-- A Study of the Outside Consulting Activities of University Faculty --

Charles Schwartz
Department of Physics
University of California
Berkeley, California 94720
September 1975

[original 25 page pamphlet transcribed by the author, April 2008, improved December 2011]


While it is widely known that university faculty sometimes hire out their special expertise as private consultants, the full nature and scope of this activity has generally been kept hidden from public view.  This report, in an attempt to pierce this shroud of ignorance, presents a collection of data, some insiders' views on consulting, several examples of abuse, and a critical discussion.  Some rather startling information, presented here in detailed tables, shows that a large number of academics serve not just as ordinary paid consultants to private industry, but actually sit as members of the boards of directors of major business corporations.  Finally, there is a proposal that all consulting faculty - and especially those at publicly supported universities - should be required to make regular public disclosures of their outside professional activities as a first step toward dealing with the inherent problems of conflict-of-interest between their public duties and their private services.


     It is told that 800 years ago, at the University of Bologna in Italy, professors had to obtain permission from their students and had to post bond in order to leave town on private business [1]. No such requirements impede the travels of the entrepreneurial professor in modern America.

     As the acknowledged custodians of expert knowledge in our complex society, professors at elite universities are often called upon to serve as consultants to organizations, both public and private, outside of the campus.  This activity, which takes the professor's time and interest away from strictly academic pursuits, is not looked upon as "moonlighting" by college officials, even though the consulting fees earned by the professor require no surrender of academic salary for the time spent working elsewhere.  There are, to be sure, general university rules that attempt to put some upper limit to the extent of such outside consulting: "one day per week" is the most common limit, explicit on some campuses, only implicit on others.  But aside from espousing the vague tenet that a professor's outside consulting should not interfere with the basic teaching commitments, universities generally take a completely laissez faire attitude toward this activity.

     This is not an easy subject to learn about.  I once wrote to Dr. George Maslach, Provost of the Professional Schools and Colleges at the Berkeley campus, trying to learn about the scope and nature of consulting activity.  He replied, in part, [2]
I have no knowledge of the extent of outside consulting by faculty and others; I have no knowledge of how many people consult, nor do I know how they have spent their time.  There is no indication of how I can obtain this information in any easy way.

     Over the past few years I have been collecting what information I could find about faculty consulting and, with the helpful advice of a number of friends, I have now assembled it into this report.


Some Data on Consulting 2
Examples of Abuse 8
Conflict of Interest 12
A Modest Proposal 16
References 19
Tables 20


     A survey conducted by the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education in 1969 shows how widespread is the practice of faculty outside consulting.  The results gathered from faculty at elite universities are shown in Table 1 at the end of this report.  Forty-one percent of the faculty devote between 1 and 10 % of their work time to consulting, with or without pay; fourteen percent devote between 11 and 20 % of their time; and five percent devote more than 20 % of their time.  The recipients if paid consulting services were diverse:
federal or foreign government (20%); local business, government, schools (18%); national corporations (17%); non-profit foundations (11%); research projects (10%).  Only 42 % of the faculty had done no paid consulting during a two year period.  Of all sources of supplemental earnings reported by faculty, consulting was the leading type but other types - such as summer teaching and research, private practice and royalties and lecture fees - were also significant. 

     An earlier survey, covering the academic year 1961-62, gave data on the outside earnings of faculty broken down according to their academic discipline [3]. The overall fraction of faculty having outside earnings was 74%, the highest being Psychology (85%) and the lowest in Home Economics (44%).  The average amount of outside earnings was highest for Law ($5,297), next highest for Engineering ($3,197) and the average for all areas was $2,165.

     A reported survey of the Harvard faculty indicated that nearly half of the senior professors had outside incomes that exceeded one-third of their college salaries; and a leading economist at a major Ivy League school was quoted as saying that he charged about $200 a day and added as much as $12,000 a year to his regular income: "I simply need the money," he explained, "Our nine-month salary is not adequate for the standard of living we like." [4]

     Information on individual professors' consulting connections is not publicly available in any systematic form.  The standard biographical reference books (Who's Who for the very elite, or such professional listings as American Men & Women of Science) sometimes list business firms or government agencies for which the individual biographee is a consultant;  but these sources, relying as they do on the voluntary contributions of the persons listed, are unreliable regarding the completeness of the data.  I have found numerous cases of academics' consulting relationships, verified through other sources, which are not mentioned in these published biographies.

     There are, however, two special kinds of consulting relationships for which one can find published listings of the individuals involved.  The first kind covers people who serve on advisory committees to the federal government.  According to a law passed by Congress in 1972 (PL 92-463) the President must give an annual report of the activities and membership of the more than 1400 advisory committees that serve the various departments and agencies of the Executive Branch.  The first such report was issued in 1973 and it included an index of committee members, arranged by institutional affiliation as well as by name. [5] Quoting from the Senate Subcommittee press release that accompanied the publication of this index,

Approximately 24,500 individual positions on advisory committees are identified in the index.  The Department of Defense had more representatives on advisory committees -- 713 -- than any other agency.  The university with the most representatives on advisory committees was the University of California (374), followed by Harvard (130) and Columbia (108).  Companies with large numbers of representatives on advisory committees include the following:  RCA --93; ITT (and affiliates)--92; ...

The index includes 78 names of U.C. Berkeley faculty and staff (reproduced in Table 2) serving on a wide variety of government committees, from agriculture and military affairs to science and poetry. (One notes that Provost George Maslach, who had "no knowledge" of faculty consulting activities, is himself listed as a member of two advisory committees in the Department of Defense.)  Rich as this index is in information, it should be noted that there are other types of government consultantships which are not covered by the public disclosure requirements of this law.  Also, it appears that this index has not been prepared for years later than 1972. 

     The second kind of consultantship for which one can find thorough tabulations involves a very special relationship to private industry: being on the board of directors of a sizeable business concern.  Dun & Bradstreet's Million Dollar Directory, published annually and available in many libraries, contains an alphabetized index of directors and top officials in U.S. companies worth over $1 million. The data in this volume is generally one or two years old; and one must take care to verify the identity of persons who are named as directors. To do this verification  I have used several published sources: corporation annual reports and stock prospectuses, the biographical books mentioned above, and newspaper items. (The Wall Street Journal has a very useful index for this purpose.) This searching can be a very tedious task; however, it has yielded some surprising results.

     In Table 3 is presented some data on my own university, showing a number of U. C. faculty and administrators who sit on the boards of directors of sizeable corporations, including some of the country's largest industries.  (This is not an exhaustive list since I was unable to carry out this search for the entire faculty, numbering several thousand persons.)

     I have also surveyed the boards of directors of the 130 largest corporations in the U. S. as ranked by Fortune in 1974, and I have identified academics serving as directors in fully one-half of these giant companies.  These findings are presented in Table 4.  This listing could readily be extended by further research in this area.

     While the job of an ordinary consultant to private business is to help that business solve some particular technical problems, the job of the board of directors is to set and supervise overall company policy, with the express objective of maximizing profit for the company's shareholders.  Thus, this new data which is presented in Tables 3 and 4 raises some most provocative questions about the ways in which the academic world is integrated into the dominant structure of corporate power in America.

     Not only do some academics consult for private industry and some others serve as advisors to government, but some academics do both types of service.  Here the possibilities for conflict-of-interest are much stronger because the academic is usually promoted in government advising circles as an expert who is supposedly independent of any special interests. On the other hand, this intimacy with government policymaking makes such an advisor even more valuable in service to private business.  I recently made a study of the membership of the two highest science advisory bodies in the federal government and found, not surprisingly, that the great majority of the people appointed to these bodies were academics, as opposed to people from industry or government agencies.  However, what was surprising was that I was able to identify more than one-half of these academics as having significant personal ties to big business, mostly in the form of directorships in large corporations. [6]

     The data given so far whets the appetite and makes one eager to find out more about this vast unexplored territory of faculty consulting activities. It is difficult to believe the earlier quoted comment by Provost Maslach (who was formerly Dean of the School of Engineering) that he has "no knowledge of the extent of outside consulting by faculty."  It is clear that this subject has a certain taboo associated with it.  When I once asked my department chairman about looking into this subject of faculty consulting he declined, referring to it as "a whole can of worms."  When I once suggested that a faculty Senate committee be given the task of reviewing campus policies and practices regarding outside consulting I was rebuffed as follows. [7]

The Policy Committee has thoroughly discussed the arguments in your letter of April 13, 1973, and finds itself unpersuaded that a useful purpose would be served by Senate surveillance of faculty consulting.

When we considered examples of specific proposals that might emanate from a committee charged with such responsibility, we were unable to imagine situations where positive consequences were plausible.  Questions of conflict with University duties are already covered both by Administrative regulations and the Faculty Code of Conduct.  The only effective safeguard we can see against the more subtle dangers in consulting is the conscience of the individual faculty member.

     Nevertheless, a few people in positions to know what is going on have been willing to discuss the subject of faculty consulting, at least in some detail.  During 1974, a few students interested in faculty consulting activity undertook to interview some campus administrators.  They spoke with the deans of three of the professional schools and they wrote up notes on the interviews.  I selected their notes of the interview with Professor Richard H. Holton, Dean of the School of Business Administration, as being the most interesting and I sent a copy of those notes to Dean Holton (early in 1975) inviting him to comment on their accuracy prior to my using them in this report.  In response, Dean Holton suggested numerous modifications of the notes; and the following text includes all of his corrections.  (These corrections are, for the most part, simply clarifications of what he intended to express in the interview and I am very grateful to Dean Holton for his cooperation.  There is only one place where I considered that a substantial change was being suggested, and that is marked by a footnote.)

Dean Holton    First I should tell you that I have only a vague notion of how much consulting is done in our school; no records are kept.  Right now we're reevaluating our promotion and consulting policies.

Questioner     Maybe we should start with that.  We've heard that the University has four criteria for promotion: research, teaching, public and private service, and professional competence.  How much weight is consulting, as a private service, given?

H     We're looking at the whole reward system that the faculty works under.  There is an argument now that faculty in the College of Letters and Sciences have an easier time with promotions than faculty in the professional schools.  The greatest emphasis for promotion is on research, with teaching closing fast.  Neither University and public service nor professional competence is assigned as much importance.  Many business administration professors feel more weight should be given to professional competence.

Not much is done with consulting in the area of professional competence, and faculty don't keep their files up to date on their consulting activities.  The view is that the campus budget committee might give consulting work negative weight, since they may wish to favor faculty members who do not earn any income beyond their University salary.  The consulting matter must be kept in check in any business school, since too much consulting causes faculty to be absent excessively from the campus, and the teaching and research processes can both suffer.  At some business schools, at least some faculty members do engage in too much consulting.

Our rule of thumb is that 1 day a week of consulting can be carried without problem.  The desirable kind of consulting is the sort that reinforces research and teaching, not competes with it.  Consulting can strengthen teaching by providing real case studies and a close look at live management problems.

An example of a desirable consulting project occurred when some of our faculty members arranged for a survey of neighborhood shopping patterns for a chain which was considering opening a new store in a particular location. * 

____________________________________________[FOOTNOTE] ________________________
*  In the original notes, this sentence read as follows:
"An example of a desirable consulting project occurred when some of our faculty members took a survey of North Berkeley neighborhoods on shopping patterns to see if it was feasible for Safeway to build a store on Shattuck Avenue to compete with the Co-op."
In suggesting the changed version, given above, Dean Holton commented that "it is probably best not to identify the stores in question." I disagree with Dean Holton's opinion on this because I see this concrete example as illustrative of the important question about whose interests are served by the existing faculty consulting practices.  Safeway is the nation's largest supermarket chain (with annual sales of over $8 billion) while the Co-ops are local consumer-owned stores.

The faculty could also use the information they gathered for their own research.  Repetitious consulting on one subject, where nothing new is learned, is an example of undesirable consulting.

Q    Is the policy that consulting should reinforce instead of compete with teaching an understanding, or is it a written policy?

H     I'll give you a copy of our guidelines for the evaluation of faculty members for advancement and promotion, which supplement the official guidelines provided by the University.  They emphasize that consulting work should be supportive of the teaching and research process and not for the sake of public relations.

Q     How many faculty in this school do outside consulting?  How much is done for government and private business, in comparison?

H     That's where I'm in trouble, since I have only the vaguest idea about how much consulting the faculty does and for whom.  I would guess that perhaps 50%, plus or minus 10%, do some consulting.  Most of this would be for business, but many faculty do unpaid work for government and for not-for-profit organizations.

Q     How much time is spent in outside consulting?

H     Again, I'm guessing.  The maximum would be one day per week.  The average for the faculty members who are consulting might be a couple of hours per week over the year, but that is only a 'guesstimate.'

Q     What kind of consulting is done for the government?

H     For example, some faculty members are on National Science Foundation committees; I am a member of the Assembly Science and Technology Advisory Committee, which looks into the general area of science and technology aspects of proposed legislation.  I'm also chairman of the Public Advisory Committee on Truth-in-Lending, appointed by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.  For this I receive transportation expenses plus $100 per day, out of which one's meals and hotel bills must be paid.

Q     How much money do consulting faculty make this way?

H     I haven't the faintest idea.

Q     Is this school working towards solidifying its policy on consulting so that you will know?

H     I'm not interested in the money the faculty makes in consulting or in the number of hours they consult, as long as the consulting work does not interfere with their teaching and research but rather serves to reinforce these two activities.

Q     Do you feel that we as students have a right to know about all consulting relationships, so we can be aware of a professor's biases?  My own opinion is that since they are supported by state taxes, and since state legislators are required to file complete financial disclosures, maybe faculty should be required to also.

H     That's a good question. But a professor's biases are probably apparent in his classroom teaching.  Biases come from a multitude of sources in addition to one's consulting work.  A teacher's relationships with his family, with his colleagues, with his political party, with the volunteer work he does can lead to biases of different kinds.  If you are interested in knowing a professor's biases, you need to know the totality of his associations and beliefs, not just his consulting relationships.  Should one teacher be required to report that he is consulting for Company X and Company Y, while another is not required to report that he is an active member of a political organization or the Ku Klux Klan?  And if the first faculty member also does a great deal of free advisory work to state and local government agencies and for the local; hospital or the YMCA, don't we get an incomplete picture of his "biases" by having him report only his paid consulting work?

Q     We understand the problem of privacy, but disclosing consulting activities doesn't seem unreasonable.

H     Biases are the product of all the past experiences of an individual.  Maybe you need to know if your political science teacher hates his mother.

Q     You seem to have been very open with us.  Are you doing any consulting for private business now?

H     I'm working as an expert witness in an anti-trust case for the defendants, some oil companies.  The case involves the prices of asphalt.  In working on such a case, the expert witness from a university faculty must guard his personal integrity and be able to defend his position before his professional colleagues.  He cannot be a handmaiden to his client without losing his effectiveness as an objective expert.

Many faculty members would agree that it would be okay for students to know who they're working for, but that the questioning of how much time is spent and how much money is earned is stretching things too far.  What's been the reaction to your suggestion by faculty so far?

Q     It's been strongly adverse.

H     It would weaken our chance for competition with private schools.

     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -

     The reader may notice that when Dean Holton was asked about his own consultantships for private business he did not mention being on the board of directors of any of the large corporations that are listed opposite his name in Table 3.


ADDENDUM       October 3, 1975

Dean Holton has now informed me that he was mistaken in his description of the Safeway marketing survey project, which appears on page 5 of this report.  What actually happened was that Safeway gave some professors a grant, administered through the university, for the purpose of gathering the data; there was no income to the faculty members, although there was income to the students who did the survey work; and the information gathered was made publicly available.  Therefore, in Dean Holton's view, this was not really an example of "consulting" but rather of a "research grant."
EXAMPLES OF ABUSE     [page 8]

I.  This first story illustrates how university faculty are cultivated and purchased for use in the promotion of special interests.  In 1971 the airline industry was doing poorly and was seeking ways to get some economic assistance from the federal government.  An associate of Ralph Nader, testifying before a Congressional committee, revealed that, [8]

At this very time the airline industry, through ATA (Air Transport Association), is gearing up a massive million dollar "economic education" program to influence CAB (Civil Aeronautics Board) and congressional decisionmaking, spearheaded by the public relations firm of Hill and Knowlton. ...

The strategy of the ATA program is to build a "pyramid of support reaching upward from a large base throughout the country to a pinnacle at Washington." The proposal identifies some of the more important segments of its planned audience:
"At a third level are groups whose ideas and opinions often spawn public opinion.  Among them are:
The media of ideas -- academic publications, and popular journals of opinion.
The college milieu-elite faculties of economics and their graduate students.
The air and press media influential at Washington.
Now, what we are seeing here is the unfolding of a strategy for the future of this industry in terms of influencing the course of the Government and the policies that will affect the industry's regulation in the public interest.

The full text of the Hill & Knowlton public relations plan for the airline industry is contained in the appendix to these hearings (at page 133) and it contains the following specific plan for the "college milieu-elite faculties."


   In the academic world, we should do some research to single out the leading economic professors with a particular interest in the field of transportation.  We would expect this to be an elite group of 100 or so, who should be systematically called on so that their views can be classified and some participation in the program planned for them.
   Closely allied to them are the few score academicians and others who are the most perspicacious minds behind the consumerist and environmentalist movements -- the men who lead movements, write the rationales that others follow, testify before government committees and serve on commissions.  It is essential that the industry know who they are, enter into personal dialogues with them, and include them in all pertinent written communications.
   These are people of intellect.  Many of them have taken positions from which they are not likely to move sharply.  What they do have in common is a respect for ideas and regard for facts.  The industry has a good case for its economic theses and its public aims.  It follows that this case should be put persuasively before those whose ideas are enormously influenced with the government and the public.
   These men should be cultivated by airline executives individually, and should certainly receive the industry's position papers and newsletters. We should also establish forums in which there is time and the opportunity for the exchange of ideas, for discussion and even argument.  An annual two-day seminar should be scheduled for each of these groups to bring them into working sessions with their peers in the airlines.
   The companies themselves should give careful thought to means of bringing individuals from these groups into close association,  perhaps through summer employment fellowships, or making contributions to college meeting-expense funds -- which are often insufficient to permit as much travel as academicians would like -- or by retaining selected individuals as consultants.

#     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #

  This second story, told by Jack Anderson [9], shows how this procurement works out in practice.

   For instance, when the Federal Trade Commission was trying to get ITT-Continental to clean up its fraudulent advertising, the government's position was attacked in a series of learned speeches by Professor Yale Brozen, a University of Chicago economist; then the Brozen speeches were reprinted in full by Barron's, the financial weekly.  Then full-page ads, containing the text of the speeches, appeared in the New York Times and other newspapers.  Then, just in case someone had missed it, hordes of ITT PR men called on financial editors all across the country to acquaint them with Professor Brozen's views.  Finally, of course, it turned out that Brozen was on the payroll of the PR firm handling ITT-Continental's account and that he had been paid for making the pro-ITT speeches which got such miraculous attention.

#     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #

III.  Just to show that there is nothing new in this type of behavior by academics, here is a story told by Upton Sinclair, writing over 50 years ago. [10]

   The people of New York are struggling in the grip of rapacious landlords, and here comes Samuel McCune Lindsay, Professor of Social Legislation at Columbia University, with a pamphlet to demonstrate that there is really no shortage of apartments, but on the contrary a surplus of thirty thousand.  The Lockwood Commission puts the professor on the stand and draws out the fact that he was paid five hundred dollars by the Real Estate Board for the writing of this pamphlet.  Samuel Untermyer, counsel of the commission, characterizes Prof. Lindsay's figures as "absurd," and forces the professor to admit that he made no actual investigation, and has "no practical knowledge."

#     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #

IV.  In January 1975, a group of 32 eminent American scientists, 11 of them Nobel Prize winners, issued a public call for a national energy policy which strongly emphasized the need for and the virtues of nuclear power. Their statement was widely reported in the press, it appeared as a 3/4 page ad in the Wall Street Journal (paid for by Middle South Utilities System, a company deeply involved with nuclear reactors), and it was displayed in full on the editorial page of the San Francisco Chronicle, a large part of that space being used to list the prestigious signers and give their institutional affiliations.  Twenty-six out of the thirty-two were identified with universities and only two of them were identified with private industry.  However, I was able to establish that 14 out of the 26 academic scientists listed have been on the boards of directors of major corporations and 4 others were shown to have served as consultants.  Significantly, among the companies to which these academics had (hidden) personal connections were several having large investments in the energy business.  [11] 

#     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #

V.   An episode of some notoriety in California concerns the famous oil leaks from commercial drilling operations in the Santa Barbara Channel in 1969.  The state's chief deputy attorney general publicly complained that university experts on this problem had refused to testify for the state in its multi-million dollar damage suit against the oil companies.  He stated that petroleum engineers at U.C. campuses indicated that they did not wish to risk losing industry grants and consulting arrangements.  One Berkeley professor of petroleum engineering, Dr. Wilbur H. Somerton, was quoted in the press as saying he had declined to appear as a witness and that he viewed his obligation to the community as that of supplying it with well-trained petroleum engineers: "We train the industry's engineers and they help us," he explained. [12]

#     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #

VI.   A recent newspaper story revealed that [13], "Equipment and personnel from the University of California's Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory are now being used in exploratory tests for geothermal steam on a ranch near Calistoga -- providing valuable services at no charge to the private interests involved." "An official with another company that specializes in geothermal exploration estimated the work would cost as much as $100,000 if it were undertaken by his or other private firms."  The American Metal Climax Co. had made this advantageous arrangement "through a faculty contact" who was identified as "Frank Morrison, a professor of geophysics at UC Berkeley who also works at the Laboratory." "For the past three years," according to a company official, "Morrison had been working under a contract 'well in excess of $150,000' from American Metal," and furthermore, "his company gave a $5000 grant to the university to 'defray the costs' of a full-time laboratory employee and several UC Berkeley graduate students who have been running the tests at the ranch." According to the article, the Dean of Engineering on the campus "declined to comment on the propriety of the arrangement."

#     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #

VII.  This account is taken from a recent book on the National Academy of Sciences. [14]

In addition to such direct industry representation, many academic scientists serving on Academy committees have ties to industry that are difficult for an outsider to detect.  Thus a committee that issued a report in 1971 on the biological effects of airborne fluorides was composed entirely of scientists from universities and research laboratories that were seemingly independent of industry influence.  But it was later revealed that four of these scientists, who had written most of the report, had close ties to the aluminum industry, which is a major emitter of fluorides.  Some had written publications for the Aluminum Association, received research support from the industry, or testified for the industry in hearings on fluoride standards.  The report which they helped prepare under the Academy imprimatur proposed tolerance thresholds which were somewhat more lenient than standards proposed by the Center for Science in the Public Interest, a Washington-based study group.

#     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #

VIII.  This story relates to one of the few faculty consulting scandals that has involved students in active protest. [15]

     Dr. Robert H. Ebert was appointed dean of the Harvard Medical School in 1965. In 1969 he became a member of the board of directors of Squibb-Beech Nut Corp., owners of the large pharmaceutical manufacturing firm of E.R. Squibb & Sons.  However, some months later he resigned his corporate directorship following a protest by a group of medical students who thought that there was a serious conflict of interest between his loyalty to Squibb and his loyalty to the best principles of medical practice and teaching.  Mindful of the loss of so prestigious a figure from its board of directors, Squibb turned around and gave the vacant seat to Dr. Lewis Thomas, dean of Yale's Medical School.

     Three years later, Dean Ebert and Dean Thomas appeared together as expert witnesses in a hearing before the Food and Drug Administration, arguing in favor of one of Squibb's lucrative drug products that the FDA had been trying to ban.  When questioned by the press, a Squibb official stated that neither dean had been paid a special fee for this appearance, since both of them had been retained on the company's payroll for a number of years.

     This revelation raised another brief flurry on the Harvard campus, but the university was mainly successful in turning a deaf ear to the complaints.  When one student was bold enough to propose a university-wide "audit" of faculty consulting work this idea was branded as "McCarthyite" by a prominent administrative official.

#     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #

IX.  Finally, we may note the sensitivity which many academics have about revealing their consulting connections.

     The Jason group is an elite gathering of scientists (mostly academic physicists) who provide top level consulting services for the department of Defense.  Little is known publicly about Jason because most of its work is highly classified;  but with the publication of the Pentagon Papers the group gained considerable notoriety when it was revealed that they had been instrumental in the creation and promotion of the "electronic battlefield" techniques used in Vietnam. [16]

     Several of these Jason members ran for elective offices in the American Physical Society, and along with the ballots there came long lists of the professional achievements and honors which these distinguished physics professors had to their credit.  However, it was later pointed out that none of them had acknowledged their connection with Jason -- although several of them did take care to list their consultantships with the more dovish Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. [17]

#     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #     #


     The basic purpose of the modern university is usually proclaimed in high and noble terms:  to search for truth, to transmit knowledge and critical skills to students, and to do all this for the betterment of society as a whole.  Research and Teaching, the twin primary jobs of the professor, are expected to advance civilized society with both short term and long term benefits.  We now want to ask how outside consulting fits into this framework.

     Existing University of California rules covering this activity provide a fascinating study in self-contradiction.  The following statement of U.C. regulations was provided by Provost Maslach, replying to my inquiry. [2]

1. Standing Order of The Regents 103.1(b) states: "No one in the service of the University shall devote to private purposes any portion of the time due by him to the University nor shall any outside employment interfere with the performance of his University duties.  Arrangements for private employment by Officers, faculty members or other employees of the University shall be subject to such regulations as the President may establish."

2.  The most recent Handbook for Faculty Members of the University of California (March, 1970, page 36) states: "Certain commitments directly affecting other persons - for example, classroom teaching and administrative engagements - naturally will involve specific schedules, but the University, in general, leaves to the discretion of the individual the allocation of his remaining time for such activities as study, writing, research, committee service and public service.  It is assumed, however, that full-time members of the faculty are devoting their hours and energies (full "working time") to the service of the University.

All faculty members are free to engage in scholarly pursuits for compensation if and when these activities can be conducted without prejudice to University duties. ... When consultations or outside services are such as to interfere with recognized University duties, they may be undertaken only on the basis of a leave of absence, without University salary, for the period involved."

     Notice that outside employments of faculty are referred to as "scholarly pursuits".  In the basic U.C. policy statement on outside services [18] it is spelled out that this activity by faculty may be justified provided that

1) it gives the individual experience and knowledge of value to his teaching or research;
2) it is suitable research through which the individual may make worthy contributions to knowledge; or
3) it is appropriate public service.

     Thus, as Dean Holton indicated in his interview, outside consulting is supposed to be an adjunct to the professor's primary tasks of teaching, research and public service.  Certainly there are examples of faculty consulting work that meet this estimable standard and just as surely there are cases that would fail this test.  As far as I can tell, the university, as a matter of general practice, ignores these criteria.  The Provost and the Senate Policy Committee, in their correspondence with me, did not even pay lip service to these notions; and certainly those of us in the general community who might wish to form our own evaluations of the worthiness of these outside "scholarly pursuits for compensation" are unable to do so because the information is kept secret.

     The apparent conflicts-of-interest involved in the practice of outside consulting by faculty can be seen from various viewpoints:

1)  Regarding teaching, students may be concerned over their professor being distracted from the commitment to good teaching because of his or her involvement in some outside enterprise; it may even be that a professor's personal commitment to some outside business or political agency may warp the presentation of course material.  Thus, one student told me, "I remember taking a Forestry course which repeatedly emphasized how the public should leave the big forestry companies alone and trust them to harvest safely; afterwards I found out that the professor was consulting regularly for the big timber companies."

2)  Regarding research -- "the unfettered search for truth" -- the outside connections a professor has may readily influence the choice of research topics, especially if the availability of research funding is important, and may also have the effect of slanting the research analysis or limiting the types of solutions that may be considered for acknowledged problems.  For example, the well documented history of scientific studies on the health hazards faced by asbestos workers shows how an industry can essentially purchase the kind of research it needs for its own uses. [19]

3) Students, parents, taxpayers and legislators may be upset about paying the professor's salary for the same time that outside income is being earned from some private clients.  As an illustration, the University of California pays its Vice President, Dr. Chester O. McCorkle, Jr., an annual salary of $53,500, which is more than the State pays its Governor; but at the same time Dr. McCorkle is working for two large agribusinesses -- Del Monte Corp. and Universal Foods Corp. -- as a member of the board of directors of each.  (I was unsuccessful in trying to ascertain how much Del Monte pays its outside directors in fees, but $10,000 a year is a typical figure for a corporation of this size. [20])

4) Any citizen may complain about the contradiction that emerges when the University presents itself as an institution dedicated to serving the broad public interest while, at the same time, much of its faculty is engaged in consulting to serve the private interests of outside employers.

     It is this last category in which, for me, the issue of conflict-of-interest is most interesting, because it allows us to look beyond the narrow question of "the conscience of the individual faculty member" so that we can focus our inquiry on the roles of social institutions.   The data showing academics sitting on the boards of directors of large corporations certainly raises these larger questions very sharply; and the examples of abuse cited illustrate some of the more blatant concrete forms that this conflict-of-interest can take.  It is also worthwhile to discuss some alternative viewpoints, from which this apparent conflict is made to disappear.

     First, there is the elitist ("pragmatic") view, held by many academics, that the ideal of service to the whole of society is merely propaganda, designed to placate the masses but never taken seriously in practice.  The consulting privileges of faculty were obtained during past years when money was plentiful and top rank experts were rare; the universities had no choice but to allow these "big-time-operators" a free reign.

     Apologists, on the other hand, will claim that the participation by academics in the powerful institutions of our society will provide an enlightening influence, and is thus to be praised. (This is parallel to one of the main arguments in favor of ROTC programs on campus; it also echoes the justification given by the many liberal professors who got involved in such reactionary programs as counterinsurgency research for the Pentagon.)  The problem is that the academic in this position can only work to assist the powerful institution to achieve its own goals, whatever those goals may be; he or she can try to modify the means (as by suggesting the electronic battlefield as an alternative strategy to massive U.S. bombing in Vietnam) but must support the ends (e.g., military victory) as given.

      Consider, for another example of the liberal view, the case of Dr. Clifton R. Wharton, Jr., president of Michigan State University, who recently accepted positions on the boards of directors of Ford Motor Co. and Burroughs Corp.  He announced that he would consider himself to be a "public director" and turned over all his directorship fees to the university.  Interviewed about this in Business Week, he said, "I view my role as a person who can exercise the responsibility of the directorship to make a profit, and bring to it a broad social and public concern." [21] Left unsaid is what he will (or can) do when these two stated objectives, corporate profits and social good, come into collision with each other -- as they surely do.

     Finally, we should consider how a Marxist would view the question of conflict-of-interest in faculty consulting practices.  Since the modern American university is here seen as an institution that has been largely fashioned for the primary purpose of serving the needs of capitalism [22], it is then no contradiction at all that certain professors should be directly tied to private businesses.

     While much of the data on faculty consulting presented in this report is new, the broad issues raised are embedded in a rich history of criticism. [23] During the 1960's the campuses of America were hotbeds of protest, against racism, against imperialism, often against the universities themselves, seen as instruments serving those evils.  Radicals analyzed the relationship of the university to the larger powers of in the society and saw the flow of Pentagon dollars into campus research for weapons of war and subtler means of social control, saw the predominance of big business leaders on the boards of trustees or regents that ruled the campuses, saw the calling in of police power to to repress student movements that seemed to present any palpable threat to the existing order of things, and saw themselves, students, being educated not for the glory of knowledge but rather to meet the call for highly trained workers that the corporate system required.

     This present study, concentrating on the area of faculty consulting, is intended to illuminate one more aspect of the integrated relationship that exists between the university and the mainstream of American power, showing the outflow of the special expertise of the professors into the private service of the large corporations and their allied institutions.  As much new information has been presented here, it is certain that there is a still greater wealth of data on this subject waiting to be uncovered.

     In closing this section, I should say that it is not my idea that all consulting by faculty should be abolished.  I do not imagine the university as an ivory tower; it should be interactive, it should serve society.  The question raised is whether the current practices serve the whole of society in some democratically balanced way or serve, instead, selected special interests in a highly unbalanced way.  I strongly suspect that the latter is actually the case; but in order to allow others to make a full evaluation of this question and to reach their own conclusions there is first a need to collect more information.  The whole panoply of consulting activities should be laid out plainly for all to see; within a university there should be no excuse for hiding the truth.


     Putting all broader social theorizing aside, there is one concrete suggestion that this study leads to.  I propose that all universities should adopt a disclosure policy, whereby every faculty or other staff member who engages in outside consulting should make an annual report of this activity, available for public inspection.  Such a report should include the name and location of each person or organization served, the amount of time spent and the compensation received for each consulting job, a brief description of the work done, along with copies of any written reports produced.

     While this proposal may be novel, there are relevant precedents.  Rigorous public disclosure of all possible conflicts-of-interest is now commonplace for public officials.  University professors are not elected to their office but they do generally claim to serve the public interest; and especially for those academics who are supported by public funds it may be claimed that these professors hold their expert talents as a sort of "public trust".  (Note that this disclosure requirement is much less stringent than that applicable to elected officials: no inquiry is made into the financial holdings of the professors, only into their outside employments.)  Furthermore, it is long established that the other areas of faculty's professional work -- teaching assignments and research achievements -- are open to public scrutiny.

     Even without digressing from the standard ideology of our present system the positive virtues of disclosure are clear: it will discourage individual abuses. indicate where further reforms may be needed, build and maintain public confidence.  Nevertheless, there are bound to be objections from some quarters.

Objection #1    "This is an invasion of the faculty member's privacy."
This objection can be refuted on several counts.  First of all, by awarding the title of "professor", the university has bestowed upon the individual a very special credential which elevates his or her value as an expert consultant; and in this way the professor is already tied to the university in carrying out any "private" practice.  Second, by permitting the professor to take time off without loss of salary to engage in consulting, the university becomes a partner, albeit a silent one, to the activity.  And third, whatever ambiguities were seen in the existing university regulations, this much is inescapable: that the university sees consulting activity as an integral part of the total service which the faculty member does as an employee of the university.  Thus, there is little which deserves to be called "private" about faculty outside consulting, aside from the fact that most of it is performed in secret.  (There may be instances where some privacy is properly claimed -- for example, the names of patients of a practicing M.D. -- but such exceptions to the general disclosure rule must be carefully delimited.)

Objection #2    "Where do you draw the line in requiring disclosures?"
This argument may be used in attempt to throw up a smokescreen, as with Dean Holton's remark, "Maybe you need to know if your political science teacher hates his mother."  For another illustration, several years ago it was proposed that officers of the American Physical Society (APS) should regularly disclose to the membership of this organization all their professional consultantships, etc. .  Professor Luis W. Alvarez, then president of the APS, explained as follows why the proposal was rejected by the APS' governing body.

I do not see how one can find a proper cutoff point for information if one does not restrict it to information concerning one's ability to serve the Physical Society.  I think that if I happen to be a member of the Board of Deacons of the local Presbyterian Church, it would be none of the Physical Society's business.  I feel the same way about my directorship on the board of the Hewlett-Packard Company, which is known to most of my friends and associates. [17]

It should not require a PhD in anything to understand the difference, in relation to the profession of physics, between a local church and a 500-million dollar electronics manufacturing corporation.  Similarly, in regard to our general disclosure rule for consulting faculty, it should not be beyond the ability of reasonable persons to draw up a reasonable set of guidelines.  The primary requirement is a good faith commitment to the principle of the public's right to know about affairs that influence the public condition.

Objection #3   "This requirement will create a great bureaucratic burden."
Many, if not most, universities are already in the habit of collecting annual reports from each faculty member, listing teaching, research and other varied activities of the past year.  Only one more category need be added -- covering consulting activity -- and these reports should then be available for public inspection, if that is not already the custom.  Also, from the position of the professor who must fill out this report there is no extra burden since the information required will already have been recorded for income tax purposes.

Objection #4    "Making this information public will expose some professors to embarrassment, criticism or harassment."
Basically, this comes down to whether one is really dedicated to the idea of the university as an open institution in society and whether one has faith in the working of democratic processes.  This objection is implied in the closing comment by Dean Holton in his interview:  if one, or only a few schools adopt this disclosure policy, they might lose some of their faculty members to other schools that guarantee them continued secrecy in their consulting activities. Hopefully, this disclosure policy will be adopted before long at most reputable universities and so this will be at worst a transient problem for whoever takes the lead.  Speaking more positively, I would say that a university is improved by the departure of any faculty members who rate their private business connections over their commitments to the university.

     It may be only a slight oversimplification to say that the problem of secret consulting is like the problem of secret research.  After much agitation, during the heat of the Vietnam war, many faculties declared secret research to be inappropriate on their campuses.  What is being asked here is not that the practice of consulting stop, but only that we be allowed to know fully about it.

     It is not difficult to predict that certain groups will, for their own interests, be opposed to this proposal for disclosure of consulting activities.  The faculty establishment, the university administration, the business and government bureaucratic organizations that have all benefited from the traditional arrangements will not want to see this change.  However, on the other side there are students, taxpayers, workers and consumers (to name some groups that are well organized politically) in whose interest it would be to support the proposal; these people do not usually benefit from being able to hire university experts to advance their causes, and in fact they often end up being in opposition to the moves of the big businesses and big government agencies that do make great use of the professors' talents.

     This leads to a consideration of strategy for getting this proposal adopted.  The state legislature should be a focal point since the many groups mentioned above have some clout there.  Also, those legislators have already adjusted to the ideas of public disclosure of their own activities and may rightly wonder why the state university faculty should be holier than they.  At some point the Congress should also be approached since federal funding is important to many private colleges that are not directly responsive to state legislatures.

     Ultimately, it may turn out that the university faculties and administrators will decide that it is best for them to institute this disclosure program themselves, rather than risk having legislatures look too closely at the cozy arrangements that now exist.

     By whatever route, however, these changes can come about only if there is strong and determined pressure from students.  Student government can play a leading role in educating, organizing and agitating -- this can go forward in open campus debate, inside faculty committees where students have a voice, and in the considerable lobbying talent that students have built.  There is also a very big opportunity for grass roots student organizing around the issue of consulting: groups can form to work on individual departments, to investigate the local consulting situation, to generate discussion, to pool their findings and to build and maintain the pressure for change as they see the need.


     The author, a professor of physics, has been on the Berkeley faculty since 1960, and has been involved in a number of controversial issues on campus.  For some years he has been interested in studying the connections between science and social problems, writing, teaching and speaking to the public from a critical perspective; and he has been an active member of Scientists and Engineers for Social and Political Action (SESPA).

REFERENCES   [page 19]

1. Robert Reinhold, The New York Times, June 18, 1969.
2. Letter from George J. Maslach to the author, March 20, 1974.
3. See Seymour E. Harris, "A Statistical Portrait of Higher Education," The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, 1972; McGraw-Hill; page 532.
4. Robert Reinhold, op.cit.
5. Federal Advisory Committees; First Annual Report of the President to the Congress, Including Data on Individual Committees; March 1973; printed for the Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Budgeting, Management, and Expenditures, United States Senate, 93rd Congress, 1st Session.  Parts 1-4, May 2, 1973; Part 5, Index, January 7, 1974.
6. Charles Schwartz, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 1975.
7. Letter from Professor Geoffrey F. Chew to the author, April 24, 1973.
8. Testimony of Reuben Robertson III in "Advisory Committees", Hearings before the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations of the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, 92nd Congress, 1st Session; June 10 and 11, 1971; U.S. GPO, Washington; page 48.
9. Jack Anderson, with George Clifford, "The Anderson Papers," Random House, New York, 1973; page 20.
10. Upton Sinclair, "The Goose-Step; A Study of American Education," published by the author, Pasadena, 1923; page 59.
11. For details, see Charles Schwartz, Science for the People, May 1975; page 30.
12. John Walsh, Science, Vol. 164, April 25, 1969; page 411.
13. William Moore, San Francisco Chronicle, June 1, 1974; page 5.
14. Phillip M. Boffey, "The Brain Bank of America," McGraw-Hill, 1975; page 77.
15. David Ignatius, The Washington Monthly, October 1973; page 21,
San Francisco Chronicle, November 23, 1972.
16. See "Science Against the People: The Story of Jason", Berkeley SESPA, 1972.
17. Charles Schwartz, Physics Today, January 1975; page 13.
18. "Principles Underlying Regulation No. 4", University of California, Office of the President, June 23, 1958.
19. David Kotelchuck, Science for the People, September 1975; page 8.
20. According to surveys conducted by the American Society of Corporate Secretaries and published by The Conference Board, New York.
21. Business Week, February 17, 1973; page 69.
22. For further reading I recommend, David N. Smith, "Who Rules the Universities?", Monthly Review Press, New York, 1974; and Bettina Aptheker, "The Academic Rebellion in the United States", The Citadel Press, New Jersey, 1972.
23. Upton Sinclair's book, cited above, is remarkably fresh and relevant despite its age. From recent years there is James Ridgeway's "The Closed Corporation: American Universities in Crisis" (Random House, New York, 1968) which contains much information pertinent to this present study; and there have been a number of local campus pamphlets: "Who Rules Columbia?", etc.

Table 1   [page 20]


Results compiled from the National Surveys of American Higher Education, sponsored by the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, 1969. This information, obtained from the Data Librarian at the Survey Research Center, University of California at Berkeley, does not appear to have been published elsewhere.  The following summaries, selected for the set of "high quality" universities, are based upon 13,924 responses.

Question 45b:  "In a normal week, what proportion of your work time is devoted to consulting with or without pay?"

None              33.7%
1-10%            40.8%
11-20%          13.9%
21-40%            3.8%
41-60%            1.1%
61-80%            0.3%
81-100%          0.2%
Not answered   6.1%

Question 55:  "During the past two years, have you served as a paid consultant to: "

Local business, government, schools       17.9%
A national corporation                              16.9%
A non-profit foundation                            10.7%
Federal or foreign government                  20.2%
A research project                                     10.2%
Other                                                         12.8%
No paid consulting                                    42.0%

Question 84:  "What are the two largest sources of your supplemental earnings?"

                                                             Largest         Second largest
Summer teaching                                    13.3%            5.1%
Teaching elsewhere (extn, etc.)                3.9%            3.9%
Consulting                                              17.3%          14.6%
Private practice                                         7.5%            1.7%
Royalties (publ., patents)                          7.1%            7.8%
Fees from speeches or lectures                 5.2%          12.8%
Research salaries and payments              15.7%           5.0%
Other                                                      10.1%            7.1%
None                                                       15.7%         22.4%
Not answered/Does not apply                   4.2%         19.6%

Table 2   [page 21]

From the Index, released January 7, 1974, by the Committee on Government Operations of the United States Senate

[78 names, not reproduced in this transcription,  serving on advisory committees to agencies: AGRI, DOD, HEW, INT, LABOR, STATE, DOT, AEC, EPA, FCC, NASA, NEARTS, NEH, NSF, ARDC]

Table 3   [page 22]


Vice Presidents
Chester O. McCorkle, Jr.                           - Del Monte Corp. **
                                                                   - Universal Foods Corp. *
James B. Kendrick, Jr.                               - Tejon Agricultural Corp.

Daniel G. Aldrich, Jr (Irvine)                     - Buffums, Inc.
                                                                   - Stanford Research Inst.
William D. McElroy (San Diego)              - Southern California First National Bank *
Charles E. Young (Los Angeles)               - Intel Corp. *

Faculty, Berkeley
Luis W. Alvarez (Physics)                         - Hewlett-Packard Co. *
Melvin Calvin (Chemistry)                         - Dow Chemical Co. **
Richard H. Holton (Business Admin.)        - Rucker Co. *
                                                                    - Dymo Industries, Inc. *
                                                                    - Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co. **
Kenneth S. Pitzer (Chemistry)                    - Owens-Illinois, Inc. **
Glenn T. Seaborg (Chemistry)                    - Dreyfus Third Century Fund
Edward Teller (Physics)                              - Thermo Electron Corp.
Charles H. Townes (Physics)                      - Perkin-Elmer Corp. *
                                                                    - General Motors Corp. **
Theodore Vermeulen (Chem. Eng.)            - Memorex Corp. *
John R. Whinnery (Elec. Eng.)                   - Granger Associates

Faculty, Los Angeles
Neil H. Jacoby (Management)                     - Occidental Petroleum Corp. **
Willard F. Libby (Chemistry)                      - Nuclear Systems, Inc.
                                                                    - Research-Cottrell, Inc. *
Harold M. Williams (Management)            - Signal Companies, Inc. **
                                                                    - Norton Simon, Inc. **
                                                                    - ARA Services, Inc. **
                                                                    - CNA Financial Corp. **

*   Corporations having over $100,000,000. in annual sales or total assets.
** Corporations having over $1,000,000,000. in annual sales or total assets.

Table 4   [pages 23-25]


From a search of the annual reports of the companies listed by Fortune in 1974: the top 100 industrials and the 5 top companies from each of the other 6 categories.  Many of the individuals listed below also sit on the boards of other, lesser, corps.

University of California
Melvin Calvin (Prof. Chemistry, Berkeley) - Dow Chemical
Neil H. Jacoby (Prof. Management, Los Angeles) - Occidental Petroleum
Kenneth S. Pitzer (Prof. Chemistry, Berkley) - Owens-Illinois
Charles H. Townes (Prof. Physics, Berkeley) - General Motors
Harold M. Williams (Dean, Management, Los Angeles) - Signal Companies

University of Michigan
W. J. Cohen (Dean, Education) - Bendix
Morgan Collins (Prof. Emer. Business) - S.S. Kresge
Robben W. Fleming (Pres.) - Chrysler
Paul W. McCracken (Prof. Business) - S.S. Kresge
William E. Stirton (Vice Pres. Emer.) - American Motors

Harvard University
Donald K. David (Prof. Business) - Xerox; Great A&P Tea Co.
Lawrence E. Fouraker (Dean, Business) - RCA; First National City Bank, NY
Jean Mayer (Prof. Nutrition) - Monsanto Chemical
Frederick J. Stare (Prof. Nutrition) - Continental Can

Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Howard W. Johnson (Chm.) - DuPont; J.P. Morgan; John Hancock Life; Champion Int'l.
James R. Killian, Jr. (Hon. Chm.) - General Motors; AT&T
William F. Pounds (Dean, Management) - Sun Oil
Jerome B. Wiesner (Pres.) - Celanese

Columbia University
Courtney C. Brown (Dean Emer. Business) - Borden; American Electric Power
Grayson Kirk (Pres. Emer.) - IBM; Consolidated Edison
William J. McGill (Pres.) - Texaco; AT&T

California Institute of Technology
Robert F. Bacher (Prof. Physics) - TRW
Harold Brown (Pres.) - IBM

Cornell University
John E. Deitrick (Dean Emer. Medicine) - Prudential Life
Franklin A. Long (Prof. Chemistry) - Exxon

Duke University
Juanita M. Kreps (Vice Pres.) - J.C. Penney
Terry Sanford (Pres.) - Cities Service

Northwestern University
John A. Barr (Dean, Management) - Esmark
Donald P. Jacobs (Prof. Finance) - Union Oil

Princeton University
Burton G. Malkiel (Prof. Economics) - Prudential Life
Courtland D. Perkins (Prof. Engineering) - American Airlines

Purdue University
Frederick L. Hovde (Pres. Emer.) - General Electric; Inland Steel
Mary Ella Robertson (Prof.) - John Hancock Life

University of Rochester
Robert L. Sproull (Pres.) - United Aircraft
W. Allen Wallis (Chancellor) - Eastman Kodak; Esmark; Metropolitan Life

Stanford University
Arjay Miller (Dean, Business) - Ford
J.E. Wallace Sterling (Chancellor) - Shell Oil

Barnard College
Martha E. Peterson (Pres.) - Metropolitan Life

Brown University
Donald F. Hornig (Pres.) - Westinghouse

Bryn Mawr College
Katherine E. McBride (Pres.) - New York Life

California State University
Brage Golding (Pres., San Diego) - Armco Steel

Carnegie Institution of Washington
Caryl P. Haskins (Pres.) - DuPont

Case Institute of Technology
T. Keith Glennan (Pres. Emer.) - Republic Steel

Emory University
E. Garland Herndon, Jr. (Vice Pres.) - Coca-Cola

Hunter College
Robert C. Weaver (Prof. Urban Affairs) - Metropolitan Life

University of Illinois
John Bardeen (Prof. Physics) - Xerox

Illinois Institute of Technology
John T. Rettaliata (Pres. Emer.) - Western Electric; International Harvester

University of Leiden
Ernst H. van der Beugel (Prof. Int'l. Relations) - Xerox

Marquette University
Charles W. Miller (Prof. Business) - W.R. Grace

Meharry Medical College
Lloyd C. Elam (Pres.) - Kraftco

Michigan State University
Clifton R. Wharton, Jr. (Pres.) - Ford; Equitable Life

University of Nebraska
Durward B. Varner (Pres.) - Beatrice Foods

New York University
James M. Hester (Pres.) - Union Carbide

Notre Dame University
Theodore M. Hesburgh (Pres.) - Chase Manhattan Bank

Pepperdine University
M. Norvell Young (Chancellor) - Lockheed

University of Pittsburgh
Marina vN. Whitman (Prof. Economics) - Westinghouse; Manufacturers Hanover Trust

Pomona College
David Alexander (Pres.) - Great Western Financial

Rensselaer Polytechnic University
Richard G. Folsom (Pres. Emer.) - American Electric Power;  Bendix

Rutgers University
Margery Somers Foster (Dean, Douglass College) - Prudential Life

University of Southern California
Norman H. Topping (Chancellor) - Litton

Syracuse University
William P. Tolley (Chancellor Emer.) - Colgate Palmolive

Tulane University
Hebert E. Longenecker (Pres.) - CPC International; Equitable Life

Tuskegee Institution
Luthe H. Foster (Pres.) - Sears, Roebuck

Virginia Polytechnic Institution
T. Marshall Hahn (Pres.) - Georgia-Pacific

Washington University
William H. Danforth (Chancellor) - Ralston Purina

Wayne State University
Edward L. Cushman (Vice Pres.) - American Motors

Wesleyan University
Edwin D. Etherington (Pres. Emer.) -- American Express

Yale University
John Perry Miller (Prof. Economics) - Aetna Life & Casualty

Statistical Summary

68 academic people, from 44 universities, holding 85 directorships, on the boards of 66 corporations.

When these findings are compared with the tabulation given by Ridgeway [23] we find that the presence of academics on the boards of these largest corporations has increased by 65% in the seven year interval between these two studies.