Philip J. Walsh

Post-doctoral Teaching Fellow

Fordham University


I received my PhD in philosophy from the University of California, Irvine and am currently a post-doctoral teaching fellow at Fordham University. My research focuses on the nature and significance of consciousness, and lies at the intersection of the phenomenological tradition and contemporary philosophy of mind. I also have a background in Asian philosophy, and received a masters in “Eastern Classics” from St. John's College in Santa Fe.


Published and forthcoming

Philosophy of Mind in the Phenomenological Tradition (2018)

Forthcoming in Kind, A. (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in the 20th and 21st Centuries. Routledge.

Phenomenology and philosophy of mind are not independent bodies of research that happen to overlap, but are rather two phases of a continuous tradition that diverged for a time and are now, at least partially, reintegrating...

Low-level Properties in Perceptual Experience (2017)

Philip J. Walsh (2017): Low-Level Properties in Perceptual Experience, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (5):682-703 (2017)

Whether perceptual experience represents high-level properties like causation and natural-kind in virtue of its phenomenology is an open question in philosophy of mind. While the question of high-level properties has sparked disagreement, there is widespread agreement that the sensory phenomenology of perceptual experience presents us with low-level properties like shape and color. This paper argues that the relationship between the sensory character of experience and the low-level properties represented therein is more complex than most assume...

Motivation and Horizon: Phenomenal Intentionality in Husserl (2017)

Walsh, Philip J. (2017). Motivation and Horizon: Phenomenal Intentionality in Husserl. Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (3):410-435.

This paper argues for a Husserlian account of phenomenal intentionality. Experience is intentional insofar as it presents a mind-independent, objective world. Its doing so is a matter of the way it hangs together, its having a certain structure. But in order for the intentionality in question to be properly understood as phenomenal intentionality, this structure must inhere in experience as a phenomenal feature.

The Sound of Silence: Merleau-Ponty on Conscious Thought (2017)

Walsh, Philip J. (2017). The Sound of Silence: Merleau‐Ponty on Conscious Thought. European Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):312-335.

We take ourselves to have an inner life of thought, and we take ourselves to be capable of linguistically expressing our thoughts to others. But what is the nature of this “inner life” of thought? Is conscious thought necessarily carried out in language? This paper takes up these questions by examining Merleau-Ponty’s theory of expression...

Cognitive extension, enhancement, and the phenomenology of thinking (2017)

Walsh, Philip J. (2017). Cognitive extension, enhancement, and the phenomenology of thinking. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:16 (1):33-51.

This paper brings together several strands of thought from both the analytic and phenomenological traditions in order to critically examine accounts of cognitive enhancement that rely on the idea of cognitive extension...

Empathy, Embodiment, and the Unity of Expression (2014)

Walsh, Philip J. (2014). Empathy, Embodiment, and the Unity of Expression. Topoi 33 (1):215-226.

This paper presents an account of empathy as the form of experience directed at embodied unities of expressive movement.After outlining the key differences between simulation theory and the phenomenological approach to empathy, the paper argues that while the phenomenological approach is closer to respecting a necessary constitutional asymmetry between first-personal and second-personal senses of embodiment, it still presupposes a general concept of embodiment that ends up being problematic...

Husserl's Concept of Motivation (2013)

Walsh, Philip J. (2013). Husserl's Concept of Motivation: the Logical Investigations and beyond. Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 16:70-83.

Husserl introduces a phenomenological concept called “motivation” early in the First Investigation of his magnum opus, the Logical Investigations. The importance of this concept has been overlooked since Husserl passes over it rather quickly on his way to an analysis of the meaningful nature of expression. I argue, however, that motivation is essential to Husserl’s overall project...


"A friend is one before whom I may think aloud." – Emerson

I consider teaching to be an essential part of doing philosophy. As a teacher, my general goal is to create an environment in which students come to see the relevance of their education and thereby come to care. As a pedagogical fellow at UC Irvine, I spent a year studying pedagogical research and active learning techniques. I aim to make the classroom a place where students engage with the material and with one another. Teaching leads me to new places, makes old questions new again, and perhaps most importantly, nourishes my hope in the power of philosophy to change people.


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