The CHIPS Act Is Paving the Way for US Technological Dominance

By Ava Ramirez

In August of 2022, President Biden signed the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) and Science Act into law. This landmark legislation includes $280 billion designed to revitalize the U.S. semiconductor and science industry by boosting training, research, and innovation. This transcendent legislation is not only an investment but a signal to the rest of the world that the United States is ready to regain control of its semiconductor production, attempting to increase its market share and reduce dependence on East Asian countries [1]. It is not just a smart policy move, but a necessary one. 

Currently, Taiwan controls a portion above 60 percent of the global semiconductor market through the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC). More so, in advanced chip manufacturing, TSMC holds a 90 percent market share. While the U.S. has historically relied on East Asia, Taiwan, and China, for the production of chips, this Act marks a sentiment to reduce the dependence on East Asia, allowing the U.S. to be better equipped to maintain control over its technological infrastructure [2]. This is critical in the potential case of global tensions or disruptions. As global supply chains are vulnerable to shocks, it is risky to rely on a singular outside nation to such an extent. 

The CHIPS and Science Act is rewriting the narrative. Arguably, it is realigning our priorities. We must demonstrate economic resilience and global competitiveness. In the face of geopolitical tensions, the increased domestic production of a good, in this case, semiconductors, is fundamental to ensuring a stable production and technological infrastructure for the United States. Notable investments have been made, such as the $100 billion invested by TSMC in the U.S. production of semiconductors. Specifically, the investment was made to create three new plants in Arizona [3]. Financial investments increase U.S. manufacturing and have effectively worked to reduce the gap between the U.S. and current leading hubs. 

Further, the increase in semiconductor manufacturing has created jobs and is expected to continue to increase employment [4]. TSMC’s $100 billion investment alone has already employed over 3,000 workers. This could include construction as well as operations [5]. 

Beyond physical manufacturing, the CHIPS Act is spearheading U.S. innovation. With $13.7 billion dedicated to research and development, it is laying the groundwork for long-term global technological influence [6]. This is the kind of proactive policy that should have been implemented years ago. Not only has the investment from the CHIPS and Science Act in R&D enhanced efforts within the fields of the Act itself, but it has also served as a precedent for other unrelated federal agencies, including the Department of Energy (DOE), to enhance their research efforts. Specifically, the formation of Microelectronics Science Research Centers (MSRCs) [7]. This chain reaction has effectively increased funding and efforts for emerging technologies.

Before the implementation of this Act, many members of Congress had a concern regarding the overreliance on semiconductor production in East Asia and American vulnerabilities to disruption [1]. An example of this can be illustrated by the COVID-19 pandemic and its subsequent halt of semiconductors in the United States. Congress is very interested in the success of the Act. They know that the stakes of the Act are high. The public sector knows it. And even the people know it. The stakes couldn’t be higher. 

Allies of the Act include state governments that are home to semiconductor facilities, as they benefit from job creation and economic growth [8]. Further, the U.S. government benefits from reduced risk of economic disruption and the enhancement of national security. Parties opposing the Act include China and other global competitors. China, for example, views U.S. policies as both a challenge and a catalyst to its semiconductor manufacturing efforts. An increase in U.S. manufacturing increases competition for China, potentially rendering it not an ally of the substantial investment in domestic semiconductor manufacturing [1]. While there might be global opposition to such an investment, this is a necessary fight to fight in reaching the next technological frontier.  

There is more to this Act than just economics. It is about political sovereignty. In the modern world, geopolitical power is defined by technological dominance. The United States has declared its intention to take the global lead through the implementation of the CHIPS Act. While it is true that the full effects of the Act are yet to be seen, the initial impacts are promising and profound.

Works Cited

1. Congressional Research Service. Chips act of 2022 provisions and implementation. Accessed March 4, 2025. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47523?utm_source.
2. Cheung, Eric, and Will Ripley. “Everyone Wants the Latest Chips. That’s Causing a Huge Headache for the World’s Biggest Supplier | CNN Business.” CNN, March 23, 2024. https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/22/tech/taiwan-tsmc-talent-shortage-training-center-intl-hnk/index .html#:~:text=Sometimes%20called%20the%20most%20important,smartphones%20to%20artifi cial%20intelligence%20applications.
3. Tang, Didi, Michelle L. Price, and Chris Megerian. “Trump to Make Investment Announcement as He Meets with CEO of Taiwan Giant Chipmaker TSMC.” AP News, March 3, 2025. https://apnews.com/article/trump-tsmc-chip-manufacturing-tariffs-42980704ffca62e823182422e e4b7b83.
4. John W. McArthur, Zia Khan, Jr. E.J. Dionne, and Malaika Simmons Nicol Turner Lee. “How Federal, State, and Local Leaders Can Leverage the Chips and Science Act as a Landmark Workforce Opportunity.” Brookings, January 31, 2024. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-federal-state-and-local-leaders-can-leverage-the-chips-a nd-science-act-as-a-landmark-workforce-opportunity/?utm_source.
5. Christoffel, Ryan. “Apple Chipmaker TSMC Committing $100 Billion to US Expansion: Report.” 9to5Mac, March 3, 2025. https://9to5mac.com/2025/03/03/apple-chipmaker-tsmc-committing-100-billion-to-us-expansion report/.
6. NSF 25-304 | November 20, and NSF 25-304 | November 20. “U.S. Business R&D in Semiconductor-Related Industries.” NSF. Accessed March 3, 2025. https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsf25304.
7. Office of Science. “Department of Energy Announces $160 Million for Research to Form Microelectronics Science Research Centers.” Energy.gov, May 8, 2024. https://www.energy.gov/science/articles/department-energy-announces-160-million-research-for m-microelectronics-science?utm_source.
8. Stacher, Macy. “How Much Will the Chips Act Help the Workers Who Make Them?” The American Prospect, August 30, 2024. https://prospect.org/labor/2024-08-30-how-much-will-chips-act-help-workers/?utm_source=chat gpt.com.

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