SCIENCE FOR THE PEOPLE

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THE POLITICS OF AIDS



The Pentagon in the Pacific
World Bank and the Philippines
Euromissiles and U.S. Scientists

about this issue

The ruling ideas of every epoch are the ideas of its ruling class. Each article in this issue of *Science for the People* illustrates this simple fact, providing descriptions and analyses of how science becomes not only the linguistic arm of the ruling class' ideological reach, but also the technological blow of its powerful ruling force. Ideologically and materially, science plays its vital role. Policy proclamations in the AIDS controversy, military capabilities in the Pacific basin, nuclear strategizing by well-meaning liberal scientists, and the economic policies the World Bank pushes on Third World countries, all serve the same goal: the wealth and well-being of those in power.

The AIDS epidemic has brought medical care in the U.S. to the forefront as a political issue. More than three years after this medical crisis became generally recognized, the Reagan Adminstration has yet to present to the public a comprehensive plan for responding to this outbreak. As Rische and Payne show in this issue, the government's slow and inadequate response is directly related to who is affected by the disease as much as what the disease is. They trace how the media, along with the Center for Disease Control and National Institutes of Health, have contributed to aggravating the social and psychological impact of the medical threat. Official spokespersons and the religious Right have also done their part in making the AIDS crisis a period of increased discrimination of the most hysterical kind. While intensifying their lobbying efforts in concert with other groups angered by health care cuts, gays have placed an unprecedented emphasis on self-help initiatives. Yet there have also been differences, as the authors discuss, on how to alert the gay community to the health considerations without opening it up to the state's repression, or creating an atmosphere of self-reproach and hysteria.

Whereas in the AIDS controversy the veil of scientific objectivity must first be removed before the underlying life-and-death projection of ruling ideology can be fully seen, in the case of U.S. militarism there can be no doubt. As most of the attention of the Peace Movement focuses on a reversal of new NATO missile deployment in Europe, in the Pacific and Indian Oceans the U.S. is pursuing a strategy of high confrontation, apparently without opposition. In both these regions, a new and provocative doctrine is unfolding under the Reagan Administration with the deployment of superior naval forces against the weakest link in the Soviet defense systems – the Soviet fleet. Despite Pentagon propaganda that Moscow's efforts to project Soviet power abroad will likely result in East-West clash at sea, Bello, Hayes and Zarsky in "The Pentagon in the Pacific," point out that Western defense analyst are well-informed about the tenuous capacities and enormous vulnerabilities of the Soviet Navy. Rather, it is its mere visibility, along with radical states and insurgencies in areas of the world traditionally within the Western orbit, that has called into question, in the Pentagon's mind, the invulnerability of western fleets, and thus their utility as instruments of coercion and influence.

Nuclear war strategic planning is an extreme form of this same mentality, with even would-be critics often serving only to project further the ruling ideology. Thus the Reagan administration's uninhibited enthusiasm for scenarios of "winnable" and "protracted" nuclear war has sparked an upsurge of concern among scientists who have come out against U.S. nuclear weapons policies. Some have continued to fight for broader disarmament and the expansion of nuclear-free zones, and against the conventional arms build-up, the U.S. world-role, and the underpinnings of the military-industrial-science-complex. Others have remained critics on the "inside," as consultants on arms control for the federal government, lending their expertise and prestige in public debates on the specific dangers of nuclear escalation. Yet, as John Harris argues, to legitimize the role of arms controllers, with their elitism and arcane language, limits debate on fundamental factors such as the roles of anticommunist ideology, financial self-interest and bureaucratic momentum in the arms race. Documenting the government's use of academics to disinform the public about its recent "arms control" initiatives, Harris challenges the image of such scientists as neutral, trusted experts, and reveals the underlying basis of ruling ideology.

And where sheer force would be too obvious, economic power accomplishes the same ends. The U.S., as the controlling voice in the West's largest multilaterial financial arm, the World Bank, blocks funds for progressive Third World Governments, while acting to prop-up repressive, right-wing regimes deemed critical to "national security." Meanwhile, the theory of "authoritarian modernization" put in practice by the World Bank in the Philippines and elsewhere in the Third World, is providing many U.S. policy makers with new ideological rationale for supporting friendly dictatorships abroad: the model of a strong centralized regime "efficiently imposing development from above." Although liberal Bank technocrats may not admit it, the subjugation of entire populations to exploitation by multinational corporations and foreign agribusiness forms the essence of modernization, which Walden Bello analyzes in "The World Bank and Economic Crisis in the Phillippines."

In these ways the ideological and material power of those who rule is maintained. Throughout all of this scientists remain but mere appendages to the military and technological machine, appendages to the ideology of those who rule. And as long as scientists hide behind cloaks of objectivity and professionalism, as long as mystification remains, they shall continue to be used by those in power. Escape lies not through study and discourse, but through action and works with the broader mass of people.

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FEATURES:

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DEPARTMENTS:

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news notes

Just When You Thought it Was Safe to Go Back in the Water...

Much concern exists over the safety of drinking water. Even the cleanest municipal water supplies come out of the faucet containing significant levels of organic chemicals, metals, and other contaminants—many of which are involved in causing cancer, mutations, and birth deformities. Governmental regulation of drinking water supplies has been meager, but the reasoning behind even that minimal level of protection of the public has been called into serious question in a recent study by health officials at the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Quality Engineering.

Publishing their findings in the May issue of the *American Journal of Public Health,* the investigators take issue with the most basic assumptions behind the government's *Suggested No Adverse Response Levels,* or SNARLs. SNARLs are the recommendations put forth by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to indicate the maximum "acceptable" concentrations of toxic chemicals in water. These figures assume an individual consumption of two liters of water per day (one liter for a child). Of central concern to these authors is the assumption by the EPA that ingestion constitutes the only major route for toxic chemicals in drinking water to gain access to the body.

While the authors do not deny that the actual ingestion of drinking water plays a significant role in determining an individual's exposure to a toxic substance, they point out that the skin constitutes another—and perhaps even the major—route of exposure to chemicals in drinking water. Depending on conditions like the hydration, temperature, and physical integrity of the skin, individual variability, the properties of the chemicals, and the presence of synergistic compounds (those that enhance transport of substances across the skin), the skin route of exposure can be significant. In fact, skin exposure accounted for anywhere from 29 to 91%—with an average of 64%—of an individual's total dose of compounds looked at in the study: toluene, ethylbenzene, and styrene. Although not reviewed by the authors, toxics like benzene, carbon tetrachloride, vinyl chloride, and trichloroethylene are commonly found in surveys of drinking water supplies done by the EPA.

The findings indicate that, in the very least, the SNARLs (which themselves are only recommended levels) dramatically underestimate the actual conditions of exposure to drinking water which include bathing, showering and swimming. In addition, coming close on the heels of the current focus in the environmental health field on indoor air pollution as constituting the major route of exposure to airborne pollutants, the evidence gathered by the authors points further to the inadequacy of many of our models for setting safety levels for toxic compounds, provisions which are only a first step to seriously attempting to protect the people from health hazards in their environment.

—Joseph Regna

Court Rules Access to Industry Pesticide Studies

CPF

Awareness of the dangers of pesticides has existed for years, but several recent developments indicate that the problem may be growing more severe. A report in *Science News* stated recently that as many as 500,000 people in Third World countries are poisoned by chemical pesticides each year. Another report from the National Research Council claimed, among other things, that only 10% of the thousands of pesticides on the market have been thoroughly assessed by toxicologists to reliably gauge their health effects.

While the picture looks undeniably bleak, there are two glimmers of hope. One is the mounting public concern about pesticide-related issues; the other a recent supreme court decision which will give the public more access to industry data on pesticide safety. Ruling against the Monsanto Chemical Corporation, which claimed that such data contained trade secrets, the court upheld the public's right to the information supplied to the EPA when individual pesticides are initially registered as safe.

Although the disclosure of such data was actually required by the federal pesticide act of 1978, industry has insured that this mandate never be fully implemented. Consequently, people outside of industry have been unable to scrutinize the safety studies. Perhaps best of all for people concerned about environmental health issues, the court not only mandated that such pesticide information be immediately released, but also made the law retroactive to the 1978 act.

The EPA is expected to announce shortly how it will handle the expected volume of information requests. As for the mounting public concern, see this issue's resource section for some excellent sources of information, and ways to get involved.

—Seth Shulman

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West German Scientists Protest Space Weapons

President Reagan's recent "joke" about bombing the Soviet Union aside, the administration is showing no signs of willingness to slow down on plans for space weapons. Despite repeated offers from the Soviets to begin talks on these issues, and the USSR's announcement of a unilateral moratorium on testing its own anti-satellite weapons, the Reagan administration seems to be forcing a stalemate. By stating a willingness to negotiate, but insisting the talks include intermediate nuclear weapons in Europe, the administration knows full well it is setting forth a proposal completely unacceptable to the USSR and the cause of their walkout in Geneva due to the presence of U.S. Euromissiles.

Meanwhile in West Germany scientists are taking a stand on this issue. According to a report in the *Guardian*, some 1500 West German scientists gathered for a major congress called on the U.S.

and Soviet governments to stop the testing of all antisatellite and space weapons. Stating their "special responsibility" to speak out against new weapons systems because of scientists involvement in the development of such systems, many participants agreed that scientists "have to draw the line" and place some restrictions on their scientific work and its use.

SftP and Others Protest Military Conference

According to the Technical Marketing Society of America (TMSA), the arms race offers a variety of strategies for profitmaking. This was the theme of a series of Boston-area TMSA conferences covering cruise missile deployment, arms sales to the Third World, and most recently "Battlefield AI/Robotics." Thanks to the efforts of SftP and other groups, each conference was also the focus of demonstrations against the arms race.

For the July 30th meeting on artificial intelligence (AI), the Boston chapter of SftP joined with Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility and High Tech Professionals for Peace, in a peaceful picket. One hundred people (and one robot) marched in front of the Cambridge hotel conference site, expressing concern over this type of escalation of the arms race as well as the effect Department of Defense (DOD) money is having on the direction of computer education and research.

The $600 million budgeted for military AI research in the next five years will have an enormous impact, as universities and corporations compete for contracts. In the northeast, there is a struggle going on among several universities for DOD resources which will have a dramatic effect on student demographics. Northeastern for example, hopes to double the size of its computer science department — with the right contracts.

As MIT Professor Joseph Weizenbaum pointed out at the demonstration, even our most advanced computer systems are prone to a wide range of errors under normal conditions. The 1965 power blackout in the Northeast is just one example of how a complex system can fail. In war conditions, particularly a war involving nuclear and chemical weapons, systems will be under unpredictable, and untestable, stresses. Weizenbaum sees these new technologies intensifying the arms race much the same way the technological developments in guidance systems of the late 1960's led to Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) warheads and the cruise and MX missiles.

CPSR members expressed particular alarm over one of the questions in the AI/Robotics conference program: "Can/Should Man [sic] Ever Be Removed Entirely From The Loop?" The "Loop" is the so-called feedback loop within which command decisions are made — the detection of enemy activity, defining response options, targeting, weapons choice, and delivery of response. The tendency has been to automate as much of this loop as possible in reaction to the growing sophistication of the cruise missile, MX missiles and other delivery systems. The effect has been to slowly push the U.S. and USSR toward policies of "launch on warning."

SftP members' critiques tended to be broader, focusing on the conference as an example of increasing militarization of our society. But activist groups are not the only ones raising their voices. Even those who work within the defense industries have begun to question the scale of Pentagon activity in the computer field. Mark Stefik, a researcher for Xerox, has raised concerns over the "military orientation" spreading through the research community. Charles Zakret, vice president of the Mitre Corporation, has cautioned that the Pentagon's money may siphon talent and resources toward military projects while civilian, socially useful projects lag behind.

The Pentagon is currently developing a wide array of automated command systems to support its "Air Land Battle 2000" strategy. This is a fundamentally new position put forward by the Army to change the defensive posture of NATO's front line troops. Coinciding with deployment of the offensively oriented cruise missiles, this strategy calls for increased flexibilty of response at all levels of command. Instead of simply trying to hold the line against the Russian and Warsaw Pact hordes, Western forces will strike behind front lines utilizing a full arsenal of conventional, chemical and nuclear weapons. Technologies being developed to support this strategy range from automated land navigation systems to tanks for robotic copilots for jet planes to complex command systems linking battle commanders to database networks that provide intelligence, decision options and even predictions of what might happen in the next battle sequence.

The Strategic Computer Initiative, as managed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and private firms like TMSA, is a clear example of how the Pentagon plans broad segments of our economy. But the voices of opposition are growing stronger through the cooperation of SFTP, CPSR, the Mobilization for Survival, and other groups. Mobe's Dan Petegorsky states, "Each time TMSA comes to Boston, we'll be here to resist their efforts."

At Science for the People, a new study group has formed around computer-related issues. The SFTP Computer Group plans a forum in early October on the social costs of military spending in computer science education and industries. Detials about the forum and other group activities are available from the SFTP office in Cambridge.

— Roger Felix & Gary Keenan

UPCOMING ISSUES OF SFTP

The National Office is now soliciting articles for the January/February special issue on "The New Impacts of Computers" and the March/April special issue: "Assessing Genetic Technologies." Please send articles, outlines, graphics and other material to: SCIENCE for the PEOPLE, 897 Main St., Cambridge, MA 02139.

Toxic Burn at Sea?

Plans to burn toxic wastes at sea have been floating around in Washington for some time now, but the EPA backed off from its enthusiasm for this disposal method at least temporarily over the summer. Overruling the recommendation of its own inspectors, the EPA, after strong protest from local residents and environmentalists, decided to deny a permit to the Chemical Waste Management firm to burn 15 million liters of toxic waste, including DDT and PCBs, in the Gulf of Mexico.

Rules governing ocean incineration are due soon from the EPA and could well open this particular area once again to much controversy. While objections to the proposals abound, including the difficulty of monitoring the incineration, questions about the technology itself, and the dangers to the crew, it seems likely that incineration at sea in some form or another is in the offing. Despite the EPA ruling, the U.S. has already invested $56 million in loans to build two waste-burning ships.

Not To Worry

In only the latest of a seemmly unending series of nuclear power-related problems, a small Associated Press item noted that state and local officials recently acknowledged that 40 "deficiencies" were encountered during an emergency drill at the Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant last year. According to the report, many of these problems were "in the area of communications." Apparently, however, the public is not to worry: despite the large number of problems encountered, the report made the remarkable claim that state and local Civil Defense officials made no errors that were "life threatening."

CPF

THE PENTAGON IN THE PACIFIC

by Walden Bello, Peter Hayes, and Lyuba Zarsky

Once again, the specter of war is casting its long shadow over the "Ocean of Peace." The thin line that exists in the Pacific between provocative maneuvers and armed conflict is hardly noted in the U.S. and Europe, where the eyes of the peace movement, for the most part, are trained on Western Europe—the site of a dramatic confrontation between a Pentagon determined to deploy cruise and Pershing missiles and antinuclear forces equally determined to prevent that deployment.

This pattern is not new. For the last forty years, the peace movement has often focused on Europe, only to be jolted when the hammer blows of the U.S. military landed in the Asia-Pacific region. While the lines between "East" and "West" stayed in place in Europe, the U.S. propelled two bloody wars—Korea and Vietnam—and engineered a number of covert actions in the Pacific. Feint in the West; strike in the East. Is the same scenario about to unfold today?

There are two likely flashpoints in the Asia-Pacific region: Northeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. In both places, the U.S. has engaged in rapid military buildup and provocative maneuvers. In both, the U.S. strategy is to deploy its one military arm which still enjoys clear-cut superiority—the Navy—against the weakest link in the Soviet defense system: the Soviet Fleet.

The Navy's Lean Years

The Pacific is larger in area—68 million square miles—than the whole land surface of the planet. This ocean is regarded by the U.S. Navy as its special preserve. Perhaps the most reactionary of the armed services, the Navy has always resisted attempts to reduce U.S. military presence in the area. Before World War II, it opposed granting independence to the Philippines with the rationale that the defense of the United States began "6000 miles west of San Francisco." Immediately after the war, the Navy, led by Admiral Chester Nimitz, the "architect of the Pacific victory," wanted to annex Micronesia outright, opposing the Truman administration's plan to control the area as a "strategic trusteeship" from the United Nations. (For an historical account of U.S. involvement in Micronesia, see *SftP,* July/Aug. 1984.)

With its destruction of the Imperial Japanese Navy during the Battle of Leyte Gulf in the Philippines in October 1944, the U.S. Navy achieved the ideal of maritime supremacy to which its foremost strategic thinker, Alfred Mahan, had directed it. But the years since Leyte Gulf have been years of discontent for the Navy. First, it had to fight off the Air Force's drive to relegate it into a minor service in a postwar strategic situation dominated by nuclear bombs, long-range bombers, and missiles. Then, with all the other services, the Navy had to bear the weight of the defeat in Vietnam and the disdain of a public swayed by antimilitarist sentiment. "The Navy's share of the cost of the Vietnam War," complained one admiral, "was the loss of a generation of new ships."

But unlike the Army Command, which is now less unwilling to admit its responsibility for the Vietnam debacle, the Navy continues to cling to the myth that the defeat in Indochina and other failures of American foreign policy in the region stemmed from one thing: the politicians' "lack of nerve" to employ the whole range of American military might.

This distrust of "liberal appeasers" was deepened in the post-Vietnam years when succeeding administrations whittled down the numerical strength of the Navy from over a thousand ships in the mid-sixties to 479 in 1980. The number of aircraft carriers—the most valuable commodity—dropped from 25 to 12. For the admirals, the fact that the newer ships were swifter, more powerful, and more versatile than anything they

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Walden Bello, Peter Hayes, and Lyuba Zarsky are members of Nautilus Research. They are currently preparing An American Lake: The Nuclear Peril in the Pacific, *to be published by South End Press in 1985. Their articles on U.S. military strategies in the Pacific and other topics have appeared in* The Nation, Mother Jones, Le Monde, Diplomatique, *and other publications. For further information, write Nautilus Research, Box 228, Leverett, MA 01054.*

ever had could not compensate for the decline in numbers. They fought back bitterly, railing that they were being left with a "one-and-a-half ocean navy" to cope with a "three-ocean war."

World Island, World Ocean

The argument for a more powerful Navy was placed on more sophisticated grounds by a new generation of naval theorists. In this effort, the so-called maritimist school of American defense thinking drew inspiration not only from Mahan, but also from Halford Mackinder, who is credited with pioneering the so-called geopolitical approach to strategic thinking. In Mackinder's view, there are two fundamental geopolitical realities which are in conflict—the "World Island" (that is, the great Eurasian land mass) and the "World Ocean."[1] Dominance in the World Island inevitably gravitates to great central land powers like Germany or the Soviet Union. The only effective counterweight to this dominance is control of the World Ocean. Great Britain effectively used control of the seas to nullify various land powers throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Today, say the maritimists, this task falls to the United States, which stands as a "bastion-redoubt" in the World Ocean.

At a time of strategic nuclear parity and Soviet superiority on land, maritime superiority enables the U.S. to project, relatively unimpeded, immense power to points of its choosing along the "rim" or periphery of the World Island—that is, Western Europe, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Northeast Asia. The effective deployment of this offensive power from the sea requires a Navy composed principally of fast aircraft carrier battle-groups with their terrific air-sea striking power. These "geopolitical truths," argues Admiral Thomas Moorer, former chief of American forces in the Pacific, dictate "the future primacy of a naval policy in U.S. strategy."

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From an estimated 1984 stockpile of 1700 nuclear warheads actively forward-deployed in the Pacific, the U.S. will deploy at least 4000 nuclear warheads in the region by 1990.

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The inauguration of the Reagan presidency in January 1981 signalled an end to America's Weimar period. Among the very first steps taken by the new administration was the unleashing of the pent-up frustrations and bellicose propensities of the Navy. Key to this process was the appointment of John Lehman, a man inspired by Mahan's imperial imperative as well as by Mackinder's strategic thinking. The fundamental axiom of what was come to be known as the "Lehman Doctrine" is the Navy's achievement of "outright maritime superiority over any power or powers which might attempt to prevent our use of the seas and the maintenance of our vital interests worldwide." The Reagan Navy, asserted Lehman, should have as its strategic goal, "to block out the Russian Navy . . . to make the Soviet Union an isolated island."

Upgrading the Navy has meant a forced march whereby in barely two years, 1981-83, the deployable battle-force rose from 479 to 506 ships. By 1988 the fleet will number 610 ships—the minimum necessary, allege the admirals, to assure maritime superiority. The mainstay of the upgraded Navy will be 15 aircraft carrier battle-groups. These carriers, asserts a former high Pentagon aide during the Carter administration, do not fulfill the traditional naval role of sea-control. "With their complement of costly F-14 and F-18 fighters and fighter-bombers and their accompanying Aegis cruisers and anti-missile projection, they are designed primarily for offensive force projection against Soviet land targets—among other things, to cripple the Soviet Navy in its home bases."[2]

Fortifying the Pacific Command

Substantially upgrading the Pacific Command (PACOM)—the only unified Armed Forces command where the Navy has undisputed hegemony—is a top Navy priority. With the addition of the cruise-missile-refitted battleship New Jersey and the newest nuclear-powered carrier, the Carl Vinson, the formidable Seventh Fleet—which patrols the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean—is at its aggressive best in years. Adding the ships of the Third Fleet, which covers the Eastern Pacific, PACOM now encompasses almost half of the Navy's peacetime forces. In 1984 Secretary of the Navy John Lehman informed Congress that "the Fleet is more ready to go in harms way than at any time in peacetime history."[3]

The focus of Pacific Command's "contingency planning" has recently shifted from the Indian Ocean—the great concern of the late seventies—to Northeast Asia or the Northwest Pacific. This was triggered by the official naval assessment, expressed by the commander of the Seventh Fleet, that "while we have an edge in the Indian Ocean and in the South China Sea . . . in the northwest Pacific, where the Soviets can bring the full range of land-based aviation, submarines, short- and long-range aircraft to bear in an area they hold dear, the balance has clearly begun to shift."[4]

On purely military grounds, the U.S. already enjoyed superiority. Part of this stems from geography: the home waters of the Soviet Pacific Fleet are the almost landlocked Sea of Japan. By building up its forces in the Northwest Pacific, the U.S. Navy hopes to "Cramp" the Soviet Pacific Fleet in its prime base of operation, thus depriving it of the maneuvering space provided by the high seas. As the U.S. Joint Chiefs of

Staff put it in their recent "defense posture" statement, a major U.S. "advantage is the ability of American forces — including those in Japan and Korea — to bottle up the Soviets' Pacific Fleet at Vladivostok."[5]

Faced with a constantly escalating U.S. presence, the Soviets, so the thinking goes, would be dissuaded from sending substantial task forces elsewhere, thus allowing the U.S. fleet to exercise unchallenged control of the rest of the Pacific and the Indian Ocean.

The United States has adopted a strategy of high confrontation and, with it, war plans to ensure preparedness should an "incident" occur. Under U.S. naval doctrine, it is far preferable to outmaneuver the enemy and overwhelm him in one location than to fight him all across the high seas. In the event of conflict in the Northwest Pacific, the U.S. and Japan could easily mine all of the five straits — the widest of which is 100 miles across — through which Soviet ships must pass to get to the open Pacific.

To prepare for the possibility of such a swift "knock-out" punch in the Sea of Japan, a massive deployment and redeployment of forces is presently taking place in the area. There are several prongs to this strategic reorientation:

• Together with the Seventh Fleet, the other arms of the Pacific Command have been upgraded. The Air Force's tactical power in the area, for instance, has been qualitatively upgraded with the assignment of 36 F-16 fighter-bombers to South Korea and the upcoming deployment of 48 more to Misawa, Japan.

• Multiple aircraft carrier battle-groups are now being periodically deployed to the Northwest Pacific. Previously, only one carrier force covered the area, and even this was absent for months when it was reassigned to the Indian Ocean during the Iran-Afghanistan crises in the early 1980s. A demonstration of the new stance was provided recently by the deployment of the Enterprise and the Midway to the South Korean coast during the massive Operation Team Spirit exercises held earlier this year.

• Japanese and U.S. forces have initiated 24-hour patrols in at least three of the five straits leading out of the Sea of Japan, with Japan committed to blockade or mine some of these "choke points" in the event of war. This cooperation is part of a larger trend toward the militarization of alliance politics, including military technology trade agreements, increases in joint military exercises, and Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone's promise to Reagan to share in the "defense" of the sea lanes up to 1000 miles from the Japanese coast.

• The militarization of the U.S.-Japan relationship is paralleled by the strengthening of the U.S.-South Korea alliance to place a potential Soviet ally, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), on the de-



fensive. The U.S. has recently placed South Korea on a par with Europe as a "first line of defense" and upgraded its defense status to one of a "vital interest area." The Pentagon plans to deploy neutron bombs in the area, in addition to the already massive stockpile of tactical atomic weapons there.

- The U.S. is also stepping up efforts to link Japan, South Korea, and itself in a "triangular military alliance" in order to facilitate military operations which are not now possible under the separate bilateral pacts—like Japan's mining of the crucial Strait of Tsushima, which separates it from South Korea.
- The U.S. strategic and tactical nuclear arsenal in the Pacific is being "modernized." From an estimated 1984 stockpile of 1700 nuclear warheads actively forward-deployed in the Pacific, the U.S. will deploy at least 4000 nuclear warheads in the region by 1990, a fantastic buildup in nuclear firepower.[6]
- Finally, the Pentagon is moving to integrate China into its war plans. The Taiwan issue's damaging effect on relations between the People's Republic and the U.S. has recently been offset by the Pentagon's recent decision to speed up the export of arms-related technology needed by the Chinese to modernize their armed forces. The recently leaked 1985-89 "Defense Guidance" document is more specific about China's role.[7] Aside from urging "a continuing program of military-to-military contacts and prudent assistance in defense weaponry," it also advises that in the event of war the U.S. provide "logistical support" for "Chinese military maneuvers to tie down the Soviets' Pacific Fleet, tactical air squadrons, and its approximately 50 army divisions on the Sino-Soviet border."[8]

The Soviet Nightmare

What former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown called the "Soviet strategic nightmare" would become reality in a battle in or over the Sea of Japan and the nearby Sea of Okhotsk. Such a confrontation might begin in militarized Korea, or result from the U.S. opening a second front against the Soviets if war breaks out in Europe or the Middle East. In such a confrontation, the U.S. can immediately field four carrier battlegroups and can count on the arrival of three others from the Third Fleet in the Eastern Pacific as reinforcements. In contrast, the Soviets have only one small carrier geared principally for anti-submarine warfare deployed to the area—forcing them to rely mainly on cruise-missile-firing ships, submarines, and land-based aircraft. The Seventh Fleet and Air Force and Marine air units based in Japan, Okinawa, and South Korea can scramble up to 440 offensive aircraft, a great many of them nuclear-capable. With reinforcements from the 13th Air Force based in the Philippines, the number of immediately deployable aircraft rises to 490 and, with support from the Third Fleet, the total number of planes which can be committed to battle becomes 780.

While the Soviets have a slight numerical advantage in aircraft, their planes are generally regarded as inferior. A U.S. admiral, for instance, states with confidence that the backbone of the Soviet offensive air force, the Bear heavy bomber, "would not be able to get to 1000 miles" of a U.S. battle group. It is also difficult to see how the newer medium-range Badger and Backfire bombers can penetrate the super-effective U.S. screen of interceptors and fighter-bombers. And the Soviets have nothing to match the enfant terrible of the U.S. offensive force—the ultra-modern F-16 fighter-bomber.

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The fundamental axiom of what has come to be known as the "Lehman Doctrine" is the Navy's achievement of "outright maritime superiority over any power or powers which might attempt to prevent our use of the seas and the maintenance of our vital interests worldwide."

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Adding in the U.S.-equipped air forces of Japan and South Korea further tilts the balance against the Soviets. In contrast, the air force of the one possible Soviet ally in the region, North Korea, draws the following comment from the commander of the U.S. Fifth Air Force: "The North Korean aircraft are fairly old and have limited range . . . . We think we can negate them pretty quickly."[9] Moreover, DPRK's participation in a conflict cannot be assumed, since China's reaction is always a major factor its leaders take into consideration.

Soviet inferiority, however, goes beyond numbers or quality of aircraft. The Soviets are fundamentally constrained by a defensive orientation, compounded by the fact that their air force in Northeast Asia is geared primarily to support ground troops in the event of war with China. It is doubtful that their aircraft would be able to sustain prolonged offensive force projection over the Sea of Japan. In short, it is unlikely that the Soviet Pacific fleet can expect much help from the air—and air power is the decisive factor in naval conflict.[10] The other two tactical arms of the Soviet fleet—missile-firing surface ships and submarines—face enormous odds: the ships would have to break through the mined or blockaded straits, and the noisy Soviet submarines would have to contend with U.S. anti-submarine warfare capabilities which a former Navy secretary has described as "awesome."

Toward Another Leyte Gulf

The naval buildup in the Northwest Pacific has been accompanied by American saber-rattling. The former commander of PACOM, Admiral Robert Long, for instance, recently told an astonished Japanese correspondent that "this region [the Pacific], I believe, is most probably where we shall witness confrontation with the Soviet Union."[11]

The worry of many is that all this is not mere saber-rattling but the frustrated outpouring of men who would launch a preemptive attack if they can get away with it. A Pearl Harbor in reverse is indeed tempting for, as Secretary Lehman is reported to have said, "He who gets the signal to fire first will enjoy a tremendous tactical advantage." The dangers of preemptive attack are made even greater by the belief harbored by many in the Reagan administration, including Reagan himself, that a theater war—even a theater nuclear war—may be possible without it turning into general strategic war; in the words of Mr. Reagan: "I can see a situation where you can have a nuclear exchange without it necessarily turning into a bigger war."[12]

The problem is that, just as Leyte Gulf is etched as a glorious lesson to be emulated in the collective mind of the U.S. Navy, the cataclysm of Tsushima—in which the Czarist Baltic Fleet went down before the guns of the rising Japanese Imperial Navy in 1905—is likewise a bitter lesson which the Soviet Fleet takes very seriously. It is this volatile mixture of present provocation and past lesson which would make it very unlikely that any aeronaval conflict in the Northwest Pacific could be "contained."

The Navy Occupies the Indian Ocean

The other likely site for superpower confrontation in the Asia-Pacific region is the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf area. A key function of the Pacific Command is to support the American military presence in this region. Until the constitution of a separate command, the Central Command (CENTCOM), late in 1982, this vast area lay within PACOM's jurisdiction.

In the mid-sixties, the Indian Ocean-Southwest Asia region was the only sector of Eurasia which was not garrisoned in a major way by U.S. forces. Present in the area in a permanent fashion since the mid-nineteenth century, the British Navy served as the regional gendarme within the grand design, orchestrated by the United States, of "containing Soviet power." From Kenya on the western border of the Indian Ocean to Malaya on the east, the British ranged themselves against the movements of national liberation shaking the imperial order. In the words of one observer, the Royal Navy "was a seamless extension of American global military presence . . . holding the central tier of the allied position, enabling the United States to focus on the cockpit of NATO west and Asia east."[13]

The withdrawal of the British Navy "east of Suez" in the late sixties led to strong U.S. Navy lobbying in Washington for the expansion of its role—this time to "fill the power vacuum" supposedly created by the British retreat. Although a naval task force was maintained in the area by France, the latter was considered both ineffective and politically unreliable by the Americans.

As is usual in these cases, the Navy invoked the specter of a "massive Soviet naval buildup" in the ocean. Soviet antisubmarine craft and other vessels had indeed appeared in the area in 1968, but this was in response to the U.S. Navy's acquisition of Diego Garcia in the

middle of the ocean and the establishment of an American missile submarine communications facility in Northwest Cape, Australia. To the Soviets, these two developments indicated the presence of submarines carrying the Polaris A-3 missile which could reach the Soviet heartland from the middle of the Indian Ocean.

The Navy, however, was stymied by some sentiment in the U.S. Congress for the demilitarization of the area as proposed by the littoral states, notably Sri Lanka, and by wariness of undertaking a major new commitment in the post-Vietnam atmosphere of antimilitarism and fiscal restraints. The shaky opposition in Congress however, caved in after the Soviet intervention in

Afghanistan in 1979. Seizing a golden opportunity, the Navy conjured up the image of Soviet ships "cutting our oil lifelines" and quickly and massively deployed its forces. Less than four years later, with no less than three carrier task forces and numerous battle-groups assigned to it, the Indian Ocean has joined the Pacific as an "American Lake."

The fulcrum of the U.S. naval presence is the tiny U-shaped island of Diego Garcia lying 1000 miles south of the tip of the Indian subcontinent. Detached from Mauritius by the British prior to that nation's independence, Diego Garcia was leased to the U.S. in 1966 after the removal of its inhabitants, the Ilois people. The island's size does not reflect its vast significance. Packed into an area 14 miles long and four miles wide are electronic intelligence and communications facilities for strategic warfare: an air base housing nuclear-armed P3C antisubmarine patrol planes, tactical aircraft, and cargo planes; and port facilities for carrier task forces and other naval units.

The Rapid Deployment Force

The formidable armada serviced by Diego Garcia is part of the much-vaunted Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). Commissioned by the Carter administration in 1977, the RDF was initially conceived as a light and relatively small mobile force of 100,000 personnel. Under Reagan, however, it has grown to a massive formation of 500,000 troops—leading to worries among defense analysts that it "may no longer be a rapid force and may no longer be deployable."[14] Elevated to a separate unified command, CENTCOM, late last year, the RDF has also seen its range of interventionist action expand from the Persian Gulf countries to 20 nations throughout Southwest Asia and East Africa.

The RDF currently consists of three elite army divisions and several specialized army units like Rangers and unconventional warfare teams; an expanded Marine battle group; three carrier task forces, one surface action group, and five maritime patrol squadrons from the Navy; and seven tactical fighter wings and two strategic bomber wings (B-52's) from the Air Force. In sum, a force no longer geared to the goal of "surgical intervention" envisioned by Harold Brown and Jimmy Carter but to that of massive intervention preferred by Caspar Weinberger and Ronald Reagan.

The backbone of CENTCOM is the naval carrier task forces, one of which will be continuously on duty in the Indian Ocean. Accompanying the latter is a Marine Amphibious Unit which will be on duty in the area for half a year. To facilitate logistical mobility, the Navy has created a Near-Term Prepositioned Force (NTPF) of 17 ships supported from Diego Garcia. This force carries supplies and provides facilities for Marine units continuously on station and "early arriving" Army and Marine forces in the event of a crisis.

Mobility demands access to bases or facilities in the region. Over the last five years, the U.S. has been able to successfully negotiate expanded access rights to sites in Egypt, Oman, Kenya, and Somalia. The Navy has also been lobbying the administration and Congress for access to the port facilities of Simonstown in South Africa—a plan which the apartheid government is all too willing to accommodate. In the southeast corner of the Indian Ocean, the Australian government is constructing a major naval base at Cockburn Sound and several airfields for possible American military use.

Outside the region, the gigantic U.S. bases in the Philippines, Subic Naval Base and Clark Air Base, enjoy the protection of the Marcos regime and continue to serve as the indispensable "gateway" to the Indian Ocean for American forces transiting through the Pacific.

The RDF is not simply a conventional force. It is armed to the teeth to fight a limited conventional war, a theater nuclear war, or a strategic war. The three carrier task forces alone possess an awesome array of nuclear bombs, missiles, and depth charges which can be easily delivered by nuclear-capable fighter-bombers and P3C anti-submarine patrol planes. The two squadrons of Air Force B-52's can switch from tactical air-support missions against radical forces in the Persian Gulf area to strategic bombing missions against the Soviet Union.

With no less than three carrier task forces and numerous battle-groups assigned to it, the Indian Ocean has joined the Pacific as an "American Lake."

The Uses of the "Soviet Threat"

Having deployed this massive nuclear force, the Pentagon now says relatively little about the Soviet divisions which are supposedly poised to rush down to the Persian Gulf from the Transcaucasus 600 miles away, for the Soviet threat has performed its real function, which was to stampede the American public into accepting a massive new commitment.

Alvin Cotrell, one of the Navy's favorite intellectuals, was an influential exponent of the image of the Soviet threat to the oil sea lanes. Now, he admits: "The basic problem has always been one of political instability—and the Soviets do come in if there is political instability. The first problem is one of undergirding existing stability." He continues: "In this particular area I don't believe we are likely to get a direct Soviet advance down to the Indian Ocean littoral. The Soviets intend to manipulate their way to the sea, not march to it."[15]

And what of the "Great Soviet Indian Ocean Fleet"? Rear Admiral Ronald Kurth of the Office of

Before the Second World War, the Navy opposed granting independence to the Philippines with the rationale that the defense of the United States began "6000 miles west of San Francisco."

Naval Operations recently placed things in perspective before a military audience: "Given the substantial presence of superior U.S. naval forces in the Indian Ocean since late 1979, it is not likely that the Soviets would provoke a naval confrontation." The Soviets are handicapped by two things, according to Kurth. First, "more than half of the roughly 20 units assigned to the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron are logistic support ships. The high percentage of auxiliary vessels reflects the difficulty of resupplying distant combatants." Second, "in the absence of Soviet naval aviation deployed to the Arabian Sea, the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron is inferior to U.S. naval forces now in the area."[16]

In sum, the RDF is directed principally at the old enemies that the United States faced in Vietnam and now faces in Central America: nationalist insurgencies and radical states. Thus, while it currently minimizes a direct Soviet invasion, the Pentagon emphasizes, as the objects of its overall policy in Southwest Asia, "support for moderate states against overt attack by radical states" and "support for moderate states against subversion aided or directed by outside powers." "Radical fundamentalist movements," asserts Asst. Defense Secretary Francis West, create situations "enticing to the Soviets, who . . . are more likely to opt for encouraging subversion and internal upheavals as a safer, more productive policy."[17]

However, the prospect of a conflict between the Soviet Union and the U.S. cannot be ruled out. Indeed, the Indian Ocean-Southwest Asia region ranks second after Northeast Asia as a flashpoint in U.S.-Soviet relations. And as in Northeast Asia, Pentagon strategists think that a limited war may be an option in the Indian Ocean. West candidly states that "a limited clash with the Soviet Union, followed by a cease-fire, is a possibility."[18]

It is likely that the instigator of such a conflict would be the United States. A scenario of this sort is laid out by Tom Farer, author of a highly respected study of the region sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, after a talk with U.S. authorities:

> Nothing was said about occupying the Gulf. But one cannot help suspecting that that is a contingency lurking in some recess of the military mind when the virtues of naval presence are extolled . . . . It may in fact be a major source of concern for the Soviet naval presence. The specter which may haunt is not an attack on oil tankers or even Soviet intervention in the style of the 1965 U.S. occupation of the Dominican Republic but rather Soviet interposition in case the United States chooses this means [occupation of the Gulf] to shore up the existing international order.[19]

Forward Deployment

Since the end of the Second World War, the U.S. has built up a formidable structure of over 300 bases and installations in the Asia-Pacific region. These facilities are part of a chain of 1500 installations in Asia, Australia, the Middle East, and Europe which effectively encircle the Soviet Union. "From an overall vantage point," asserts a key Pentagon study of the overseas base system, "one of the prime strategic advantages enjoyed by the United States over the USSR is the possibility of surrounding the Communist bloc with combat forces—land, sea, air—or of strategically positioning or shifting these forces wherever needed. An adequate U.S. base system is an essential means of exploiting this benefit of geography and of promoting the continued collective defense effort among free world nations."[20]

From the Pentagon's point of view, the principal value of the U.S. base system in the Pacific lies in its role in facilitating the projection of conventional or tactical nuclear power against national liberation movements or progressive states in Asia. The most vital of these springboards for intervention are the Yokosuka-Yokohama naval complex in Japan, Taegu Air Base in South Korea, Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, Apra Harbor and Andersen Air Base in Guam, and Subic Naval Base and Clark Air Base in the Philippines.

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The Wizards of Armageddon

EUROMISSILES AND U.S. SCIENTISTS

by John Harris

Nuclear weapons arose out of physics, and physicists have played an important role in the decisions concerning the way the weapons are used and in the development of nuclear weapons doctrine. Some, particularly those from inside the weapons establishment, have consistently argued for increases in the number and different types of weapons, and have equally consistently acted to frustrate efforts towards arms control or disarmament. In 1957, when it seemed likely that President Eisenhower might agree to an end to the testing of nuclear weapons in response to a unilateral halt announced by the Soviet Union, physicists Ernest O. Lawrence and Edward Teller sought a private audience with the President. In the meeting they argued that a test ban would interfere with the development of a "clean" nuclear explosive which would be useful in civilian nuclear programs. Eisenhower was persuaded by their reasoning and an opportunity for ending the arms race was lost.[1]

The public may find it easy to appropriately discount the views of those who are closely involved with the weapons establishment, but it continues to believe that the business of nuclear weapons is sufficiently mysterious that it requires interpretation by experts. Although senior physicists are still regarded by the public as trusted, neutral experts on the subject, there are very few such knowledgeable scientists who are not now and were not formerly employed as consultants by the weapons establishment. Furthermore, while the workings of nuclear weapons are unquestionably matters of science, the strategic and arms control questions are entirely political subjects in which scientists have no special competence.

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There is an increasing debate as to whether ending the arms race is in any way a technical problem, or whether the race is in fact driven entirely by reasons of political expediency, ideological prejudice and bureaucratic and financial self-interest. Scientists who continue to "explain" nuclear doctrine as if it were a scientifically rational system may be maintaining a myth of rationality that disguises the fact that the arms race serves only those who profit from it.

Herbert York and the Euromissile Disaster: A Case Study

In December 1983 NATO began the deployment of Ground Launched Cruise Missiles and Pershing II missiles at sites in Germany and Great Britain. The decision to deploy, taken five or more years earlier, was stated to have two main purposes: to strengthen the linkage between European security and US deterrence strategy, and to give renewed impetus to European arms control negotiations. The results have been precisely the opposite: all arms control negotiations have been broken off, and in several European countries political movements have arisen which are pushing for a non-nuclear defense of Europe, perhaps independent of the United States. What were the factors which led to this policy disaster?

In October of 1983, Herbert York, Professor of Physics at the University of California at San Diego, published an extensive and informative article on the subject of arms control negotiations.[2] The article, he says, draws on his twenty-five year experience in arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. His career also includes several years as the Director of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, one of the nation's two nuclear weapons design laboratories.

In the article, York traces the reasoning behind the decision to deploy the Euromissiles back to 1977, when "Chancellor Schmidt of the Federal Republic of Germany made a speech in which he focussed special attention on the situation: he asserted that there was a need for some kind of highly visible land-based NATO system that would roughly counterbalance the [Soviet Union's deployment of the] SS-20."

This explanation is one which is widely published, but, like many widely published stories, it is almost entirely false. Helmut Schmidt did indeed make a speech in October 1977 in which he referred in a minor way to European defense matters,[3] but he did not comment on the Soviet SS-20 deployments, nor did he suggest a counter deployment. His only statement referring to the general topic was that "Europeans did not have a clear enough view of the close connection between parity of strategic nuclear weapons . . . and tactical and conventional weapons." This was in a context of concern that the SALT II treaty, then near signing in Geneva, would codify a strategic standoff between the two superpowers, making the US less likely to support European security with its strategic deterrent. But the remedy that he suggested was for "both NATO and the Warsaw Pact to reduce their force strength [in conventional weapons] and achieve an overall balance at a lower level."

York's statement of the roots of the Euromissile "twin-track" decision is faulty on another ground. The plan to deploy these missiles originated not with Helmut Schmidt in late October 1977, but with NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (the defense ministers of the major NATO countries) earlier that year. The NATO yearbook lists two meetings of the group in 1977. In the first, on June 8, the ministers "noted continuing improvements in Soviet nuclear forces, including mobile intermediate range systems and discussed . . . potential improvements in NATO nuclear weaponry." In the second meeting on October 11, a few weeks before Schmidt's speech, the ministers established "a Nuclear Planning Group high level group on Theater Nuclear Force modernization." Thus, the decisions were already being made before Schmidt's speech.

The Real Origins of Deployment

Herbert York's characterization of the reasons for the Euromissile deployments as being part of a technically rational response to Soviet deployments is disputed by other sources. *Science* magazine writer R. Jeffery Smith[4] has quoted Walter Slocombe, who was in charge of the Pentagon's Office of International Security during the late 1970's: "It was 'the right wing in the United States, the same crowd of people that didn't like SALT II,' that whispered in the ear of the Europeans about the virtues of the cruise missile." Field Marshall Lord Carver, former chief of the British General Staff and in 1966 the President of NATO's Military Committee, tells a similar story: "Some of the hawks in the German defense establishment . . . people with an East European background, people who talk to [Reagan

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adviser on the Soviet Union] Richard Pipes told Schmidt to do it."[5] And Smith, in an extensively researched series of articles, has established that the deployment decision was made because "military officials desired newer, more capable weapons; military contractors desired more business; and conservative US weapons analysts developed the appropriate strategic rationale."[6]

There are other forces that Smith doesn't deal with: the exigencies of electoral politics in the Western democracies. Sociologist Alan Wolfe has pointed out that the rise and fall in the perceptions of the "Soviet threat" has more to do with domestic political events than with reality:[7] "The extremely negative perceptions of the Soviet Union now popular in Washington . . . [have to do with] not the Russian military build-up but the peculiar features of the American political system." In 1979, when the Euromissile decision was made, President Carter was facing an election. In the Senate, ratification of the SALT II treaty was being blocked by conservatives. The other national leaders involved in the decision, Schmidt of Germany and Callaghan of Britain, were in similar situations. All three were under pressure from the right and perhaps saw this as an opportunity to gain support. As it happened, the world economic downturn and the hostage crisis in Iran created conditions which made it impossible for any of the three to survive the elections.

But Professor York suggests that the deployment decision was a rational and necessary response to Soviet deployments. With his twenty-five years of experience it is difficult to believe that he is naive in these matters. Had he wished to inform the public about the true roots of these developments, York would perhaps have pointed out that the modifications to the Pershing missile which would allow it to reach the Soviet heartland were planned as far back as 1971, long before the Soviet Union modernized the aging SS-4's and SS-5's, originally deployed in about 1960. Nor would he have written that SS-20 was "the first new weapon in its class in 20 years." It was, naturally, a more up-to-date weapon, but its military capability, and the total number of warheads available, were little changed as a result of the modernization.

Washington's Public Relations Campaign

An article in the London *Observer* suggests that more than an innocent mistake may be involved.[9] Washington correspondent Peter Pringle reports on some recently leaked documents which suggest that the story which York presents was crafted in the US State Department. Pringle finds the documents "reveal how the Americans prepared a vigorous public relations campaign, advising NATO member countries to disseminate selected information on 'theater nuclear forces.'" The purpose of the campaign was to develop a rationale that would explain the planned deployments. Pringle continues: "By June 1979 a plan had been drawn up to pass on selected facts to well-placed 'multipliers' such as journalists, academics or politicians who would use the information to 'temper any debate.'" Herbert York was, perhaps, one of these multipliers.

The search for a solution to the arms race depends upon an informed public. Scientific leaders have for too long discussed the problem as if it were within a technically rational system, a matter of numbers, predictable actions and responses, as if the only questions at issue were details of weapons design and deployment. It is increasingly clear that this is not the case. Like other spheres of public policy, weapons systems are responsive to a wide range of political forces, bureaucratic and financial self-interest, and deep ideological forces. Scientists who aspire to the role of public advocate in these matters must be willing to deal with the fact that it is an irrational system. Attempts to disguise this fact can only be interpreted as complicity in a system of illegitimate exploitation.□



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THE POLITICS OF AIDS

by Kenneth W. Payne and Stephen J. Risch

Disease is an analytic prism for cultural understanding. Entire mythologies build up, not only about a disease itself, but about the individuals bearing the disease. Social images, stereotypes, and official fictions come to be perpetuated by the media as the facts of the disease. The more virulent the disease, the greater its social importance.[1] Diseases of no known cause or cure, especially, strike at the very depths of our fears.

Medical factors alone do not determine the course of public health events. Attitudes toward particular diseases closely reflect general attitudes of the times in which such diseases occur. From the Renaissance until the 18th century, for instance, syphilis carried none of the stigma that later was attached to it, for those were years of "tolerance in sex matters."[2] With Victorian morality, attitudes towards syphilis changed.

Public reaction and political responses to diseases are also dependent on the status of the groups most affected by the disease. Whether the disease is perceived as a public health problem or as a problem for the victims themselves, is not grounded in scientific fact, but in social reality: "How much of a national scientific effort we devote to fighting an illness is a reflection of the political value we attach to it and its victims."[3] A disease which clearly illustrates the interaction between social forces and medicine is Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), which has grown into the nation's "Number One Public Health Priority" since its identification in 1981.[4] Only recently have we begun to understand what causes it,[5] although we do not yet know how to cure it, where it began, or how it works. This has spawned a climate of uncertainty in which misinformation abounds and attempts to curb the spread of the syndrome encounter resistance and challenge. Attitudes towards AIDS can tell us much about current social climate. The epidemic allows us to peer beneath the veneer of tolerance of diversity so loudly proclaimed in the mass media and view the deeply conservative feelings of our time.

To date, the majority of victims of AIDS have been homosexual or bisexual men (72%); intravenous drug users (17%); Haitians (4%); and hemophiliacs (1%). Unfortunately, three of these groups in particular—homosexual/bisexual men, drug users, and Haitian immigrants—are stigmatized, even regarded by some as disposable populations. Classified as "high risk" for contracting AIDS, members of these groups have become victims of a "double stigma,"[6] at once social and medical pariahs. One recent article referred to hemophiliacs and others who have contracted AIDS via blood transfusions as "innocent bystanders caught in the path of [this] new disease."[7]

Although much is known about viruses, bacteria, and "germs" as causative agents in disease, people still ask the age-old question, "Why me?" when struck down with sickness. This singularity-of-misfortune notion seeks not an impersonal germ as the cause, but some more personal explanation, whether one extracted from Biblical dogma or modern psychiatric notions. In either case, responsibility for the disease is often laid at the victim's doorstep. A very close fit is made here between the disease and the victim. People are even led to believe that disease agents make rational choices—they seek out "proper victims." As Joan Ablon[8] noted about other stigmatized conditions, the illness becomes a crime in the eyes of society—and, by extension, the victims of the illness, criminals. The fact that homosexuals have been most affected by the AIDS epidemic makes it easy to posit a Christian theory of divine retribution: the victim has gotten what he deserves.

An AIDS "personality" has been sought among AIDS patients, and the press has suggested that alienation, personal inability to cope with stress, and shame are contributory to AIDS. It has even been posited that "the disease is 'chosen' at a profound, unconscious 'level' as a dramatic form of protest."[9]

Homosexuality has long received widespread opprobrium in the U.S. In response, Gays have kept

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their sexuality underground, finally surfacing in some areas during the increasingly liberal climate of the 1960s and early 1970s. With the advent of AIDS, media attention has brought Gay sexuality up for discussion in nearly everyone's home. The "darker" side of homosexuality (e.g., sex clubs, orgy rooms) has been exposed to public scrutiny. Absurd statistics intended to shock the public have been quoted, suggesting that the "average" number of sexual partners in the life of the "average" active male homosexual is more than 1,600.[10]

The medical/scientific establishment has yet to publish for general consumption a comprehensive profile of the individuals stricken with AIDS, although it is well over three years (and over 5,000 U.S. victims) since the epidemic was first recognized and monitored. The profile presented in the popular media is blurred—the image is one of a highly promiscuous man who uses recreational drugs and has repeatedly abused his health. This profile contrasts dramatically with those AIDS victims whose lives and experiences have been chronicled in the Gay press, or who have been interviewed in the popular press as well. Instead of statistical data, Gays have had to rely on anecdotes. For every report of an AIDS victim who lived in the fast lane (with alcohol and drug abuse, poor sleep patterns, poor diet, etc.), most Gays have heard of exceptions, where someone has lived a moderate lifestyle, one similar to their own, perhaps even a monogamous lifestyle.

That AIDS has appeared in these conservative times seems especially unfortunate. "Just as society was ready to grant that homosexuality is not a disease, it is seized with the idea that homosexuality breeds disease."[11] AIDS is described in many circles as a disease of sexual expression, a narcissistic neurosis of sorts, the consequence of enslavement to one's desires. The public's anxiety over AIDS has begun to generate a climate that could lead to erosion of many of the civil rights that Gays have gained over the last 15 years.

Politicians and preachers have evinced a special interest in AIDS. "For them, it represents opportunity—opportunity for politicians to score political points with homosexuals, and for preachers to score moral points against them."[12] Recently, Phyllis Schlafly's publication, *The Eagle Forum,* used AIDS for political manipulation. In an article titled, "The ERA-Gay-AIDS Connection," she claimed that, were the ERA ratified, the American family would have no protection against AIDS. AIDS was also used by California Senator H.L. Richardson (R) to defeat Assembly Bill 1, which would have placed homosexuals under the protection of the fair employment statutes by adding them to the list of minorities in the anti-discrimination codes. In a letter to members of the Judiciary Committee, Richardson cited "real medical problems" in the homosexual community that would place everyone in potential grave jeopardy. Homophobic propaganda exploiting AIDS also appeared in Texas, where Representative Bill Ceverha worked on House Bill 2138, designed to prevent and deter homosexual conduct which could "destroy the public health of the State of Texas" by causing the transmission of AIDS.

Media Culpability

The media have offered considerable in-depth coverage of the AIDS crisis, but the coverage has oscillated between sensationalism and assurances that all will soon be under control by scientists. Although AIDS has continued to spread unabated, the impression given by a longitudinal study of the media's coverage of the epidemic is that AIDS, somehow, is less of a problem today. Left with the impression that the media coverage of the epidemic is proportionate to the threat of the disease, the public has been misled. So-called "breakthroughs" in AIDS treatment or in understanding the etiology of the disease receive front page and prime time coverage. But there is rarely any follow-up of these leads, which are mostly false starts: "Poppers Causes AIDS," "Homosexual Intercourse Linked to AIDS," "Interferon Checks the Progress of AIDS."

Gay groups have been forced for their own good to monitor the media's presentation of AIDS information for accuracy and timeliness, trying to maintain a balance between public education and hysteria. Certain facts have had to be continuously underlined:

• **AIDS is not a "Gay" disease.** The connection between AIDS and homosexuality has become a verbal reflex. This is unfortunate, because it has impressed upon the public the erroneous idea that AIDS is *only* a homosexual affliction. That intravenous drug users and Haitians constitute the next largest affected groups only serves to underscore the belief that AIDS affects outcast groups, disenfranchised peoples, and that, with luck, the disease could be contained among these peoples. The only outpourings of public concern and sympathy came with the recognition of a small percentage of AIDS victims who "unwittingly" contracted the disease, namely, hemophiliacs and blood transfusion recipients. Heterosexuals *can* get the disease.

• **AIDS is not a "plague."** Calling AIDS a "plague" conjures up images of a medieval scourge, unchecked contagions sweeping the land and annihilating the population. AIDS is a devastating disease (43.5% of reported cases are dead already), but the number of individuals affected thus far barely constitutes an epidemic, let alone a plague. The fact remains that, uncharacteristic of a plague, AIDS has proven rather difficult to transmit.

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AIDS contingent of June 1984 Boston Lesbian/Gay Pride March. Marchers' signs a remembrance of victims of the disease.

• **The privacy and dignity of persons with AIDS must be respected.** A number of ethical issues, such as individual rights versus public rights have been raised. Foremost is the question of what to do with persons who may be unwitting carriers of AIDS. Compared to "Typhoid Marys,"[13] these individuals are believed to be incubating a milder version of the disorder and, although asymptomatic, may be *carriers* themselves. Another ethical issue surrounds AIDS patients and the danger of quarantines being imposed, job access being limited, etc. The media have shocked the nation with reports of AIDS patients continuing to frequent bathhouses and to engage in those sexual activities implicated in the spread of the disease. Such media exposure adds tremendous stress to the AIDS victim's already difficult position.

Politics of Government Intervention

AIDS research is unique since it is the first time the medical establishment has had to deal with a national crisis that primarily affects a highly stigmatized group. Although Gay activists complained that the government was committing far too few funds to deal adequately with the health crisis, such suppositions were dismissed by the popular press as the pleadings of special interest groups until the release in 1983 of a House Committee on Government Operations Report, "The Federal Response to AIDS." The report, which described the internal memos of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services on AIDS research financing, found that the government responded far too slowly to the AIDS outbreak in 1981, and that the research funding that finally came was dictated by narrow political and budget "constraints" rather than by the advice of health experts.

For example, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) requested an additional $833,000 for AIDS research in 1982. But the committee found that the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services never responded to the request. Congress appropriated $500,000 for AIDS research nine months later, but that appropriation was vetoed by President Reagan and not enacted until September 1982. The 1983-1984 AIDS budget for the CDC was submitted three times to the Administration before it was cut back sufficiently (i.e., by 40%) to satisfy the Administration.

The federal and state monies now finally going to AIDS research are nearly all earmarked for strictly biologically-oriented investigations (e.g., What is the causative agent? How can the syndrome be treated?). Of 20 grants (totalling nearly $4 million) announced in February 1984, for New York State-financed research, only one grant was awarded for a preventative study, and no money was allocated for educational assessments.[14] This has not been the most effective or judicious expenditure of funds if the immediate goal is to stop the spread of the epidemic and help those who already have the disease. The biological questions are important, but too little money has been spent on public education and prevention, despite the fact that very early in the epidemic most researchers suspected that the disease could be sexually transmitted, and that Gay people could arm themselves with the information necessary to make educated decisions regarding certain sexual practices.

Only in a few large urban centers where Gay people are politically organized (e.g., New York and San Francisco) has there been a significant effort to educate the Gay community about preventative measures. This was possible only with funds solicited directly from the Gay community and by intense pressure on local governments to generate money for education. Chicago has yet to allocate any funds for public education, while Los Angeles got its AIDS program off the ground only in the Fall of 1983. New York City, with about one-half of the nation's AIDS cases, has still spent only $1 million for its non-hospital health activities relating to AIDS.

Medical Dominance of AIDS Research

The rapidity with which the medical establishment successfully laid claim to the available research money reflects both its opportunism and its lobbying power. Because of the severity of the problem, it was quite clear that there were going to be large amounts of research money available, at least eventually. In today's tight funding market, research priorities often are dictated by funding levels. There are now many laboratories receiving AIDS money that previously had only the most peripheral association with AIDS research. The recent congressional report noted that only 10% of the money given to nongovernmental researchers for AIDS went to scientists specifically investigating the syndrome. The remaining 90% comprised previously awarded grants to investigators who devoted 20% or less of their funds to AIDS research.

Another factor motivating the medical community's interest in AIDS was that the disease raised some very exciting scientific questions, especially in the area of immunology. There were clearly careers to be made—tenure, promotion, international recognition. Already there is evidence that some laboratories are not openly sharing their research findings or adequately recognizing the findings of others, in obvious competition for medical fame. For example, nearly a year after a French team at the Pasteur Institute in Paris published an article in the widely read journal, *Science,* on their discovery of T-lymphotropic viruses (LAV) in AIDS cases, American researchers, led by Dr. Gallo, admitted the importance of LAV and the probability that this virus was identical to one that they, too, had isolated, grown, and named HTLV-III. Why the French discovery was

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not fully appreciated earlier is curious. Dr. Roger W. Enlow of the New York City Department of Health observed:

> . . . it is inconceivable to me that Dr. Gallo and his coworkers have been to date unable to consider LAV as fully as his other isolates. LAV has been available to him repeatedly . . . . Evidence that these viral isolates and others from around the world are one and the same would add essential evidence that these isolates cause the disease we now call "AIDS." Withholding or obscuring of such information is reprehensible behavior of the gravest sort. Such can not be tolerated one moment by a civilized society and thwarts the pursuit of truly meaningful scientific collaboration and inquiry.[15]

"Everybody sees a Nobel Prize in this, of course," said Warren Winkelstein of the University of California, Berkeley, the recipient of a $3 million federal grant for AIDS research. "But that's not bad—that means you'll get the best minds in the country working on this."[16]

Politics of AIDS Treatment

AIDS is a "medical profession's free-for-all."[17] Treatments depend on "what clinic one stumbles on, what doctor he happens on, what hospital he gets delivered to, and who is funding what program with whatever experimental drug company's largesse."

The media have reported many instances in which decisions about how to deal with AIDS patients are being made unilaterally. The *New York Times* reported cases of dentists, considered at higher risk than physicians or other health professionals, who refused to treat Gay patients (not just confirmed AIDS cases).[18] When three nurses at a San Jose hospital quit rather than treat AIDS patients, it received national media attention.[19] When a San Francisco AIDS patient developed meningitis, ambulance attendants refused to take him to the hospital.[20] Evidence that AIDS patients have been receiving less-than-optimum care at many hospitals is mounting. Patients have been ostracized in the hospital, and some medical workers, judging AIDS cases as hopeless, have undertaken less aggressive diagnostic and therapeutic plans as their patients return with more and more infections.[21] At Lenox Hill Hospital in New York, one AIDS patient in a $420/day room said that he had to clean the room and scrub his bathtub himself, as the porters refused to touch the room.[22] At St. Joseph's Hospital in Phoenix, AIDS patients were left unbathed, as health care attendants were afraid to handle them.[23]

The medical establishment has also not been responsive in establishing vigorous standards on isolation procedures, safe handling of specimens, infectious disease control procedures, and "standard precautions." The occupational hazards of being a health care worker and a definition of what constitutes "normal" risks are undergoing examination. Are health care professionals to be excused from delivering care to patients with AIDS? Can nurses choose their patients? Can guidelines be drawn governing these issues, or must decisions be made on a case-by-case basis?

The moral value we attach to a disease also affects the extent to which its victims receive proper medical attention. Patient management is adversely affected by the attitudes of medical staff about the culpability of their patients. Persons not responsible for their illness are regarded as "legitimate," whereas those regarded as somehow responsible for their illness come to be viewed as unworthy. As such, the latter are subjected to less-than-optimal care. This has been illustrated in the case of anorexia nervosa, another disease believed by many to be self-induced. The literature on anorexia nervosa indicates that the victims are the brunt of hospital gossip, that many are purposely neglected, and that some are even abused by their nurses. AIDS is widely regarded as a disease one has brought on oneself, and hence one in which the victims should expect neither sympathy nor help from the public coffers.

Doctors themselves have decried what they see to be the abuse of the medical system by homosexuals. They cite high recidivism rates (e.g., multiple cases of sexually transmitted diseases within a single year's time or multiple hospital admissions for one infection after another) to support their case. One San Diego physician recently charged that Gays were demanding taxpayers' money to save themselves from their own frivolous indiscretions.[24] Another doctor recently justified discrimination against homosexuals as "reasonable" since "their activity not only is harmful to themselves but risks the health of the society they live in."[25] This accusation of culpability could also be leveled at the victims of other diseases proven to be the direct consequences of lifestyle choices, such as victims of lung cancer due to cigarette smoking, or of liver cancer related to alcohol abuse. The underlying homophobia in the case of AIDS is all too apparent.

Response to AIDS by the Gay Community

Gays have responded to the health crisis by forming lobbying groups, politically- and educationally-oriented activist organizations, and even entirely new foundations to raise and distribute money for AIDS research and social services for victims. The special nature of the contradictions that define Gay life in the United States have allowed for this response. On one hand, homosexuals are seriously stigmatized in our culture and deprived of basic civil rights, a condition that would suggest powerlessness. Yet at the same time the stigmatization has fostered the development of a subculture. While hardly unified on most issues, large parts of the Gay community, especially in urban centers, typically socialize together and have much more discretionary income and time than other stigmatized groups. This has facilitated the development of the infrastructure necessary for organizing politically and accounts partly for the success of Gay civil rights struggles since 1969. Thus the Gay community was in a sense organizationally preadapted to fight AIDS from the onset of the crisis. The other groups at high risk of getting AIDS (i.e., Haitians, intravenous drug users, and hemophiliacs) were not so preadapted. It is not, therefore, surprising that Gays and bisexuals, who comprise about 70% of the AIDS cases, totally dominate the organized response.

Reluctance on the part of a large number of Gays to surrender control of their sexuality and lifestyle to the "men in white" is understandable: "Many of us have been so critical of the medical model of homosexuality, that I would expect us to bridle at the attempt to reimpose another of its hydra heads so soon after the psychiatric one has been lopped off."[26]

Others, ever optimistic, see a silver lining around the dark cloud of AIDS. Edmund White, the author, hopes that the AIDS crisis will lead to "a more profound vision of community."[27] Dennis Altman senses the development of "a new notion of what constitutes community."[28] They assert that AIDS has politicized Gays in a way that right-wing groups and Moral Majority supporters have never been able to do. An unprecedented level of political organizing is taking place in the Gay community and many formerly closeted Gays have become politically active, boosting the political cohesiveness of Gay groups.

Yet, a rising homophobia *within* the Gay community also exists. Guilt-embroidered fantasies of sexual pollution now have medical backing, and it is clear that more and more single Gay men are regarding one another not as potential partners or sources of support, but as possible sources of contagion. Indeed, Jim Geary, Executive Director of the Shanti Project, a San Francisco counseling and hospice group, stated, "it is time to start relating to all sexual partners and to yourselves as potential AIDS carriers."[29]

"Politically correct" homosexuals have tried to present a sanitized Gay image, asserting that more Gay bonding is taking place[30] (mimicking the "family") and that less unorthodox sex, or even, for some, no intercourse whatsoever, is occurring (Gays only cuddle and play house). In the meantime, the so-called "hard-core" group of homosexuals, variously referred to as the "self-destruct" segment and "the Evel Knievel's of medicine,"[31] has taken its sexuality further underground, away from peering and judgmental eyes. In many cases, this group will not only hide its practices from the public, but from other Gays as well. There has been a growing intolerance for disparate sexual expression within the Gay community, paralleling the intolerance of mainstream straights for Gays. This has forced "hard-core" types to weed out of their networks individuals who exert peer pressures toward conformity with existing "safe sex" guidelines.

The Gay community's response to efforts to close gay bathhouses illustrates the dilemma involved in fighting homophobia while at the same time behaving re-

AIDS FACTS

TOTAL NUMBER OF CASES IN THE USA: 5,037 (as of 6/30/84)

AIDS "HOT SPOTS"

New York City:	1,927	38%
San Francisco:	581	12%
Los Angeles:	411	8%
Miami:	212	4%

	F	M
TOTAL NUMBER OF MALE VICTIMS:	4,604	93%
TOTAL NUMBER OF FEMALE VICTIMS:	339	7%
TOTAL NUMBER OF HOMOSEXUAL & BISEXUAL VICTIMS:	0	3,553
TOTAL NUMBER OF HAITIANS: (Belonging only to this risk group)	29	161
TOTAL NUMBER OF IV DRUG USERS: (Belonging only to this risk group)	189	674
TOTAL NUMBER OF HEMOPHILIACS (Belonging only to this risk group)	0	37
TOTAL NUMBER OF UNKNOWN RISK GROUPS	121	179
TOTAL NUMBER OF VICTIMS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES:	122	(7/26/83)

RACIAL DISTRIBUTION

White:	2,876
Black:	1,247
Hispanic:	714
Other:	16
Unknown:	90

AGE DISTRIBUTION

Under 20:	29
20-29:	1,093
30-39:	2,324
40-49:	1,056
Over 49:	438
Unknown:	3

The number of AIDS cases is exceeding predictions made two years ago. Only last year, Dr. Harold Jaffe of the CDC made the gloomy prediction that, "In three years' time, at the present rate of infection, AIDS would claim 100,000 victims; in five years, 1.6 million."[33] The number of cases now are triple those of last year. Cases still are doubling every six months. One hundred *new* cases are being reported nationally every two weeks. The crisis has not gone away, even though many people's sense of urgency about AIDS has.

sponsibly during a health crisis. On the one hand, it was clear that frequent sexual encounters encouraged the spread of AIDS and that such encounters occurred at the bathhouses. Yet, it was not at all clear that closing the bathhouses would reduce such encounters, as men would just go elsewhere. There were also fears that such a ban would act as a foot in the door for those with a more sweeping homophobic agenda, "eliminating first the gay baths, then the gay bars, then all gay businesses and organizations, and possibly the jobs of every gay person."[32] The fight against bathhouse closing made for strange bedfellows, temporarily joining Gay bath owners, whose primary concern clearly was protection of profits, with progressive political Gays whose main fear was more State control of consensual behavior.

Conclusions

All diseases occur in a political context and an appropriate analysis of any major disease can tell us much about the medical establishment and the larger society. But the particular attributes of AIDS—its high mortality, epidemic status, poorly understood biology, and, most importantly, the stigmatized nature of the groups it affects—make an analysis of AIDS especially revealing.

Despite the vast resources available in the U.S., the response to AIDS on the part of the government and the research community has been relatively slow and disorganized. As so often happens, resources allocated for public education and prevention were miniscule compared to those directed at biological studies, despite early evidence that prevention was the quickest and most sure method of fighting the epidemic.

Within the medical research establishment itself, there have been competitive struggles over funds and intellectual turf, with examples of laboratories withholding information or refusing to publicly acknowledge the contributions of other research groups. The result has been slower progress than should have been the case. While one could say that this happens after the discovery of any new disease in our system, AIDS is much more than just a lesson in the normal operation of the U.S. medical system. Because almost 95% of its victims are stigmatized, the response to AIDS has revealed a tremendous amount about how the medical system, and society at large, responds to the needs of its dispossessed. Since by far the largest group affected were homosexual and bisexual, there is a special message about the prevalence and impact of homophobia. The 1960s and 1970s saw tremendous gains made by Gays in winning basic civil and human rights. AIDS has clearly demonstrated that beneath a veneer of social tolerance lies widespread, virulent homophobia, and that it can surface at the slightest excuse. The medical struggle against AIDS will be won long before we can wipe out the social attitudes that have hindered a humane and timely response to this epidemic. □

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THE WORLD BANK AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE PHILIPPINES

by Walden Bello

In early December 1983, members of the World Bank staff working on the Philippines were called to an emergency meeting. The gathering was convened by higher management to announce that the Bank was freezing funding for most of its projects in the country and converting it into quick cash to help the embattled Marcos regime pay off its gargantuan external debt of $25 billion. The meeting, however, turned into an explosive session filled with recriminations over the Bank's involvement with Marcos when one technocrat stood up and posed the question: "Aren't we somehow partly responsible for the economic mess?"

The relationship between the discredited dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos and the world's biggest multilateral aid agency is now regarded as one of the worst scandals in the history of development assistance. The World Bank was one of the first international institutions to throw itself behind the Marcos regime after the imposition of martial law in September 1972. In calling for massive aid to Marcos, Michael Gould, head of the Bank's Philippine desk, asserted: "While the country is formally under martial law, the basic strategy of government is to resort as little as possible to outright coercion and to broaden popular support through the development of effective economic and social programs."[1] In the 11 years between the imposition of martial law and the assassination of former Senator Benigno Aquino in August 1983, the Bank provided Marcos with almost $3.5 billion in aid.


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There were several reasons why the Bank chose to make the Philippines a "country of concentration." But perhaps the most important was that World Bank President Robert McNamara chose to make this Southeast Asian country of 50 million people the experimental site for the Bank's strategy of "development from above" or "authoritarian modernization." Not only did it enjoy the advantage of being a former colony of the U.S., with traditionally pro-American governments, but economic decision-making was in the hands of U.S.-trained technocrats, classmates of Bank staffers advising the country.

With the regime intolerant of any opposition, the World Bank and its Filipino technocrat allies had a free hand in restructuring an economy which had been criticized by U.S. investors as marked by growing nationalist restrictions on the entry of U.S. commodities and investment. The solution proposed was a program of "export-oriented industrialization."

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Strategies for Industrialization

From the late 1940s to the early 1960s, the Philippines experienced what many economists now regard as the "golden age of manufacturing." The Philippine government instituted import and foreign exchange controls that discriminated against "non-essential" manufactured imports, spawning a vibrant consumer goods industry that filled the demand for scarce light-manufactured imports. Industrial growth averaged 12% annually between 1950 and 1957[2], but by the 1960s, growth based on "import substitution" was stagnating, due largely to the very limited size of the internal market. Export-oriented industrialization avoided this problem by divorcing industrial growth from expansion of domestic markets, gearing production to the markets of advanced industrial countries.

Export-oriented industrialization, however, turned out to be a euphemism for a policy of attracting multinational corporations to the country. "Incentives" included "export-processing zones" like the one set up in Mariveles, Bataan, where multinationals could set up shop without worrying about import and export taxes and enjoy tax holidays, accelerated depreciation on fixed assets, and subsidized infrastructure (i.e., low rent for land and water).

The main incentive, however, was cheap labor. The Bank advised the regime that "the comparative advantage of the Philippines lies in the utilization of skilled, low-wage labor" and proposed an approach of promoting "the growth of employment and investment through, among other things, wage restraint."[3] "Wage restraint" was achieved through banning strikes and any form of free labor organizing. After about a decade of labor repression, the Bank issued the following confidential assessment of a policy it had encouraged:

> . . . Marcos has kept tight control over the labor unions, which were restructured under martial law such that national-level, governmentally controlled organs in turn control the local unions in each industry. The emasculated unions deal primarily with minor issues, and martial law prohibits strikes in "vital industries" and politically motivated strikes in any industry.[4]

The "success" of wage repression is revealed by the statistics on workers' income: between 1972 and 1978, the wages of skilled workers declined by close to 25% and those of unskilled workers by over 30%.[5] Meanwhile, the productivity of labor rose by 13%. The sharp decline in wages coupled with the rise in productivity translated into a higher rate of profit for multinational firms.

A sharp decline in the real income of urban labor was not, however, the only negative effect of the World Bank-backed strategy. Since industrial production was directed away from satisfying the needs of the population and towards export markets in the United States, Japan, and Europe, the Philippines became very vulnerable to international trade conditions. When the ongoing international recession began in 1979, export markets began erecting protectionist barriers against the very products in which the World Bank and its sister agency, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), had encouraged the Philippines to specialize—"labor-intensive" light manufactured exports like handicraft, shoes, and garments. In two years alone, 1978-1980, the IMF identified at least 33 barriers erected against Philippine products in 10 key First World markets.[6]

The Current Crisis

Imports of oil, machinery, and food, however, continued to rise, resulting in a massive deficit of $3.3 billion in the country's current account (a figure which reflects mainly the difference between import expenses and export earnings) by 1983. To pay off the constantly growing current account deficit, the Marcos regime borrowed large sums from international private banks like Manufacturers Hanover and Chase Manhattan. As interest rates shot up, so did the country's total external debt, which, at $25 billion, was the sixth highest in the Third World.

The country was basically insolvent by 1983. The flight of capital following the assassination of former Senator Benigno Aquino in August aggravated this condition by reducing the country's dollar reserves to nearly zero. Not only did the regime have to suspend payments on the principal of its debts; it also had to severely restrict imports of industrial inputs, forcing the closing of scores of firms and mass layoffs. The current crisis is expected to add 300,000 workers to the 40% of the work force that is now unemployed or underemployed.

Most Filipinos bitterly regard this as a human-made tragedy on a massive scale, and many point the finger of blame at the suicidal policy of export-led growth promoted by the Bank and its technocrat allies within the Marcos regime.

World Bank advice wreaked havoc not only in the area of industrial and trade policy but also in agriculture. Over $1.5 billion in Bank money went to finance huge hydroelectric dams, irrigation dams, credit programs, and other "development" projects.

Many of these projects were carried out with considerable insensitivity. Thus a whole rural community was evicted from their lands to make way for a World Bank-Marcos showcase, the Pantabangan Dam in Central Luzon, which opened in February 1974. Only stubborn resistance on the part of over 100,000 Kalinga and Bontoc tribal people prevented them from suffering a similar fate when Marcos and the Bank tried to set up Chico River Dam complex in Northern Luzon. Mass demonstrations, civil disobedience and international protests followed the project's announcement in 1974; by 1976, the New People's Army turned the site into a battleground, and by 1979 the dam was cancelled.[7]

The Bank, through its credit programs, promoted mechanization and the indiscriminate spread of high-technology, chemical-intensive agriculture. The Marcos regime's Masagana 99 program, launched in 1973 with the support of the World Bank, tied easy credit to the use of high yielding rice seed varieties, fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides. The Bank's Third Rural Credit Project used 86% of its funds to finance purchases of tractors and other machinery[8], hardly "appropriate technology" for a country with a labor surplus.

But perhaps the main problem with the World Bank's rural program was that it was carried out with the narrow aim of "increasing productivity" and without attempting to alter the patterns of inequality in the control of land in the countryside. Thus, the benefits of increased productivity and production accrued almost wholly to the local landlords or to foreign agricultural corporations—contrary to the Bank's rhetoric of meeting the "basic needs" of the rural population. A Bank report on rural poverty released in 1980 admitted this confidentially:

> A substantial portion of agricultural growth was concentrated in activities known to have high commercial content, and one could therefore argue that the benefits from the high level of agricultural growth may not have reached substantial numbers of the poor.[9]

The Bank's statistics were eloquent: the number of rural families living below the poverty line increased from 48% in 1971 to 55% in 1975.[10] And according to the government itself, the income of rice farmers declined by an astonishing 53% between 1976 and 1979 alone.[11]



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Not surprisingly, the World Bank acquired a reputation worse than the CIA's among Filipinos, who had to bear the brunt of all the experiments in authoritarian development. The World Bank management was aware of its growing unpopularity. As a candid Bank internal assessment expressed it in 1980: ". . . the World Bank's imprimatur on the industrial program runs the risk of drawing criticism of the Bank as the servant of multinational corporations and particularly of U.S. economic imperialism."[12] Still, not even Marcos' rapid loss of legitimacy after the Aquino murder has convinced the Bank management to dissociate itself from the regime.

Currently, it is a key participant in a multibillion dollar effort to rescue Marcos from bankruptcy. Most Bank technocrats working on the Philippines, however, have become demoralized, disillusioned, and cynical after a decade of investment which has yielded economic devastation instead of prosperity. As one officer asserted as early as 1980, "It is no longer a question of development but of keeping the patient alive."[13]

The World Bank odyssey in the Philippines stands as an object lesson of the disastrous impact of development experiments foisted on people by an alliance of authoritarian rulers and technocrats. It demonstrates that, more than ever, democratic decision-making is a necessary condition for sound economic development. □


AMPO

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PENTAGON IN THE PACIFIC

Continued from p.13

The Reagan administration and the Marcos regime have just concluded a five-year agreement which promises the U.S. military "unhampered operations" in Subic and Clark in return for $900 million in military aid which will go toward repressing a fast-spreading revolutionary movement that the U.S. considers a major threat not only to one of its most faithful allies but also to the bases themselves. The Pentagon now considers the Philippines' bases its most important installations in the Pacific since their strategic location allows them both to serve as the logistical hub of aeronaval deployment in the Indian Ocean in the Southwest and to support operations in Japan and South Korea to the northeast.

Strategic "Thinking"

Aside from serving as launching pads for swift intervention against national liberation forces, the Pacific base system also performs multiple roles in the Pentagon's plans for strategic nuclear war. The strongpoint of the region's "nuclear defense" system is the island of Guam in the Marianas. A U.S. possession since 1898, Guam hosts 14 B-52 Strategic Air Command (SAC) bombers and functions as a forward station for nuclear-missile submarines.

These strategic delivery systems are currently being upgraded. B-52G bombers outfitted with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles will replace the older-model B-52Ds commencing in 1984. These medium-range missiles, called ALCM's, are designed to destroy anti-aircraft missile sites hundreds of miles away, allowing the B-52's to more easily reach their targets and drop their free-falling megaton bombs. Like the bomber force, the missile submarine force has been upgraded in recent years. Polaris and early Poseidon missiles are now being replaced with longer-range Poseidon C-3 or Trident systems. The Trident has a range of 4000 miles, allowing its deployment much closer to the U.S., in the Eastern Pacific. While the Navy has denied that Trident submarines will be based in Guam or the Western Pacific, it is likely that the island's Apra Harbor will serve as a port of call and repair facility for these missile carriers.

The Anti-Submarine Warfare Complex

Strategic delivery systems are only one component of the system of strategic warfare. Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) facilities are also vital, as are the "C3I" (command, control, communications, and intelligence) installations which constitute the "software" that makes the "hardware" supereffective. ASW and C3I facilities dot the Pacific.

The U.S. is well-equipped to wipe out Soviet ballistic missile submarines with its contingent of P3C ASW patrol planes operating from bases in Guam, Japan, the Philippines, Okinawa, Diego Garcia, and Singapore. Complementing the P3Cs are the 41 nuclear-powered "hunter-killer" submarines the U.S. maintains in the Pacific, which are especially geared to destroy Soviet missile submarines (SLBMs). Equipped with nuclear depth charges and torpedoes and the most advanced surveillance devices, the P3Cs and the killer submarines are directed toward their prey by sonar arrays (SOSUS) laid out on the ocean floor at strategic points throughout the Pacific.

American ASW capabilities are now so advanced that a first strike against the Soviet SLBM fleet is a tempting prospect. According to U.S. Navy sources, in 2000 patrols their SLBMs have not been detected by Soviet submarines, while all Soviet SLBM movements have been tracked by the U.S. According to William Claytor, Carter's Navy Secretary, "the qualitative edge that we hold over the Soviets in both equipment and personnel is awesome and our ability to orchestrate the many components of the U.S. anti-submarine warfare team into an effective killer force has enormously improved in recent years."[22]

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From the Pentagon's point of view, the principal value of the U.S. base system in the Pacific lies in its role in facilitating the projection of conventional or tactical nuclear power against national liberation movements or progressive states in Asia.

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Nuclear Software Installations

C3I facilities also play a key role in the "counterforce" or first-strike doctrine which now governs U.S. strategic planning. According to the noted Australian defense analyst Desmond Ball, U.S. C3I systems "are involved in much more than the simple deterrence of surprise attack. They are, for example, used for the identification and precise location of targets necessary for the planning of counterforce attacks, as well as for the continuous real-time monitoring of Soviet missile silos and bomber bases, command and control centers, etc., necessary for the counterforce exchanges in current U.S. strategic nuclear war-fighting doctrine."

Among the most important C3I facilities in the Pacific are the following:

• The VLF (Very Low Frequency) communications station for U.S. missile submarines in Northwest Cape, Australia, and the LF (Low Frequency) facilities providing "back-up" communications in Yosami, Japan, and San Miguel in the Philippines;

• TACAMO aircraft towing seven-kilomer-long antennae which serve as airborne VLF transmitters and provide "nuclear-survivable" communications to the U.S. SLBM's in the event of destruction of ground-based VLF facilities. TACAMOs have access to air bases in Guam, the Philippines, and Japan;

• SIGINT (Signals Intelligence or electronic spying) sensors operated by the Pentagon, the National Security Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency in Japan, Okinawa, Australia, Diego Garcia, Guam, and the Philippines;

• ASAT (Anti-Satellite) radar stations which track Soviet launches of satellites, especially of vehicles which might be directed against U.S. C3I satellites. Three of these stations, which make up the so-called "Pacific Barrier," are located in Guam, Kwajalein, and the Philippines. Another tracking station called GEODSS, which tracks satellites in deep-space orbits for early warning and communications, is said to be under construction in Taegu, South Korea.

The Pacific Missile Range

The U.S. also continues to use the Pacific for the development of new strategic weapons. Between 1946 and 1959, some 66 nuclear devices were detonated in the Marshall Islands—with tremendous negative consequences on the health of both people in the area and U.S. personnel who monitored the tests. Since then, Kwajalein and other sites in the archipelago have served as the "Pacific Missile Range"—that is, as an "impact area" for experimental missiles launched from Vandenburg Air Base in California. Nearly all the major Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), including the Zeus, Hercules, Titan, Sprint, and Nike missiles, have been tested there, as have multiple entry vehicles for nuclear warheads (MIRVs).

So valuable are the Marshalls and other parts of Micronesia to the current and future strategic weapons development and deployment plans of the Pentagon that the latter has attempted to devise all sorts of political arrangements—such as "free association"—which would grant nominal sovereignty to the Pacific peoples but reserve effective control over their territories for the U.S. military.

The Pentagon has done its best to militarize and force its plans on Europe. However, not only can the same be said for the Ocean of Peace, but it also may be likely that the Asia-Pacific region provides the most probable location for a confrontation between the two superpowers—a confrontation that would be not just disastrous for the peoples of this region, but catastrophic for all human beings on the planet.□

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book review

by Della D. NiHera

Two From the Antipsychiatry Movement:

The Politics of Schizophrenia; Psychiatric Oppression in the United States by David Hill, New York: University Press of America, 1983. $20.75

Dr. Caligari's Psychiatric Drugs (3rd Edition) by David Richman, eds. Leonard Roy Frank and Art Mandler, N.A.P.A., 2054 University Ave., Berkeley, CA 94704, 1984, $4.50

At the turn of the century Drs. Emile Kraepelin and Eugene Bleuler invented a language of psychopathology to label any behavior they considered undesirable. A strong critical tradition followed, which, though silenced in the media, text books, and most centers of formal education, continues to grow. A recent work arguing for the demise of psychopathological constructs in general and the schizophrenic label in particular is David Hill's *The Politics of Schizophrenia.*

Unlike his professional predecessors, Dr. Hill makes use of protest writings by the recipients of such labels. This humanizes his theories and helps readers connect with the experience of psychiatric survivors. He also includes a close examination of the early texts of Kraepelin and Bleuler, a brief history of the various psychiatric "treatments," and discussions of psychiatry's role in Nazi Germany's final solution, the relationship of racism and sexism to a labeler's choice of diagnoses, and the contemporary forces resistant to change.

Hill suggests that the concept of schizophrenia or "split mind" comes not from scientific research, but from a moralizing philosophy of social control. He shows how the eugenicists Kraepelin and Bleuler used a medicalized language to account for broken social rules and to rename acts of punishment medical treatment. Though techniques have changed in this century, the ideology has remained constant.

Not only the moralizing, social control ideology and the misplaced expertise disturb Hill about psychiatry, but also the profession's legal right to inflict damage on the individuals they label and to call this helpful. Using the language of statistics, this clinical psychologist shows the relationship between physiological problems and electroshock, psychosurgery and psychiatric drugs. Doctor-initiated disorders in the psychiatric arena alone now affect over 45 million people worldwide. Hill points out that this damage is a direct result of patients coming into contact with mental "health" professionals.

This is one of the more in-depth books available challenging how psychiatry organizes behaviors into disease categories. It familiarizes readers with the problems of naming and inventing diseases and professional responses to behaviors so organized. It also gives readers a glimpse into the thinking of the white, European men responsible for the medical language we use to name undesirable behavior or broken social norms.

David Hill goes further than his critical predecessors, but in many ways he does not go far enough. He proves that "mental illness" is a damaging label, both physiologically and socially, but continues to use the terms "mental health" system, "mental health" professional and "therapy" as synonymous with the potential alleviation of human suffering. Does not this usage accept the medical model? This politically-minded psychologist also seems to consider university-trained people-helpers who call themselves "radical" or "feminist" beyond criticism. This attitude is just what he is challenging in more traditional therapies. Most important, Hill fails to make connections with the politics of diagnoses in other branches of medicine. He appears to believe that only psychiatrists moralize and create harmful involuntary treatments. Still, the book is worth examining.

Like Hill, psychiatrist David Richman believes in the scientific, objective nature of medicine in general. His faith lapses when it comes to his specialty. Richman does not think labels of psychopathology are helpful to doctors or anyone else, nor does he use incarceration, electroshock or drugs in the name of health. His work includes warning people about contemporary psychiatric treatments. "It is tragic that the pressures of pharmaceutical companies, professors, peer groups, professional journals and the press make the overwhelming majority of 'mental health' professionals unwilling to recognize their own complicity in the destructive and brain-damaging practice of psychiatric drugging." He knows pills can be replaced with people and lives this knowledge.

Dr. Caligari's Psychiatric Drugs grew out of Richman's columns for *Madness Network News.* Art Mandler and Leonard Frank edited this work into a highly readable and informative booklet on the use of these potent chemicals, aimed at an audience of drug users, their concerned family and friends, and professionals. The organization publishing this work, Network Against Psychiatric Assault, is a self-help group composed mainly of former psychiatric inmates. (The group prefers this term to patient.) Their work includes education, political activity and peer support. The drug booklet attempts to combine the three.

Most of the booklet consists of sections on drug groups such as geriatric drugs, neuroleptics, lithium, sedative-hypnotics, and anti-depressants. These sections include general information about the drugs, their frequent, occasional and rare effects, and special precautions they require. Interspersed

Continued on p.33

Ms. NiHera is a survivor of psychiatric violence. Her work over the past decade has included the creation of alternatives to the medical model of health and disease and alternatives to psychiatric institutionalization.

book review

by Daniel Gordon

Reading on Artificial Intelligence:

Artificial Intelligence and Natural Man
by Margaret Boden, Basic Books, NY 1977

The Fifth Generation: Artificial Intelligence and Japan's Computer Challenge the World
by Edward A. Feigenbaum and Pamela McCorduck, Addison-Wesley, Reading MA 1979

Machines Who Think,
by Pamela McCorduck, W.H. Freeman, San Francisco, CA 1982

At campuses and research-for-hire shops scattered across the U.S. and around the world, they are trying to write programs that will make computers intelligent. The military and National Science Foundation are still picking up most of the tab, but in the past three years some overall, new companies have been trying to develop "intelligent systems" as commercial products. None of today's programs is even close to passing the classic Turing Test, in which a computer is judged intelligent if it can fool a human into confusing its terminal output with that of another human. But today there are computers that play master-level chess, diagnose limited classes of disease, and understand subsets of spoken English. The three books above, taken together and read critically, constitute a good introduction to artificial intelligence (AI) and its prospects.

The goal of *Artificial Intelligence and Natural Man* is to investigate what makes an AI program "smart" and to measure the ideas generated by computer work against those coming from the author's fields, psychology and philosophy. The result is an admirable book which, despite its ancient (1977) publication date, remains important today. Boden takes a hard look at the details of many AI programs, discussing what the given program "knows," how it "reasons" about what it knows, and what is deficient in the paradigm. She calmly sifts the facts about performance from the hyperbole (no easy taks in view of the persistent hype generated by AI researchers). An interesting detail—Boden uses female generic pronouns throughout the book.

Although Boden presupposes no knowledge of programming and writes with great clarity about how programs work, her book requires close reading. The effort is worthwhile; this book is a model of literate, careful popular writing about computer science.

Not so, the other selections. *Machines Who Think* is a sort of "official" history of AI. McCorduck is a great admirer of the the "artificial intelligentisia," and her book lacks critical distance. She is constantly interrupting her narrative to apologize for a brash remark or to fend off a critic. The value of the book likes in its rich stock of facts, stories, and, most importantly, interviews. While a vivid picture emerges of the bright, difficult, sometimes childish men and women who constitute the AI community, *Machines Who Think* ignores the many questions stemming from the relation of AI to the rest of computer research, to the computer industry as a whole, and to government and the military.

The military connection has been especially important to AI at least partly because no one else has been eager to finance an area with such a dearth of short-term results. The situtation is uncomfortable for many AI investigators; a typical remark is, "it's better that they're spending DOD money on our research than on something that would actually work."

Defense interest in AI lies in area of so-called C3I (command, control, communication, and, intelligence). The military wants a computer system, for example, that could automaticaly read through tons of raw intelligence data and select the pertinent items and relationships. The AI community promises them an "intelligence-analyst expert system" with a "natural-language front end" which do just that. Such a symbiosis is common in computer devel-

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opment as a whole, and it would be interesting to study the effects of military priorities on the course of AI research. *Machines Who Think* lacks to objectivity to undertake such an analysis.

The Fifth Generation has a section on the relation of AI to "national defense," and adds some recent history not covered by *Machines Who Think*. But its main value lies in its glimpse into the inner thinking of one trend within AI. The title of the book comes from the name of a long-range project organized by the fabled Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). The plan calls for producing "fifth generation" computers by the beginning of the 1990's (the current "generation" is the third). Fifth generation machines will be distinguished by their ease of use (one will be able to instruct them by means of human language and pictures) and their intelligence. Feigengbaum and McCorduck see the MITI initiative as a bold attempt by the Japanese to seize world leadership in computer technology, and their book, by turns threatening computer technology, and their book, by turns threatening, cajoling, Jeremiah-like, and rhapsodic, is designed to precipitate similar action in the U.S. It is fascinating and somewhat repellant.



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Feigenbaum is one of the founders of the "expert system" technology on which both he and the Japanese plan to base the fifth-generation machines. An expert system is a program composed of huge sets of rules together with a control system that builds the rules into chains of case and effect. MYCIN, an expert system for deciding on the proper antibiotics to treat infection, has rules relating observations and lab results to probable strains of bacteria, and other rules relating strains of bacteria to the most effective antibiotics. By soliciting information about a given case, MYCIN can use its rules to "decide" what bacterium is causing the infection, and what combination of drugs to use against it.

Although MYCIN has done quite well in several trials (about as well as residents in infectious disease), it is not yet used widely (one must be wary of the passages in *The Fifth Generation* implying that expert systems are in everyday use outside of the laboratory), and the mainstream of the computer industry, dominated by IBM, doubts that expert systems will soon be commercial products. The gist of Feigengbaum's and McCorduck's message is, "Look, the cunning Japanese have stolen the lead from us in automobiles, steel, consumer electronics, and probably even integrated circuits. They are now moving in on software and computer systems. If they think expert systems are the way to go, you can be sure it's true. We must move now if we are to stop them."

Despite their limitations, these books are imporant because their subject is imporant. AI and its related disciplines in computer science and other fields will continue to make progress in simulating human intelligence, and the spinoffs of the research will begin to have significant social implications. The human use of increasingly human computers demands neither Luddism nor uncritical zeal, but rather detailed knowledge, a careful program, and a long struggle. □

MENTAL HEALTH

Continued from p.31

throughout the text is testimony from drug users. The graphics include drug ads reproduced from professional journals. One, showing a woman in a small closed box, is captioned, "Help release her from anxiety. Then she can open up to you." The path to this opening is a drug.

The work also gives helpful hints on how to get off these drugs if users so choose, precautions to take if users choose to remain on the drugs, and how friends and family can be either supportive or harmful in their relationships with those choosing a drug-free existence. Included for general knowledge is a brief history of psychiatric drugs and definitions of terms which psychiatrists employ when guessing at dosages.

Unfortunately the booklet neglects the personal experiences of people who no longer use these chemicals even though they were told their survival depended on continued usage. More needs to be said on alternatives and how former users are surviving. This booklet ends too abruptly, but what it attempts to do it accomplishes. It answers questions and exposes what psychiatric science does not *for* but *to* the people. □

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The Buddha is Smiling, Nuclear Proliferation in Asia, Slideshow, Center for Development Policy, 418 Tenth Street, S.E. Washington, DC 20003, Rental $20, purchase $65.

U.S. Strategic Arms in the Pacific, booklet available for $1.25 from U.S. Nuclear Free Pacific Network, 942 Market St., Room 711, San Francisco, CA 94102.

The Pacific Ocean: Paradise or Nuclear Playground? brochure, available from Pacific Concerns Resource Center, PO Box 27692, Honolulu, HI 96827.

FOR ACTIVISTS

Towards a Nuclear Free Future, A Guide to Organizing a Local Nuclear Free Zone Campaign, 44-page guide, $5 ea. ($2.50 ea. for 10 or more). Also available is Nuclear Free Zone Information Packet, $3 ea. Mobilizaion for Survival, 853 Broadway, Room 2109, New York, NY 10003.

Information on Military-funded Research in American Universities is sought by Bruno Vitale, Professor of Physics at the University of Geneva, Switerland. Data on any project, whether weapons-related or not will contribute to his effort to monitor scientific support of militarism. Please forward information to: Bruno Vitale, 8 rue des Bugnons, CH 1217 Meyring, Switerland.

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LINKS, bimonthly newsletter. produced by the Central American Health Rights Network/East Coast. Individuals $10/year, Institution $25/year, Sustainer $40. Checks payable to Committee for Medical Aid to El Salvador—Links, to P.O. Box 407, Audubon Station, New York, NY 10032.

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

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

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