Sean Gailmard: Research Curriculum Vitae • Google Scholar profile Research interests: Institutional development; political accountability; bureaucratic politics; formal modeling; historical political economy Books Learning While Governing: Expertise and Accountability in the Executive Branch, with John Patty, University of Chicago Press, 2012 (Chicago Studies in American Politics series). This book presents a framework for analyzing bureaucratic accountability problems when the expertise bureaucracies possess is (endogenously) developed rather than (exogenously) given. Almost all prior thinking on bureaucratic accountability assumes bureaucrats are experts at some facet of policy making or administration. We consider the political and institutional foundations of that expertise. Our fundamental point is that political principals can actually benefit from institutions that appear to insulate bureaucratic agents from their control. The book combines formal modeling on these issues and analysis of cases from the historical development of the executive branch in the U.S. Winner, 2013 William H. Riker Prize for Best Book in Political Economy (Political Economy section, American Political Science Association) Winner, 2017 Herbert A. Simon Prize for Best Book in Public Administration published 5-10 years prior (Public Administration section, American Political Science Association) Statistical Modeling and Inference for Social Science, Cambridge University Press, 2014 (Analytical Methods in Social Research series). This book presents elements of probability theory, statistical modeling, and statistical inference from the standpoint of applications in social science. It emphasizes statistics and statistical models as tools to express and identify relationships of theoretical interest in social science. The exposition is self-contained, emphasizes both technical foundations and intuition, and is suitable for 1st year Ph.D. students with little prior exposure to theory or practice of statistical modeling. Data sets for chapter exercises Agents of Empire: English Imperial Governance and the Making of American Institutions, Cambridge University Press, 2024 (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions series). Political institutions in the English New World were neither direct imports from England, nor the home-grown creations of autonomous colonists. Instead, they emerged from efforts of the British Crown to assert control over a colonial empire in the face of acute limitations on British state and military capacity. I explore the strategic dilemmas facing the constrained Crown in its attempts to assert control. The institutional structures that emerged from these dilemmas form the building blocks of legislative power, separation of powers, federalism, judicial review, and other institutions that comprise the American polity today. Introductory chapter Papers on Historical Political Economy Building a New Imperial State: The Strategic Foundations of Separation of Powers in America, American Political Science Review 2017 Distributive Politics and Congressional Voting: Public Lands Reform in the Jacksonian Era, with Jeff Jenkins, Public Choice 2018 Imperial Politics, English Law, and the Strategic Foundations of Constitutional Review in America, American Political Science Review 2019 Game Theory and the Study of American Political Development, Public Choice 2019 (special issue on Causal Inference and American Political Development) Imperial Governance and the Growth of Legislative Power in America, American Journal of Political Science 2019 Theory, History, and Political Economy, Journal of Historical Political Economy 2021 Formal Models in Historical Political Economy, Oxford Handbook of Historical Political Economy 2023 Papers on Bureaucracy & Bureaucratic Accountability Expertise, Subversion, and Bureaucratic Discretion, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 2002 Whose Ear to Bend? Information Sources and Venue Choice in Policy-Making, with Fred Boehmke and John Patty, Quarterly Journal of Political Science 2006 Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise, with John Patty, American Journal of Political Science 2007 Multiple Principals and Oversight of Bureaucratic Policy-Making, Journal of Theoretical Politics 2009 Discretion Rather Than Rules: Choice of Instruments to Control Bureaucratic Policy-Making, Political Analysis 2009 Politics, Principal-Agent Problems, and Public Service Motivation, International Public Management Journal 2010 Formal Models of Bureaucratic Politics, with John Patty, Annual Review of Political Science 2012 Business as Usual: Interest Group Access and Representation across Policy-Making Venues, with Fred Boehmke and John Patty, Journal of Public Policy 2013 Stovepiping, with John Patty, Journal of Theoretical Politics 2013 Accountability and Principal Agent Models, Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability 2014 McNollgast: Review and Analysis, Oxford Handbook of Classics in Public Policy 2015 Participation, Process, and Policy: The Informational Value of Politicized Judicial Review, with John Patty, Journal of Public Policy 2016 Giving Advice vs. Making Decisions: Transparency, Information, and Delegation [online appendix], with John Patty, Political Science Research and Methods 2018 Bureaucratic Agency Problems and Legislative Oversight, with Janna Rezaee and Abby Wood, Journal of Theoretical Politics 2023 Papers on Legislative Politics Negative Agenda Control in the Senate and House of Representatives: Fingerprints of Majority Party Power, with Jeff Jenkins, Journal of Politics 2007 Minority Party Power in the Senate and House of Representatives, with Jeff Jenkins, in Why Not Parties? Party Effects in the U.S. Senate, University of Chicago Press 2008 Intercameral Bargaining and Intracameral Organization in Legislatures, with Tom Hammond, Journal of Politics 2011 Coalition Structure and Legislative Innovation in American National Government, with Jeff Jenkins, in Living Legislation: Political Development and Contemporary American Politics, University of Chicago Press 2012 Building a New Imperial State: The Strategic Foundations of Separation of Powers in America, American Political Science Review 2017 Distributive Politics and Congressional Voting: Public Lands Reform in the Jacksonian Era, with Jeff Jenkins, Public Choice 2018 Imperial Governance and the Growth of Legislative Power in America, American Journal of Political Science 2019 Papers on Electoral Accountability Agency Problems, Electoral Institutions, and the 17th Amendment, with Jeff Jenkins, American Journal of Political Science 2009 Accountability and Principal Agent Models, Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability 2014 Optimism, Pessimism, and Dialogue in Electoral Accountability Research, PS: Political Science and Politics 2019 (symposium on The Democratic Dilemma after 20 years) Preventing Prevention [online appendix], with John Patty, American Journal of Political Science 2019 Papers on Collective Choice An Experimental Comparison of Collective Choice Procedures for Excludable Public Goods, with Thomas R. Palfrey, Journal of Public Economics 2005 Self-Interest, Inequality, and Entitlement in Majoritarian Decision-Making, with Daniel Diermeier, Quarterly Journal of Political Science 2006 Arrow's Theorem on Single Peaked Preference Domains, with John Patty and Maggie Penn, in The Political Economy of Democracy 2009 Moral Bias in Large Elections: Theory and Experimental Evidence, with Tim Feddersen and Alvaro Sandroni, American Political Science Review 2009 Manipulation and Single Peakedness: A General result, with Maggie Penn and John Patty, American Journal of Political Science 2011 Multidimensional Agenda Setting, with John Patty, in progress Home | Teaching