My research divides into historical work centering around Gottlob Frege and his philosophical contemporaries, and non-historical work centering around values and norms connected with truth. But the two parts are closely connected: what interests me most about Frege and other figures in his historical period is their treatment of the values and norms connected with truth.
See here for more about this work.
Some long papers:
- “Frege on the Generality of Logical Laws” is about what Frege thinks logic is. It is also in the European Journal of Philosophy.
- “Frege’s Critical Arguments for Axioms” is about how Frege thinks you can be justified in accepting logical axioms. It will soon also be in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
- “Why Can’t What Is True Be Valuable?” is about why there are no serious obstacles to seeing the things that are true as themselves valuable, rather than just the things we do with them. It is also in Synthese.
Some short papers:
- Frege’s Radical Anti-Psychologism is about Frege’s reasons for thinking psychology has nothing to do with logic.
- Post-Truth and Valuing the Truth is about about what valuing the truth has to do with today’s post-truth tendencies.
- Logical Pluralism and Normativity: Conflict and Collapse is about why extant normative arguments against logical pluralism fail (though I think there are probably better ones.)
If you ask me, I will also send you some papers that are currently under review, including:
- One about Frege’s philosophy of science.
- One about Frege’s metaphysics.
- One about conceptual engineering.
- One about the normativity of logic.