the convergence historically leaves his otherwise unexceptionable work a little unfinished and the reader a little hungry for closure.

Why convergence now?
Because the arguments for therapeutic convergence are much the same now as they were fifty years ago, the obvious historical questions are: "Why did most therapists and therapists not listen then? And why do they now?" This is just what the publication flow of writing on this topic shows. "Hi-falutin'" conceptual answers might claim that we have come lately to collegial brotherhood and humility by the impact of research showing that therapeutic effectiveness is equally doubtful for all varieties, a la Jerome Frank (Ch. 18), or more or less clearly positive for all major therapies, a la Morris Parloff (Ch. 19), or even that closest competitors are "influenced" to come out "creative" by Fairchild and Richard Katz's discovery (Ch. 8) that they are now the majority of psychotherapists (who answer mail inquiries to members of the Division of Clinical Psychology of the APA). Another "hi-falutin'" answer might go to theory, perhaps arguing—like Anthony Ryle (Ch. 28), Irwin Sarason (Ch. 24), or Goldfried (Ch. 25)—that the language gap from one modality to another has only now been bridged by the good news from cognitive psychology, which lets us see that what had looked like weeds in the garden of clinical science are really theoretical flowers of kindred species. I think that the research results and language bridges are valuable all right, but as explanations of change, they do not suffice. Goldfried's own editorial choices stand in evidence. The "equalizing" outcome research he presents was published in 1973 and 1978, well after the convergence trend had been established. More comprehensive summaries—in fact, all supporting psychotherapy but not editorial conclusions—have appeared even later. Conceptual arguments to theory and language, on the other hand, were around a generation before the trend was visible, as witness Goldfried's first five chapters! Anyhow, other than for its current "mainstream" popularity in the journals, what makes cognitive huge per se a better intellectual currency than the learning- and psychodynamic models of Adler or of Dollard and Miller, which Goldfried presents, or the computer-dynamic models of Gerald Blum (1961) or of George

Miller, Eugene Galanter, and Karl Pribram (1969), which he omits? Convergence should be made of sterner stuff.

The era of free market psychotherapy. The main "stuff" that legitimized eclecticism in therapeutic practice and eclecticism in theory, I believe, was the economic and social pressure of events created simultaneously by the behavioral rebels, the boom in professional practice via legal accreditation of psychologists and the mushrooming of their trade schools, the designation of soul-searching for pay by growth centers and the encounter movement, and the ousting of third party funding on both sides of the therapeutic counter-government paying for the doctors' training, and insurance companies financing the patients' treatment. These events, all set in place in the 1960s, have two kinds of fruit in the 1970s:—a hyperinflation of brand-named treatments (Goldfried notes Parloff's 1975 count of 130). Neither's 1960 count exceeds 250, and on the one hand, a tendency toward recollaboration among therapies belonging to the mental health establishment, on the other. The Establishment in this case means mostly psychiatrists and psychologists, mostly on university faculties and hospital staffs, and mostly having access to government training and research funds. The list of contributors to Goldfried's volume, and those to the parallel 1960 volume that Jud Marmor and Sherry Wood edited, and the critics and innovators they cite in turn, is just such a "Who's Who?"

It is a worthy registry and a design Establishment. So, too, the convergence of psychotherapy theory is a worthy idea whose time has come—but not because we have lately made great advances in theory nor because the convergence yields automatic gains in practice. Rather is the case. It is rather a flight into good sense that promotes and sanctions broader, ergo better, practice. It was generated by economic expansion and competition. Its value is as apologia, not invention. As such, it makes psychotherapy a more honest craft, free of stifling "school" protectionism and intellectual cant.

References

Ahead of His Time


Both Géry d'Ydewalle, author of a chapter in A. Flammer and W. Kintsch's Discourse Processing, and Willy Lom, coeditor with J. Nuttin of several chapters in Nuttin's Motivational Perspectives d'Avenir, are professors in the Department of Psychology at the University of Louvain (Belgium). John F. Kilmstrom is associate professor in the Department of Psychology at the University of Wisconsin Madison. A recipient in 1979 of APA's Early Career Award in Personality, he is coordinator of Personality, Cognition, and Social Interaction with N. Cantor.

This book is a festschrift presented to Joseph R. Nuttin, Professor Emeritus at the University of Louvain (Louvain) in Belgium. From the time he took his doctoral degree Nuttin was a steadfast critic of the doctrine of passive connectionism in learning, especially as represented by Thorndike's Law of Ef-
foot, and an advocate of what has come to be known as the cognitive approach. He sought to redirect the focus of inquiry in psychology away from the question of the effect of reward on the subsequent probability of a response toward the question of what is learned when a response is rewarded or punished. Nettin's central arguments were that reinforcement provides information about the probable outcomes of certain actions: that the person selectively encodes and retains information about both positive and negative outcomes, and that in particular behavioral episodes people actively select some action from their repertoires in order to achieve a particular end. Human behavior, then, was to be interpreted not in terms of a blind association of stimulus and response but in terms of the person's motives, goals, intentions, perceptions, and memories.

Nettin's efforts to promote these views were impeded by a sort of double-whammy of zeitgeist and chauvinism. He took his degree in 1941, and his major work was published in 1953. Thus, he raised questions about cognitive structures and processes just at the time that academic psychology was dominated by radical behaviorism and its concept of the empty organism. Moreover, he was a Belgian psychologist who published largely in European journals and largely in French. By the late 1950s, when Nettin's work became well known on this side of the Atlantic through the translations and synopses provided by Greenwald (1958; Nettin & Greenwald, 1968), the cognitive revolution had begun. If research within the cognitive framework has not substantiated all of Nettin's ideas about the nature of reinforcement, the importance of motivation, and the like, it has at least confirmed that, by seeking to peek inside the black box, he was on the right track. In this book eleven prominent psychologists—from both sides of the Atlantic and from diverse as learning, perception, development, and personality—offer tribute to Nettin's foresight.

Nettin's central work has been on the Law of Effect, and chapters by Este, Marx, and Ryan review the conflict between the S-R and cognitive views of the nature of reinforcement. Este makes a solid case for the role of memory representations, comparison and classification, expectation and hypothesis-testing, decision and choice, and other cognitive processes in selective learning and shows how this perspective ties the once-iso-

ated field of reinforcement to other research domains within cognitive psychology. Marx summarizes a large body of work, chiefly from his own laboratory, that demonstrates the importance of non-cognitive "habits" of the kind envisaged by the classical S-R view of the world. Ryan produces a tentative list of eleven major types of learning and memory tasks: a principal organizational rubric in this list is the distinction between intentional and incidental learning, with cognitive factors paramount in the former and automatic ones in the latter. Neither Marx nor Ryan denies a role for cognitive processes in reinforcement, but they do not want traditional learning processes absolved in the paradigm shift. Along the same lines, Pribram argues strongly that the increasing dominance of the cognitive point of view should not lead psychologists to ignore the biological substrates of mental functioning and the influence of neural organization on cognition.

Nettin also emphasized the importance of the mental representation of the situation—of sets, outcomes, and the time intervals between them—as an important determinant of behavior. In separate chapters, Heckhausen and Mischel discuss the way in which children develop mental representations of rewards and punishments, successes and failures. Mischel reviews his programmatic research on delay of gratification, showing how cognitive processes such as attention, distraction, symbolic representation, and mental transformation can help achieve highly desirable outcomes. As they mature, children acquire both the metaknowledge that these principles are involved in successful delay and the capacity to turn them into effective delay strategies. Heckhausen begins with Nettin's distinction between stimulation pleasure and causality pleasure and then goes on to trace the nature of feelings of success and failure. His developmental analysis shows how the novice's rudimentary awareness of set-outcome contingencies yields to a full-blown sense of instrumental mastery and internal causal attributions. Finale offers a masterly review of the literature on time perception, including a valuable overview of the large body of literature on the subject in non-American journals. He distinguishes between the perception and the representation of time, the former for short intervals and the latter for long ones, and discusses factors affecting both. The chapter culminates in an information-processing model of time estimation lodged in the framework of a multidimensional conception of memory. Thomas also takes up this problem in the form of future-time perspective, especially that of aged people. Throughout, he is concerned with the question of whether a purely cognitive view of action—one that rules out motivation altogether—is possible or even desirable. He concludes that cognition and motivation influence each other and that motives cannot be reduced to anticipations.

Nettin's third concern was with motivation—with the influence of the individual's goals, interests, and intentions on cognition and action—and the remaining contributions deal in various ways with these issues. Bruner offers evidence from naturalistic studies of language acquisition that the actions of both adults and infants are guided at every step of the way by goals and intentions. Although Bruner's chapter is concerned with children's ability to represent their goals, other chapters, of a more psychodynamic bent, do not rely so much on the conscious accessibility of motives. The possibility of unconscious motives is raised, at least implicitly, in Atkinson's sweeping review of thirty years of TAT research. He defends the reliability of the TAT on both psychometric and substantive grounds: Because the test proves valid, it must be reliable. Reliability of the usual sort is not to be expected of a measure of a temporary state; what we need is a broader concept of reliability. Achievement motivation is the focus, with a review of the story-coding system, the classic studies published during the 1950s, the development and testing of mathematical models relating motivation to action, and the most recent computer simulations of the process of thematic apprehension itself. Rayner, another investigator in the TAT tradition, links the topics of mental representation and motivation. Individuals who differ in level of aspiration apparently differ in terms of the value assigned to success and failure, and in terms of the perception of past, present, and future. A festoehris, like any edited anthology, suffers from inherent problems in selection and organization. Who should be included? How should their contributions be organized? Is there any way to integrate such a wide range of material? Only seven of the papers seem to
Social Psychology's Roots, Branches, and Kindling

William S. Sahakian
History and Systems of Social Psychology, 2nd ed.
$24.50 cloth; $10.95 paper

Review by
Seymour Rosenberg

William S. Sahakian is professor of psychology and philosophy at Suffolk University. His many books include Psychology of Personality, 3rd ed., by Seymour Rosenberg; professor of psychology at Rutgers—The State University. He is coeditor of Personal Construct Psychology: Recent Advances in Theory and Practice with H. Hovanes and R. Holland.

There is no single, dramatic event in the history of modern social psychology that can be identified as marking its founding. Occasionally an historian will offer 1890, the year William James published his Principles of Psychology and introduced the concept of "social selves"—a notion that subsequently proved to be very influential in social psychology. More commonly, the publication by Tripplett in 1898 of the first laboratory experiments in social psychology is chosen as a significant marker. Sahakian, and other historians as well, choose the publication in 1908 of the first tests in social psychology—one by William McDougall, the psychologist, and the other by Edward Ross the sociologist—to identify the beginnings of modern social psychology. Although social psychologists may disagree on when to celebrate the centennial of social psychology (William James will probably lose out again, as he did to Wundt in the recent centennial celebration of scientific psychology), they generally agree that social psychology is primarily a 20th-century development.

Part I of Sahakian's book, which takes us from antiquity to 1908, reflects the long-standing interest in the social processes of individuals and groups. Except for a brief chapter on the ancient Greek philosophers and medieval religious scholars, this part is devoted mostly to 18th- and 19th-century thinkers, first in Europe and Britain, and then in America. The philosophical roots and scientific antecedents of social psychology seem more diverse than those of experimental psychology. What is clear, however, is the source of two contrasting philosophical orientations among contemporary social psychologists. The advocates of one orientation seek an understanding of social phenomena in terms of the psychological nature of the individual. This approach has its roots in British empiricism and later, in 19th-century Darwinism. The contrasting orientation is rooted in the European continent where philosophers postulated emergent concepts such as "group mind" and Volkgeist because they viewed the characteristics of a group or a society as not reducible to individual psychology. Sahakian's coverage of these 18th- and 19th-century ideas is somewhat sketchy and loosely organized, although most of the principal figures are given some space.

Part II, the shortest part of the book, takes us from 1908 to 1930. A brief chapter on the landmark tests by Ross and McDougall is followed by a more extensive description of the Chicago school of symbolic interactionism. As the author notes, C. H. Mead and his contemporaries at the University of Chicago did much to advance the conception of modern social psychology as a field of inquiry, rooted in and yet distinct from general psychology and sociology. A grab bag chapter on Floyd Allport, Bugarsky, and Pieger concludes Part II.

The coverage of Floyd Allport is cursory and concludes with the comment that his "influence on subsequent social psychology was negligible." To my mind, Floyd Allport and then Kurt Lewin helped spawn experimental social psychology—only the most prolific research areas in American psychology. Behaviorism and field theory, the respective legacies of these two founders, provided major competing theoretical frameworks for a generation of experimental social psychologists. The coverage of Gordon Allport is even more cursory—yet he (and Lewin) are responsible for the strong links that were established between personality and social psychology in the 1930s and 1940s.

Part III is a review of theoretical and methodological developments in the 1930s that were significant in shaping modern social psychology. These developments include (a) the applied field studies by Mayo and others; (b) the early laboratory studies by Sherif, Lewin, Miller, and Dollard; (c) the anthropological work of Benedict, Margaret Mead, and Meadowski; and (d) the measurement of attitudes by Thurstone and Likert and of social networks by Moreno. On the other hand, Sahakian notes that many of the topics of the 1930s, as represented in Murchison's A Handbook of Social Psychology (Clark University Press, 1935) are now very remote from contemporary social psychology.

Part IV describes the field during and following World War II, the period in which, according to the author, "social psychology comes of age." The opening