Fiery Words, Frozen Conflict: Resolving Armenia and Azerbaijan’s Dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh

“An entire generation grew up in a climate of mutual hatred and hostility, not knowing it is possible to live in a different way….the battlefield…has entered the souls of each and every Azerbaijani and Armenian. War has crawled into our existence. It has become an everyday routine.” 

Armenia and Azerbaijan’s ongoing conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh has touched everyone from billionaires like the Azeri Farkhad Akhmedov to those who live on the border between the two nations. As Akhmedov describes, the dispute is more than a political conflict; it reaches deep into the psyche of many Azeris and Armenians. Resentment towards the opposition has imprinted itself onto citizens of both countries. Solving a conflict rooted in aggressive nationalism passed down through generations requires more than a political solution. Armenia and Azerbaijan need to humanize each other through cross-cultural programs and changes in political rhetoric to create an environment that is more conducive to political compromise.

Roots of the Conflict

Nagorno Karabakh is a 1700 square mile region (about the size of Delaware) within Azerbaijan. For centuries, it was populated by Christian Armenians and Turkic Azeris who lived in relative peace together. In the 19th century, the Soviet Union took control and recognized Nagorno-Karabakh as an autonomous region. The region was still administered by Azerbaijan, but it was dominated ethnically by Christian Armenians while Azerbaijan was, and still is, mainly Muslim Azeri. The ethnic divide between ruler and subject made conflict almost inevitable. 

Clear signs of conflict emerged during the Soviet Union’s decline in the late 20th century. Nagorno-Karabakh’s government passed a resolution to join Armenia in 1988, prompting fighting between ethnically Armenian secessionists backed by the Armenian government and Azerbaijan. The war escalated in 1991 as the Soviet Union collapsed entirely; Nagorno-Karabakh then declared independence, though no nation recognizes this status. The war continued until a 1994 ceasefire, but the damage was done. Not only did 20,000 people die and thousands more, including the Azeri population in Nagorno-Karabakh which made up about 25% of the region, were displaced, but the foundation for the bitter hatred between Armenians and Azeri was set. The Armenian secessionists had also gained control of not only Nagorno-Karabakh, but seven surrounding territories in Azerbaijan.

The ethnic divisions underlying the conflict are reflected in the demographics of Armenia and Azerbaijan today. Armenia’s population is 98.1% ethnically Armenian and 1.2% Kurd while Azerbaijan is 91.6% Azeri and only 1.3% Armenian. Nagorno-Karabakh is 95% Armenian. The stark ethnic division lends itself to the hate of the “other” fostered by politicians on both sides. Religious majorities in the two countries reflect a similar trend. Armenia is about 93% Christian while Azerbaijan is 97% Muslim.

Foreign Actors

Armenia and Azerbaijan’s bloody war gained the attention of the international community. In 1992, the United States, Russia, and France formed a coalition known as the OSCE Minsk Group to help negotiate a peaceful conclusion to the conflict. Success has been limited as both Armenia and Azerbaijan have backed out of Minsk Group-moderated negotiations. Azerbaijan has accused the Mink Group of favoring Armenia while Armenia often thinks they have to give up too much. Additionally, the Minsk Group does not work with Nagorno-Karabakh’s government as it is not recognized as an independent nation, leaving out a key member of the conflict.

Turkey’s backing of Azerbaijan adds further complications. In 1993, Turkey closed its border with Armenia to support Azerbaijan, stunting Armenia’s economic growth. According to one estimate, opening the border would generate a 2.7% increase in GNP growth for Armenia. Azerbaijan hopes to use the loss of trade with Turkey to push Armenia to make concessions. It has not worked. The alliance has actually made reaching a resolution harder as some Armenians view the connection between the two Muslim-majority nations as resembling the circumstances of the 1915 Armenian Genocide. 

The Genocide’s origin can be traced to when a group of young, military officers, known as the Young Turks, came to power in the Ottoman Empire (located in modern-day Turkey) in 1908. They aimed to renew Muslim and Turkish culture within the crumbling empire. When World War II began, the Christian Armenians in the northern portion of the empire sided with Russia while the Ottomans backed Germany. The Young Turks viewed this as a security threat and responded by passing laws allowing for the confiscation of Armenian property and weapons. The measures escalated as the Ottoman Empire killed about 1.5 million Armenians while displacing about a hundred thousand more. The fear of a Muslim majority (Turkey and Azerbaijan both have larger populations than Armenia) uniting to again persecute an Armenian minority is an underlying fear for some Armenians. Armenia has worked on normalizing relations with Turkey, but Turkey’s involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute just sows more distrust into the region.

A Thawing Conflict

Since 1994, the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute has been described as a Frozen Conflict, a dispute which lacks consistent violence, but where a resolution has not been reached to the satisfaction or recognition of the two sides. Fighting has largely been reduced in Nagorno-Karabakh, though both sides have infringed on the 1994 ceasefire on multiple occasions. 

Since the ceasefire, progress towards peace has been halting, partially due to both nations’ tendency to rally their citizens around Nagorno-Karabakh whenever support was lacking. These words turned to violence during the 2016 April War, a four-day war that many observers believe Azerbaijan initiated to distract their citizens from their economic issues. Nevertheless, Azerbaijan had success; over a hundred Armenian soldiers died, demonstrating the results of Azerbaijan’s oil-funded, increased military expenditure. Additionally, Russia backed Armenia, selling them weapons at reduced prices, while Turkey sided with Azerbaijan, a continuation of traditional alliances. 

Recent political changes have also affected the conflict. Though not the most representative democracy, with one dominant political party and a president (Ilham Aliyev) who has been in power since 2003, Azerbaijan’s government has remained relatively constant in recent years. Armenia, on the other hand, underwent political upheaval in 2018 when former journalist turned politician Nikol Pashinyan led a series of popular protests against the Armenian government which was rife with charges of corruption and abuse of power. The protests came to be known as the Velvet Revolution: named after the Czech peaceful transition of power which also harnessed the non-violent power of public demonstrations to push a transition from a one-party government to a democracy. Pashinyan was elected as president and has spent a majority of his time in office removing corrupt figures from his government.

Pashinyan remains popular today but has reached the inevitability of having to deal with Nagorno Karabakh. Because Pashinyan has so much support, there is hope that he can afford to make a compromise to end the dispute. Some progress has been made. Incidents of violence have decreased along the border between Azerbaijan and Armenia, a hotline between the two leaders has been established, and the nations have agreed to stop shooting across one heavily-populated part of the border. However, despite a series of relatively successful talks where both nations ‘agreed upon the necessity of taking concrete measures to prepare the populations for peace,’ inflammatory rhetoric and a refusal to budge on essential demands clouds hope for the peace process. Pashinyan has fallen back upon his predecessors’ strategy of building support through uniting around Nagorno-Karabakh. In August, he declared that “Artsakh is Armenia,” using Artsakh, the Arminian name for Nagorno-Karabakh. Pashinyan has also reiterated that “the territory-in-exchange-for-peace” formula would not be accepted in a compromise. While this appeases the Armenian mindset that giving up land would dishonor those who lost their lives defending Nagorno-Karabakh, it puts Pashinyan in direct opposition to Azerbaijan’s demands: the removal of Armenian soldiers from Azerbaijan to ensure the territorial integrity of the nation.

The entire region is precariously positioned. Should the peace process stall, the price of oil drop again, or an incidental shooting escalates, Azerbaijan and Armenia are positioned to engage in a deadly conflict.

The Countries Today

Besides the stark ethnic and religious divisions between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the economic difference between the nations is glaring as well. Azerbaijan’s GDP is $46.94 billion, almost four times larger than Armenia’s $12.43 billion GDP even though Armenia’s economy is growing at a faster rate. Azerbaijan’s 5% unemployment rate and 5% of the population under the unemployment line is also considerably more favorable than Armenia’s 18.9% unemployment rate and 32% of the population under the unemployment line. Azerbaijan’s relative success stems from its oil production and exportation; the nation produces about 800,000 barrels of oil per day. However, the drop in oil prices in 2016 hit the country especially hard, leading to extreme devaluation of their currency. 

With oil prices generally rising again, Azerbaijan has been able to increase its spending on its military. Armenia, on the other hand, continues to lag behind due to Russia’s stalling economy, one of its most important trade allies, and the closed borders with potential trade partners in Turkey, and of course, Azerbaijan.

Since the early 2000s, an arms race has unfolded between Azerbaijan and Armenia with Azerbaijan increasing its military spending by more than twenty-fold, leading their president to boast that their 2014 military budget was twice as large as Armenia’s total budget. Political posturing aside, Azerbaijan does pace Armenia with a defense budget of $1.6 billion to Armenia’s budget of $512 million. Overall, the increases in military spending by both nations leave the region vulnerable to a conflict that would be more devastating than the April War.

Cooling Down Rhetoric

Cross-cultural programs and less divisive political rhetoric could help create an environment where compromise is more probable. The current peace process is unlikely to succeed. It is unrealistic for the nations to reach a solution that satisfies both parties only through political bartering. The Madrid Principles of 2007 exemplify this situation. The Minsk Group negotiated a potential compromise that included the return of territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh, Nagorno-Karabakh’s status to be resolved through a vote, and for all refugees to be able to return to their homes. However, both Azerbaijan and Armenia did not make this compromise out of fear of alienating their citizens. Armenians view conceding territory as dishonoring those who died for their cause while Azeris unite around a shared sense of indignity stemming from Armenia’s occupation of their land. Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s leaders cater to these desires to maintain support, leading to hardline positions that allow little room for compromise.

This problem is self-inflicted. Political leaders on both sides continue to use communal identities as symbols to consolidate support. The reliance on demonizing the enemy has created extreme ideological polarization and institutionalized dislike that has made a top-down solution unlikely to succeed. Nevertheless, recent progress, such as the reduction in ceasefire violations, reveals an opportunity to lower the conflict’s ‘basic rivalry level’ or the amount of tension that exists ‘normally’ between the two nations.

Decreasing the tension between the two nations requires both Pashinyan and Aliyev to change their rhetoric. The status quo of trying to find a solution in a meeting, then demonizing the opponent to the public just creates more vitriol, pushing the two sides farther apart while also decreasing trust. Urging patience and compromise does not quite have the same invigorating effect on citizens, but it discourages them from thinking of the opposition as a hated enemy. Both leaders could afford any potential drop in popularity stemming from this change. Aliyev has consolidated his hold on power considering he has been Prime-Minister for 16 years and Pashiyan’s popularity remains high. Peace is worth it.

Soccer and Students

A bottom-up solution would decrease tension between Azeris and Azerbaijanis more effectively than a top-down fix. Engaging citizens of both nations to reduce prejudice towards the other can take a variety of forms, but sports and students offer two interesting mediums.

Sports can help bridge political conflicts. During the Cold War, the United States’ ping pong team traveled to China to play in the World Ping Pong Championships. While the Chinese routed the Americans, the teams became friends and helped thaw the previously frozen dialogue between the two nations. Under the banner of ‘sportsmanship,’ the two teams showed how citizens of both nations had more in common than they thought. 

Sports could also play an influential role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Soccer is one of the biggest sports in both Armenia and Azerbaijan, yet the national teams do not play each other. An Armenian soccer player even refused to play in a European club tournament final held in Azerbaijan. Considering how soccer could bring a sense of normalcy to fans, Azerbaijan and Armenia should begin to regularly play each other, perhaps first behind closed doors and at a neutral location to reduce conflict risks. The games should be highlighted with messaging about sportsmanship, showing citizens of either nation what they have in common and how they can come together through soccer. Small steps like this could help put the two nations on track to normalizing relations and building trust with each other. 

Laurence Broers, the Caucasus program director with Chatham House, suggests increasing facetime between Azeris and Armenians as another solution. This option exemplifies the tenets of Contact Theory, a concept introduced by Gordon W. Allport in 1954 to reduce prejudice and conflict between groups through interpersonal contact between members of the two different groups. Allport argues these interactions should be structured by certain criteria such as equal status of interacting members. Contact theory works as positive contact experiences, structured and unstructured, have been shown to reduce prejudice. 

Citizens of both nations should interact more to reduce their prejudices towards the other. One place to implement Contact Theory is through students. Increasing interactions between the younger generations creates a more constructive, future environment as they grow older. Israel and Palestine offer an example of one potential implementation. Earlier this year the largest ever congress of Israeli and Palestinian students gathered to discuss trust-building measures. The congress’ goal was to push political leaders to engage in peacemaking efforts. Similar events, in addition to student exchange and other cross-cultural programs, should occur in Armenia and Azerbaijan in order to increase personal contacts between students. Embracing Contact Theory could help decrease tension between Armenians and Azeri, creating an environment where compromise would be more likely.

Implications for the Region

Solving this conflict could reinvigorate the Caucasus region, boosting the world economy. Should a new, peaceful normal be reached, Turkey might even be able to open its borders to Armenia, stimulating the Caucus nation’s economy. For Azerbaijan, peace would help increase the stability of its economy as increased conflict would disrupt its exportation of oil. 

Maintaining peace is also critical for Europe. Some of the main ways that oil flows to Europe are through Russia, Iran, and Azerbaijan. With the shaky relations between the West and the former two nations, Europe is semi-reliant on Azerbaijan. A violent conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia could put Europe’s oil supply at risk as oil pipelines run nearby Nagorno-Karabakh. This would force further reliance on Russia or Iran, a less than desirable outcome. 

A violent conflict could also escalate quickly into an inter-regional issue. Turkey’s continued support of Azerbaijan makes its involvement in any war over Nagorno-Karabakh more likely. This kind of conflict would be catastrophic for the area. 

Thankfully, a few Non-Governmental Organizations are currently working on bottom-up solutions, similar to the plan described above. For instance, Anna Hakobyan, the wife of Nikol Pashinyan, founded the Women for Peace initiative. The initiative focuses on increasing peer-to-peer interactions between the two nations and pushing for more women to be involved in the peace process. Hakobyan’s organization has the potential to decrease some of the animosity between the two sides and involve a greater part of the population in working towards a solution, hopefully leading to more normalized, peaceful relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia and ending the loss of life stemming from this decades-old conflict.

Featured Image Source: Euractiv, Reuters