Re: Mayoral race
Kevin Dempsey Peterson (peterson@ocf.Berkeley.EDU)
Sun, 8 Feb 1998 21:20:21 -0800
On 8 Feb 1998, Daniel C. Burton wrote:
>Kevin Dempsey Peterson <peterson@ocf.Berkeley.EDU> wrote in article
><Pine.SOL.3.96.980207213344.12231E-100000@apocalypse>...
>> On 8 Feb 1998, Daniel C. Burton wrote:
>Whether or not the money stays in the local area is irrelevant. Money is
>merely a means of exchange. The creation of wealth stems from producing
>the most valuable things possible, so that they can be traded for the most
>other valuable things possible. A local economy that creates a few things
>of great value and instantly uses the money made from doing so to buy
>desired items from outside the area is in much better shape than one that
>produces lots of things nobody really values and barely trades with the
>outside world. In the latter case, money may turn over 30 times before it
>leaves the community, but it doesn't matter because there's not much to be
>made in the first place.
You're right -- free market economies are more efficient in all ways.
>> I respect the right of idiots in groups, in addition to idiots
>> individually, to do stupid things. Over protective economic policies
>> ruin the economy. Slight incentives may (I'm not sure) have benefits
>> which outway the incentive to be inefficient.
>
>The incentives are themselves incentives to do things that are inefficient
>in fulfilling the desires of society. This can result in nothing but
>inefficiency.
They are incentives to do things which are economically inefficient.
They may or may not be outweighed by non-econimic results. An economic
incentive to preserve old buildings may be outweighed by the
non-economic result of a more beautiful city. (Whether the city has the
right to make such determinations has yet to be decided, though)
>> >I don't care if there are other localities available to move to. Doing
>so
>> >is not without cost. Nobody should have the right to take peoples'
>money
>> >and subject them to such policies on any level of government, no matter
>> >where they are.
>>
>> I disagree. When I moved to Berkeley and signed my lease, I agreed to
>> play by the local rules. If a private protection agency owned an area
>> of land, and sold perpetual, transferable leases to land in that area,
>> on the condition that the leasee obey the laws handed down by that
>> protection agency, then it's a legitimate government, and can do
>> anything provided for in the contract. We don't have an explicit
>> contract with the city, but I do think we have an implicit contract.
>> The question is what it says. I don't think we have even an implicit
>> contract with "the United States", so it's more or less irrelvent what
>> it says.
>
>The legitimacy of anarcho-capitalist protection agencies only stems from
>their ability to protect our liberty better than anything else available.
>The moment one of them became a government (which is more likely than not
>after about 300 years), all their legitimacy would be gone and no
>protection agencies would be better than any at all. It would be time for
>another political revolution.
Why is a government inherently illegitimate? I think we need to define
"government."
>Besides, the odds of an anarcho-capitalist protection agency ever being
>able to obtain all the land in a large metropolitan area through legitimate
>means are so astronomically low that we might as well not consider it.
>Even if there was only one agency in an area, which in and of itself would
>be almost impossibly unlikely if there had ever been at least 5 or 10, it
>is still increadibly unlikely that everyone in the area would accept the
>terms of a protection agency at all. With about 100,000 people, it's more
>likely than not that somebody, somewhere in the middle of the city, would
>choose not to buy into the system and just stock up on some heavy
>artillery.
>
>Even if the few people who didn't choose to sign up couldn't manage to
>protect their land from theft, they would still be the ones with the moral
>claim to it. That's why it's extremeley unlikely that something like a
>city government could ever have the kind of moral claim you say.... And
>even if it did, it would be beneficial to break it up for practical
>reasons.
What if someone later comes along and buys the land from a protection
agency which has taken over the property of a predatory protection
agency? It seems to me they would have a moral claim to the land, but
the original owner would have a claim to it as well. I think that
whoever stole the land has no claim to it, but everyone who legitimately
acquired it does. This leaves a method for a legitmate government to
arise from an illegitmate government.
>The real legal standing of cities, is in fact quite different from what you
>say. They are merely extensions of the county, given authority by charter,
>and the county is itself merely an extension of the state, the only
>independent body of government at work. The deed for land is in fact a
>deed for real and sole ownership with all the protections of the
>constitution. A city may not seize private property for public use with
>any less just compensation than any other level of government.
>
>Cities can merge, expand their borders, split up, and do other things with
>permission from the county, that places people in jurisdictions they did
>not consent to be in. They can also do things like imprison people for
>possession of alchohol, violating curfews, etc., which no private party can
>ever demand as violation for breach of a contract -- self-ownership is
>non-transferable. The worst they could do is fail to hold up their end of
>the bargain -- kick you off the property they let you use -- and collect
>monetary compensation for breaches in excess of this. But in fact, cities
>don't even have the authority private parties would have -- they can't
>banish people. As a government agency they are bound to respect the
>freedom of assembly and movement on both private and public property.
Well, then, the government is illegitimately restricting the rights of
individuals to delegate the right to banish people to agencies.
I think the argument about changing borders effectively demolishes any
argument that the cities are legitimate.
>An anarcho-capitalist protection agency that turned into a government as
>you said, would also not be a democracy. It would be a for-profit monopoly
>that would do things that made sense in terms of maximizing its profit. It
>would care about the vitality of the local economy. A democratic city
>governement with unlimited authority doesn't even do something as good as
>that -- it succumbs to special-interest pressures that benefit a few at the
>expense of the vitality of the entire region.
Probably not, but following customer feedback would be a good selling
point. Again, though, doing stupid things doesn't affect whether it's
legitimate.
>> I've got an essay kicking around in my mind that might clear some of
>> this up (or at least provide a better defined point of argument). I'll
>> have to try to get it written. The main idea is that people don't have
>> any rights, but agree to a government because it is efficient.
>
>That's funny. I wouldn't agree to something as inefficient as a
>government. Oh well, everyone's entitled to their own opinion.
Well, not government as we have now. Just in general, government is
more efficient than private bargaining because it reduces transaction
costs. Protection agencies are a form of government, though they don't
have the monopoly. There may be areas where the monopoly and economies
of scale outway the cost of lost rights.
>> I really
>> don't like the idea of anarchy (even with protection agencies) because
>> it doesn't provide a moral basis for saying what power a protection
>> agency has over people who are not clients, and where its power to
>> enforce its contracts ends, such as, Can clients leave the area where a
>> protection agency is active (possibly competing with other agencies)
>> when they own money to the protection agency? Can the protection agency
>> legitimately enslave them for failure to pay?
>
>The moral basis isn't provided by the system. It's already there whether
>it's adhered to or not. The reason anarcho-capitalism is good is that it
>produces a moral state of affairs.
well...I like absolutes, and government provides and absolute frame of
reference for morality (murder is against the law, working for wages is
legal). Stupid argument, but oh, well.
>You have to remember that there would be no government to enforce
>contracts. The protection agencies would have to do it themselves, and
>other agencies would not want to honor ones that kept potential customers
>captive to their competitors. Practically speaking, you could not enslave
>someone for failure to pay, because it's more profitable to serve a free
>man than to own a slave, and if you won't do this, someone else will -- and
>they'll stand up for their right to do so with the threat of force.
But it's more profitable to own a slave than to lose a customer to
someone else. (possibly)
I think the strongest argument in favor of protection agencies providing
reasonable contracts and following them is that we're better of than a
single monopoly who is free to sweep its contract under the rug when it
gets in the way (oh, we added a few exception to the first amendment
while you were away)
So, proven, the only possible advantage of government is the economic
advantage of being a monopoly. This doesn't mean that the only
alternative to government is the protection agency as most people think
of it. A commune is an alternative, so is a city owning a bunch of land
and selling perpetual, transferable leases under teh condition that the
leasee submit to the control of the city. "Coercion" seems pretty
meaningless when you consider that there is nothing to stop a
protection agency from exerting coercion. It may be protection agencies
would be better off without using coercion, but this just makes it a
practical matter, not the main principle behind limiting government.
>> Some things I'm still not sure of:
>> Do people have any inherent (natural) rights, or are rights only a
>> relic of government?
>
>My current take: No, and they're not a relic of government either. Rights
>come from society itself, not government or nature. An ethical system is
>merely a set of rules for interaction between members of society, and it
>gains its authority by its ability to continue providing us with what we
>value over the course of history. This is not just in the immediate
>consequences of its rules, but also moral conclusions created by more fully
>developing its ideas in the future.
So you are saying that a "right" is something that someone may morally
do, and no one may morally prevent them from doing so. Rights being an
outcome of morality is the same as the natural rights argument, though
rephrased.
Either people have natural rights, derived from some moral system, or
"rights" is just a term used to phrase the powers of a government. Or,
there is a third option. I don't see how rights arise from society,
though.
>> Is "the right to govern" a legitimate right to tie to (real) property,
>> or can the right to govern only arise from the voluntary agreement to an
>> explicit contract?
>
>I would say that the right to govern does not exist at all because
>government is characterized by a monopoly of force -- something that nobody
>should have the right to establish and which in any case makes any explicit
>contract of submission suspect. (It is more likely chosen because of
>threats than by voluntary choice.)
Okay, make that, "Can a hypothetical 'right to govern' be tied to land
in such a way that the land can only sold subject to the condition that
the buyer agree to cede certain rights to some agency, or can rights
only be ceded as a requirement of a voluntary and explicit contract?"
>> Does acceptance of and participation in a form of government imply
>> agreement to the nebulous social contract?
>
>No, it means participating in government helps you achieve your goals. The
>only thing a social contract isn't is in fact a contract. It's not a
>contract because it's offered under coercive circumstances, and even if
>it's never explicity agreed to, it's assumed anyway.
>
>Maybe there are certain inherant moral responsibilities people have, but
>this certainly doesn't qualify as a contract -- and these responsibilities
>really have to be inherant. They can't be some kind of implicit agreement.
> I would put respecting other peoples' choices at the top of the list.
I'm not sure that I can legitimately expect others to adhere to my moral
system. Most moral systems are mutually contradictory, and I don't
think that mine has any inherent superiority.
>> Is there any method of establishing a government which will have a
>> legitimate claim to exert coercion over residents of an area who have
>> not explicitly agreed to obey that government?
>
>Perhaps if it does the best job of protecting people from private force and
>the private force would be worse than the government force -- but the
>moment the government becomes worse it loses its legitimacy.
I'm not comfortable with evaluating governments based on practical
consequences because to do that I have to assume the superiority of my
own moral system. My moral system says abortion is okay, someone else's
might say abortion is murder. I would think a system which protects
doctors from assasins is best, while someone else might think that a
system which hangs those who perform abortion for murder is best.
I think it's either a legitimate government, with coercion, is possible,
in which case we just need to determine how it can be established, or no
legitimate government is possible, in which case it doesn't matter how
good the government is, because it's illegitimate.
-Kevin