


**OCCASIONAL PAPERS/
REPRINTS SERIES
IN CONTEMPORARY
ASIAN STUDIES**

NUMBER 4 — 1984 (63)

**A NEW DIRECTION IN JAPANESE
DEFENSE POLICY: VIEWS FROM
THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC
PARTY DIET MEMBERS**

Steven Kent Vogel

**School of Law
UNIVERSITY
of
MARYLAND**



*Occasional Papers/Reprint Series
in Contemporary Asian Studies*

General Editor: Hungdah Chiu
Executive Editor: Mitchell A. Silk
Managing Editor: Shirley Lay

Editorial Advisory Board

Professor Robert A. Scalapino, University of California
at Berkeley
Professor Martin Wilbur, Columbia University
Professor Gaston J. Sigur, George Washington University
Professor Shao-chuan Leng, University of Virginia
Professor Lawrence W. Beer, Lafayette College
Professor James Hsiung, New York University
Dr. Lih-wu Han, Political Science Association of the
Republic of China
Professor J. S. Prybyla, The Pennsylvania State University
Professor Toshio Sawada, Sophia University, Japan
Professor Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, Center for International
Politics, University of Munich, Federal Republic of Germany
Professor Choon-ho Park, College of Law and East Asian Law of
the Sea Institute, Korea University, Republic of Korea

Published with the cooperation of the Maryland International Law Society
All contributions (in English only) and communications should be sent to
Professor Hungdah Chiu, University of Maryland School of Law,
500 West Baltimore Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21201 USA.

All publications in this series reflect only the views of the authors.
While the editor accepts responsibility for the selection of materials to be published,
the individual author is responsible for statements of facts and expressions of opinion
contained therein.

Subscription is US \$10.00 for 6 issues (regardless of the price of individual issues) in
the United States and Canada and \$12.00 for overseas. Check should be addressed to
OPRSCAS and sent to Professor Hungdah Chiu.

Price for single copy of this issue: US \$3.00

© 1984 by Occasional Papers/Reprint Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Inc.

ISSN 0730-0107
ISBN 0-942182-64-2

**A NEW DIRECTION IN JAPANESE DEFENSE POLICY:
VIEWS FROM THE LDP DIET MEMBERS**

*Steven Kent Vogel**

CONTENTS

Chapter	page
I. DEFENSE POLICY IN AN ERA OF TRANSITION..	1
The Postwar Consensus on Defense	1
The Transition to the New Debate: External Causes	4
The Transition to the New Debate: Internal Developments.....	8
The Nature of the New Debate	10
The LDP's New Role in Defense Policy-Making	10
II. THE SILENT OPPOSITION: THE LDP "DOVES" ...	14
Doves that are not Doves	17
Doves in Power	20
The Outspoken Doves.....	22
III. BEYOND INCREMENTALISM: THE LDP "HAWKS"	24
The Old Right	26
The New Right: The Seirankai and the Nakagawa Group	27
The Military Realists.....	31
Nakasone Yasuhiro and "Autonomous Defense"	34
IV. THE POLITICAL REALISTS AND THE NEW DIRECTION.....	37
Sakata Michita and the Defense Outline	37
The New Realist Elite.....	39
Political Realism in the LDP Factions	42
The New Direction in Defense	45
V. TOWARD A NEW CONSENSUS ON DEFENSE.....	48
VI. EPILOGUE	56
Appendix	
PROFILES OF PRESENT DIET MEMBERS	58
BIBLIOGRAPHY	61

* Staff writer, *The Japan Times*. The author offers many thanks to three great mentors, Kinjo Kunio, Nakajima Masaki, Mike Mochizuki, and all the good folks at the office of Ito Soichiro.

CHAPTER I*

DEFENSE POLICY IN AN ERA OF TRANSITION

Japanese defense policy is now experiencing a critical period of transition. In the 1970s, a combination of international developments and domestic political shifts transformed the postwar consensus into the present debate. This new debate is characterized by an extremely broad spectrum of views and no fundamental agreement on policy aims.

The creation of a new direction in Japanese defense policy follows, however, the collapse of the old consensus. That is, the incremental political decisions and bargaining that are now determining defense policy are gradually working towards a new consensus on goals. This new consensus may not be solidified for quite a few years, but there are already signs indicating a more assertive defense policy for Japan. This could very well be part of a general shift from dependence on the United States to a more autonomous foreign policy, a shift comparable to Japan's transition from submission to self-assertion in the first half of this century.

As will be argued later in this chapter, the principal actors guiding Japan toward a new direction will be the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Diet members. It is for this reason that this paper will focus on the attitudes of these Diet members in this analysis of the development of a new consensus on defense policy. In order to understand the present defense policy, however, we must first examine the original postwar consensus and the causes of the transition from that consensus to the new debate.

The Postwar Consensus on Defense

The Yoshida administration (1948-54), in cooperation with the U.S. government, adopted a basic defense policy which survived as a mainstream consensus for more than twenty years. This policy established Japanese control over internal security while depending primarily on the United States for protection from external threats.¹ The United States continued to keep military bases in Japan, but gradually decreased force strength as the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) slowly expanded. This policy was initially created through informal bilateral agreements, and was later formally articulated in the security treaties of 1951 and 1960.

Prime Minister Yoshida believed in strict limits on the role of the SDF. The most prominent force behind this position was the Peace Constitution, which was drafted at the end of World War II under the direction of the U.S. occupation command. Article Nine reads:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

Yoshida perceived a number of other constraints on the SDF. He felt that military expansion would be detrimental to economic growth, which was clearly Japan's top priority. He was also sensitive to the strong anti-military sentiments of the public. The Japanese people had personally experienced the dangers of Japanese militarism and the terrors of war, and thus emerged from the war vehemently opposed to rearmament. Furthermore, the opposition parties, and particularly the Socialists, strongly opposed rearmament. The Socialist's position in favor of "unarmed neutrality" strongly appealed to the people. Prime Minister Yoshida, however, tried to steer support away from the Socialists by adopting strict limits on the SDF for his own policy. Finally, Yoshida was very concerned with relations within Asia. He felt that any sign of Japanese rearmament would excite an extreme reaction from Japan's neighbors, particularly those which had so recently fallen victim to Japanese militarism.

John W. Dower summarized Yoshida's reservations in this way:

He continued to argue that the Japanese economy, even under the war boom, could not stand the strain of massive rearmament; the populace, and especially the "tender sex," would not tolerate it; and a good part of the world would be appalled at the sudden spectacle.²

Underlying Yoshida's philosophy, however, was a basic assumption that became an essential element in the postwar consensus: that there was no immediate threat of Communist attack.³

* All names in the text and footnotes are given in the Japanese order, surname first.

1. Martin E. Weinstein, *Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-1968*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1971, pp. 41-42.

2. John W. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979, p. 387.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 388-91.

Given the overwhelming constraints against any significant rearmament, the only viable alternative to the Yoshida strategy was unarmed neutrality, a policy strongly supported by the Socialists. Yoshida did not feel that this option would ensure Japanese security in the future and thus actively sought an agreement with the United States.⁴ This agreement nullified hopes for unarmed neutrality because any U.S. military presence in Japan rendered neutrality impossible. The constraints against rearmament on the one hand, and the American military presence on the other, strictly confined the alternatives for Japan's defense policy. This political stalemate was incorporated into the Yoshida strategy, and was not seriously threatened until the 1970s.

The consensus was further characterized by non-confrontation on the issue of defense. Confronted with strong opposition from political minorities on both the left and the right, the LDP politicians carefully avoided any statement on policy that would meet with resistance from those forces. In this way, the LDP gradually turned defense into a non-issue. They were only foiled once, in 1960, when massive protests threatened the new U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.⁵

The limits inherent in the Yoshida strategy gained the strength of a national consensus because they appealed to the anti-military sentiments of the time, and because it had a clearly articulated rationale. The backbone of this rationale was found in the Peace Constitution, but it was later reinforced by the popular acceptance of the notion of "exclusive defense" (*senshu boei*). This notion incorporates the following established limits on rearmament: (1) there will be no overseas dispatch of troops; (2) there will be no export of arms from Japan; and (3) there will be no manufacture, possession, or introduction of nuclear weapons.⁶ The assumptions of the Peace Constitution and exclusive defense provided the foundation for a national consensus which reigned until the 1970s.

The Transition to the New Debate: External Causes

A gradual process involving a number of international and domestic developments shaded the transition from the postwar consen-

4. *Ibid.*, p. 371; and Weinstein, *supra* note 1, pp. 16-17.

5. Concerning the Yoshida consensus, see Dower, *supra* note 2; Weinstein, *supra* note 1; and Martin E. Weinstein, "The Evolution of Japan's Self-Defense Forces," in James H. Buck, ed., *The Modern Japanese Military System*, Sage Research Progress Series on War, Revolution, and Peacekeeping, Vol. V, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1975.

6. These so-called "three non-nuclear principles" were originally articulated by Prime Minister Sato in December, 1967.

sus to the new debate. However, two simultaneous shifts in the international power balance provided the most fundamental force behind this transition: (1) the rise of Japan as an economic power, and (2) the decline of the United States as a military power.

Japan's new economic prosperity became increasingly apparent in the 1970s. While high growth had continued since the early fifties, Japanese growth only made its impact on the international market in the 1970s. Japan began to export vast quantities of manufactured products, and proved stronger than other industrialized nations in the face of the oil crises. This prosperity stimulated a reconsideration of Japan's role in the world. Critics began to argue that Japan should take more responsibility for its own national security, and decrease dependence on the United States. Furthermore, many felt that Japan should take on a more active role in international politics in general, a role more appropriate for an economic giant.

The 1970s also brought on a perception of American weakness, particularly relative to the Soviet Union. The Vietnam War was a vivid display of inept leadership and lack of U.S. military strength. Moreover, the Soviet military build-up over the 1970s brought doubts about the strength of the almighty American nuclear deterrent. The perception of weakness was enhanced by the relative American economic decline, as manifested in trade deficits with Japan and the demise of the dollar gold standard with the "Nixon Shock" of October, 1971. Skepticism of U.S. capabilities was coupled with increasing doubts about U.S. willingness to protect Japan. The soybean embargo provided a glaring example of American lack of good faith which increased Japanese distrust. The "Nixon Doctrine," calling for more autonomous defense for U.S. allies in Asia, also served to reinforce doubts concerning U.S. intent.

Japanese strength and American weakness posed a new challenge for the postwar consensus. These two transformations were reinforced by a number of international developments. The four most significant of these will be analyzed below: (1) the Okinawa reversion; (2) Chinese recognition of the SDF; (3) the Soviet build-up in the Asia; and (4) U.S. pressure for rearmament.

The bilateral agreement on the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese rule was finalized on June 17, 1971, and reversion was completed in 1972, with very little domestic resistance. Nevertheless, this change implied a stronger role for Japanese defense forces. First, Japan was left to help defend Okinawa. Second, the American withdrawal signified a partial "Japanization" of defense. Furthermore, the reversion signified the retreat of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, be-

cause the Japanese non-nuclear principles dictate that nuclear weapons may not be introduced on Japanese soil.⁷

The reversion spurred the pro-defense forces into action. The right wing of the LDP, and the forces for constitutional revision in particular, became significantly more vocal at this time, and even the more moderate Diet members spoke out for increased self-reliance. The strongest spokesman for this cause was Director-General of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) Nakasone Yasuhiro (1970-71) who developed the concept of "autonomous defense" (*jishu boei*) for Japan.⁸

The Okinawa reversion helped to bring the defense issue to the forefront, yet the "hawks" were still isolated politically and the opposition was strong. This strength was exhibited as the opposition parties combined with the LDP "doves" to force postponement of the official beginning of the Fourth Defense Build-up Plan by one year, from FY 1972 to 1973.⁹ Later developments, however, served well to take some steam out of the opposition parties' cause.

President Nixon's 1972 visit to China paved the way for a Sino-American detente which eventually led to the establishment of Sino-American and Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. Furthermore, with the coming of this new detente, the Chinese expressed support of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), hoping that they would contribute to increased military stability in Asia.¹⁰ There was no similar announcement from the ASEAN nations, but it was clear that Japan's neighbors felt less uneasy about Japanese rearmament than they had immediately after the war.¹¹

These developments spelled political disaster for the Socialist Party and unarmed neutrality. The Socialist platform stood for disarmament as an essential step toward better relations with China and Southeast Asia. Thus a Sino-Japanese detente engineered by the LDP, coupled with an effective Chinese rejection of unarmed neutrality, was a solid blow against the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP). This was similarly a defeat for the LDP doves, many of whom were known to be pro-China. Thus Sino-Japanese detente

7. Otake Hideo, "Detanto kara gunkaku e" (30 part series), *Asahi Journal* (12 June 1981—29 October 1982), hereafter referred to as "Otake series." Concerning Okinawa reversion: part 2 (26 June 1981), pp. 32-36.

8. Otake series, part 4, *Asahi Journal* (3 July 1981), pp. 28-32.

9. Otake series, part 8, *Asahi Journal* (7 August 1981), pp. 28-32.

10. Michael Pillsbury, "A Japanese Card?," *Foreign Policy*, No. 33 (Winter 1978-79), p. 16.

11. Otake series, part 15, *Asahi Journal* (13 November 1981), p. 39.

was a strike against the opposition, but it was the Soviet build-up and the American pressure which gave the pro-defense cause its broad base of support.

The Japanese have historically turned deaf ears on the American notion of the "Soviet threat," but events in the late 1970s dealt to the Japanese a bit of political realism. First, Soviet nuclear expansion forced them to question the strength of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Second, in 1976, an undetected MiG-25 aircraft crashed in Hakodate, exposing the weakness of the Japanese early warning system. Third, in 1978, 75,000 Soviet ground troops were relocated in the Northern Islands (just north of Hokkaido). During this period, the Soviets deployed the "Minsk" aircraft carrier, the amphibious vessel "Ivan-Rogov," and the "Backfire" bomber in Asia. Finally, in October, 1979, the U.S. government announced the deployment of SS-20s in the Asian theater.

These events had a decisive effect on defense policy. Japanese defense had found a concrete goal: meeting the Soviet threat. Defense goals transformed from "fundamental preparedness" to defense against a specific threat. This made defense planning a far more precise art, with concrete and directed contingency plans. Academics and certain hawkish experts took on a "military realist" perspective, insisting that the level of defense should be set relative to the military threat faced by the nation. The Soviet Union forced the general public to think about this new threat, but many still believed that the Soviet Union lacked the will to attack. Public consciousness had been aroused, but it was the U.S. pressure which brought widespread support to the defense cause.

Although the United States helped create the Peace Constitution, only shortly after its signing the American government desired greater Japanese defense efforts. However, even though such figures as General MacArthur and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles expressed such sentiments in the 1950s, the first formal request was not made until January, 1980, when Defense Secretary Harold Brown visited Prime Minister Ohira in Tokyo.¹² His appeal was backed by a chorus of "jawboning" from U.S. congressmen who resented the Japanese "free ride" on defense. An implied linkage with the trade issue augmented this pressure.

This pressure had an enormous effect on Japanese attitudes, for the Japanese were acutely aware of their military and economic de-

12. Research Institute for Peace and Security, *Asian Security, 1981*, Tokyo: Research Institute for Peace and Security, 1981, p. 152.

pendence on the United States. U.S. pressure swayed public attitudes and directly led to two important shifts in allegiance. First, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), which had been anti-defense on the basis of keeping stable relations in Asia, changed its stance in favor of a greater sharing of the defense burden with the United States.¹³ Second, the trade linkage shifted the support of the business community strongly toward compliance with the American requests.¹⁴ These shifts were crucial in the transition toward the new debate because for the first time since the war there were broad private interests in favor of a defense build-up. The U.S. pressure also changed the nature of the debate, inaugurating a new rhetoric of "burden sharing" and "cooperation with the Western alliance," which was far more effective as a popular appeal than any previous bids for greater defense efforts.

The Transition to the New Debate: Internal Developments

The above external factors were the most important causes of the transition, yet internal political developments also contributed to the creation of the new debate. A handful of shrewd LDP leaders played a crucial part in making the defense debate public, in raising "defense consciousness," and in creating an atmosphere in which a defense build-up could meet with popular acceptance. The first leader to perceive the need for changing attitudes was Prime Minister Sato (1964-72), who surprised many by speaking out frankly on defense. As early as December, 1968, he declared:

The people must unite in the spirit of defending our own country and in thinking in terms of a more realistic policy. Only then can we come closer to the goals of raising our international status and securing Asian stability. . . .¹⁵

Nakasone, in turn, was the first to use the office of Director-General of the JDA as a means of influencing public views. He developed a theory of "autonomous defense," claiming that Japan needed to transform from a "pacifist nation" (*heiwa kokka*) into a "normal nation" (*tsujo kokka*). He appealed to the people, insisting that his goal was no more than a reasonable non-nuclear defense structure modeled after the NATO countries. Finally, Nakasone tried to gather public support with the publication of the first De-

13. Otake series, part 26, *Asahi Journal* (15 October 1982), pp. 30-35.

14. Otake series, part 27, *Asahi Journal* (22 October 1982), pp. 34-39.

15. Quoted in Otake Series, part 3, *Asahi Journal* (26 June 1981), p. 33.

fense White Paper on October 20, 1970.¹⁶

The critical shift in popular views, however, came under Director-General Sakata Michita with Diet approval of the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) on October 29, 1976. The outline sketched the guidelines for a major defense build-up, yet it met with surprisingly little public resistance. The Outline was successful because it did not specify a time period in which the goals had to be reached, and it was accompanied with clearly established limits on military expansion. The Outline limited the SDF role to repelling "a limited and small-scale attack," and a November 5 Cabinet agreement set a limit on defense spending of one percent of GNP. Furthermore, the Outline was designed as a limit as well as a goal, not to be exceeded once it was realized. These limits made the Outline an extremely elusive target for opposition party criticism, and helped it appeal to the general public.

The Outline was also successful because it was developed by Sakata Michita, a well-respected party politician, under the relatively dovish Miki administration. Sakata raised defense consciousness without appearing as a hawk. In order to popularize the issue, he set up a "committee on defense problems" to educate the public; he finalized the creation of the National Security Council (*kokubo kaigi*); he laid the foundations for a Diet committee on defense; and he initiated the annual publication of White Papers. Sakata also broke the taboo of joint operations with U.S. forces, establishing a bilateral committee with Defense Secretary Schlesinger in August, 1975.¹⁷

Defense emerged from the Sakata era as a national issue, with the goals of the Outline accepted by a large portion of the population. Sakata's successors could do no better than to follow his lead in creating popular support and acceptance of a defense build-up.

The Fukuda administration continued to cultivate popular support under Director-General Kanemaru Shin (1977-78). Kanemaru tried to weaken the opposition's case by carefully avoiding any militaristic statements, while subtly sabotaging the opposition's argument. He thus made a concerted effort to ridicule the argument that the F-15s should be "fixed" so that they could not execute missions overseas. He also introduced taboo notions such as "threat" and "deterrence" into the everyday rhetoric of the defense debate.¹⁸ Prime Minister Fukuda himself took a stab at the nuclear allergy,

16. Otake series, part 4, *Asahi Journal* (3 July 1981), pp. 28-32.

17. Otake series, part 12, *Asahi Journal* (11 September 1981), pp. 33-37.

18. Otake series, part 15, *Asahi Journal* (13 November 1981), pp. 35-39.

declaring that defensive nuclear weapons and biological warfare are not contrary to the Constitution.

The appeal for the "understanding of the people" continued under Prime Ministers Ohira and Suzuki, and continues today under Prime Minister Nakasone. In fact, it is likely that such famous "bloopers" as Ohira's mention of the U.S.-Japan "alliance," and Nakasone's reference to Japan's defense force as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" may have merely been ways of breaking down the popular defense taboo.

The Nature of the New Debate

Fundamentally, the transition to the new debate was simply a move from an era of consensus to the present era in which Yoshida's limits against rearmament are questioned seriously. The Yoshida strategy, previously most seriously challenged by the Socialists' call for disarmament, is now challenged by a cry for rearmament. In addition to this central shift, there have been several subordinate developments. First, a debate over the SDF's constitutionality has turned into a debate over the SDF's military capability. In other words, the SDF has become accepted and the new debate focuses on its force level. Second, the Japanese now perceive Japan as part of the Western alliance. While they used to concentrate solely on the possibility of direct attack, they are now beginning to assess the indirect threat: the threat to the West as a whole. Finally, the assumptions of "small-Japanism" (*sho nihon shugi*) have come under fire. That is, officials now question whether Japan should not play a larger role in the international political scene. Another major change has been in the scope of the debate. The previous non-issue has now emerged as an open debate, boasting a vast range of views, all articulated and argued publicly.

The transition to the new debate was most clearly reflected in two fundamental changes in the LDP position on defense. First, the LDP gradually shifted toward a more assertive defense policy. The following chapters will analyze in detail this change. Second, the LDP took on a larger role in the defense policy-making process. The second shift suggests that the LDP will take the lead in guiding Japan toward a new direction in defense.

The LDP's New Role in Defense Policy-Making

With the transition away from the Yoshida consensus, LDP Diet Members have taken on a far more active role on defense issues. As defense became less of a public taboo, it also became less of

a political taboo. Traditionally, any association with defense has been equated with lost votes, and this belief seemed to be confirmed as a number of old hawks, including the "Defense Tribe" leader of the sixties, Hoshino Zenshiro, lost their Diet seats. LDP Diet members have therefore cleverly avoided taking any stand. But now, with the popular taboo gone, Diet members feel free to express their views. In fact, because it is still not a major election issue, Diet Members are more frank in stating their personal views on defense than on most other political issues. Most Diet Members today actually feel it necessary to have some sort of position on defense, because constituent interest is so clearly on the rise. Many Diet Members who previously were silent on the issue are now becoming more interested, and are forming a broad support system for pro-defense interests.

Furthermore, the number of Diet Members knowledgeable about defense issues has increased greatly. Many junior Diet Members are taking an active role on defense issues, and a small group of experts has emerged that can speak on even the most technical defense issues: most notably Shiina Motoo and Arima Motoharu. At the same time, the post of Director-General has produced an impressive corps of more senior LDP defense experts including Nakasone Yasuhiro, Sakata Michita, Mihara Asao, and Kanemaru Shin.

Increased LDP involvement on defense issues has led directly into an increase of LDP influence on defense. In fact, by the time the new debate took its full force at the beginning of the 1980s, the LDP had established itself as the dominant force in defense policy-making. This change became clear as LDP influence grew relative to several other forces, namely: (1) the opposition parties, (2) the bureaucracy, and (3) the forces of public opinion, the media, and industry.

The LDP has always been in a leading role relative to the opposition parties. During the period of postwar consensus, however, the opposition parties acted as a powerful constraint against any move toward a more assertive policy. Since then, as discussed earlier in this chapter, Chinese support for the SDF and the limits established by the Outline greatly weakened their cause.

The opposition parties experienced other problems in the 1970s. Popular support for dovish views declined, and the opposition parties failed to come up with appealing counter-arguments for the LDP's new assertive stance. Finally, fragmentation plagued the opposition. While the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) stood fast to its doctrine of unarmed neutrality, both the Democratic Socialist Party

(DSP) and the Komeito Party began to change their anti-military views. The DSP recognized the Self-Defense Forces and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1975, and in 1981 went so far as to call for a revision of the Outline. And in December, 1981, the Komeito approved both the SDF and the Treaty, formally announcing changes in their foreign and defense policies.¹⁹

The LDP has also taken on a stronger role relative to the bureaucracy. There has always been an implicit division of labor between the party and the bureaucracy. The JDA controls specific allocations and planning and has joint control over the budget with the Ministry of Finance (MOF), while the party sets broad policy trends and has the power of budget review. Throughout the era of consensus, this left almost no role for the LDP because they automatically approved all budgets and they initiated no changes in basic policy. However, as the new debate emerged, the LDP took on a different role by setting new trends for defense. Professor Otake Hideo of Tohoku University argues that this is consistent with a party tradition of taking the lead on ideological or controversial issues.²⁰

The weakness of the JDA relative to other agencies and ministries best explains, however, party dominance over the bureaucracy on defense issues. The postwar political structure put strict limits on the power of military officials, and anti-military sentiments have kept them in a subordinate role. Due to its lack of political clout, the JDA has consistently appealed to Diet members for support, and this has served all the more to bring the party into a role of leadership on the fundamentals of defense policy. JDA officials have rarely suggested changes in policy aims, and the one notable official who did speak out, Joint Chief-of-Staff Kurisu, was promptly dismissed in July, 1978.

The most striking change in the LDP role, however, was in the budget process. Until 1980, the Diet basically played the part of the "rubber stamp," quickly passing the defense budget. Incremental budget politics in Japan dictate that the crucial figure for the budget is percentage increase over the previous year, and usually all budget items increase at a comparable rate.²¹ Defense generally has risen at

19. Otake series, part 8, *Asahi Journal* (7 August 1981), pp. 28-32; part 28, *Asahi Journal* (29 October 1982), pp. 38-43.

20. Otake Hideo, *The Politics of Defense Spending in Conservative Japan*, Ithica: Cornell University Peace Studies Program, 1982, pp. 3-4.

21. See John C. Campbell, *Contemporary Japanese Budget Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1977.

a rate of 1-2 percent less than the budget as a whole, maintaining a 15-20 percent growth rate through the 1970s, which was enough to satisfy defense interests. Budget increases, however, took a sharp dip in 1980 as the Japanese government tried to turn the tide on a long history of budget deficits. The Ministry of Finance (MOF) began to set ceilings for general budget increase and for each ministry as well. This fiscal constraint suddenly made it necessary to fight for defense spending increases, and the growing number of LDP hawks were ready for this confrontation.

For the FY 1980 budget, the "Defense Tribe" (*boeizoku*) initiated a strong lobbying effort late in the "budget revival" (*fukkatsu sessho*) negotiations in December, 1979. They primarily operated out of the three LDP defense committees: the Investigative Committee on National Security (*anzen hosho iinkai*), the National Defense Committee (*kokubo buikai*), and the Special Committee on Military Bases (*kichi taisaku tokubetsu iinkai*). They lobbied prominent government leaders as well as the Ministry of Finance. Their lobbying only resulted in a moderate 6.5 percent increase, but the effort was significant because it solidified a strong hawk coalition in the LDP which has continued to grow in influence since 1980. Their strength was most vividly manifested in the "budget revival" for FY 1982, when intensive lobbying efforts actually projected the budget increase over the MOF designated 7.5 percent ceiling for defense increases to a 7.754 percent figure.²²

These efforts are significant, first, because for the first time in Japanese postwar history, defense is a top priority item in the budget. Second, the LDP has gained considerable influence in budget-making, an area traditionally dominated by the bureaucracy. LDP influence has further increased relative to both the opposition parties and the bureaucracy through strategic use of its cabinet power. Since the 1970s, both Prime Ministers and Directors-General of the JDA have played an active role in shaping policy trends. Directors-General Nakasone, Sakata, and Kanemaru have all publicly encouraged a shift in defense attitudes, and such appeals have also been made by each Prime Minister since Sato Eisaku. The Prime Minister with the greatest impact on defense policy, however, is likely to be Nakasone Yasuhiro.

Finally, the LDP has taken on a more dominant role relative to private sector forces. Clearly in some cases LDP Diet members sim-

22. Concerning the 1982 defense budget battle: "Tosshutsu e no michi" (31 part series), *Asahi Shimibun* (16 February-27 March 1982).

ply mirror the forces of public opinion, the media, and industry. At the same time, however, the party influences these forces in turn. Given this interrelationship, it is extremely difficult to prove which is the leading force. Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that the LDP has gradually gained control over private sector forces. In the era of the old consensus, the LDP was severely constrained by these forces, fearing that any discussion of defense could elicit a negative public reaction. In the 1970s, however, the LDP began to control and manipulate public views on defense. To this end Sakata, Kanemaru, and others embarked on their missions of "consciousness raising." Their efforts were extremely successful in raising awareness, and surely contributed in pushing public support of the SDF up from 73 percent in 1972, to 85 percent in 1978.²³ Similarly, *zaikai* (business) statements concerning defense seemed to mirror LDP statements, with only a 2-3 year time lag to show the difference.²⁴

This new debate, a debate dominated by the LDP, indicates that defense policy is apt to move away from the Yoshida strategy. Although there is a wide spectrum of views in the LDP today, clear shifts in policy positions hint at the new direction. The relative influence of the various positions has been redistributed, individuals have changed stances, and new representatives have entered the Diet with more assertive viewpoints than those whom they replaced. For the purposes of this paper, the spectrum of LDP views roughly have been divided into three groups: the "doves," the "hawks," and the "political realists." The following chapters will analyze each of these groups as a means toward understanding the new direction in Japanese defense policy.

CHAPTER II

THE SILENT OPPOSITION: THE LDP "DOVES"

LDP "dovishness" is not easily defined. Dove ideology is an integral part of the postwar Japanese political tradition. The ideology emerged after World War II as a set of common assumptions and has rarely been clearly articulated or debated since, although it was to a large extent an integral part of the Yoshida strategy. In the present debate, the dove viewpoint is fundamentally that of maintaining the status quo. There is virtually no support for disarmament in the LDP, so the dove position is merely one of limiting

further rearmament. The ideology behind this position, however, is extremely complex.

The LDP doves emphasize economic growth above all else. This priority was set in the Yoshida era, and was further developed under the "economic rationalism" of Prime Minister Ishibashi Tanzan (1956-57), a well-known prewar liberal. The fundamental concept of this view is that any militarization would directly threaten the economic prosperity of Japan, both in terms of budget financing and in terms of maintaining good trade relations.

At the present, the doves' sensitivity to the financial constraints on military expansion most clearly manifests economic rationalism. Doves consistently side with the Ministry of Finance in its battles with the JDA, fearing that the defense budget will push out other programs. This was particularly evident in 1972 when the doves joined forces with the opposition parties and the Ministry of Finance to postpone the Fourth Defense Build-up Plan.

Most doves prescribe to the notion of "small Japanism" (*sho nihonshugi*). They have little ambition for their country in terms of military or political power, and they feel that Japan should refrain from expanding its international commitments. Much of this sentiment stems from a reaction against the mistakes of prewar Japanese imperialism. Critics claim that such thinking displays a typically Japanese naivete, which assumes that Japan can afford to look inward without taking a more assertive role in international relations.¹

Doves have a strong faith in the power of peaceful diplomacy. They are acutely aware of the fact that Japanese prosperity depends on world peace and free trade, because of the overwhelming need for imports of raw materials. Many also argue that peace is more of an imperative for Japan because of its vulnerability to nuclear annihilation. The best way to pursue peaceful foreign relations is to follow a three-part foreign policy designed to avoid war: (1) maintain close relations with the United States; (2) avoid confrontation with the communist powers; and (3) emphasize economic cooperation, particularly with ASEAN, in order to achieve harmony with the developing nations. This stance favors appeasement when necessary, rating the avoidance of war as the top priority in foreign policy. As Kitakawa Ishimatsu (House of Representatives) put it: "Diplomacy means creating an atmosphere where arms are unnecessary."²

23. Nishihira Shigeki, "Senso hoki, jieitai," *Jiyu* (September 1980), p. 95.

24. This point is argued by Otake Hideo, *supra* note 20.

1. For a discussion of "Small Japanism", see Ishida Hakuei, "Sho nihonshugi ni kaere," *Chuo Koron*, July, 1982.

2. Shinsei Kurabu, *Nihon no sentaku*, Tokyo: Shinsei kurabu, 1982, p. 66.

Doves characteristically deny that there is a Soviet threat to Japan. While they recognize Soviet military capabilities, they contend that the Soviet Union would never have the will to attack Japan. They do not feel that the Soviet Union has any real imperialistic ambitions, and they argue that the U.S. nuclear umbrella provides a more than adequate deterrent against Soviet attack.

In denying any specific threat, the doves challenge military realism and the corresponding notion of "necessary defense strength." Instead, they contend that Japan only needs "fundamental defense strength" (*kiban teki boeiryoku*). The 1957 "Basic Guidelines for Defense Preparedness" and the 1976 National Defense Program Outline propounded this view. It differs significantly from the military realist view in that it asserts that defense needs are basically static, and do not need to be constantly revised in order to compensate for improvements in enemy forces.

Perhaps the most important element of the dove ideology is a deep-seated fear of militarism. This grows out of the Japanese experience in World War II and has strong roots in public opinion as well. Doves are afraid that the Japanese military is still ruled by prewar military structure, which could be very dangerous if unleashed. The Japanese still doubt the government's ability to control these forces. Yoshida's grandson Aso Taro (HR) discussed this:

In America, the antithesis of democracy is communism. In Japan, the antithesis of democracy is militarism. Democracy came here suddenly, along with the Americans. We didn't get democracy by our own hands. . . . Most Japanese still doubt whether politicians are strong enough — or wise enough — to control the military. This is something which is rarely talked about in public, but clearly exists in the Japanese subconscious. This is why the Japanese [politicians] try to control military expansion.³

Doves are not only suspicious of military leaders, but also are wary of the weapons themselves. They have never accepted the American notion of deterrence because throughout Japanese history the production of arms has been followed closely by their use in war. Another element in Japanese anti-militarism is a concern over the reaction by Japan's neighbors. Most of East Asia experienced the scourge of World War II Japanese militarism, doves argue, and they would therefore react vehemently against any sign of Japanese rearmament.

3. Interview with Aso Taro (HR), Tokyo, Japan, 23 July 1982.

The dove ideology, particularly anti-militarism, is applied to policy through a firm belief in the established constraints against rearmament. They support the Peace Constitution and all of the various principles underlying "exclusive defense." They are also extremely sensitive to any negative reaction from the public or the media, and they often use this as an argument when they plea for moderation in defense expansion.

Finally, most LDP doves are supporters of global disarmament. The issue is considered to be a problem *sui generis* to the superpowers and basically unrelated to Japanese defense. It is therefore an issue which can be used to appease the anti-nuclear and disarmament interests without expending any domestic political capital. It is clearly more an issue of rhetoric than of policy.

The dove view is still prominent as a political ideology, yet it is not an active force in defense policy-making. To some extent this is because the dove ideology was an assumption of the Yoshida consensus which rarely warranted debate. Despite wide acceptance, it remains today as an ideology without an active or identifiable political support group. LDP doves are rarely interested in defense issues, and they are certainly busier pushing for other items, such as welfare spending, than they are fighting against defense at the time of the crucial budget decisions. After forty years of unthreatened peace, the zeal that the anti-military cause had immediately after the war has gradually faded into complacency.

The doves' political decline, however, has made its most dramatic transformations in the past ten years. The shift in the political atmosphere in the 1970s had a striking influence on the doves. Some doves were forced to conform to the times by the nature of their positions, some doves were ignored, and many simply gave up the cause.

Doves That Are Not Doves

Many Japanese politicians, notably Prime Minister Nakasone, are known as "weathervanes" because their views flow along with the political winds of the time. Such is the case with many LDP doves who refrain from confrontation with the growing forces for defense expansion. A variety of explanations for their inactivity remain.

For a majority of the LDP doves, defense is simply not a priority issue. They have limited political capital at budget time, and they are generally more concerned with other areas. This reflects both the Diet members' preferences and their assessments of what is impor-

tant to the constituents. Although defense is no longer "taboo," it is clearly not a major issue at election time.

Furthermore, many have confidence in the checks and balances of the Japanese political system. They do not feel that the push for assertive defense will get out of hand. Sakamoto Misoji (HR) argued that although "hawks" dominate the party committees and the committee resolutions call for significant rearmament, any significant move toward rearmament will be squelched as it moves through the party hierarchy and onto the Diet floor. While the one percent limit may be reached, he insisted, any more rapid change would meet widespread opposition, and less active doves like himself would begin to speak out. In the meantime, he sees no such need. Hashiguchi Takashi (HR) echoed this view:

If they said, "Let's raise defense spending to three percent of GNP," we would oppose them. But now they are not saying anything so extreme. They're just talking about going a little bit over one percent. This is a very delicate problem, and not something we need to make a great fuss about.⁴

For others, compliance with the present defense increase is a more conscious decision. The most critical force behind this decision was the increase in American pressure for rearmament. All LDP Diet members realize the extent of Japanese dependence on the United States, and are particularly sensitive to U.S. pressure because of the linkage with the trade issue. The U.S.-Japan relationship is the backbone of LDP foreign policy, and thus it is difficult for LDP Diet members to fight the American viewpoint with vigor.

Many dovish Diet members have consciously decided to appease the Americans because they believe it is the only way to avert full-scale militarization. They see a spending increase to one or two percent of GNP as a necessary evil in order to keep good relations with the United States, and as the only alternative to an increase to five or six percent for independent defense. As Kato Koichi (HR) put it:

If the U.S. Congress decided not to extend the treaty, at that very moment Japan would start to become a military power. This much is certain. Therefore, in order to keep this treaty, we have to make efforts toward reasonable "burden-sharing . . ." We must increase defense spending to the extent necessary to keep the U.S.-Japan Security

4. Interview with Hashiguchi Takashi (HR), Tokyo, Japan, 29 July 1982.

Treaty in effect and to maintain trust between the United States and Japan.⁵

For one reason or another, the majority of LDP doves have conceded to a certain amount of defense expansion. Some analysts argue that the reason this shift came so easily is because most LDP Diet members never had firm anti-military views. LDP dovishness was largely just a reflection of the rhetoric of the Yoshida consensus. Ishibashi Masashi (HR) of the Japan Socialist Party argues that the LDP Diet members never renounced prewar militarism and the LDP dovishness is all just empty electioneering.⁶ Utsunomiya Tokuma (House of Councillors), an independent and former LDP representative, is far less kind in his analysis. He claims that most LDP Diet members just do what they are told, and thus the move from dovishness to defense expansion was a natural result of the American requests:

They just do whatever America says because they figure that increasing defense a little bit will keep up relations with America. . . They're pigs, mindless pigs. They just squeal a lot and take whatever they're fed.⁷

The contradictions inherent in the position of these "migratory" doves is most apparent in the disarmament community. There are ninety-two LDP Diet members in the International Disarmament Federation, and not one of them is vocal at the time of defense budget decisions. One of the most ardent supporters of disarmament, Hashiguchi Takashi, explains that disarmament does not apply to Japan:

I support international disarmament. I believe that disarmament should be international, and I am a member of the International Disarmament Federation. But I'm not talking about domestic disarmament. The global alliances, starting with America and the Soviet Union, are over-competing in an endless arms race. I want them to cut down. But at present, there is no need for disarmament in Japan. . . . Japan needs to have enough military power to protect itself.⁸

In fact, Hashiguchi himself is a proponent of independent defense for Japan: "If possible, Japan should become able to defend itself,

5. Interview with Kato Koichi (HR), Tokyo, Japan, 10 August 1982.

6. Interview with Ishibashi Masashi (HR), Tokyo, Japan, 12 August 1982.

7. Interview with Utsunomiya Tokuma (HC), Tokyo, Japan, 4 August 1982.

8. Interview with Hashiguchi Takashi (HR), Tokyo, Japan, 29 July 1982.

without having to depend on the United States.”⁹

What appeared to be a solid base of LDP doves in the 1960s has suddenly disappeared with the political tide. This change profoundly affected even the most powerful of the LDP doves.

Doves in Power

Japanese state ministers are the shrewdest of political “weathervanes.” They cannot betray extreme opinions if they are to stay in power. Their foremost talent must be gauging the political climate and manipulating it if they can.

Most of the political elite in Japan defy the simply dove/hawk distinction. Despite occasional ambiguities, however, Miki Takeo and Ohira Masayoshi played a role as the foremost doves of the seventies. Both concentrated on economic matters, were wary of defense spending, and generally prescribed to the economic rationalism of the postwar consensus. These two faction leaders were instrumental in constraining defense in the early seventies. It was primarily their efforts, with the backing of their factions, which enabled the opposition parties to force postponement of the Fourth Defense Build-up Plan from 1972 to 1973.¹⁰

As Prime Ministers, however, they were forced to compromise their positions and were unable to constrain defense expansion. In fact, Japanese defense took its most significant steps forward under their administrations. Miki’s “limits,” for example, in effect only paved the way for popular acceptance of military expansion under the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO).

Ohira remained extremely cautious with the defense budget even as Prime Minister, yet he compromised his dove position considerably in other ways. Under pressure from the right, he approved of a law officializing the Emperor’s calendar (*genko hosei*). Although this was merely a symbolic move, it was nonetheless a concession to the right. Ohira also introduced the notion of “comprehensive security” to replace his previous foreign policy motto of “economic diplomacy.” He was not hesitant to include Japanese contribution to the defense forces of the West as a central element in his program: “Complete defense preparedness is the foundation of the comprehensive security strategy.”¹¹ At times, in fact, Ohira seemed to have lost his dovish ways altogether:

9. Hashiguchi, *ibid.*, 29 July 1982.

10. Otake series, part 8, *Asahi Journal* (7 August 1981), p. 29.

11. As quoted in Otake series, part 22, *Asahi Journal* (17 September 1982), p. 90.

We must recognize the Soviet military expansion in the Far East, and as well as strengthening our reconnaissance capabilities, we must have as much deterrent force as possible.¹²

Ohira died in office and Miki is in semi-retirement, yet these two leaders are extremely important in that their factions remain the last vestiges of dovishness in the LDP. Their successors as factional leaders, Suzuki Zenko and Komoto Toshio, were both even more dovish than their predecessors, yet each soon found his position compromised as well.

Suzuki took over the faction and the premiership when Ohira passed away in July, 1980. As a whole-hearted dove following in the tradition of Yoshida Shigeru, he had fought hard against the Fourth Defense Build-up Plan, and he was a strong advocate of global disarmament. With the exception of his speech on disarmament at the United Nations, however, Suzuki was unable to articulate his dovish inclinations as Prime Minister. As in other policy areas, he was extremely vulnerable to factional pressure from either Fukuda or Tanaka. He cooperated openly in the campaign for public defense consciousness, and he was responsible for the controversial joint communique with President Reagan, in which he pledged “even greater efforts” on defense.

Komoto Toshio, who replaced Miki as faction leader, boasted a long history of support for “economic rationalism” and growth-oriented politics, with no past support for defense at all. Even Komoto, however, was influenced by the U.S. pressure coupled with trade linkage. On two separate occasions in December, 1981, he spoke out on defense budget increases, citing trade friction and a lack of trust in U.S.-Japan bilateral relations as the rationale for his altered position.¹³

The Komoto faction is the most staunchly dovish faction, yet even views within this faction are beginning to shift. Significantly, the last two Directors-General of the JDA, Ito Soichiro and Tanikawa Kazuo, were both chosen from the Komoto faction. The Director-General post, as Ito explained, is one which cannot help but leave its mark on a politician. Representatives traditionally graduate from their term as Director-General and soon take on the new task of representing defense interests in the Diet. Ito is proving to be no exception. Although he had no previous stance on defense, as Director-General he quickly became regarded as a hawk by his

12. As quoted in Otake series, part 23, *Asahi Journal* (24 September 1982), p. 38.

13. “Tosshutsu e no michi,” part 19, *Asahi Shimbun*, 9 March 1982, p. 2.

factional colleagues. He will surely be more active in defense as he steps down, and if he has his way, he may become a prominent force in driving the faction toward a more assertive defense position.¹⁴

The most ardent of the LDP doves to reach power in the 1970s was Sonoda Sunao (HR), who was Foreign Minister under Ohira. As a young Dietman, he voted against the 1951 Security Treaty, and was so critical of defense policies that some accused him of siding with the communists.¹⁵ He disputes the notion of the Soviet threat and believes that Japanese foreign policy should stress peaceful diplomacy with China, the United States, and the Soviet Union. He is a strong advocate of detente and global disarmament. As Foreign Minister, Sonoda continued to oppose military expansion, and was actually quite successful in suppressing anti-Soviet views in the Ministry.¹⁶ However, in late 1979, the combination of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and increased U.S. pressure on defense caused a shift in the policies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ohira administration. Sonoda was thus isolated in his continued emphasis on detente, and his political influence sharply declined. In later administrations, as Welfare Minister and once again as Foreign Minister, he continued to oppose defense spending, yet his pleas were no longer heard. Sonoda's strong stand on defense effectively took him out of the most powerful political elite, and ruined his one-time chances as a possible candidate for Prime Minister.

The Outspoken Doves

The political tide of the transition era swept away many of the old doves, but that is not to say that a few idealists do not remain. As members of the LDP, their views are not so extreme as to condemn the SDF, but they have held their ground, staunchly opposing any further military expansion. The most persistent of these doves are two of the most senior Dietmen, Akagi Munenori (HR) and Ishida Hakuei (HR). Both of them have experience as Ministers of State dating back to the 1950s, and were prominent party leaders earlier in their careers.

Akagi, who was Director-General of the JDA at the time of the signing of the Security Treaty (1960), has traditionally carried the banner of the dovish extreme of the LDP. As chairman of the Japa-

14. Interview with Ito Soichiro, Tokyo, Japan, 17 July 1982.

15. Otake series, part 23, *Asahi Shimbun* (24 September 1982), p. 41.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

nese-Soviet Friendship Association, he has repeatedly criticized government policy concerning the Soviet Union:

The LDP mainstream does not view the Soviet Union with an open mind. I am more flexible. Popular sentiments are also a factor, but the reason that attitudes are so bitter is because the LDP has a history of making the Soviet Union into the enemy; and saying that we don't like the Soviet Union and that they are a hateful nation. And on top of this, the Americans bad-mouth the Soviets, and sure enough it looks like we'll be at war any day. I disagree with this.¹⁷

He feels that the United States too often imposes defense policy on Japan. To a large extent, he believes that this is a result of a misinterpretation of the Security Treaty:

The central military aim of the treaty revision was to send some of the American forces home. The other major point was for Japan to increase economic cooperation. Japan would be protected by the Security Treaty. No one had any intention of creating any "military alliance."¹⁸

The most articulate LDP spokesman for the anti-military cause is Ishida Hakuei. A one-time faction leader and Prime Minister hopeful, Ishida was for many years a powerful force in the party. Ishida's article "Kokusai teki sekinin o hatasu michi" [The way to fulfill Japan's international role] reads like a proclamation of the dove ideology. He questions the likelihood of Soviet attack and the existence of any threat to the sea lanes around Japan. He doubts the strength of civilian control, and he fears the resurgence of militarism. Furthermore, he is particularly wary of blindly following the United States. He argues that the U.S. pressure is badly intentioned, being designed to increase American arms imports and eventually to weaken the flow of Japanese commodity exports to the United States. He also disputes the "free ride" argument, insisting that the Security Treaty framework has involved sacrifices for Japan as well.

Ishida agrees that Japan must take on a larger responsibility in the international sphere, but he feels that there are a number of ways to go about this. He proposes that Japan boost aid to the developing nations of East Asia, increase economic interdependence with the Soviet Union, and strive toward delinkage of trade and defense in

17. "Jieitai wa 'senshu boei rain' o fumikoeta" (panel discussion), *Asahi Journal*, 10 September 1982, p. 26.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 23.

relations with the United States. The military alternative, Ishida claims, would be disastrous:

If Japan were to try to realize its international role through an increase of military expenditures, in the long run this would not only mean a weakening of the Japanese economy, a tightening of the political structure, and heightened tension in East Asia. It would also destroy any chance for a peaceful means of taking a role in the international political arena.¹⁹

Thus only a few outspoken old men are willing to fight for the anti-military cause in the LDP. Although Akagi and Ishida have been influential in the LDP in the past, their day has passed. Their dovish views show that they have missed the boat on the political shifts of the seventies. Their views, which used to be part of the conservative mainstream, have been pushed aside as extreme and out-of-date. The other extreme, the hawks, are now gaining the attention of the realist mainstream.

CHAPTER III BEYOND INCREMENTALISM: THE LDP "HAWKS"

For many Japanese, any politician who is concerned with defense, and certainly anyone who supports defense expansion, is a "hawk." By this definition, the present mainstream LDP Diet members are all hawks. In this chapter, however, hawks are defined as a much more limited group: those who advocate rearmament to the point where Japan takes on a significantly larger role in the international order. There are a number of characteristics which distinguish this viewpoint from that of the "political realists."

While the realists recognize the Soviet threat, only the hawks argue that this is a threat of crisis proportions, warranting immediate military preparation by Japan. They claim that the Soviet Union preys on weakness, and that only the fear of military response will deter Soviet aggression. In many ways, the hawk view echoes American Cold War ideology, insisting that it is only through military buildup on the part of the entire Western alliance that the present international "crisis" can be overcome.

In assessing both the threat and the necessary response, the

19. Ishida Hakuei, "Kokusaiteki sekinin o hatasu michi," *Sekai*, no. 438 (May 1982): p. 70. His views are also stated in Ishida Hakuei, "sho nihonshugi ni kaere," *Chuo koron* (July 1982).

hawks rely almost exclusively on military calculations. As "military realists," they equate military capabilities with intentions, and discount political considerations. They believe that Japanese defense forces should not be aimed at a given level of preparedness, but should be designed to meet a very specific military threat: that posed by the Soviet forces in Asia.

Hawks believe that Japan should strive toward an independent foreign and military policy. They argue that any self-respecting nation must be able to defend itself. They appeal to nationalist instincts in the people, insisting that Japan must "catch up" with the rest of the world militarily. They also feel that increased military power might gain them more respect in international politics. Aso Taro (HR) described this sentiment:

They are trying to constrain our economic expansion. They are treating us badly because we don't have enough military power. Many Japanese think: "If only we had more military power, we wouldn't be pushed around so by the Americans and the Europeans."¹

Although it is often hidden, a fundamental distrust of the United States motivates the hawk perspective. The hawks are concerned about the need for independent defense only because they do not trust U.S. military protection. Kato Koichi (HR) explained that there are two completely different mentalities behind the present push for defense expansion. If politicians would only answer frankly, Kato explained, it would require but one question to distinguish the two groups: "In the event of an attack on Japan, do you trust the United States to come to the rescue?"²

In terms of policy, the hawks advocate a build-up at a rate well above the present incremental expansion. They propose a restructuring of forces so as to better meet the military threat posed by the Soviet Union. They oppose most of the established constraints against rearmament, first, because they hamper military policy, and second, because they claim that there is no realistic possibility of Japan ever becoming a great military power.

Although the ideological distinction between hawks and realists is clear, in practice it is much more difficult to distinguish the two. This is particularly difficult because many ideological hawks in the Diet compromise their positions in the name of political expediency. Given the fact that the hawk view is still not acceptable to the con-

1. Interview with Aso Taro (HR), Tokyo, Japan, 23 July 1982.

2. Interview with Kato Koichi (HR), Tokyo, Japan, 10 August 1982.

servative mainstream, the hawks are left with two choices for the present: (1) they can stay their ground as extremists — a path taken by the Old Rightists, and Nakagawa Group, and the military realists — or (2) they can play along with the realists in order to keep power within the mainstream. The latter was the choice of the most powerful of the hawks, Prime Minister Nakasone.

The Old Right

The ideology of the Old Right has not been a popular political viewpoint due to its clear association with prewar militarism, but its appeal to traditional values has carried weight in the hearts of the Japanese. Vocal representatives of the Old Right have always been on the periphery of postwar politics. They have been isolated from the political mainstream, and their numbers in the Diet have continued to dwindle. Their ideology, however, permeates the philosophies of some of the most prominent LDP leaders, such as Tanaka Kakuei (HR) and Fukuda Takeo (HR), and they still have an articulate spokesman in the Diet in the person of Genda Minoru (HC), who was one of the main strategists in the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Genda's ideology has a close link to the prewar machismo of Japan's militaristic era. He glorifies stoicism and self-denial, while harshly criticizing the weakness and selfishness of postwar Japan. He is particularly critical of Japan's dependence on the United States, and he insists that it is high time that Japan grew up:

For thirty odd years since the war, Japan has posed as America's adopted child. If we keep up our childish ways — requiring the blood of others [Americans] while refusing to spill a drop of our own blood, we will end up as the orphan of the world. Now we must stop being such a spoiled child and make a fresh start as a grown boy.³

Genda is also vehemently anti-communist. He idealizes the independence and the freedom of the West, and sharply contrasts this with the "slavery" and "subordination" of the communist system. He insists that the Soviets are imperialists by nature:

The Soviet Union — well of course I hate communism. But the Russian people don't want to conquer the world. It's the Communist Party that does.⁴

3. Genda Minoru, *Zaichu shoki o shiru*, Tokyo: Zembonsha, 1978, p. 33, as quoted in Otake Hideo, "Jiminto ni okeru boeiron," *Hogaku semina*, Tokyo: Nitto hyoronsha, 1981, pp. 86.

4. Interview with Genda Minoru (HC), Tokyo, Japan, 2 August 1982.

Military strength, he argues, is the only way to prevent this tendency toward aggression:

If they detect any weakness in the enemy, they will attack. But they won't if they might lose. If they think they can win, they'll attack regardless of treaties or anything else.⁵

His attitude toward the Soviet Union is very much that of a military thinker. He follows "worst-case" analysis of the Soviet threat, and concludes that Japan must be prepared for all military contingencies.⁶

His ideology leads Genda to a fundamental disagreement with almost all of the present constraints on the military. He disputes the very notion of "exclusive defense." He insists that oil routes to Japan must be militarily protected and therefore the ban on overseas dispatch of troops must be removed. He even debates the three non-nuclear principles, particularly that which prohibits the introduction of U.S. nuclear submarines into Japanese ports.

Genda claims that the most important factor in military capabilities is the state of technology, and he feels that only an end to the arms export ban can give the domestic industry the needed incentive to innovate. The export ban, he argues, prevents market forces from operating in Japan:

You have to have a market for weapons. For other things too, there is no technological progress without a market. . . . Japan doesn't have a market, so we don't get anywhere.⁷

Regarding the constitution as well, Genda's viewpoint is refreshingly clear:

We have got to get rid of it — the present Constitution. If we don't fix that much, we'll really be stuck!⁸

The New Right: The Seirankai and the Nakagawa Group

Ideologically, the New Right is not much of a departure from the Old Right. There is no similar linkage to the prewar era, yet both groups share many of the traditional Japanese values. In fact,

5. Genda interview, *ibid.*, 2 August 1982.

6. Genda's ideology is discussed in detail in Otake Hideo, "Jiminto ni okeru boeiron," *Hogaku semina*, Tokyo: Nitto hyoronsha, 1981, pp. 85-88.

7. Genda interview, 2 August 1982.

8. Genda interview, *supra* note 4, 2 August 1982.

at times the Seirankai appears to be more reactionary than the Old Right. Morishita Motoharu (HR), for example, proclaimed:

The new Constitution emphasizes individual rights and denies the value of the state as a living thing. Just as individuals have rights, the state should have its own life as a collective of individuals. That is the national polity (*kokutai*), and in order to protect individual safety, the people must in turn protect the national polity. . . . And the symbol of the nation is the continuation of the imperial system and the existence of Shinto.⁹

The Old Right and the New Right, however, are completely independent political movements. The Old Right holds the prewar military perspective, while the New Right represents a new postwar "romanticism."

In July, 1973, thirty-one junior Diet members joined forces in a political alliance which they termed the "Seirankai." Led by such figures as Nakagawa Ichiro (HR) and Ishihara Shintaro (HR), the Seirankai stressed four policy areas: foreign policy, defense, public order, and education. They emphasized spiritual issues and public awareness, particularly in their attack on communism. The Seirankai provided the beginnings of a new alliance, the "Nakagawa Group," the most recent new faction to enter the LDP. The Group has the potential to be extremely influential on defense issues, for it is the first faction to claim a unified stance on defense.

The Nakagawa Group is typically "hawkish" in its analysis of the Soviet threat. Ishihara Shintaro, the Group's foremost spokesman on defense, asserts that the Soviet Union has gained the upper hand in the military balance, and that this warrants prompt action on the part of the Western alliance. Within this context, he argues that it is imperative that Japan take action in order to secure its own defense. In his article "Boei taisei no hasso tenkan o" [Toward a new conception of the defense structure], Ishihara attacks the naivete of the Defense Outline.¹⁰ As a document written in an era of detente, it is not at all appropriate for the drastically altered international situation of today. Furthermore, he adds, there is no logic in the assertion that Outline levels of defense appropriations would al-

9. Morishita Motoharu, in *Seirankai kara no chokugen*, Tokyo: Roman, 1974, p. 25, as quoted in Otake Hideo, "Detanto kara gunshuku e," part 9, *Asahi Journal*, 14 August 81, p. 52.

10. Ishihara Shintaro, "Boei taisei no hasso tenkan o," in Imai Hisao, ed., *Myonichi ni idomu kodo shudan*, Tokyo: Keizai oraisha, 1981, pp. 93-110.

low for the defense of Japan against a "limited small-scale attack," whatever such an attack might entail.

He insists that it will be necessary to go considerably beyond the Outline levels before Japan acquires the defense capabilities it needs. He ridicules the present JDA emphasis on tanks and ground strength, arguing that the most important task of the SDF should be to protect the coastline by air and sea. He also favors Japanese defense of the sea lanes of the North Pacific, as requested by the United States.

The most telling point of his argument, however, is that he questions American protection of Japan. Under the present Outline, he insists:

In an emergency, we have no way of predicting what kind of help we can expect from America, and without even a vague notion of this, U.S.-Japan cooperation on defense is just a bunch of talk.¹¹

This implies that in Ishihara's view, military expansion is more than a mere sharing of international responsibility. It is a step toward a security structure which he feels will be more reliable than the present U.S.-Japan security system.

The Group's belief in a more independent Japan is reflected in their strong support for Constitutional revision. For them, the most distasteful aspect of the present Constitution is the mere fact that it was imposed on Japan by the Americans. Mori Kiyoshi (HR), the Diet's most vocal critic of the present constitution, proclaimed his reasons for advocating an "independent constitution":

An independent constitution means one that is established through proper channels by the will of the people. For any nation to be truly independent, it must have an independent constitution. A nation that has a constitution given by another country is at best only half-independent. We believe that an independent constitution must be established.¹²

The most problematic aspect of the present constitution, Mori asserts, is Article Nine's restriction of defense. He does not feel that it is at all clear that Article Nine allows for the existence of the SDF, and therefore, he argues, revision is imperative. Furthermore, he

11. *Ibid.*, pp. 99-100.

12. Mori Kiyoshi, "Kempo," in Imai Hisao, ed., *Myonichi ni idomu kodo shudan*, Tokyo: Keizai oraisha, 1981, pp. 130-31.

feels that the Constitution would be a major impediment to defense activity were there ever to be an attack on Japan.

It is unclear whether or not they advocate an end to the U.S.-Japan military alliance, but the Nakagawa Group clearly envisions a larger international role for Japan. Nakagawa himself likens this role to that of a Vice-President. As the number two economic power in the world, Nakagawa argues, Japan will have to spend much more on defense if it is to retain its spot:

If Japan, which has made it all the way to the Vice-Presidency of this corporation called the Free World, keeps thinking only of itself — even though this corporation is being threatened — it will be thrown out of its position as Vice-President. I'm not sure how, but it will be thrown out.¹³

The NATO allies might be a bit surprised to hear that Nakagawa has declared Japan as the new Vice-President of the Western alliance, but it is clear that other members of the faction agree that Japan should take on a leadership role. In another essay, Nakao Eiichi (HR) claims that Japan is already extremely influential due to its economic strength, and it needs a more assertive foreign policy to both enhance and better guide this influence.¹⁴ As the first principle for foreign policy, Nakao states:

1. Our country's safety and prosperity depend on world peace and stability. Therefore, we must stand at the head of the nations of the world, and take a leading role in maintaining a world peace and stability based on justice and fairness.¹⁵

Nakao goes even further in his fifth principle. He seems to imply that Japan should replace the United States as a worldwide protector of freedom:

5. We must hold to and protect the principle of the freedom and dignity of man. We must recognize that the realization of this principle is the main task toward achieving permanent peace for mankind, and we must promote friendship with those nations that share this principle, and in cooperation with them, we must promote this principle

13. Imai Hisao, ed., *Myonichi ni idomu kodo shudan*, Tokyo: Keizai oraisha, 1981, p. 32.

14. Nakao Eiichi, "Heiwa gaiko no gensoku," in Imai Hisao, ed., *Myonichi ni idomu kodo shudan*, Tokyo: Keizai oraisha, 1981, pp. 75-92.

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 83-84.

worldwide. Toward this end, we must cooperate with and support those societies, and their governments and organizations, which are based on freedom and democracy.¹⁶

If Nakao's statement speaks for the entire faction, which it appears to do as it was printed in a Group publication, the Nakagawa vision seems to go far beyond military expansion. Although their policy stances are more realistic, it seems that the Nakagawa Group's real long-term goal for Japan is a return to power in the world.

Nakagawa's surprising suicide in January, 1983, has brought the future of the Group into question. Ishihara has now taken charge, and his strong position on defense could imply an even more extreme stance for the Group. However, Ishihara lacks both Nakagawa's popular appeal, and his close connections with other leaders such as Fukuda; thus the loss can only signify a decrease in power for the Group. Nevertheless, the Group remains an important new force in the defense debate, and its appeal to nationalism and traditional values is likely to gain increasing support.

The Military Realists

Military realism is a new phenomenon in postwar Japan. Throughout the period of consensus, the SDF's role was designed primarily as a symbolic effort to appease the United States. Its force strength was based less on any actual military purpose than it was on achieving a certain minimum force level. Any military strategy that did exist was exclusive to the JDA, and was certainly not the subject of political debate. As discussed in Chapter I, this all changed due to the two key shifts in the international arena: (1) Soviet expansion prompted a new public assessment of the military threat to Japan; and (2) American pressure forced Japanese leaders to understand the American perspective on the Soviet threat. Military realism, to a great extent, is simply the Japanese version of present American Cold War thinking.

The foremost headquarters for military realists today is the Center for Strategic Studies of Japan (CSSJ), a research center established by former JDA Director-General Kanemaru Shin. Aside from directors Kanemaru and Minowa Noboru (HR), the Center is staffed by a large group of military experts, mostly former officers. Many claim that this gives the Center a military perspective closely resembling that of the Defense Agency. In the Center's treatise, *Ko*

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 85-86.

sureba nihon wa mamoreru [This is how to defend Japan], they explicitly call for a shift toward military thinking.¹⁷ They claim that postwar defense has lacked any strategy at all:

Japanese defense has never had a military strategy. This is a reflection of the government's defense posture, which has basically been to leave everything up to America. Defense preparation has been no more than a gesture to the United States.¹⁸

They argue that the concept of "fundamental defense," which was most recently articulated in the Outline, helps to incorporate this lack of military thinking into the present defense policy. They criticize this entire system of thinking about defense, citing four basic weaknesses. First, fundamental defense determines necessary force levels without any regard to the international balance of power. Defense policy, by definition, must react to the world military situation. Second, present defense stresses only force level, whereas any real defense policy must stress also popular support for the armed forces. Third, the notion of fundamental defense was created in an era of detente, and does not take into consideration the present level of international tension. Last, fundamental defense lacks any military goal. It is not at all clear what a "limited small-scale attack" is or what defense against such an attack should entail.¹⁹

Aside from the lack of strategy, the problem that the Center stresses most is the lack of popular consciousness. They feel that the Japanese people are deluded in their belief that Japan is militarily secure, and they feel that one of their largest aims is to publicize the nature of the Soviet threat.

This is How to Defend Japan is, as Minowa describes it, a "guidebook to the Soviet threat."²⁰ The Diet members in the Center follow in the hawk tradition of an extremely grim assessment of this threat. In fact, they compare the present-day Soviet threat to that of Hitler's Germany:

The present international situation is reminiscent of the nightmare of World War II. In 1938, Prime Minister Chamberlain made an agreement with Hitler at Munich convincing Hitler that England and France would not in-

17. Kanemaru Shin and Minowa Noboru, ed., *Ko sureba nihon wa mamoreru*, Tokyo: Nihon senryaku kenkyu senta, 1981.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 109.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 111-12.

20. *Ibid.*, p. v.

tervene, and eventually leading to the Second World War. The present day reaction against Soviet intervention shows a conviction not to let this happen again. The situation in Poland and the Middle East crisis are by no means far removed events, but represent a crisis for the democratic nations, including Japan. To what extent are the Japanese people really aware of this?²¹

The book certainly attempts to increase this awareness. The Soviet threat to the whole Western alliance, and to Japan in particular, is described in intricate detail.

They clearly envision a far more independent role for Japanese defense. In particular, they stress that Japan needs to take responsibility for sea lane defenses. In February, 1981, they submitted a concrete proposal to the administration and to the LDP leadership.²² They recommended significant restructuring of the SDF, emphasizing air force and naval appropriations well above the 1981 Mid-Range Plan and Outline levels. They called for an annual increase in defense spending of 0.1-0.3 percent of GNP, reaching 2.5 percent by 1986. Their proposal represents the most clearly stated proposal from the hawk perspective, and bears a striking resemblance to the more optimistic American proposals. This proposal is already playing a key role in adding to public awareness, and provides a compelling alternative to the uncertainty of the present policy.

The long-term defense goals of the Center are unclear. The Center's leaders argue for increased autonomy, but they still operate under the assumptions of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Nevertheless, they make it clear that the United States could easily move out of the region in the event of a crisis in the Middle East. In this sense, although they do not reject the notion of the alliance, they assert that Japan needs enough power to be able to hold its own in the Pacific.

There are a small number of military realists in the Diet not affiliated with the Center, who also seem to envision "autonomous defense" for Japan. One of the most prominent of these Diet hawks is Arima Motoharu (HR). He feels that Japan depends too heavily on America:

Many people think that because we have the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, we can forever count on the goodwill of the Americans to protect us. It is clear from the statements of officials on both sides that there is only a limited sphere

21. *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

22. *Ibid.*, pp. 445-71. The entire proposal is reprinted here.

in which cooperative defense operates, and that we, for example, have to protect the safety of our own ships. The Americans might protect them out of goodwill, but this is no more than goodwill. Ours is a dependent defense structure because we have to depend on this [goodwill].²³

Arima believes that this arrangement is not enough to ensure the continued security of Japan, although for the time being it is the only viable alternative. Eventually, however, Japan will have to move toward independent defense:

We think that Japan must defend itself. However, because this is impossible at this time, we are operating under the cooperative defense structure of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.²⁴

Arima's perspective on the Constitution is similarly realistic. For the present, Japan must work within the limits of a liberal interpretation of the Constitution. In the end, however, Article Nine will have to be revised. Shiina Motoo (HR), one of the most knowledgeable defense experts in the Diet, echoed this sentiment. Article Nine sounds nice and it makes for useful rhetoric, he argued, but the problem is that if it stays around long enough, people might start to believe it.²⁵

In the past few years, the emergence of the military realists has played a major role in pushing Japan toward a more independent defense structure. The single most important figure in the defense debate today, however, is the same man who originated the notion of "autonomous defense," Nakasone Yasuhiro.

Nakasone Yasuhiro and "Autonomous Defense"

Prime Minister Nakasone is the political "weathervane" that he is made out to be. His political viewpoint has become equally moderate and unclear in his ascent to the top.

Immediately after the war, he directed a rightist youth group, "Seiunjuku," and even as a young Dietman in the days of Prime Minister Hatoyama (1954-56), he was a strong proponent of Constitutional revision and rearmament.²⁶ This sentiment stemmed pri-

23. Arima Motoharu, *Boei senryaku no tenkan o*, Tokyo: Sankei, 1982, pp. 84-85.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 276.

25. Interview with Shiina Motoo, Tokyo, Japan, 20 July 1982.

26. Otake Hideo, "Jiminto ni okeru boeiron," *Hogaku semina*, Tokyo: Nitto hyoronsha, 1981, p. 92.

marily from a deep-seated resentment of American treatment of Japan:

Japan was left spiritually and physically handicapped due to American misgovernment. The claim to a national defense that would not be manipulated by the United States — the claim for any defense of the motherland in the real sense — was denied.²⁷

Nakasone later explained his feelings at the time:

I was disgusted with those politicians who had made the war, with the outsiders, and with the Communists, and I felt a real anger over the oppression of the Tokyo Trials, the violence of the occupation forces, and the humiliation of the Japanese people.²⁸

Nakasone's perspective had moderated considerably by the time he became Director-General of the JDA in 1970. He was more sensitive to public opinion, and fast becoming the hero of the "new conservative class." Nevertheless, Nakasone proved to be the most hawkish Director-General in JDA history. As Director-General, he popularized the notion of "autonomous defense," but the theory had already begun to take its form the year before. In September, 1969, he shocked his audience with the following statement:

By the time Okinawa is reverted to home rule around 1975, we should discard the Security Treaty, and build a new foundation for U.S.-Japan friendship.²⁹

Nakasone left it unclear as to whether or not he advocated an eventual end to any military alliance with the United States, but it was evident that he sought a stronger position for Japan:

We need to create an independent security policy for Japan, and rid ourselves of the impression that we are just a part of U.S. strategy for the Far East.³⁰

Nakasone kept his long-term goals to himself, but in a March, 1970 speech, he made it clear what "autonomous defense" meant for short-term policy: (1) increased Japanese control of military bases in Japan; (2) higher arms production capacity; and (3) significantly

27. Nakasone Yasuhiro, *Nihon no shucho*, Tokyo: Keizai oraisha, 1956, p. 7, as quoted in Otake series, part 4, *Asahi Journal* (3 July 1981), p. 30.

28. Nakasone Yasuhiro, "Gijido no arashi no naka kara," *Bungei shunju*, April 1965, p. 126, as quoted in Otake series, part 4, *Asahi Journal* (3 July 1981), p. 30.

29. As quoted in Otake series, part 3, *Asahi Journal* (26 June 1981), p. 34.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

larger naval and air force appropriations.³¹

From 1971 to 1982, Nakasone was relatively quiet on defense issues. The popular view was not that he had lost his hawkish ways, but that his silence merely reflected his desire to become Prime Minister. Even in this era of transition, an overly hawkish position could kill a candidate's chances for the post.

As Prime Minister, Nakasone's "hawkish" leaning has emerged. He pleased the Americans in his trip to Washington with his commitment to defense expansion. His assertive stance, however, has incited considerable negative reaction domestically. Particularly controversial was his reference to Japan as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier," and his declaration that Japan shares a "common destiny" with the United States, which many interpreted as an affirmation that Japan is no more than a part of U.S. global strategy.

If the past year is any indication, his rhetoric will not be any disappointment for the hawks. Looking behind his political facade, it appears that the real Nakasone believes in a strong, proud, and militarily independent Japan. During his tenure as Prime Minister, however, he will stick to the present policy of incremental build-up, without any fundamental change in the pace or nature of defense expansion. Ironically, as a "hawkish" Prime Minister, like his more hawkish predecessors Tanaka and Fukuda, he may be more constrained in his defense policy than were his more dovish predecessors, Miki, Ohira, and Suzuki. Due to his hawkish reputation, Nakasone is far more vulnerable to criticism of any pro-defense stance, and must strive not to appear too militaristic.³²

Someday the hawk view may take on more power within the administration, but for now it is restricted to the Diet. The new forces of Nakagawa rightism and military realism are clearly influential within the party, and could very well be the vanguard on a new path for Japanese defense. For now, however, the realists remain in control.

31. Otake series, part 3, *Asahi Journal* (26 June 1981), p. 35.

32. For more information on Nakasone's perspective, see Ikeda Hisakatsu, *Chokan sora o yuku*, Tokyo: Feisu, 1972; Nakasone Yasuhiro, *Atarashii hoshi no ronri*, Tokyo: Kodansha, 1978; and Otake Hideo, "Jiminto ni okeru boeirou," *Hogaku semina*, Tokyo: Nitto hyoronsha, 1981, pp. 91-94.

CHAPTER IV THE POLITICAL REALISTS AND THE NEW DIRECTION

The political realists represent the present mainstream view on defense in the LDP. Many of the former doves support the realist position, for a large part of the political mainstream has simply moved from the Yoshida strategy to the new realist view. Almost all Cabinet leaders are also realists, as they are responsible for following the mainstream position. In terms of policy, the realists offer a compromise between the doves and the hawks. They recognize the Soviet threat, yet they do not demand immediate action to counter this threat. Some realists consider easing the limits on defense, but none feel that all limits should be abolished. Most importantly, realists are fundamentally committed to the U.S.-Japan security system, and make no pleas for an independent defense structure.

Given these guidelines, the realists formulate defense policy primarily on the basis of political calculations. Decisions are not made on the basis of military analysis or any ideological inclination, but by a careful weighing and balancing of political factors. Roughly divided, this balancing takes place in three arenas: the public, international, and domestic political levels.

The most important factor in the public arena is public opinion. This element must always be carefully gauged although it sometimes can be manipulated as well. Other key factors in the public arena are media reaction and business interests concerning defense. At the international level, Asian reactions must be taken into account, but the dominant political influence is the American pressure for stronger defense. The most important arena for the political realists, however, is that of domestic politics. Here they must balance the hawk push for acceleration against the dove cry for a stop to military expansion.

In general, the political realists simply seek to find an acceptable balance between conflicting alternatives. Occasionally, however, when the conflict is not easily resolved, they take a more active role in trying to make compromise politically acceptable. Most significantly, this takes place in the drive to gain popular support for the present policy of incremental defense build-up. The first leader to adopt this active approach toward reaching a political harmony was Sakata Michita, who established the new political realism of today.

Sakata Michita and the Defense Outline

As a long time party politician with the perspective of a political

realist, Director-General Sakata (1974–76) tried to bring defense into harmony with domestic political views. From the beginning, he advocated a politically oriented perspective on defense:

Many people think that defense should only be debated among the old military men. They think that it should be left up to the specialists. . . . But in the present day that is not enough. I think that there is a way to bring today's realities into consideration. What I mean is that a civilian perspective is necessary. . . . Experts often don't understand certain things.¹

His foremost goal in bringing defense into the political reality of the day was to gain the understanding of the people. He believed that public support was absolutely essential to defense policy:

Without the understanding, the support, and the cooperation of the people, even the strongest Self-Defense Forces with the finest equipment would be useless.²

It was toward this end, gaining public support, that Sakata launched his full-scale public relations and defense education programs.

This constituted the first of his three basic principles for defense policy: (1) defense consciousness for everyone. The other two principles reflected his awareness of the political constraints against defense: (2) minimum necessary defense within the limits of the Constitution; and (3) full support of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Sakata himself admitted that the cautious wording of the second principle was a concession to political reality.³

Sakata conscientiously worked toward a defense policy that would be acceptable to the public, and which could appease both the hawks and the doves in a way that Nakasone's "autonomous defense" had failed to do. As explained earlier, Sakata was able to accomplish this with the National Defense Program Outline. It appealed to both the hawks and the doves. It not only set concrete plans for a defense build-up but it also set clear limits on military expansion.

Sakata's personal ideology reflects this same balance. On the question of the Soviet threat, he recognizes the threat yet denies that it is as immediate or as overwhelming as many hawks suggested:

1. Sakata Michita, *Chisakute mo okina yakuwari*, Tokyo: Asagumo shimbunsha, 1977, pp. 32–33, as quoted in Otake series, part 11, *Asahi Journal* (4 September 1981), p. 36.

2. As quoted in Otake series, part 11, *Asahi Journal* (4 September 1981), p. 37.

3. Otake series, part 11, *Asahi Journal* (4 September 1981), pp. 36–40.

There is no doubt that Soviet naval power has increased. One could even say that the Soviet Union has gained virtual control of the Japan Sea. I think this is a potential threat. That is not to say, however, that Japan is like Europe, where Soviet intervention is a real possibility. In that sense I don't think that there is any direct threat to Japan.⁴

Likewise, on the issue of Japanese military independence, Sakata's view represents a compromise between the doves and the hawks. He does not question the U.S.-Japan security arrangement, yet he does go as far as to say that an American response to a Middle East crisis could leave a weak point in the Pacific. To this extent, he asserts, Japan needs to become less dependent on the United States.

The New Realist Elite

With a political atmosphere where defense has consistently been considered a secondary issue, postwar Japan has lacked knowledgeable defense leaders in the Diet. Only a few military men have spoken out. However, the two political posts in the JDA, Director-General and Parliamentary Vice-Minister, have provided a valuable training ground for the defense leaders of today. During their appointments at the Defense Agency, these Dietmen learn to understand the details of the issue, and appreciate the military perspective on defense.

Circumstances mandate that the Directors-General take a politically realistic stand on defense. They must take on the duty of representing the JDA and supporting the cause of improved defense capabilities, while at the same time, as Cabinet Ministers, they must be extremely wary of any political controversy. Traditionally, former Directors-General have taken on an active role in defense issues in the Diet, but this custom took on a new strength after Sakata made the defense debate public. The most active of all former Directors-General, in fact, is Sakata's successor, Mihara Asao (HR).

As Chairman of the LDP Investigative Committee on National Security and the leader of the "Defense Tribe," Mihara is the most powerful figure in the Diet defense debate today. He took on the role of a defense leader after a term as JDA Parliamentary Vice-Minister in 1967–68, but his position took on a new importance since he stepped down as Director-General in 1977. As an experienced party politician, he has considerable influence with the other party leaders and Cabinet Ministers. As an independent, he has the ad-

4. As quoted in Otake series, part 12, *Asahi Journal* (11 September 1981), p. 35.

vantage of good relations with each faction, but some analysts claim that he has less clout than he might have with a strong factional affiliation. Nevertheless, he has strong support from seventy odd Diet members who form the "Defense Tribe" and carry considerable influence at budget time.

Many view Mihara as a hawk because of his position in the "Defense Tribe" and because he is so active in support of the budget, but a close look shows Mihara to be a model political realist. He is acutely aware of the political constraints on military expansion. He stresses the importance of public opinion, and advocates a clear new statement on defense goals which can then be taken to the people. Although he feels that the GNP one percent barrier might need to be surpassed, he feels that defense spending should maintain a comparable limit. He firmly believes that it should stay with the range of one percent:

If we surpass one percent, the opposition parties will come on the attack. We have to make limits. Even if we are being pressured from abroad, we have to consider our financial and political constraints as well. Keeping this in mind, if we pass one percent we have to make sure that this doesn't continue uncontrolled: from 1 to 1.3 percent, to 1.8 percent, to 2.5 percent, and so on.⁵

Mihara's position, which is tied to political reality, seems to lack any long-term vision or goal. It is clear in Mihara's viewpoint that despite his "hawkish" reputation, he really believes in limits to defense. He agrees with the concepts in the Outline, but only adds that the level of "fundamental defense strength" should take technological progress into account. He feels that Japan should be able to defend itself in the event of a minor threat and should be able to hold off a larger invasion for a reasonable period before reinforcements come from the United States. Still, he is firmly dedicated to the U.S.-Japan security system.

He feels that Constitutional revision is impossible both politically and logistically, and feels that adequate defense preparations can be made within the present Constitution. Finally, Mihara has a clear commitment to "exclusive defense":

Japan has promised not to become a military power. The Self-Defense Forces are meant to ensure peace. We will only maintain the minimum defense forces necessary for our own self-protection. We won't build offensive weap-

5. Interview with Mihara Asao, Tokyo, Japan, 6 August 1982.

ons. We will continue to honor this commitment.⁶

Two powerful leaders within the Tanaka Faction, Kanemaru Shin (HR) and Yamashita Kanri (HR), followed Mihara as Director-General. Although Kanemaru has since become a prominent hawk, he was very much a realist as Director-General (1977-78). He was extremely careful not to upset the opposition, and he continued in the Sakata tradition of stressing limits while trying to generate more public awareness. Yamashita (1978-79) also emphasized a commitment to the limits on nuclear weapons, arms exports, and conscription, while trying not to alienate public opinion. He too is now an active defense leader, although not as hawkish as Kanemaru.

The present Chairman of the House of Representatives' Special Committee on National Security (*anzen hosho tokubetsu iinkai*), Hosoda Kichizo, was Director-General (1980) under Prime Minister Ohira. He insists that the present level of defense is entirely insufficient, and that spending increases must be pushed through. Nevertheless, he follows in the line of the new realist elite.

In fact, Hosoda's viewpoint is unusually clear on the one point that definitively separates the realists from the hawks, for he firmly believes in counting on the United States for defense:

Japan cannot defend itself alone. Japanese defense must rely on cooperation with the United States and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The only question is what level of defense is necessary for Japan given the present level of American military strength. . . . Only when Japanese defense forces are combined with American forces does the Japanese defense structure take shape. It is useless to debate the level of Japanese defense apart from U.S. military power and U.S. military strategy. That's nonsense.⁷

He is not concerned, as the hawks are, that this puts Japan in a subordinate position:

Many are bothered by discussion of Japan as a part of U.S. global strategy. . . This may not be the best way to put it, but this is the way it really is.⁸

Ito Soichiro (1981-82) broke a long-standing tradition, becoming the first Director-General appointed from a dovish faction in many years. Within this context, as discussed in Chapter II, he may

6. Mihara interview, *ibid.*, 6 August 1982.

7. Interview with Hosoda Kichizo (HR), Tokyo, Japan, 9 August 1982.

8. Hosoda interview, *ibid.*, 9 August 1982.

play a key role in bringing the new realism to the more dovish factions, particularly his own Komoto faction. As a newcomer to the defense debate, Ito brought with him no biases on military issues, leaving only his acute political sensibilities to guide him. Even more masterfully than his predecessors, perhaps, he was able to fulfill both his political obligations as a representative of the JDA and his commitment to observing political constraints. The result is a moderate and deliberately vague political compromise typical of the realists:

As much as possible, our country must actively contribute to the peace and prosperity of the Free World. On defense, we must do our best while regarding our various commitments under the Peace Constitution.⁹

This new realist elite now diligently represents the JDA in the Diet, skillfully speaking for both the doves and the hawks. Combining the two in speech is difficult, but combining the two in policy is the real "realist" challenge.

Political Realism in the LDP Factions

LDP factions are not divided on any strict policy lines, and in fact, many argue that factions do not have policy stances at all. It is true that factions are primarily political support groups, and not policy-making organizations. However, the factions do have distinguishable leanings on political issues, and there is no doubt that factional politics plays a vital role in the policy-making process.

As discussed earlier, the Komoto and Suzuki factions traditionally have taken a dovish viewpoint. Nevertheless, many of their members have gradually abandoned this position, preferring to side with the realists. Furthermore, their leaders, Komoto and Suzuki, have compromised their positions as well. The Nakagawa Group remains only a minor faction but, as explained in the previous chapter, it could be an important force due to its solidified view on defense.

The remaining three factions, those of Nakasone, Tanaka, and Fukuda, generally follow the realist perspective, although there are some notable hawks in their midst, particularly in the Tanaka Faction. Of the three, the Nakasone Faction is the most difficult to analyze, boasting such outspoken doves as Oishi Sempachi (HR) as well as a considerable corps of more hawkish Diet members. Furthermore, as a faction leader, Nakasone is far less influential than the two strongest forces in Japanese politics today, Fukuda and Tanaka.

9. Ito Soichiro, *Seiron* [Defense Information No. 3] (Tokyo: Sankei, 1982), p. 37.

Despite his conviction in the Lockheed scandal, Tanaka Kakuei remains the foremost of the faction leaders. The Tanaka and Fukuda Factions are at a stand-off, so that neither will allow the premiership to the other, but Tanaka seems to be winning the battle of the behind-the-throne powers. Tanaka has been the more powerful influence on both of the Prime Ministers since Ohira's death, Suzuki and Nakasone.

The Tanaka Faction appears to be the most hawkish of the factions, boasting such defense leaders and former JDA appointees as Kanemaru, Minowa, Yamashita, Esaki Masumi (HR), and Omura Joji (HR). The post of JDA Director-General is one of the few minor appointments for which Tanaka fights very hard, along with the Minister of Construction spot, because controlling large contracts such as those that are involved in the defense industry can be very lucrative for a politician.¹⁰ Yet, all leaders should avoid going too far and getting caught, as Tanaka did. The Director-General spot should become more and more appealing as the defense industry grows, and defense industry support could drive the faction to take a more pro-defense stance.

Tanaka's views on defense are uncertain, but his political ideology leans to the right. As Prime Minister (1972-74), he stressed defense consciousness more than military build-up, but this may have been a mere reflection of the political constraints of the time. He championed many nationalist causes, such as officializing the national anthem and the national flag and allocating public funds for the Yasukuni Shrine, which traditionally have been associated with militaristic views.¹¹ Because he has been out of the administration for so long, it is particularly difficult to decipher Tanaka's policy inclinations. The indication is, however, that he is above all a political realist, who would like to see defense expansion gradually accelerate in the future.

Fukuda is more outspoken on the issue, but his stance is equally ambiguous. Although he is generally considered to be a supporter of stronger defense, the Fukuda Doctrine, articulated in his 1977 speech at Manila, is one of the strongest statements for limits on defense:

Historically, great economic powers have always been great

10. Interview with Hiramoto Kazunori (Tanaka Faction Press Club), Tokyo Broadcasting Service, Tokyo, Japan, 6 August 1982.

11. The Yasukuni Shrine is a World War II war memorial. The issue of public support for this shrine has been a major source of conflict between the hawks and the doves in the Diet.

military powers as well. However, our country holds an unprecedented vision: that of protecting the safety and the lives of the world's people by trusting in their justice and fidelity. We are determined not to become a military power.¹²

Despite this noble proclamation, Fukuda is foremost a realist, and if anything leans toward the hawk perspective. He has had close ties with the Seirankai and later the Nakagawa Group, and at times, he has had a rightist and nationalist sentiment reminiscent of the Meiji Era. This manifested itself in his support for patriotic education, and for laws officializing that national anthem and the traditional Emperor's calendar. As Prime Minister (1976-78), he consistently pushed for increased public support for the SDF and he gave behind-the-lines support to JDA initiatives such as those concerning crisis management and F-15 procurements. Although it has fewer vocal defense advocates than the Tanaka Faction, Otake Hideo claims that it is the Fukuda Faction which has the real potential to become a powerful defense lobby.¹³

The factional issues of the defense debate are not crucial in that the faction leader does not determine the policy choices of the faction members, and there is virtually no hope for a unified policy stance by any major faction. However, factions do play a role in the defense debate. First, factional leanings are important considerations for decision makers, particularly for Cabinet Ministers who are at the same time part of this network of intra-party rivalries. Second, the more powerful faction leaders can play a decisive role at key moments in the policy-making process, particularly at budget time.

To date, Tanaka and Fukuda have supported the defense budget but have not cast much of their political capital in that direction. The stand-off between the two factions is a key factor here, because as the two most powerful factions and the two factions most supportive of defense, together they potentially could change the nature of the domestic defense debate. For now, they are only pushing for incremental build-up of the nature that Mihara recommends. Their nationalistic tendencies indicate, however, that although they are taking a realist stand at this time, they eventually would like to see a much stronger and more influential Japan.

12. As quoted in Otake series, part 14, *Asahi Journal*, (6 November 1981), p. 30.

13. Otake series, part 21, *Asahi Journal* (25 December 1981), pp. 35-40.

The New Direction in Defense

Political realism is by no means a new phenomenon in Japanese politics. To a large extent, the "conservative mainstream" (*hoshu honryu*) of the LDP has always been more concerned with the political mood of the time than the content of the issues. In the defense debate, however, the present political realists represent an entirely new movement.

Primarily due to the transformations of the seventies, they have drawn a very different conclusion on defense than the realists of the postwar consensus. The political realists of the fifties and the sixties supported the dove ideology as described in the beginning of Chapter II. This ideology was accepted by the public, by Japanese allies, and by a firm majority in the Diet. It was particularly appealing because it had a logical foundation in the Peace Constitution and the numerous established limits on defense. It was thus a policy position both easily explained and easily justified. The political realists today see a very different picture. In order to understand the new realists' perspective, we must examine their assessment of the balance in the public, international, and domestic political arenas.

Public views have slowly shifted in favor of defense. The majority of the people support the SDF, and there are a growing number who advocate significant rearmament. According to nationwide polls, from 1972 to 1980, those favoring an increase of SDF forces have risen from 10 percent to 25 percent, while those advocating a decrease have dwindled from 23 percent to 11 percent. Among LDP supporters, according to the 1980 poll, 34 percent favor an increase while only 4 percent favor a decrease. Nevertheless, the majority still favor the status quo, and any rapid acceleration is likely to excite strong public opposition.¹⁴ The media has become less critical of the military, while the business world (*zaikai*) is beginning to be actively supportive. Thus in the public arena, the political realists enjoy strong support for build-up so long as it remains at a moderate rate.

In the international arena, while Japan's Asian neighbors would hardly welcome Japanese rearmament, they are becoming more tolerant of the notion. Specifically, Chinese support of both the SDF and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was crucial in this development.

14. 1972 figures from Douglas H. Mendel, "Public Views of the Japanese Defense System," in James H. Buck, ed., *The Modern Japanese Military System*. Sage Research Progress Series on War, Revolution, and Peacekeeping, Vol. V, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1975, p. 166. 1980 figures from *Asahi shimbun* (25 March 1980, evening edition), p. 3.

At the same time, the United States increasingly has pressured the Japanese in favor of military expansion. Given the overwhelming importance of U.S.-Japan relations, most realists concede that the Americans must be appeased on this issue.

The mood in political circles is far more complex. On the one hand, the doves push for an end to defense expansion. The doves, however, have lost much political support to the realists. This is natural, of course, because the mainstream of political thought has switched from the dove ideology to an intermediate position. Further, the doves rarely are concerned with defense issues, and are extremely unlikely to oppose gradual expansion of the defense budget. All in all, as argued in Chapter II, the dove cause has lost considerable force.

Meanwhile, the hawks are on the rise. They have not yet caught hold of the political mainstream, but they have become accepted as an alternative viewpoint. Furthermore, certain aspects of the hawk argument have a very strong appeal for the public and for the LDP in general. The military realists offer the military rationale and strategy that Japanese defense has lacked in the postwar era. The hawks' strongest appeal, however, is to Japanese nationalism. Even the purist of political realists are moved by the notion of a stronger and more respected Japan.

Political realists realize that the constraints against rearmament still carry force, and that above all, expansion must be incremental. Dissent from the opposition parties, the LDP doves, and the Ministry of Finance, will not prove to be a major obstacle if sudden increases are avoided. Even many of the hawks realize that the push for military expansion will be most successful if it is implemented gradually. The Sakata approach of slowly expanding without exciting any opposition appears to be more successful than the Nakasone approach of actively supporting large-scale increases in defense forces. For this reason, many ideological hawks now support the realist position on short-term policy. This is the case in the "Defense Tribe," where hawk and realist perspectives unite in support of incremental increases in defense spending.

This policy consensus is manifested in the resolutions of the three LDP defense committees, traditional strongholds of the Defense Tribe. Ideologically, the position of these committees is unclear, but their policy recommendations clearly reflect the realist perspective. They emphasize comprehensive security rather than rearmament, and they cite maintenance of the U.S.-Japan security

structure as a primary goal.¹⁵ Nevertheless, at some points, they betray a slightly more hawkish perspective:

The United States, recognizing the 1980s as a period of international "crisis," has requested defense efforts beyond the level prescribed in the Defense Outline of 1976. Keeping this in mind, and given the present state of international tension, we believe that Japan must accept a more independent position, revising the Outline and establishing a new defense plan for Japan. However, government policy has set realization of the present Outline as its main goal, and we feel that compliance with this policy is the most realistic means of advancing defense preparedness at the present time.¹⁶

Some critics argue that the Joint Defense Committee represents a very hawkish perspective, but actually the majority view in the party supports a similar line. According to a 1980 *Nihon Keizai shimbun* poll, 78.6 percent of LDP Lower House (HR) representatives advocate expansion of the SDF and maintenance of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, while only a handful, including Ishida Hakuei (HR) and Oishi Sempachi (HR), argue that the SDF should not be expanded. Another indication of the strength of the realists was that 50.5 percent said that the Soviet Union presents a potential threat, but is not likely to attack Japan in the near future. 41.4 held the more typically "hawkish" view that the Soviet Union poses a major threat, while almost none argued that there is no threat at all.¹⁷ 19.5 percent replied in favor of passing the GNP one percent limit, compared to only 7.9 percent which supported the dove stance of keeping this barrier. Once again, however, the political realist position dominated as 59.3 percent said that the one percent limit should be reached first, and then reconsidered.¹⁸

Thus the realists are dominant. At the same time, however, as defined here, the "hawk" views are stronger than the "dove" views in the LDP. While those ready to attack the established limits on defense are still in the minority, many seriously question these limits. According to the poll, 46.4 percent oppose the arms export ban, while 31.8 percent favor it. More surprisingly, however, only 31.2

15. LDP Political Affairs Research Council, Joint Defense Committee, "Boeiryou seibi o meguru teigen" [Resolution Concerning Defense Preparation] (14 July 1982), p. 1.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

17. Hino Ichiro, ed., "Anzen hoshō ko kangaeru" (5 part series), *Nihon keizai shimbun* (27 April—1 May 1980). Part 1, 27 April 1980, p. 2.

18. *Ibid.*, part 3 (29 April 1980), p. 2.

percent support the present Constitution, while 36.7 percent favor constitutional revision.¹⁹

The new realists will continue to lead defense policy for at least the next decade. They advocate incremental expansion of the SDF, and this gradual expansion characterizes the new direction in Japanese defense policy. Throughout the 1980s, defense will remain as a top priority item on the budget continuing with spending increases in the 5–10 percent range. GNP one percent will be passed before the completion of the 1981 Mid-Range Plan in 1988. The growing strength of the hawk position and the strength of the hawk-realist alliance in the Defense Tribe suggests that defense expansion may accelerate, particularly if international tension heightens.

In the next few years, incrementalism will guide defense policy. In the long run, however, incremental decisions could lead Japanese defense policy in any one of several very different directions. These incremental decisions are likely to build toward a new national consensus on goals, and the nature of this national consensus will determine the future of Japanese defense.

CHAPTER V TOWARD A NEW CONSENSUS ON DEFENSE

Japanese defense policy has a new direction, pointing toward gradual military expansion, yet it lacks any clear rationale. In the era of the original postwar consensus, defense policy had a logical foundation in the Peace Constitution, which was further reinforced by the limitations established under the notion of “exclusive defense.” These basic principles gave the political choices of Yoshida and others an articulated rationale, which in turn gave force to the consensus on defense. The changes of the 1970s question this rationale and now leaders search for a new defense strategy.

Such a strategy is necessary for there to be any consensus on defense. Public support and political stability will not be achieved unless policy goals are clearly defined. This drive for a new basis for defense lay behind the public campaigns for Nakasone’s “autonomous defense” and Sakata’s “fundamental defense” strategy under the 1976 Outline, and the search continues today. A rationale is particularly important for the forces that favor military expansion. Without a clear strategy they will not be able to overcome the political constraints against rearmament. In order to surpass the limits

19. *Ibid.*, part 4 (30 April 1980), p. 2.

established under the Yoshida strategy, they will need a suitable replacement. Only then can they go beyond the present incremental build-up.

Finding a strategy for Japanese defense is no easy task. Defense leaders are caught in an almost inescapable paradox. If the foundation for Japanese defense is truly dependence on U.S. military power, then why should Japan have any military at all? Given that the present enemy is the Soviet Union, spending a few more percent of Japan’s mighty GNP still will not stop even a small flock of SS-20s from sinking the islands. On the other hand, if Japan cannot entirely depend on the United States, then why stop short of full-scale rearmament complete with a nuclear deterrent? Ironically, the two most extreme positions, total disarmament and full-scale rearmament, are the most logically defensible views for Japanese defense. Ishibashi Masashi, foremost advocate of unarmed neutrality, puts this even more strongly, saying that in the long run, there are only two alternatives for Japan: unarmed neutrality or a return to Japanese militarism.¹

The Yoshida strategy provided a compromise between these two extremes in that it allowed for some defense within the context of a security relationship with the United States. Ishibashi argues that, even so, it was only a temporary stage on the eventual road toward militarism. Here, perhaps, he underestimates the force of the Yoshida consensus. It had much of the same logical appeal as unarmed neutrality in that it negated any potential for significant military power, and was based in firmly established principles. Nonetheless, this consensus has eroded, and if Ishibashi is to be proved wrong, a compromise strategy must be found.

Kato Koichi (HR) suggested a compromise close to Yoshida’s, but only more applicable to the present situation. The strategy simply is to maintain the U.S.-Japan security system, even compromising the limits on defense expansion if this is necessary to secure strong U.S.-Japan ties.² Under this strategy, the SDF’s only purpose is to appease the Americans. The argument lacks popular appeal, though, for few taxpayers would be happy to know that five percent of their taxes are spent on a gesture to the American government. Furthermore, the political momentum of the defense debate has moved beyond this point, for the new realists and the hawks see

1. Ishibashi interview, *supra* Chapter II, note 6, 12 August 1982.

2. Kato interview, *supra* Chapter II, note 5, 10 August 1982.

much more than simply quieting the Americans as their goals for defense.

A similar strategy is that of "burden-sharing." Under this strategy, Japanese defense is seen within the larger context of the East-West conflict. The Western allies, it is argued, must counterbalance the Soviet threat with equal or superior military forces. As a member of this alliance, Japan must do its part. This is a very common analysis in the new debate, and may be the most realistic strategy for Japanese defense today. However, many Japanese dislike the notion of Japan as no more than a part of some vague global strategy. They feel that Japanese defense can hardly make any difference in the global balance, and they thus fail to understand why Japanese efforts are necessary.

Other possible compromise strategies reflect more of a military perspective. Aso Taro (HR) suggests that the Soviet Union has no reason to attack Japan alone, and that aggression would only take place in a global war. In this case, the Soviet armed forces would be concentrating on other fronts, only leaving a small percentage of their forces with which to attack Japan. Japanese defense, Aso argues, should be tailored to cope with this limited threat because it is the only realistic threat that faces Japan:

If the Soviet Union directed its military power against Europe, against China, and against America, then what's left — that is the threat which we must be able to repel. This should be the standard.³

Under this strategy, it would be extremely difficult to calculate the level of "necessary defense." It fails to address the question of nuclear attack, which is a possibility even if the Soviet Union is fighting on other fronts. Finally, it lacks a strong appeal, for few would agree that Japan is not threatened by anything short of global war.

An alternative military strategy involves a division of labor between U.S. and Japanese military forces. The Yoshida strategy incorporated such a division, but stressed defense against internal threats as the main responsibility of Japanese forces. Clearly the present SDF is designed for a more active role than this. Defense leaders have tried to offer alternative divisions of labor. The present JDA "strategy" provides that Japan must be able to repel a "limited small-scale attack" or be able to hold off a larger attack until help

3. Aso interview, *supra* Chapter II, note 3, 23 July 1982.

arrives.⁴ Although this is the present official position, it has failed to satisfy political leaders or to convince the public. It is under increasing criticism from the hawks, particularly the military realists, who say that this strategy is incomprehensible, and does not logically proceed to any particular policy.

The military realists offer an alternative division of labor. The Center for Strategic Studies of Japan argues that Japan should be responsible for the defense of the mainland and for the protection of naval transportation lines, while depending on the U.S. nuclear umbrella for deterrence of large-scale Soviet aggression.⁵ This proposal offers a more cogent foundation than most other alternatives, yet it is still difficult to envision what the respective roles of U.S. and Japanese forces would be in specific crisis contingencies. The Center and others are working on clarifying this. Nevertheless, they are still susceptible to the attack of the skeptics: why do anything if the U.S. nuclear umbrella works, and why stop rearming if it does not?

There are, as stated earlier, two remaining possibilities if a compromise strategy cannot be found: disarmament and full rearmament. Arguably, unarmed neutrality was a real possibility for Japan after the war, but this is no longer so. The reason is simple. Kato Koichi explains:

The Japanese people, including myself, will never trust the Soviets enough to stand before them without arms.⁶

A notion more difficult to accept is that for similar reasons, the Japanese do not feel that they can rely solely on the United States for protection. The fact that the United States has refused to commit itself in terms of how it will respond to specific cases of aggression against Japan exacerbates the lack of trust. A 1978 *Asahi* poll showed that 56 percent of the Japanese people felt that American forces would not come to the rescue in the case of an attack on the Japanese homeland.⁷ Because they do not completely trust the Americans to protect them, the Japanese cannot possibly disarm. This puts to rest one side of the paradox: the Japanese need some arms because U.S. protection is not absolute. The flip side of the question remains: what will keep Japanese rearmament limited?

The traditional answer would be that formidable constraints

4. Interview with Fujishima Masanori, JDA, Tokyo, Japan, 29 July 1982. See Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan, 1981*, Tokyo: JDA, 1981, pp. 121-42.

5. Kanemaru Shin and Minowa Noboru, ed., *Ko sureba nihon wa mamoreru*, Tokyo: Center for Strategic Studies of Japan, 1981, pp. 116-25.

6. Kato interview, *supra* note 2, 10 August 1982.

7. *Asahi Shimbun* (1 November 1978).

will prevent the hawks from attaining their goals, and will thus force a compromise short of full rearmament. However, these constraints are gradually losing force. The GNP one percent limit may be the first of these constraints to give in. It will be impossible to maintain under the 1981 Mid-range Plan as it now stands, and probably will be surpassed in the next several years. Judging from the public reaction to the July, 1982 announcement of the Mid-Range Plan, which pointed to spending above one percent, this limit will be passed with very little public outcry.

The Peace Constitution provides another constraint. It is remarkable, however, that this is even an issue when the Constitution so clearly states that "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential will never be maintained." There is no reasonable doubt that Japanese defense has long since stepped over this boundary. It remains as an important symbolic statement, but it is losing force. Resolutions calling for Constitutional revision are now commonplace and an LDP resolution is likely to pass within the next decade. Even if constitutional revision is logistically impossible, as many argue, it could very well be subject to further "reinterpretation." It is likely, for example, that the definition of the right to self-defense for Japan will be expanded to allow for Japanese participation in collective security arrangements.

The principles underlying "exclusive defense" are likewise losing power. An important element in the arms export ban was retracted as Prime Minister Nakasone recently agreed to allow the export of military technology to the United States. Many Diet members are also pushing for an end to the ban on overseas dispatch of troops so that Japan can participate in United Nations forces. The principle banning introduction of American nuclear weapons has been severely criticized in recent years, and former Ambassador Reischauer is not the only one to have claimed that it is regularly violated. This principle will be under fire even more in a few years when U.S. cruise missiles are scheduled to be shipped into the Asian theater.

The strongest barrier is that against the production or possession of nuclear weapons. Even if Japan does build up an independent military capability, the Japanese people with the support of their Asian neighbors and even the superpowers, will resist Japanese nuclear armament. Some strategists suggest that Japanese defense policy may eventually follow this direction: full rearmament and independent defense against all conventional military threats with some minimal reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella for deterrence

against nuclear attack. Although the Japanese "nuclear allergy" still carries considerable force, nuclear armament will become more of a possibility as the war generation passes away and Japanese conventional military forces grow in strength. Such prominent figures as Prime Minister Fukuda have mentioned the possibility of nuclear arms for Japan, and a number of defense experts in Japan advocate the idea.⁸

The opposition parties, the Ministry of Finance, and the LDP doves all play a role as constraints in the present stage of incremental military expansion, and could indeed succeed in preventing full rearmament. The opposition parties have been incapable of countering LDP defense policy in the past few years, but they might gain more force if defense expansion were to suddenly accelerate. For now, however, support for unarmed neutrality is on the decline, and the Komeito and the Democratic Socialist Party have begun to support defense. The Ministry of Finance (MOF) has been a major force in constraining defense expansion in the past five years, and will continue to play an important role. Nevertheless, the Ministry basically has accepted the LDP designated priority on defense for the budget. In the long term, the MOF is likely to be a force in retarding, but not halting, the expansion of the defense budget.

As shown in Chapter II, the LDP doves have lost force as a constraint, yet many claim that they will reemerge as a powerful lobby if there is any sudden increase in the rate of defense expansion. In this sense, the rate of expansion is key. Gradual acceleration of defense expansion is not likely to meet within any significant opposition from the LDP. However, gradual change still can be very dramatic. This was the case in the seventies when incremental shifts transformed the Yoshida consensus into the new debate in the space of a decade. Similarly, gradual acceleration of defense expansion easily could lead to full rearmament before the year 2000. Oddly enough, if the hawks move too quickly, their cause is sure to be lost.

The final constraint is the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Full rearmament could be extremely detrimental to U.S.-Japanese relations, especially if the Japanese defense industry becomes very competitive. Japanese military strength would decrease American

8. On Fukuda's statement and nuclear weapons, see Research Institute for Peace and Security, *Asian Security, 1981*, Tokyo: Research Institute for Peace and Security, 1981, pp. 156-158. For a full discussion of the issue, see Herbert Passin, "Nuclear Arms and Japan," in William H. Overholt, ed., *Asia's Nuclear Future*. Studies of the Research Institution on International Change, Columbia University, Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1977, pp. 67-132.

political leverage over Japan and could eventually pose a threat to U.S. military supremacy. A decline in U.S.-Japan relations, however, is more likely to be a cause than an effect of Japanese rearmament, and thus bilateral ties may already be weak when Japanese remilitarization becomes an issue.

The constraints against rearmament are not yet dead, but they now are seriously questioned, and they could further lose force in the next decade. After ten years of slightly accelerated incremental build-up, the Japanese people, the media, and the politicians may be much more accustomed to the idea of a postwar Japanese military. Furthermore, the growing defense industry could become a far more influential interest group in Japanese politics, particularly if the arms export ban is lifted.

International events, however, potentially could push the Japanese to rearm. Any dramatic increase in Soviet military strength in Asia will accelerate Japanese rearmament. The growing acceptance of military realism suggests that future defense policy will react more rapidly to any Soviet military build-up, and that in the case of such a build-up, the military realists might be able to rally support for fundamental changes in defense policy. Likewise, political developments that make a Soviet attack appear more likely could inspire a similar reaction. U.S. military withdrawal from the region would even more clearly push the Japanese toward military expansion. Thus a significant change in Japan's military situation could lead to a scenario in which Japan alters its present course, opting to become an international military power.

The most critical variable in guiding the future of Japanese defense policy, however, will be the nature of Japanese relations with the Western allies, particularly the United States. If protectionism continues to rise in Europe and the United States, the effect on the Japanese economy could be devastating. Economic isolation could result in political isolation as well, as the Japanese develop a resentment for this mistreatment by the West. This is particularly likely to cause international tension as the phenomenal postwar economic growth grinds to a halt. This isolation, economic deprivation, and the resultant feeling of resentment is most likely to feed the desire for a stronger military.

These international factors will be pivotal in the future of defense policy, but it is ultimately the Japanese people and their political leaders, the LDP Diet members, who will make the decisions. Ishibashi argues that the LDP has never felt any remorse for the Japanese militarism of World War II. He explains that this senti-

ment showed up vividly in 1982 when the government tried to rewrite the history textbooks used in secondary schools so as to play down the Japanese oppression against the Koreans and the Chinese during the war. He insists that prewar nationalism never left the hearts of the Japanese leaders, but was only suppressed out of political necessity. This is why, he insists, it is only a matter of time before Japan once again becomes a great military power.⁹

The Japanese people still have strong ties with their militaristic past. The leaders and the people of Japan share a common sense of nationalism, somewhat akin to that of the prewar era. This is why the hawk position, particularly that of the Nakagawa Group and Nakasone, carries such strong appeal. To this day, the Japanese feel a real sense of isolation in the international system. Many claim that mistreatment by others forced them to assert themselves in the first half of this century. A recent box-office smash, *Dai nihon teikoku* [The Great Japanese Empire] (1982), shows how economic isolation forced Japan into war. It then dramatically depicts the suffering of the Japanese people and their mistreatment by foreigners. The Japanese people may once again feel oppressed and decide to assert themselves in the world.

Many LDP leaders envision a stronger and prouder Japan. This vision is embodied in much of the hawk ideology, but is also shared by many of the realists. As these groups cooperate more and more, international events and domestic political shifts could result in a transformation more dramatic than the shift of power from the doves to the new realists which took place in the 1970s. The political mainstream could easily move on, from the realists to the hawks.

9. Ishibashi interview, *supra* Chapter II, note 6, 12 August 1982. Ishibashi's views are put forth in Ishibashi Masashi, *Hibuso churitsuron*, (Tokyo: Shakai shinsha, 1980).

EPILOGUE

The December 1983 election in the House of Representatives was an upheaval for Japanese politics, but did not result in any major changes in defense policy. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) lost thirty-six seats along with its majority in the House of Representatives. Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro was held responsible for this defeat. Nonetheless he managed to stay in power, and even consolidated a stable majority by recruiting the support of nine independents and then forming a coalition government with the tiny New Liberal Club. This quick thinking and effective leadership during the party's political crisis cleared the prime minister's name, and even revived his hopes for re-election in November.

Some critics interpreted the election defeat as a negative response to Nakasone's assertive stance on defense and foreign policy. In part, voters were voicing their displeasure over the problem of political ethics in the ruling party, which became the central issue in the election after former Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei refused to resign from the Diet despite his October 12, 1983 conviction in the Lockheed payoff scandal. Most importantly, however, the LDP's election defeat simply reflected the people's desire for a better balance in the Diet. The LDP won an overwhelming victory in the 1980 double election, partly due to the sympathy vote after the sudden death of Prime Minister Ohira Masayoshi. Given that the number of seats in the House of Representatives won by the LDP has fluctuated within the range of 248 to 288 for more than twenty years, it is no surprise that last year's election brought the ruling party back to earth with 250 seats after a high of 286 in 1980.

The election has proved to have little effect on defense policy. In the wake of defeat, Prime Minister Nakasone appeared slightly more cautious on defense, pledging to keep defense spending within the limit of one percent of GNP. Nevertheless, he remains committed to an assertive foreign policy, as he confirmed in his new year's policy speech. Defense spending has continued to rise at a steady rate, with a 6.5 percent increase in fiscal 1983 and a 6.55 percent increase in fiscal 1984, despite the tightest budget in twenty-nine years.

The election did, however, mark a transition for a number of the Diet members introduced in this study. Ishida Hakuei, a long time dove leader, retired, while Aso Taro, Hashiguchi Takashi, Nakao Eiichi, and Shionoya Kazuo all fell to defeat. Defense Agency Director-General Tanikawa Kazuo also lost, proving that the cabinet post is not necessarily one appreciated by the constitu-

ents. Meanwhile, Hosoda Kichizo joined Prime Minister Nakasone's new cabinet on December 26 last year as Minister of Transportation, Sakamoto Misoji took over as Minister of Labor, and Kanemaru Shin became chairman of the LDP's General Affairs Council.

Ishibashi Masashi, who is now chairman of the Japan Socialist Party, was cheered by his party's gain of twelve seats in the election for a total of 112 in the House of Representatives. Nevertheless, even Ishibashi, one of the last real doves, has begun to sell out on his policy of "unarmed neutrality." He has introduced a new policy which argues that the Self Defense Forces are legal, but still unconstitutional. He thus gave up the clearest position in the entire defense debate for one which is thoroughly incomprehensible, all in the name of being more "realistic." Ishibashi came under heavy fire last fall when he was successfully attacked by Prime Minister Nakasone for his "unrealistic" views on defense in a much publicized Budget Committee debate.

The political mood of today, alas, still favors the moderate defense build-up of the political realists. The doves and the hawks of the LDP, and now even the Socialists, are resigned to this fact. The realists' policy, with spending increases in the range of seven percent, will continue to prevail in the next few years. In the long run, however, as is argued in this paper, international tension could push Japan to accelerate defense expansion. Then the Japanese hawks may prove to be stronger, and the doves weaker, than Japan's allies ever expected.

Steve Vogel
January 1984
Tokyo

APPENDIX

PROFILES OF PRESENT DIET MEMBERS

Akagi Munenori (HR- Ibaraki 3rd), 79, Komoto Faction. Former Director-General of the JDA (1959-60), Agriculture Minister, Secretary General of the Cabinet, Chairman of the LDP Political Affairs Research Council (PARC), Chairman of the LDP General Affairs Council. Elected fourteen times.

Aso Taro (Formerly HR- Fukuoka 2nd), 43, Suzuki Faction. Former Party Youth League Director. Elected twice.

Arima Motoharu (HR- Kagoshima 2nd), 63, Tanaka Faction. Former Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense (178-79) and Labor. Elected five times.

Esaki Masumi (HR- Aichi 3rd), 68, Tanaka Faction. Former Director-General of the JDA (1960-61, 71-72), Minister of International Trade and Industry (MITI), Minister of Home Affairs, PARC Chairman, Chairman of the LDP General Affairs Council. Elected fifteen times.

Fukuda Takeo (HR- Gumma 3rd), 79, factional leader. Former Prime Minister (1976-78), Vice Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Finance Minister, LDP Chief Secretary. Elected thirteen times.

Genda Minoru (HC- nationwide), 79, no faction. Chairman of the LDP National Defense Committee. Former Air Force Chief-of-Staff (1959-62). Elected five times.

Hashiguchi Takashi (Formerly HR- Kagoshima 3rd), 70, Komoto Faction. Former Chairman of LDP Special Committee on Military Bases, Vice-Chairman of PARC and LDP General Affairs Council. Elected six times.

Hosoda Kichizo (HR- Shimane), 71, Fukuda Faction. Minister of Transportation. Former Chairman of HR Special Committee on National Security, Director-General of JDA (1980), Director-General of the Government Management Agency. Elected nine times.

Ishida Hakuei (Formerly HR- Akita 1st), 69, Komoto Faction. Former Transportation Minister, Labor Minister (four times). Elected fourteen times.

Ishihara Shintaro (HR- Tokyo 2nd), 51, Nakagawa Group. Famous novelist. Formerly HC. Former Director-General of the Environmental Agency. Elected five times.

Ito Soichiro (HR- Miyagi 1st), 59, Komoto Faction. Former Director-General of the JDA (1981-82), Parliamentary Vice-Minister

of Agriculture and Science and Technology Agency. Elected eight times.

Kanemaru Shin (HR- Yamanashi), 69, Tanaka Faction. Chairman of the LDP General Affairs Council. Former Director-General of the JDA (197-78) and Construction Minister. Elected ten times.

Kato Koichi (HR- Yamagata 2nd), 44, Suzuki Faction. Chairman of LDP Agriculture Committee. Former Vice Secretary General of the Cabinet and MFA official. Elected five times.

Kitakawa Ishimatsu (HR- Osaka 7th), 65, Komoto Faction. Former Parliamentary Vice Minister of Home Affairs. Elected four times.

Komoto Toshio (HR- Hyogo 4th), 72, factional leader. Director-General of the Economic Planning Agency. Former MITI Minister, Postal and Telecommunications Minister, PARC Chairman. Elected fourteen times.

Mihara Asao (HR- Fukuoka 2nd), 74, no faction. Chairman of the LDP Investigative Committee on National Security. Former Director-General (1976-77) and Parliamentary Vice-Minister of the JDA (1967-68), and Director-General of the Development Agency. Elected eight times.

Miki Takeo (HR- Tokushima), 76, no faction. Former Prime Minister (1974-76), Vice Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Director-General of the Environmental Agency, LDP Chief Secretary. Elected eighteen times.

Minowa Noboru (HR- Hokkaido 1st), 59, Tanaka Faction. Former Parliamentary Vice-Minister of the JDA (1972-73), Postal and Telecommunications Minister, Director-General of the Government Planning Agency. Elected seven times.

Mori Kiyoshi (HR- Aichi 2nd), 58, Nakagawa Group. Former Secretary General of the Ministry of Home Affairs. Elected three times.

Morishita Motoharu (HR- Tokushima), 61, Nakagawa Group. Former Welfare Minister, Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Agriculture and MITI. Elected seven times.

Nakao Eiichi (Formerly HR- Yamanashi), 54, Nakagawa Group. Former PARC Chairman, Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Agriculture. Elected six times.

Nakasone Yasuhiro (HR- Gumma 3rd), 65, factional leader. Prime Minister. Former Director-General of the JDA (1970-71) and the Science and Technology Agency, LDP Chief Secretary, Chairman of the LDP General Affairs Council, Transportation Minister, MITI Minister. Elected fifteen times.

Oishi Sempachi (HR- Shizuoka 1st), 48, Nakasone Faction. Former Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Welfare and Home Affairs. Elected five times.

Omura Joji (HR- Okayama 1st), 64, Tanaka Faction. Former Director-General of the JDA (1980–81), Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Finance. Elected seven times.

Sakamoto Misoji (HR- Ishikawa 2nd), 61, Komoto Faction. Minister of Labor. Former Parliamentary Vice-Minister of the Environmental Agency. Elected seven times.

Sakata Michita (HR- Kumamoto 2nd), 67, no faction. Former Director-General of the JDA (1974–76), Justice Minister, Welfare Minister, Education Minister. Elected sixteen times.

Shiina Motoo (HR- Iwate 2nd), 53, no faction. Vice-Chairman of the HR Special Committee on National Security. Elected three times.

Shionoya Kazuo (Formerly HR- Shizuoka 3rd), 64, Komoto Faction. Former Chairman of the LDP General Affairs Council, Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Labor. Elected six times.

Sonoda Sunao (HR- Kumamoto 2nd), 70, no faction. Former Foreign Minister (twice), Welfare Minister, Secretary General of the Cabinet. Elected fifteen times.

Suzuki Zenko (HR- Iwate 1st), 73, factional leader. Former Prime Minister (1980–82), Chairman of the LDP General Affairs Council, Agriculture Minister, Welfare Minister, Postal and Telecommunications Minister. Elected fifteen times.

Tsuji Hideo (HR- Fukuoka 1st), 64, Komoto Faction. Former Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs. Elected four times.

Yamashita Kanri (HR- Shiga), 63, Tanaka Faction. Former Director-General of the JDA (1978–79). Elected seven times.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Arima Motoharu, *Boei senryaku no tenkan o* [Toward a Change in Defense Policy]. Tokyo: Sankei, 1982.
- Boei handobukku* [Defense Handbook]. Tokyo: Asagumo shimbunsha, 1982.
- Buck, James H., ed., *The Modern Japanese Military System*. Sage Research Progress Series on War, Revolution, and Peacekeeping, Vol. V. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1975.
- Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan, 1981*. Tokyo: Defense Agency, 1981.
- Dower, John W., *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878–1954*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979.
- Hino Ichiro, ed., “Anzen hosho ko kangaeru” [Views on Security] (5 part series). *Nihon keizai shimbun*, 29 April — 1 May 1980.
- Ikeda Hisakatsu, *Chokan sora o yuku* [Director General: In the Air]. Tokyo: Feisu, 1972.
- Imai Hisao, ed., *Myonichi ni idomu kodo shudan* [The Group That Challenges Tomorrow]. Tokyo: Keizai oraisha, 1981.
- Ishibashi Masashi, *Hibuso churitsu ron* [The Theory of Unarmed Neutrality]. Tokyo: Nihon shakaito chuohonbu kikanshi kyoku, 1980.
- Ishida Hakuei, “Kokusai teki sekinin o hatasu michi” [The Way to Fulfill Japan’s International Role]. No. 438, *Sekai*, May 1982.
- . “Sho nihon shugi ni kaere” [Return to “Small Japanism”]. *Chuo koron*, July 1982.
- Ito Soichiro, “Nihon no boei to sekai no heiwa” [Japanese Defense and World Peace]. *Seiron* [Defense Information No. 3], February 1982, pp. 30–73.
- “Jieitai wa ‘jishu boei rain’ o fumikoeta” [The SDF Has Stepped Past the “Exclusive Defense Line”]. *Asahi Journal*, 10 September 1982, pp. 20–27.
- Kanemaru Shin and Minowa Noboru, eds., *Ko sureba nihon wa mamoreru* [This is How to Defend Japan]. Tokyo: Nihon senryaku kenkyu senta, 1981.
- Nakasone Yasuhiro, *Atarashii hoshi no ronri* [The Theory of the New Conservatism]. Tokyo: Kodansha, 1978.
- “Nihon no anzen hosho” [Japanese Security]. *Ekonomisuto* (special issue), 20 November 1980.
- Okazaki Hisahiko, “A Strategy for Japan,” 21 July 1982.
- Otake Hideo, “Jiminto ni okeru boeiron” [The Defense Debate in the LDP]. *Hogaku semina*, Tokyo: Nitto hyoronsha, 1981.

- . *The Politics of Defense Spending in Conservative Japan*. Ithaca: Cornell University Peace Studies Program, 1982.
- . "Detanto kara gunkaku e" [From Detente to Military Expansion] (30 part series). *Asahi Journal*, 12 June 1981–29 October 1982.
- Passin, Herbert, "Nuclear Arms and Japan," in William H. Overholt, ed., *Asia's Nuclear Future*. Studies of the Research Institute on International Change, Columbia University. Boulder: Westview, 1977.
- Pillsbury, Michael, "A Japanese Card?" *Foreign Policy*, No. 33, Winter 1978–79, pp. 3–30.
- Research Institute for Peace and Security, *Asian Security, 1981*. Tokyo: Research Institute for Peace and Security, 1981.
- . *Asian Security, 1982*. Tokyo: Research Institute for Peace and Security, 1982.
- Shapiro, Isaac, "The Risen Sun: Japanese Gaullism?" *Foreign Policy*, No. 41, Winter 1980–81, pp. 62–81.
- Shinsei kurabu [The Shinsei Club], *Nihon no sentaku* [Japan's Choice]. Tokyo: Shinsei kurabu, 1982.
- Solomon, Richard H., ed., *Asian Security in the 1980s*. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1979.
- "Tosshutsu e no michi" [The Road to Expansion] (31 part series). *Asahi shimbun*, 16 February–27 March 1982.
- Weinstein, Martin E., *Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947–1968*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971.
- . "Japan's Defense Policy and the May 1981 Summit." *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1, March 1982, pp. 23–34.

INTERVIEWS

Diet members: (LDP unless otherwise indicated)

1. Aso Taro (HR), 14 July 1982.
2. Genda Minoru (HC), 2 August 1982.
3. Hashiguchi Takashi (HR), 29 July 1982.
4. Hosoda Kichizo (HR), 9 August 1982.
5. Ishibashi Masashi (HR), Japan Socialist Party, 12 August 1982.
6. Ito Soichiro (HR), 17 July 1982.
7. Kano Akio (HR), 22 July 1982.
8. Kato Koichi (HR), 10 August 1982.
9. Mihara Asao (HR), 6 August 1982.

10. Ouchi Keigo (HR), Democratic Socialist Party, 2 August 1982.
11. Otsubo Kenichiro (HC), 14 July 1982.
12. Sakamoto Misoji (HR), 23 July 1982.
13. Shiina Motoo (HR), 20 July 1982.
14. Shionoya Kazuo (HR), 12 August 1982.
15. Tsuji Hideo (HR), 10 August 1982.
16. Utsunomiya Tokuma (HC), Independent, 4 August 1982.

Journalists:

1. Hino Ichiro, Nihon keizai shimbun, 16 July 1982.
2. Hiramoto Takeshi, Tokyo Broadcasting Service, 6 August 1982.
3. Muramatsu Yasuo, Asahi shimbun, 30 July 1982.
4. Takahashi Toshiyuki, Yomiuri shimbun, 16 July 1982.

Academics:

1. John Gano, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 5 July 1982.
2. Kenneth Hunt, Research Institute for Peace and Security, 16 June 1982.
3. Mike Mochizuki, Harvard University, 12 July 1982.
4. Momoi Makoto, Defense Research Institute, 5 August 1982.
5. Nakajima Masaki, Waseda University, personal secretary for Ishida Hakuei (HR), 6 July 1982.
6. Keizo Takemi, Tokai University, 12 July 1982.

Bureaucrats:

1. Jan deWilde, American Embassy, 2 August 1982.
2. Fujishima Masayuki, JDA, 29 July 1982.
3. Ito Shintaro, JDA, 17 July 1982.
4. Kinjo Kunio, LDP Headquarters, Public Relations Bureau, 9 July 1982.
5. Matsumoto Muneyoshi, JDA, 4 August 1982.
6. Shimizu Takanobu, LDP Headquarters, Policy Affairs Research Council, 19 July 1982.

All interviews took place in Tokyo, Japan.