Editorial Board

EDITORS-IN-CHIEF
DAVID VILLANI is a third-year history major and Arabic minor. Originally from Pisa, Italy, he went to school in the DC area. He hopes to write a senior thesis on the history of the French colonial empire. At the moment, his research interests lie in the various ways in which different colonial subjects in sub-Saharan Africa expressed political and social agency in the constructive and destructive phases of the empire. He is also interested in Early Modern European history, cooking, development economics, Italian movies, and French novels.

PHIL HANNA is a senior from Southern California majoring in History and German, with an emphasis on the social history of 20th-century Germany, specifically the Weimar period. In his senior thesis, he hopes to explore this period through the lens of military youth groups across the political spectrum. Among his other interests are the history of fascism, ideological extremism, and youth history. After his time at Berkeley, he hopes to continue to complete a Ph.D. and work in the field of historical research.

MANAGING EDITOR
HANNAH PEARSON is a fourth-year transfer student from Concord, California. She is majoring in History, with her area of concentration being 20th-century conflicts. For her senior thesis, she is exploring the end of World War I in the US by examining the Treaty Ratification Debate in the American press. During her senior year in high school, she found her calling in history thanks to her teacher and mentor, Dr. Andrew Hubbell. Outside of Clio’s Scroll, Hannah is the Membership Chair of Phi Alpha Theta, Berkeley’s History Honors Society. She is also the Director of Special Events for the University of California Rally Committee. In her free time, she enjoys watching action, sci-fi, crime, and historical TV shows/movies, creating and listening to Spotify playlists, and planning her next adventures. After she graduates, Hannah hopes to earn her Ph.D., eventually become a historian and work in the field of academia.

ASSOCIATE EDITORS
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SOPHIE DURYEE is a sophomore at Berkeley studying Political Economy and Chinese. Her planned concentration is global inequality. She has always been fascinated with history, especially ancient history and archeology. Outside of school she is a board member of Political Computer Science club and an avid weightlifter.

EMILY CURTIN is a 4th year student triple majoring in Anthropology, Ancient Greek and Roman Studies, and Integrative Biology. Emily is excited to be a part of a journal discussing important historical topics that contribute to the historical field.

JACLYN QUAN is a third-year history major and data science minor from Southern California. Her main research interests lie within the political and social history of 20th century Latin and Central America with a specific emphasis on American intervention in the region and left-wing social movements. She is also interested in Cold War history and immigration/diaspora studies. Outside of class, Jaclyn enjoys going on boba runs, listening to new hip hop music, and watching cringe-worthy TV shows.

ANTHONY LIN is a third-year history major from the Bay Area. His focus is American racialization, especially around immigrant communities. Outside of academics, his interests include chess and overdosing on coffee.

JADE LUMADA is a senior from Long Beach, California majoring in history and South & Southeast Asian studies. Her studies focus on marginalized groups in the United States, and her senior thesis will analyze Filipino immigrant history in 20th-century America. Outside of school, Jade works as a peer adviser for the College of Letters and Science. Jade likes to unwind by crocheting, embroidering, and making jewelry for her family and friends.

RONAN MORRILL is a third-year student from Redwood City studying History. He is interested in American political history and American foreign policy during the 20th century. Outside of Clio's Scroll, Ronan is a rower for the Cal Lightweight Crew. In his spare time you will find him watching soccer and movies, hiking and trail running, or reading a good book.

ROSA MURPHY is a third-year History major and Chemistry minor from San Francisco, California. She is interested in cultural and legal history, particularly in relation to books, media, and science. After graduation, she hopes to pursue a career in intellectual property law or history. Outside of school, she works at the Exploratorium in San Francisco. In her spare time, she enjoys reading novels, thrifting, and watching baseball.

ELLIOTT NERENBERG is a senior studying world history in the 20th century, with a focus on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. He has also studied the Russian language and the history of Japan. Before deciding on the history major, he also spent some time studying political theory. This foundation has informed his other interest in political history. In his free time, when he’s not glued to a screen reading for his history classes, he likes to draw, play video games, read manga, and write silly short stories for his friends.
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Note from the Editorial Staff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Contributors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>The Contested Countryside: Peasant Engagement with the Supernatural in Carolingian Francia</td>
<td>Jack Corp, Drury University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Divided Nation, Collective Objections: Perspectives on the Vietnam War from East and West Germany</td>
<td>Ryan Singsank, George Washington University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>Left Behind: The Burundian Hutus and Continuity of Historical Blindness</td>
<td>Cedric Iyumva, Trinity Western University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122</td>
<td>About Clio’s Scroll</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Note from the Editorial Staff

Dear Readers,

Thank you for choosing to pick up the latest edition of Clio’s Scroll. This edition brings together outstanding papers on the theme of conflict written by undergraduate historians from around the world. These works are not only representative of these historians’ ingenuity and creativity but also their dedication to the field of history. We hope that through this edition, we are able to convey new perspectives into these topics as well as inspire others to pursue their own historical research.

The first paper is a paper written by Drury University alumni Jack Corp, which discusses rural communal engagement with supernatural forces in early medieval France. This is an interesting paper and a pleasure to read. The second is by George Washington University graduate Ryan Singsank. He brings a new lens to a familiar topic, examining the similarities and differences in East and West German reactions to the Vietnam War. The final paper is by Trinity Western University graduate Cedrick Iyumva and explores the relatively unexplored Burundian genocide in relation to the more widely studied Rwandan genocide. We believe this paper adds to the field and highlights an often-overlooked topic of historical inquiry.

Finally, we would like to extend our regards to the team of associate editors who worked tirelessly to make this semester’s edition possible. Whether you have been a supporter for many semesters or this is your first, we thank you for helping make Clio’s Scroll what it is today. And to our readers both near and far, we thank you for your continued interest, and we hope you enjoy this edition of Clio’s Scroll.

Sincerely,
The Editor Staff
Contributors

JACK CORP graduated summa cum laude from Drury University with majors in History and Political Science in May 2022. Growing up in the Ozarks, his academic interests first developed from hearing family stories that intersected rural poverty and the supernatural, which cultivated a passion for studying the margins of society. Consequently, his academic interests focus on models of holiness, sanctity, and the supernatural in rural, early medieval communities, framed through the heuristics of hegemony and counterpower and analyzed from a methodologically anti-state perspective. He wishes to continue this research into graduate school, perhaps from a global perspective. He would also like to thank Dr. Shelley Wolbrink for igniting his love for the Early Middle Ages and Dr. Michael Verney for humoring his thesis proposals. Jack is now helping the State Historical Society of Missouri conduct oral histories in the Ozarks.

RYAN SINGSANK graduated from The George Washington University in 2022, earning a Bachelor of Arts in History and International Affairs. He is currently a student in the dual degree master’s program in international and world history at Columbia University and the London School of Economics. His interests center around transatlantic relations during the Cold War, focusing primarily on the United States and divided Germany. During his free time, Ryan enjoys taking long walks, playing golf, watching baseball, and eating dessert.

CEDRIC IYUMVA is a senior student and athlete at Trinity Western University, where he studies History and runs on the Men’s Track and Field team. His work is a product of 3 years of independent research and is inspired by his Burundian background. Cedrick grew up witnessing how so many voices were being left behind and wanted to help give a voice to those who cannot speak. He is co-founder and president of Global Educo Association at his University, leading campus-wide discussions on current and historical global issues. He sits on various committees, has been invited as a university guest speaker, and in his spare time serves communities in his local hospitals. Cedrick credits his success to his community, friends and family, and to Mr. Michel Duchesne, who encouraged him to pursue research on Burundi while in high school.
The Contested Countryside
Peasant Engagement with the Supernatural in Carolingian Francia

In the ashes of Kempten lived a demon. In this small village in the Carolingian kingdom of East Francia, the Annals of Fulda reports that in 858 “an evil spirit gave an open sign of his wickedness.”¹ Little more than a nuisance, at first, throwing stones and banging on walls. Quickly, thought, the demon began to sow the seeds for communal strife.² Rumors of a thief spread across the village. The evil spirit directed suspicions towards an unnamed villager. To ensure that the accused thief might be more hated, houses he entered went up in flames. Fire destroyed the harvest.³ In Kempten, an eruption of the supernatural intertwined systems of sin and salvation with local justice. To members of the community, it was “as if it were for [the accused thief’s] sins that everyone had to suffer such things.”⁴ But the villagers were not helpless. After exiling the suspect and his family to the fields outside village limits, the peasants plotted his execution. Local clerical authorities, as mediators of the Carolingian Church, demanded the villagers halt the lynching in the spirit of “peace, unity and concord among the Christian peoples.”⁵ The methods by which the villagers of Kempten dealt with demonic trouble-making reveal a world of strife and suspicion inextricable from ecclesiastical systems of religious practice. For at the heart of this entry is the texture of rural Carolingian society as a spiritual community, tied together by common calamities, caught within the tensions between a local and imperial identity.

Between saints and demons, elites and peasants, the Carolingian countryside was a contested space. From the eighth to the ninth centuries, religious reforms attempted to press villages into a burgeoning imperial collective built on “an alliance of throne and altar.”⁶ Emperors, nobles, and clerical elites wielded religion as a unifying force,

² The Annals of Fulda, 44.
³ The Annals of Fulda, 44.
⁴ The Annals of Fulda, 44.
a guide to correct belief and practice. This paper will first examine how Carolingian dynastic legitimacy relied on the inculcation of the empire as the church through the correction of the ignorant. It traces the construction of a sacralized Frankish identity that elites sought to disseminate through parish networks in the reign of Charlemagne. It argues that this identity reached its ultimate expression in the literature of the early ninth century, especially under the rule of Louis the Pious, when the ecclesiastic and royal elite advanced doctrines that bound the fortune of the empire and the fate of their souls to the religious behavior of the entire population. This political theology embedded the countryside in a series of reforms that sought to ensure that religious experience occurred in authorized settings like the local parish.

Finally, this paper will examine how rural communities engaged with supernatural forces as an alternative, external form of agency to negotiate the strategies of control imposed on them by elites. Villages fell within a web of pressures, material or imagined – from nearby ecclesiastics and aristocrats, distant monasteries and courts, or even from local, informal elites and parish priests. But the connections that pressed rural inhabitants into the social structures of the empire also opened up possibilities for action. Elites were not the only people with decision-making capacities, even as manorial organization spread across the imperial heartlands; indeed, it is from the northern regions of Francia that the bulk of these supernatural stories emerge. Carolingian stories of miraculous and demonic intervention in rural conflicts evidence a tactic of dispute settlement that impeded the process of sacralization by which Carolingian elites order the empire.

Finding the Supernatural and the Peasant in Carolingian Francia

In the archives of Carolingian monks is the countryside: villages and villagers litter the documents and texts produced and preserved by monasteries, the accounts of the divine an integral genre to the record of their heavenly patrons. Hagiographies and miracles collections blossomed in the Carolingian age. It is not until recently, however, that historians turned towards these texts, namely hagiographies or

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visionary texts, to detail the supernatural elements of everyday lives. This research predominately examines ninth-century miracle collections which, in contrast, remain neglected. At first glance, this is not a surprise. Miracle collections appear as endless lists accrediting the power of relics, compiled by monastic authors with explicit aims to circulate and promote their patron saint. The value of these texts is not in the beliefs that they attest, but rather in the interactions between these beliefs and the social circumstances of the believing community. These stories were not always limited to the walls of the cloister. This research uses miracle collections, along with ninth-century letters and annals, to evidence how peasants instrumentalized the supernatural.

Pastoral literature, a broad category of texts concerned with the spiritual, moral, and doctrinal orthodoxy of the faithful, are also critical but problematic sources. Bernadette Filotas’ *Pagan Survivals: Superstitions and Popular Culture in Early Medieval Pastoral Literature* stresses that these texts were selective in indicting marginalized groups. Occult charms in the Carolingian court, for example, deployed by clerics and elite laypeople for exorcistic practices, received comparatively less attention than the illicit behaviors of peasants. Clerical authors also wrote with concerted criticisms towards the religiosity of women. One group of scholars found a consistent pattern of anti-female discourse in early medieval ecclesiastical texts, concluding that Carolingian spirituality possessed sharply gendered roles that excluded women from male religious spaces. More recent scholarship, however, questions Carolingian restrictions on female religiosity. Hagiographical sources, they claim, reveal that in the countryside of Francia, nuns attended to

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10 Innes and West, “Saints and Demons,” 72.
12 Innes and West, “Saints and Demons,” 72.
pastoral needs. From this angle, elite criticism of female spiritual behavior dances the line between miscomprehension and the purposeful silence of Carolingian women.

Through the category of “superstition,” Carolingian writers – overwhelmingly male, aristocratic, and clerical – deliberately mischaracterized and coded religious behaviors. A standard medieval definition of this concept drew from Isidore of Seville, stressing the that “superstition” meant to excess. It also encompassed a broad spectrum of behaviors, from incorrect observation and witchcraft to Muslim or Jewish beliefs. Carolingian scribes, like Agobard of Lyon and his successor, Amolo of Lyon, included a social dimension by tying deviant or excessive religious practice to the figure of the “rustic” and the concept of “rusticity” (rustici), a shorthand for bad belief. Efforts to disentangle actual practices from these sources read to extract patterns of local social dynamics through frames like class or gender. Consider the readings the suspect Dijon relics condemned by Amolo in the 840s. Shane Bobrycki advances that early medieval elites like Amolo used the trope of female pliability to critique crowds of unregulated religious worship: the mass of women venerating the Dijon relics threatened to upend the social order. Other scholars, like Charles West, situate Amolo and his letter in the context of Carolingian Church reform, shifting the focus away from the relics and their venerators to the expansion of the imperial church into parish communities.

Any attempt to locate the “peasant” within the legal statuses of the Frankish empire deepens the semantic issue with these texts. Not all rural land cultivators were free tenants. Peasant families who worked lands owned by an aristocratic family were often unfree dependents. Those of unfree status were not slaves, and although Frankish merchants engaged in the slave trade, Frankish agriculture did not rely on a slave

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22 Costambeys, Innes, and MacLean, The Carolingian World, 245.
mode of production. An imposition of modern ideas of freedom muddies early medieval understandings of dependence. Free and unfree were not absolute conditions but a continuum of dependencies between laborers and land-owners. It is therefore necessary to determine from context that status of a person mentioned in a text. For the purpose of my analysis, this paper defines peasants as members of a household that derive their resources mainly from agricultural work performed by members of the same household.

No matter the status, Carolingian Franks operated within complex multilateral relationships. Implications of choice or agency in the sources does not mean these peasants had total freedom to practice their faith. Norms constructed by social structures, economic forces, or even violent conflict conditioned their actions. Even when sources present choices as self-determined action, it is impossible to know that the peasants had a clear motive behind their behavior. Saint’s lives and miracle collections, for example, detail the voluntary acts of peasants expressing their devotion, and in a different way, the normative prescriptions issued in capitularies and canons suggest that church leaders expected a degree of autonomy. These sources provide ample evidence that peasants, with or without elite approval, structured their religious life.

**Historiography**

In 811, after several years of violent skirmishes with Danish pirates, a sick and weary Charlemagne asked, “are we really Christians?” Charlemagne’s existential question reflects the centrality of identity in both the Carolingian imagination and in recent scholarship. On its surface, the empire lacked diversity. Religious historians have long noted that paganism diminished with every conquest, Muslim communities remained isolated near the Pyrenees, and Jewish populations lacked the privileges afforded to their Christian counterparts. Historians of empire, however, stress that the

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Carolingian Empire maintained a patchwork of political, ethnic, and legal communities that permitted the political integration of conquered domains.\textsuperscript{27} The unity of the realm depended on political and ethnic plurality as much as on the authority emanating from its center.\textsuperscript{28} But the relationship between imperial hierarchies and local religious organization, specifically the diversity of practices at the disposal of the peasants, has not received any attention so far. I contend that diversity manifested not only in the borderlands of the empire, but also in the rural communities of its core, as Carolingian elites instrumentalized contending conceptions of Frankish identity and Frankish history to legitimize their authority over the Merovingian kingdoms.

A number of recent studies contest the confluence of social control, religious correction, and imperial church reform as machines for a homogenized Carolingian Christianity. In their survey, \textit{The Carolingian World}, published in 2011, Marios Costambeys, Matthew Innes, and Simon MacLean claim that “there was not one Christianity, but many Christianities, not one Church, but many churches.”\textsuperscript{29} Any sense of collectivity derived itself from the patterns of religious behavior adopted by a community. Drawing from emerging genres of religious writing, namely hagiography, the authors stress that belief was a matter of external practices rather than of internal mentality.\textsuperscript{30} From this angle, there is no reason to distinguish the kinds of holiness housed in local shrines, embodied by holy men, or embedded in rituals as incommensurate. This means that peasants across the empire, even if untouched by the burgeoning orthodoxy of religious practices, could access the channels through which the sacred was articulated.

The Christian pluralism advanced by Costambeys, Innes, and MacLean, in a way anticipating the current characterization of the empire as diverse, contrasts Thomas F. X. Noble’s conception of


\textsuperscript{28} Kramer, “Franks, Romans, and Countrymen,” 318.

\textsuperscript{29} Costambeys, Innes, and MacLean, \textit{The Carolingian World}, 90.

\textsuperscript{30} Costambeys, Innes, and MacLean, \textit{The Carolingian World}, 93.
Carolingian Christianity as unifying, specifying, and sanctifying. In an address given to the American Society of Church History in 2015, Noble argues that the Carolingians gathered the “many Christianities” into one meaningful whole, a process which eventually culminated into the creation of Roman Catholicism. Religious life was set in the royal and imperial court, not in local communities, where bishops contributed to plans for reform and renewal. Costambeys, Innes, and MacLean do not challenge that the Carolingian period experienced substantial changes in religiosity; but instead what emerged was less a fusion of state and church than a symbiosis of the secular and ecclesiastical. Both the structural-functionalism of Costambeys, Innes, and MacLean and, to a lesser degree, the exacting teleology of Noble, fall into a historiographical trend that distinguishes between organized and unconstrained religiosity and personal and institutional forms of holiness. These separations obscure the dynamism of the Carolingian Church and its reforms in its linking of the peasant and their community to imperial political structures.

A more complete conceptualization of Carolingian Christianity and selfhood must move away from binary oppositions. As Charles West argues, the root of this issue is the widespread habit of discussing religion, and particularly sanctity, through the Weberian concept of charisma. In his reading of Amolo and the Dijon relics, published in 2010, West suggests an alternative formulation of charisma developed by the sociological theorist Edward Shils. This framework, also adopted by Shane Bobrycki in his 2018 analysis of the Dijon relics, defines the charismatic as a sense of being close to the center of society, not a trait of extraordinary personalities, as conceptualized by Weber. Imperial officials, holy men, and objects could all embody the charismatic, each capable of invoking the “awe-inspiring centrality” of a social system, which included the values, norms, and beliefs to which members adhere or possess. It is a new relationship between Christianity and imagined space that fuses the mechanisms of imperial expansion to the

34 Costambeys, Innes, and MacLean, The Carolingian World, 127.
35 West, “Unauthorised Miracles,” 308.
territorialization of the Church. As parishes stretched across the empire, so too did imperial reach. This in turn creates a useful analytical shift towards the geographical locations of the charismatic and its various articulations. Carolingian Christianity, in this sense, fits within a calibrated articulation of local and central interests. My research introduces the peasantry as an active actor engaging in the “awe-arousing centrality” developed by Shils and applied by West and Bobrycki. This is not to restrict the supernatural to the charismatic, to advance two distinct discourses of the hagiographical and the legal, but to cast otherworldly interactions as authentic articulations of social tensions.

To view the Carolingian programs of reform as productive of the charismatic resituates the Church’s role in relationships of power. This paper turns to Michel Foucault’s theories of power to identify the peasant within the religious networks conceptualized by the imperial elite. Between 1977 and 1978, in a series of lectures at the Collège de France, Michel Foucault developed the theory of pastoral power. Pastoral power is the art of governing the collective faithful through a matrix of individualizing practices, namely penitence, self-examination, and confession. Ecclesiastical authorities, or the “pastorate” according to Foucault, exercise pastoral power in pursuit of their flock’s salvation. Central to this project is a Christian hermeneutics of the self: a verbal practice and struggle against the “interior Other,” or Satan and his temptations. These struggles turn the soul into a visible object with a distinctive character and identity, malleable to external influences, and vulnerable to social norms. Pastoral power is not incompatible with Shilsian charisma. Interactions between political authority, orthodox faith, and supernatural engagement in local communities demonstrate distribution of the sacred. Pastoral power is merely an analytical tool that illustrates how the ruling and clerical elites used religion to reorder the empire as the church, and to specify Carolingian Christianity as a social bond and a source of individual identity. By locating selfhood within these processes, Foucault alerts the medieval historian to the means by

which Carolingian elites directed the periphery into the societal power relations of the imperial court.

Unspoken traces of this Foucauldian modal appear throughout Carolingian scholarship. Lynda L. Coon’s “Collecting the Desert in the Carolingian West,” published in 2006, argues that Carolingian “dynasts” appropriated the charismatic lure of Egyptian art through monastic regulations and the “imperialistic venture” of collecting relics, which also functioned as a vehicle of State propaganda.40 John H. Arnold’s Belief and Unbelief in Medieval Europe, published in 2005, claims that Christian rituals of self-examination, such as confession, and of self-discipline, like fasting or abstinence, entwined ideas about selfhood and spirituality with ideas of the body.41 Discourses of orthodox and illicit belief informed not only the way medieval people regulated one another, but also their own behaviors and thought processes. These imperialist ventures extended to the body. As Arnold points out, ecclesiastical authorities sought to police this behavior. Christian rituals of self-examination, such as confession, and of self-discipline, like fasting or abstinence, entwined ideas about selfhood and spirituality with ideas of the body.42 Discourses of orthodox and illicit belief informed not only the way medieval people regulated one another, but also their own behaviors and thought processes. Through the horizontal, disciplinary power of social norms, Arnold concludes that the medieval religious community regulated body and mind to enable the formation of a specific Christian identity. More recent studies collaborate this claim. In his 2021 article, “Baptismal Renunciation and the Moral Reform of Charlemagne’s Christian Empire,” historian Yin Liu frames the renunciation of the devil in the rite of baptism as a discourse of moral reform that obligates the individual, regardless of social rank, to maintain themself fully in imperial and religious guidelines.43 Further studies on political and moral fidelity argue that oaths and vows connected imperial subjects not only to kings and emperors but to the community they represented – the Franks.44

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42 Arnold, Belief and Unbelief, 187-189.
Evidence of pastoral power relies on sources that emphasize the ought – sermons, hagiographies, penitentials – each a normative prescription of emotional ideals. Through the history of emotions, Barbara H. Rosenwein contends the verticality of these bonds. In the thoughtful Emotion Communities in the Early Middle Ages, Barbara H. Rosenwein gives weight to the emotions conveyed in early medieval literature. Emotional communities are “groups in which people adhere to the same norms of emotional expression and value – or devalue – the same or related emotions.” These communities share elements of the common, Foucauldian discourse as a set of shared vocabularies and modes of thought with a disciplining function, that exist in social and/or textual spaces. Mayke de Jong’s seminal study, The Penitential State, published in 2009, advances a similar thesis of emotional unity, but centers it on the idea of collective guilt. In her research, de Jong argues that Emperor Louis the Pious’ public penance in 833 ordered the realm into a unique polity that fused religious rituals with public office, a penitential state organized by a need to combat the collective sins of the empire, “lest they incur God’s wrath.” This powerful and expansive case of an emotional community used religious ritual as the primary tactic to address conflict, crisis, and questions of loyalty. De Jong anchors imperial power in the Carolingian vocabulary of correctio, admonition, and correptio, focusing on elite reactions to the “new wave of imperial confidence” inaugurated by Louis’ correction. Public penance rendered Louis the minister of the kingdom and caretaker of the church: a divine authority that empowered all ecclesiastical and secular leaders. By involving every subject of the empire in this atonement, fostering a sense of collective guilt, Louis interlocked the political and religious worlds. As Paul Kershaw envisaged, a spiritual understanding of the scripture was a political education: the well-being of the empire hinged upon piety and the ruler’s relationship with God. Couching identity in terms of sin, guilt, and correction thus bridged the divides across the empire. It sets imperial and ecclesiastical officials and local communities

47 de Jong, The Penitential State, 120.
48 de Jong, The Penitential State, 115
within a web of interpersonal connections, with the court, and its hybrid political and religious offices, sitting at its middle.

These studies point to the formation of a *populus christianus*, its membership determined by one’s relationship with the ruler, not bishops, abbots, or priests. Expect for Bobrycki and Arnold, all of the above scholarship fails to incorporate rural cultivators, unfree dependents, and lay women as actors in the creation of a sanctified Carolingian identity. De Jong and Rosenwein limit their analyses to elite dynamics: the influence of the patrimonial authority exercised by Carolingian kings, lords, and clergymen on kings, lords, and clergymen. Without extending the systemic parts of collective guilt and atonement to the peasants, de Jong restricts Carolingian Christianity to the unifying, horizontal force later articulated by Noble, whose earlier work inspired *The Penitential State*, and similarly does not include peasants.  

Arnold, however, proposes that historians of religion “must engage with those elements of faith that are less easily explicable and fit less happily with the core tenets of Christianity,” such as popular religious practices. The purpose of his proposal is twofold. One reason is that the periphery of faith may inform the way in which the center assumed it central position; another is that the margins may give insights into the beliefs, attitudes, and ideas of lay people. Medieval society normalized the supernatural as an omnipresent force. In the borderlands of sacred and secular power, like in the cases of saints and relics, marginalized lay people could instrumentalize the supernatural to wield power in their communities.

Scholars of the Carolingian countryside attend to the nature of belief and not its function. This is, in part, a consequence of primary source material. Consider Agobard of Lyon’s letter condemning weather-magicians. Some historians frame these weathermakers as a critical feature of low-yielding agrarian societies. Other scholars frame these magicians as vestiges of popular belief, or even rogue clerics extorting the faithful. A more recent reading focuses less on the
episode’s social context than the scriptural foundation of Agobard’s disbelief.\(^{56}\) Agobard’s normative condemnations of deviant behavior, like all the learned discourse of Carolingian intellectuals, forces the dynamics of rural life to the periphery. There also exists in the historiographical tradition a tendency to privilege legal documents over miracle collections, hagiographies, and annals.\(^{57}\) Formidable research concepts that press social systems into features of Carolingian economic organization, namely manorialism, are inescapable.\(^{58}\) Charters, polyptychs, and estate surveys trap the countryside within a bureaucratic frame of reference that cannot account for the kinds of events, the kinds of conflict in rural communities, as hagiographical collections and annals evidence, that resist property-based social models.\(^{59}\) In this respect, my research takes inspiration from Matthew Innes and Charles West, co-authors of “Saints and Demons in Carolingian Christianity” in 2019, who argue that “the Carolingian countryside was not necessarily as ‘legalized’ or ‘routinized’ as the received canons of charters and polyptychs (perhaps deliberately) make it seem.”\(^{60}\) Obligations, status, and rights of ownership were not clear-cut.

Ultimately, my research diverges from previous works on the history of the Carolingian countryside in that it uses texts about the miraculous and the demonic to form an emergent picture of a distinctive rural model of social relations. There is a risk in framing the integration of rural communities into imperial structures as a “top-down” exercise of power with occasional acts of resistance. Hagiographical collections and annals attest to the rather real and vibrant internal dynamics of rural communities and detail how these villages operated within wider structures of authority. It is better, then, to characterize them as following a logic of “in-out” relations. In this “in-out” model, proposed by French historian Jean-Pierre Devroey, and advanced by Innes and

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57 Innes and West, “Saints and Demons,” 96.
58 For recent usage of manorialism, see Costambeys, Innes, and MacLean, The Carolingian World, 251.
59 Innes and West, “Saints and Demons,” 97.
60 Innes and West, “Saints and Demons,” 99.
West, relations of power are multidirectional. Villages and villagers were not monolithic groups, dominated by taxes and tithes, caged-in by an ideology of communal guilt, their local identities erased by a sacralized, imperial identity. Instead, all these elements coalesced in the behavior of the peasants; their interactions with the supernatural an attempt to negotiate social tensions outside of formal law and without making direct challenges to positions of prominent parties.

**Early Medieval Idiota: Carolingian Belief and Ignorance**

Monasteries and ecclesiastical institutions sought to concentrate the limits of supernatural authority. A central step was the mobilization of a secular ecclesiastical hierarchy towards the correction of the lives of the Franks. Parish priests, living among the laity as representatives of the church, played an instrumental role in this project, and needed intimate knowledge of their communities to eliminate real or perceived ignorance of orthodox faith. Attempts to transcend or circumvent the boundaries of authorized religious experiences became an obsession of clerical authorities. The *Roman Penitential*, composed by Bishop Haltigar of Cambrai in 830, highlights the efforts taken by local priests to unify and correct the souls of their flock. Haltigar, for example, pinned and disseminated several confessional prayers urging the faithful to lay their souls bare before God’s gaze, beneath which “every heart trembles and all consciences are afraid.” His prescriptions of penance make frequent reference to the supernatural: for instance, anyone who acts as a “magician” for the sake of love faces half a year of penance, whereas those who cause death or conjure storms face seven years, and “ignorant” persons who eat or drink beside sacred places of pagan origin must consume only bread or water for forty days. Ignorance is a critical element of this corrective, pastoral power. Haltigar’s condemnation of the uneducated mirrors a letter of instruction written thirty years earlier in the years around 800 by Archbishop Arn of Salzburg. Addressed to the clergy under his supervision, the Archbishop warns of *idiota* priests unable to understand scripture, and thus incapable of administering

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62 Van Rhijn, “‘Et hoc considerat episcopus,’” 162.
64 “The So-Called Roman Penitential of Haltigar,” 300.
65 “The So-Called Roman Penitential of Haltigar,” 305.
rituals, such as baptism or the Eucharist. Orthodox communities of religious practice cannot suffer the improper, since, as Haltigar stresses, “if one member suffers anything, all the members suffer with it.” The idiothae, or the uneducated, both lay and ecclesiastical, threaten to undermine the ideals of the Christian-Frankish world by their ignorance.

Activities outside the obvious bounds of Christian liturgical or material culture were thus dangerous practices. Against a backdrop of famines and natural disasters, Emperor Louis the Pious (778-840) convened a council to deliberate over the task of appeasing God. At the Council of Paris of 829, clerical and political authorities stressed that “there exist other most insidious evils, which, no doubt, remain with us from heathen rite.” Through these “various evils,” such as sorcery, divination, and incantations, “the condition of the church weakened, and the kingdom put in jeopardy.” Control over magical forces, which invoked divine wraith, was a matter of physical and moral security. But such practices were not exclusive to the unfaithful. Hrabanus Maurus, a senior ecclesiastic of the Carolingian Church, famous for turning the abbey of Fulda into a scholastic hub, launched a critique of magic in his test, On the Magic Arts. Written in the early ninth century, On the Magic Arts denounces the divinations and “perverse” superstitions of “false Christians.” Hrabanus Maurus writes, “anyone who does these evil things is an abomination” and will face annihilation, for “you must be perfect and without stain before the Lord your God.” Carolingian Christianity, in this sense, made claims on the individual: following the faith required the navigation of controlled and carefully mediated eruptions of the otherworldly.

Peasants were not passive actors in the supernatural systems that populated the countryside. Among the most well-attested supernatural figures in pastoral literature are the tempestarii, a style of weather-magician paid by farmers to protect the fields from storms. In 816, Agobard, the Archbishop of Lyon, issued the most comprehensive treatment of the topic. In his treatise, De grandine et tonitruis (“On Hail

66 Van Rhijn, “‘Et hoc considerat episcopus’,” 162.
69 Council of Paris, 142.
and Thunder”), is evidence of peasants using the supernatural to articulate social tensions outside the boundaries circumscribed by the church. He relates that found four tempestarii within his custody, enchained by the very villagers for having failed to provide protection.\textsuperscript{72} When faced with the extreme conditions of hailstorms, which could destroy a year’s harvest, rural communities needed a mechanism to cope with the randomness of nature. Peasants used weather-magicians as an alternative to existing systems of supernatural protection. In return for their services, these tempestarii received a share of the crops, an exchange which mirrored the payment of tithes to local priests.

Carolingian bishops wanted to routinize supernatural experiences to be less prone to error. In Lyon, Agobard observes that “nearly all men, noble and common, city and country dwellers, old and young, believe that hail and thunder can be produced by human will.”\textsuperscript{73} It is not the improper practice itself that angers Agobard so much as the perceived idiocy of the peasants: “so much stupidity has already oppressed the wretched world that Christians now believe things so absurd that no one ever before could persuade the pagans to believe them, even though these pagans were ignorant of the Creator of all things.”\textsuperscript{74} It is not that educated authorities, such as Agobard, were skeptical about the possibility of magic. In fact, he makes ample use of the Egyptian enchanters, Jamnes and Mabres, from the Old Testament, in his argument. What concerns Agobard is the perceived inability of the rural laity to engage with proper practices.\textsuperscript{75} He links the tempestarii and their fee to the community’s failure to pay tithe, refusing to recognize that the peasants sought an alternative form of protection.\textsuperscript{76} The violent reaction towards the captured tempestarii is no surprise. It was not through mindless ignorance that the peasants stumbled into the magicians’ fees but a conscious navigation of agricultural life. They expected meaningful returns, and when the tempestarii failed to uphold their end of the dead, the peasants responded, receiving prompt correction by ecclesiastical authorities.

\textsuperscript{73} Agobard of Lyon, “On Hail and Thunder,” sec. XVI.
\textsuperscript{74} Agobard of Lyon, “On Hail and Thunder,” sec. XVI.
\textsuperscript{75} Bailey, “Magic and Disbelief in the Carolingian Lyon,” 197.
\textsuperscript{76} Palmer, “Defining Paganism in the Carolingian World,” 407.
Supernatural forces existed on a continuum of permissibility that corresponded with the political aims of the empire. Archbishop Agobard, despite his disappointment in the perceived spiritual and intellectual capabilities of his congregation, never demanded physical punishment. It was him, after all, who saved the *tempestarii* from mob violence. Frankish expansion into Saxony, however, not yet tied to dense ecclesiastical networks, lacked the unifying religious force present in Lyon. Emperor Charlemagne’s *Admonito generalis* (*General Admonition*) in 789, for comparison, commanded magicians and enchanters within the empire to repent or face charges of death. Reactions against the surviving paganism of Saxony, despite continuous waves of missions and military ventures, culminated in draconian measures, no matter the severity of the crime. In the “Capitulary on the Saxon Territories” (c. 775-790), cannibalism and disloyalty are comparable offenses, the same as demonic sacrifices and a refusal to undergo baptism. Emperor Charlemagne’s *Capitulatio de partibus Saxoniae* (c. 792) used accusations of paganism for political gains in newly-conquered Saxony. Ironically, evidence for belief in cannibal witches is not in Saxon texts but in the Franks’ *Pactus legis Salicae* issued by King Clovis sometime between 507 and 511. Likewise, the decrees on pagan conspiracy against Christians, and condemnation against cremation practices, were efforts to enforce a Frankish culture. Disloyalty within the realm posed a similar problem. In 834, his great-grandson, Lothar II, had a rival’s sister put in a cask and thrown into the River Saône as a witch. These cases make evident that the supernatural, not without its risks, played an integral role in Carolingian systems of power. Charlemagne’s capitularies indicate that the concentration of legal and religious authority applied not only to local churches, but also, when faced with external threats, the entire empire.

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Authority, Power, and the Pastorate: Constructing the Carolingian World

Contemporary imagination sought to make the empire’s rise inevitable, existence natural, and legitimacy divine. Carolingian authority, from its inception in 751 to its dissolution in 888, relied on establishing political boundaries as religious boundaries. Pepin the Short, first of the Carolingian dynasty, usurped the Frankish throne from the Merovingian monarch Childeric III in 751. Two years later, Pepin received papal anointment as King of the Franks, which apologists later backdated to coincide with his coup. Charlemagne’s imperial coronation by Pope Leo III in 800 replaced the title of king with emperor. It is by virtue of this papal appointment that the Carolingians claimed not only Francia but also the Roman Empire. Emperor Louis II confirmed as much to the doubtful Byzantine emperor Basil I in 871, situating the Franks as the surrogates of the Romans: “When the branches were broken, we were grafted onto them; when we were wild olives, we were joined to their roots and became fat with olives. We say therefore that the branches were broken so that we might be grafted on.” These texts individualized the Carolingian realm coherent historical entity with divine legitimacy. Louis believed that the Carolingians “derived this title [Emperor of the Romans] from the Romans…whose people and whose city we divinely received to govern, and whose church, the mother of all churches, we received to defend and raise up.” By the mid-ninth century, the propagation of educational and religious reform self-consciously redefined the Frankish world as Carolingian.

As places of learning and education, rural parishes and monasteries were key elements in the imagined and material construction of the Carolingian world. Monasteries contributed to the exponential increase in the production of historical records, such as annals, that sought to locate the dynasty within schemes of long-term

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85 Costambeys, Innes, and MacLean, The Carolingian World, 14.
historical development. Early Carolingian historians politized ethnic identity on a Christian foundation as far back as the 720s, when Charles Martel, Charlemagne’s grandfather, controlled Merovingian politics. The Liber historiae Francorum is the only contemporary narrative history from the late seventh and early eight centuries. It tracks the history of the Franks from their legendary beginnings up until 642, when the perspective shifts to an account of events up to 721, told from the perspective of the Frankish aristocracy. Historians did not write the LHF, completed in 727, to flatter Charles Martel but to guarantee the Frankish elites a position in the new political constellation that featured the Carolingians at its center. These chronicles did not just expand the political horizons of Frankish solidarity; they also reflect the geographical expansion of a shared Frankish past.

As rural monasteries populated the countryside, the Carolingian realm tied its diverse, distinct regions to the religious and political hierarchies of the empire. As Charlemagne expanded east of the Rhine and south of the Loire, he launched a systemic policy of imposing imperial lordships over local elites by assuming control over key monasteries. In 773, for example, Charlemagne granted the strategic fiscal estate of Heppenheim to the Abbey of Lorsch, effectively plugging Carolingian authority into local currents of power. But this transfer of property, as Matthew Innes reveals, came only after Charlemagne used a local land dispute to impose royal power over Lorsch. Charlemagne’s patronage, in effect, dismantled the control of local elites over monastic networks, turning the lands of Heppenheim and Lorsch, both built on the rural residences of local counts, over to the hands of monks under royal lordship. New monasteries, like Lorsch, gained property rights at an unprecedented scale as local elites, gifting smaller, familial houses of worship, created centers and complexes of spiritual worship. Carolingian power strategies thus centered on bids to position rural

86 Costambeys, Innes, and MacLean, The Carolingian World, 269.
87 Costambeys, Innes, and MacLean, The Carolingian World, 19.
91 Innes, “People, Place and Power,” 418.
92 Innes, “People, Place and Power,” 419.
93 Innes, “People, Place and Power,” 412.
parishes as constituent cells of a network of imperial patronage, reifying
the collective Frankish identity mobilized by chroniclers.

Monastic networks embedded the countryside in imperial structures, as evident in a return to Kempten’s demon. In 858, As
villagers resolved to put the suspected arsonist and thief to death, the
archbishop of Mainz sent priests and deacons, armed with relics and
crosses, to “expel the wicked spirit from that place.” These ecclesiastical
authorities created a through-line between the village and wider
Christian society: entangling the small worlds of the countryside into
religious and political hierarchies. At Kempten, the priests and deacons,
functioning as representatives of the imperial church, sought to heal a
divided community through ecclesiastical peace-making, a concerted
attempt to impose the contemporary political theology of Christian
peace. Instead of slaying the accused, as desired by the locals, the clerics
performed an exorcism, reciting the litany and spreading holy water
around the building where the demon was most active – all to no effect.
For the demon, “the old enemy,” as labeled by the annal, threw stones at
the exorcists and nearby villagers, wounding several, and forcing the
clerics to abandon Kempten. After their departure, the demon claimed
to control an anonymous priest, whose liturgical cloak shielded him
from the exorcism, and continued to spread disaster until the complete
abandonment of the village.

Kempten and its demon fit within the social networks around the
archbishopric of Mainz; the Annals of Fulda itself a delicate negotiation of
the convoluted politics of the year 858, mapping the tensions caused by
the political stances taken by successive archbishops, including the
incumbent, Charles of Mainz. Crisis plagued the region. Charles’ uncles,
Louis the German and Charles the Bald, were at war over the region of
Aquitaine, and the martial scandals of his cousin, King Lothar II, also
demanded his attention. Kempten, despite its potential for political
allegory, is a complex, inconsistent account that serves as a vivid
reminder of the dire consequences of moral degradation. Its narrative
betrays a truth, mainly that in the Carolingian period it was possible to
imagine peasants as guided by the passions of retributive emotions.

94 The Annals of Fulda, 44.
95 Kershaw, Peaceful Kings, 177, 220; Costambeys, Innes, and MacLean, The Carolingian
World, 269.
96 The Annals of Fulda, 44.
97 The Annals of Fulda, 44.
98 Innes and West, “Saints and Demons,” 88.
More immediately, the story reveals the limits of independent peasant action and the perversion of imperial mediators through ignorant action. Although the community exercised some degree of social action, it was neither sufficient nor within the villagers’ total control. Kempten, much like Lorsch, belonged to the networks of imperial rule, meaning it had to negotiate with the agencies of the Carolingian political and religious hierarchy.\(^99\) The villagers exercised mechanisms of dispute settlement, primarily policing and exclusion, by arranging an ordeal and banishing the afflicted to the borderlands of the community. The village was not an isolated unit. Murder transgressed the Carolingian political theology, forcing intervention on behalf of the church to prevent moral and social disruption. This community was so riven with conflict that its problems became an opportunity for the archbishop of Mainz’s agents to penetrate the village structure. Yet the clerics of Mainz also failed. Ignorance threatens territorial affairs through the danger of demonic entryism. As the \textit{Annals of Fulda} recounts, a corrupt priest slept with the bailiff’s daughter, delivering him into the demon’s servitude, and unleashing catastrophic disorder on the villagers.\(^100\) This story encapsulates Haltigar’s fears – local priests must inculcate the strict standards of church reform or else the parish collapses, and its members descend into blood-thirsty barbarity. The Kempten story serves a model of paternalistic lordship and pastoral care.\(^101\) If the realm was to endure, it could suffer few \textit{idiota}.\(^102\)

Ignorance, then, became the target of the Carolingian Church as its legitimacy depended on collective recognition. Anything on the contrary, like corrupt priests or murderous peasants, threatened the stability of the empire. Defining aristocratic and ecclesiastical rule in these terms meant that individuals failing to conduct themselves as agents of a Christian empire ought to receive strict correction.\(^103\) As the \textit{Annals of Fulda} warns, “nothing is hidden which will not be revealed.”\(^104\) Carolingian elites, as ardent reformers of religious practice and social morality, attempted to establish their influence in material and otherworldly affairs. To act beyond the boundaries of legitimate belief

\(^{99}\) Costambeys, Innes, and MacLean, \textit{The Carolingian World}, 270.
\(^{100}\) \textit{The Annals of Fulda}, 44. See also Costambeys, Innes, and MacLean, \textit{The Carolingian World}, 270.
\(^{101}\) Innes and West, “Saints and Demons,” 88.
\(^{102}\) Costambeys, Innes, and MacLean, \textit{The Carolingian World}, 431.
\(^{103}\) Costambeys, Innes, and MacLean, \textit{The Carolingian World}, 270.
\(^{104}\) \textit{The Annals of Fulda}, 44.
brought with it spiritual and mortal danger. Illicit practices, be it murder or weather-magic, obscured the soul, circumventing the established practices of penitence, self-examination, and confession, and thus rendered the self incompatible with the networks of power that supported the Carolingian world.

**Supernatural Appeals:**

**Intercessions of the Divine, Demonic, and All In-between**

Peasants used the supernatural as an alternative articulation of social tensions. Sometime in the mid-ninth century, in an unnamed village in northern Francia, Hubert the Priest recorded in a letter that Saint Vaast visited a carpenter named Dagobert. Near-death, soon to depart without penance or communion, the saint restored Dagobert to health, but with a catch.\(^{105}\) The nephew of Imbod, the village priest, Hubert shared some responsibility for the villagers’ pastoral care. Shortly after Hubert administered Dagobert’s final rights, as demanded by Carolingian church legislation, Saint Vaast commanded the carpenter to “fearlessly repeat all things” revealed to him in a vision, passing messages that spoke “the truth of the matter as it is” to people in his village.\(^ {106}\) Through Dagobert, Saint Vaast commanded the village lord to restore some property to the nearby monastery of St-Vaast, and the local judge to not torment the villagers without cause. Some of these messages also penetrated the village’s internal affairs. Indeed, rural communities functioned outside of the strategies imposed upon them, even though subjection was an important element of imperial cohesion. Imbod, the local priest, needed correction; the mayor, Orcius, received punishment for a village scandal; and divine forces reprimanded an informal elite named Ebruin, blinding one eye and paralyzing his daughter, for his part in the scandal, which concerned the theft of slaves over whom the saint claimed ownership.\(^ {107}\)

Hubert’s letter was an appeal, at the expense of his uncle, Imbod, to a monastic patron and a call to mobilize the networks that connect the village to the wider Carolingian church. Hubert had explicit ties to the nearby monastery of St-Vaast, the target of Orcius and Ebruin’s thiev ery, 


\(^{106}\) Innes and West, “Saints and Demons,” 84; Hubert the Priest, “The Appearance of St Vaast,” para. 4.

\(^{107}\) Hubert the Priest, “The Appearance of St Vaast, para 6-8. See also Innes and West, “Saints and Demons,” 84.
and the village lord’s territorial dispute. Addressed to the monk Haimin, his “dearest instructor,” Hubert’s letter functions as a corrective cudgel that individualizes and illuminates the sins of the community. Dagobert’s vision, presenting the complex anatomy of a conflicted rural community, is an indirect critique of the monastery’s neglected claims. Hubert’s letter articulates social tensions and advocates for dispute resolution through the divine and miraculous, even at the margins of structured and hierarchical authority. For Hubert the Priest, already in a place of relative power as a learned individual, Saint Vaast offered a means to manipulate relations within his village. Irrespective of Hubert’s motives, however, the village existed with its own sense of history and obligations. Local traditions claim that King Dagobert, a Merovingian ruler, founded the village, and office-holders, poor laborers, and informal elites all interacted with patterns of local power mediated by the miraculous.

Miracle collections documented the extensive decision-making behind saintly patronage, with the most explicit examples coming from Einhard’s *Translation and Miracles of the Blessed Martyrs, Marcellinus and Peter* (c. 830-831). At the tombs of Marcellinus and Peter in Seligenstadt, divine and secular intercession were inextricable. Einhard, the famed biographer of Charlemagne and a powerful courtier, wrote extensively of the Roman relics housed at his monastery in Seligenstadt, boasting of the many visitors that came from near and far. Stories like the deaf girl from Bourges, for example, who travelled nearly 400 miles to Seligenstadt, evidence that peasants could access different shrines, and that saints offered help to everyone, regardless of status.

Even unfree dependents of different monastic complexes, despite being the property of other saints themselves, received divine attention at Seligenstadt, but not without danger. Einhard reports the travels of a girl from Höchst, a village owned by the monastery of Lorsch, possessed by a demon named Wiggo. With the voice of the girl, Wiggo exclaimed in Latin that he was the devil’s disciple, and launched into a damnation of the empire’s moral condition. Wiggo targeted the Carolingian elites, even Louis the Pious, explaining he derived his demonic power from

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108 Hubert the Priest, “The Appearance of St Vaast,” para. 1.
“the wickedness of [the Franks] and because of the various sins of those appoint [to rule] over them.”

By seeking Marcellinus and Peter, the girl and her family abandoned Saint Nazarius, the patron of Lorsch, demonstrating that the rural laity had some choice in deciding where to receive miracles.

Einhard’s *Translation* reveals that peasants used intercessions of the divine to challenge elite networks of power, especially those connected to a saint’s shrine. In one example, Einhard urged a count named Poppo to spare two poor men found guilty of poaching. In his appeal, Einhard stresses the spiritual and moral opportunity created by the crime, as it led the criminals to the tombs of Marcellinus and Peter. By accessing the saints’ shrine and, by extension, Einhard’s ear, the two men of lower status indirectly engaged in elite power dynamics. A similar instance occurred in Mainz, where two servants of the St-Martin cathedral asked the martyrs to save their brother from heavy corporal punishment. Upon hearing their plea, Einhard advised an estate manager to allow the murderer’s brothers to pay a *wergild* to the victim’s family. These brothers sought out Einhard as a figure of exemplary political and spiritual status, representing the confluence of choice and intercession. The links between the saintly and secular were apparent even to those of lower status. The sacralization of political posts, initiated by historical narratives and perfected by Louis the Pious, rendered Einhard a well-connected host in the physical as well as the spiritual world.

Miracle collections ultimately existed for the benefit and advantage of the community, following dominant narrative tropes that reordered documentary materials of the countryside. In his text, Einhard presented two versions of the same event that occurred on June 19, 828. Einhard heard the first account from George, a Venetian cleric and the rector of St-Saulve in Valenciennes, entrusted to transport some of his relics. According to this story, George let the oxen graze a meadow by the roadside. A peasant who owned the field confronted the cleric with a pitchfork, asking “with irritation” why the animals were on his land.

Before the conflict escalated, George demanded the peasant, described as a hunchbacked with a swollen jaw, prostrate himself before the relics, which miraculously cured his toothache, much to the community’s

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111 Einhard, “Marcellinus and Peter,” 104.
112 Einhard, “Marcellinus and Peter,” 133.
113 Einhard, “Marcellinus and Peter,” 138.
delight. The next entry in Einhard’s text, however, is a copy of George’s written account of the same miracle. In this version, the confrontation is gone, the peasant unarmed and passive, leaving only the toothache and its cure. Einhard admits to reshaping George’s oral report to reflect the miracle’s social context. In George’s written account, however, there is no communal celebration, in which “a great crowd of people poured into the meadow and a throng from the surrounding area gathered together to give thanks,” just the cleric and the peasant. These competing accounts illustrate that miracle compilers sought to dominate narratives of collective unity, peace, and spirituality, even at the expense of source materials.

Early medieval Frankish society organized around such communal gatherings, especially in religious behavior, where notions of legitimate worship were critical concerns of the elite. Aristocratic and ecclesiastical domination was not total, the lines between proper and subversive holiness not always clear. In the early 840s, for example, Archbishop Amolo of Lyon received strange news of disturbing miracles occurring inside the church of St-Bénigne in Dijon, Burgundy. The popular draw of relics is not a surprise; Einhard packs the whole fourth chapter of his “Translation” with accounts of crowds observing miracles and giving alms. Even the physical spaces of the cult of relics as monks built massive crypts and guesthouses or moved relics to strategic sites to accommodate crowds. What distinguishes these relics was their power. Around the bones of an unknown saint, brought to the village by traveling monks, bruised women convulsed on the ground, unable to leave the premises. Bishop Theobald of Langres, the bishop responsible for Dijon, sought advice from Amolo. The archbishop, while uncomfortable with the suspect origins of the relics and the “preposterous” traveling monks, did not categorically deny the sanctity of the bones. Instead, he insisted that they “should be totally removed from the holy buildings” and buried outside in the church courtyard, or under a wall, or in some hidden place, and the women sent home.

116 Einhard, “Marcellinus and Peter,” 117.
117 Einhard, “Marcellinus and Peter,” 118.
118 Einhard, “Marcellinus and Peter,” 117.
121 Kohl, “Peasant Agency and the Supernatural,” 105-106.
122 Amolo of Lyon, “Concerning Suspect Relics,” sec. 3.
Amolo’s justifications are lucid and reflective – a rational approximation of the situation not dissimilar from Agobard, his predecessor, and the conflict with weather magicians. Outside the church, “some reverence may be shown to them, since they are said to be holy, yet also, since they are entirely unknown, the uneducated populace should not have any opportunity for error and superstition.” The crucial point here is that the women afflicted by the relics did not engage in any illicit or improper supernatural forces. Instead, it is that communal veneration, specifically the presence of crowds, which placed the non-elite at the center stage of public events, attracted the concern of early medieval elites.

Traditionally, historians read the events of Dijon as a scandal accompanying the Carolingian expansion of the cult of relics. Crowds followed the transfer of relics, an important form of publicity and legitimization that provided monetary profits to shrines, monasteries, or churches and bolstered their authority. But these relic cults also played a role in local power politics. In the late 830s and 840s, tensions fractured the relationship between the monks of St. Bénigne and the bishops of Langres. In the mid-eight century, the bishopric shifted from Dijon to Langres, granting the monks a considerable degree of autonomy from their Bavarian bishops who ruled from afar, until Theobald’s predecessor, Alberic (d. 838), transferred personnel from St. Bénigne to Bèze and to St. Mammès. After Alberic’s death, the promotion of new relic cults, West and Bobrycki argue, became a way for the monks of St. Bénigne to regain control, wrestling the community out of Theobald’s admittedly notional authority. While this argument explains why the monks encouraged the crowds, it does not account for the behavior of the “three, or even four hundred women” that flocked to St. Bénigne.

Despite the severity of their actions, the behavior of the St-Bénigne crowds was comprehensible in the language of communal guilt. Dijon was a pivotal theater in the civil war that plagued the 840s. In Burgundy, the grandsons of Charlemagne – Lothar, Louis the German, and Charles the Bald – seized resources, pressed men into service, and fought battles that spilled the conflict into local communities. Amolo himself met
with King Charles in January 842. Viking invaders also posed a threat from the North. Amidst this disorder, it is not a surprise that the central figures of this event were people at the social margin. “Compelled by necessity of hunger,” these “unrespectable and wicked little people,” as Amolo describes them, sought out the relics to supply their physical needs.\(^\text{129}\) It was not only expected but demanded by capitularies that parish churches, and in fact the entire kingdom, provide “shelter and fire and water to pilgrims traversing our country in God’s name, or to anyone traveling for the love of God or for the safety of his own soul.”\(^\text{130}\) Famines, war, and invasion, however, disrupted this social norm. As the Carolingian political theology posits, disaster arose from the misalignment of virtues of the ruler, the consequences of conflict a divine response to the sins of the populace. War and greed threatened the cohesion of the empire. In this respect, only bolstered by the Lenten context of the events, the violent reaction to these relics was not an outburst of mass hysteria. Rather the relics inspired physical action which mirrored monastic corporal penance.\(^\text{131}\) Without access to structures of social aid, these worshipers used the supernatural to attend to crisis and rectify spiritual tensions.

While not explicit acts of resistance, the crowds simply making use of the limited resources available to them, this behavior challenged the account of Carolingian society given by its dominant elites. At St-Bénigne, the deviant religious practices of marginalized social groups indirectly threatened the imagined core of the Carolingian empire. Lorsch, Kempten, Lyon, Dijon, Seligenstadt – each of these villages represent the establishment of rural parishes as the central units of the empire. Exploring faith outside routinized boundaries, both spiritual and territorial, eroded the constructed differences social statuses and parish communities maintained by ecclesiastical elites.\(^\text{132}\) Amolo’s letter fits within the pastoral tradition, set by ecclesiastics like Haltigar and Agobard, that located the ignorant, or the \textit{idiota}, as obstacles to the unifying force of Carolingian Christianity. Amolo’s paramount concern is with the “wicked little people,” compelled by hunger or greed to ignore orthodox forms of collective, religious behavior.\(^\text{133}\) These people,

\(^{129}\) Amolo of Lyon, “Concerning Suspect Relics,” sec. 4.


\(^{133}\) Amolo of Lyon, “Concerning Suspect Relics,” sec. 4.
deluded by “worthless belief,” are pawns in the “deceptions and mockery of demons,” permitted by God to spread a pestilence of illusion and deception among the ignorant.\textsuperscript{134} He even ordered the crowd flogged, should they not disperse.\textsuperscript{135} Each congregation ought to remain within the boundaries of their own parish, venerating local shrines and realizing spiritual wellness through local channels.\textsuperscript{136} These pilgrims, devoted to the “vanity of novelties,” disturbed the flow of resources that fueled pastoral expansion. The tithes and gifts owed to local parishes funnel into the pockets of the “greedy” priests of St-Bénigne.\textsuperscript{137} Amolo’s letter illuminates peasant devotion to relics as much centrality of pastoral care in the exercise of Carolingian authority. Amolo’s denunciations of the St-Bénigne crowds reflects the Carolingian missions to disseminate the sacred across the countryside within the circumscribed network of the parish and the parish priest.\textsuperscript{138}

Emphasis on the “rustic” elements of Theobald’s report undermined permissible behavior like collective worship, almsgiving, and penance. Tropes of female and rural manipulability delegitimize the crowd. Among the “wicked women” were “not just girls but even married women, both young and old, respectable and unrespectable,” all unable to leave presence of the relics.\textsuperscript{139} The relics did not only recapitulate religious behavior in abnormal circumstances. They also perverted the social unit of the household. Amolo expressed disbelief that holy martyrs would ever separate wives from husbands, mothers from children, or young girls from parents.\textsuperscript{140} Amolo’s gendered vilification bound women to “the house of their menfolk,” just as the relics, in similar function, physically bounded them to the premises of the church.\textsuperscript{141} By targeting alternative dispute-processing actions, Amolo makes his desires clear: lay communities must access the awe-arousing effects of the relics through authorized ecclesiastical channels lest the social fabric of the empire come under threat.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[134] Amolo of Lyon, “Concerning Suspect Relics,” sec. 5.
\item[135] Amolo of Lyon, “Concerning Suspect Relics,” sec. 5.
\item[136] Amolo of Lyon, “Concerning Suspect Relics,” sec. 7.
\item[137] Amolo of Lyon, “Concerning Suspect Relics,” sec. 5.
\item[139] Amolo of Lyon, “Concerning Suspect Relics,” sec. 2.
\item[140] Amolo of Lyon, “Concerning Suspect Relics,” sec. 5.
\item[141] Amolo of Lyon, “Concerning Suspect Relics,” sec. 5, sec. 2.
\end{footnotes}
Conclusion

Sometime in year 1941 or 1942, the esteemed historian Marc Bloch professed “what a shock it might be if, instead of poring laboriously over the jumbled – and probably artificial – terminology of the Carolingian manorial scrolls and capitulatires, we were able to take a walk through a village of that time, overhearing the peasants discussing their status amongst themselves.” Thanks in part to the publication of new documents, and the expansion of archaeological data, historians now approach the early medieval countryside with a transformative set of tools. Perhaps the most impactful of these changes, however, is the willingness of some historians, like Innes, West, and Bobrycki, to engage with the Frankish countryside through non-legal material. Through interactions with the supernatural, social tensions found articulation outside routinized, bureaucratic means.

Clerical authorities, like Haltigar, Agobard, and Amolo, expected unorthodox beliefs. Royal, aristocratic, and ecclesiastic elites formed across the countryside a matrix of patronage networks: these vertical ties between the rural parish and a wider Christian community redefined the Frankish world as Carolingian. External discourses, like the growing genre of pastoral literature, tried to make claims upon early medieval individuals. Rulers like Charlemagne and Louis the Pious sacralized political authority by melding the collective sins of the people with the prosperity of the empire, and by trying to make a holy people through the correction the idiotia. Carolingian religion resituated the empire as the church: a political theology that was as much a totalizing discourse of moral reform as it was a cultural expression of a specific, Frankish identity; an institution of political and religious power as much as a social system of imperial hierarchies. Ultimately, it sought to embed rural communities within a supernatural landscape that demanded interactions with the otherworldly to negotiate local and imperial interests.

Hagiographical collections and historical records situate rural communities at a nexus of interpersonal relations and imperial hierarchies. In Lyon, peasants sought the tempestarii as protections against storms, and in Seligenstadt, peasants found protection from

143 Innes and West also reflect on Bloch’s comment. See Innes and West, “Saints and Demons,” 67-70.
144 See
conflict within saints’ shrines. From the margins of political organization and religious education emerged a unique mechanism to participate in the empire. Hundreds of women congregated at Dijon, the crowd mirroring forms of collective religious behavior: tithes to the wrong people, veneration of the wrong saints, and charity at the wrong place. For some, as with Dagobert and Hubert, village tensions articulated through the miraculous, and for the villagers of Kempten, it was a matter of life or death.
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Divided Nation, Collective Objections
Perspectives on the Vietnam War from East and West Germany

The physical divisions and ideological contrasts that came to define the Cold War developed intensely in Germany of the postwar era. As the two leading global superpowers the United States and the Soviet Union played an instrumental role in the creation of two separate German states in 1949. From their inception, the American-supported Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in the West, and the Soviet-backed German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the East maintained close ties with their powerful international backers. Developing such a partnership was critical for both German states to usher in greater domestic political and economic stability. By the 1960s, with internal stability improving in East and West Germany, Moscow and Washington began to pressure their German allies to play a more active role in the international arena.

Like Germany, Vietnam was also partitioned to continually maintain the Cold War international equilibrium. After nearly a decade of conflict to end French colonial rule, the 1954 Geneva Conference established two separate Vietnamese states. Just like with the partition of the two German states years prior, the division of Vietnam opened the door for superpowers to create strategic allies out of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in the North and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) in the South. The US played an active role in building an anti-communist state in the RVN, while both the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China contributed support to the DRV. As tensions escalated into armed conflict between North and South Vietnam, the interests of Cold War superpowers in Vietnam soon forced the FRG and the GDR to become active observers to a war thousands of miles away.

Given the international reach of the Vietnam War, strong reactions towards the conflict developed on both sides of the inner

146 Caldwell and Hanshew, Germany Since 1945, 71.
Divided Nation, Collective Objections

German border. Initially, East and West Germany adopted vastly contrasting approaches in foreign policy based largely on their positioning on opposite sides of the Cold War. Furthermore, in the GDR, media coverage and public opinion of the war remained consistently critical of the US’s position as a direct combatant in the war and sought to provide as much support as possible to their socialist allies in Vietnam. Meanwhile, West Germans were initially overall supportive of their American allies’ efforts in Vietnam. Yet, the views of the West German government, media, and citizenry towards the war all grew increasingly negative with American military intensifications in Vietnam starting in 1965. As a result, the eventual shared opposition to the Vietnam War developed into one of the few instances of agreement between the two states.

Initial Approaches to Vietnam

The GDR’s positions on the Vietnam War were crafted mainly to further the international ambitions of the Soviet Union. The close link between the Soviet Union and the GDR was further solidified with the signing of the Soviet-East German Friendship Treaty on 12 June 1964.\footnote{“Soviet-East German Friendship Treaty,” \textit{Current History} 47, no. 280 (1964), 363-67.} Article I of the treaty calls for the two states to commit themselves to “continue to develop and consolidate the relations of friendship and close cooperation in all spheres,” including in foreign policy, where Article III outlines the need for “the high contracting parties to join their efforts together ensuring peace and security in Europe and throughout the world.”\footnote{“Soviet-East German Friendship Treaty,” 363-64.} With the Sino-Soviet split continually dividing the communist world, Moscow was concerned with Beijing’s development of Third World influence which the Soviets feared could eventually translate into weakening the Soviet grip over Eastern Europe.\footnote{Westad, \textit{The Global Cold War}, 164.} As such, it became critical for Moscow to further solidify its relationships with its Eastern Bloc allies like East Germany to remain the dominant global communist power. The GDR was positioned to act as a beneficial Soviet resource to help promote pro-Soviet international positions, especially as the North Vietnamese leadership began to quarrel over which model of socialism the DRV should follow.

The GDR’s global promotion of Moscow’s foreign policy ensured that it faced difficulties in its relations with the DRV from the start. The
most pressing challenge for the GDR in developing relations with the DRV was the growing number of leading figures in the Vietnamese Workers Party (VWP) who wanted to develop closer bonds with Beijing rather than Moscow. The East German embassy in Hanoi concluded in August 1963 that the “‘pro-Chinese elements’ in the VWP were clearly on the offensive,” indicating that the “‘pro-Soviet elements’ within the Lao Dong had been systematically isolated.” 152 Despite this initial setback, the GDR still pushed forward with supporting individuals within the VWP who most aligned with pro-Soviet positions. However, the pro-Beijing faction in the VWP failed to fully consolidate control after the 9th Plenum, leading the GDR Foreign Ministry to determine that the GDR should continue to “support the progressive forces within the Lao Dong and curb the harmful influence of the leadership of the Communist Party of China.” 153 By November 1964, the East German Embassy in Hanoi reported that “on the surface, a change in the [DRV’s] attitude towards the USSR had occurred.” 154 The softening of anti-Soviet views within the VWP’s leadership also directly affected the GDR, due to the GDR’s position as one of the closest Soviet allies. Despite this positive development, skepticism remained in Moscow (and predictably in East Berlin) towards Beijing’s motives in the DRV.

The East Germans and their Soviet backers kept a close watch on Chinese actions towards Vietnam into 1965, as hopes persisted that the DRV could deviate continually closer to the Soviets. Writing back to Berlin on 6 January 1965, Wolfgang Bertold, the East German ambassador to the DRV, reported on a recent conversation he had with Ilya Scherbakov, the Soviet ambassador to the DRV, on new developments in Vietnam. Bertold noted Scherbakov’s observations that “some changes have been felt in the DRV,” with increasing numbers of Soviet delegations visiting Vietnam, something that was “unthinkable

154 “Remarks by the East German Embassy in Hanoi on the Article in Hoc Tap No. 11/1964 [Excerpts],” November 12, 1964, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv (Archive of the Parties and Mass Organizations of the GDR in the Federal Archives (Foundation); SAPMO-BArch), Berlin, Germany, DY 30/IV A 2/20/442, 57-58, translated from German by Lorenz Lüthi.
some months ago.” Bertold also reported on Scherbakov’s pleasure that “among some Vietnamese cadres, doubts about the sincerity of the Chinese leaders and the possibility of aid have occurred,” as a growing number of VWP leaders believed that “the Chinese only use the Vietnamese as a tool for their own, Chinese policy.” With some North Vietnamese leaders turning away from the Chinese leadership, the opportunity was opening up for the Soviets and the East Germans to play a more substantial role in aiding the Vietnamese. The chance for the GDR to demonstrate an even greater interest toward Vietnam came as the US committed itself to a direct combat role in the conflict.

The spring of 1965 marked a massive increase in American efforts in Vietnam. Washington began to send thousands of more combat units, who would now engage in offensive operations against communist forces in South Vietnam. The East German government used the increase of American troops in Vietnam to its advantage by linking the expanding war in Vietnam with the GDR’s own struggle against West Germany. As the US ramped up its role in Vietnam, the GDR began a political offensive to assert itself on the global stage by strongly condemning the American aggression. The ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) organized the GDR Peace Council (GPC) to assert the GDR as a leading socialist nation against imperialist actions. The GPC helped orchestrate the GDR’s “Official Peace Policy,” which was released on 28 June 1965. The peace policy took a strong stance against the US “trying to drown the people’s will for freedom and self-determination in blood,” while also claiming that “together with the forward strategists in Bonn, the ruling circles in the United States want to trigger conflicts in the heart of Europe as well.” By linking the US efforts in Vietnam with aggression in Europe, the GDR Peace Policy was also clearly crafted to tie West

156 “Note No. 2/65 on Conversations with Comrade Scherbakov,” 2.
157 Lawrence, The Vietnam War, 92
159 Official Peace Policy of the GDR (June 28, 1965), German Historical Documents and Images [hereafter GHDI], 1-2.
Germany to the imperialist actions of the US. In order to do so, the GDR outlined specifically Bonn’s aggression towards the GDR:

Bonn has sided with United States imperialism without reservation. He [FRG Chancellor Ludwig Erhard] is supporting all military aggressions, especially the crime in Vietnam, with propaganda, huge sums of money, and by supplying materials. This is the price that Erhard had to pay for U.S. support of the grab for nuclear weapons by the Hitler-generals in Bonn. The Erhard government wants to bring the brutal U.S. rape methods [used] in Southeast Asia to central Europe. West German foreign minister [Gerhard] Schröder demanded: “We must be prepared to use short-term changes in the state of world policy affairs to our advantage.” This is the voice of the adventure-tactics of incorrigible world conquerors.\footnote{161} 

The East Germans did not stop with this initial indictment of the West German support for American “imperialism” in Vietnam. As the US embarked on a steep military escalation in Vietnam beginning in 1965, the GDR’s continual linkage of the FRG to the US’s war effort was employed to drum up opposition to the war amongst both the East and West German populace.

While the East German position exaggerated the levels of aggression that Bonn was undertaking against them, the Peace Policy was not entirely wrong in its assertion of the FRG’s overall approval of the American military escalation in Vietnam. Recognizing the importance of a strong relationship with Washington and fearing US troop withdrawal from the FRG, Chancellor Erhard demonstrated unwavering support for US actions in Vietnam during the early years of the war.\footnote{162} West Germany had taken favorable actions towards South Vietnam in 1963, being among one of the first nations to recognize the new government of General Duong Van Minh and sending 15 million Deutsche Marks’ worth of economic aid to RVN, in the hopes that Washington would respond with more substantial concessions.\footnote{163} Washington persistently pressured Bonn to increase their commitments

\footnote{161} “Official Peace Policy of the GDR,” 1.  
\footnote{163} Blang, “A Reappraisal of Germany’s Vietnam Policy,” 343-44.
to assisting South Vietnam with little promise that the West Germans would receive much in return. George C. McGhee, the US ambassador to West Germany, informed the State Department in a 16 May 1964 telegram that the FRG “responded favorably” to increasing aid to South Vietnam, and expressed his hopes that a Presidential message would convey gratitude for “the strong German support to our policy in South Vietnam.” 164 Such positivity from Bonn served as a justification for Washington to continually press the West Germans for more support in Vietnam. Fearing unfriendly relations with their most critical ally, the FRG had no choice but to follow along.

As the US began to send more combat troops to Vietnam, Erhard found it increasingly challenging to fully align himself with the US position towards Vietnam. Erhard’s difficulties centered around the fact that Washington effectively linked the issue of not altering the levels of US troops in the FRG in exchange for West Germany to offset the cost of stationing US troops in the country. 165 This fear of troop reductions, or even worse, complete abandonment of US military protection, provided the US with extraordinary leverage over the FRG. Meeting with US President Lyndon B. Johnson in June 1965, Erhard “welcomed the President’s assurance that the United States would maintain its forces in Europe,” later reaffirming his belief on “the importance of mutual solidarity in dealing with communist aggression.” 166

While Erhard received affirmations from Johnson over protection, Erhard found himself increasingly unenthusiastic about the further expansion of the conflict. When Erhard met with French President Charles de Gaulle later that month, Erhard pressed his support for US positions asserting that “the Americans are fighting there [Vietnam] for reasons of treaties and solemn obligations.” 167 Erhard’s willingness to

back Washington in Vietnam was rooted in his trust that the US would, in turn, continue to defend the FRG and West Berlin. However, if the US were unable to take a stand and defend South Vietnam against communist aggression, the fallout of such a defeat would be strongly felt in West Germany.

Washington continued to push Bonn to increase their aid to South Vietnam, putting Erhard in a much more difficult position by the end of 1965. In the months preceding Erhard’s December 1965 visit to the US, Washington heightened its requests for greater allied support in Vietnam. Most notably, the US attempted to pressure the FRG to uphold the offset agreements, send non-military personnel to the RVN, and push West German businesses to enter the South Vietnamese markets, but Johnson went so far as to raise the possibility of a direct West German military contribution. With pressure coming from Johnson, Erhard replied to the US president that he did not believe it was “possible under their existing legislation to send military units to Vietnam,” saying that instead, “perhaps it could be done on a voluntary basis.” Erhard recognized that it was becoming increasingly difficult, if not nearly impossible, to fulfill all of Washington’s desires when it came to their Vietnam policy. By April 1966, Bonn learned of plans that 15,000 American troops were slated to leave West Germany and instead be sent to Vietnam due to their failure of not paying the offset commitments on time. The offset issue indicated that the Vietnam War had partially fractured the US-FRG alliance. However, there was not much Bonn could do but follow along with Washington.

Erhard visited the US again in September 1966, where Johnson was keen to publicly express the bonds between the US and the FRG. In the private talks between Johnson and Erhard, disagreements about Vietnam continually intensified. Yet, the optics and formalities of a diplomatic visit provided a cover to the growing fractures within the US-FRG alliance. During a dinner toast at a White House banquet held in Erhard’s honor, Johnson used the opportunity to express appreciation for West German efforts in Vietnam:

by Lloyd C. Gardner and Ted Gittinger (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), 151.
169 “Memorandum of Conversation between President Johnson and Chancellor Erhard, After the White House Dinner, 20 December 1965,” FRUS, 1964-68, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin, Document 141.
And in Vietnam tonight are your doctors and your teachers who have come there from Germany, and your medicine and your economic assistance—all devoted to spelling hope to aid a struggling, freedom-seeking people. You seem to understand how deep is our concern for South Vietnam and how earnestly our thoughts these days are turned in that direction. But you also know that America’s efforts in Southeast Asia can and will never diminish our concern for the security of Europe and the Atlantic, because, Mr. Chancellor, more than one ocean commands our interest. Mr. Chancellor, no one need doubt the American commitment to Europe’s future. We keep our commitments in Vietnam and we keep them every place that we have them.  

Although Johnson praised West German efforts and provided reassurances of US protections of the country, growing disagreements and greater US pressures for increased commitments dominated Erhard’s visit. While Erhard continually offered “to again review how much more they could do to support the US in Viet-Nam,” Johnson was unwavering on the offset payment issue as the US was beginning to face financial difficulties funding the rapidly expanding war. Upon returning home, Erhard also faced growing domestic challenges on top of a declining relationship with the US. The FRG’s economic problems deepened, triggering a recession that led to his resignation in November 1966.

Erhard’s insistence on supporting the US war efforts in Vietnam certainly influenced his downfall. Recognizing the significance of the FRG’s reliance on the US for its own protection, Erhard had no choice but to support the US war in Vietnam.

**Responding to an Escalating War**

Unlike the FRG, the GDR was not tied down to an ally who committed themselves to a direct combat role fighting in Vietnam. The actions taken by the GDR during the years of the war’s escalation indicate that the GDR was more enthusiastic about providing consistent support to North Vietnam. The US began to increase its ground presence

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in Vietnam after the National Liberation Front (NLF), or Viet Cong, attacked an American base at Pleiku on 7 February 1965, sparking a US retaliation bombing of North Vietnam. 174 Weeks after the attack at Pleiku, a report was sent to the State Department from the US embassy in Saigon detailing that a ship carrying large quantities of weapons, ammunition, and medicine for the NLF sank off the RVN Coast. 175 Washington concluded that the findings “furnishes by far the most dramatic evidence of Hanoi involvement yet uncovered in the war,” especially since the supplies were manufactured in communist nations, including the GDR. 176 This discovery provided the US with a greater rationale to step up their operations against both the DRV and the NLF since nations like East Germany were actively arming the Viet Cong guerrilla fighters.

As the US American war effort in Vietnam intensified, Washington remained concerned with active global communist support for the NLF. Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff indicated that the NLF maintained international representation, including in East Germany, which was a cause for US concern since Washington knew “very little about the caliber, status and personality of any of the individuals in place.” 177 While the growing international reach of the NLF was a headache for the US, for a communist nation like the GDR, to have close links with the NLF through representatives in East Germany offered the GDR a valuable connection. Open dialogue with the NLF allowed the East Germans to continually promote pro-Soviet viewpoints within communist circles in Vietnam, especially as Chinese influence was still prevalent.

As reported by East German diplomats in the region, the leaders of both North Vietnam and the NLF continued to embrace Chinese viewpoints. As the Sino-Soviet relationship remained strained, the GDR played a critical role as another pro-Soviet nation that could help tilt the

174 Lawrence, The Vietnam War, 89.
176 “Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State, Saigon, February 23, 1965.”
North Vietnamese closer to the Soviets and share information on the Chinese with Moscow. When Otto Winzer, the East German Foreign Minister, updated the SED Politburo on the situation in Vietnam, much of his focus centered on the presence and influence of the Chinese in the DRV. Winzer identified that factions within DRV and NLF leadership remained divided between, “comrades who follow the Chinese line” and “comrades who recognize that the Chinese harm the national interests of the Vietnamese.” He also noted that the Soviet delegation that was sent to Hanoi offered to increase Soviet assistance on all fronts to limit American abilities to “broaden the war,” which was “in the interests of the socialist camp and of the struggle for peace.” With the Soviets offering to boost their aid to the Vietnamese communist struggle, the East Germans would have to act in unison with their Soviet allies to effectively limit Chinese influences. As such, East Germany continued its efforts to assist the North Vietnamese the best it could.

In addition to providing physical assistance, the GDR continued its constant public condemnations of the American war effort. A State Department report from May 1967 included comments from an East German official on the American bombings of North Vietnam. An unnamed GDR official, according to the Defense Department, had asserted that “the destruction of American air raids compares in magnitude to the damage inflicted on Germany during World War II.” The GDR official’s remarks seek to continually frame the US as the aggressors, who are destroying entire cities in Vietnam, like they did in Germany decades prior. Specifically, the East German official underscores the magnitude of destruction of North Vietnamese industry, including the fact that “several sugar factories, for example, constructed

by the East Germans in North Vietnam have been totally destroyed.”

The mention of East German-constructed sugar factories in North Vietnam is significant since it highlights the significant role GDR aid played in building up critical industry in the DRV. East German physical support through building critical industry had a positive effect on the North Vietnamese, yet it was another form of East German aid that would prove to be even more wide reaching in aiding their war effort.

The most profound contribution provided by the GDR to the DRV was assisting the North Vietnamese in improving their intelligence abilities. The East German Ministry for State Security (better known as the Stasi), had established itself as one of the world’s top intelligence services and sought to play an increasingly active role internationally. With the US escalating their war efforts on North Vietnam, the North Vietnamese Ministry of Public Security first reached out to the Stasi, laying the foundations for a relationship to develop by 1965. Following years of poor DRV-GDR relations due to East Germany’s close partnership with the Soviets, the need for intelligence during the war offered the opportunity to forge a new path forward between the two socialist states. The first substantial expansion of the intelligence relationship came in September 1966 when the DRV Minister for Public Security, Tran Quoc Hoan, visited the GDR where he met with Erich Mielke, the GDR Minister for State Security. Both figures during the meeting were keen to assist each other in their joint struggles against the “American imperialists,” with Mielke requesting American weapons be sent to the GDR to “gain new insights,” while offering to send Stasi agents, technology, and money to help the Vietnamese war effort.

With such assistance from a leading intelligence operation, the DRV was better equipped to fight back against their enemies both on the battlefields and amongst the North Vietnamese population.

By aiding the DRV to fight against the forces of imperialism, the Stasi also enabled the North Vietnamese security services to develop tighter surveillance of their own citizens. Along with new equipment

185 Grossheim, 11.
and training techniques to track down enemies of the state and establishing networks of informants, the Stasi also played a crucial role in creating a central repository for identity cards, with an official documents department within the DRV Ministry of Public Security established in 1968.\textsuperscript{186} Public Safety Minister Hoan wanted a network that included “individuals of many different types and from any different social classes in order to uncover and combat all types of counterrevolutionary targets, especially spies conducting secret operations.”\textsuperscript{187} The methods shared by the Stasi to the North Vietnamese were directly taken from their methods that had found success being implemented in the GDR.

By 1971, a formal security assistance agreement between the GDR and DRV secured the close bond between the two socialist states. Milke approved these plans for continued GDR support for the DRV’s intelligence and security services in December 1971.\textsuperscript{188} Along with providing financial support to the North Vietnamese, the East Germans also planned to increase deliveries of essential intelligence equipment to the DRV beginning in 1972. To “ensure order and safety in the development of socialism” in the DRV, the increased Stasi support was motivated by “the possible expansion of the war in the DRV.”\textsuperscript{189} Even though the Americans were beginning to reduce their presence in Vietnam, the socialist cause was centered around unifying the entirety of Vietnam under a socialist government. As such, the increase of GDR intelligence assistance would enable the DRV to continually fight on against the South, while also preparing for the DRV’s anticipated need to surveille state enemies upon their contemplated victory.\textsuperscript{190}

Compared to the active role in assisting their Vietnamese allies by the GDR, the FRG did not express the same amount of enthusiasm about assisting the war effort compared to when it first began. While the GDR continued to stand in firm line with the Soviet views and actions on Vietnam, the FRG faced a much different situation due to direct US involvement. As Washington continued its escalation of the war effort,

\begin{footnotesize}
\bibitem{186} Grossheim, “Fraternal Support,” 15; 18-19.
\bibitem{187} Grossheim, 20.
\bibitem{189} “Excerpts from the Perspective Plan of the Ministry of State Security (MfS) for the Years 1971-1975,” 1971.
\bibitem{190} Grossheim, “Fraternal Support,” 28.
\end{footnotesize}
Bonn increasingly attempted to distance itself from US policy in Vietnam and instead prioritized other foreign policy objectives in their discussions with the US. Instead of becoming intertwined with Washington on the Vietnam issue, like under Erhard, the new Chancellor, Kurt Georg Kiesinger, and his Foreign Minister, and eventual successor as Chancellor, Willy Brandt, focused more on developing a more unique and independent West German foreign policy. Brandt as foreign minister “had to refrain from giving the Americans advice in public,” but asserted Bonn’s new position that the FRG “declined to shoulder an impossible commitment or venture into a grey zone by declaring our ‘moral support’ as the previous Federal Administration had done.” As such, the new foreign policy approach adopted by Kiesinger and Brandt would no longer place such a heavy emphasis on being completely in line with the US. American escalations in Vietnam effectively paved the way for a more independent West German foreign policy. Despite the damage done to the relationship and their differences of opinion over Vietnam, Bonn understood it was vital to the FRG’s own security and prosperity to maintain amicable ties with Washington.

In his first meeting with Kiesinger, Johnson made it clear to the West German Chancellor that the war in Vietnam was more of a pressing foreign policy challenge than security concerns in Europe. The talks were held in Bonn on 24 April 1967, as Johnson was in Bonn for former Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s funeral. In the meeting, Johnson was frank, informing Kiesinger that “he was facing complex problems in other parts of the world,” but still assured Kiesinger that “he and the German people were right at the top of the list of American attention.” Despite Johnson’s statement of support for the FRG, the continual American escalation in Vietnam by 1967 indicated that Vietnam required most of Johnson’s attention. Nevertheless, Johnson made it known to Kiesinger that “despite the fact that so much time and sacrifice had to be given for the support of the U.S. fighting men in Viet-Nam ... there was hardly any question that he was giving more time and attention to—to the relationship of the United States with Germany and the other

European nations." Johnson’s statements undoubtedly helped somewhat to repair some of the damage that the Vietnam War caused on the US-West German relationship. However, continual American escalations of the war ensured that the FRG would continue to shift its foreign policy approaches and that damage was already inflicted on the alliance.

The growing West German dissatisfaction with US policy in Vietnam was well known in Washington by 1967. Since Bonn believed US interests in Europe were declining due to the escalation of the Vietnam War, the State Department concluded that even though “the FRG still wants an alliance with the US,” the FRG “will probably never again follow the US lead in foreign policy so completely as it did under Erhard.” These views were confirmed by Harvard University Professor Henry Kissinger, who met with Chancellor Kiesinger in Bonn on 10 January 1968. Kissinger shared his thoughts on the meeting with Alfred Puhan, the State Department’s Director of the Office of German Affairs. Puhan was informed that the Chancellor asserted to Kissinger on Vietnam that the FRG “had no intention of criticizing or interfering with, US actions in this area.” In response, Kissinger shared his belief that “it was erroneous to believe that a premature US withdrawal from Vietnam would lead to increased US presence in Europe.” While Kiesinger is making his thoughts known that the US position Vietnam is of secondary importance to the FRG, Kissinger’s remarks provide a reminder to the Chancellor that the US foreign policy goals are not entirely independent of one another and are instead linked. As such, a US decision to withdraw troops from Vietnam did mean that they would automatically be relocated to Europe instead.

Possible parallel American troop withdrawals in Vietnam and Europe continued to dominate discussions between US and FRG leaders. In an April 1968 meeting between US Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford,

194 “Memorandum of Conversation, Bonn, April 24, 1967.”
195 “Policy Planning Council report regarding relations between the U.S. and West Germany. Topics include: historical background of Germany; West German foreign policy; U.S. attitude toward West Germany; U.S. interest in West Germany,” United States: Department Of State, 1 Nov. 1967, USDDO, 11.
196 “Letter From the First Secretary of Embassy in Germany (Imhof) to the Director of the Office of German Affairs (Puhan), Bonn, January 10, 1968.” FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin, Document 243.
197 “Letter From the First Secretary of the Embassy in Germany.”
Divided Nation, Collective Objections

and West German Minister of Defense Gerhard Schröder, Vietnam dominated the conversation, especially the newfound American desires to reach a peace settlement. Schröder expressed his views that while the FRG would undoubtedly welcome the US reaching a peace agreement in Vietnam, “the question of US forces in Europe cannot be considered without also considering Vietnam.” With the Soviets becoming more aggressive in Eastern Europe with their invasion of Czechoslovakia, Schröder asserted that “now is a poor time to change the balance of forces in Europe.” Even though Bonn had been attempting to distance itself from the US efforts in Vietnam, there was no doubt that the security of the FRG was based around the presence of US troops in West Germany. Bonn was forced to continue a wait-and-see type approach to see how the US military commitments to European security would be affected by an American exit from Vietnam.

Changes in leadership in both the US and the FRG in 1969 resulted in more shifts in each country’s foreign policies, thus further testing the strength of the US-FRG alliance. In the US, Richard Nixon was elected to the presidency by campaigning on the pledge to obtain a “peace with honor” in Vietnam by undertaking new diplomatic and military strategies to achieve this goal. Nixon began a path of “Vietnamization” in which the US would transition more of the war responsibilities to the RVN forces, thus freeing the US to devote more attention to foreign policy concerns elsewhere in the globe. Meanwhile, in the FRG, Willy Brandt was elected and built his primary foreign policy focus around Ostpolitik, in which the FRG would seek to improve their relations with the GDR, Soviet Union, and other Eastern European Nations. Brandt’s attempts to craft a more independent West German foreign policy raised concerns in Washington as the Nixon administration itself sought to pursue détente with the East on its own

199 “Summary of a discussion between the West German Defense Minister,” 6.
200 Lawrence, The Vietnam War, 137.
201 Lawrence, 144-45.
202 Caldwell and Hanshew, Germany Since 1945, 152-53.
terms by tying the Vietnam War to the issue of east-west rapprochement.  

The diverging foreign policy approaches that were being pursued by the US and the FRG dominated the December 1971 discussions between Nixon and Brandt in Key Biscayne, Florida. Ahead of the meeting Nixon briefed the President on what to expect from his meeting with Brandt. Even though the two leaders were attempting new foreign policy approaches, the two allies were not on the same page. As such, Kissinger advised Nixon that “it is essential that the Allies harmonize their individual approaches within a common framework.” However, this goal would be increasingly difficult to accomplish due to the growing rift in US-West German relations partially brought about by the Vietnam War. As such, in their meeting on December 29, 1971, the situation in Vietnam was a secondary topic. The only mention of Vietnam came when Nixon informed Brandt that “the US involvement casualties and sacrifices have steadily declined.” The two leaders instead spent most of their time covering “China, European problems, FRG and US relations, and that on the whole, these relations were excellent.” Compared to earlier exchanges between US and West German leaders, the minimal attention given to Vietnam indicates that both nations were facing larger foreign policy priorities entering into 1972.

Following the Nixon-Brandt meeting in Key Biscayne, US and FRG foreign policy changes were clearly visible. Nixon had continued his gradual withdrawal of US troops in Vietnam, but a renewed communist offensive in the spring threatened US foreign policy efforts.

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204 Brandt’s main foreign policy initiative that sought to change the status quo approach adopted by previous West German chancellors was his “Eastern Policy” (*Ostpolitik*). At the core of this approach were Brandt’s initiatives to normalize relations with East Germany, the Soviet Union, and other communist nations. For an overview of the Nixon Administration’s views on *Ostpolitik*, see Juneau, “Limits of Linkage,” 277-97.


beyond Vietnam in terms of détente with both China and the Soviet Union. Brandt, too, was pursuing détente across the German border with the GDR, and other nations in Eastern Europe, with the Bundestag, preparing for ratification votes for Moscow and Warsaw Treaties. Seeking to continually link the new events in Vietnam to the diplomatic advances in the FRG, Nixon’s National Security Advisor Kissinger reached out to West German State Secretary Egon Bahr. Kissinger informed Bahr on 8 April 1972 that the US views on the “long range East-West relationships,” have been dampened due to new “problems posed by a massive invasion of South Vietnam based on Soviet arms.” Moscow had asked if Washington was able to sway FRG parliamentarians to vote in favor of the treaty, but Kissinger informed the Soviets that the US “could not be active in Bonn” as long as the Soviets were “undermining America’s position in Southeast Asia.” Although the treaties were independent initiatives of the FRG, Bonn still recognized damaging relations with the US was a far worse outcome than constructing normalization with the Soviets. Kissinger’s strong reaction indicates how the US continually saw its foreign policy initiatives and relations worldwide as intertwined with the Vietnam War.

Public Reactions: The Media and Citizenry

Over time, public reactions towards the Vietnam War on both sides of the inner German border would ultimately come to mirror the same paths taken by their governments. In particular, some of the most significant reactions were expressed in both East and West Germany by the media and the citizenry. In the GDR, these outlooks on the war amongst the media and citizens in the East remained consistent in wanting to stand in solidarity with their socialist allies in the face of imperialist aggression. In contrast, West Germany's initial approvals of the American-led war effort diminished substantially over time with the rise of critical reporting and mass anti-war protest movements.

208 Lawrence, The Vietnam War, 153-54.
209 Caldwell and Hanshew, Germany Since 1945, 155.
The Media

The central strategy of the East German state-run media was to mimic the government’s approach of linking the FRG as closely as possible to the US’s effort. Such a strategy was implemented in an attempt to elicit a strong reaction from the East German population. These efforts were outlined on June 12, 1965, when the Politburo released Guideline No. 66 to the East German media, specifically instructed GDR media outlets to play up the supposed FRG military involvement in Vietnam. The official SED newspaper, Neues Deutschland, followed these instructions when it ran a frontpage story on 4 September 1965, entitled “Bundeswehr takes part in aggression in Vietnam.” The Neues Deutschland story pushed claims that 120 West German air force officers were taking part in the American air war, as part of a secret new FRG regiment called the “Vietnam Legion.” Such a story was sensationalized as West German Chancellor Erhard had committed not to send any FRG troops to Vietnam despite the US’s calls. However, printing fake news stories about Vietnam proved to be beneficial to the East Germans. The stories fulfilled the regime’s desire to clamor up support in the East and raise doubts in the West by framing the FRG as complicit in aiding the American war effort.

Sensationalist stories that highlighted the imperialistic American actions in Vietnam continued to dominate the pages of Neues Deutschland as the war in Vietnam intensified. The US Central Intelligence Agency reported on a story that ran in Neues Deutschland on January 2, 1966, alleging that the US was carrying out a “diplomatic diversion in order to extend its aggression in Vietnam,” with another East German report the next day alleging that “American ultras demand atomic pressure against Hanoi if the so-called US peace offensive should fail.” The East German press continually ran hit pieces on US’s imperialist actions against Vietnam that complemented the talking points made by the SED regime. Intense headlines targeting American aggression in Vietnam such as “Adventurous Plan of the Pentagon,” or “Poison War Against Women and Children in Vietnam,” frequently appeared in GDR

212 Peter Busch, “The ‘Vietnam Legion’: West German Psychological Warfare against East German Propaganda in the 1960s,” Journal of Cold War Studies 16, no. 3 (Summer 2014): 171.
214 Busch, 164-65.
Furthermore, beginning in March 1966, *Neues Deutschland* began to describe the war to its readers as the American “war of annihilation (Vernichtungskrieg).” The imperialist labels were not only exclusive to the US but were also frequently used by the GDR press to place blame on the atrocities in Vietnam on the FRG due to its close association with the US. The emergence of this “guilt-by-association” tactic ensured that the GDR could continually attack the FRG’s positions on Vietnam and their endorsement and support for “a ruthless genocide.”

GDR publications began to publish harsher and more absurd claims as the war continued. This print assault by the GDR press intensified the East’s anti-American and anti-West German rhetoric through comparisons between the US’s imperialist actions in Vietnam with the fascism of the Nazis. In 1967, *Neues Deutschland* released a piece entitled “in Hitler’s Tracks,” which offered readers a comparison between “pacification attempts by South Vietnam and the United States to the early phase of Hitler’s conquest.” This article was followed by another, “The Nazi Cross on the US Dollar,” which made connections between the treatment of the Vietnamese people and suppression of minorities in the US, both of which *Neues Deutschland* claimed were being funded and supported by the FRG. Just as the GDR Peace Council’s 1965 peace policy had drawn parallels between US actions in Vietnam and Germany’s Nazi’s past, the GDR media played a critical role in furthering this comparison.

The other central theme that dominated East German reporting of the Vietnam War was the need to stand in solidarity with their North Vietnamese comrades. The official East German definition of solidarity were actions that offered “mutual support and commitment, the willingness to help and sacrifice,” making solidarity “a basic principle of the working class and all progressive forces.” With this definition in

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219 Horton, 564
220 Horton, 564.
mind, it was only natural that the term “solidarity” frequently appeared in East German news stories about the Vietnam War. *Neues Deutschland* featured over 5,600 articles on the topic “solidarity” during the Vietnam War period, indicating a clear desire for the GDR to make the socialist struggle in Vietnam well known to the population.\(^\text{222}\) Along with the printed publication of *Neues Deutschland*, because all media in the GDR was entirely state-controlled, these sentiments of “solidarity” with the North Vietnamese cause were also frequented in radio and television broadcasts.\(^\text{223}\)

This reporting combined with the GDR government narratives ensured a unified message of East German support for the Vietnamese struggle. The state-run media in the GDR directly contrasted with the independent press that operated in the FRG. Since the West German press functioned freely from government interference, divergences in opinion from government positions were able to emerge. However, early West German sentiments towards the Vietnam War in print were largely positive. The news of all-partisan stances tended to frame Vietnam as a US-led stance against the spread of communism, which connected the security of the FRG and West Berlin.\(^\text{224}\) This favorable stance towards the war also extended to television coverage as news programs expressed similar approvals of the US’s “crusade of liberty,” to defend South Vietnam.\(^\text{225}\) With statements like these, the media made it clear to the governments in both Washington and Bonn and the West German populace of their overall endorsement of US actions in Vietnam. However, as the war intensified, the initial sympathy deteriorated.

The US’s continual escalation of the Vietnam War directly accounted for the emergence of mixed coverage of the war within the West German media as early as 1966. A popular foreign affairs television program, *Weltspiegel (Mirror of the World)*, ran a half-hour special entitled “The Hopeless War,” which came to the bleak conclusion that “never was America further away from losing this war – and never further away from winning it.”\(^\text{226}\) In the printed publication more pessimistic

\(^{222}\) Witkowski, “Between Beggars and Fighters,” 75.
\(^{223}\) Witkowski, 75.
\(^{226}\) Horton, 9.
reporting also emerged after the US resumption of bombing North Vietnam after failed negotiations in December 1966. Newspapers across West Germany covered the events but developed differing conclusions. On one side, the Stuttgarter Zeitung took a hard stance against Johnson’s decision to bomb, concluding that “the women and children killed in Hanoi will further blacken the image of the US President, who must now decide to fight harshly or endlessly.”

Unsurprisingly, partially due to West Berlin’s location surrounded by the GDR and heightened American desires to defend the city, the Berliner Morgenpost takes a more positive stance. The publication struck more of a benevolent take by pointing out by pointing out the proximity of military targets with civilian areas, saying that “the bombing of houses cannot always be avoided.” These independent West German media outlets taking the opposite sides on the issue of US escalation demonstrates how the print reporting in the FRG was beginning to turn negative against the American war effort.

In the following years, the West German media continued its increasingly adverse reporting on US policy in Vietnam, with the events of the Tet Offensive solidifying the negative views of the war in the media. Just as it did in the US, the surprise attacks of the Tet Offensive appeared on West German television screens and were described in length in West German newspapers. The US Information Agency best summarized the collective reporting on the Tet Offensive in a report entitled “German Disbelief,” with one West German publication determining that “now American credibility is completely destroyed.”

Even though that growing skepticism had been present within West German reporting of the Vietnam War, the Tet Offensive offered journalists and citizens alike the opportunity to solidify their opposition to the American war effort. These views would only grow increasingly cynical in the years following Tet. West German media reported on the horrors of the continual American bombing campaigns and killing of civilians in Vietnam, making comparisons to Germany’s Nazi past, during a time when the discourse was growing in the FRG surrounding that dark chapter of German history.

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also made comparisons involving the US in Vietnam and the Nazi atrocities, the sentiments expressed in the FRG were much profound as there was a sense of genuine wrongdoing behind the US actions, rather than a typical GDR attack line. Despite operating independently of the government, the West German media experienced a similar response to the Vietnam War, shifting from initial acceptance to eventual disapproval. Since the media did not have to maintain good diplomatic standing like the FRG government did, the press came to develop stronger views against the Vietnam War.

The Citizenry

To fully extend support for the communist cause in Vietnam, the goal of the GDR was to mobilize as much of the population as possible. By doing so, the GDR achieved their goal of standing in solidarity with their North Vietnamese comrades through visible shows of support and mass campaigns to support the war against imperialism. Once the US began its escalation of the war effort in 1965, one of the first East German responses was to form a dedicated “Vietnam Committee” within the state-run Solidarity Committee, which was tasked with organizing the East German people’s support for the North Vietnamese.232 One of the main tasks of the Vietnam Committee was to arrange mass campaigns to gather financial support for the North Vietnamese causes. This wide-ranging approach called for the East German people to donate money towards campaigns such as “Bicycles for Vietnam,” “Sewing Machines for Vietnam,” and “Notepads for Vietnam’s Children.”233 Along with the collections from these campaigns, the GDR Solidarity Committee also developed close connections with local partners in Vietnam who were receiving the aid. These campaigns allowed the East German regime to turn the rhetoric of solidarity into actions that directly benefited North Vietnam. Since the GDR citizens contributed to the cause, the regime could use the public contributions to the solidarity campaigns to bolster its image as an active supporter of the North Vietnamese efforts.

Along with using solidarity campaigns, films became a valuable tool for the GDR to further mobilize its population. The creation of anti-war documentary films allowed the GDR to extend its anti-imperialist messaging further by selecting negative aspects of the war to showcase to the East German public. Two leading East German filmmakers, Walter

Heynowski and Gerhard Scheumann, were tasked with making documentaries that specifically raised criticisms against American imperialist actions in Vietnam and West German support for these actions. One 1968 documentary film series entitled *Piloten im Pyjama* (*Pilots in Pajamas*) highlighted the US role in Vietnam through interviews with ten American pilots who were now prisoners of war, having been shot down during the bombing campaigns over the DRV. Rather than frame the interviewed American pilots as evil, the series took a different approach to implicate the American pilots as guilty of war crimes. Instead, the filmmakers intended for the viewers to come away with the impression that the American pilots were blindly following their orders to unknowingly commit atrocities, drawing parallels to the Nazis on trial at Nuremberg. While these films like *Piloten im Pyjama* were widely watched throughout the GDR, the filmmakers and GDR government encouraged the spreading of GDR documentary films abroad for viewing throughout the Eastern Bloc, the Third World, and even in Western Europe.  

By the 1970s, the East German solidarity efforts were reaching new levels. At first, there was initial hesitation among the East German population to contribute and participate in solidarity campaigns, partially due to racial sentiments. A 1966 Stasi report on blood drives in Leipzig noted that some of the population did not want to provide “the yellow race with white blood.” Anti-Vietnamese racial sentiments continued in the GDR, especially as Vietnamese guest workers and students were invited to the GDR beginning in the 1950s, continuing through the Vietnam War period. Yet, the desire of the SED regime to extend support to the DRV outweighed any hesitations held by the East German populace. As such, the solidarity campaigns in the GDR remained consistently strong, even as the US was in the process of completing its withdrawal from Vietnam. A February 1973 Stasi report from Dresden identified “thousands of new acts of solidarity and donation campaigns,” which was best seen through the fact that “many workers are willing to donate between 1-5% of their yearly bonus and an ever-larger number have increased their monthly solidarity donations.” This massive mobilization of the populace through

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234 Horton, “Sailing in the Shadow,” 567
235 Horton, 569.
solidarity campaigns and voluntary donations in the East was in direct contrast to the negative positions that gradually were emerging in the West.

In the early years of American involvement in Vietnam, a fair amount of the West German population was receptive to American military actions. Polls conducted by the Institut fur Demoskopie Allensbach in February 1965 concluded that 91 percent of the FRG population was aware of the US efforts in Vietnam. However, only 33 percent approved of American escalation, while 27 percent opposed it, and the rest remained undecided. 238 Starting from such a large percentage of uncertainty among the West German population, American escalations in the following years grew the numbers of those opposed to the war. The deepening involvement of American efforts in Vietnam also revealed what West Germans thought of potentially sending their own units to fight in Vietnam. A 1966 survey showed that an overwhelming majority of 81 percent of West Germans rejected the proposal of direct German military intervention in Vietnam. 239 Following the events of the Tet Offensive in 1968, most West Germans now stood against the US war in Vietnam, with 56 percent of the population opposing continued American fighting in the war. 240 These polls help to showcase that the increase of American efforts in Vietnam ran parallel with an increase in West German reactions against the war. However, these negative opinions felt by West Germans towards the US war in Vietnam are best seen through the actions of groups of citizens within the FRG against the war.

Intellectuals and students played a massive role in voicing and organizing opposition to the Vietnam War in the FRG. Herbert Marcuse, who emerged as one of the leading figures of the “Frankfurt School” thought movement, emerged as a strong opponent of the Vietnam War. Specifically, Marcuse identifies that opposition amongst students and younger generations towards the war will be the strongest:

The opposition among intellectuals and the younger generation, especially at the universities, is probably the most vocal, visible, and effective opposition in this category. As I have already mentioned, even the radical opposition among college students and young people is not a socialist or a communist opposition.

240 Page, 235.
Mistrust of ideologies of all kinds (and these young men and women regard communism, socialism, and Marxism as ideologies) is a critical factor in this movement. The slogan “We don’t trust anyone over thirty” is characteristic of the situation. One can often hear: “These older generations have dragged us into the muck we are now in. What they have to say to us can no longer mean anything to us.”

Marcuse identified student groups as the leaders of a potential opposition to the Vietnam War because they stood apart from West German society on both ideological and generational differences. This disillusionment helped fuel the West German Socialist Students’ Federation (SDS) which was becoming increasingly interested in taking “direct action” to protest the Vietnam War, garnering inspiration from American students who were also protesting against the war in the US. The clearest example of learning from American tactics was the organization of sit-ins on German college campuses, with one of the largest taking place at the Free University of Berlin on 22 June 1966. Sit-ins demonstrated to the protesting students that they could take collective action to take a stand against issues like the Vietnam War. Like in other instances throughout the Western world, student protests in West Germany put considerable pressure on their government and their fellow citizens to reconsider their support for the American war effort. The growing shift in West German public opinion coincided with large marches organized by students, such as the “Day of International Protest Against the Vietnam War” march on the Kurfürstendamm, held on October 21, 1967. While these actions spearheaded by students against the Vietnam War were designed to be peaceful, a small but influential number of militant radicals within these groups rose to prominence.

In West Germany, like elsewhere in the Western world, new leaders who called for transformational societal changes emerged within the student groups. To fight back against the American-backed “establishment” in the FRG, leaders began to call for violence against the West German government, media, and industry. Individuals like Rudi

243 Klimke, The Other Alliance, 71.
244 Klimke, 150.
Dutschke emerged as one of the primary advocates for enacting violence in the FRG to oppose the Vietnam War in the hopes of achieving more profound changes in West Germany. Having risen up through the SDS, Dutschke was among one of the most recognizable political activists in the FRG by 1967. Such notoriety allowed Dutschke to land an interview with Der Spiegel, in which he outlined a proposed plan to protest the war. Dutschke made clear that he and his followers will “take a closer look at the factories in Frankfurt, Munich, Hamburg, or West Berlin that directly or indirectly supply the American army in Vietnam with chemical and electronic installations.” Dutschke claimed he wanted to simply see “how these factories operate,” asserting that the goal was “not to blow them up, but to make it clear through the outreach to minorities in these factories that one cannot agree to supporting oppression in Vietnam.” While Dutschke adamantly rejects the possibility of violence against these factories supporting the US war effort, the emergence of extremist militant movements in the FRG by the late 1960s changed the nature of opposition to the Vietnam War.

The rise of political extremist violence in West Germany was similarly motivated to oppose the American-led — and West German-supported — war due to its perceived unethical nature. However, unlike the student movement which sought to raise new radical ideological alternatives in the late 1960s, extremist militants were intent on using violence to deliver a more profound revolutionary change. One of the first instances of violent extremism against the Vietnam War in the FRG came in April 1968 when two Frankfurt department stores were bombed as an act of protest against West Germany’s support for the war. While extremists encompassed a small fraction of the opposition to the Vietnam War, their promotion of violence undermined many of the efforts begun by the students to promote change in West German society.

The growing impact of extremist militancy to oppose the Vietnam War in West Germany was made possible as a handful of students were among the first who embraced the shift to extremism. This change can

246 “Rudi Dutschke Demands the Expropriation of the Springer Press Empire,” 5.
247 For the differentiation of “radicalism” and “extremism” within the context of the late 1960s see Ignacio, Sanchez-Cuenca, The Historical Roots of Political Violence: Revolutionary Terrorism in Affluent Countries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 20-21.
be attributed through the growing influence of Americans on West German students. Like the West German student activists, some African American soldiers of the US 7th Army in the FRG who were influenced by the Black Panther Movement were also growing disillusioned with the US war efforts in Vietnam. Shared opposition to the Vietnam War helped forge a strong bond between West German students and African Americans in the FRG. In particular, KD Wolff in November 1969 established the Black Panther Solidarity committee in West Germany, hoping that the alliance between German students and African American soldiers could foster an “‘overthrow’ (Umwälzung) of the US ‘centers of imperialism’ and overturn the ‘power of the militarist war machine’ in the heart of Germany.”

Such a message would come to also be supported by the Red Army Faction (RAF), an extremist West German leftist, urban-guerrilla group that employed violent tactics such as assassinations, and bombings to fight back against the authoritarianism of the status quo. To achieve their goals, the RAF would come to adopt a militant-like organizational structure along the lines of the organizational hierarchy employed by the Black Panthers and other leftist groups. Opposition to the war offered West German militant groups that sought to foster profound revolutionary change in the FRG the ideal opportunity to turn their rhetoric into action.

Urban guerrilla groups like the RAF used their opposition to the Vietnam War as a justification to promote and execute violence in West Germany to promote revolutionary change. What was once a peaceful movement to protest the war, was consumed with violence by 1969. Urban guerrilla groups like the RAF began to plan their actions to incite violence against the Vietnam War. Bommi Baumann, one of the more notable militant figures, recounted to protest against the war, he made plans to plant a bomb to “give Mr. Nixon a little scare” during the president’s February 1969 visit to West Berlin. Baumann envisioned that such an action would be coupled with targeting “American industrial firms, banks, police stations, and everything which makes a man into a slave.” The growth of radical militancy in conjunction with

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250 For a complete overview of the rise of the RAF, their ideology, and actions, see Stefan Aust, Baader-Meinhof: The Inside Story of the RAF (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
251 Bommi Baumann, How It All Began: The Personal Account of a West German Urban Guerrilla (Vancouver: Pulp Press, 2000), 47.
252 Baumann, How It All Began, 56-7.
the Vietnam War helps demonstrate how the opposition towards Vietnam in West Germany developed over time. Even though most West Germans disapproved of American actions, the small yet powerful presence of radical militant groups like the RAF in the opposition movement undermined the formation of a broad coalition among the majority of West Germans who opposed the war.

Conclusion

Neither the GDR nor the FRG was directly involved in fighting in the Vietnam War, yet the responses of the two German states to this war had profound impacts on the governments and societies on both sides of the East-West border. The GDR designed its approach to Vietnam in close cooperation with the Soviet Union and built a working partnership with the North Vietnamese, despite initial disagreements. The East German government’s steadfast support for the cause translated into mobilizing both the state-run media and the populations to stand in firm solidarity with the North Vietnamese fighting in the name of socialism against American-led imperialism. In West Germany, it was the presence of the Americans fighting in Vietnam that directly impacted the FRG’s stance on the war, and the wider reactions. As US efforts intensified, Bonn sought to slowly rescind its support for Washington’s war aims and instead began to formulate uniquely West German positions. At the same time, in the FRG, the media and citizens began to turn against the American war effort as reporting became more critical and protests against the war radicalized.

The outlooks of East and West Germany towards the Vietnam War helps to further demonstrate that despite differences that developed due to the division of Germany, a shared view had ultimately developed across the inner-German border. While other US allies in Europe and nations in the Soviet Bloc opposed the war, the uniqueness of Germany’s divided composition during the Cold War offers an unusual comparison of approaches and reactions to the Vietnam War. What began with distinct differences in outlooks and actions evolved into a united reaction of negativity. While the division between East and West Germany did not produce a war between the two divided states like it did in Vietnam, the two German states and their citizens observed this intense armed conflict that had engulfed a divided society similar to their own from a shared position as outsiders. Evident disparities initially emerged between East and West Germany in the form of each state’s foreign policy, which swayed both media and public’s first reactions towards the
war. However, shared unfavorable views towards the brutality of the never-ending quagmire in Vietnam War strengthened in the two Germanys. For a divided nation where such stark political and ideological contrasts were imposed, the development of collective objections towards the Vietnam War was a remarkably rare instance of agreement during the division of Germany between 1949 and 1990.
Bibliography

Primary Sources: Published Documents


Primary Sources: Memoirs


Secondary Sources


Left Behind
The Burundian Hutus and Continuity of Historical Blindness

Bush: ... [but Americans might] wonder why the hell isn’t the U.N doing something about it—the Burundians eating each other up, 200,000 of them digested each other and there’s not the slightest word in the U.N. about it.

All: [Reaction to 200,000]
Nixon: ...Nobody cares...
Kissinger: You would think with all the bleeding hearts in the country. I was reading about this, they have killed every male of every family that has any education at all—grammar school—Hulus...
Bush and Rogers: Hutus.
Nixon: Wow...why?
Kissinger: Because there was an uprising of the others whose name I keep forgetting.......

Kissinger: It’s a governmental policy. It isn’t that the soldiers are running wild. It’s a
systematic effort to kill the male members of educated...
[Unintelligible]
Nixon: How do they do it?

Bush: Shoot them.
Kissinger: Go around to the villages and shoot them.

Bush: Or take a bayonet and kill them.

Nixon: Good God!  

...  

Nixon: I want hard action. And second, I want to get that Burundi Ambassador’s ass out of there right now and that’s an order.

Kissinger: That should be--
Nixon: Now, goddamnit--
Kissinger: That will be ordered today.

Nixon: Now we--I think you will agree, Henry, we have really had a double standard on this thing.
Kissinger: Oh, sure.

Nixon: In the African Division, you know what I mean, do we care when they kill a poor goddamned Pakistani? Do we care when these damn Africans eat 100,000 people? I mean, it’s really gone too far. What do you think?

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Kissinger: I couldn’t agree more.254

... Since his assumption of power in January, 1971, [Uganda] General Idi Amin has been destroying the elite of all tribes not allied or belonging to his own grouping. The judiciary, top civil servants, academics, the limited professional class and senior army and police officers have been Amin's targets. Amin has not had to eliminate whole tribes to insure his control; he has simply eliminated their leadership with little regard for the consequences of wiping out the economic and intellectual backbone of the country.

There are no reliable estimates of deaths. They most probably number several thousand but not above 10,000 in a population of 10 million. This

compares with over 100,000 deaths in Burundi where the population was 3.5 million.  

... 

**Nixon:** Don’t you really feel, I mean...I mean... just be totally honest—isn’t a person a person goddamnit? You know, there are those that talk about Vietnam...these people far away that we don’t know...and you remember that poor old Chamberlain who talks about the Czechs...that they were far away and we don’t know them very well. Well goddamnit, people are people in my opinion!

**Kissinger:** Well it’s not only that... 

**Nixon:** I don’t mean our national interest gets involved, but every time...every time that anybody else gets involved... you know every time it’s one other or us...and you have a little pressure appear, State goes up the wall. **But I am getting tired of this business of letting these Africans eat 100,000 people and doing nothing about it.**

Situated in central Africa, Burundi is a small, landlocked country that in 1972 was populated by 3.5 million people. Burundi sits within the Great Lakes region of Africa, bordered by Rwanda to the north and Tanzania to the east and southeast. Demographically, Burundi is populated by two ethnic groups of political consequence: the Hutus and the Tutsis.

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256 Conversation Between President Nixon and Henry Kissinger. “Uganda.” National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Camp David Secretary’s Table, Conversation No. 154-7. 24 September 1972. [https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve05p1/d258](https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve05p1/d258)
In 1972, most Westerners were busy watching the Munich Olympics in Germany, while hundreds of thousands of Hutus were being massacred in Burundi. Little was known then about the Burundi genocide; and little continues to be known about this genocide today—its mechanics and scale and the fact that it only ended because “the Tutsi government ha[d] frankly run out of Hutu targets.” The story of the Burundian Hutus is a largely untold narrative, one that has so often been forgotten that when genocide occurred in Rwanda in 1994, very few scholars linked the interethnic threads of violence. Thence, the term historical blindness not only regards the blindness towards Burundi’s history, but also the historiographical blindness in the narrative framework of the Rwandan genocide.

The struggle for power in countries of the Great Lakes region of Africa has often been shown to be chronic, stiffly rooted in exclusion and ethnic tensions. Time after time, power has been the common denominator of divides and conflicts, and the stakeholders of power, it seems, have always been capable of escaping from the slippery slopes of international reprisal for crimes against humanity. Whether it was Uganda (1978-79), Zaire (1996–97) Rwanda (1994), or Burundi (1972)—where conflicts for superiority have frequently led to cycles of vicious bloodlettings, or genocides between distinctive ethnic groups—history has shown that power could be utilized as a means of solidifying a favoured historical narrative of events. Power has allowed the dominant forces of history to assure the complete annihilation of any evidence or information that could turn against them, not merely destroying history—but in turn—altering the historical narrative that would be told and retold to the world; thus making their shared consciousness of events the constructed permanent truth.


I. Introduction

Today the 1972 Burundi genocide has fallen into virtual oblivion—except among the Hutu masses—yet its significance is crucial to understanding subsequent events in both Burundi and Rwanda...

Many Burundian Hutus looked back to 1994 with unease. That year, full-scale interethnic killings erupted north of the border in Rwanda. To many observers, the fact that roughly seventy percent of the over half-million killed were Tutsi was enough to legitimize and publicize that a Hutu-plotted “genocide against Tutsi” had occurred. The wide-eyed Burundians watched helplessly as the acute trauma of Rwandan Tutsis methodically received its due: Hutu génocidaires were globally condemned, and world sympathy towards Tutsis was acquired, all while the longstanding story of the repressed and suppressed Burundian Hutus was swiftly monopolized and diverted into a melting pot of blanket denials.

In the spring and summer of 1972, when Burundi saw the systematic ethnic cleansing of 300,000 educated Hutu elites by an exclusionary Tutsi government, the United Nations (U.N.) and the international community turned a blind eye. In 1988 and 1993, when

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263 The true number of deaths remains unknown to this day. However, estimates range from 150,000-300,000 Hutu elites killed. See the following: René Lemarchand, ed. Forgotten Genocides: Oblivion, Denial, and Memory. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011; René Lemarchand, “The Burundi Genocide.” In Totten, Samuel, William S. Parsons, and Israel W. Charny, Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts, 321–35. New York: Routledge, 2004; Robert Krueger, Kathleen Krueger, Tobin Kathleen, From Bloodshed to Hope in Burundi : Our Embassy Years During Genocide (University of Texas Press, 2007), 29; Boniface Fidele Kiraranganya, La vérité sur le Burundi : témoignage, 2e édition (Sherbrooke: Naaman, 1985), 79.
Burundi poignantly saw her Hutu once more slaughtered by Tutsi power, the world remained quiet, neither publicizing nor ratifying Hutu outcries. Therefore, a query arose—given the undeniably conflated nature of interethnic conflicts in both Burundi and Rwanda, what accounted for the overlapping and salient nature of the Rwandan genocide over multiple Tutsi bloody campaigns in Burundi? Why have large-scale massacres against the Hutus been steered into oblivion? To what extent did the 1994 Rwandan genocide signal the continuity of a repressed and suppressed Burundian Hutu voice?

During the post-colonial era, Central African countries such as Burundi and Rwanda saw the emergence and escalation of interethnic inequalities within their political, social, and economic realms. These inequalities enmeshed into violence in both nations’ political cultures, creating a long-term descent into mass slaughter, marginalization and creating mutual distrust within their citizenries. For the Hutus in Burundi, ethnic polarization was a significant issue enshrining every norm in society. Throughout the twentieth century, hundreds of thousands of Burundian Hutus were persecuted and killed by a long-line of Tutsi de facto hegemonies. Indeed, the long-simmering repression of Hutus by the Tutsis was severe, as Tutsi counterparts generally perceived themselves as superior to the Hutus, or, as Kiraranganya framed it, “[it was] the relationship of a horse and his master.” Thus came coup after coup and counter-coup after counter-coup after coup after coup...

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coup. And, when Tutsi governments would commit mass atrocities against Hutu populations, their human rights violations would pass unheard on the international scale.

In 1994, the assassination of two Hutu presidents—from Burundi and Rwanda—unleashed the genocidal rampage today-known as the “genocide against Tutsi” in Rwanda. Most scholars covering the causal factors of the Rwandan genocide have generally pointed towards the more immediate causes—including anti-Tutsi racism in Rwandan media, the rising tension from the Civil War, and the assassination of Rwanda’s Hutu president, Juvénal Habyarimana. Others have discussed the metastasis of ethnic polarization, considering Belgian colonial legacy as the most significant factor in prompting the commencement of genocide—through the institutions and ethnic perceptions which white colonizers introduced. While many scholars have keenly addressed the internal factors which contributed to the genocide’s explosive lead-up, most fail to acknowledge the interlinked Burundian ethnic struggles which sowed the seeds for violence in 1994.

Instead, scholars like Des Forges and Guichaoua examined the role state-institutions played in motivating the popular participation of ordinary ethnic Hutus in the murder of Tutsis in Rwanda, while scholars like Straus and Fujii documented the various rationales which drove Hutus to kill Tutsis in the 1994 genocide. These authors’

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reading of history, however, have failed to illustrate the role that historical memory of mass violence played in shaping a collective Hutu consciousness which made genocide a logical option in 1994. Even scholars like Thomson, who highlight that the genocidal norm in 1994 was rooted in “an ideology that framed all Tutsi as a threat to Hutu survival,” merely ground their analysis on accounts denoting the role of colonial contact in infusing the genocidal ideology used by Hutus in 1994.271 In seeking to bring justice to the survivors of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, historians like Prunier and Chrétien, in their analysis of the factors leading to genocide, tended to demonize the Hutus by emphasizing the genocide as a campaign led by the Hutus as a whole, negating the crimes against humanity committed upon them by the then-rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), leading to, during, and after the 1994 genocide.272 Indeed, Hutus did shamefully and sadly kill Tutsis in what was genocide in 1994. I do not deny that. Nor do I seek to minimize the extent of violence and pain that genocide imposed upon Rwandan Tutsis. But none of these scholars provided an in-depth analysis of the entrenched pattern of victimization which continued to paint one ethnic group as victims of genocide and negate the pain and suffering of the other. None of these scholars assessed how the influx of Hutus throughout the Great Lakes region—and their memories of violence—shaped the regional ethnic contingencies which helped reproduce the genocidal ideologies Thomson describes. While these scholars successfully document and aim to bring justice to the survivors


in their documentation of the 1994 genocide, they leave the story of the Burundian Hutus behind.273

This paper seeks to intervene in the historiographical narrative of the Rwandan genocide by revealing how reframing this narrative within the broader context of Burundian Hutu repression and suppression reexplains how and why genocide became a legitimate option in 1994. In her work Settler Genocide in Rwanda, Susan Thomson contends that genocidal character 'cannot happen accidentally.'274 In other words, she argues that genocidal character must be cultivated and driven within a contextually perceived threat, but she only implicates this methodology within a framework exclusive to Rwanda. Applying this methodology to the story of the Burundian Hutus ultimately reveals how: 1) historical blindness towards the Burundian Hutus was the necessary precursor to genocide in Rwanda; and how 2) "historical memory of mass violence...play[ed] a central role in a nation or an ethnic group’s cultural identity,"275 not only hyping genocide in 1994 as the only viable solution, but also encouraging a continuity of historical blindness. In his work Memories of Violence, historian Elazar Barkan warns that "lack of judicial accountability is aggravated by the absence of recognition of the historical violence in contemporary politics and peacebuilding."276 But if the story of the Burundian Hutus and the Burundi genocide remain blanketed within contemporary knowledge in comparison to the well-known genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda, how, then, can true interethnic redress occur? How, then, does a 'genocide against Tutsi' narrative inflame conflict among Hutu circles rather than demand justice when justice is unilaterally served? Though not the questions to which this paper will answer, these

273 As Newbury theorizes, “the fourth ‘wave,’ of which we speak here, was formed of the postwar (and postcolonial) generation of western academics who sought to treat African histories as fully integral to global culture and western university curricula, and give voice to a broader range of actors.” David Newbury, “Canonical Conventions in Rwanda: Four Myths of Recent Historiography in Central Africa” History in Africa 39, no.1 (2012): 43.


inquiries carry powerful reflection points that underline the necessity of this paper.

The following pages demonstrate how the story of the Burundian Hutus serves as a starting point from which to problematize the historiographical blindness in the narrative framework of the Rwandan genocide. I argue that only through reading the silences in the history, the pain and the suffering of the Burundian Hutus can we understand how historical blindness acted as the necessary precursor to genocide in Rwanda. The story of the Burundian Hutus illustrates how hegemonic knowledges, produced through the subordination of the Hutu memory, reinforced, and normalized the demonization of Hutus within historical narratives, codifying Tutsis and Hutus into historically protagonist-antagonist and victim-perpetrator binaries. I show how the pain and suffering of the Hutus, silenced and delegitimized within history, “illuminated some at the expense of others, the left behind, the ones who cannot move, and those who become immobilised because the light no longer shines on them,”277 obscuring justice and enacting symbolic violences that created dangerous, contesting and counter-reconciliatory definitions within Hutu-Tutsi circles. In centring on the voices of the Hutus, this paper does not deny—but challenges—the dominant narrative defining the Rwandan genocide by providing a lens through which we can draw a conciliatory narrative that validates the pain and suffering of victims of mass violence. Fifty years ago today, the Burundi genocide took the lives of hundreds of thousands of Burundian Hutus. This paper commemorates their lives and tells their story.

II. Burundi: Ethnicity, Power, Political Culture:

At the heart of the Burundian society was an ethnic pendulum that continuously yielded towards Tutsi power and quashed ethnic Hutu from the fundamental right of life. In Burundi, political power and wealth disproportionately went to the Tutsi minority at the expense of rural Hutu farmers.278 As a result, this would continuously yield ethno-political strife between both groups, who had, for over 400 years intermarried, shared the same customs, values, space and culture. The cleavages between the Hutus and Tutsis within Burundian society

were not merely based on ethnicity. Rather, ethnicity functioned as a steering mechanism that mediated the social and political dynamics of Burundian life.

In the years leading up to Burundian independence in 1962, the Hutus saw the systematic socio-political exclusion from power, as well as the gradual monopoly and superiority of the Tutsi. The Burundian Hutus became subjected to a system of marginalization which used ethnic lines to uphold the pervading perception of Tutsi superiority and Hutu inferiority.279 Thus came systems of inequality that subordinated the Hutus to Tutsi authority.

The subordination of the Hutus intended to transfer power and monopolize social, political and economic strands to the Tutsi minority. In other words, it intended to create a “[social] class of literate, westernized, autocratic Tutsis [could] rule over the illiterate, traditional peasant Hutus.”280 As it became more and more evident through the unequal access to education, land expropriation, disproportionate land taxes, and forced labour obligations placed upon the Hutus, ethnic identity became a justification for the subordination of the Hutus and their repression from hegemonic power.281 Nowhere else was this more evident than in civil service, where Hutu chiefs in the Burundian administration made up 20% in 1929, 7% in 1933 and, 2% in 1937, all while the Tutsis progressively took on societal positions of authority previously excluded from the Hutus.282 Not only does this regressive trend reveal the increasing sociopolitical inequalities towards the Burundian Hutus, but it also suggests that Hutu subordination and sociopolitical exclusion from power became a legitimate and accepted tool of ethnic superiority.

While sociopolitical exclusion may not sound rather extreme, it is crucial to understand that the Tutsis made up just under 15% of the Burundian population during the middle part of the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{283} And when the Hutus—who made up approximately 85% of the population—held high-up positions, it was “generally by favour rather than by right.”\textsuperscript{284} This dehumanization reveals how Hutus were deliberately being marginalized for being Hutu and Hutu alone.

Buyoya better encapsulates the gravity of the inequality, claiming:

As time went on, the Hutus, considered to be an "inferior race", were evicted from the management of the chiefdoms and sub-chiefdoms to such an extent that in 1945, no Hutu remained in power. A real purge! By systematically sweeping the Hutus out of positions of power and by stripping them of all privileges for the benefit of the [...] Tutsi, the Belgian colonial administration had just installed a real policy based on ethno-racial discrimination.\textsuperscript{285}

That is to say, the struggle was not really about ethnicity but about power. Ethnic identity was the steering mechanism that mediated the extent to which social and political mobility was possible, while power allowed the Tutsis to circumscribe the Hutus on social, political, and economic grounds. Thus, marginalization was a legitimate and accepted part of Burundian society, used not only to repress the Hutus but to grant power to the Tutsi minority.

All of this occurred in the context of Belgian colonial rule in Burundi when, between 1922 and 1962, the Belgian colonial administration instilled a native authority constituting of “the king and his Tutsi acolytes” to whom the colonizer “reserved education and jobs in the administration.”\textsuperscript{286} Essentially, the Tutsi chiefs were “secure in the white man’s support.” The white man would impose unequal legislation, taxes, obligatory cash crops, and compulsory labor on the Hutus at the benefit of local Tutsis, and in return, the Tutsis were the conduit through which the colonizer could have access to the state.\textsuperscript{287}

\textsuperscript{285} Minani Passy, \textit{Burundi}, 18.  
\textsuperscript{287} Uvin,"Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda,” 255.
that way, Tutsi superiority would foot-drag the decline of colonial influence.\(^{288}\) Thus, Tutsi sociopolitical ethnic predominance served the interest of both Belgian colonizers and the Tutsi minority in such that a Tutsi hegemony would work in tandem with Belgium, strengthening colonial presence within the country. Belgium’s support of the systematic sociopolitical exclusion of the Hutus reveals how the marginalization of Hutus was not only accepted from a national perspective but also internationally—an indispensable feature of historical blindness.

As Boyoya’s testimony, civil service statistics, and the Burundian sociopolitical dynamics suggest, the institutions of inequality put in place by Belgian colonial powers to marginalize and subordinate the Hutus to the Tutsis intended to wield and subsequently maintain a Tutsi hegemony that would symbiotically serve both Belgium and Tutsi interests, stripping the Hutus from all ranks of authority. Although ethnicity was at the core of the inequality, it only served as a means of transferring power and justifying the oppressiveness towards the Hutus. Because the Hutu majority were now socially considered inferior to the Tutsis minority, ethnic polarization made Burundi incrementally vulnerable to interethnic violence, as neither the Hutus nor the Tutsis wanted to be dominated by each other.\(^{289}\) This is extremely significant, because the marginalization of the Hutus and the maintenance of Tutsi hegemonic power were key reasons for the descent into inter-ethnic tension in the Burundian political culture, which was significant in the assassination of Prince Louis Rwagasore in 1961.

The marginalization of the Hutus in Burundian society was central to the promulgation of a political culture that encouraged the rise from inter-ethnic tension to inter-ethnic violence. As independence loomed large in the late 1950s and early 1960s, so did inter-ethnic tension between Burundi’s Hutu and Tutsi population, who pitted against each other in a power struggle. However, given that Belgian colonial powers had already leaned towards a Tutsi post-independence transfer of power, the idea of a Hutu-governed Burundi was indeed farfetched.\(^{290}\) This was best seen in 1958 when a “patriotic and visionary” leader who envisioned “national unity, power-sharing, and

\(^{288}\) Minani Passy, *Burundi*, 23


\(^{290}\) Kiraranganya, *La vérité sur le Burundi*, 110.
equality” emerged into Burundian political life: Prince Louis Rwagasore. Founder of the ‘Union pour le Progrès National’ (UPRONA)—a nationalist party with close ties to the Hutu community—Rwagasore dreamt of an “independen[t] and unit[ed]” Burundi, where one’s perception of another could be solely based on “competence, courage, kindness and human dignity rather than ethnic identity.” Countering the UPRONA party was “Parti Démocrate Chrétien” (PDC), a Tutsi-bent conservative party led by chiefs close to Belgian powers. In essence, the Belgians disliked the idea of national ethnic unity, as they regarded national unity as a threat to their colonial presence. In fact, on September 21, 1961, Belgian officials themselves, discussed the necessity to "kill Rwagasore" and that “nothing is lost if one gets rid of Rwagasore in time.” Though Rwagasore himself was a ganwa-Tutsi and not a Hutu, his vision of an ethnically heterogeneous Burundian leadership polarized from the Belgian leadership ideals of a Tutsi-led Burundi. Thence, the Belgian government’s desire to kill Rwagasore reveals how a continuity of marginalization towards the Hutus as independence approached would ferment into a maintained Tutsi hegemony and long-lasting colonial presence. The desire to kill Rwagasore, thus, reveals that the maintenance of Tutsi hegemonic power, and the threat thereof, was a key catalyst in the promulgation of violence in the Burundian political culture.

As the 1962 Burundian independence approached, the struggle for power between the UPRONA and PDC parties intensified, as the maintenance of hegemonic power was threatened by hard-line

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293 Though Uvin only states that “PDC […] was led by chiefs close to Belgium”, I claim that PDC was Tutsi-bent because Belgium flirted with the idea of a post-independence, Tutsi-led Burundi, to divide-and-rule. See at: Uvin, Life after Violence, 9. For further reading consult: Nizigama, Burundi, qui es-tu?, 80.


295 The ganwa are presumed to be ancestors of the Tutsi-Banyaruguru. As Weinstein states: “the exact origin of these Ganwa is a matter of historical debate, but it is clear that they were closely affiliated with Burundi’s Tutsi.”
Rwagasore supporters. On September 8, 1961, the Burundian legislative elections that aimed to install the government to rule Burundi following independence from Belgium in 1962 occurred. Rwagasore’s multi-ethnic party—consisting of 25 Tutsis and 22 Hutus—dominated the elections, making Rwagasore the soon-to-be Prime Minister of Burundi. On the whole, the birth of UPRONA marked the first time since colonial arrival that the Hutus had safely occupied a prominent position in Burundian politics. By the same token, however, Rwagasore's 1961 victory marked a threat to Tutsis’ hegemonic control of Burundi. Just one month later, on October 13, 1961, Prince Louis Rwagasore was assassinated by agents of the PDC. The assassination of Rwagasore symbolically represented a continuity of Hutu repression from power insofar that inter-ethnic tension shifted into inter-ethnic violence through the political tool of assassination. Rwagasore’s assassination exposes the degree to which the Hutus had no means of expression in Burundi, as their voice, wherever it rested, was continuously suppressed in Burundian society.

The suppression of the Hutu voice gravely deepened in the years following Burundian independence, as the Tutsi elites desired to regain and permanently secure Burundian political life. The clearest manifestation of the aforementioned was seen on January 15, 1965, when Burundi’s first Hutu Prime Minister, Pierre Ngendandumwe, was assassinated by a Rwandan Tutsi. Nine months later, another prominent Hutu politician was assassinated, Paul Mirerekano. Before Burundian independence, Paul Mirerekano helped build Rwagasore’s multiethnic UPRONA party. But in 1965, as Kiraranganya claims, Mirerekano was tortured and indiscriminately beat “without pity” along with other Hutu intellectuals of the UPRONA party, revealing how opposition to Tutsi political power was significant in fostering strife in the Burundian political culture. Most significantly, for the first time, “the educated Hutus began to understand that not only would their compatriots Tutsis not let them rule the country as Burundians,

297 See the following: Uvin, Peter. Life after Violence, 9; Gaëtan Sebudandi et al, Le drame burundais, 173; Minani Passy, Burundi, 23; René Lemarchant, Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice, 55.
299 Kiraranganya, La vérité sur le Burundi, 66.
but that they could be the next to be assassinated,\textsuperscript{300} exposing the degree to which inter-ethnic inequality exacerbated not only mutual distrust within Burundian citizenry but also mutual fear.

Mutual distrust and mutual fear were the root causes for the ethnic polarization entrenched within Burundian citizenry. In fact, before 1972, Burundi saw eight different Prime Ministers, as government after government fell from coups and countercoups.\textsuperscript{301} And, in October of 1965, frustrated Hutus “fighting for their liberation,” began rallying to organize a coup d’État against the longstanding Tutsi \textit{de facto} hegemony.\textsuperscript{302} This is extremely significant because the marginalization in the Burundian political culture encouraged the Burundian population that violence was the only option for political expression. Hearing the rumours of a plotted coup, the head of the Burundian army, Colonel Michel Micombero responded by ethically cleansing the army, this revealing that mutual fear of mass slaughter indeed existed from both camps.\textsuperscript{303} According to the Burundian scholar Melchior Mbonimba, by the end of October 1965, the majority of Hutu soldiers in the Burundian army were physically eliminated.\textsuperscript{304} On the same note, Chrétien \textit{et al.} and Weinstein also claim that on 15 October 1965, the remaining Hutus soldiers and police officers organized another coup d’État that culminated in the massacre of Tutsis in the Muramvya region of Burundi; the reoccurring nature of the revolts reveals the degree to which violence was the Hutus’ last resort.\textsuperscript{305} Since the Hutus were already stripped of social mobility rights and since they were legitimately subordinated on social, political, and economic grounds, they were merely fighting for their own human rights. And, the reprisals that followed this failed coup were significant, as “villagers in Muramvya province were slaughtered, along with Hutu

\textsuperscript{300} Minani Passy, \textit{Burundi}, 110.
\textsuperscript{301} Minani Passy, \textit{Burundi}, 27.
\textsuperscript{304} Mbonimpa, \textit{La “pax americana” en Afrique des Grands Lacs}, 232.
army officers and politicians.”

Though the number of army officers and politicians killed is unknown, “for the first time, Hutu heads started to fall for political reasons.”

Coupled with marginalization and mutual distrust, the zeitgeist of the late 1960s and early 1970s was gravely filled with tension. Between 1965 and 1972, most Hutu intellectuals were executed, purged from the army, and “as many as 5000 Hutu[s] were killed in the hillsides.” During this period over 100,000 Hutus fled into Tanzania, Rwanda, and Zaire. In Burundi, population fear remained a reality, as rumours of Hutu-plotted coups continuously circulated around the country. To Micombero, this meant the necessity to protect hegemonic power. Therefore, the political culture in Burundian society fuelled the tension and the cynical mindset that led the Tutsi-ruled government to plot out ways of eradicating potential dangers to hegemonic power—a significant factor in the commencement of the Burundi genocide.

III. The Burundi Genocide

Burundi’s 1970s regime found itself sandwiched between Hutu belligerence and Tutsi insecurity—the former fighting for human rights, and the latter fearing mass slaughter. Although the gravity of Hutu suppression from power was known to world powers like the United States, Belgium and France, and apparent to supranational bodies like the international community and the U.N., the events that

309 Minani Passy, Burundi, 39.
310 Rose Kambizzi-Ndayahoze, Le Cdt Martin Ndayahoze. UN VISIONNAIRE (Bujumbura: ÉDITIONS iWACU, 2016).
transpired in Burundi between April and August\textsuperscript{312} of 1972 would define the world’s blindness towards the history of the Burundian Hutus forevermore.\textsuperscript{313} During the 1970s, Hutus would go to work in the morning and not return home at night. From the White House, this was known as the Burundi genocide.\textsuperscript{314}

On 29 April 1972, a group of Hutu soldiers crossed the Tanzanian border into Burundi, attacking two Tutsi-populated towns and a military garrison, killing 1000-2000 Tutsis.\textsuperscript{315} The Burundi government, seeing this as a threat to Tutsi hegemonic power, “responded not only with a counteroffensive that defeated the invaders, but also began a violent campaign of reprisals against Burundi’s Hutu population.” According to Taylor, however, “the claims of the Burundi government throughout this whole period are suspect.”\textsuperscript{316}

On 26 May 1972, news that the Burundi government was systematically murdering educated Hutus in an effort to permanently suppress the Hutus reached U.S. president Richard Nixon's desk.\textsuperscript{317} In an effort to stop the killings, president Nixon sent U.S. ambassadors to meet with Burundi president Michel Micombero and advise him to stop the killings. According to Taylor, “despite Micombero’s assurances that the killings had run their course, the arrest and execution of Hutus intensified throughout May;” the dichotomy between the claims of discontinued repression versus the reality of ongoing repression

\textsuperscript{315} Taylor, “The U.S. response to the Burundi Genocide of 1972,” (Masters Theses: James Madison University, 2012), v, 12.
\textsuperscript{316} Taylor, “The U.S. response to the Burundi Genocide of 1972,” v, 12.
reveals the degree to which the Burundi Tutsi government’s power functioned as a mediator in pushing the story of the Burundian Hutus away from global consciousness.318

However, the Burundi government’s blanket denials towards accusations of mass slaughter was not the greatest problem. The greatest problem was, as Taylor reasoned, if the U.S. was to take any action in what it knew was genocide, they had to somehow “get the Burundi government to end its reprisals against the Hutus while avoiding accusations of American imperialism.”319 Since the Burundi government had no desire of admitting their human rights violations to foreigners and the U.S. government had no intent of facing accusations of American imperialism, the U.S.’s few subtle nudges were enough to pass on the problem to international bodies. Even so, supranational bodies like the international community and the U.N., too, feared accusations of interfering in a sovereign state’s internal affairs and thus chose to turn a blind eye to the mass atrocities against Burundi’s Hutus.320 The fear of neocolonial meddling in Burundian internal affairs and the resulting silence from the U.S., U.N., and international community towards the Burundi genocide evidently reaped no global recognition.321

Concurrently, in Burundi, the radio remained silent about the ongoing repression, emphasizing not only the mutual fear that encroached the tense Burundian climate but also Kiraranganya’s statement that “even Tutsis who opposed the [genocidal ideas against the Hutus] were killed and/or driven out of the country.”322 In 1972 when Burundi’s all-Tutsi government was systematically killing its Hutu population, every effort was made to prevent journalists from

319 Regarding his diction, Taylor explains that “when I call the events in Burundi “killings, massacres, reprisals,” etc. this is merely semantics on my part; I believe it was genocide. When these less legally binding euphemisms occur in my narrative, they often represent the perspective and word choice of the State Department prior to (and then after) the 26 May unofficial recognition of “genocide” in Burundi by the U.S. Embassy in Bujumbura.” See the following: Taylor, “The U.S. response to the Burundi Genocide of 1972,” 18-32.
travelling into the country.\textsuperscript{323} And in 1973, when Burundi’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Arthémon Simbananiye and other military officials were interviewed, neither Simbananiye nor military personnel admitted to the existence of ethnic subordination, disappearances of Hutu students in high schools, and mass slaughter within Burundian society.\textsuperscript{324} The Burundi government’s refusal to acknowledge the reality of Hutu subordination and mass killing is significant for understanding how the story of the Burundian Hutu was continuously silenced, subdued by a dominant form of memory.

On the whole, since the longstanding dehumanization, subordination, and deprivation of the Hutus was evidently an accepted part of Burundian life from a national and international perspective, historical blindness was almost inevitable. Belgian powers bolstered Tutsi superiority, all while the Hutus were marginalized and greatly excluded from attaining power. Not only did violence serve as a means of political expression, but it also helped maintain a Tutsi hegemony that would, by all means possible, fight to suppress and repress the Hutus from attaining power. Though not exclusively, international bodies were insecure and turned a blind eye towards the mass atrocities by the Burundi government against the Hutus, ultimately yielding to the blanket denials and forged narrative of the Tutsi hegemony. On the grounds that contemporary knowledge was \textit{ipso facto} reliant upon, and restricted to official sources, the same Tutsi government in power which instrumented genocide was, therefore, the storyteller of the \textit{official} narrative of what went on. The heretofore untold story of the Burundian Hutus, therefore, remained buried into the collective memory of Burundians and painted through the epistemic framework of those who endured it.

Despite its tragedy, the story of the Burundian Hutus remains a largely untold narrative. This is primarily because, as Liisa Malkki


explains, "the events of 1972 are not fully documented anywhere." In late 1972, the Burundi government released a White Paper to the United Nations, claiming that a ‘genocide against Tutsi’ had occurred and that “only the guilty were punished.” This is problematic, because if the contest over historical memory is contingent upon the legitimation of a national official memory, what happens when the untold stories of the disenfranchised and marginalized are suppressed? How do we justly remember history if it has been subordinated to fit a dominant form of historical memory in public and institutional spaces? As Hutus had historically been subject to marginalization and dehumanization, the Burundi government’s spiral blame reveals how the story of the Burundian Hutus continued to be exploited, bound and isolated within the confines of private spaces in Hutu-Tutsi circles, and thus, omitted within international public spaces, blinding us from its reality.

While the story of the Burundian Hutus remained private within Hutu-Tutsi circles, many Hutus struggled to come to terms with the legacies of the genocide, that is, how the genocide severed what it meant to be Umurundi. The genocide personified ethnic fear, ethnic subordination, and fear of mass slaughter as realities which predicated the power and authority of the Tutsi—even to the point where Hutus themselves feared to claim they were Hutsu. This was visibly demonstrated in the 1973 Un pays, deux ethnies documentary at a national public event, when the Swiss journalist Pierre-Pascal Rossi asked a short, stocky Burundian soldier, “Are you a Hutu or a Tutsi?” The soldier, with his head facing the ground, thoughtfully replied, “Me... I’m a Burundian.” As the journalist went on to insist a different answer, the soldier once again responded, “All I know is that I’m a Burundian.” In claiming to be merely Burundian, this soldier illustrates the “structural invisibility” of the Hutus after the 1972

327 Kirundi Translation for ‘Burundian’
Burundi genocide. Structural invisibility is a term conceptualised in Lissa Malkki’s *Purity and Exile* to describe the physical and systematic invisibility of those separated or systematically ignored; those who have “lost imagined cultural authority to stand for “their kind” or for the imagined “whole” of which they are or were a part.”

This reveals how the 1972 Burundi genocide solidified a mindset among the Hutus within the private, that they were inherently inferior, subordinated and bound within a Tutsi-dominated authority, and thus, barred from revealing the realities of marginalization and fearful of being ‘punished’ for exposing their ethnic consciousness within public spaces—a key feature of historical blindness.

Lissa Malkki’s book, *Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania*, is one of few works that extensively and comprehensively tells the story—the first-hand ethnic perceptions and memories of violence—of the Burundian Hutus after 1972. Her work, based on her fieldwork with Hutu in three refugee camps in Tanzania from 1985-86 (over a decade after the Burundi genocide of Hutus), and published in 1995 (a year after the genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda), focuses on the Hutus who fled Burundi during and after the Burundi genocide to shelter in refugee camps abroad. Malkki shows how displacement and deterritorialization shaped “the social construction of ‘nationness’ and history, identity and enmity of the Hutus.”

She demonstrates that the Hutus in and after 1972 “located their identities within their very displacement, extracting meaning and power from the interstitial social location they inhabited.” However, while Malkki’s work situates the memories of violence of the Hutus as “interstitial” and central to the construction of the Hutu “history, identity and enmity,” like Des Forges and Guichaoua, and Straus and Fujii, she fails to conceptualize how “historical memory of mass violence” not only “play[ed] a central role”

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331 Malkki, *Purity and Exile*, 1.

in the Hutus’ “cultural identity,” but also encouraged future mass violence.

Burundian Hutus who sought refuge in Tanzania, Rwanda, and Zaire during the genocide became estranged of their once-called motherland and feared returning into a territory once called home. Poignantly told in Liisa Malkki’s *Purity and Exile*, it was there, in the foreign lands, that the collective memory of mass slaughter awakened among the Hutus; that the realities of Burundi under Tutsi subjugation were exposed in public spaces and reconstructed into “mythico-histories” to preserve, understand, and explain the memories of mass violence that shaped their collective identities as refugees. The Hutus had lived through genocide and had witnessed “the Tutsi kill the children, the old people, the pupils in school, the pregnant women and [...] all the inhabitants of the country of Hutu origin.” The Hutus described at length how “the world knew that a war had exploded in Burundi” and that “had they known what was going on, could somehow have protected the Hutu—or could, at least, have ‘written about it’ and made the wider world aware of the apocalypse.” The Hutus, thus, saw a clear link between lack of international recognition and judicial accountability as driving factors for historical blindness.

The powerlessness of the Hutu refugees and the submissiveness of the Hutus in Burundi only inflamed the already-existing schisms between the Hutus and the Tutsis. As Malkki describes, it was in exile, there in the refugee camps, that the “collective effervescence of consciousness, an intensive period of intellectual and political awakening” occurred; that Hutus began to realize that those who were in refugee camps were “thrown together in exile” because of “something they all had in common, their Hutuness.” The 1972 Burundi genocide reified the permanent rupture between relations with the Tutsi, acting as a moment of illumination that demonstrated that, just like in the 1960s, the Hutus had to take matters into their own hands. Malkki’s work continuously shows this, for example, with a

337 Malkki, 102.
338 Malkki, 221.
Hutu refugee claiming “those Tutsi, we will conquer them because we know now the malignities. Earlier we did not know. That is why they spoiled us. That is why they killed us…” This reveals how their collective memory, serving as a vantage point for understanding their powerlessness, convinced the Hutus that the Tutsis were inherently evil and had to be conquered. The Burundian Hutus no longer wanted to "give in to this blackmail of the Tutsis.” They felt the world turned a blind eye to their pain. The Hutus were genuinely angered at what had occurred in 1972. The stark reality was that after 1972, as Greenland showed in his analysis of the 1974 Burundi education system:

University of Bujumbura: 120 of 350 students have disappeared. 60 were killed.
Ecole Normale Supérieure: 40% of 314 students have disappeared.
Ecole Technique de Kamenge: 170 disappeared out of 415, 60 killed.
Athénée de Bujumbura: 40% of students have disappeared.
Ecole Normale de Kiremba: 10 of 335 pupils killed.
All Hutu teachers in government secondary schools and nearly all in church-aided secondary schools were killed. It is estimated that between 40% and 45% of all primary teachers have disappeared, many arrested and killed, the rest refugees.

The stark reality was that despite the facts, the Tutsi-dominated Burundi government still denied that they committed genocide. They still claimed that a ‘genocide against Tutsi’ had occurred in 1972. However, the fact was that in 1972, “a sizeable portion of Burundi’s

Hutu population disappeared.”343 But what angered the Hutus, just like Richard Nixon, was that “the Burundi government could slaughter hundreds of thousands of its own people without receiving the slightest reprimand from the international community.”344 What angered the Hutus was “how the deaths of eleven Israelis could receive more collective world sympathy than the deaths of 100,000-200,000 Africans.”345 What angered the Hutus was that “nobody gives a damn,” as Nixon expressed it, when their lives are lost.346 The 1972 Burundi genocide represented the pinnacle of Burundian Hutu marginalization since colonial arrival in 1923; not only did it culminate in the murder of approximately 300,000 educated Hutu elites, but it also marked the continuity of a repressed and suppressed Burundian Hutu voice. After decades of dehumanization, subordination, and deprivation, the Burundi genocide turned Hutu families to decimation.

Until today, there is a salient difficulty in analyzing the Burundi genocide, largely due to the scarcity of sources available after 1972 and partly due to the scholarly misunderstanding of the Hutu perspective. This becomes apparent when reading the scholarship of Rwanda scholars like Des Forges, Guichaoua, Thomson, Straus and Fujii. In seeking to interpret how genocide came to happen in 1994, neither of them explicitly mentions the overwhelming significance of the Burundi genocide in their scholarship. Neither of them mentions how the Burundi genocide was a turning point for the Hutus, one which called them to collectively “wake up” because “it [was no longer] the time to sleep” in the face of “mistreatment” when “the enemy is watching,”347 as one Hutu described it. That is, neither of them discuss how after 1972 the Hutus began to perceive the Tutsi as “enemy.” None of these scholars interpret how the continual repression and suppression of the Hutus in Burundi shaped the Hutus’ unwillingness to “give in to this blackmail of the Tutsis” reflected in 1994.348 Yet, this antagonism


344 Taylor, 42.

345 Taylor, 41-2.


described by the Hutus in Malkki’s works is extremely significant for understanding how historical blindness was the necessary precursor which made genocide become a viable option in Rwanda in 1994. Liisa Malkki’s work is, thus, significant to interpreting how the Hutus sought to reconstruct “what really happened” in Burundi; the “true facts” from the perspective of the Burundian Hutus, who now were exposing their anger towards that which was previously kept in the hidden.349 Together, the testimonies of Hutu refugees serve as a melting pot of epistemic frameworks, revealing how the Hutus defined their identities as Burundians after 1972 and came to terms with the forgotten legacies of the genocide.

IV. Key Catalyst: Assassination of Melchior Ndadaye

During the 1980s, exactly while Liisa Malkki was conducting her fieldwork with Hutu refugees in Tanzania, Hutus in Hutu-exclusive political parties and those who were refugees abroad, continued to raise awareness on the international scene, exposing the realities of marginality and mass violence by the Burundi Tutsi government.350 But it was not until the late 1980s that the international community began paying close attention to the ethnic conflicts in Burundi, first asking, then pressuring the Burundi government to charter for democratic reforms and a multi-partisan political system.351 In July of 1993, Burundi received her first democratically elected, and first-ever, Hutu president: Melchior Ndadaye.352 His victory was historic. Since Louis Rwagasore’s assassination in 1965 (when Hutus were to potentially hold real power in Burundian political life), Burundi was ruled by a small group of Tutsi-Hima: Michel Micombero (1966-76), Jean-Baptiste Bagaza (1976-87), and Pierre Buyoya (1987-93).353 These Tutsi-Hima were considered minorities within the Tutsi minority, and their rule “constituted the creation of a low-caste Tutsi dictatorship.”354 Their rule was characterised by Tutsi political gain, the

349 Malkki, Purity and Exile, xi, 104.
350 Minani Passy, Burundi, 109.
351 This occurred in the context of the close of the Cold War and the rise of democracy as the emerging world order. Minani Passy, Burundi, 118.
353 Uvin, Life after Violence, 9
354 Uvin, Life after Violence, 9
almost total exclusion of Hutus from social mobility and Hutu land confiscations. However, Melchior Ndadaye, as a Hutu president, disrupted this notion of Tutsi hegemonic power, and, in a sense, represented a threat to the “low-caste Tutsi dictatorship” that for decades reaped luxuries at the expense of the Hutus.  

On October 4, 1993, approximately 90 days into office, Burundi President Melchior Ndadaye stood before the General Assembly at the United Nations in New York. There, he aptly chronicled the story of the Burundian Hutus, while discerning his vision for the future of a united Burundian nation. This is extremely significant, because in speaking before an international audience, Ndadaye was not only contesting the secrecy of the story of Burundian Hutus, but also projecting it within public international public spaces, demanding the world hear this narrative. As he stated:

“The past 30 years have been marked by ethnic upheavals that have traumatized our people. In truth, the history of the people of Burundi is replete with tragedies. Political forces have exploited ethnic differences with impunity and have fought to control the State for their own interests....Outright crimes against humanity have been committed by individuals and by organized groups, some of which have enjoyed the protection and blessing of the State, which lent itself to the perpetuation of such base actions. That sowed mistrust and suspicion among ethnic groups in our country, thus traumatizing the people and creating unease about the future.”

Ndadaye would go on to call Burundians to accept the truth about the atrocities in the nation’s history and unite as one people for Burundi’s better future. In placing this story centre stage, Ndadaye was indirectly forcing the Tutsis to confront this narrative, removing it from coercion. As he went on to discuss how his victory—that is, the victory of democracy—rekindled the hopes of those who “have been forced to stay in exile,” Ndadaye was not only showing how “the triumph of democracy has removed the essential reason for their leaving their country,” but also alluding that the Hutus believed the only way to

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357 United Nations, 2.
358 United Nations, 3.
receive basic human rights was through Hutu leadership—and Ndadaye was exactly that. Melchior Ndadaye represented the hope that Burundian Hutus could finally have fundamental human rights as Burundians, and, in placing their pain in public spaces, invoked the commencement of reconciliation. Then, just two weeks later, on October 21, 1993, Melchior Ndadaye was assassinated by Tutsi extremists.\textsuperscript{359}

In Rwanda, the Hutus reacted to the assassination of Ndadaye with violence. All told from the U.S. embassy in Kigali, the Burundi coup became the primary preoccupation of all Rwandans.\textsuperscript{360} In the Rwandan capital (Kigali), ministers sought to find ways to “contain the violent reactions of Rwandans and prevent the violence in Burundi from spilling into Rwanda.” However, incidents of ethnic violence and hospitalization nevertheless ensued. Rwanda’s radio coverage of the coup even further fuelled the anger in the Hutus through anti-Tutsi racism. As protests flooded the streets, on Rwandan television, “pictures of the bodies flowing the Nyabarongo river” inundated, “hyping the brutality of the coup in Bujumbura (Burundi).”\textsuperscript{361} As this cable notes:

\begin{quote}
A SNEEZE IN BUJUMBURA BRINGS PNEUMONIA TO KIGALI. INSECURITY IN THE TUTSI COMMUNITY WAS EXACERBATED BY A COUPLE OF WILD CDR TYPES CALLING ON THEIR COLLEAGUES TO MURDER TUTSIS WHEREVER THEY FOUND THEM, AND POSTING SUCH THREATS…THROUGHOUT THE TOWN. GOVERNMENT LEADERS WERE AWARE OF THE DANGERS OF ETHNIC VIOLENCE, BUT SOMEHOW RELUCTANT TO CENSOR THE MOST TROUBLING REPORTS ON RADIO RWANDA…RWANDANS WHO BELIEVE IN
\end{quote}


This reveals how the assassination Ndadaye in October of 1993 echoed virulently across the Great Lakes region of Africa. As Ndadaye to the Hutus represented the possibility for peaceful ethnic coexistence and reconciliation, his assassination signalled the ultimate rupture between the Hutus and the Tutsis. His death reincarnated the memories of mass violence that shaped the collective identities of the Hutus after 1972 and that remained scarred within their epistemic framework. It re-instilled the idea that all Tutsi were inherently evil and a threat to the collective lives of all Burundians—that if not contained now, were going to kill the rest of the Hutus as they did in 1972. As one Hutu said after hearing the news of Ndadaye’s death, “back in 1972 they got us, but this time they won’t!” And another, “Since 1972 it is our blood that’s being spilled! Now we hear that President Ndadaye has been killed. If they did that, that means we are next.” This reveals how the 1993 Hutu reactions to Ndadaye’s death were 'cultivated,' fomented through the memories of violence of 1972 and driven within the 1993 context of 'perceived threat' to Hutu survival. Given that the Hutus’ identity had already been defined by systematic marginalization, widespread dehumanization, and historical memory of mass violence, genocidal character was something already taught—normalized in the presence of everyday violence towards the Burundian Hutus.

V. Dialogue of Violence and Rwandan Genocide

On April 6, 1994, just six months after Melchior Ndadaye’s assassination, Burundi and Rwanda’s Hutu presidents were

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assassinated when a presidential plane carrying both was shot down. The perpetrators remain, officially, unknown. Hutus in Rwanda went on to kill at least 500,000 ethnic Tutsis in what has come to be known as the Rwandan genocide. There is a danger in the dialogue of violence describing the 1994 genocide, however. How is it that a whole group of people attempted to physically eliminate a whole other group? Why is the narrative of genocide in Rwanda important for understanding the historical blindness towards the Burundian Hutus?

In Queen’s University professor Yolande Bouka’s doctoral work, In the Shadow of Prison: Power, Identity, and Transitional Justice in Post-Genocide Rwanda, she investigates released prisoners of the Rwandan genocide and analyses their narratives on violence in Rwanda and their experiences within the transitional justice system. In expressing the rationale for conducting research on “them,” the killers of 1994, she reflects:

Well, I found it puzzling that many in the Western world know that “800,000 Rwandans, mostly Tutsi and some moderate Hutu died in 100 days in 1994” but significantly fewer have heard of the approximately 300,000 Rwandans, mostly Hutu, but also Tutsi and Twa who died during the decade of civil war, the genocide, and the First Congo War at the hand of the Rwandan Patriotic Army, credited for ending the genocide. It is this similar framework that guides this research. It is the framework that points to a continuity of historical blindness, where mass violence towards the Hutus goes unheard on the international scale, and is continuously suppressed within historical dialogue. It is through this framework that we can understand how the 1994 genocide also meant a continuity of a repressed and suppressed Burundian Hutu voice. It is within this scholarship that this paper intervenes.

The general consensus is that the Rwandan genocide erupted as a result of structural factors intersecting colonial legacies, and anti-Tusi sentiment and propaganda. The narrative is that the rising tension from the civil war between the then ruling Rwandan government and the

368 Thomson, “Settler Genocide in Rwanda?”, 244.
Tutsi-dominated RPF starting in 1990 created the existing tension, which was sparked by assassination of Rwanda’s Hutu president. Scholars often offer depictions of the anti-Tutsi racism in Rwandan media in the months and even years leading to the genocide, demonstrating the myths and tensions emerging from colonial ethnic perceptions of Hutu and Tutsi. Offering a deterministic lens of the Rwanda conflict, many scholars point to colonial legacy as the most significant factor in prompting genocide, linking the ethnic perceptions and racist institutions that Belgian colonizers created to divide Hutus and Tutsis to the reoccurring instances of violence.

Many scholars, unfamiliar with the re-occuring nature of ethno-political strife in the Great Lakes Region, offer colonial-like, black-and-white explanations for the 1994 genocide. They fail to see the regional temporalities of interethnic violence. Daniel Rothbart and Tom Bartlett, for example, unaware of the story of the Burundian Hutus, blindly tell the story of how in “the late 1980s and early 1990s Hutu extremists were portraying Tutsi as essentially degenerate and demonic,” simply and narrowly attributing the Hutu stories of past atrocities, and narratives of Tutsi plans for conquest as the “righteous hatred of an enemy” rather than emerging from the historical memories of mass violence described in Malkki’s work.\(^\text{371}\) These authors simply describe the political propaganda that precipitated the 1994 genocide as “a shift in the anti-Tutsi ideology” from the colonial era and trace Hutu claims of Tutsi as “‘power-hungry,’ ‘intelligent,’ ‘tricky,’ ‘double-dealing,’ and ‘dishonest’ people whose presence in Rwanda served as a direct threat to the Hutus as genuine Rwandans” as grounded in Rwandan and colonial history rather than from the regional ethnic contingencies in Burundi.\(^\text{372}\)

Instead, the perspective of the Hutus is left behind in a scholarship and history that continuously denies or omits their pain and suffering. Instead, the story of the Burundian Hutus and the truth about the genocide is framed in “the singular, with a capital T;” where


Hutus are the sole wrongdoers and Tutsis are the sole victims. These are the biases that perpetuate into scholarship. Historian Gérard Prunier, for one, admits to this bias in his 2009 book, 15 years after having written numerous works on the Rwandan genocide. In his 1995 book, he discredits counter-evidence claiming that massive campaigns of killings of Hutus were also occurring during the 1994 genocide, then later sheds light to these same findings within a positive light in his 2009 book. Later in an endnote of that work, Prunier explains that he “must offer my apologies to readers of The Rwanda Crisis, where on pp.94-96 I give a totally false account of Rwigyema’s death. My only excuse is that, in a book written in the immediate aftermath of the genocide, I still wanted to believe in the relative innocence of the RPF and therefore accepted the cooked version of the facts it provided me with, in spite of several warnings that I was wrong.” These claims are by no means intended to diminish that Hutus killed Tutsis in what was genocide in 1994; rather, they demonstrate the modes through which binaries form within public and historical memory, reinforcing perpetrator-victim, protagonist-antagonist dichotomies that are dangerous—a key factor for historical blindness.

The words of Prunier are commendable. However, addressing this mistake 15 years later does not remove the framework of collective guilt towards Hutus that his scholarship helped create, nor does it remove the damage it created within the historical record. As scholarship builds on scholarship—and as knowledge builds on knowledge—not only is the story of the Burundian Hutus lost within this dialogue of violence, but also that of the innocent Hutus who died during these killings. The words of Prunier illustrate how a historian of all people—the keeper and shaper of history—in 1995 was “personally hoodwinked into disbelieving the very existence” of counter-evidence because he “still wanted to believe” the “cooked version of the facts”

375 Gérard Prunier, From genocide to continental war: The 'Congolese'conflict and the crisis of contemporary Africa. (Hurst & Company, 2009), n51 to Chapter 1, p. 372.
Despite “several warnings that [he] was wrong.” They illustrate how an African Great Lakes region specialist subverted the historical data based on his personal feelings. These are the biases within discourse that highlight how historical blindness occurs and re-produces itself. Each of these factors leave the story of the Burundian Hutus behind. Each of them undermine the primacy of the historical memory of mass violence which shaped the collective frustration of Hutus in Burundi and Rwanda.

The danger in the dialogue of violence in the historiography of the Rwandan genocide is that scholars minimize the significance of Burundi. Most scholars either minimize, neglect or are outright unaware of the Burundi genocide of 1972 and of its significance in creating the historical memories of mass violence that were central to the perpetuation of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Even though scholars like Thomson and Bartlett see that the Hutus viewed the 1990 invasion of Rwanda by the Tutsi-dominated Rwanda Patriotic Front as a threat to Hutu survival, like most scholars, they fail to understand the interconnectedness between this threat to Hutu survival and the post-1972 ethnic perceptions described in Malkki’s work.

The historiographical blindness towards the story of the Burundian Hutus and the Burundi genocide of 1972 has created a blindness in the narrative framework of the Rwandan genocide, where “the systematic killings of Hutu intellectuals in 1972 by a Tutsi-led exclusionary government, coupled with the killings of Hutu in 1988 and the assassination of the first elected Hutu President, Melchior Ndadaye, in Burundi by a Tutsi-dominated army, and the death of more than 100,000 Hutu [in Burundi] in the aftermath of the massacre of Tutsi after Ndadaye’s death,” has been forgotten; and where scholars continually fail to understand its role in “the capacity of Rwandan [Hutu] extremists to incite ethnic fears in Rwanda.” As Jefremovas explains:

The spiral of blame and self-justification continues a well entrenched pattern of power in Rwanda, and the tendency to characterise one group only as the victims of genocide, and to deny the existence of any other. It has also taken a cruel twist in


Burundi, where Tutsi elites have taken the deplorable killings of Tutsi which followed assassination of the President in October 1993 and turned them into a history of the persecution of the Burundian Tutsi. This is a return to the strategy in 1973, when the government in a White Paper to the United Nations characterised the slaughter of Hutu intellectuals which saw between 150,000 and 250,000 Hutu die and 100,000 flee the country and 2,000-3,000 Tutsi die as genocide of the Tutsi. While scholars like Newbury assert that Burundi and Rwanda are mirrors of one another, “mutually reinforcing” but not simple extensions of one another, they do no justice to the story of the Burundian Hutus by not fully examining how Hutu anonymities in historical discourse continue to define and redefine a denigrating cultural identity of the Hutus—an identity which shaped not just their collective memory of mass violence, but also their reality in 1994. This can be understood through Susan Thomson’s 2005-2006 fieldwork in Rwanda, where describes a man she interviewed named Thomas—a prisoner of genocide, or génocidaire. As he tells Thomson about 1994, he says:

Killing was the law. We had to kill or suffer ourselves! Hutu killed Tutsi but Tutsi also killed us. There was a civil war, you see! We knew our enemy was Tutsi. I killed. Yes, but I was also following orders. It was an extreme time and some of us did extreme things. I admit to that. But we cannot forget that the RPF [Rwandan Patriotic Front] are foreigners and they killed our president! They came from outside to oppress Hutu. That cannot be overlooked. Tutsi leaders have always oppressed Hutu like me. This issue of ethnic groups cannot be swept away…But people, so we Hutu suffer as killers, rotting in prison while Tutsi who killed are outside, living free. That’s what you outsiders don’t understand. There was war and some of us did things to win the war. It wasn’t genocide, it was a way to save Rwanda for Hutu like me.

Bear in mind, in 1972 when hundreds of thousands of Hutus fled Burundi into neighbouring countries amid genocide, many fled to Rwanda, where they, too, shared the mythico-histories—or memories of violence—described in Malkki’s work. Just as Thomas in Susan

Thomson’s work claims that “we knew our enemy was Tutsi,” so too did the Hutus who were “thrown together into exile” in 1972 claim the “enemy” was the Tutsi.\(^{381}\) Just as Thomas claims that “Tutsi leaders have always oppressed Hutu like me… That’s what you outsiders don’t understand,” his lens corroborates that of the Burundian Hutus who spoke for this sense of spiral blame that continued to deny Hutus of human rights and invalidate their suffering. In a sense, Thomas reverberates the “extract[ed] meaning” from this “blackmail of the Tutsi,” or the logic which made genocide a viable option for Hutus in 1994. But like most scholars on Rwanda, Susan Thomson interprets Thomas’s claims in isolation—within a framework exclusive to Rwanda.

By implicating the story of the Burundian Hutus within the dialogue of violence of the Rwandan genocide, this paper provided a novel analytical pathway for understanding and explaining the logic of the 1994 genocide as something that was cultivated in society. This paper did not justify the genocide by any means. Rather, it revealed how the pain and suffering of the Burundian Hutus continued to be silenced and delegitimized at the expense of the Hutus, “the left behind, the ones who cannot move, and those who become immobilised because the light no longer shines on them,” re-producing a historical blindness. Just as Hutus after 1972 perceived the Tutsis as a threat to Hutu survival, so too did the Hutus in Rwanda frame all Tutsis as a collective threat.\(^{382}\) When two Hutu presidents were assassinated in 1994 as a Tutsi-dominated RPF approached, a Rwandan Hutu society that had seen the “the Burundi elections [as] one of the stabilizing events which had made it possible for Rwanda to make peace with the RPF” saw her memories of violence of 1972 reincarnate.\(^{383}\) This paper revealed how the Hutus of 1994, just as the Hutus of 1972 and 1993, felt that “back in 1972 they got us, but this time they won’t!” creating “a sneeze in Bujumbura (Burundi)” that “br[ought] pneumonia to Kigali (Rwanda).” As the pain and suffering of the Hutus continued to be silenced and delegitimized, the story of


\(^{382}\) Thomson, “Settler Genocide in Rwanda?”, 244.

the Burundian Hutus and the Burundi genocide “became part of the fund of knowledge or the ideology of... not what has actually been preserved in popular memory, but what has been selected, written, pictured, popularized and institutionalized by those whose function it is to do so”—a key feature for historical blindness.  

VI. Coda

In May 1973, an assessment of the ethnic situation in Burundi by U.S Ambassador to Burundi, Thomas Melady, concluded “that the factors in the ethnic Hutu-Tutsi equation are such to almost guarantee another serious confrontation.”

Recalling that Tutsi voices were completely outmatched during the 1972 killings of Hutus, Melady warned that “the ethnic fears and hatred are so deep that attempts at reconciliation and dialogue must be preceded by more pragmatic arrangements.” Despite this, the Burundi government continued to deny that they committed genocide.

In June 1973, as ethnic violence renewed, U.S. Ambassador David Newsom met with Burundi Ambassador Joseph Ndabaniwe. Pointedly, Newsom told the Burundi ambassador that “we were aware of what was going on in Burundi with regard to killings by the JRR and the army. There were too many reports from too many sources for them to be denied. Many countries in Africa have had problems but only Burundi resorted to massive slaughter in reprisal...” and that “Genocide by anyone in Africa is Still genocide and must be condemned...” Newsom told the Burundi ambassador that U.S.-Burundi relations could not improve until the Government of Burundi ceased its indiscriminate killing and began a program of national reconciliation. Despite this, no formal action was taken and no form of international recognition of genocide was given.

385 Memorandum From the Ambassador to Uganda (Melady) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Newsom), Washington, May 15, 1973. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve06/d59
It is moral wrong to close eyes to human rights abuses by one ethnic group and to condemn another. As evidenced, historical blindness is a precursor to future violence and "lack of judicial accountability is aggravated by the absence of recognition of the historical violence in contemporary politics and peacebuilding."\footnote{Elazar Barkan, “Memories of Violence: Micro and Macro History and the Challenges to Peacebuilding in Colombia and Northern Ireland,” Irish \textit{Political Studies} 31, no.1 (2016): 10.} In affirming the story of the Hutus, this paper does not negate the memories of violence of the Burundian Hutus who view the historiographical narrative of the Rwandan genocide with unease. Rather, this paper validates their pain and suffering by reframing the historiographical lens through which we can understand the Rwandan genocide as part of a larger conversation of the continuity of historical blindness towards Burundian Hutu repression and suppression within historical discourse. The story of the Burundian Hutus illustrates how hegemonic knowledges, produced through the subordination of the Hutu memory, reinforced and normalized the demonization of Hutus within historical narratives, codifying Tutsis and Hutus into historically protagonist-antagonist and victim-perpetrator binaries. It yields an understanding of how silenced historical narratives obscure justice and enact symbolic violences that incite conflict. Because when we approach the history of victims of mass violence too simplistically—when we point fingers within historical dialogue without fully grasping the wider contextual underpinnings characterizing mass violence—we incite violence by recreating the polarizing binaries that initially led to violence; we negate and delegitimize the pain of those who never afforded the chance to speak; those who were continuously muted.

This paper was intended as a small step to uncovering the truth about the suffering and pain of Burundi’s Hutu population over the last fifty years. In doing so, this paper demonstrated how the truth of the Burundian Hutus was continuously denied, and how the ‘truth’ continued to be presented within language of ‘blame,’ threatening to reproduce the very rationales which allowed for mass violence. I showed how, only through reading about the pain and suffering of the Burundian Hutus over the last 50 years can we understand how historical blindness occurred towards the Hutus. The story of the Burundian Hutus introduces a new dilemma: how will Hutus remember their past within an intergenerational lineage? How should
historians help to bring light to marginalized voices within historical dialogues without hurting those they write about?

Today the contestation over antagonist-protagonist binaries remains a problem within Hutu-Tutsi circles precisely because the pain and suffering of the Hutus remains just as unacknowledged and misunderstood as it was in 1972, 50 years ago. This is problematic because, as Barkan asserts, “our histories shape our identities;” they “change who we were, not just who we are.” Our histories affect our self-perception. In centering this paper on the voices of the Hutus, this paper challenges the dominant literature and provides a lens through which we can draw a conciliatory narrative that validates the pain and suffering of victims of mass violence. This paper was written for the many who were never afforded the chance to tell their story; those who were persecuted and killed because of who they were. It is the story of the lost lives whose struggles were never heard or understood; those whose story was never given justice; and those who continued to be persecuted and killed even after 1972 and 1994. Lest we forget.

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