

# Jim Hutchinson

*Curriculum Vitae*

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Department of Philosophy

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<b>Employment</b>	University of Toronto, Mississauga Postdoctoral Fellow	2020-Present
	Simon Fraser University Term Lecturer of Philosophy	2019-2020
	Indiana University, Bloomington Oscar R. Ewing Visiting Assistant Professor of Philosophy	2018-2019
<b>Education</b>	University of California, Berkeley Ph.D. in Philosophy (Advisors: John MacFarlane and John Campbell) Dissertation: <i>A Haunting Conviction: Frege On Truth and Logic</i>	2009-2018
	Wilfrid Laurier University	2004-2006
	University of Toronto B.A. in Philosophy	2006-2009
<b>Specialization</b>	History of Analytic Philosophy, Epistemology, Philosophy of Logic	
<b>Competence</b>	Early Modern Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind/Language, Value Theory	
<b>Publications</b>	"Frege's Critical Arguments for Axioms" <i>Pacific Philosophical Quarterly</i>	Forthcoming
	"Frege on the Generality of Logical Laws" <i>European Journal of Philosophy</i>	March 2020
	"Why Can't What is True Be Valuable?" <i>Synthese</i>	December 2019
	[Paper about Normativity and Logic]	Under Review
	[Paper about Frege's Metaphysics]	Under Review
	[Paper about Frege's Philosophy of Science]	Under Review
	[Paper about Conceptual Engineering (co-authored)]	Under Review
<b>Presentations</b> (* = Blind Review) (** = Invited)	"Logical Pluralism and Normativity: Conflict and Collapse" * Eastern APA: Colloquium	Upcoming; January 2021
	"Frege's Radical Anti-Psychologism" * Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy * Eastern APA: Colloquium	July 2021 January 2021
	"Post-Truth and the Value of Truth" * Pacific APA: Colloquium * IU Inter-Campus Philosophy Conference	April 2021 March 2019
	"Psychologism and Normative Generality" ** University of Toronto LEMM Group	October 2020

“Why Can’t What Is True Be Valuable?”	
* Eastern APA: Colloquium	January 2020
** Simon Fraser University Philosophy Colloquium	September 2019
* North Carolina Philosophical Society Conference	March 2019
* Indiana Philosophical Association Conference	November 2018
IU Bloomington Faculty Work-In-Progress Talks	September 2018
“Frege on the Generality of Logical Laws”	
* TiLPS History of Analytic Philosophy Workshop	July 2019
** IU Bloomington Logic Seminar	September 2018
“Frege on Science: Simplicity and Grounding”	
* Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy	June 2019
* Pacific APA: Colloquium	April 2016
* Berkeley-Stanford-Davis Graduate Conference	May 2015
UC Berkeley Richard Wollheim Society	March 2015
“Did the Later Wittgenstein Accept Frege’s Anti-Psychologism?”	
* Kraków Conf.: Wittgenstein and Frege on Psychologism	November 2018
“Frege’s Critical Arguments for Axioms”	
* Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy	June 2018
* Brown University Mark Shapiro Graduate Conference	November 2017
* Eastern APA: Colloquium	January 2017
* Berkeley-London Graduate Conference	May 2016
* Berkeley-Stanford-Davis Graduate Conference	April 2016
UC Berkeley Richard Wollheim Society	December 2015
“Frege and Lotze on Criteria of Identity”	
* Pacific APA: North American Neo-Kantian Society	March 2018
“Truth Among the Neo-Kantians”	
UC Berkeley Richard Wollheim Society	February 2018
“Kant’s Quadrilemma and the Needs of Reason”	
UC Berkeley Richard Wollheim Society	April 2017
“Frege’s Philosophy of Language”	
UC Berkeley Graduate Research Colloquium	December 2016
“You Oughta Be Truthin’!”	
UC Berkeley Richard Wollheim Society	February 2014
“A Criterion for Sameness of Sense in Frege”	
* Berkeley-London Graduate Conference	May 2013
UC Berkeley Richard Wollheim Society	December 2012
** UC Berkeley Undergraduate Philosophy Forum	November 2012
“Are Perceptual States Object-Dependent?”	
* Berkeley-London Graduate Conference	May 2012
UC Berkeley Richard Wollheim Society	December 2011
“Inquiry, Indication, and Rigid Beliefs”	
* Berkeley-Stanford-Davis Graduate Conference	April 2011
UC Berkeley Richard Wollheim Society	September 2010
“Do We Share Most of our Concepts?”	
UC Berkeley Richard Wollheim Society	September 2009

<b>Teaching</b>	UTM: Mentoring: The Socrates Project (Advanced) Ongoing: Fall 2021/Spring 2022
	UTM: History: Early Analytic Philosophy (Advanced) Ongoing: Fall 2021
	SFU: Epistemology/Logic: Justifying Axioms (Graduate) Summer 2020
	SFU: History: Early Analytic Philosophy (Advanced) Summer 2020
	(2x) SFU: Logic: Truth and Generality (Introductory) Sum. 2020/Fall 2019
	(2x) SFU: Epistemology: The Value of Truth (Intermediate) Spring 2020/Fall 2019
	SFU: Metaphysics: Reality (Intermediate) Spring 2020
	SFU: Metaph./Epist.: Authenticity and Objectivity (Introductory) Fall 2019
	IUB: Logic: Generality and Modality (Intermediate) Spring 2019
	(2x) IUB: Ethics: Pleasure, Love, Truth, and the Meaning of Life (Intro.) S2019/F2018
	IUB: Epistemology: The Value of Truth (Advanced) Fall 2018
	UCB: History: Modern Philosophy (Intermediate) Summer 2017
	UCB: Mind: Nature of Mind (Introductory) Summer 2014
	<b>UC Berkeley</b>
(2x) Mentoring: Berkeley Connect (All levels, Lara Buchak) Fall 2017/Spring 2018	
<b>Assistant Teaching</b>	
Mentoring: Philosophical Methods (Advanced, Lara Buchak) Spring 2017	
History: Kant (Advanced, Daniel Warren) Fall 2016	
History: Spinoza (Advanced, Tim Crockett) Spring 2016	
History: Aristotle (Advanced, Klaus Corcilius) Fall 2015	
History: Later Wittgenstein (Advanced, Barry Stroud) Spring 2015	
History: Modern Philosophy (Intermediate, Hannah Ginsborg) Spring 2014	
Language: Theory of Meaning (Advanced, John MacFarlane) Spring 2013	
History: Frege (Advanced, Hans Sluga) Fall 2012	
Logic: Introductory Logic (Introductory, Daniel Warren) Spring 2012	
(2x) Mind: Nature of Mind (Intro., John Campbell / Geoff Lee) Fall 2011/Fall 2010	
Mind: Philosophy of Mind (Advanced, John Searle) Spring 2011	
<b>UC Berkeley</b>	
<b>Coursework</b>	
(* = Audited)	
* Kant on Causality (Daniel Warren) Spring 2018	
* Kant's Metaphysics and Epistemology (Daniel Warren) Spring 2017	
* Descartes, Hobbes, and Spinoza (Kristin Primus) Fall 2016	
* Meaning, Understanding and Commitment (Barry Stroud) Spring 2016	
* Rule-following and the normativity of meaning (Hannah Ginsborg) Spr. 2016	
* Wittgenstein's Tractatus (Paolo Mancosu and Hans Sluga) Fall 2014	
* Attention, Perceptual Disorders, & First Person (John Campbell) Spring 2013	
* Recent Work on Reasons and Normativity (Jay Wallace) Spring 2013	
* Perception Object & Content, (Michael Martin) Fall 2012	
* Judgement, Competence and "Practical Knowledge" (Barry Stroud) Spr. 2012	
* Philosophy of Perception (John Campbell and Michael Martin) Fall 2011	
Democratic Authority (Niko Kolodny) Spring 2011	
* Expressivism and Relativism (John MacFarlane) Spring 2011	
* Metaphysics: Objects and Properties (Geoff Lee) Spring 2011	
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (Dorothea Frede) Fall 2010	
Concepts, Attitudes, and the Unity of Judgement (Barry Stroud) Fall 2010	
Hume (Michael Martin) Fall 2010	
Consciousness (Geoff Lee) Spring 2010	
Content Without Structure (John MacFarlane and Seth Yalcin) Spring 2010	
* Content and Consciousness (Michael Martin) Fall 2009	
Conceptual Representation (Hannah Ginsborg and Tania Lombrozo) Fall 2009	
Attention, Consciousness, and Mental Causation (John Campbell) Fall 2009	
First Year Graduate Seminar (John MacFarlane and Niko Kolodny) Fall 2009	

<b>Awards and Honours (Competitive)</b>	Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence EURO Travel Grant (IU Bloomington)	2019
	Berkeley Connect Fellowship (UC Berkeley)	2017-2018
	Outstanding Graduate Student Instructor Award (UC Berkeley)	2016
	Intensive Language Course Grant (Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst)	2013
	John F.M. Hunter Memorial Scholarship (University of Toronto)	2008
	Graham Solomon Logic Prize (Wilfrid Laurier University)	2006
<b>Professional and Departmental Service</b>	Referee:	
	<i>Mind</i>	2020-
	<i>Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy</i>	2020-
	<i>Thought</i>	2020-
	Cambridge University Press	2019-
	American Philosophical Association, Central Division	2019-
	<i>Journal of Philosophical Logic</i>	2019-
	<i>History of Philosophy Quarterly</i>	2019-
	Berkeley-Stanford-Davis Philosophy Conference	2010-2016
	Judge:	
	British Columbia Ethics Bowl	2020
	UC Berkeley New Crop Undergraduate Essay Prize	2014, 2016
	Organizer:	
	Berkeley-London Philosophy Conference	2015
	UC Berkeley Philosophy Department Colloquium Receptions	2009-2012
	Chair, UC Berkeley Graduate Student Instructor Evaluation Committee	2017
Graduate Student Library Liaison, UC Berkeley	2015-2016	
Graduate Student Faculty Meeting Representative, UC Berkeley	2015	
Research Assistant, Hans Sluga on <i>The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein</i>	2014	
<b>Languages</b>	German (C1 Proficiency, Goethe Institut Berlin 2013)	
	French (reading knowledge)	
<b>Citizenship</b>	Canadian	
<b>References</b>	John Campbell	Hans Sluga
	Willis S. and Marion Slusser Prof. of Phil.	William and Trudy Ausfahl Prof. of Phil.
	University of California, Berkeley	University of California, Berkeley
	jjcampbell@berkeley.edu	sluga@berkeley.edu
	John MacFarlane	Barry Stroud
	Professor of Philosophy	Willis S. and Marion Slusser Prof. of Phil.
	University of California, Berkeley	University of California, Berkeley
	jgm@berkeley.edu	barrys@berkeley.edu
	Gary Ebbs	Daniel Warren
	Professor of Philosophy	Associate Professor of Philosophy
University of Indiana, Bloomington	University of California, Berkeley	
gebbs@indiana.edu	dmwarren@berkeley.edu	
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## **Abstract of *A Haunting Conviction: Frege on Truth and Logic***

Many philosophers think that *truth* is prior to *science*, in something like the following sense: though it belongs to the nature of science to pursue truth, the nature of truth does not itself involve science or the cognitive goals that we satisfy through it, such as understanding and explaining things. Frege denies this, giving no priority either to truth or to science. For him, the things that are true satisfy the cognitive goals of science: what we know about each can guide our thinking about the other. No truth is trivial, since every one has a contribution to make to these cognitive goals.

For both Frege and the Neo-Kantian philosophers in his philosophical milieu, it is this connection with these cognitive goals that makes truth a *value*, whose significance is comparable with that of goodness and beauty. This value and these goals enable Frege to offer a normative characterization of logic: the logical laws are those that tell us how all our judging must be if we are to achieve these goals.

These views of truth, science, and logic make possible an approach to the justification of logical axioms that has frustrated readers by its apparent inconsistency: Frege seems both to rule out arguing for logical axioms, and himself to offer arguments for them. The key to resolving the conflict is to see that he only means to rule out arguments that derive the axioms from other truths that we are already justified in accepting. His own arguments, by contrast, derive them directly from the *goals*: the point of the arguments is to show that the axioms *must* be true if our cognitive goals are ever to be reached.

The discussions of truth, science, and logic in which the above points emerge do not involve language in any significant way, which will surprise anyone who is familiar with Frege's reputation as the herald of the "linguistic turn"—his reputation for proclaiming an independent philosophy of language to be the foundation of all philosophy. I argue for a quite different account of the role of language in Frege's philosophy. I point out that key arguments in his *Foundations of Arithmetic* already force us to understand Frege's philosophy of language not as a foundation for philosophy, but as a grand project in *linguistic engineering*. Frege's goal is not to reveal how language is, but to re-design it in order to help us reach our (independently understood) cognitive goals. This technological interpretation of Frege's philosophy of language, I believe, will allow us to break the interpretive deadlock that has prevented us from understanding the key linguistic notion from Frege's later work: that of the *sense* of an expression.