The Classical Republican Model and its Remarkable Longevity

In the preface to the *Ab Urbe Condita*, Livy imposed a narrative arc on the history of his city with the terse dictum, *Adeo quanto rerum minus, tanto minus cupiditatis erat* (“For true it is that the less men’s wealth was, the less was their greed”).26 Over the course of the last three centuries—and even within Livy’s lifetime—Rome had multiplied its wealth many times over. Thus the first half of Livy’s corollary to the dictum catches hardly anyone, ancient or modern, by surprise: “Of late, riches (*divitiae*) have brought in avarice (*avaritiam*), and excessive pleasures (*abundantes voluptates*) the longing to carry wantonness (*desiderium per luxum*) and license (*libidinem*) to the point of ruin for oneself and of universal destruction.”27 It is the extension of Livy’s dictum into the social realm—“to the point...of universal destruction”—that induces so much amused condescension in modern readers. Today we euphemize avarice as a ‘minor vice’; in political discourse it is more often called the profit-motive. Modern societies have harnessed avarice, and directed its energy (however imperfectly) toward attaining a level of material prosperity unthinkable in antiquity. In the mindset a classical Roman, however, the social implications of avarice were dire: the stability and prosperity of the state, it was believed, ultimately depended upon a moral consensus on the common good, a sort of ‘public virtue’ that sustained political institutions by bringing the private and public interests of individuals and classes into harmonious unity (*concordia*). The obvious metaphor is that of the ship of

27 Livy, preface to *History of Rome* 12.
state, helmed by the best men, but only sailing—toward one common destination—by the cooperation of all.28 Another image, favored by Livy and certainly the more Roman of the two, is that of a well-functioning army: its commanders cooperate, its troops follow orders with enthusiasm, and—as Livy repeatedly notes with pleasure—it conquers with impunity.29

Of course, even as Livy penned his history, the republican way of life was rapidly disappearing. Nevertheless, his classical republican view of avaritia possessed remarkable staying power. Its longevity was doubtlessly sustained by its flexibility. The classical Roman attitude toward wealth—and here let us be perfectly clear—did not condemn the possession of wealth in itself, but rather demanded adherence to a number of principles governing the management of wealth, the first and foremost of which was simply that it serve the good of the city and its people, the populus Romanus. M.I Finley was the first to observe that this ideology effectively ‘embedded’ economic concepts in social relations: the appetite for gain was never denounced per se but rather “inhibited…by overriding values” of aristocratic honor and political justice.30 Thus the proper management of wealth—necessary for the attainment of virtue and public honor—was defined as respect in word and deed for the values of the Roman elite, and performance of one’s civic obligations, all while maintaining a sizeable fortune. Avarice, by contrast, was a private ethical concern: it functioned like a disease, gripping its victims with an unquenchable desire for ever more riches, and driving them to greater and greater evils.31

Of key importance to this ideology of wealth were the concepts of leisure and personal independence, the possession or want of which defined a person’s moral agency.32 In a famous passage from the De

28 For just a few uses of this metaphor in antiquity, see Livy, History of Rome 24.8.12-13; Cicero, De Re Publica 1.62-63; Cicero, In Catilinam 2.7; Plato, Republic 488e-89d.
29 See, above all, Livy, History of Rome 2.60, in which the rival Aequi, “not daring to face this harmonious union (tantae concordiae) of commander and troops, allowed the enemy to range over their land seeking plunder.”
32 Finley, The Ancient Economy, 40-43.
Officiis, Cicero succinctly captures the economic implications of this aristocratic sensibility:

Now in regard to trades and other means of livelihood, which ones are to be considered becoming to a gentleman (liberales) and which ones are vulgar (sordidi), we have been taught, in general, as follows. First, those means of livelihood are rejected as undesirable which incur people’s ill-will, as those of tax-gatherers and usurers. Unbecoming to a gentleman (illiberales), too, and vulgar are the means of livelihood of all hired workmen whom we pay for mere manual labor, not for artistic skill; for in their case the very wage they receive is a pledge of their slavery. Vulgar we must consider those also who buy from wholesale merchants to retail immediately; for they would get no profits without a great deal of downright lying; and verily, there is no action that is meaner than misrepresentation (vanitate)....

But the professions in which either a higher degree of intelligence (prudentia) is required or from which no small benefit to society is derived—medicine and architecture, for example, and teaching—these are proper (honestae) for those whose social position they become. Trade, if it is on a small scale, is to be considered vulgar; but if wholesale and on a large scale, importing large quantities from all parts of the world and distributing to many without misrepresentation, it is not to be greatly disparaged. Nay, it even seems to deserve the highest respect, if those who are engaged in it...make their way from the port to a country estate, as they have often made it from the sea into port. But of all the occupations by which gain is secured, none is better than agriculture, none more profitable, none more delightful, none more becoming to a free man (nihil homine libero dignius).33

Cicero’s distinction here, between vulgar and honorable wealth, ensures that those who possess sufficient wealth to manage it properly, and who proceed to do so, will not only be richer, but better than their peers. The proper outlet for proper wealth is civic benefaction: as patrons of their civitates, possessing true amor civicus, they will both win themselves glory on public monuments and serve the welfare of their community through regular acts of largess.34 Crucially for our purposes, this was precisely the moralizing model of civic engagement that Rome exported to its empire. The inheritors of the republican tradition—the true heirs to Cicero’s

legacy—were not only the grand old Senatorial families that prolonged Rome’s civic customs, but also the provincial notables of municipal councils across the Mediterranean world. By accepting Roman rule and consenting to seek the improvement of themselves and their communities according to the republican model of civic euergetism, the curiales more than anyone else were responsible for the vitality and stability of the empire in the first two centuries AD.\textsuperscript{35}

Even as the third century brought a military and administrative crisis in its train, along with significant structural reforms (on which more below), the ethos of classical republicanism as an intellectual paradigm remained stronger than ever, often reappearing in the most unexpected of places. The emperor Diocletian, for instance—who possibly did more than anyone to dismantle and transform the institutions of the early empire—issued his Edict on Maximum Prices in 301 AD with the professed goal of reigning in avaritia. What can only be described as a Late-Roman administrative crackdown was still, incredibly, couched in the terms of republican morality: “Greed (avaritia) raves and burns and sets no limit on itself. Some people always are eager to turn a profit...they seize the abundance of general prosperity and strangle it....[so] let not anyone suppose that a hardship is being enacted, since the observance of restraint is present and available as a safe haven for avoiding the penalty.”\textsuperscript{36} The fifth-century Christian Salvian of Marseilles also adopted republican virtue as his theme, even while advocating the disestablishment of the imperial institutions of his war-torn Gaul:

For, who can be eloquent about freebooting and crime because the Roman State is dying or already dead or certainly drawing its last breath? In that one section where it still has a semblance of life...there is still to be found a great number of rich men...[who] have become richer by lessening the obligations which they bore lightly; the poor are dying from the multiplication of the burdens which they were already unable to bear.\textsuperscript{37}


Contrary to Gibbon, given the longevity of this patently Roman political philosophy, perhaps the inquiry ought to be “why the [western] Roman Empire was destroyed,” and be rather unsurprised that it “subsisted so long.”

Let us not forget, however, why we have reviewed this history of Roman civic culture. It is because for all the universal appeal, for all the persistent strength of the classical republican paradigm, the De Rebus Bellicis remains a stubborn and bewildering exception. The Anonymous’s subject is not a moral crisis, but a series of regrettable administrative missteps. He believes that the perversion of traditional mores can be overcome with sound social policy. He is neither an historian nor a philosopher, but a tinkerer who understands the social world as a mechanism, like one of his military contraptions. In Thompson’s words, the Anonymous does away with “speculations and whimsies on the nature of the decline” in favor of scientific theorizing “couched solely in terms of economic and social relations, of which in fact the psychological phenomena mentioned by other writers are merely the manifestations.”

His authority, the Anonymous attests, derives not from status, wealth, office, or eloquence, but solely from “intellectual power” (ingenii tantummodo magnitudo) appropriate to the “technical arts” (utilitates artium). Unlike Diocletian, he does not aim to refill the imperial coffers by cracking down on avaritia, but rather by limiting expenditure, recovering the loyalty of provincial taxpayers, and cleaning corruption out of the civil service. He provides an insightful, if impracticable, solution to the problem of maintaining full military strength while reducing both military pay and general expenditure: as any modern economist will testify, the only way to get more from less is a technological

39 Thompson, A Roman Reformer and Inventor, 31-32.
40 Preface to De Rebus Bellicis 4. Of course, this statement cannot be taken completely at face value—the Anonymous must have possessed some status just to write and submit his petition in the first place. It is unlikely, however, that he would have included such an elaborate defense of his qualifications, and in this particularly striking manner, unless he really were something of an outsider to imperial politics.
41 De Rebus Bellicis 1.1, 2.4, 3.1-3, 4-5.
innovation.\textsuperscript{42} Above all, the Anonymous’s narrative of decline—one of the few classical tropes he retains, though in a highly idiosyncratic way—begins not with the fall of the republic or the crisis of the third century, but with the “age of Constantine” (\textit{Constantini temporibus}) and his introduction of the golden \textit{solidus}. Thus it is with Constantine that any explanation of \textit{why} the Anonymous held such peculiar views must begin.

\textbf{Imperial Bureaucracy and Weberian Ethics in the Later Roman Empire}

Today, one must speak very carefully when describing ‘late antiquity’ as an age of decline. The phrase itself implies continuity and stability rather than transformation and undoing. ‘Decline? In what sense?’ some will ask. ‘For how long? According to whom?’ Perhaps it is best to answer the last question first: according to none other than our very own Anonymous, the fourth century was an era of political and economic deterioration, in which the age-old traditions of the early empire were slowly taxed into extinction. But here we arrive at a key distinction: it is not necessary for the purposes of this article that the later Roman Empire was \textit{in fact} in a state of decline, but only that certain citizens of that empire (like the Anonymous) intellectualized their situation in this way, and that their ideas can (in part) be traced back to the facts of their condition. The question at hand is whether, continuity and decline aside, there developed in late antiquity an incongruity between the dominant intellectual paradigm of the age and the realities of practical governance.

The so-called ‘Third-Century Crisis’ can be described both as a near-calamity and as a triumph over adversity, but the imminence of the threat to the very existence of the empire’s formal institutions should not be underestimated.\textsuperscript{43} For decades, Roman emperors attempted to ‘play within the system’ by forging \textit{ad hoc} solutions to pressing military and administrative problems while retaining a political infrastructure inherited from the Principate.\textsuperscript{44} Diocletian was the first ruler to recognize the futility of this approach and mobilize sufficient force to blaze his own


\textsuperscript{44} Cf. Kelly, \textit{Ruling the Later Roman Empire}, 110.
course. The reform programs he set in motion—including the expansion of the tax-collection apparatus, the standardization and (attempted) regulation of currency, the doubling of the number of provinces and the accompanying introduction of additional administrative units, and the turn from reliance on distant provincial elites to intimates within the imperial court—would remain in motion for centuries, not simply because they were backed by violence, but because they were cost-effective and they worked.45 Even Diocletian’s two failed attempts to curtail inflation—the revaluation of the denarius and the subsequent Prices Edict in 301—demonstrate an administrative imagination and boldness unknown in the early empire.46 Though it is impossible to measure precisely how much Diocletian and each of his successors individually contributed to the expansion of the civil service, even the most conservative studies estimate that from just a few hundred officials and perhaps 10,000 slaves in the first and second centuries AD, the Roman administration by the sixth century employed some 30,000 to 50,000 bureaucrats.47 Nonetheless, it was not Diocletian but Constantine who was most responsible for the transformation of the Roman political landscape in late antiquity. Under his supervision, a huge tide of new laws, economic initiatives, and military reforms swamped—and nearly sank—Roman society, the resilience of which had always been determined by the fortune of a small political elite. The systematically organized and stringently hierarchical regime of the Notitia Dignitatum would have struck curiales under Diocletian as mere fantasy, but by Constantine’s death in 337, his administration had taken the “decisive step” toward making that fantasy a reality.48 First and foremost among Constantine’s innovations was the introduction of a small golden coin. The solidus was simply a lighter version of Diocletian’s aureus—it weighed 4.5 grams rather than 6 grams—but with Constantine’s stamp of approval (made possible by confiscation of the temple treasuries), it was rapidly adopted as the standard medium of exchange for tax payments, civil and military salaries, and other large-
scale transactions.\textsuperscript{49} Scholars disagree whether or not the proliferation of the \textit{solidus} stabilized the rate of inflation, but the new currency was just as much a social reform as an economic one.\textsuperscript{50} The new store of wealth—money, not land—was not available to everyone, and its dispersal was centrally controlled by the treasury.\textsuperscript{51} Privileged officials and wealthy families favored by the emperor grew even richer on imperial patronage, while outsiders to the court saw their currency devalued and their traditional status symbols illegitimated or simply ignored.\textsuperscript{52} This consolidation of wealth around the emperor and his regime in turn funded the establishment of a new senate at Constantinople and the introduction of new legal orders, each bearing its own honors and lucrative income: \textit{illustres} and \textit{spectabiles} now outranked the old Senatorial \textit{clarissimi}, while the \textit{perfectissimi} and \textit{egregii} occupied further rungs below.\textsuperscript{53} The whole edifice was upheld by the very “public grants”—the \textit{largitiones}—that the Anonymous author of the \textit{De Rebus Bellicis} so loathed. As it was put in one of Constantine’s own laws in 326, the bureaucracy was “deluged with … privileges.”\textsuperscript{54}

But largess was not enough, nor could it ever have been, to satisfy characters like our Anonymous. Though some in the provincial ‘middle-class’ (of which St. Augustine can be considered a member) capitalized on the administrative revolution by seeking employment in the civil service, others could only “resent the fact that they had missed out on the new age

\begin{footnotesize}
\item[50] Jones thinks not, while Depeyrot finds the \textit{solidus} to be a source of both stability and instability in the economic sphere. See Jones, “Inflation in the Later Roman Empire”; Depeyrot, “Economy and Society.”
\end{footnotesize}
of gold,” according to Peter Brown.55 The old provincial aristocracy found itself in increasingly dire financial straits: taxes were up, but the revenue stream now flowed into others’ pockets. The elite Senatorial families of Rome managed to survive in the reoriented economy, but the curiales, if they could not acquire the literally golden ticket of a bureaucratic office, were left behind.56 These were the Anonymous’s afflicta paupertas, afflicted not by poverty, but by their impoverishment relative to the new administrative class.57 The traditions of civic euergetism, which had served for so long as the critical joint binding together the empire and her urban communities, fell into an indelible decline.58 As the (in)famous Album of Timgad suggests, emperors did attempt to rescue these traditions from total neglect, but with only limited success: “a new currency of power” had already taken their place.59 Further evidence abounds, but for now it will suffice to note that the longest single section of the Theodosian Code was dedicated to preventing members of the municipal councils from shirking their civic obligations for other more attractive pursuits.60

This decline of republican civic culture demonstrates that the empire’s administrative revolution was also a moral revolution. Bureaucracies, by design, are absorbed in the question of means but agnostic about ends, a matter of values that does not concern the arm of government tasked with enforcement rather than legislation. Yet this ethical agnosticism masks a moral commitment, namely, a judgment that there are no reasonable moral commitments beyond the bureaucracy’s self-referential logic, a belief that only managerial authority—which judges means, but comes secondary to arbitrary ends—can be justified.61 Clearly, no traditional system of morality is reconcilable with this view. As Max Weber once observed, “The ‘rational’ interpretation of law on the basis of strictly formal

55 Brown, Through the Eye of a Needle, 24.
57 Brown, Through the Eye of a Needle, 24.
58 Ibid., 600-07; Giardina, “The Transition to Late Antiquity,” 758, 767; Brown, Through the Eye of a Needle, 22-23, 63-65.
59 Kelly, Ruling the Later Roman Empire, 108.
60 See Liebeschuetz, The Decline and Fall of the Roman City, 29-222 (“further evidence”); Codex Theodosianus 12.1.1-192.
conceptions stands opposite the kind of adjudication that is primarily bound to sacred traditions.”

Bureaucracy erases social distinctions and levels informal hierarchy; it subordinates everything to legal rationalism. Thus, as the new Roman administrative apparatus provided means for the emperor’s ends, its officials developed their own identity and internal ethical code, defined negatively against their aristocratic competition. An enforceable (though admittedly primitive) system of seniority within the legal orders was developed. Shadowy enforcers, the *agentes in rebus*, travelled the empire snooping on provincial officials and informing the emperor of corruption.

As Christopher Kelly has written, Bureaucrats … regarded themselves as separate from those over whom they ruled. Theirs was a strong sense of difference and of a collective self-interest fostered by a deep love of formality and administrative arcana, by the unstinting use of impenetrable technical jargon, and by splendid official uniforms which set bureaucrats apart as servants of the state.

The rise of imperial bureaucracy meant the deterioration of the republican political ethos because their accompanying moral ideologies were incommensurable—the rise of one paradigm required the fall of the other.

Of course, classical republicanism did not go down without a fight, and the victory of the bureaucratic ethic was never complete. Some, especially in the east, sought a rapprochement between the new imperial regime and the intellectual traditions of the aristocracy, relocating to the imperial court but striving at the same time to maintain a semblance of their old independence. Self-consciously entertaining two contrary ideologies, men such as Themistius and Synesius of Cyrene struggled to reconcile their love of philosophy and leisure with the new rationalism of the administrative elite.

They naturally embraced irony as their preferred rhetorical instrument—a device effective only when its audience effortlessly apprehends the asymmetry between what has been said and some unspoken moral standard. Over time, however, as Christianity became ingrained in politics, the tension of this unhappy union between autocracy and autonomy was eased, for “Christianity did not condemn

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63 *Codex Theodosianus* 8.7.1.

64 See especially *Codex Theodosianus* 6.27; cf. Kelly, *Ruling the Later Roman Empire*, 206-07.

65 Kelly, *Ruling the Later Roman Empire*, 111.

66 See especially Synesius of Cyrene, *De Regno*; and Themistius, *Orations* 6, 8, 10.
dependency, nor did it denounce any consequent moral humiliation; on the contrary, it exalted its spiritual virtue.”

But others were less willing to assimilate to the new normal. One typical line of critique was to condemn the imperial administration for *avaritia*, a thirst for largess so unquenchable that it wrung provincial taxpayers dry and drowned the virtue of the new bureaucratic elite in indulgent excess. Constantine bore the brunt of this polemic. In Julian’s *Caesars*, the emperor is confronted by a sanctimonious Marcus Aurelius: “‘What was the height of your ambition?’ ‘To amass great wealth,’ [Constantine] answered, ‘and then spend it liberally so as to gratify my own desires and the desires of my friends.’” A still harsher denunciation appears in Zosimus’ *New History*:

Constantine continued wasting revenue by unnecessary gifts to unworthy and useless people, and oppressed those who paid taxes while enriching those who were useless to the state; for he thought that prodigality was liberality. ... By such exactions the cities were exhausted; for as these demands persisted long after Constantine, they were soon drained of wealth and most became deserted.

The later pagan critiques of Constantine, like Livy’s censure of the late Republic, are equal parts moral and economic: they condemn certain administrative policies not only on the grounds that they promote vice, but also that such vice represents a grave threat to the sanctity of the *res publica*. In the classical republican mind, the secular goods of safety and affluence could only be secured through the moral steadfastness of the citizenry; political institutions were necessary but not sufficient to sustain *concordia*; policy may have been the efficient cause of prosperity, but the final cause was always public virtue.

It should be quite clear that neither of these points of view—neither that of the court philosopher nor that of the pagan reactionary—is not shared by the Anonymous. Although he condemns the *avaritia* of civil servants and ascribes their greed to Constantine’s extravagant *largitiones*, he does not propose to remedy the situation by restoring republican

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67 Giardina, “The Transition to Late Antiquity,” 766.


virtues or by reviving civic traditions. As already stated above, the Anonymous’s approach is above all scientific: he seeks to tinker with the social world as he tinkers with machines; the political realm consists of mechanisms, and politics is the science of placing them in proper order. Yet even while his method is incompatible with classical republicanism, his avowed goal—like Synesius and Zosimus alike—is to defend it. He protests the bureaucratization of Roman politics and pleads the case of the curiales, but his treatise exhibits the standard features of rationalized legal discourse. This is a genuine paradox for the intellectual historian. How are we to explain it?

**Monarchy, Despotism, and Decline**

Thus far, the aristocratic spirit of Constantine’s critics—the love of honor and independence which makes an idiosyncratic appearance in the *De Rebus Bellicis*—has been described as a ‘republican’ moral orientation, ultimately traceable to Livy and Cicero in the first century BC. True enough—but there is perhaps a more accurate terminological paradigm with which to describe these traditional civic values: not ‘classical republicanism,’ but ‘classical monarchism.’ For there is a distinction to be drawn, as Montesquieu understood in *The Spirit of the Laws*, between monarchical and despotic government. Monarchy is defined by competition between an autocrat and an ambitious hereditary nobility that seeks public honor in the form of “preferences and distinctions”: wealth and leisure, independence and self-sufficiency, title and privilege.\(^{70}\) The desire of the ruler to dominate his realm is checked by the nobility, which, despite receiving some distinctions from the hand of the sovereign, must possess autonomy if it wishes to honorably exercise its own agency.\(^{71}\) Therefore the nobility must retain its own system of ranks and privileges, independent of the sovereign, in order for liberal governance to endure in a monarchical state.\(^{72}\) Much as in the Roman Empire of the first two centuries AD, it is also necessary in a monarchical state that conflicts between nobles and their prince do not always end in

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\(^{71}\) Cf. Cicero, *De Officiis* 1.150-51, in which the individual’s ability to exercise moral agency in an occupation is the decisive factor in determining its ethical status for aristocrats.

\(^{72}\) Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws* 5.4-9, pp. 44-55.
the sovereign’s favor. Essential to understanding the history of the later empire and the *De Rebus Bellicis*, however, is precisely how such monarchies decline into illiberal despotisms:

Monarchies are corrupted when one gradually removes the prerogatives of the established bodies or the privileges of the towns. In the first case, one approaches the despotism of all; in the other, the despotism of one alone....A monarchy is ruined when a prince believes he shows his power more by changing the order of things than by following it, when he removes the functions that are natural to some to give them arbitrarily to others, and when he is more enamored of what he fancies than of what he wills. A monarchy is ruined when the prince, referring everything to himself exclusively, reduces the state to its capital, the capital to the court, and the court to his person alone....The principle of monarchy has been corrupted when the highest dignities are the marks of the greatest servitude, when one divests the important men of the people’s respect and makes them into the vile instruments of arbitrary power. It has been corrupted even more when honor has been set in opposition to honors and when one can be covered at the same time with infamy and with dignities....The principle of monarchy has been corrupted when some singularly cowardly souls grow vain from the greatness of their servitude and when they believe that what makes them owe everything to the prince makes them owe nothing to their homeland.

It has been said that the later Roman Empire was “before all things a monarchical state,” but it was a despotism. When Diocletian, Constantine and their successors over hundreds of years consolidated the powers of the aristocracy into their own hands—when they reduced “the state to its capital, the capital to the court, and the court to [their] person alone”—they effectively corrupted the political principle propelling and sustaining public life in the early empire. All of the titles and privileges which had once been acquired through civic benefaction were now distributed at the whim of the emperor, and the independent aristocracy which required such privileges to survive was transformed into a dependent bureaucracy.

Now, finally, we can begin to grasp the paradoxical nature of the *De Rebus Bellicis*. The Anonymous wrote at a time of transition from

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73 Kelly, *Ruling the Later Roman Empire*, 109.
75 Kelly, *Ruling the Later Roman Empire*, 225.
monarchy to despotism in the Roman Empire of the fourth century. Though he sought to protect the taxpayer against the *avaritia* of the emperor’s civil service—a defense of the old monarchical order—he recognized that by the time of his writing, all the prerogatives and functions of the state were tied together in single bundle. He adopted the logic of bureaucratic governance simply because there was no longer any alternative for persons in his position under despotic rule. Perhaps he did not even apprehend the methodological contradiction running through his treatise. After all, the Anonymous was not a Julian or a Zosimus, frantically railing against the new empire with a reactionary’s zeal, nor was he a Synesius or a Themistius, craftily inventing ways to preserve old virtues in a strange new world, but simply a disgruntled provincial aristocrat, frustrated by administrative incursion on his privileges and pushed to the pen by financial turmoil.

To ask whether the Anonymous’s counsels were really practical, or whether they ever reached Valens and Valentinian, is to miss what is so exciting about the *De Rebus Bellicis* as an event in intellectual history. In a time when politics was conceived as a fundamentally moral space, the Anonymous saw only mechanisms; even while championing the *ancien régime*, his technique was rational, calculated, and *scientifique*. Ever since Albert Hirschman published his brief monograph on the historical emergence of political economy, it has been popular to argue that the social sciences were built on a series of Enlightenment insights about the nature of morality and politics. Yet the *De Rebus Bellicis* raises the possibility that such assumptions may not belong only to the Enlightenment, that there may be other ways to develop an intellectual temperament disposed to scientific inquiry in the realm of human interaction and institutions. If the Anonymous is to serve as our example, certainly first among these alternative routes to social science must be the despotic-bureaucratic mentality of his later Roman milieu. For if this worldview was sufficiently powerful to undermine even the classical republican ethos of the Roman Empire—and all in the mind of a man seeking to reverse the advances of bureaucracy—then it is plausible that such a mindset could accomplish similar feats in other societies and other ages.

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**TRANSLATIONS OF CLASSICAL WORKS**


Saxons, Slavs, and Conversion

*Toward a New Understanding of Crusade*

Stanislaw Banach

Ever since twentieth-century historians began grappling with the semantics of the term “crusade,” attempting to create an encompassing definition for it, schools of scholarly interpretation concerning the matter have multiplied.¹ For instance, traditionalists hold that crusades were only those expeditions directed eastwards towards the Holy Land, while pluralists emphasize papal authorization as the defining feature of crusade.² A few more major methods of classification exist, yet these two have particular relevance in analyzing the Second Crusade of 1146 to 1148.³ This venture, approved by Pope Eugene III, consisted of three separate campaigns: one aimed at the Holy Land, another intended for the liberation of Lisbon, and a final one directed against pagan Slavs on the eastern borderlands of the Saxons.⁴ The only campaign considered successful was the Iberian venture, during which Lisbon fell to the

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¹ The term “crusade” first surfaced in the early thirteenth century and did not become common in English until the eighteenth century. Thus, any attempt to define crusade is a matter of systematizing an idea of Christian holy war that was nebulous to those who created and developed it. This article uses “crusade” to describe those expeditions universally termed so, such as the First Crusade, but the term also serves as an elegant, if not entirely precise, shorthand for the various ideas, symbols, and acts associated with warfare conducted in the name of Christianity. See Giles Constable, “The Historiography of the Crusades,” in *The Crusades from the Perspective of Byzantium and the Muslim World*, ed. Angeliki E. Laiou and Roy Parviz Mottahedeh (Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 2001), 12.

² Ibid.


⁴ Ibid., 214.
Portuguese in 1147 and the last Muslim outposts in Catalonia were occupied by Christian armies in 1149. The poorly organized foray into the Holy Land concluded after Muslim forces trapped crusaders assaulting Damascus and forced them to withdraw. Although the Saxon expedition also ended inconclusively, its initiation represented a crucial shift in the paradigm of crusade.

The First Crusade of 1096, which had focused solely on the Christian conquest of the Holy Land, had generally treated non-Christian resistance as an obstacle to achieving the foremost goals of crusade: the liberation of eastern Christians and the capture of the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem. The inclusion of the northern expedition in Eugene III’s call for crusade added an entirely new dimension to crusading—that of conversion. The Wendish Crusade of 1147, as the northern leg of the campaign is known, did not aim to capture any lands of spiritual significance to Christianity, but instead sought to expand the Christian flock. The Cistercian abbot St. Bernard of Clairvaux—an influential preacher responsible for crucial monastic reforms and a chief proponent of the expedition—called for crusade against the heathen Slavs “until such a time as, with God’s help, either religion or nation shall be wiped out.” Such a perspective on crusade seems to support a pluralist interpretation, as the primary area where conversion took place was on the Saxon frontier and not within the Holy Land. Eugene III’s simultaneous approval of three parallel

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6 Ibid., 129.
8 Riley-Smith, The Crusades, 2-8.
9 The venture also sought to claim new land for Christendom and for the Saxons, as discussed elsewhere in this article, but these motivations were not as pronounced in contemporary records about the theology behind the crusade, which emphasized the aspect of conversion.
10 Riley-Smith, The Crusades, 123.
expeditions, all aimed in various directions, also suggests the legitimacy of a pluralist view. However, the regional context of the Wendish crusade cannot be disregarded. Saxon campaigns against the Wends began centuries before the crusade of 1147, so this specific conflict should also be viewed as the continuation of local warfare.\textsuperscript{11} A traditionalist interpretation of crusade underscores how the regional background of the Wendish Crusade significantly differentiates it from the First Crusade, which represented an unprecedented European military effort. In order to illuminate these various aspects of the Wendish Crusade, this article will examine the work of one of the campaign’s most important chroniclers: Helmold of Bosau’s \textit{Cronica Slavorum}. Helmold found papal approval of crusade important, but he did not see the expedition itself as vastly different from earlier or later Saxon-Wendish warfare.\textsuperscript{12} His chronicle helps reveal that the Second Crusade saw an immense liberalization in what types of warfare could qualify for papal approval and constitute crusade.

Helmold was born sometime between 1118 and 1125 at an unknown location and spent time in Segeburg and Oldenburg before becoming pastor at Bosau, all locations on the northeastern Saxon frontier.\textsuperscript{13} Thus, he spent the majority of his life amongst belligerent Saxons eager to expand their holdings into pagan territories.\textsuperscript{14} He composed the \textit{Cronica Slavorum} in two stages, between 1167 and 1172, basing the text on his own observations and opinions as well as on past accounts.\textsuperscript{15} Helmold produced a work well-grounded in contemporary reality: he avoided flowery classical allusions, rarely mentioned miraculous events, and only occasionally referenced the Bible.\textsuperscript{16} He displayed an authentic interest when describing his non-Christian subjects, distinguishing between the various Slavic tribes living on the Saxon borderlands and providing what

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{11}{Urban, “The Wendish Princes,” 225.}
\footnote{12}{Helmold, \textit{The Chronicle of the Slavs}, 170.}
\footnote{13}{Ibid., 20.}
\footnote{14}{Francis J. Tschan, “Helmold: Chronicler of the North Saxon Missions,” \textit{Catholic Historical Review} 16, no. 4 (January 1931): 398.}
\footnote{15}{Christiansen, \textit{The Northern Crusades}, 60.}
\footnote{16}{Tschan, introduction to \textit{The Chronicle of the Slavs}, 34.}
\end{footnotes}
information he knew about their pagan rites. Francis Tschan claims that Helmöld’s commonplace style may be indicative of a humbler background. Writing in support of this thesis, Tschan states that Helmöld almost certainly retained the relatively insignificant rank of pastor throughout his life and that the *Cronica Slavorum* lacks the sophisticated political insights present in the writings of more influential clergymen.

Although his origins remain obscure, Helmöld clearly conveys his ideology and purpose through his text. The account describes the German political situation, international events involving the German emperors, and particularly important developments in Europe, such as the First Crusade, but these elements are interspersed only periodically so as not to distract from the focus of the work: the conversion narrative of the pagan Slavs living east of the Saxons. The *Cronica Slavorum* begins by describing the various Slavic tribes inhabiting the Saxon frontier, offering general information on the Abodrites, the Wilzi, and the Rugiani, who are “given to idolatry…always restless and moving about.” Helmöld praises those Saxon military campaigns which successfully converted these tribes, but he often condemns the materialistic motives of the Saxons as harshly as he does the heathen practices of the pagans. He blames military misfortunes of Saxon leaders on their failure to recognize “that the battle is of the Lord and that victory is from Him,” and for taxing certain newly Christianized Slavs too heavily. Helmöld does give credit where he believes it is deserved, however, citing the example of Bishop Otto of Bamberg, who successfully converted Pomeranians by himself. Thus, Helmöld’s appraisal of the Wendish crusade is mixed. He commends the heroic deeds of certain participants, but ultimately concludes that “the grand expedition broke up with slight gain,” pointing out that many of the

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17 Helmöld also briefly describes Christianized Slavic nations, namely the Russians, Poles, and Bohemians, and includes Hungary as “a part of Slavania.” See Helmöld, *The Chronicle of the Slavs*, 44-52.

18 Tschan, introduction to *The Chronicle of the Slav*, 33.

19 Ibid., 21.


21 Ibid., 52.

22 Ibid., 100.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid., 138.
supposedly converted Slavs swiftly gave up their baptisms.\textsuperscript{25} As Christiansen so eloquently states, “Helmold was a firm believer in a crusade that never happened.”\textsuperscript{26} For Helmold, a successful crusade would have had to live up to his existing standards for missionizing warfare: widespread, authentic, and lasting conversion of the group against whom the campaign was directed. This might suggest that, to Helmold, the Wendish Crusade was just another skirmish in a chain of conflicts between Saxons and Slavs. Yet he does distinguish the crusading army as “\textit{signo crucis insignata}” (“signed with the sign of the cross”), devotes an entire chapter to describe the preaching of St. Bernard and Pope Eugene III, and discusses the simultaneous campaigns to Lisbon and the Holy Land.\textsuperscript{27} Evidently, despite its seemingly unremarkable nature, the expedition bore some special distinction in Helmold’s mind.

An examination of the wider, European context behind the Second Crusade offers insight into the unique characteristics of the expedition against the Slavs and its significance in changing conceptions of crusade. Pope Eugene III’s 1145 letter calling for a new crusade, \textit{Quantum praedecessores}, granted participants a more significant remission of sins than that offered by Urban II during the First Crusade and developed policy that protected crusaders’ property while they were away, marking an even fuller papal commitment to supporting the campaign.\textsuperscript{28} St. Bernard preached the crusade widely and reached Frankfurt in November 1146, where he appealed to King Conrad III of Germany.\textsuperscript{29} In March 1147, certain Saxon rulers requested that they direct their campaigns against the Wends rather than the Muslims.\textsuperscript{30} St. Bernard agreed to this call and persuaded Eugene III to formally authorize the Wendish crusade in his letter \textit{Divina dispensatione}.\textsuperscript{31}

Many contemporary records, such as the chronicle of Sigebert, echo the Cistercian’s view of this venture, stating that the campaign against the Slavs should continue until the Saxons “either exterminate the

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 181.
\textsuperscript{26} Christiansen, \textit{The Northern Crusades}, 61.
\textsuperscript{27} Helmold, \textit{Cronica Slavorum} (repr., Hannover: Hahn, 1909), 122.
\textsuperscript{28} Riley-Smith, \textit{The Crusades}, 121.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 123.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 123-24.
neighboring people of the Slavs or [force] them to become Christian.”\(^\text{32}\) That the Saxon request had to be approved by the spiritual leaders of the expedition indicates the unconventional nature of the idea and the shift in rhetoric that St. Bernard and Eugene had to adopt to sanction this crusade. St. Bernard’s words on the matter do not include a call for the geographic expansion of Christianity in northern Europe, but instead emphasize the hitherto nonexistent missionary aspect of the venture. They exemplify a profound shift in the theology behind crusade and a liberalization in the understanding of which warfare could constitute crusade.

Some historians have pointed out Pope Eugene III’s disinterest with originally including the Germans in the expedition, crediting the popularity of the crusade there to St. Bernard and explaining Eugene’s acceptance of Saxon involvement in northern Europe as a move of political calculus.\(^\text{33}\) Constable mentions that Eugene may have been concerned about the stability of the Empire during Conrad III’s absence and thus did not want the monarch to depart from Europe.\(^\text{34}\) This line of reasoning holds that when the opportunity presented itself to include the Germans on the campaign without having them depart from their homeland, Eugene eagerly obliged.\(^\text{35}\) However, such an interpretation stressing the practical motives of the Pope does not reduce the significance of the shift in the theology of crusade.\(^\text{36}\) Bernard, the foremost apologist of the Second Crusade, approved of the Saxon proposal before Eugene did and, most importantly, adopted new rhetoric to account for the campaigns against the Slavs. The nature of this warfare, however, did not differ significantly from the 175 campaigns that the Saxons had already undertaken against the Slavs since 789.\(^\text{37}\) In spirit, the Wendish Crusade progressed as any other regional Saxon conflict and had very little in common with the campaigns directed towards the Holy Land.

The local quality of the Wendish Crusade and Helmold’s description of it indicate its unremarkable nature in the context of previous Saxon

\(^{32}\) Constable, ”The Second Crusade as Seen,” 224.

\(^{33}\) Ibid., 256.

\(^{34}\) Ibid.

\(^{35}\) Ibid.

\(^{36}\) Eugene III’s supposed plan did not succeed, as Conrad III did lead armies towards the Holy Land despite the Saxon engagements along the German borderlands. See Constable, ”The Second Crusade as Seen,” 213.

\(^{37}\) Ibid., 225.
warfare against the Wends. These aspects grant traditionalist historians some credibility, as the northern campaign never wielded the unique, momentous quality present in expeditions eastward, nor was its goal as significant to the whole of Christendom as the preservation of the Holy Land under Christian rule. The symbolic trappings of crusade—knights signed with the cross, the exhortations of a holy man, and papal approval—were all present in the Wendish Crusade as in others, yet the expedition was also part of the Drang nach dem Osten, or the more local phenomenon of the eastward expansion of German-speaking peoples.  

The German nobles and the Church in northern Germany had their own goals that did not shift because a crusade was declared. While some clergymen like Helmold had loftier aspirations for German Christianity, the local Church had a longstanding “hunger for land,” and “appetite for rich endowments.” Converted Slavs could be used to pay tithes to fill Church coffers and work Church lands as serfs, thus incentivizing Church expansion eastwards.

Some historians, such as James Westfall Thompson, go so far as to claim that the German Church’s motives were wholly material and devoid of any missionary intention. Saxon nobles had their own goals. They were satisfied once tribute had been exacted from the Slavs and were willing to grant the Wends more local autonomy than the Church, allowing them to keep their pagan gods. Nevertheless, the expansionary zeal of the Church caused Slav rebellions to break out in 983, 1018, and 1066, leading to widespread devastation that Helmold describes. 

During the final and most aggressive rebellion, “the stronghold of Hamburg was razed to the ground and even crosses were mutilated by the pagans in derision of our Savior.” The see of Oldenburg remained vacant for eighty-four years, or until the Wendish Crusade itself. This campaign must be considered against a backdrop of violent and unceasing regional

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39 Thompson, “The German Church and the Conversion of the Baltic Slavs,” 210-11.
40 Ibid., 211.
41 Ibid., 218.
42 Ibid., 220.
43 Ibid., 220-28.
44 Helmold, The Chronicle of the Slavs, 98.
warfare and local disputes. Indeed, the conduct of German nobles during the Wendish Crusade resembled previous interactions between Saxons and Slavs rather than that of a crusader army.

Upon learning of the expedition against the Abodrites, their leader, Niclot, attempted to negotiate with the Saxon Count Adolph of Wagria, reminding him of a previous pact that the two had concluded. Adolph responded diplomatically, hoping to preserve his warm relations with Niclot without angering the leaders of the crusade. Such an interaction was expressly against St. Bernard’s dramatic call to convert or kill all heathens. According to Helmold, the crusader army itself lost heart while assaulting the Abodrite stronghold of Dobin, agreeing to end the siege in exchange for the Slavs’ lukewarm and temporary acceptance of Christianity and the return of some Danish captives. Such a lack of Christian zeal places the expedition in sharp contrast to the First Crusade, which demanded far greater sacrifices of its participants who nonetheless persevered and eagerly advanced towards the Holy Land.

Fulcher of Chartres, a chronicler of the First Crusade, described how the Christian army “endured cold, heat, and torrents of rain,” but “gladly ran the full course of martyrdom.” Formally, the Wendish campaign of 1147 had all the outward symbols of crusade, yet its conduct resembled the regional, small-scale conflicts that had existed along the Saxon borderlands for centuries rather than the spiritually imbued warfare of the First Crusade.

The Wendish Crusade presents an intriguing case for modern historians to deduce the essential elements of crusading warfare. For pluralists, Pope Eugene III’s formal authorization of the expedition as part of a larger crusading venture in Divina dispensatione remains the most important factor classifying the Saxons’ campaign as a crusade. Other factors also support this line of reasoning. St. Bernard’s call for converting or exterminating heathens is clearly intended for the northern armies rather than those entering the Holy Land, while Helmold’s account distinguishes the participating armies as signed by the cross and describes

46 Ibid., 176.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid., 180.
49 Riley-Smith, The Crusades, 17.
them as an integral element of the three-pronged crusade. Yet the expedition against the Wends can also be interpreted as divorced from the essential elements of crusade as defined by traditionalists. After all, the conflict in 1147 was one small part of the centuries-long process of German expansion eastward. Neither the German Church nor the Saxon nobles changed their regular habits for the sake of crusade. The Saxons continued to view expeditions against the Slavs as strategic military ventures involving diplomacy and negotiations rather than zealous holy war.

In his assessment of the conflict, Helmold used the same standard that he applied to all warfare between Germans and Slavs. Taking both arguments into account, the Wendish Crusade can legitimately be termed so, yet the course that the conflict took had little in common with existing notions of crusade. St. Bernard’s rhetoric and the events of the Saxon campaign created a new understanding of Christian holy war that would hold grave implications for the fate of the Baltic and the peoples surrounding it. The Teutonic Knights, formed in the Holy Land at the end of the twelfth century, came to adopt this liberalized meaning of crusade during their exploits in northern Europe beginning in the thirteenth century, this time using St. Bernard’s rhetoric to justify their campaigns against the still unconverted Balts.51 Although the Wendish Crusade failed as a missionizing venture, its application of the crusading ideal to an entirely new sort of conflict—one focused on the conversion of pagans rather than on the liberation of Christian lands and peoples—provided Christian Europe with a crucial precedent.

51 Riley-Smith, The Crusades, 80.
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Beyond Einstein
The American Response to the Influx of Jewish Refugee Scientists, 1932-1945

Lauren Cooper

Introduction
On July 13, 1945, the New York Times published two letters to the editor responding to the Allied victory on the European front during World War II. The first, “Refugees Pose a Problem” by Johan J. Smertenko, called for the deportation of nearly nine hundred Jewish refugees living in a temporary haven in Oswego, New York. The article argued that their continued presence was a “violation” of the U.S. government’s pledge that the refugees would not “worsen the employment situation in this nation.”¹ The second, “Scientists Seen as Need” by Robert B. Sheridan, called for the active recruitment of scientists and students of science to fill vacancies in the field created during the war effort.² What is most notable about the juxtaposition of these two letters, printed side-by-side, is not merely the disconnect between Smertenko’s fear of job competition and Sheridan’s fear of job vacancies. Rather, it is that, despite the celebrity of several Jewish refugee scientists working for the American war effort—Albert Einstein and Leo Slizard, for example—Sheridan did not acknowledge the possibility of filling the vacancies within the scientific community from outside the United States. Yet, despite this oversight, Einstein and Slizard were only two of a large group of Jewish refugees who steadily streamed into the American scientific community between 1932 and 1945. With Germany’s annexation of Austria in the 1938 Anschluss, and its subsequent

invasion of Poland in 1939, the number of Jewish scholars seeking refuge in the United States skyrocketed.³

There is a tendency in the study of this period of American history to focus on a specific group of prominent German-Jewish refugee scientists who were actively recruited by a number of scholar-run refugee committees.⁴ These accounts rarely detail the reactions of the American public except in direct relation to the wartime scientific contributions of these men. However, an examination of the paths taken by several lesser-known Jewish refugee scientists and scholars attempting to gain entry to and employment in the U.S. reveals an unwillingness on the part of the American public to extend aid, and an ambivalence on the part of American scientists as they negotiated their national and scientific identities. The receptions of those who did manage to reach the U.S. were often colored by a combination of executive statements from the Roosevelt administration and representations in the media and popular culture that portrayed refugees as potential threats to the livelihood of the average American.

**Historical Background**

**Jewish Intellectual Life in Germany: 1840–1933**

With the advent of the dye industry in the 1840s, Germany transitioned from a largely agrarian society to an industrialized power. Leading scholars of German Jewry, including John Efron, Déborah Dwork and

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Robert van Pelt, detail how the subsequent civic emancipation of the small Jewish community living in Germany allowed Jews to move to city centers, attend universities, and build up professions like modern laboratory medicine.\(^5\) By the early 1930s, Germany became a scientific center, taking thirty-three of the one hundred Nobel Prizes awarded in the sciences between 1901 and 1932. Of these, one-third were awarded to Jewish scientists, giving the impression that the Jewish community, though less than one percent of the total population, dominated German intellectual production.\(^6\)

After World War I, Germany’s Weimar Republic struggled to pay war reparations and the nation experienced an economic depression—the rate of unemployment doubled between June 1929 and June 1930 alone.\(^7\) The visibility of Jews in middle-class professions, alongside accusations of Jewish treason during the war, fed an increasing climate of anti-Semitism within Germany, and anti-Semitic political campaigns were on the rise.\(^8\) Soon after Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of Germany and the Nazi Party came to power in January 1933, over 1,200 university professors—ninety percent of them Jewish—were forced out of their positions.\(^9\) The majority of these were mathematicians and scientists.\(^10\)

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\(^9\) Adam, *Germany and the Americas*, 576-77.

written by Jewish and non-Jewish academics was subsequently orchestrated by the Nazi Party, leading one German-Jewish scientist to recall Germany in his memoir as “a country in which the proud centres of learning and science have been dishonoured, where books have been burned, where Jews are outlawed and subject to persecutions of all kinds.” The anonymous author deliberately establishes a link between universities, knowledge production, and Jews, suggesting that the scientific prowess of the nation was due solely to Jewish scientists.

Indeed, the near immediate exodus of eight hundred of the purged academics led contemporary American doctors and academics to comment not only on the loss of Germany’s “best minds,” but also on the “political stooges” appointed to replace them. Without the presence of Jewish scholars, German universities became international embarrassments, at least to the scholars who visited them. Historians like Efron, Dwork, and van Pelt, however, tend to follow the narratives of those who remained in the Third Reich, rather than focusing on the ways in which those like the anonymous German-Jewish scientist mentioned above fled Germany.

**Jewish Intellectual Life in America: Albert Einstein**

In contrast, many scholars of American history do write on refugee narratives; though some, including Walter Isaacson, focus narrowly on the stories of one or two prominent scientists, like Albert Einstein, and their contributions to the American war effort. Born in Germany to a Jewish family, Einstein quickly built a career as a theoretical physicist, becoming an active member in several scientific and academic societies, including the Prussian Academy of Science. By the time he lost his position in the Prussian Academy, he had already toured the United States several times, earning a certain “celebrity status,” among scientists and non-scientists alike. The new Institute for Advanced Study soon created a position for

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him, which he accepted, and then able to enter the U.S. relatively easily.\textsuperscript{15} Using his sway within the academic community and with U.S. government officials he was able to find academic positions for other refugee scientists trying to enter the country.

Einstein’s story, however, is unique, as are the stories of the relatively small number of scholars brought to the United States through the aid of refugee committees. Between 1932 and 1935, before the founding of the majority of these committees, over six thousand Jewish professionals—physicians and academics—arrived in the United States. Over the course of the next ten years, tens of thousands more would desperately apply for entrance visas. While these scientists enjoyed successful careers in Germany, very few had access to the same types of academic networks that Einstein or his colleagues formed. The author of \textit{Why I Left Germany}, who published under the name “A German Jewish Scientist,” wrote his memoir to tell the story of the average refugee scientist—a story that remains largely untold by modern historians.

\textbf{Quotas and the Fear of Anti-Semitism}

Much of American immigration policy was colored by the nation’s involvement in World War I, after which it became increasingly isolationist. The Immigration Act of 1924, for example, established strict quotas that restricted the number of immigrants from each nation granted entrance visas.\textsuperscript{16} Not only were refugees subject to the same quotas without distinction, but also these quotas remained largely unfilled throughout the 1920s and 1930s, to the approval of nearly seventy-five percent of the American public.\textsuperscript{17}

\textit{The Imaginary Einstein: A Set-Up for Failure}

While Einstein’s story of immigration was an exception among the vast majority of refugee scientists arriving in the United States during the 1930s, he was also the most visible member of this group. The cover story

\textsuperscript{15} Dwork and van Pelt, \textit{Flight from the Reich}, 21.
of an issue of *Time* magazine in 1938 presented a portrait of Einstein sitting in a cozy armchair—the refugee, “exiled” in Princeton, which then became his home. Describing his transition to life in America, it reads, “He is no longer the timid bewildered man who visited the U.S. in 1930. He has acquired considerable poise in public.”18 The once foreign Einstein now he fit in with the American public. President Roosevelt even personally offered to introduce a bill to Congress expediting Einstein’s naturalization process (Einstein refused, though he became a naturalized citizen through the regular process several years later).19 Comparing Einstein’s entrance into American life to that of previous generations of immigrants, the American public was forced to reimagine the immigrant, previously pictured as a lower-class farmer, instead as a middle-class scholar.

Furthermore, *Time* magazine did not hide the fact that “many [Institute for Advanced Study] members are Jewish exiles from Germany,” just like Einstein.20 The possibility other Jewish refugees as brilliant and capable as Einstein captivated a subset of the American public, who came to believe that the Jewish refugee, who once made Germany an intellectual powerhouse, could do the same for the United States.21 A series of committees were formed in order to find employment for refugee scholars, and appeals were made to the Roosevelt administration to exempt scholars and students from the quota limitations. The success of these committees was limited, largely due to a lack of funding—out of the six thousand scientists that sought help from the Emergency Committee of Displaced Foreign Scholars, fewer than three hundred were placed in academic positions. Those who were aided tended to have distinguished scientific experiences and not representative of the average German-Jewish scientist.22

Despite the relative renown of the refugees rescued through such committees, not all pleased the American public as Einstein had years earlier. One might think that the perpetuation of the image of an Einstein-like, Americanized refugee scientist would make the American public

19 Isaacson, “The Refugee, 1932-1933.”
20 “Science: Exile in Princeton.”
more accepting of other German-Jewish refugees, but in fact it revealed underlying prejudices against those who were not deemed “American” enough. For instance, *Time’s* mention of Leopold Infeld, a Jewish scientist from Poland who joined Einstein’s research team, characterized him only by his accent, and thus his foreignness. If Americans were at first inclined to believe that other refugee scientists might become part of American culture as seamlessly as Einstein had, then the refutation of that belief only enhanced previously held prejudices.

*The Jew as the “Other”*

While the quotas were theoretically created to regulate all immigration to the U.S., a comparison of two letters originating from the White House—one regarding Jewish refugees and one regarding Christian refugees—suggests a discriminatory element in their implementation. The first, a letter sent by Roosevelt to New York Governor Herbert Lehman in November 1935, responds negatively to a request for increasing the quota for German Jews. In the letter, Roosevelt assured Lehman that “there is no immigration quota fixed for persons in the class described” (i.e. German Jews, as opposed to Germans of all faiths and ethnicities), but he acknowledged that the majority of applicants for the German quota were Jewish. He then stated that consular officers “must issue immigration visas, within quota limitations.” Here the word “must” has a coercive connotation. The officers were required to issue visas indiscriminately, yet Roosevelt did not write that officers “assign” visas. That American consulate workers only allowed Jewish refugees into the country because “they must” implies an aversion to them, either as foreigners or as Jews.

A memorandum from the Department of State to Roosevelt’s secretary written one year later, denied a request to allow entry to Christian refugees from Germany on the grounds that “it would be inappropriate for the President to support an appeal for assistance for one particular class of refugees.” The memorandum does not mention filled quotas at

23 “Science: Exile in Princeton.”
all, although the previous letter affirmed that the German quota would be applied to all German applicants, Jewish or not. This suggests an unspoken acknowledgment that the quotas were created for application in cases of non-white or non-Christian applicants—those who might not assimilate well into American culture. Furthermore, the State Department’s request that the denial be expressed “by telephone rather than by letter” suggests a fear that publicity of the denial to help Christians could result in a public backlash. As no fear of backlash over the publicity of the denial to extend quotas for Jewish refugees existed, it can be assumed that the American public regarded foreign Jews as less worthy of aid than foreign Christians. Both refugee groups were foreign, yet only one was expressly limited by the quota restrictions. This demonstrates an undercurrent of anti-Semitism within the U.S. that transcended general xenophobia.

Indeed, a telephone conversation recorded between two American Jews working in the Roosevelt administration demonstrates the fear that support of Jewish refugees could result in a wave of anti-Semitism. In 1944, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., asked speechwriter Samuel Rosenman to attend a meeting on a newly compiled memorandum on U.S. compliance to the “murder of the Jews.” Upon hearing that a third Jewish staff member and Roosevelt would be in attendance, Rosenman said, “I don’t suppose there will be any leak on the thing...The thing I am thinking about is whether when you talk about refugees you want to have three Jews.”26 The idea of the American public finding out about the involvement of three Jews in the filing of the refugee report concerned Rosenman. He, the report’s findings, or the president might be criticized. Morgenthau had to reassure him: “courage first.”27 Rosenman’s reluctance to place three Jews in a room with Roosevelt, while discussing Jewish interests, hints at a fear that the American public might question whether Roosevelt’s policy decisions were unduly influenced by his Jewish staffers.

This second concern becomes clear after a discussion of the prevalence of anti-Semitic thought in the media and popular culture. After the First World War, industrialist Henry Ford used his newspaper, the *Dearborn*

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27 Ibid.
Beyond Einstein, to push forward the conspiracy theory of the “International Jew.” A description on the front page of one issue speaks of the Jew’s “Oriental love of display and... full appreciation of the power and pleasure of social position; a very high average of intellectual ability.” 28 This description effectively “others” American Jews, creating the image of them as foreigners infiltrating American institutions. The underhanded attribution of high intellect suggests the ability of American Jews to manipulate their position in the United States in order to gain influence. Thus, Rosenman’s fear of public backlash resulting from a group of Jews discussing Jewish concerns with Roosevelt is contextualized in the idea that accusations of Jewish involvement in international conspiracies were loudly voiced by distinguished citizens. Anti-Semitism, while perhaps not always so extreme, was alive and well in the nation.

Economic Obstacles to Acceptance
The mistrust of foreigners, reflected in the establishment of immigration quotas in 1924, only grew after the beginning of the Great Depression, as all immigrants—refugees included—were seen by underemployed Americans as competitors for the diminishing number of jobs.29 Jewish refugees in particular experienced hostility in their attempts to find employment. Though Ford’s assertions a decade earlier of economic conspiracy among the world’s Jews were refuted by many, the increasing visibility of Jews, like Morgenthau and Rosenman, within the Roosevelt administration led some to call the New Deal, the economic program intended to create services and jobs for underemployed Americans, the “Jew Deal.”30 The perception that Jews were favored for high positions in such a poor economy created simmering resentments that emerged with the influx of job-seeking refugee scholars.

Contributor, Not Rival
The 1941 book Today’s Refugees, Tomorrow’s Citizens, written by the refugee social scientist Gerhart Saenger, described the experiences of the average refugee, arriving in America and searching for employment. Saenger

30 Newman, FDR and the Holocaust, 56.
dedicates his book “to the American People for the kindness and understanding shown to the refugees who have come to start a new life.” However, the foreword expresses hope that the book might serve its American readers as a “challenge to our current attitudes” in regards to refugees, suggesting that the understanding and acceptance of refugees mentioned in Saenger’s dedication was more of a hope than a reality.  

Thus, when Saenger writes later in his book, “the professional man conceives of his colleague not so much as a rival but as a contributor to the common goal of the profession,” it is difficult to accept such a utopian portrayal as fact.

Throughout his book, Saenger desperately tries to allay the American academy’s reluctance to hire refugees. He seeks to recreate the image of the intelligent, collaborative scientist that many Americans first saw in Einstein. In a prophetic moment, he even suggests, “should a national emergency arise many refugees would prove to be of great value,” anticipating not only the coming world war, but also the prominent place of the refugee scientist in the war effort.

However, when the first refugee scholars arrived in the U.S., the depression was raging and many Americans with a Ph.D. were unemployed. Finding a place in an academic institution depended greatly on one’s field—whether it was glutted or underdeveloped determined whether or not hiring a refugee would displace an American. Often, positions could only be found at lesser-known teaching colleges, where refugee scholars, often unpracticed at English and accustomed to research universities, would have to reorient themselves around the American student.

While those with laboratory skills could easily transition into a new position by proving their knowledge, those in regulated professions were forced to start at the bottom of the employment ladder and begin again. Physicians, especially, encountered difficulties, as the American Medical

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32 Ibid., 123.
33 Ibid., 257.
34 Heilbrut, Exiled in Paradise, 79.
35 Adam, Germany and the Americas, 577; Saenger, Today’s Refugees, Tomorrow’s Citizens, 263.
Association required foreign doctors to undergo American licensing examinations. This process created stress for some—over a twelve-year period, twenty-six refugee scholars placed by the Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced Scholars died of cardiac problems induced by stress. Others were devastated by the prospect of being barred from their profession—over half the physicians entering the U.S. remained unlicensed in their new country. According to Saenger, many of these refugees continued to contribute to the scientific world through similar fields, becoming lab technicians, dieticians, or medical illustrators. Whether their reception was warm or not, it would seem (and Saenger certainly agrees) that the refugee scientists lucky enough to find work in their field contributed to it, if not through the production of new research, then at least through its introduction to new students.

Institutional Anti-Semitism

While the American public could speculate on a Jewish conspiracy within the Roosevelt administration, a Jewish presence within academic institutions soon became even more noticeable. Jewish students were subject to a quota system during admissions processes, and universities tended to favor Jewish refugee scholars whose names did not sound Jewish. Once again, it would seem that the desire was for a rapid Americanization process among refugee scholars. Thus, when an identifiably Jewish refugee sought a position at an academic institution, they often became isolated, but also visible. The distribution of refugee scholars at universities across the country was unbalanced. Among top research universities, the University of Michigan faculty contained a disproportionately low number of refugees, while Columbia University’s faculty contained a disproportionately high number. Yet accounts of anti-Semitism were heard throughout. At

37 Saenger, Today’s Refugees, Tomorrow’s Citizens, 194.
38 Duggan and Drury, The Rescue of Science and Learning, 46-50.
40 Saenger, Today’s Refugees, Tomorrow’s Citizens, 207.
41 Ibid., 193.
Michigan, students created an alternate version of the official fight song, “The Victors”:

Hail to the crooked noses,
Hail to the sons of Moses,
Hail, hail to Michigan,
The Israel of the West!43

The parody establishes a conscious discrepancy between itself and the original fight song, played at nearly every football game, which refers to the University of Michigan as the home of conquerors, heroes, and leaders.44 The parody comments on these elevated traits, replacing them with identifiably Jewish traits (i.e. “crooked noses,” “sons of Moses,” and “Israel”). While proudly sung by Jewish students at the University of Michigan in the late 1960s, it was originally created by students at Michigan State University—a neighboring institution—as an anti-Semitic taunt against the University of Michigan.45 It would seem that the song originated at Michigan State University in order to discredit the athletic prowess of the University of Michigan by creating a contrast between the victors of the original fight song, and the Jews present in the university, likely playing on stereotypes of the imperfect body of the unathletic Jew. In the context of the song, Michigan becomes the “Israel of the West”—a refuge for Jews on the American continent. This relation suggests the song was created to highlight, once more, the idea of the Jewish outsider coming into the American university and taking over.

While antipathy toward refugee scholars emerged at other universities around the country—student newspapers of the University of Kentucky and Harvard University both published a 1938 poll showing that nearly seventy percent of students did not want refugee scholars at their schools—such acts of antagonism often lay within either the hiring

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43 Lauren Cooper, “The Jewish Version of the University of Michigan Fight Song, ‘The Victors’” (contribution, Folklore Archive, University of California, Berkeley, September 27, 2014).

44 See the Official University of Michigan fight song, “The Victors”: “Hail! to the victors valiant / Hail! To the conqu’ring heroes / Hail! Hail! To Michigan, / the champions of the West.” Available at http://www.umich.edu/~mgoblue/sounds/lyrics-victors.html.

45 “Michigan State University Football Chant (Sung to the University of Michigan Theme as a Taunt),” Journal for the Study of Antisemitism 2, no. 2 (2010): 523.
administration or the student body. Among the scholars themselves, according to the records of the Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced Foreign Scholars, refugees were at the very least accepted as fellow faculty, if not as fellow Americans. An account publicized by *Time* magazine about a 1939 joint petition to combat racism and anti-Semitism suggests an even greater kinship amongst American and refugee scholars than the polls above. Working toward a common goal, whether in science or in society, nationality ceased to matter.

**Reinventing the Résumé**

While some refugee scholars experienced acts of anti-Semitism after accepting positions at universities, others applied to several positions, only to be turned away. As Germany prepared for war, the Nazi Party passed regulations preventing fleeing Jews from taking their savings with them. As a result, refugees who arrived in the U.S. without any employment lined up were often forced to take menial jobs in order to support themselves. If refugee scholars experienced little animosity when they remained in their field of expertise, the refugee’s entrance into the unskilled labor market piqued Americans’ fears of job competition.

The State Department and Department of Labor responded to these fears by making requirements for obtaining entrance visas stricter. Whereas before 1939, a refugee needed two sponsors to write affidavits vouching for their ability to work, after 1939, a sponsor would either have to be a close relative vowing to support the refugee financially, or an American employer guaranteeing work for the refugee. Furthermore, refugee scholars without a teaching job lined up no longer qualified for quota exemptions, making the process of obtaining an entrance visa even

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47 Duggan and Drury, *The Rescue of Science and Learning*, 35.
more difficult.\textsuperscript{52} To make themselves more appealing to the consulate workers issuing U.S. entrance visas, scientists had to prove that they would not become a burden to the state. Some taught themselves new skills. Others reached out to the American scientific community for help in obtaining employment prior to their departure from Germany.

For those still in Germany, hearing that refugees already in the U.S. could not find jobs in their field was devastating. Unemployment, however, had its benefits—utilizing the free time they suddenly had, many scholars formed loose networks through which they could learn new technical skills. Robert Rosner, a chemistry student before he was forced out of his German university, learned how to apply his knowledge in chemistry to produce shoe polish. Others, learning that those with technical agricultural training could receive visas with few delays, trained on local farms. Those who were able to enter the U.S. now had the option of jobs in industry, in addition to academia.\textsuperscript{53}

\textit{Networking Among Colleagues}

In presenting themselves to a potential sponsor, the scholar often had to think of what might hurt their chances of acceptance and what might benefit them. One scholar, writing to an acquaintance working in the Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced Foreign Scholars in 1934, described in a friendly, if not detached, tone how he was removed from his position at a university because of his wife’s Jewish heritage. Here he gave a detailed genealogy of his wife, concluding that she was only one-quarter Jewish. Possibly wary of the extent of American anti-Semitism he might face, the scholar carefully shifts the topic to his own dismissal being due to political disagreements, effectively distanc[ing himself from Judaism.

Mentioning his previous good standing and listing several awards he received, the scholar ends the letter: “being a passionate teacher and lecturer, however, I should like very much, temporarily, to exercise such functions. If you could help me to find such opportunities, I should be most grateful to you.”\textsuperscript{54} While he touts his teaching ability, Saenger’s


\textsuperscript{53} Dwork and van Pelt, \textit{Flight from the Reich}, 129-32.

\textsuperscript{54} Duggan and Drury, \textit{The Rescue of Science and Learning}, 9.
description of German universities suggests that they placed little emphasis on teaching. Thus, it is possible that the author of the letter was trying to make himself look appealing to an American hiring committee. Likewise, the strategic use of the word “temporarily”—while possibly the scholar’s true intent—was likely effective in allaying long-term fears within the U.S. about job competition.

The Cold Call

While writing to a colleague would almost certainly yield more results, the average German scientist likely did not have connections in the international community. In such a case, the only option for finding employment was to write multiple letters to a variety of potential employers soliciting a job.

One such letter was written by Dr. Zygmunt Binder in 1939 to Wendell M. Stanley, then a biochemist and virologist at the Rockefeller Institute in Princeton, New Jersey. Binder describes how he found Stanley’s name in a scientific publication, and asks the American to help him and his wife gain entry to the United States. In return, Binder offers to “prove [their] gratitude by [their] collaboration” on Stanley’s research team. Though Binder tries to maintain a dignified tone, the urgency of his plea is reflected in the writing itself. There are grammatical and spelling errors throughout. Near the beginning, a word is added in with pen, and several mistakes are scratched out in the middle. The mere fact that a letter with these mistakes would be mailed out in a professional context suggests either a lack of time to retype the letter, or even a shortage of paper and ink due to the approaching war. The mistakes themselves might have resulted from continuous typing—it is likely that similar letters were mailed to other researchers throughout the U.S. to increase the chance that one might meet with acceptance. They could also be the result of the increasingly frayed emotional state of the typist (presumably Binder or his wife). Indeed, the syntactical errors associated with English as a second language (e.g. the lack of prepositions and the subject-verb reversal) seem to increase in frequency toward the end of the letter, mirroring the increasingly prominent tone of desperation.

It is important to note that the entire letter is framed in terms of work. The claim that Binder learned of Stanley through an article in a scientific journal immediately establishes Binder’s presence in the world of scientific research. Binder commoditizes science, offering his skills and interest “for a very small salary.” Perhaps another indication of the author’s belief that Americans would not sympathize with the plight of the threatened Jews, it is likely that Binder, and others in his position, felt the need to bargain with whatever skills they had. In the face of an upcoming war—even if it was not yet clear to Americans that they would become involved—it must have been clear that scientific advancements would become central to military strategy. An offer of scientific collaboration, therefore, could be considered tantamount to an offer of political allegiance.

Despite the cynicism reflected in this commoditization, Binder does not totally dismiss science as a bargaining tool. In his introduction, he states his “hope to find understanding and help sooner from a scientifist [sic] than...from anyone else”—including, presumably, aid workers and philanthropists. Going so far as to portray his knowledge of science as an inherent part of him, he writes, “all what we long for is to live again under normal human conditions and to be able to follow our scientific interests.” Here, Binder portrays science as transcending ethnic and cultural barriers in a very real way. Through his scientific interest, he already felt connected to Stanley, a man halfway around the world whom he had never met.

Conclusion

The downside of examining the pleas of unknown scientists, like the unnamed scholar and Binder, is that their narratives remain incomplete. Both of their letters were saved by the respective recipients, but at a time when the State Department required more and more of American visa sponsors, it seems unlikely that Stanley, especially, would go out of his way to bring a stranger across the Atlantic, sight unseen. However, these letters reveal a great deal about the average refugee scientist’s path to acceptance within the American scientific community.

Einstein was known to the American public well before his arrival in the U.S. as both a scientist and a Jew. Idolized for his intellectual

56 Ibid.
production, his status as a refugee was traded in early for his academic prestige. While he, and other American scientists, tried to replicate this rapid Americanization process through the rescue of more and more refugee scientists, cultural differences soon overshadowed intellect in the minds of the American public. Drawing on anti-Semitic tropes of the interloping Jew, many saw Jewish refugee scientists as attempting first to move into jobs and displace American workers, and second to overtake American academic institutions entirely—the fact that many German Jews, especially, continuously talked of their wonderful years of employment in Germany, belittling their experiences in America, did not allay these fears.  

Recognizing this unfavorable perception of themselves, refugees strove to present themselves in a way that the American public might approve of, learning new technical skills and presenting their interest in science as a means toward social progress. Binder’s attempt to commoditize his scientific skills clearly exemplifies the way refugees felt they must market themselves. When society turned its back on Jewish refugees, their ties to the scientific community gave them hope. Binder’s passion for science is not limited to its use-value. It is, rather, a result of the idea that within the scientific field, there are no barriers between people.

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57 Saenger, Today’s Refugees, Tomorrow’s Citizens, 84.
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“Tuition is Not a Dirty Word”

Ronald Reagan, the University of California, and the Dismantling of the Tuition-Free Principle

Maiya Moncino

Introduction

It was February 12, 1970. William Forbes, a Regent of the University of California (UC), waited patiently as a pint of blood was drawn from the crook of his arm. With a practiced gesture, the nurse withdrew the needle, bandaged Forbes’s arm, and handed him a pin. “Bleed for UC,” it read. Resolutely, he fastened it to the lapel of his suit jacket.

This was no ordinary medical procedure. Forbes had come for a political purpose: to express his opposition to tuition at the University of California. Here on the Los Angeles campus (UCLA), students organized a creative protest against the possibility of tuition at their historically tuition-free university. Rather than line up in the streets, they lined up to donate blood, selling it by the pint and using the funds to publicize anti-tuition arguments.¹ In many ways, however, it was already too late. The “Bleed for UC” campaign was ultimately unsuccessful: only eight days later, the Board of Regents voted in favor of an educational fee, in a symbolic move away from the historical commitment to tuition-free higher education.

The dismantling of the tuition-free principle was a gradual process. Between the 1960s and the present, the principle was chipped away bit by bit. Tuition—in the form we know it—truly began in the 1990s, but the year 1970 marks the moment when the Regents abandoned their commitment to the principle of tuition-free education.² In this article, I will

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¹ Dorothy Townsend, “UC Students Avoiding Action Against Tuition,” Los Angeles Times, February, 18, 1970.
² Tuition will be defined according to the University of California Student Tuition and Fee Policy’s designation of its function: “In addition to funding programs and services supported by Tuition (such as student financial aid and related programs, admissions, registration,
examine how and why the principle was undermined, in the hope that this case study might inform an understanding of the broader shift away from heavily-subsidized public education and towards a tuition-based funding model at the University of California.

For nearly one hundred years, tuition-free higher education had been a defining feature of the University of California system. It had survived two World Wars and the Great Depression, and in 1960 had been reaffirmed in a historical document known as the Master Plan for Higher Education in California. In 1970, however, the Regents cast it aside. The dominant narrative portrays this moment as a reaction to necessity—a pragmatic response to financial conditions. This perspective is insufficient and limiting in that it neglects the role of human agency in driving this decision. In 1970, the Regents renounced the tuition-free principle because the forceful, charismatic figure of Ronald Reagan shaped the conditions necessary to break down old traditions and make tuition plausible.

 Newly-elected Governor of California and ex-officio UC Regent, Reagan had both an economic and a cultural motive for undermining the tuition-free principle and for using tuition as an instrument for university reform. In the economic sphere, Reagan was concerned with government spending, believed firmly in tight budgets for public institutions, and felt that university financing was weighing too heavily on California’s taxpayers. Portraying himself as the champion of the taxpayer, he vowed to ease this burden. In the cultural sphere, Reagan was appalled by the culture of protest that became dominant on UC campuses in the 1960s. Reagan held a very specific view of a university’s function. In his mind, a university was a bastion of tradition, a space for creating objective knowledge, and a training center for molding students into good members of society. In the 1960s, the University of California became famous for the

administration, libraries, and operation and maintenance of plant), income generated by Tuition may be used for general support of the University’s operating budget. Revenue from Tuition may be used to fund all costs related to instruction, including faculty salaries.” As will be shown later in the article, this definition differentiates tuition from previous fees, and designates the educational fee as a form of tuition. “Regents Policy 3101: The University of California Student Tuition and Fee Policy,” University of California Board of Regents, Approved January 21, 1994, available at http://regents.universityofcalifornia.edu/governance/policies/3101.html.

3 Although, notably, the recommendation of adherence to the tuition-free principle was included in an earlier general agreement that was never actually written into law. It continued to be referenced by Regents as an important promise, however.
opposite: rejecting tradition, honoring subjective knowledge, and challenging old models of good citizenship. As governor, Reagan felt responsible for shaping the university into the conservative institution he envisioned—though whether the UC had ever been such an institution is questionable.

Reagan believed that the tuition-free principle both overburdened state finances and enabled a culture of protest that he found intolerable. Tuition, on the other hand, could present a solution. For one, it would shift the financial burden partially onto the student and away from taxpayers. In addition, it would restrain impulsive student protests by making students more responsible, keeping faculty accountable to the students, and increasing the opportunity cost of protesting. Tuition could act as a mechanism for reconstituting the university as a moral and orderly institution.

As governor, Reagan was well placed to dismantle a principle that he saw as pernicious. With the power to appoint Regents, he could choose new members who shared his views. Through his influence over the state budget, he could apply pressure in crucial areas and compel the Board to seek alternate funding. Poised as the mediator between the taxpayer and the university, he could activate popular indignation against the university, then reference taxpayer resentment to justify underfunding it. Political and financial pressure proved overwhelming. Though many Regents had expressed doubts throughout the month-long decision-making process, a sense of inevitability pervaded the room as the Regents decided that, given insufficient state funds for the university, the tuition-free principle was no longer feasible. UC President Charles Hitch summed up the general feeling when he lamented that the Board had “no other real choice” but to raise fees, “unless we turn our backs on future students.”

Contrary to this language of inevitability, however, the tuition-free principle did not die a natural death. Rather, it was the victim of a carefully designed and powerfully ideological process driven by Governor Reagan.

The abandonment of the tuition-free principle can be understood as an early element of the neoliberal project. Admittedly, the year 1970 predated the widespread rise of neoliberal doctrine, defined here in Jamie Peck’s terms as “a contradictory process of market-like rule,” characterized by “deep antipathies to collectivist, planned, and socialized modes of government.”\(^5\) Ronald Reagan, however, would be remembered as the champion of neoliberalism: promoter of small government, minimal regulation and taxation, and the rule of market forces. The move towards tuition in 1970 foreshadowed the neoliberal force that Reagan would become.

Reagan was powerful and his influence decisive, but I do not intend to write a Great Man theory of history in these pages. Scottish historian Thomas Carlyle, intellectual father of the Great Man theory, proposed that history is shaped by the actions of “great men.”\(^6\) In this case, his words ring true, but British philosopher Herbert Spencer’s critique presents an important caveat. Spencer asserted that great men are themselves products of the society they live in: “Before he can re-make his society,” Spencer argued, “his society must make him.”\(^7\) Reagan, also, was a societal creation. Reagan’s ideas had social traction because California was ready for them. Nevertheless, by wielding both the power of the people who had chosen him as well as the institutionalized authority vested in him as Regent and governor, Reagan the politician, the ideologue, and the cultural critic was able to actively erode a time-honored principle.

This analysis relies on a variety of sources, primarily the Regents’ meeting minutes, the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Archives, and a series of oral histories conducted circa 1984 with various members of the Reagan administration and the state government. Each source is limiting in its own way, and I have attempted to employ them as judiciously as possible. Minutes from Regent meetings were the only source available for exploring the decision-making process, but they are neither comprehensive nor unbiased. Filtered through the language of the notetaker, it was at times challenging to distinguish between the diplomatic phrasings of the minutes and the true sentiments of the speakers. They

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were useful for understanding the process, but less so for investigating the motivations. The archives of the Reagan Library proved most useful for discovering the driving forces behind Reagan’s stance on tuition. The sources examined in these archives had, in some way, come into contact with Reagan himself. They therefore best reflected his understanding of the issue and gave insight into his rationale for desiring tuition. In this archive, I hunted less for hard facts and more for driving factors. Finally, the oral interviews provided a window for examining the events of 1970 with the benefit of hindsight. As a reflection on the educational fee decision, this source unearthed Reagan’s motivations as perceived by those who had worked with him and who no longer had a stake in the outcome. These interviews reflected the biases of the speakers and the passage of time, but I found them to be valuable in certain contexts.

The structure of the article is not chronological, but conceptual. I first consider the dominant narrative for understanding the shift away from the tuition-free principle and suggest that this analysis is incomplete. This narrative invokes financial constraints, but I examine the financial “crisis” of 1967 and argue that Reagan was exaggerating fiscal conditions to justify cutting back the university budget. I then examine Reagan’s rationale for underfunding the university: first, that the university was not adhering to its public mission, and therefore did not deserve a generous public subsidy; second, that education was not only a public good but also a private investment, which its funding should reflect; and thirdly, that California taxpayers were outraged with the university and unwilling to continue funding it at the same levels. Here, tuition enters the stage as an instrument for restoring the university to its former glory. Finally, I explore how Reagan accomplished his goal through political and economic pressures. Though the educational fee was minimal, certainly smaller than Reagan had wanted it to be, it was a powerfully symbolic move. It was the triumph of an idea: the victory of Reagan’s belief in the transformative power of tuition over the historical principle of tuition-free education.

The Necessity Narrative
The conventional wisdom on rising tuition tends to portray what I will refer to as the necessity narrative. This narrative encompasses the various financial, economic, political, and social pressures that allegedly drove the
adoption of tuition and suggests that this shift was exclusively, or chiefly, pragmatic. In doing so, it neglects to consider the actors who engineered this transition, seeing them only as static participants in a process beyond their control. This strips the narrative of human agency, portraying the shift to tuition as an impersonal and natural process. It was neither of these things. This section will consider a few of the leading academics in the field and then suggest how the necessity narrative can benefit from a wider consideration of human agency.

In *California: America’s High-Stakes Experiment*, Peter Schrag argues that it “was probably beyond the bounds of financial possibility, or maybe even equitable public policy, to maintain the low fees—in some cases no fees—that the Master Plan of 1960 had promised.” Subsidizing tuition largely meant paying for the children of the wealthiest members of society to attend college. These students would then go on to take high-paying jobs, often times much more high-paying than the job of the taxpayer who had supported him or her financially. It was unrealistic to expect this to go on forever. Schrag suggests that the tuition-free model was unsustainable in the long run and that its abandonment was both foreseeable and, perhaps, an equitable policy response. However, he also notes that “what happened in California higher education was never planned or even formally discussed.” Though convinced of the unsustainability of the tuition-free principle, as well as of its potential inequity, Schrag critiques the fact that the move towards tuition was not directed by defined guidelines or intentions.

Former UC President Clark Kerr also critiques the lack of intentionality in this process. In his book, *The Great Transformation in Higher Education*,

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8 Peter Schrag, *California: America’s High-Stakes Experiment* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 110.

9 In a speech to the Los Angeles Breakfast Club, Reagan contended that the tuition-free financing model bore more heavily on low-income taxpayers in comparison to their ability to take advantage of the free university system: “At present, every student, regardless of whether he or his parents are rich or poor, is given a subsidized scholarship of about $2,000 a year. That is roughly the cost of a year’s schooling at the university. The wealthy benefit from this bonanza at the expense of the poor. 72 percent of the 18-year-olds from families with income over $14,000 are in colleges but only 12 percent from families with less than $2,000 annual income. Yet, the taxes for financing the bonanza bear more heavily on the poor than on the rich.” Ronald Reagan, Speech at Los Angeles Breakfast Club, July 26, 1967, Box 873, Ronald Reagan 1980 Campaign Papers, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library (hereafter 80CP-RRPL).

10 Schrag, *California*, 110.
1960-1980, he situates tuition in a wider trend that prioritized university growth above all else, making university leadership blind to the fact that it had become “a plaything of external events.” If it had been more farsighted, he argues, the university “might have been more in charge of its history.”\textsuperscript{11} Citing increased costs, lack of public confidence, and stagnating growth in operating resources, Kerr counsels that “higher education needs to be less introspectively concerned with itself alone and more alert to its environment.”\textsuperscript{12} In Kerr’s understanding, the university allowed itself to be blown about by the turbulent winds of external events, heedless of its surroundings.

John Douglass, scholar of higher education, takes a less political and more economic approach, arguing that the unplanned progression of tuition trends left universities with no coherent understanding of the most effective way to divide costs among beneficiaries. Douglass takes note of multiple factors, including an intensifying focus on the sciences and increased operating costs. The primary factor, Douglass argues, “has been the corresponding decline in state and local government subsidies,” a point which he justifies by noting that “jumps in tuition correlate with economic cycles and fiscal crises within state governments.”\textsuperscript{13} Increasing tuition was a response to financial downturns, not to a carefully evaluated program examining the efficacy of a tuition-based model. “In essence, states and their public universities have backed into tuition increases without a broader plan or idea about what the proper contribution might be from the state, from students and their families, and from other sources,” writes Douglass.\textsuperscript{14} Without a plan, there was no way of knowing whether the new tuition model would be better than its predecessor.

Crucially, scholars who adhere to the necessity narrative represent the tuition trend as a spontaneous process: unplanned and undirected. While this may be true over the time span between 1970 and the present, this article aims to show that it may not have been true at particular moments in time when funding decisions were made. The intention here is not to


\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 133.


\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
refute the necessity narrative, but to build upon it and to suggest that it did not apply to the University of California in 1970.

There is no doubt that the challenges facing the UC were daunting, and tuition seemed to present a solution. Declining state and public support left the university with very little foundation. However, rather than falling into the trap of the necessity narrative—asserting simply that the funds were not there, that the taxpayers did not want to invest, and that this was an element of a quasi-natural process—I ask why public support declined and why the state gave increasingly less money. While the Regents were responding to conditions that necessitated an alternate source of funding, the conditions themselves were not spontaneous. Instead, they were carefully orchestrated by the governor, ultimately backing the Regents into a decision that they had opposed from the beginning. The necessity narrative is not wrong, but it is incomplete, and to some extent, fatalistic.

**Background: The Tuition-Free Principle**

In its original charter, the university pledged that higher education would be provided free-of-charge to any Californian student who wanted to learn. The Organic Act of 1868 stipulated that “as soon as the income of the University shall permit, admission and tuition shall be free to all residents of the State,” and, excluding a short three-month period, this principle held for nearly a century from the university’s inception.\(^\text{15}\) Tuition-free higher education was a legacy of the university’s public mission. Prominent California educator Gustavus Schulte proudly declared that “Of all the high institutions of learning, both in the new and old world, the State University of California is the only one which, responsive to the call of the people, through the liberality of its Board of Regents, has been created free—absolutely free.”\(^\text{16}\)

The principle of tuition-free higher education arose out of the egalitarian, populist mission envisioned by the founders of the public university movement. This mission was characterized by what historian Douglass has referred to as the “social contract” of public universities,

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\(^\text{15}\) During the first three months of the university’s existence, a minimal tuition was charged, but within three months it had been abolished. See California Assembly Bill No. 583 (“Organic Act”), March 5, 1868, available at http://vm136.lib.berkeley.edu/BANC/CalHistory/charter.html.

aiming to “proactively mitigate barriers to access” as part of a project to provide education for every eligible citizen of the state. Public funding of higher education institutions aimed to socially engineer a more progressive, productive, and prosperous society by equipping individuals with free educational opportunities.\(^{17}\)

Rather than being a public gift to the individual, the tuition subsidy was seen as a social investment in the state’s future. The UC was intended to serve the state; individual benefits were subordinate to those of society. In the words of Daniel Gilman, second president of the University, the UC was to “perform the service of the State in the education of the young,” since it “is of the people and for the people—not in any low or unworthy sense, but in the highest and noblest relation to their intellectual and moral well-being.”\(^{18}\) By designing the institution in this way, the founders of the university primarily envisioned that its students would serve the advantage of the state. Several years later, UC President Benjamin Wheeler proclaimed similar intentions. In his 1899 inauguration address, he described the “supreme purpose of the University” as the mission “to provide living beings for the service of society—good citizens for the State.”\(^{19}\)

Higher education, like primary and secondary education, was seen as a public good necessary for a functioning democratic society. Commitment to tuition-free education was espoused consistently in university and state rhetoric, perhaps most notably in the 1960 Master Plan.\(^{20}\) The Master Plan united the three branches of California’s university system into a cohesive whole, assigning each a particular role. As the culmination of years of planning and organizing higher education, the Master Plan became the hallmark of California’s unique education model, and its rhetoric shaped the university’s conception of itself for many years, arguably even to the present day. The Master Plan famously recommended that the governing boards of California higher education

\(^{19}\) Benjamin Ide Wheeler, “The Inauguration of Benjamin Ide Wheeler as President of the University,” 1899, available at http://bancroft.berkeley.edu/CalHistory/inaugural.wheeler.html.
\(^{20}\) The tuition-free principle was never codified into law, and the university’s governing Board of Regents retained the legal right to charge tuition at any time.
reaffirm “the long established principle that state colleges and the University of California shall be tuition free to all residents.”21 Yet, exactly ten years later, the tuition-free principle would be undermined with the imposition of an educational fee, the first fee to be charged for instruction. The educational fee was tuition in all but name, steadily rising throughout the twentieth century and skyrocketing in the beginning of the twenty-first. Eventually, in 2010, the Regents officially acknowledged that the educational fee constituted a tuition, and renamed it accordingly.

Choosing a Moment: Why the 1970 Educational Fee was Distinct
The educational fee was the true beginning of tuition, since, excluding the initial three months after the UC’s inception, it was the first time that students would be asked to contribute to the costs of instruction. This understanding of the fee is complicated by the fact that, for the first few years, it was actually spent on capital outlay rather than education, which is to say that it was earmarked for expenditure on buildings. However, it clearly represented tuition in that the intention behind the fee was distinctly different from fees that had preceded it.

Before 1970, attending the University of California had by no means been free. Cost of living, the opportunity cost of foregone income, and textbook prices were augmented by an incidental fee, which had been instituted in 1921 and had reached $300 by 1970. An argument could be made that tuition, in the form of the incidental fee, had thus begun much earlier than 1970. Regent Edward Carter certainly felt this way, brushing aside “the philosophical question” of whether or not to charge tuition, since “In my judgement [sic] we already have tuition—by whatever name.”22 However, the Board members who first implemented the incidental fee were careful to introduce a distinction between this fee and what might be termed tuition. According to the General Catalogue, the incidental fee covered “expenses of students other than the cost of their

instruction,” such as maintenance of cafeterias, libraries, and gyms.\textsuperscript{23} Defining the incidental fee in this way indicated an understanding of tuition as a charge for cost of instruction. The incidental fee therefore “cannot properly be regarded as tuition,” wrote the University Comptroller in a memo recommending the policy.\textsuperscript{24} In 1953, over thirty years later, the Committee on Finance of the Board of Regents affirmed that the fee “should not be considered as a revenue producing instrument and it should also not be assessed on the theory that a student should pay a part of the cost of his education.”\textsuperscript{25} Levied for particular services unrelated to instruction, the incidental fee furthermore rejected the principle that students should contribute to education costs. These characteristics distinguished it from the 1970 educational fee.

The incidental fee did not nullify the tuition-free principle, or so the Regents claimed. When voting for the educational fee, though, the Regents were fully aware that this move would be regarded as a break from tradition. Regent John Canaday “was reluctant to accept the principle of tuition embodied in the...motion,” while State Senator Albert Rodda urged against “abandonment of the principle of free higher education.”\textsuperscript{26} Regent William Roth expressed concern that the new fee “would be abrogating [the Board’s] traditional policy of tuition-free higher education.”\textsuperscript{27} The similar apprehensions presented by various members of the Board indicate that the educational fee was not simply the extension of an existing tuition-based policy. Though the incidental fee had incorporated some tuition-like elements, its purposeful delineation as pertaining to costs other than instruction implied a continued adherence to the principle of tuition-free education. Members of the Board of Regents and participants in the audience recognized the educational fee as something different: a shift away from the tuition-free model.

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{26} Regents Meeting Minutes, February 19, 1970.
\textsuperscript{27} Regents Meeting Minutes, November 20, 1969, Box CU-1.4, Folder 20-21: November 1969, UCA-BL.
Unlike the incidental fee, the educational fee was not restricted to non-instructional costs. Nor was it explicitly differentiated from the concept of tuition. At the 1970 meeting, Regents were aware that this moment was different from past tensions over student fees. By discussing the educational fee as a move away from tradition, as “abandonment” and “abrogation” of the tuition-free principle, the Regents and associated participants made it clear that 1970 marked a critical turning point in the philosophy and practice of higher education finance.

**Challenging the Tuition-Free Principle**

By the time Reagan assumed office, attitudes towards the University of California were already shifting. The statutory body established to coordinate higher education in California was questioning the validity of considering education as a public good. Taxpayer support was declining in response to the UC’s culture of protest. Reagan was elected in part because he tapped into these discontents and shifting perspectives, incorporated the language into his political platforms, and made this discourse the basis for his tuition proposal. Though dissatisfaction with the university and shifting attitudes towards public education made conditions conducive to a tuition proposal, it was not until Reagan came onto the scene that the possibility of tuition became a reality.

From 1868 to 1970, the tuition-free principle had been seriously threatened only twice. Each time, the philosophical commitment to free education outweighed other considerations. In the first three months of the university’s existence, a minimal tuition was charged, but this fee was quickly abolished in deference to the tuition-free model recommended in the Organic Act. In 1895, the Regents passed a temporary fee of $10, but the tuition charge was immediately overturned by the governor. The 1921 incidental fee, however, was incrementally increased over the years, reaching $50 in 1957, $75 in 1962, and $110 in 1964. Gradually raising the incidental fee offered an outlet for deferring debates about tuition. It was not until the 1960s that tuition reemerged as a serious consideration.

It is perhaps unsurprising that the issue of tuition reared its head in this decade. The 1960s were a particularly chaotic time in the university’s

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history. Beginning in the fall of 1964, the Free Speech Movement tore apart the Berkeley campus, radicalizing students against Clark Kerr’s administration. Students occupied buildings and held enormous rallies. A mass arrest put over 800 students behind bars. Controversy raged about politicized classes, such as a series of lectures taught by Black Panther leader and political activist Eldridge Cleaver. Berkeley was not the only incendiary campus, however. The appointment of avowed communist Herbert Marcuse at UC San Diego (UCSD) proved extremely divisive. In response to the 1970 Kent State shootings of anti-war protestors, UCLA students staged a massive demonstration, breaking into buildings and provoking a state of emergency. At UC Santa Barbara (UCSB), protesting students set a Bank of America branch on fire. As radical elements of the campuses became more pronounced, the university’s reputation as the great Californian institution became tarnished. Clark Kerr noted that “many citizens resented what they considered misuse of the campuses at their expense as taxpayers.”

In this context, arguments in favor of tuition began to gain traction. At the same time, the language of the university’s social contract and public mission was being undermined by rhetorical shifts towards more market-based language. The 1960 Master Plan had firmly upheld the tuition-free principle, but the ideas undergirding this conviction were already beginning to erode. Higher education, once envisioned as a public good necessary for a flourishing democracy, was increasingly seen as an investment undertaken jointly by states and individuals to reap financial rewards.

This perspective is epitomized in the language of the Coordinating Council for Higher Education, a fifteen-member organization established under the Master Plan, representing public and private higher education institutions as well as the general public and charged with monitoring the implementation of the plan. In 1965, the Council published An Evaluation of the Tuition-Free Principle in California Public Higher Education, examining the effectiveness of the tuition-free policy: had it achieved its mission of providing economic benefits to the state, training manpower, and increasing access? The report toyed with the idea of considering higher education as a private investment rather than a public good. Weighing
individual benefits, such as the “enduring consumer benefits of education,” against social benefits, it found that both parties benefited.\textsuperscript{30} For society, the costs of education “can be considered a financial investment that has produced a substantial addition to national income,” and the costs for the student “have been handsomely reimbursed in future lifetime earnings.”\textsuperscript{31} Under such rhetoric, the student had become a consumer and the university quantifiable purely by its economic contributions.

The philosophy of the social contract and public mission of the university came under serious pressure, faced with this new language of financial investment and consumer benefits. The notion that providing education free-of-charge would have social benefits and allow for more egalitarian access to the institution was no longer enough. Now, the principle was subjected to rigorous analysis, as policy-makers became concerned with proving that it could be upheld under the doctrine of efficiency. An alternative language, setting individual before public benefit, was now made available to those who sought to undermine the tuition-free principle. In 1968 and 1969, two legislative challenges to the tuition-free principle used this logic to advance their arguments. The Monagan Plan proposed “requiring those who benefit to shoulder an increased cost burden” of education expenses.\textsuperscript{32} The Collier Plan suggested that students “Learn, Earn, and Pay.”\textsuperscript{33}

The university was thus being attacked from all sides. The legislature picked up market language to criticize the university’s tuition-free policy on efficiency grounds. The public threatened to withdraw its subsidy in response to radicalization on campus. To make matters worse, the first major campaign of Reagan’s governorship was to cut state spending in response to what he envisioned as a crippling budget deficit.

In a 1968 graduation address, Vice Chancellor William Boyd deplored the loss of the university’s golden years:

I suspect that the most noticeable change of the past four years has been in the hearts of people. Berkeley was once the crown jewel of California, a

\textsuperscript{30} Spalding et al., \textit{An Evaluation of the Tuition-Free Principle}, 17.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{32} Robert Monagan, “Graduated Student Charges: An Equitable Plan for Raising Revenue for Improved Support of Higher Education Based on Ability to Pay,” CA Assembly Bill No. 468, introduced February 12, 1969.
source of affection and pride for its state. Year after year the legislature gave what was asked for its support until finally it produced one of the world’s finest universities. Now our very name is a shorthand for trouble, our budgets are inadequate, our lagging salary schedules make faculty recruitment ever more difficult, and the public holds us in varying degrees of distrust or disgust.34

The university’s newly gained reputation as a hotbed of trouble had made it a contentious issue in the legislature, and a sore spot with California taxpayers. Funding the university became a political issue. In the past, Boyd indicates, the university received funding commensurate with its needs. By the late ‘60s, however, the gap between the Regents’ budget request and the actual state allocation was widening. In 1967, the Regents requested a $264 million operating budget, and received only $252 million. In 1968, they requested $311 million and received $276.5 million.35 Declining support from the state placed pressure on the Regents to find alternative funding models.

Put to a Vote: The Educational Fee of 1970

In January 1967, William French Smith, a representative of Reagan, brought the subject of tuition before a reluctant Board of Regents. Smith proposed a budget that would provide 20% less funding for the university than it had received the year before, even though enrollments were expected to increase by 15%. To compensate for the decreased funds, he suggested a $400 tuition fee.36 After months of discussion, Governor Reagan proposed in August of that year that the Board of Regents “adopt tuition as a policy of the University of California.” Tabling a motion to uphold the tuition-free principle, the Board considered Reagan’s three-pronged approach, whereby the Regents would first decide on the principle of whether to charge tuition, then on the size of the charge, and finally on how it would be used.37 Though the Regents sanctioned a $33

34 Address by William B. Boyd at Baccalaureate service for graduating seniors, GOF67-75-SXII-RRPL.
37 Regents Meeting Minutes, August 30-31, 1967, Box 1967, Folder 30-31: August 1967, UCA-BL.
registration fee to fund student financial aid, the motion for tuition was soundly defeated by a vote of 14 to 7, with two Regents abstaining.\textsuperscript{38}

Three years later, the Board’s response to a similar motion was surprisingly different. In 1970, the Regents voted overwhelmingly \textit{in favor} of the $150 annual educational fee: the motion passed 16 to 6, with one abstention. What changed from 1967 to 1970 to make tuition more palatable? In the specific context of the Board, the answer includes a change in membership: ten members left the Board and nine new members joined. Of those who left, six voted against tuition, only two for it, and two abstained. Of those who joined, all but one voted for tuition. Five of Pat Brown’s seven appointees voted against tuition, and all five of Reagan’s appointees voted for it.

The makeup of the Board was not the only change between the 1967 and the 1970 vote. The $276 million funding for the 1968-69 academic year was a figure that UC President Charles Hitch decried as “too low to support essential programs of the university.”\textsuperscript{39} Student financial aid and capital outlay funding were particularly hard-hit between 1967 and 1970. State support for student financial aid dropped from $172,000 in 1967-68 to only $80,000 in 1969-70.\textsuperscript{40} In 1969-70, the university requested $97.8 million for capital outlay expenditures, but received only $37.4 million.\textsuperscript{41} Deferred maintenance was accumulating to a backlog of $5.3 million by 1969.\textsuperscript{42}

The state was not actually \textit{defunding} the university. Throughout the 1960s, expenditure on higher education was increasing in nominal terms and, as a percentage of California’s General Fund, remained remarkably stable.\textsuperscript{43} However, the university was facing starkly different budgetary needs than in the past. Enrollments grew from nearly 15,000 in 1953 to almost 27,000 in 1964.\textsuperscript{44} In addition, costs of higher education were rising.

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{40} “Analysis of Tuition Alternatives,” Report, Box CU-1.4, Folder 20-21, UCA-BL.


\textsuperscript{42} Committee on Finance Meeting, January 16, 1970, Box CU-1.4, Folder 15-16, UCA-BL.


\textsuperscript{44} Neil J. Smelser, \textit{Reflections on the University of California: From the Free Speech Movement to the Global University} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), 59.
Clark Kerr reflected that the “cost of higher education, as another negative factor, rose from 1 to 2.5 percent of the GNP [gross national product] in the 1960’s.” Faced with ballooning enrollments and increased educational costs, the minimal increases in state funding were being stretched to cover a wider range of needs.

State funding for the university was stagnating at the same time that the UC was seeking to serve more students than ever before, at a higher cost per student. It was in this fiscal context that attacks on the tuition-free principle were gaining ground. From this vantage point, it is understandable that tuition emerged as one solution to the particular conditions of the late 1960s and tempting to suggest that this solution was the only one. This perspective is limiting and insufficient because it neglects the role of human agency, particularly the role of Governor Reagan, in creating the financial conditions under which the university had to reexamine its funding model. Although the UC was already facing daunting challenges when Reagan entered the governorship, it was not until his ascendancy that these began to be reflected in and aggravated by the university’s budget allocations.

Financial “Crisis” or Intentional Divestment?

The necessity narrative claims that tuition was a pragmatic response to declining state support. However, it assumes that state support declined exogenously, that is, as a result of factors that had nothing to do with the university. The evidence suggests that this was not the case. Instead, Governor Reagan created budgetary restrictions for the university by exaggerating the state financial “crisis” and personally limiting the amount of funds that the UC would receive.

By the mid-1960s, the UC was already facing increased enrollments and higher costs per student. Beginning in 1967, it also encountered tighter budget allocations from the state. A fierce believer in moderate government spending, Reagan set out in 1967 to balance California’s budget, asserting that the state found itself in “an unprecedented fiscal crisis.” Nearly every branch of state government saw its funding decline,

and higher education was no exception. Economies would have to be made, Reagan pronounced, suggesting that some government services were “just goodies dreamed up for our supposed betterment.”47 These had to go.

During Pat Brown’s governorship, the state was spending $1 million more than its revenue on a daily basis.48 In order to meet its expenses, California was using tax revenues from 15 months to fund 12 months’ worth of spending. To make matters worse, the deficit was already $63 million. In his inaugural speech, Reagan tempered these numbers with the following analogy:

Our fiscal situation has a sorry similarity to the situation of a jetliner out over the North Atlantic, Paris bound. The pilot announced he had news—some good, some bad—and he would give the bad news first. They had lost radio contact; their compass and altimeter were not working; they didn’t know their altitude, direction or where they were headed. Then he gave the good news—they had a 100-mile-an-hour tailwind and they were ahead of schedule.49

Reagan promised to resolve California’s financial problem. The time had come to “squeeze and cut and trim until we reduce the cost of government,” he declared, and vowed to include every governmental department in the austerity measures.50

Reagan stood by his commitment. In The Report to Californians, the Reagan administration proudly declared the “largest cut ever made in a state budget:” a reduction of $127 million in 1967-68, including $43.5 million that Reagan personally penciled out of the Legislature’s final budget.51 With regard to austerity at the university, Reagan emphasized that there was simply “no way we could exempt them from the belt tightening that is necessary.” Higher education would have to bear its share of the burden. “The problem, briefly, is finances,” Reagan affirmed.52

48 “Report to Californians: The First Eight Months of the Reagan Administration,” Box 873, 80CP-RRPL.
50 Ibid.
51 “Report to Californians: The First Eight Months of the Reagan Administration.”
There were many, however, who disputed the severity of the proclaimed crisis. Students and faculty of the university denounced the “crisis” as contrived. In a November 1969 position paper on tuition by the Associated Students of the University of California (ASUC), students declared: “It is difficult for us, as students, to believe that this crisis is not a fiction when the State can ‘discover’ budget surpluses and has been able to give tax rebates and apparently, if the news is to be believed, anticipates giving more of these rebates in the current year.”\(^5^3\) The crisis, the students alleged, was a cover for providing tax breaks to select groups. At a Sacramento rally, a philosophy professor called out the governor directly, asking “whether there was ‘a real crisis, or a manufactured crisis.’”\(^5^4\) Professor T. L. Allen, the chairman of the University Committee on Education Policy of the Academic Senate, asserted: “It should be made quite clear that there is no financial or economic reason for the imposition of tuition charges.”\(^5^5\) Allen believed the push for tuition to be motivated by ideology, not pragmatism.

Voices outside of the university supported these accusations. Speaker of the California State Assembly Jesse Unruh accused Reagan of a “complete distortion of the fiscal facts of life,” citing Democratic studies that indicated the state would end the year with a budget surplus of $115 million. While Reagan was making cuts to the university’s budget, he was unwilling to decrease spending for county fairs, in what Unruh denounced as “a bad case of an inverted sense of values.”\(^5^6\) For Unruh, the budget problems were a value judgment, not a response to necessity. In addition, Alan Post, legislative budget analyst since Earl Warren’s administration, criticized Reagan’s concern with balancing the deficit. In a press conference with Governor Reagan, a journalist mentioned to Reagan:

Government, A. Alan Post in his analysis of the budget apparently disagrees with yours considerably. He sees no need for any crucial delay in the spending programs...What about Mr. Post’s accusation that this is not the

\(^{53}\) “Position Paper on Tuition,” November 1969, Box CU-1.4, Folder 20-21, UCA-BL.

\(^{54}\) Davies, “Reagan’s Budget ‘Crisis’—Real or Not?”

\(^{55}\) “Statement Presented by Professor T.L. Allen, Chairman, University Committee on Education Policy of the Academic Senate, to the Regents,” November 21, 1969, Box CU-1.4, Folder 20-21, UCA-BL.

time to cut back, as he put it, the investment in education in California youths?\textsuperscript{57}

Even budget analyst Alan Post, who had served under Democratic and Republican governors alike, and who had no particular stake in how the university was to be funded, took issue with Reagan’s spending policy.

The financial crisis rhetoric implied fiscal conditions so severe that necessity required cutting back drastically. However, Reagan was by far the most adamant about slashing budgets, more so than the Legislature responsible for state finances. Significant portions of the cuts came directly from the governor’s office as line-item vetoes to the budget passed by the Legislature. In 1969, Reagan personally vetoed $9.6 million of the Legislature’s budget for the UC.\textsuperscript{58} In an article for \textit{Times Education}, William Trombley noted that this same pattern had held true for many years after the deficit problems of 1966. Each year, “Reagan has trimmed the regents’ budget request and then has held firm in the face of legislative efforts to restore some of the cuts.”\textsuperscript{59} Reagan’s personal vetoing of portions of the UC budget suggests that he was ideologically committed to paring the university budget as much as possible. In addition, though by 1968 Reagan was asserting that California’s budgetary problems were largely resolved, Trombley claimed that “As far as the University of California is concerned the fiscal crisis has lasted not one year but six.”\textsuperscript{60} According to Trombley, the state fiscal situation of 1967-68 did not explain the six years of austerity at the University of California.

Financial crisis rhetoric invoked a state of emergency, with Reagan as the far-sighted reformer, come to save the state from its own mismanagement. If the “crisis” had more to do with Reagan’s political ideology of minimal state spending, could it have been an overreaction to the fiscal facts? The protests of everyone from the students to the legislative budget analyst suggest that this might be the case. The legacy of underfunding the UC from 1967 through 1973 tells a similar tale, but also indicates a differential treatment of the university, one not arising


\textsuperscript{58} Goff, “Unruh Accuses Reagan of Using ‘Half-Truths’ in UC Budget Row.”


\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.
purely from financial conditions. In any case, the tradition invoked by William Boyd, where “Year after year the legislature gave what was asked for its support until finally it produced one of the world’s finest universities,” had been replaced by a political fight over finances, pitting the university against the state.61 The necessity narrative claims that charging tuition was a response to economic conditions. However, the issues facing the University of California in the late 1960s were predominantly ideological rather than financial. The state’s financial condition was only one element of a broader process of underfunding the university.

**If Not Financial, What Then?**

While advocating for austerity as a temporary response to necessity, Governor Reagan simultaneously spoke of permanently reorienting university finances, indicating a non-financial motive for austerity. When asked how he would respond if Regents refused to implement tuition that year, Reagan warned that “We’re going to have to review our entire approach to the financing of the university based on the funds that are available if they reject this as a permanent program.”62 This assertion undermined Reagan’s allegation that the lack of state funding for the university was only a temporary result of the financial crisis. At the same time that he claimed a short-lived state of austerity, the governor implied that a new long-run funding program for the university was unavoidable. Reagan was creating the conditions for a new financing model for the university, not based on pure economic necessity, but on principle. As the Christian Science Monitor alleged in late 1967, it seems that the governor was “philosophically committed to students paying their own way.”63

In a 1967 letter to the Regents, Reagan himself suggested that his attitude towards the university was motivated by factors unrelated to the financial conditions of the state, noting: “It is ironical that our primary problem for the University is no longer a problem of the state’s financial condition.” The state was “getting its financial house in order,” he wrote, but the university suffered from “a drive toward total chaos: pornographic

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61 Address by William B. Boyd at Baccalaureate service.
and lewd behavior without limit, takeover of buildings and campus, setting of race against race, and violence.” Just a year after Reagan demanded 10% budget cuts from the university—and in the same year that the university received 11% less than requested—Reagan suggested that the university’s finances were not the most pressing issue it faced.

Instead, he argued that there was a moral crisis, that students and faculty were behaving in unacceptable ways, and that the university was not serving the taxpayer in the way it should.

At a press conference a few years later, Reagan expounded on his conviction that the university’s problems were not financial. “They never get as much as they would like,” Reagan said, referring to the university administration. He wished the administration would focus less on the financial aspects and more on the “deterioration of quality within the university over the last few years and that had nothing to do with money.” Deterioration of quality was a result of “an attitude within some elements of the university,” unrelated to the budget. Convinced that the university’s issues originated “from within,” Reagan rejected Chancellor Hines’s allegation that he was “starving the University of California to death by [his] budget economies” and suggested the university itself was the cause of its own deterioration. The challenge facing the university, Reagan alleged, was “not whether outside assistance is necessary to keep the University operating in the face of a threat of violence, but whether the University community itself will choose to take the necessary action to meet its responsibilities.”

Shifting blame to the university, Reagan began creating an image of the University of California as an immoral, undeserving institution, not a victim of circumstance but itself the cause of its problems. For one, Reagan criticized the university faculty as lazy and inefficient. Citing a random audit of thirty-six departments, Reagan noted that professors were spending an average of 4.3 hours in their classrooms every week. He

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64 Reagan to Regents, February 16, 1967, Box GO 169, GOF67-75-SXII-RRPL.
67 Ibid.
expressed concern that teaching was not being prioritized and demanded that faculty members lecture for at least nine hours a week.\textsuperscript{69}

Furthermore, as Reagan proclaimed in a speech to the Commonwealth Club, the UC tolerated “the willful use of the classroom by too many faculty members trying to impose on students their own beliefs and biases.”\textsuperscript{70} The once great university had become an institution engaged in “a manipulation of academic freedom contradicting the very purpose of the academy as a place where truth and knowledge can be pursued objectively, without fear.”\textsuperscript{71} As evidence, Reagan read from a letter sent to him by a student:

I’m being cheated—all too often I must write essays from the New Left viewpoint in order to get good grades. Three papers were returned with progressively better grades in direct proportion to my discovery that only by submitting work with the New Left line would my grade improve. My last paper dealt with U.S. involvement in Vietnam and could have been written by a North Vietnamese minister’s aide. It received the highest grade in the class.\textsuperscript{72}

Reagan saw freedom of speech and objective knowledge besieged by a revolutionary faculty with a low work ethic. The university administration was refusing to take responsibility for maintaining order and discipline, Reagan maintained. Now was the time, he declared to the Commonwealth Club, to “reclaim for higher education its proper role as guardian, advocate and inspiration for all the lasting values of our civilization.”\textsuperscript{73}

\textbf{The Dissenting UC}

When he took office, Reagan was faced with a university he found deplorable. In his eyes, the UC was promoting a culture of protest and dissent, advocating for the destruction of traditions and accepted values, and departing from its public mission. If the university was not acting as a university should—according to Reagan’s distinct vision of a

\textsuperscript{69} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid.
university’s function—then it did not deserve to benefit from taxpayer money.

In a letter to the Regents, Reagan noted that he carried “heavy responsibilities to the people of our state,” and laid out his vision for what the UC should be. The taxpayers “have earned, and well earned, a quality institution in which they can feel pride, and which, God knows, they need not fear,” Reagan wrote, and “they have sent their children to learn more of the values of their culture.”74 The university of 1968, however, did not fit Reagan’s idea of the appropriate role of this publicly funded institution. If the Regents were unwilling “to bring the University back to its true course,” Reagan cautioned that he would “have no choice but to turn to the people to get the job done.”75 A publicly funded university held certain obligations to the taxpayers of the state: to maintain quality and excellence along common standards and to pass down the traditions and values of the people it served.

Reagan envisioned a public university as an incubator of good citizens for the state, a place to pass down communal traditions and values, and an opportunity to instill respect for justice, law, and order. The taxpayer paid for every student’s education; it was therefore reasonable for the taxpayer to have a say in what that education entailed. “It does not constitute political interference with intellectual freedom for the taxpaying citizens—who support the college and university systems—to ask that, in addition to teaching, [the students] build character on accepted moral and ethical standards,” Reagan pronounced during his inauguration speech.76 Students who refused to follow the norms for appropriate conduct had a simple choice, he declared: “obey the rules, or get out.”77 The University of California was no place for students who would not conform to conservative moral standards. The current attitudes and actions of the campuses, Berkeley in particular, undermined Reagan’s view of what a university should be. Even more significant, they were undermining the very purpose of why this university should be subsidized by the taxpayer. “Our colleges and universities were created—

75 Ibid.
76 Reagan, “Inaugural Address.”
77 Reagan, State-of-the-State Address, California State Legislature, January 9, 1968, Box 873, 80CP-RRPL.
and are tax-supported—as centers of education—not staging areas for insurrection,” Reagan asserted.78

Moreover, Reagan believed that the university was misusing its funds. After all, tax dollars were not meant to subsidize “intellectual curiosity,” he stated in a 1967 press conference. Reagan cited a master’s degree in the repair of band instruments and a course at UC Davis that taught how to organize demonstrations; these courses were “intellectual luxuries,” and the university could surely do without them. After all, “carrying a picket sign is sort of like oh, a lot of things you pick up naturally, like learning to swim by falling off the end of the dock,” he said.79 A university was not a place for indulging such forms of knowledge, Reagan felt.

In Reagan’s mind, the university faced two related problems. One was a lack of efficiency, an unwillingness “to face up to the fact that as public institutions they have a public responsibility not to spend beyond the public’s means.”80 The other problem was the politicization of the university, the cultivation of a culture of dissent, protest, and nonconformity. As a result, the university had simply become too expensive and too controversial to justify being fully state-funded. Reagan envisioned the ideal university as the representative of “society’s highest devotion to objectivity, a place where reason ruled over emotion, where the cultural values of our civilization were passed on from generation to generation, pushing forward the frontiers of knowledge.”81 Objectivity, reason, and a common culture: these were the university’s legacy and could be its future, if it would reorient itself towards what Reagan termed its “traditional role in our society.”82

Conservative Regent and Reagan-appointee W. Glenn Campbell espoused similar beliefs. As director of the conservative Hoover Institution at Stanford University, Campbell observed in a 1971 speech that the University of California had reached a decisive turning point. It could return to its true function, teaching and research, or it could

78 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
continue on the path towards politicization. If it did not turn back, “only the quacks and demagogues will remain to man the lifeless form,” he warned. The university thinks it is indispensable, he contended, and uses this as “a license to arrogance and self-aggrandizement,” but it would do well to remember that “history is littered with the ruins of allegedly indispensable institutions.”

The problem of the university, according to Campbell, was its flirtation with radical political ideas and its tolerance of dissent. Such an institution could not survive if it did not return to the pursuit of traditional knowledge and leave politics behind.

UC President Charles Hitch found this conservative view of a university’s function too limiting. “Are [universities] good because the faculty engages in noncontroversial and irrelevant research,” he inquired at the National Conference of State Legislative Leaders, “or because it probes the fringes of knowledge however controversial and wherever that may be?...Are they good because professors talk only to each other, or because they engage the issues of society with people in the community?”

A university, Hitch implied, was by definition provocative. Seeking new knowledge meant crossing boundaries. Mediating between society and the world of ideas, a university was meant to engage with the problems it encountered. Often, this precipitated a certain level of dissent. “You can’t have a relevant, current, active university and, at the same time, have tranquility,” he suggested. The university that Reagan envisioned was a university of the past, with “eccentric professors conducting irrelevant research, philosophizing in their ivory towers, passing on the wisdom of the ages to obedient and worshipful students, a University of winning football teams and snappy marching bands.”

Reagan’s conception of a university must be situated within the grander arch of the rise of neoliberalism, under which higher education became a quite different institution than the one Hitch described. According to Gary Rhoades and Sheila Slaughter, the neoliberal


84 Charles J. Hitch, “The University as a Public Issue: National Conference of State Legislative Leaders,” Honolulu, Hawaii, December 4, 1968, Box GO 69, GOF67-75-SII-SB-RRPL.

85 Ibid.
The university specializes in preparing students “to be malleable workers who will fit into (and be retrained for) new information-based jobs and workplaces.” Students are not intellectuals or revolutionaries, but workers-in-training. Henry Giroux, scholar of critical pedagogy, denounces the doctrine of neoliberal education, which replaces critical learning “with mastering test-taking, memorizing facts, and learning how not to question knowledge or authority.” Reagan’s vision of a university echoes Giroux’s critique: higher education institutions as producers of objective knowledge, passing down sanctioned ideas from professor to student, and undermining the capacity for dissent.

The conservative university of Reagan and Campbell’s conception was docile and objective, but in 1970 the University of California was neither of those. With a powerful vision of what a university should be and how knowledge should be attained, Reagan set out to reshape the University of California into a conservative institution. While the university dissented, he did not see fit to reward it financially, subsidizing the “intellectual luxuries,” the politicization, and the spreading of controversial values.

**From Public Good to Private Investment**

Not only was the UC unworthy of public subsidy, argued Reagan, but the very structure of university financing was flawed. To make his case, he borrowed from language in the Coordinating Council for Higher Education’s previously discussed report, *An Evaluation of the Tuition-Free Principle in California Public Higher Education.* In his position of authority both as the governor and as a member of the Board of Regents, Reagan would exercise the necessary political power to give credence to these suggestions.

The report established an alternative language to the public mission and social contract that had been so crucial to the university’s self-

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88 The Coordinating Council was established under the Master Plan as an advisory body on university and state college issues. It was composed of representatives of the general public, the UC, the state colleges, the public junior colleges, and private institutions in California.
definition since its inception. Instead, it suggested a cost-benefit analysis, using market language to discuss education, and suggesting that students should bear a portion of the burden, since they would share in the benefit. Having examined the various benefits to the state (political awareness, social mobility, cultural advancement, economic growth, and capital formation) and to the student (increased lifetime earnings, social mobility, and consumer benefits that improve quality of life), the Coordinating Council remarked that “to approach an equitable distribution of the costs of education between society and the student, an effort to evaluate and measure the differential benefits to the student and to society seems necessary.”

The report clearly differentiated between the elements of higher education that could be considered a private investment versus those traditionally considered a public good. In doing so, it dismantled the notion that higher education was primarily a public good and suggested that costs should be shared between the private and public beneficiaries.

When Reagan joined the UC Board of Regents in 1967, he brought this language into the heart of the university itself. At a Regents meeting in mid-1967, Reagan tested the waters by suggesting that “a practical solution would be to ask those who are receiving an education at the University to bear a small portion of the increasing costs of that education.” According to Governor Reagan, the current financing model for the university was not sustainable. By 1969, Reagan became bolder, articulating a vision for tuition “as a capital investment which could be amortized over the life of the investment.” Students would pay in proportion to their benefits in lifetime earnings, and taxpayers would pay in proportion to societal benefits. This rhetoric hinted at the utilitarian notion that education was nothing more than a private investment in human capital. Tuition was the logical next step.

The notion of education as a private investment was an early manifestation of a neoliberal worldview. In Academic Capitalism and the New Economy, Slaughter and Rhoades delineate the neoliberal state as an entity that “focuses not on social welfare for the citizenry as a whole but on enabling individuals as economic actors,” moving resources “away

89 Spalding et al., An Evaluation of the Tuition-Free Principle, 11-17.
90 Regents Meeting Minutes, August 30-31, 1967.
91 Regents Meeting Minutes, November 20, 1969.
92 Ibid.
from social welfare functions toward production functions.” In much the same way, the educational fee conceptualized students as economic actors, as individuals making rational decisions based on expected economic returns rather than social actors with societal goals in mind. The language of the educational fee proposal unabashedly advocated the idea that students should contribute to the costs of their own education. The first line of the 1970 motion stipulated that “the University accept the general concept that the student is economically responsible for a part of his education costs.” In a stark departure from the no-tuition policy, the motion embodied a new understanding of a UC education: partially a social investment for public benefit, partially an individual investment for private gain. By implication, the burden of funding the university should no longer fall solely on the state.

“We Stand Between the Taxpayer and the Tax Spender”

Armed with an understanding of education as a partially private investment, Reagan took his argument one step further. Invoking equity arguments, he announced that the California taxpayer could not reasonably be asked to continue providing abundant funds. Furthermore, Reagan rallied the public behind him. By exacerbating public response to student protests, he deepened already existing fissures between the students and the taxpayer base. He then used the public backlash against the university to justify underfunding it.

Reagan lauded “the generosity of the people of California to the university” but indicated “that the citizens cannot continue to support the University as generously as in the past.” Reagan’s rhetoric reflected a fundamental shift from the Wheeler-era understanding of the university as a tool of the state. In his perspective, the university drained state resources, profiting from California citizens’ “generous” willingness to fund it. Substantial university funding had been a gift bestowed on the university, but contemporary conditions meant that this gift would have to be less lavishly provided.

94 Regents Meeting Minutes, February 19, 1970.
A strong believer in the principle of small government, Reagan envisioned his role as a politician to be one of mediation between the forces seeking to entrench permanent structures of government and the citizens wishing to maximize their freedoms. In his mind, keeping government expenditures low was a duty to the taxpayer. In his inauguration speech, Reagan proclaimed he stood “between the taxpayer and the tax spender.” Reagan portrayed himself as the taxpayer’s champion from the very beginning of his governorship. When Edmund Brown took office in 1974, Reagan counseled: “I would like to remind him that balancing the budget is like protecting your virtue—you have to learn to say no.” Saying no—keeping budgets as low as possible—was an important element of Reagan’s political stance. Reagan saw himself as the defender of the taxpayer, since to “accept the University’s financial demands means a tax increase for our people.” If meeting the university’s budget request meant an increased taxpayer burden, Reagan would side with the taxpayer.

Reagan styled himself as the politician willing to say “no.” Conveniently, taking a strong stance on university finance was a politically savvy move. The culture of protest of the 1960s had already been a source of discontent among the public, and incumbent governor Pat Brown had come to represent an inability to quell these protests. Campus unrest quickly became one of the chief issues in the 1966 gubernatorial campaign, in which incumbent Pat Brown was pitted against former-actor Ronald Reagan. Reagan used the issue strategically, blaming the chaos on Brown and riling up crowds. Lamenting the “degradation” of the university, Reagan claimed there was a “morality and decency gap,” where “a small minority of beatniks, radicals, and filthy speech advocates have brought such shame to and such a loss of confidence in a great University.”

It is arguable whether Reagan’s words reflected or generated the loss of confidence he described. Reagan maintained that he was simply responding to popular uproar about Berkeley, but historian Gerard

97 Rodney Angove, “Sounds Like Reagan,” Box GO 169, GOF67-75-SXII-RRPL.
DeGroot boldly claims that Reagan had fabricated the public reaction. Though constituents consistently raised the question of what to do about Berkeley, it did not seem to have gained much traction as a political concern. DeGroot cites Stuart Spencer, Reagan’s gubernatorial campaign manager: “Reagan escalated it into an issue,” reflected Spencer, “and it started showing up in the polls.” The campus issue was politically convenient. By pointing at Berkeley, Reagan revealed incumbent Pat Brown “in the worst possible light,” and “rendered his [own] conservatism mainstream.” Presenting himself as a virulent opponent of the status quo and a man of action, “Reagan had become the hero of taxpayers outraged by campus unrest.” “Yet,” argues DeGroot, “that outrage was his creation.” DeGroot claims that Reagan was not simply responding to public apprehensions about the campus; he was constructing them.

Legal scholar David A.J. Richards similarly suggests that Reagan incited a popular backlash against the university. In angry response to students’ disavowal of paternal and university authority, Reagan “mobilized a politics of patriarchal rage in others.” He capitalized on parents’ fears of losing control over their children and found “a resonance for his authentic moral voice in attacking student protest.” Reagan’s approach to the university became a crucial factor in catapulting him to the governorship. Reagan engendered public indignation against the UC as a political tool in the fight to defeat Pat Brown.

This perspective is corroborated by allegations from Alan Post, the legislative budget analyst at the time. Post contended that Reagan was “exacerbating the public reaction,” using it as a “political horse” to further his campaign. Evidence suggests this was, in fact, the case. Berkeley was

101 DeGroot, Selling Ronald Reagan, 199.
not a politically significant issue until Reagan decided to make it so. As Lou Cannon notes in *Governor Reagan*, Reagan “acted from conviction rather than calculation, raising ‘Berkeley’ as a political issue when it was a minor blip in the polls.”\(^{104}\) Yet the focus on campus unrest was still a politically savvy move, a means for discrediting Pat Brown’s administration and asserting the values that marked Reagan as a man of principle and conviction. By the time of Reagan’s election, all eyes were trained on the university, and few were sympathetic. In 1968, Reagan claimed to have received “3,735 letters, all against the University, two-thirds demanded withholding their tax money from the University.”\(^{105}\) He wrote in a letter to the Regents: “The people of California are speaking, as I have never known them to speak before, against giving tax money to support the likes of Ergo, Cleaver, Marcuse, the Vietnam Commencement, a drug culture, bomb explosions, and violence.”\(^{106}\) Reagan portrayed the university as irresponsible, radical, and unrepresentative of the people it was meant to serve.\(^{107}\) It was spending tax dollars, but not fulfilling its end of the social contract.

Public outrage at the university, then, was at least partially constructed as a political move, vesting Reagan with the support of the public and a key instrument for pressuring the Regents to seek alternative funding. Reagan thus established a two-part rationale for underfunding the university. The first arose from an economic ideology: the university cost more than the taxpayer could be asked to provide, especially given the current condition of state finances and the understanding that higher education was both a public good and a private investment. The second arose from a cultural ideology: the university was no longer an institution producing objective knowledge, but a bastion of discontent that had relinquished its right to full public subsidy. Here, Reagan employed the taxpayers, acting as their champion and asserting the public desire to limit


\(^{105}\) Reagan to Members of the Committee on Educational Policy, February 16, 1968, Box GO 169, GOF67-75-SXII-RRPL.


\(^{107}\) Eldridge Cleaver was a Black Panther leader and political activist who gave a series of lectures on campus. Reagan disapproved of his radical views and eventually banned his course. Herbert Marcuse was a self-professed Communist teaching at UCSD. The Vietnam Commencement was an anti-war gathering in Lower Sproul Plaza area at UC Berkeley. Between seven and eight thousand people came to hear speeches by anti-war leaders, and students took a pledge to refuse the draft.
its funding of the rebellious university. Convinced that the university was straying from its mission and that a new financing model should be constructed, Reagan envisioned tuition as a solution.

**Tuition as a Disciplining Mechanism**

From Reagan’s perspective, tuition could act as a mechanism for guiding the university away from the harmful politicization it had engaged with in recent years. On the one hand, it would make students more responsible and faculty more accountable. On the other hand, it would increase the opportunity cost for engaging in activities that Reagan considered unacceptable. Tuition was to be a tool for facilitating a conservative vision of what a university should be, how its students should act, and what forms of learning were socially valid.

Reagan believed that implementing tuition would be a financial motivator for students. Having invested money in their education, students would act more maturely, be more likely to graduate, and spend their time studying intensively. In a letter to faculty, he noted that “tuition might also increase the sense of responsibility among students and act as a spur to help them realize their goal: An education and a degree.” With the current model, he added, only one-third of students who entered the University were graduating.\(^{108}\) Reagan thought that students were not taking their educations seriously enough; if they paid to attend, perhaps they would act differently.

In an interview many years later, Reagan’s Education Advisor Alex Sherriffs reflected that the Reagan administration latched on to the ideology of tuition even before Sherriffs arrived in Sacramento. Sherriffs asserted that the administration’s public statements differed from what Reagan truly believed. “His arguments with me in private were not because the state needed the money,” Sherriffs acknowledged, “but were essentially you don’t value something you haven’t given something to get.”\(^ {109}\) Disavowing the necessity narrative, Sherriffs asserts that Reagan

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believed in tuition on principle, not as a response to conditions but as a fundamental transformation in how students should relate to their educations. Until students were giving up financial resources in exchange for the services they received at the university, they would not know the value of what they were receiving. In other words, a free education would be valued less, simply because it was free.

Sherriff’s laid out Reagan’s belief that students would have higher standards for their education if they were paying tuition. In particular, they would hold their professors accountable, having “an investment in how that course is taught,” and being “much more likely to suggest that keeping office hours is a good thought, and preparing your lectures is a good idea.”

The student as customer would feel empowered to demand a better product. Students on a free ride would have “less reason to argue.” Sherriff’s suggested that, in this way, tuition could act as a device for holding faculty accountable. According to Sherriff’s, Reagan had two motivations for wanting tuition: “in part to make the faculty more responsible, in his mind, and in part to have the students feel this was for their education, not some building or forced charity for somebody else.”

Tuition, then, was not a response to necessity, but a principle that Reagan believed would reorient the relationships among the faculty, the students, and the university. In this business-like model, the student was consumer and faculty the producers, and the relationship between them could be mediated by the financial transaction. As a result, students would act more responsibly and demand better quality, faculty would be held accountable to the students, and the conditions would be set for the university to return to its pursuit of objective knowledge.

With the university thus structured, the only problem left to eliminate was the issue of campus radicalization and politicization. Here, also, tuition would provide a solution. Tuition could act as a disciplining mechanism, weeding out the “undesirables,” students “who are there really not to study, but to agitate.” If tuition were charged, those students “might think twice how much they want to pay to carry a picket sign,” Reagan alleged at a press conference in 1967. Tuition could price out those students whose motivations for attending the university were not

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10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
educational. Students would be forced to reconsider why they were attending the university: those who were more interested in protesting than in learning would be encouraged to rethink their actions.

Robert Finch, the lieutenant governor, expressed a similar idea. Speaking before the Republican State Central Committee in 1967, Finch clarified that the administration has “never advocated tuition as a revenue raiser.”

This statement directly contradicts the necessity narrative. If tuition was not being levied as a way to make up for declining state funds, then why was it being charged? Finch argued that “we have thought of it as a discipline, as an investment in enriching the lives of students through fuller participation in the academic life of the campus.”

Tuition as discipline meant tuition as a way to bind students to academics rather than political engagement. Though Finch spins this positively, as an enrichment for the student, the effect is the same: with the imposition of tuition, the opportunities for students to be politically active were limited.

Jesse Unruh, Speaker of the California State Assembly and ex-officio Regent at the time, accused the Reagan administration of “charging tuition as a punishment for student activists,” calling this both “unfair and illogical.”

Reagan, perhaps, did not see it in quite the same way. Instead, he saw tuition as an instrument for reasserting the university’s mission as a place dedicated to rigorous, unemotional analysis and the production of objective knowledge. Tuition would discourage rebel students from attending the UC. In his view, these students did not deserve to be there anyway; they could only get in the way of progress at the university. In addition, charging tuition would enable other students to fully value their educations, would mature them and make them invested in educational outcomes. Faculty would be forced to respond to students, as students would begin to make more demands. In short, tuition could solve the challenges facing the university: it would depoliticize and deradicalize the institution while introducing business-like market transactions to introduce accountability and responsibility to its students and faculty.

114 Ibid.
The Great Persuader
Philosophically, Reagan believed in tuition. However, in 1967 he failed to turn that conviction into a reality. The Board of Regents voted against his proposal to “adopt tuition as a policy of the University of California.” Rather than as a pragmatic reaction to financial conditions, this proposal was about tuition as a principle. Regent Carter criticized this as “voting abstractly on the matter of tuition” without a sense of the purpose and plan for these revenues. Other Regents also expressed concerns with the wording of the motion, balking at the use of the word “tuition” as a denial of the long-standing commitment to tuition-free education. Eventually, Reagan backtracked: “he had not realized, in making his motion, that the use of the word ‘tuition’ would be objectionable.” The Regents clearly expressed their disapproval of the principle of tuition, and Reagan was forced to take a new approach. Where tuition as a principle had not proved convincing, financial conditions and political pressures would.

When Sherriffs was asked how Reagan managed to convince the Regents to accept tuition, he replied:

They never did accept the tuition idea, and haven’t yet. However, many are now asking the legislature to put in tuition, for the wrong reasons I suppose, because they’re trying to prevent layoffs. The student’s costs aren’t the issue now!

According to Sherriffs, Reagan never managed to convince the Regents to endorse tuition on principle. The Regents simply responded to a choice between implementing tuition and firing faculty. Furthermore, Sherriffs stated that a majority in favor of tuition was attained partly “by the appointment of new people,” and partly “by the wearing down.” These two points indicate the level of influence that Governor Reagan wielded over the Board, and are a testament to the power of the governor in shaping conditions to his will. For one, he could appoint Regents when past terms expired. Notably, the five Regents appointed by Reagan all voted in favor of tuition. In addition, he had the last say on the UC budget, with the power to line-item veto portions he did not endorse and to pressure the Board of Regents by presenting an inadequate budget. By

116 Regents Meeting Minutes, August 30-31, 1967.
117 Ibid.
119 Ibid.
consistently underfunding the university in certain areas—notably capital outlay expenditure and student financial aid—Reagan could create the conditions that necessitated an alternate source of funding, “wearing down” the university leaders until they had little choice but to charge tuition.

Governor Reagan also had the weight of the Californian people behind him. That is to say, he was in a position to allege that he represented the taxpayers, couching his tuition proposal in rhetoric concerning tax burdens and public approval. Rather than framing tuition as a merely personal conviction on his part, Reagan claimed to have a public endorsement for his mission. “There is every indication that the people of California, who support our entire state spending program, approve of tuition,” Reagan asserted. “Surely their wishes should be given some consideration.”

Reagan, championing the rights and desires of the California taxpayer, declared tuition to be a mandate from his constituency, making it more palatable and politically powerful.

Poised as the defender of the taxpayer, wielding control over the UC budget, and endowed with the power to appoint new Regents, Governor Reagan eventually pushed tuition through. If anything, this narrative suggests a fundamental problem in the governance of the University of California. Both inside and outside of the university, the governor and other ex-officio Regents have inordinate power to mold conditions that affect the university and thereby influence university policy through their votes as Regents and through the political channel. Reflecting on his time as Chancellor of UC Berkeley, Roger Heyns noted this contradiction. “It’s an anachronism,” he stated, referring to the existence of ex-officio Regents on the Board. “It worked for a long time but I don’t think it’s wise now. You can’t mix up the management of the university with the political process.”

It is all too easy to paint Reagan as the antagonist in this story, especially considering the consistent increase in tuition costs till the present day. However, the evidence suggests that Reagan had a narrow view of tuition with a specific function—to encourage student

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120 Reagan, “Open Letter to Faculty at UC and State Colleges by Reagan.”

responsibility and faculty accountability, as well as to depoliticize the university—and did not foresee a grander scheme of complete privatization of the public university. Reagan did not actively defund the university, but he did consistently underfund it. He made conditions just severe enough that tuition was required to offset costs, but not so severe that the university would be substantially harmed in the long run. Though the Board of Regents raised student fees once more in 1972-73, they remained constant thereafter for the remainder of Reagan’s gubernatorial years. This further supports this article’s claim that tuition was intended, not as a revenue-raising device, but as a targeted disciplining mechanism.

Conclusion
Financing the University of California was not purely an economic problem. Abandoning the tuition-free principle was an orchestrated effort on the part of Governor Reagan. In 1966, Reagan began a campaign to reduce government spending. This campaign was motivated partially by existing financial conditions, and partially by a neoliberal ideology prescribing modest government budgets. In the case of the university, the effect was augmented by Reagan’s belief that the university, like the state, had lost its way. Rather than passing on traditional values in an orderly, respectful manner, the university became a center of dissent. In Reagan’s mind, this was not its original purpose and certainly not what the taxpayer should be subsidizing. Limiting university budgets thus became a disciplining mechanism, as Reagan redirected blame for the university’s problems away from the financial and towards what he saw as the true crisis: the moral deterioration of a once-great university. Tuition would present a solution. By considering education as an investment, students would become more responsible and faculty more accountable. Sinking substantial funds into their UC degrees would prevent students from having the time or the motivation to protest. It would weed out the troublemakers from the rest, and the UC would once more become the pride of California.

Motivated by this belief, Reagan set out to slowly undermine the tuition-free principle. Some of the elements were already in place. For example, the notion that higher education was a public investment was gradually giving way to a neoliberal understanding that individual students should bear some of the burden rather than relying on society. Reagan merely expanded on this language. In addition, he used the
Tuition is Not a Dirty Word

The taxpayer to justify his push for tuition, vowing to stand between the taxpayer and the wasteful, dissenting university. Finally, he perpetuated language about financial crisis and cut key areas of the UC budget, pressuring the Regents to cut back university spending and consider alternate funding sources.

Though the UC continues to adhere to its mission of serving the state, admitting the best and brightest, and functioning as an engine of social mobility, this mission is being compromised as tuition exceeds $13,000 in 2015. Students are saddled with debt and financial pressures and the student body over-represents those from high-income backgrounds. Though the university did not fully conform to Reagan’s neoliberal vision, it does display aspects of this worldview. For Christopher Newfield, scholar of critical university studies, the outcome of the neoliberal project has been “something like an agency crisis, a combination of a weak individualism and a weak socialization that made it harder to articulate objectives, desires, and activities other than those that adapted to direct economic pressures.”122 Students face the pressure of debt and make choices based on long-term economic metrics rather than individual desire. Professors and lecturers are chronically underpaid, tied financially to the academy and dependent on producing profitable knowledge. Administrators are challenged with the recurring problems of funding, turning to financialization and privatization of the university’s assets. In Clark Kerr’s words, “An appropriate emblem for the American college might be the traditional open book, but an open book lying on a sales counter.”123 The neoliberal view of higher education has not completely decimated the University of California’s potential for critical knowledge and engagement, but it has left a lasting mark.

Implementing tuition has far from solved the university’s funding problems. As Peter Schrag notes, the effect of the tuition-based model, and the perpetual budget conflicts that it engendered, has been to make California’s higher education system “subject to greater political and fiscal buffeting and uncertainty.”124 Every year, the university budget is a source of contention, a battlefield of competing interests. The university and the

122 Christopher Newfield, Unmaking the Public University: The Forty-Year Assault on the Middle Class (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 7.
124 Schrag, California, 110.
state, once partners on a mission to build a great public university, have become antagonists in a political struggle that seems to have no end in sight.

On November 19, 2014, the UC Office of the President released a “Long Term Stability Plan for Tuition and Financial Aid.” Despite the four decades separating 1970 and 2014, not much had changed. “This proposal responds to an era of chronic State underfunding of UC,” the report reads, “which unfortunately has continued despite significant improvements in the economy and the State’s fiscal outlook.”125 The language of the plan echoed the same problems the Regents faced in 1970, and the Board’s response was much the same: when state funding declines, student fees must increase. With the tuition-free principle effectively abandoned, it has been all too easy to continue raising fees.

What this article has shown, however, is that the problem of funding the university is not always purely financial. Ideology and politics played an important role in advancing the educational fee in 1970, and it is worth considering how it continues to play a role in the present day. The recurring rhetoric of austerity and necessity associated with economic downturns conceals the political, ideological, and cultural beliefs driving changes in financial policy. As former Clinton advisor Paul Begala wisely said, “The budget is a profoundly moral document;” allotting funds is a representation of values and priorities, not simply a string of numbers on paper.126 In 1970, the educational fee was not simply about the budget. It indicated the triumph of Reagan’s ideology, which combined a distaste for a radical university with a belief in education as a private investment and a conviction that tuition would serve as a mechanism for restoring order. “Tuition is not a dirty word,” Reagan proclaimed at the Los Angeles Breakfast Club in 1967.127 Perhaps not, but tuition is no virtue, either.

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