Michael N. Escobar
PS 148A
Ruth B. Collier
Wendy Sinek
Dependency theory versus the critical
junctures approach
"Man
is born in bondage to his own history," said Oskar Werner in the film The
Shoes of the Fisherman.The
critical junctures framework helps us to understand the different trajectories
of national development in Latin America by recognizing that actions have
consequences and affirming the possibility of individual (or collective)
agency. Dependency theory basically states that a country's option sets are
prescribed and certain options are proscribed by a country's position in the
world economy. They can be easily unified: dependency theory explains the
options that were available to political actors within a country, and Shaping
the Political Arena
describes how the actors exercised their options.
As a result of the Mexican Revolution, Mexico in 1920 was a country with a certain
balance of power and a certain momentum, which individuals and groups sought to
manipulate or within which to maneuver. The actions taken by Lázaro Cárdenas left the political generations that followed him with a new range of options
and a new set of imperatives from their constituencies. Any political actor
will find some options available and others out of reach, and these option sets
are inherited from the consequences of others' previous actions, as well as the
structural system in which they take place.
Dependency
theory would go too far to argue for a strict determinism, as any empirical
study of Latin American nations can easily show that, while Latin American
countries occupy a more or less generic position of subordination in the world
economy, nevertheless their histories have been very divergent. However,
dependency doesn't argue this; it does provide an apt explanation for the way
in which Latin American economies developed, with a focus on the export of raw
materials, since they were late developers. Those who choose policies that
don't fit easily within the dependency system do so at their own peril, as the
Peronist and Cuban revolutionary regimes discovered.
The
Mexico of 1910 shows the total relevancy of the dependency model: it was
dominated by a small elite, with most economic development concentrated in
export sectors. It exported raw materials and imported capital goods and
upmarket consumer goods. Porfirio Díaz' regime was totally geared to the
service of the exporting elite and the interests of foreign capital who
facilitated development. The massive power of the system which promoted
dependency in development is shown by the massive revolution which it
engendered. The "path of least resistance" would have involved getting along
with the existing system; the fact that various actors in Mexican society rose
up to overthrow the ancien régime does not contravene dependency theory, but in
fact bears it out. Dependency describes the system, the set of options
available to Carranza, Villa, and Calles; those who chose to rise up created a
new political landscape, but this didn't magically create a heavy industry that
could compete against Britain and the United States: Mexico was still
dependent. The new constitution and the Cárdenas administration attempted to
push Mexico in a new direction, but Cárdenas' policies did not outlive him.
With Miguel Alemán and his successors, the constituencies which Cárdenas
represented got what they needed institutionally but not what they wanted
ideologically (land reform was slowed but not halted; the electricians of
Mexico City got a daily siesta guaranteed in their contract, etc.), and the
interests of the exporting elites (e.g. the Monterrey industrialists) were
defended by the new PRI and the satellite parties.
Argentina's
experience differs fundamentally from Mexico's. Paradoxically, the country
which did not experience a massive social revolution found itself with a much
more unstable political system. But let us examine this more closely: the
industrial sector which grew up before and during the Perón regime
concomitantly generated a large working class. Here, the intensity of the
control established over the labor movement by Perón, and the later viciousness
of the military dictatorship, bear out dependency theory, just as the
revolution did for Mexico. Looking at the situation from a global perspective,
we have a dependent economy whose most dynamic sector is the export one, and
the working class and bourgeoisie which pertain to it fought each other
intensely during the 20th century. The workers' demands were blocked
by the political system, and ultimately by the military, the guardian of the
interests of the elite, whose power sprang from their participation in the
world economy and their exploitation of the workers.
An
argument, let's call it "neo-dependency", might be made, to update dependency
in light of its crisis and incorporate the critical junctures approach. Just as
Betty Friedan argued in The Feminine Mystique that women cooperated in their own
subjugation, we can compare the experiences of Japan, Russia, and Sweden with
Latin America, and suggest that the elites of Latin America were instrumental
in perpetuating their countries' dependency. Japan and Sweden industrialized
late, but quickly, became competitive in the world market, and developed
diverse industrial bases. This is singularly impressive in that Japan and
Sweden are both relatively small countries, and Japan particularly lacks
domestic petroleum (this was a main cause of World War II). Another late
developer, Russia, opted out of the world capitalist system after 1917. The
fall of communism in the USSR must be understood as partially a result of the
arms race, and as a result of popular political rebellion against
authoritarianism, and we cannot discount the massive damage inflicted on the
system during World War II; in other words, communism as such was not solely
responsible for its own demise. Before 1990, Russia developed a strong industry
that was able to subsidize the development of Eastern Europe and Cuba (the
center of the "evil empire" was actually poorer than its satellite countries).
Thus, the path a country's development takes is not determined by structural
factors, but can progress divergent to the dictates of the world capitalist
system, if the political will can be found to do so. In spite of being late
developers, Russia, Sweden, and Japan were able to industrialize and build
strong industrial sectors. Latin America's particular history must, partially,
be laid at the door of an intransigent oligarchy that jealously defended its
priviledges, and an opportunistic middle class.
In
Mexico and Argentina we see the same class structure, although Argentina had no
mass peasantry, and although the classes' balances of power were not identical.
The balance of power dictated how far the incorporation-period reformers were
able to go, before they were stopped by the right-wing reaction. The classes
originated in a dependent political economy. The representatives of these
classes pursued their agenda in the political arena, shaping it as they went,
choosing to play fair or play dirty according to how they thought their
interests would best be served. The title of Shaping the Political Arena is a clue for us: the arena is not only
the locus of political action, but has a particular shape, which has a
particular origin: the actions of previous political actors, and the
political-economic system in which they live. And more to the point, the
arena's shape evolves over time as a result of the activities of actors in the
present. In the pursuit of their goals, actors change the arena in which they
work, both unwittingly and deliberately.