The year 1937, when Floyd Ruch’s *Psychology and Life* appeared in its first edition, was also a signal year for the scientific study of personality. That year witnessed the appearance of Gordon Allport’s *Personality: A Psychological Interpretation*, as well as the first edition of Ross Stagner’s *Psychology of Personality*. Allport’s book literally created the field of personality as a topic of academic study, just as his brother Floyd’s text had done for social psychology 13 years earlier. There had been scientific work on personality before that time, of course—else Ruch would not have been able to include in his first edition chapters devoted to “Individual Differences” (Chapter 2) and “Personality and its Measurement” (Chapter 3)—citing, among other items, a pioneering study of measurement of ascendant and submissive traits conducted by the brothers Allport.

It is interesting to note that Ruch placed personality at a very early place in his first edition; later editions, and most other prominent texts, tend to put personality at the back of the book. Either placement is intellectually defensible. For example, individual personality might be seen as the culmination of the general mental processes described in the beginning of the course, and as a sort of prelude to the study of psychopathology. Still, it is a happy event to find personality treated at the very beginning of the book, as if it were the instigation for the study of mental processes in general. Arguably, that is how most psychologists came to their field in the first place.

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It is instructive to compare the first edition of *Psychology and Life* with the 12th edition (by Philip Zimbardo), published in 1988. Many of the same themes come up in Chapter 12, “Assessing Individual Differences,” which centers on formal assessment methods and material on intelligence testing. But the real clue to the changes in the field is that this chapter is preceded by another one, Chapter 11, that had no counterpart in the first edition: “Understanding Human Personality.” Here we find a survey of not just the type and trait theories discussed by Ruch in 1937, but a large number of competing approaches including psychodynamic, humanistic, behavioristic, and cognitive theories of personality. The development of these theories of personality, and their heuristic use to guide empirical research, is the primary feature of the psychology of personality as it has developed over the past 50 years.

**PSYCHOMETRIC APPROACHES TO PERSONALITY**

The first scientific view of personality relied on the classical fourfold typology offered by Hippocrates, Galen, and Kant: melancholic, sanguine, choleric, and phlegmatic. Types were categories of people, and at the end of the nineteenth-century categories were defined in terms of singularly necessary and jointly sufficient defining features. But classical type theory encountered the problems of partial and combined expression that bedevil all attempts to construe natural categories in terms of proper sets: some people are much more representative of their type than others, and some people appear to combine features of two or more types.

There are various ways to solve this problem: Ruch himself redefined types in terms of features distributed continuously but bimodally; more recent work on categorization would suggest that types be construed in terms of fuzzy sets held together by family resemblance and represented by prototypes or exemplars. But the solution adopted at the time was that offered by Wilhelm Wundt: to reconstrue the classic fourfold typology in terms of two independent dimensions representing the speed and strength of emotional arousal. In this way, the theory of personality *types* was transformed into the theory of personality *traits*. With individual differences reconceptualized in terms of continuously distributed variables instead of discrete categories, the problems of partial and combined expression were solved. Personality measurement was put on a quantitative basis and the psychometric approach to personality had begun.

The psychometric approach to personality takes as its model the analysis of individual differences in intelligence and other human abilities. This viewpoint was clearly expressed in what might be called the “Doctrine of Traits.” From this point of view, persons are viewed psychologically as collections of traits—internal dispositions that cause individual differences in experience, thought, and action. Rather than being slotted into pigeonholes, individuals were located at points in multidimensional space, the dimensions being the major personality traits.

A large proportion of traditional personality research consists of the development of an instrument—usually a paper-and-pencil questionnaire—for assessing some trait, and demonstration of the validity of the questionnaire by relating it to some trait-relevant criterion behavior. The successful prediction of criterion behav-
ior validates both the questionnaire and the investigator’s theory of the trait—a process known as construct validity. These efforts comprise the “meat and potatoes” of empirical research on such personality traits as authoritarianism, achievement motivation, machiavellianism, and so on.

But how many traits are there? In 1936, Gordon Allport and H. S. Odbert had counted no less than 17,953 different trait terms in the English lexicon. Some of these were redundant and others useless for personality description, so the problem remained of determining how many traits were needed for an adequate conceptualization of individual differences in personality. Thus began the search for a universally applicable structure of personality traits—a highly economical, tightly organized set of trait terms that could be used to capture individual and group differences in any culture, in any temporal epoch. (It should be noted that Allport himself, a devoted advocate of the uniqueness of each human personality, rejected the idea that individuals could be compared to each other.) This search for a universal structure was initiated in the 1940s by Raymond B. Cattell, and continues today in what has come to resemble a quest for a personological Holy Grail—a quest pursued mostly through factor analysis and other multivariate statistical techniques. Now, almost fifty years after the quest began, many have accepted Warren Norman’s “Big Five,” introduced in 1963 and consisting of extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, and culturedness. L. Goldberg has argued that these five dimensions form the basic structure of personality.

One salutary result of the psychometric tradition has been the development of an increasingly sophisticated technology for the assessment of individual differences (see Tyler’s chapter in this volume). The history of personality assessment begins with purely rational instruments such as R. S. Woodworth’s Personal Data Sheet, introduced during World War I to identify draftees who were disposed to mental illness; it continues with multidimensional questionnaires developed through factor analysis, such as the Guilford-Zimmerman Personality Questionnaire and Cattell’s 16 Personality Factor Questionnaire; and with empirically derived inventories such as the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory and the California Psychological Inventory.

The most recent trend in the evolution of personality assessment has been the construction of new inventories by means of a combination of the three methods described. These instruments, such as the Jackson Personality Inventory and A. Tellegen’s Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire, represent the state of the art in psychometry. However, it is too early to tell whether the improvements in empirical validity are great enough to justify the enormous costs associated with their production.

THE CHALLENGE TO THE PSYCHOMETRIC TRADITION

Although trait conceptions of personality dominated scientific research on personality from Allport’s time on, the decade of the 1960s gave signs of increasing dissatisfaction with it. The gathering storm hit shore in 1968, with the near-simultaneous publication of Walter Mischel’s Personality and Assessment and Donald

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Peterson’s *The Clinical Study of Social Behavior*. Mischel’s monograph was the signal event in the revolt against trait theory, mustering the evidence against traits (and their assessment), and offering an alternative conceptualization from the perspective of cognitive social learning theory.

When analyzed, the Doctrine of Traits appears to contain four distinct propositions. (a) Topographically different behaviors (such as *smiling* and *talking*) co-occur reliably, such that they represent different public manifestations of the same primary trait; and semantically different primary traits (such as *ambitious* and *dominant*) also tend to covary, such that they represent different facets of the same superordinate trait (such as *extraversion*). This gives traits the property of *coherence*, resulting in a hierarchical structure of personality with specific behaviors at the lowest level, and habitual behaviors, primary traits, and secondary and tertiary (etc.) traits at progressively higher levels. (b) Within each level of this hierarchical structure, there is appreciable *stability* over both long and short intervals of time. (c) Within each level there is *consistency* across a wide variety of different situations. (d) There is predictability in the sense that knowledge of individual differences at one level of the hierarchy permits reasonably accurate inferences about individual differences at another level.

Obviously, no psychometrician expects to find perfect levels of coherence, stability, consistency, and predictability; at the very least there is measurement error to take into account. But from the point of view of the Doctrine of Traits, the more these qualities are displayed in the individual’s experience, thought, and action, the better for the doctrine. The critical literature of the 1960s cast profound doubt on the validity of all four propositions. For example, the degree to which specific behaviors (in specific situations) can be predicted from knowledge of generalized traits seems rather poor. In 1968, Mischel coined the term “personality coefficient” to characterize the correlation obtained between a questionnaire measurement of a trait and the occurrence of some trait-relevant behavior in some specific situation. A coefficient of approximately 0.30 was typically obtained, a value significantly greater than chance, but leaving a large proportion of behavioral variance unaccounted for by the trait measure.

Given the dominance of the psychometric viewpoint within personality study, it would be expected that Mischel’s criticism would generate vigorous replies. One common theme has been that the instruments usually used to provide the predictor variables in such studies are far from perfect psychometrically; and that the single-item behavioral criteria usually targeted are inherently unreliable. Under these circumstances, a validity correlation of 0.30 might be very good indeed, and Mischel’s criticism would be unfair. And studies of cross-situational consistency, which often correlate one single-item index of behavior with another, would be severely constrained and thus almost irrelevant. Another tack has been to propose that there are individual differences in consistency itself, and further that consistency, far from being a generalized trait-like disposition, varies across trait domains within subjects. Thus, in the phrase of D. Bem and A. Allen, it may only be possible to predict “some of the people some of the time.”

But the personality coefficient is not merely an artifact of the failure to employ psychometrically adequate predictors and the use of aggregate criteria. For example,
two of the “state-of-the-art” self-report inventories described earlier (which are, almost by definition, psychometrically adequate) were validated against peer ratings on the same trait dimensions (which combine information across behaviors, contexts, time, and observers). In the final analysis, the sorts of critiques leveled against the Doctrine of Traits remain relatively intact. Traits may exist, they may be measurable by questionnaires and rating scales, and they may exert some palpable influence on experience, thought, and action, but there is more to personality than traits.

THE PSYCHODYNAMIC ALTERNATIVE

Although it took some time before they were fully felt, the problems of trait theory were appreciated at the time of Ruch’s first edition. Outside the domain of academic psychology, the clinic offered a rather different view of personality—one that was not so troubled by evidence for incoherence, instability, inconsistency, and unpredictability. This was the psychodynamic (or depth-psychological) viewpoint, as exemplified at the time of the first edition of Ruch’s textbook by Freud’s classic psychoanalytic theory of personality. Recall that the evidence limiting the Doctrine of Traits comes largely from studies of surface behavior. These findings, so troubling for the psychometric view, presented little or no problem for the psychoanalytic view. After all, psychoanalysis posits a number of processes—the defense mechanisms—by which one behavior could be transformed into another. By virtue of reaction formation, for example, the child who deeply loves his mother may appear to hate her. Thus psychoanalytic theory accepts surface inconsistencies as a given, and resolves the difficulty by analyzing the hidden, unconscious processes that govern the vicissitudes of conscious experience and public behavior.

By 1937 psychoanalysis had triumphed within clinical psychiatry, but it had found the going rough within academic psychology. The difficulties encountered by classical Freudian psychoanalysis in gaining acceptance among academic psychologists are too familiar to require detailed exposition in this space. There was, first, the reliance on unobservable structures and processes in a time of rising behaviorism. Not even the database of psychoanalysis was available for public observation, having been gathered in the privacy of the consulting room and retrieved from the unverified memory of the analyst. Just as important, the interpretive rules linking unconscious and conscious mental life were poorly specified, and there were so many of them that virtually any inference could be sustained by the appropriate combination of primitive motives and defense mechanisms. It probably didn’t help that psychometricians and psychoanalysts came from different cultures (London and Vienna), wrote in different languages (English and German), and had different training (statistical and medical). Nor did it help that the psychoanalysts were reluctant to subject their theories to formal tests, and that the few tests performed generally gave negative (or at best inconclusive) results.

Yet even in the 1930s some of the psychoanalytic viewpoint began to creep into academic psychology. At Yale’s Institute for Human Relations, Clark Hull convened a seminar on psychoanalysis, partly to show that behaviorism could deal with a wide range of human problems. With the presence of John Dollard, Neal Miller, and
Robert Sears, the Institute became a center for the integration of learning theory and psychoanalysis. In this environment, Dollard and Miller produced their rigorous analyses of frustration, aggression, conflict, and avoidance. Along with Sears, they tried (with some success) to translate a de-sexualized form of psychoanalytic theory into the principles of S-R learning theory.

At roughly the same time, psychoanalysis was influencing the work of Henry Murray and his colleagues at Harvard, as represented in Murray’s *Explorations in Personality* (1938). David McClelland, trained at Yale and Murray’s intellectual heir, produced a psychodynamically oriented textbook in 1951; it paid a great deal of attention to psychoanalysis, and it systematized Murray’s emphasis on unconscious social motivation. (By introducing into personality the concept of schema, derived from Jean Piaget and the psychoanalyst Ernest Schachtel, McClelland also foreshadowed certain cognitive trends in personality research, to be discussed below.)

After World War II, when clinical psychology emerged as a separate profession, and psychologists began to have sustained working relations with psychoanalytically oriented psychiatrists, psychoanalysis clearly entered the discipline as both a substantive theoretical point of view and a source of hypotheses about mental life. One example of its influence was seen in the “New Look” in perception initiated in the late 1940s and early 1950s. In this movement, Jerome Bruner, George Klein, and others tried to demonstrate the influence of motives, attitudes, and other personality variables on perception; they were particularly concerned with unconscious influences on perception and memory.

The emergence of psychoanalysis as a theory to be contended with is clearly seen in the next great publishing event in personality. The appearance in 1957 of *Theories of Personality* by C. S. Hall and Gardner Lindzey, modelled on Ernest Hilgard’s classic *Theories of Learning* (1st Edition, 1948), literally remade the undergraduate course on personality into a survey of comparative theoretical approaches. The first substantive chapter in Hall and Lindzey’s volume was on Freud; the second on Jung; the third on Adler, Fromm, Horney, and Sullivan; the fourth on Murray.

Certain developments within psychoanalysis eased the process of integration. These theoretical developments did not reflect a rejection of Freud, but rather a form of intellectual evolution: they all have, as their common ancestor, statements in Freud’s latter work (e.g., *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, 1921*; and *The Ego and the Id, 1923*). After Sigmund Freud’s death in 1939, and under the influence of his daughter Anna, a serious movement began to de-sexualize and de-biologize Freud, while paying continued homage to his psychodynamic principles. One group of analysts began to explore the adaptive, reality-monitoring functions of ego processes, and fostered a movement known as *psychoanalytic ego psychology* (as opposed to the classic id psychology, emphasizing basic mental functions of perception, memory, and thought. These were, of course, the very things that academic experimental psychologists were also interested in. The ego psychologists sometimes did perform controlled laboratory experiments, and in other ways tried to make contact with their colleagues in academic experimental psychology.

Sometimes their colleagues responded. The second edition (1956) of Hilgard’s *Theories of Learning* contained an entire chapter on Freud, including an extensive
review of the available empirical literature bearing on psychoanalytic theory. Hilgard explored some of the parallels between psychoanalytic theory and conventional learning theory with discussions of "The Pleasure Principle and the Law of Effect," "The Reality Principle and Trial-and-Error Learning," and "Repetition-Compulsion in Relation to Theories of Habit Strength." He also showed how psychoanalytic concerns had influenced analyses of learning processes with discussions of "Anxiety as a Drive," "Repression, Forgetting, and Recall," and "Aggression and Its Displacement." He pointed out how an integration of the two psychologies could be fostered through studies of learning related to stages of development, the psychodynamics of thinking, and therapy as a learning process.

The chief theoreticians of the ego-psychological movement were Heinz Hartmann, whose 1939 monograph *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation* gave the trend its name, and David Rapaport, whose major books were *Emotions and Memory* (1944) and *The Organization and Pathology of Thought* (1951). In *Diagnostic Psychological Testing* (with M. M. Gill and Roy Shafer, 1945-1946; revised by Holt, 1968), Rapaport and his colleagues attempted to put a psychoanalytic approach to personality assessment on a firm psychometric footing.

The house organ of the ego-psychological movement was *Psychological Issues*, which in its earliest volumes published empirical studies of memory for prose, the structure and perception of events, cognitive styles, subliminal perception, and perceptual development. Many of these papers might have been written by an academic experimental psychologist, but in the context of the sterile psychophysics and radical behaviorism characteristic of the time, their emphasis on motivation, emotion, pathology, and development marked these papers clearly as products of a distinctively psychoanalytic metapsychology. Some ego-psychological theory and research also appeared in mainstream psychological journals. A case in point is Robert White's 1959 paper in *Psychological Review*, reinterpretting Freud's psychosexual stages in terms of the development of competence and mastery.

An argument could be made that psychoanalytic ego psychology kept the study of higher mental processes alive during the peak years of behaviorism in America. But with the triumph of the cognitive revolution of 1956-1967, it no longer served this function. Still, the impulse to integrate psychoanalysis with cognitive psychology remains active, as evidenced by such books as Karl Pribram and M. M. Gill's *Freud's 'Project' Re-Assessed: Preface to Contemporary Cognitive Theory and Neuropsychology* (1976), referring to Freud's unpublished *Project for a Scientific Psychology*, and M. H. Erdelyi's *Psychoanalysis: Freud's Cognitive Psychology* (1985). In addition, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation has established a Program on Conscious and Unconscious Mental Processes, whose aim is to promote interchange between psychoanalysts and cognitive scientists.

At the same time that the ego psychologists were attempting to merge psychoanalysis with classic experimental psychology, other psychoanalysts were establishing links to classic social psychology. Freud had proposed that each instinctual drive had an object, and for the sexual and aggressive drives that mattered most to psychoanalysis, the relevant objects were people. Soon after Freud's death a number of psychoanalysts, stimulated by theoretical developments in sociology and cultural anthropology, began to draw attention to the social (rather than instinctual) origins of
conflict and anxiety: Freud's daughter Anna was part of this movement, but more conservative than Karen Horney and Erich Fromm in her continued adherence to the classic psychosexual theory. The difference between Freud and the neo-Freudians is perhaps best illustrated by Erik Erikson's reinterpretation of the developmental stages in terms of the development of identity, trust, and other aspects of interpersonal relations. By extending the concept of psychological development beyond adolescence to middle and old age, Erikson laid an important foundation for the current field of life-span developmental psychology.

The psychoanalytic object-relations movement emerged fully after the war, in the hands of Melanie Klein, Heinz Kohut, W.R.D. Fairbairn, and D.W. Winnicott. Good coverage of this trend may be found in Morris Eagle's *Recent Developments in Psychoanalysis* (1984) and Greenberg and Mitchell's *Object Relations and Psychoanalytic Theory* (1985). As a group, the object-relations theorists are concerned with the same sorts of questions that concern social psychologists—especially cognitive social psychologists: how people form internal, mental representations of themselves and others; how these representations are structured; the relations between the information contained by these mental concepts and images and the properties of the external objects they ostensibly represent; and how mental representations of self and others influence interpersonal behavior. Cognitive social psychologists work out these problems in terms of stereotypes, person perception and memory, the self-concept, and expectancy confirmation effects; psychoanalytic object-relations theorists tend to focus their attention on the parent-child bond and the transference relationship between patient and client. Cognitive social psychologists strongly favor controlled laboratory experiments and objectively recorded behavior; psychoanalytic object-relations theorists strongly favor unstructured or semistructured clinical interviews and (most recently) the coding of recorded therapeutic encounters. The methodological tools and investigatory contexts differ widely, but the basic problems are the same.

**FLIRTING WITH SITUATIONISM**

Motives and defenses, like types and traits, are hypothetical constructs that cannot be directly observed and whose existence must therefore be inferred. Beginning in the 1950s, increasing appreciation of the empirical difficulties of the psychometric approach, as well as the methodological difficulties faced by psychoanalysis, led some researchers to deny the existence of these "invisible entities." Adopting a behaviorist stance with respect to personality, these critics abandoned intrapsychic variables and focused instead on variables that were external to the person: behavior and the situation in which it occurred. The situationist perspective on personality was stated most forcefully by B.F. Skinner in his *Science and Human Behavior* (1953). In it he argued that drives, traits, and internal states were conceptual baggage that should be discarded—that most individual differences in behavior are due to differences in deprivation and reinforcement history.

In the 1960s, the tendency toward situationism was abetted by the success of classical experimental social psychology in demonstrating the powerful effect of the
social situation on individual experience, thought, and action. More important than anything else, probably, was the growth of the behavior therapy movement within clinical psychology. Traditionally, the syndromes of psychopathology had been treated as analogous to personality types and traits; however, as H. J. Eysenck and others had shown, efforts of insight-oriented therapists to change their patients' underlying personalities had not been notably successful. By contrast, behavior therapists, applying the principles of classical and instrumental conditioning, produced considerably better outcomes. It became common for behavior therapists to equate mental illness with behavioral symptoms, to focus on the external conditions under which the symptoms occurred, and to change the behavior by altering the contingencies of reinforcement. Possibly, it did not seem too much a generalization to equate normal personality too with manifest behavior, and to apply a similar analysis.

In a 1973 Psychological Review paper, K. S. Bowers outlined the salient features of what might be called The Doctrine of Situationism: that the important causal factors in behavior, including social behavior in natural environments, reside in the environment rather than in the organism itself and that a satisfactory explanation of the causes of behavior is provided by a description of the environmental conditions that are associated with it. As Bowers noted, however, the problems with the situationist perspective on personality are the same as the problems with the behaviorism in general. Research on preparedness, autosizing, and species-specific defense reactions showed that there were important biological constraints on learning. In addition, research on predictability and controllability in learning, observational and latent learning, and language acquisition and use (particularly Noam Chomsky’s critique of Skinner) clearly demonstrated the important role played by internal cognitive structures and processes in the acquisition and maintenance of behavior. These lines of research undermined the behaviorist assumptions of the empty organism, arbitrariness of association, association by contiguity, and learning by reinforcement. Although very little of this research was conducted in the traditional domain of personality, it undermined the situationist emphasis there too and refocused attention on the sorts of internal cognitive and biological variables that the behaviorists had abjured.

In the final analysis, it is not clear how seriously situationism was ever taken by personality psychologists. Aside from Skinner, there are no theorists who have lent their names to the Doctrine of Situationism as strongly as Allport, Guilford, Cattell, and Eysenck lent theirs to the Doctrine of Traits, or as strongly as Freud, Murray, and McClelland advocated the psychodynamic point of view. An acknowledged target of Bowers’ 1973 critique was Mischel, but earlier that year, and in the same journal, Mischel had made clear that his point of view was not, and never had been, that of a situationist. In 1987, it appears to be as difficult to find an avowed Skinnerian among personality psychologists as it is to find someone who will admit to having voted for Nixon in 1972.

That does not mean that Bowers had erected a straw man. Allport’s 1937 text had critiqued situationism in no uncertain terms. In their first edition (1956) of Theories of Personality Hall and Lindzey had clearly identified a behaviorist perspective on personality, exemplified by Dollard and Miller’s social learning theory
THE EVOLUTION OF INTERACTIONISM

However wrongheaded, the situationist critique did have a lasting and positive impact in that it reminded personality psychologists of the important role played by physical and social structures and processes in the outside world in determining the person's experience, thought, and action. In the 1970s the task of personality research was redefined so that investigators became explicitly concerned with understanding how structures and processes internal to the person—the traditional domain of personality psychology—interacted with those external to the person—the traditional domain of social psychology.

This had long been an agenda item. In the 1930s, both Kurt Lewin and Henry Murray had proposed theories of personality that explicitly considered the interaction between personal and environmental factors. Beginning in the 1970s, a number of investigators began to articulate a Doctrine of Interactionism for personality, and put it into empirical practice. The Doctrine, as stated in Bowers' 1973 Psychological Review piece, "denies the primacy of either traits or situations in the determination of behavior; instead, it fully recognizes that whatever . . . effects do emerge will depend entirely upon the sample of settings and persons under consideration. . . . More specifically, interactionism argues that situations are as much a function of the person as the person's behavior is a function of the situation" (emphasis in the original).

Interactionism in personality is commonly construed in statistical terms, modelled after the interaction of two main effects in the analysis of variance. But statistical interaction is only one model for interactionism in personality. The classic prediction paradigm is unidirectional: personal and environmental factors combine somehow to produce experience, thought, and action. More recently, however, Albert Bandura has proposed that each of these elements exerts a causal influence on the others. Not only do the person and the environment jointly produce behavior, but the behavior itself feeds back on its determinants to shape both the person who emitted the behavior and the environment that elicited it. This is the essence of the Doctrine of Reciprocal Determinism, which represents a resurgence of holism (as opposed to reductionism) in psychology.

Reciprocal determinism may be illustrated by John Gottman's studies of distressed couples, in which one partner's complaint elicits a second complaint from the other partner, setting off a cross-complaining "loop" that quickly degenerates into an exchange of negative affect; or by Gerald Patterson's studies of aggressive boys, in
which the child’s noxious behaviors elicit retaliatory responses in kind from the parents, quickly developing into a vicious cycle. It may also be illustrated by studies of expectancy effects (the self-fulfilling prophecy) in dyadic social interaction. Here, one person’s (the actor’s) beliefs lead him or her to behave in a particular way toward another person (the target); this tends to elicit behavior from the target that confirms the actor’s beliefs. More recently, it has been shown that targets can act reciprocally to correct the actor’s beliefs, when these do not match the target’s self-concept, and thus influence subsequent behaviors.

FROM SOCIAL LEARNING TO SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE

A major problem for interactionism is to define more clearly the nature of the person-situation interaction. In his 1973 paper, Bowers asserted that persons affect situations in three ways: people may alter the situation that they enter by their mere presence, as when a black person walks through an all-white neighborhood, or a woman enters the drawing room of a men-only club; they may alter the situation by their behavior, as when an extravert tries to liven up a dull party, or a colicky child annoys its parents; or they may alter the situation by transforming their mental representation of it, as when a dissident construes prison as a means of scoring political points rather than as punishment. Research on this last mode, involving cognitive transformations of situations, marks an important stage in the development, over more than 40 years, of a cognitive perspective within the psychology of personality.

The first major personality theorist to adopt an explicitly cognitive perspective was George Kelly, whose theory of personal constructs appeared in 1955. Kelly argued that individual differences in behavior could be understood in terms of individual differences in the categories—personal constructs—through which people, situations, and events were perceived and interpreted. But even in the 1950s Kelly was not the only theorist to adopt this stance. Long before, Lewin had emphasized the importance of the psychological over the physical environment, and Murray had stressed beta press, the perceived environment. Social behaviors acquired through learning, and sought to understand the social circumstances under which these habits were acquired. This “social learning theory” was constructed within the framework of Hullian S-R learning theory, with emphasis on the reduction of secondary, acquired drives, and imitation as a habit acquired through social reinforcement. As noted earlier, however, in the 1950s a number of workers in learning theory began to be critical of both Hullian and Skinnerian approaches to behavior, and cognitive concepts began to creep into social learning theory as well. Thus, Julian Rotter’s 1954 monograph on Social Learning and Clinical Psychology was explicitly intended as a fusion of the drive-reduction, reinforcement theories of E. L. Thorndike and Clark Hull with the cognitive learning theories of E. C. Tolman and Kurt Lewin. Although Rotter’s version of social learning often used behaviorist vocabulary and proposed a list of human needs serving drive functions,
his emphasis on expectancies, values, choice, and locus of control gave it a clear
cognitive twist.

In the final analysis, Rotter's approach was less a theory of learning, and more a
theory of choice. He had little to say about how expectancies, values, needs, and
behavioral options were acquired—except to say that they were acquired through
learning. It remained for Bandura to add an explicit theory of the social learning
process. Like Miller and Dollard, Bandura stressed the role of imitation in social
learning. However, his concept departed radically from theirs because imitation no
longer functioned as a secondary drive, and because reinforcement was given no role
in learning per se. Although on the surface his 1963 Social Learning and Personality
Development, written with R. H. Walters, seemed to draw heavily on Skinnerian
analyses of instrumental conditioning and the contingencies of reinforcement, its true
nature was revealed in its use of the emerging literature on language acquisition and
use for arguments in favor of learning by precept and example rather than reinforce-
ment. By emphasizing cognitive processes rather than reinforcement, observation
over direct experience, and self-regulation over environment control, Bandura took a
giant step away from the behaviorist tradition and offered the first fully cognitive
theory of social learning processes. His 1986 monograph, Social Foundations of
Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory, completes the break with behaviorist
analyses begun more than two decades before by dropping the term "social learning"
from the title.

Another step in the evolution of cognitive theories of personality was taken by
Mischel, whose 1968 critique of psychometric and psychodynamic approaches had
embraced social learning as a viable alternative for personality psychology. Like the
early theory of Bandura and Walters, Mischel's 1968 position was couched in
behaviorist language, with many references to the specificity of stimulus–response
relations, reinforcement, generalization, discrimination, and the importance of
assessing behavior in specific situations rather than in general. However, it also
reflected a cognitive, phenomenological perspective wholly foreign to traditional
learning theory. From Mischel's point of view behavior is controlled by the meaning
of situations, and individuals have the power to transform those meanings through
purely cognitive activities. More recently, he has proposed a new set of cognitive
social learning person variables that determine how situations will be interpreted and
how actions will be organized.

The next step in the evolution of the cognitive perspective on personality has
been to take the vocabulary of cognitive social learning theory and translate it into
the technical vocabulary of contemporary cognitive social psychology. One attempt
to do this is represented in a 1987 monograph by Nancy Cantor and John Kihl-
strom, Personality and Social Intelligence. These authors begin with the assumption
that social behavior is intelligent behavior, and that individual differences reflect the
unique intellectual resources that people bring to bear on the problems encountered
in their life situations. The social intelligence repertoire is construed in terms familiar
in cognitive psychology: declarative knowledge concerning ourselves, others, and the
situations in which we encounter them; and procedural knowledge consisting of the
rules, skills, and strategies by which we form impressions of ourselves and others, and
plan goal-directed interactions with them.
FIFTY YEARS BEFORE, FIFTY YEARS HENCE

In 1937, the study of personality was almost totally divorced from the rest of mainstream academic psychology. Allport’s idiographic psychology celebrated human uniqueness, but his departmental colleagues were concerned with understanding processes of perception, memory, and learning that all humans shared in common. And as Lee Cronbach noted in his 1957 address, “The Two Disciplines of Scientific Psychology,” even those psychometricians who had nomothetic concerns used correlational techniques that were largely foreign to their colleagues who manipulated independent variables in controlled experiments. With few exceptions, those who favored psychoanalysis were shut out of the academy by their emphasis on unconscious mental processes, symbolic interpretation, reliance on uncontrolled case histories, and qualitative methods of analysis. Thus for the first 20 years of its existence as an academic subdiscipline, personality psychology was clearly on the fringes, if not beyond the pale, tolerated as a curiosity or as a concession to undergraduates who still wanted to “know how people work.”

The process of integration began with social learning theory, and Dollard and Miller as well as Rotter made this agenda clear. As personality psychologists made the effort to express their concerns within the lingua franca of general experimental psychology, and to perform controlled experiments, the two disciplines within scientific psychology became more closely linked. Integration was fostered by similar developments within clinical psychology, as practitioners construed both psychopathology and psychotherapy in terms of learning. The trend was not even set back by the cognitive revolution. In fact, an argument could be made that personality theory only flirted with situationism, not because it embraced behaviorist learning theory late, but in large part because early social learning theorists were really cognitivists at heart.

If there is a moral to this story, it is that the burden of personality psychology is to express its concerns, and perform its research, within the conceptual and methodological framework provided by the general psychology of perception, memory, thought, and language. Only then will other psychologists take an interest in the activities of their personologist colleagues, and see the relevance of personality psychology for their own work. And only then will students just entering the field see how the chapters on personality relate to the rest—wherever in the textbook they happen to be placed.

Footnote

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References


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Essays in Honor of Floyd Ruch

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