5. Reflections
1. Questions about identity in Buddhist studies (for example, related to schools/lineages) seem very confused, in part due to an initial failure to specify between emic and etic definitions, and confusion regarding the function of the definitions (ex: ostensive definition to further another research project, or definition as the outcome/goal of a research project).
How to go beyond this confusion? Perhaps: look at issues of theories of defintions, identity per se, ethnic identity, and lineage evolution. The following sources could be useful: Ethnic Identity in Tang China (2007); Is Taiwan Chinese (Melissa Brown) and related references to literature by S. Harrell; the classic Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (1969, F. Barth); various references to sources on lineages througout time from the J. Watson-edited book on mortuary ritual and from M. Freedman such as Chinese Lineage and Society (1966); updated ideas of lineage in Emily Martin’s book and Jun Jing’s book; also see S. Weinstein’s book on Tang Buddhism and his entry in the Encylopedia of Religion. Basic strategy would be: (1) theoretically, clarify how the term/definition should function, (2) expand scope of discussion to identity in general, w/ comparisons to ethnic identity, (3) locate the term “lineage” in diachronic framework, and (4) supplement with concrete examples of how, in Buddhism, lineages were spoken of explicity and also the implicit entailments of discourse on lineage.
2. To some extent, Madhyamikas and other philosophers are the standard against which we compare many of the texts we've read in class. The following have been mentioned in class during discussion of important philosophical points, which our texts often allude to and touch on but don't really dive into:
- Dignaga's logic
- Nagarjuna, as understood by Paul Williams, by Richard Hayes [perhaps we should add by R. Robinson]
- Paul Griffiths on "mindless" meditative states
- Jizang, Sengzhao
- L. Gomez, his article "Proto-Madhyamika in the Pali Canon" in Philosophy East and West 26 (2), pp.137-65.
By trying to read our Chinese texts as philosophical texts, do we thereby assume they contain "axiomatic" rather than "case" knowledge?
3. Sharf evidentally understands Nagarjuna as not advocating a correspondence theory of truth. I think his reading of Nagarjuna is influenced strongly by the later Wittgenstein’s writings, such as Philosophical Investigations. What is not entirely clear to me is whether this would entail the following: (1) Nagarjuna does not have a theory of truth at all, or (2) Nagarjuna has (or his writings entail) a non-correspondence theory of truth. It seems that (1) is the case if we understand Nagarjuna to be saying that all statements are ultimately self-defeating. Then of course we might have very standard problems with a totalizing system (or just on universal, reflexive proposition) that implicates and potentially undermines itself, the same as we have with Marxism, etc. If (2) were the case we would need to work out what kind of truth theory Nagarjuna’s writings presuppose: a pragmatic, coherence, or deflationary theory of truth?
4. Sharf suggests that Chan texts may be more “phenomenological” than Indian treatises, which are characterized more by logical argumentation. And yet “phenomenological” does not mean “experiential.” Examples: narratives (such as the Huike/BD dialog) that led the reader to imagine the propositions “let go of your mind,” “give me your mind”—these speak directly to the reader and are “phenomenological” in a sense, and not really arguments. Question: can we specify with more precision differences between what is means by “phenomenological” and “experiential”? Partial answer: In class Sharf mentions that he uses “phenomenological” because he has a better understanding of the philosophical projects around this term (he mentions Maurice Merleau-Ponty, for instance). He’s less certain what’s meant by “experience,” which he understands is used more in psychological, rather than philosophical, discourse.
5. At one point Sharf mentions that if we were to agree with certain philosophical moves in Buddhism that would end up “just mystifying the issue.” (Clarify several examples of this.) But, couldn’t we see mystification as an essential quality of religious discourse? Without mystification, people don’t have the incentive to chew on certain condundrums for decades and across multiple generations. [References: Spiro on Burmese Buddhists, Boyer on function of doctrines, Sperber on two sources of authority.]
6. There is a spectrum of responses regarding how Chinese and Japanese understood koans. When someone moves on from one koan to another, have they understood anything, or just learned a way not to get caught up in it, which they can only do if they can at some point really get caught up in it? For the Chinese monk Dahui in his later years, koans ultimately did not have cognitive value; they were to be recited just as one would recite a mantra.
7. Are intellectual exercises in Buddhism part of the path itself, are just a preliminary step to clarifying the path? For Gelupas (also see writings by Huntington--such as the intro to his book, and Dreyfus), thinking and debating doctrines is itself treading the path. And how does this relate to koan practice, esp. once koans were sytematized by Hakuin in the Rinzai school?
8. What are pan-Buddhist issues that crop up in various cultural settings? For Sharf, these include the following: (1) condundrums regarding the relationship between the path and the goal; how the conditioned can lead to the unconditioned? [Note: or the caused lead to the uncaused—R. Walpola is vague on this in his basic primer on Pali Buddhism, too.], and (2) issues about mediation between the two truths (which, in Sharf’s view, is also common to Saussurian semantics, and which B. Faure takes on).
9. Sharf suggests that the relationship between Indian and Chinese Buddhism could be compared to a grain of sand in a clam, but that would be to overstate the differences a bit too much. A grain of sand in a clam eventually produces a pearl, but the sand is not a component, much less the "core," of the pearl.
10. Sharf mentions different kinds of iccantikas: those lacking Buddha nature, those with unfixed natures, and interestingly, bodhisattvas. He mentions these bodhisattva iccantikas might have been mentioned in an old article he wrote. I wonder if the "iccantika bodhisattva" might answer John McRae's query on H-Buddhism some time ago, about whether or not bodhisattvas ever really renounce full buddhahood in order to fulfill their vows?
11. Feng Youlan was a student of Tang Yongtong, and someone even mentioned Feng might have married Tang's daughter or something like that?
12. Zongmi is important as a "syncretist," in part because he influenced later important thinkers such as Yongming Yanshou and Chinul. [And it's said Zhuhong was influenced by Yongming Yanshou.]
13. A synoptic text is a text in which parallel passages in different versions are listed side by side in columns. The word comes from the "synoptic Gospels." Could we make a synoptic text of the Platform Sutra (DH version plus Song vulgate version)?
14. Are there self-validating enlightenment experiences? If so, why does everyone who has an experience want to run off to have someone validate it?
15. In Buddhaghosa's Vissudhimagga, Sharf believes it's hard to see vipassana as anything other than the result of bhavana (rather than as a method per se).
16. Collins, in Selfless Persons, discusses "taboo" topics in Buddhism, things that are not supposed to be asked. Interesting project: tabulate all taboos in different branches, time periods of Buddhism; also cf Jordan's comments on this for sectarian religion.
17. In class we discussed whether xiang4 相 could be translated "characteristic" (=Skt. laksana) (in Zongmi reading). My opinion: for our texts, unless "I" or "person" could be seen as characteristics/properties of a dharma--which is doubtful--then better to go with "form" or "perceived category" or something like that.
18. It’s recommended that titles of works be written in English, not in transliteration or with abbreviations, so that non-specialists have an easier time reading your work. For example, write Patriarch’s Hall Collection, not Zutangji, not ZTJ. But it’s a good idea in your own draft to write ZTJ, etc. and then use the find/replace function at the end, replacing with the translation you want to use.
19. Sectarian identity and related ancestral cult: I think it might be useful to look not only at family lineage cults, but also at the imperial ancestral cult for any given time period to see how that relates to religious sectarian cults.
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