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Rants and Raves

Link to Spanish translation by Claudia Monteys.

Herewith, occasional and largely informal commentary on issues relating to psychology as a discipline and a profession, including mental-health policy issues, beginning with a sort of haiku:

I don't blog and I
Don't tweet.  I'm not on Facebook
And I'm not Linked In.

The Red and the Blue

When I was in college at Colgate University (1966-1970), I joined a fraternity -- the Greek houses were the basis of campus social life, and Colgate didn't, at the time, offer much by way of housing for "unaffiliated" upperclassmen (it does much better now, partly by buying up the houses themselves and pretty much abolishing the Greek system, which is a good thing).  But it wasn't that kind of fraternity: it housed an eclectic collection of swimmers, liberals, and gays (though this last was pretty much unspoken), and there was no blackball system -- new members were chosen by random selection from interested freshmen.  And there was no hazing, either.  Instead, each new member was given a task to perform.  Colgate separated its semester by a "January Special Studies Period", now abandoned, in which students pursued some individual or group project under the auspices of a faculty member.  I was deeply involved in music (singing bass in the Glee Club, playing French horn in the orchestra), and also very involved in the Episcopal Church, and I got it into my head that I would compose a Mass.  In one month.  With no particular knowledge of music theory -- though I did buy Walter Piston's treatise on Orchestration.  It was an entirely stupid idea, and the final product was execrable.  But it is a tribute to Colgate, and to Donald Wheelock (now retired from teaching at Smith), the music professor who supervised the project with good humor, that I was put on a long leash.

Anyway, when the older members found out about this, I was assigned (by Gerry LaCavera '69) to compose a song as a pledge project -- on the theme of "Raccoon Shit is Blue" (this was a fraternity, after all, and it was the 60s).  I ended up composing only the verses, which I sang to the tune of "Smoke Gets in Your Eyes" (originally written by Jerome Kern and Otto Harbach, and famously recorded by The Platters):

They asked me how I knew
My true love was true
I of course replied,
"Something here inside
Cannot be denied"

They said someday you'll find
All who love are blind
When your heart's on fire
You must realize
Smoke gets in your eyes

So I chaffed them and I gaily laughed
To think they could doubt my love
Yet today, my love has flown away
I am without my love

Now laughing friends deride
Tears I cannot hide
So I smile and say,
"When a lovely flame dies,
Smoke gets in your eyes"

Smoke gets in your eyes
They asked me how I knew
Raccoon shit was blue
I looked up and said,
"Horseshit you've been fed,
Raccoon shit is red

They threw me on my ass
Out upon the grass
Saying "Join us too,
Join the motley crew,
Raccoon shit is blue"

Through the day and through the night
We kept discussing
All the time omitting facts
And mostly cussing

Now, sadly I replied
"This I can't abide,
I just can't agree
With what you just said,
Raccoon shit is red"

Raccoon shit is red

Reprint Requests

There was a time when academics would mail postcards to each other requesting reprints of journal articles.  Well, not so much anymore.  Most journal articles are available on line, and most of the very few reprint requests academics receive now come over very prosaic email.  But once in a while, you receive a reprint request that is so striking that you hang onto it.  Link to a few of my favorites.

Mental Health Parity

Link to a letter to the editor published in the New York Times (December 15, 2001), and expanded commentary.


Truth Serum

Link to a letter to the editor of the Wall Street Journal (submitted June 20, 2002).


On Changing the Name of the American Psychological Society

A very ill-conceived idea.  Link to PDF.


Great Books in Psychology

On January 13, 2005, I circulated a message to three listservs, the Society of Experimental Psychologists, the Society for a Science of Clinical Psychology, and the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, inviting listmembers to contribute short lists of fondly remembered, perhaps life- or career-changing textbooks, read either as undergraduates or graduate students, along with a sentence or two about the effect they had on them.  Link to the results of the poll.


Social Neuroscience

Does Neuroscience Constrain Social-Psychological Theory?  Link to an invited commentary published in Dialogue, the newsletter of SPSP (2006).


On EBPs in Mental Health

Regarding my chapter in the volume, Evidence-Based Practices in Mental Health, a few individuals have written to question my strong position favoring EBPs.

Correspondent #1:  I am a graduate student... reading Evidence-Based Practices in Mental Health.  In reading your paper, entitled "Scientific Research", I was struck with a few questions that I am hoping you may be able to answer.
You make the statement that until very recently the medical profession had few effective treatments for diseases, thus most treatments were palliative in nature.  Your implication is that this treatment is not effective and certainly not respected.  Of course ideally treatments in both the medical and psychological profession would "cure" patients, but it is often not a possibility.  When that is the case, how is it not beneficial to receive palliative care for physical or mental ailments?  

I don't mean to imply that palliative treatments aren't effective and not respected.  When a disease is incurable, palliation is one possible approach.  But I think that the goal of medicine, including mental health, should be to move beyond palliation with all deliberate speed -- to cure disease when possible, and when it is not, to maximize symptom relief; actively help the patient manage chronic illness, and promote rehabilitation where appropriate.  In many cases, there is much more that we can do besides palliation, and when there is, we should do it.  And I think that where palliation is the choice, the provider has the obligation to make sure that the palliative treatment actually   -- well, palliates.  So even in the case of palliative care, we need EBPs to make a rational choice among treatment options in the best interests of the patient.  Palliative treatments that work are beneficial. Palliative treatments that do not work are not, and should be abandoned.

You state that insurance companies and managed care will be more likely to reimburse clients for services proven to be EBPs or ESTs, however hospice coverage is widely available.  In roughly 47 states it is provided by both Medicare and Medicaid and by many private providers.  If palliative care is covered for medical conditions why is it not covered for mental conditions? 

Yes, but hospice care is an extreme measure, to ease the situation of a dying patient for whom nothing more can be done.  Excepting suicide, nobody dies from mental illness, so hospice care is not a good analogy.  Whether MD or PhD, the doctor's first task is to do no harm; his/her second task is to make the patient well, or at least better.  Now, it may be that in some cases of chronic mental illness, long-term hospitalization is the best alternative for the patient, and these costs should be reimbursed by third-party payers, just as long-term hospitalization for, say, polio or tuberculosis would be (it is clear now that it was a mistake to empty the state mental hospitals, instead of improving the conditions of the patients housed in them).  But even in that case, I believe that there is an obligation to deploy EBPs directed toward management and rehabilitation (which is what should have been done).

You also make the statement that patient values are important, but not as important as scientific evidence.  I strongly disagree with this assertion.  Patients have a right to seek out whatever medical treatment they wish.  Eastern and Western medicines are both used in this country.  Why can't there be multiple types of therapies as well?  How is the opinion of the client in terms of their improvement not the most valid marker of the improvement?  

I stand by my statement.  Patients have a right to seek out any treatment they wish, and to pay for it out of their own pockets; but providers have an obligation to provide treatments that are effective, and third-party payers are under no obligation to pay for treatments that are ineffective.

My position is very simple: the status of clinical psychology as a profession, including its autonomy from psychiatry and its eligibility for third-party payments, depends on its adherence to its scientific base.  Or, put another way: if someone had cancer, or heart disease, they'd insist that their doctor try a proven method.  Why would anyone treat their mind differently than their body?


Correspondent #2 wrote: "In his 2006 PsycCRITIQUES review of the volume Evidence Based Practices in Mental Health, Sher expressed his concern about the lack of the consumer viewpoint...."  S/he also enclosed a manuscript which discussed clinical trials from a statistical and consumer vantage point.
Ken Sher is right that the book didn't explicitly contain an expression of the consumer viewpoint, but I thought that I at least addressed some consumer-oriented issues in my contribution, where I discussed the  Rosenblatt/Atkisson framework for evaluating outcomes (p. 29).  The implication of their "cube" is that there are actually a lot of different consumers of mental health services, not just the individual patient, and each of them probably evaluates the outcome of treatment according to different criteria.
"There are many consumer-oriented issues related to psychotherapy and evidence-based practice; some were very briefly touched on in the volume, but this is a very broad area that warrants much more discussion -- perhaps to the extent of a volume of its own. For example, the Rosenblatt/Attkisson paper addresses these issues for severe mental illness, which is quite different from the more ordinary issues a typical clinical psychologist deals with in everyday practice.  As I mention in my first paragraph, "No one client can expect to represent all, but this client would like to provide some commentary on the volume in the hope that it might be seriously considered by at least some in the mental health profession." As you will see, one way in which I am not a typical client is that I have a decent statistical and scientific background, and consequently bring up questions of statistical validity in clinical trials."

I agree that clinical trials pose some difficult statistical issues, epitomized by the difference between statistical and clinical significance, and the fact that we're dealing with average outcomes, which may hide the fact that even an effective treatment doesn't work for everyone who gets it.  But these problems shouldn't serve as an excuse for doing nothing about the scientific basis of clinical practice -- which, frankly, is the position taken by a number of leading figures in the American Psychological Association, some of whom are authors in the Norcross book.  As I've said many times, clinical psychology owes its professional status, including its autonomy from psychiatry and its eligibility for third-party payments, to the assumption that it's practices are justified by a firm scientific base.  But all too many of the leaders in clinical psychology want to practice business as usual.

I'll defend the Rosenblatt/Atkisson cube as a model for representing consumer interests in EBP.  Yes, they focus on severe mental illness, but their basic point is that in any case of mental illness, there are a number of different consumers -- the patient him- or herself, his/her family, employer and colleagues, neighbors and the larger community, all of whom have an interest in whether the patient gets well.  Whoever the consumer is, beginning with the patient, consumer interests are best served by providing services that are both effective and cost-effective.  And the only way we have to identify those services is scientific research, modeled on clinical trials.


Ulric Neisser, Social Cognitive Psychologist

Link to some comments on the "godfather" of cognitive psychology, who died on February 17, 2012.


Free Will and the Libet Experiment

On July 14, 2012, I sent the following letter to the Editor of the New York Times Book Review, concerning a review by Daniel Menaker of Free Will by Sam Harris.  It was never published, but the point it made remains important.

Daniel Menaker seems too willing to accept Sam Harris’s conclusion that free will is an illusion – and not even a necessary one, at that (“Have It Your Way”, July 15, 2012). But the relevant science does not support Harris’s view. Benjamin Libet is no longer alive to defend his experiment, but the latest evidence indicates that his results were wholly an artifact of his procedures. And while a host of evidence in cognitive and social psychology shows that automatic, unconscious processes play some role in our experience, thought, and action, none of it demonstrates that they overwhelm conscious control. So Harris's arguments about free will are based more on ideology than evidence. How free will works is indeed a problem for neuroscientists. But they’ll never solve it so long as they keep denying it.


Duncan Luce (d. 2012)

Duncan and I didn't have too much in common: I barely can do a t-test, after all. But he was a great colleague during my time at Harvard. I was appointed in the Personality and Developmental Studies area, at a time when the Department was just being put back together and those institutional distinctions actually still meant something. But the only available office space was on the 9th floor of William James Hall. A big corner office, and I was happy to have it, but it was embedded in the Laboratory of Psychophysics, where I felt a little like a fish out of water. Maybe it was the Penn Connection, but Duncan and Dave Green (and Douwe Yntema and Edwin Newman) were very friendly and supportive, and even invited me to their Fechner Day celebrations held on April 19. Later, after I had left Harvard, I had the privilege of working with Duncan on an NRC project to identify the "Leading Edges in Behavioral and Social Science". There I learned just how broad Duncan's interests were -- it turned out that we had more in common than I had imagined at the outset.

Martin Luther King's Alleged Plagiarism

The following Letter to the Editor was published, in edited form, in The Economist (04/14/2018).  The high-school in question was Horseheads High School, from which I graduated in 1966, and the choir in question was directed by Joseph Crupi (I was a tenor, then a baritone, then a bass).  Like many American school choirs, we sang a lot of spirituals, and other "folk" music, to acquaint us with America's musical heritage -- an aspect of cultural literacy, alas, quickly going the way of the passenger pigeon with the current emphasis on STEM subjects.

Your article about Martin Luther King, “Like a Mighty Stream” (March 31, 2018), implies that MLK borrowed the phrase “Free at last!  Free at last! Thank God almighty we are free at last!” from a 1939 novel by Zora Neale Hurston, rather than “an old Negro spiritual”.  But my (all-white, rural upstate New York) high-school choir sang that very spiritual (among others) in the 1962-1963 academic year, and it has been traced as far back as John Wesley Work’s 1907 collection of American Negro Songs: New Jubilee Songs and Folk Songs of the American Negro.  Most likely, Hurston herself got it from there.

Claparede's "Recognition et Moiiete" (1911)

In January 2019, Russ Poldrack of Stanford University posted a query to the listserv maintained by the Memory Disorders Research Society concerning Ernst Clapraede's classic paper on "Recognition et moiiete (1911).  In response, I wrote a little postscript to the ensuing thread.


Claparede’s 1911 article was first translated by David Rapaport (Claparede, 1911/1951), and published in his anthology, Organization and Pathology of Thought (Rapaport, 1950).  Rapaport was a psychoanalytic ego-psychologist who tried valiantly to integrate psychoanalysis with scientific psychology, and he was particularly interested in what we could learn from psychopathology (including neurological syndromes) about normal mental life.  The book is a real gem, and can probably be found in most academic libraries who haven’t de-accessioned their books to make room for computer terminals and juice bars.

Rapaport’s translation wasn’t complete, unfortunately, so Bill Banks commissioned a full translation, by Anne-Marie Bonnel and Bernie Baars  (Claparede, 1911/1995), which was included in a special issue of Consciousness and Cognition devoted to implicit memory (Banks, 1995).  Self-promotion alert: the new translation was accompanied by a commentary by yours truly (Kihlstrom, 1995), perhaps because Bill knew that I relied heavily on Claparede in my 1993 Carnegie Symposium paper on the role of the self in consciousness and explicit memory (Kihlstrom, 1997).

In a second special issue on implicit memory (W.P. Banks, 1996) published the first-ever translation of a paper by Korsakoff (Korsakoff, 1889a/1996) which had been cited by Dan Schacter (Schacter, 1987) as the first notice of spared implicit memory in amnesia.  Bill did the translation (with Sandra Jade Karam), and wrote the accompanying commentary (W. P. Banks, 1996).

It’s good to have a full translation of the Claparede paper, though I regret the change in title.  “Selfhood” may be technically correct (I don’t know French), but “me-ness” has more… more… je ne sais quoi.

For some reason, the C&C version of Claparede and Korsakoff doesn’t turn up in a PsycInfo search (though Rapaport’s does).  Neither do Bill’s prefaces to the two special issues. 

I have performed a paragraph-by-paragraph comparison (not sentence-by-sentence; I have my limits) of the translations in Rapaport's anthology and in Consciousness & Cognition.  There are differences in paragraphing, but I can't find anything in the C&C version that isn't in the Rapaport version.  On the contrary: not only does the C&C version lack Rapaport's extensive notes (no surprise), but it also, apparently, lacks a couple of footnotes (to references) that appeared in the original.  For scholarly purposes, I'd recommend the Rapaport version, just for his very erudite, and illuminating, notes.

Link to a PDF comparing the Rapaport and C&C translations.  To view my annotations, turn on Comments after you load the PDF.

Banks, W. P. (1995). Implicit memory. Consciousness & Cognition, 4(4), 369-370. doi: https://doi.org/10.1006/ccog.1995.1043

Banks, W. P. (1996). Implicit memory, Part 2. Consciousness & Cognition, 5(1), 1. doi: https://doi.org/10.1006/ccog.1995.1043

Banks, W. P. (1996). Korsakoff and amnesia. Consciousness & Cognition, 5, 22-26. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/ccog.1996.0003

Claparede, E. (1911/1951). [Recognition and me-ness]. In D. Rapaport (Ed.), Organization and pathology of thought: Selected sources (pp. 58-75). New York: Columbia University Press.

Claparede, E. (1911/1995). Recognition and selfhood. Consciousness & Cognition, 4(4), 371-378. doi: https://doi.org/10.1006/ccog.1995.1044

Kihlstrom, J. F. (1995). Memory and consciousness: An appreciation of Claparede and Recognition et Moiite. Consciousness & Cognition: An International Journal, 4(4), 379-386. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/ccog.1995.1045

Kihlstrom, J. F. (1997). Consciousness and me-ness. In J. D. Cohen & J. W. Schooler (Eds.), Scientific approaches to consciousness (pp. 451-468). Mahwah, N.J.: Erlbaum.

Korsakoff, S. S. (1889a/1996). Medico-psychological study of a memory disorder. Consciousness & Cognition, 5(1-2), 2-21. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/ccog.1996.0002

Rapaport, D. (Ed.). (1950). Organization and pathology of thought. New York: Columbia University Press.

Schacter, D. L. (1987). Implicit memory: History and current status. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 13, 501-518. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.13.3.501

Stress, Ulcers, and Psychological Factors in Medical Illness Generally

In May 2020 Mark Tarrant and Martin Hager posted to the online Open Forum of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology a request for nominations of "classics" in health psychology.  Nobody would call me a card-carrying health psychologist, but my wife Lucy is a card-carrying health-services researcher, and from time to time we offered seminars at Berkeley on various topics related to health psychology, including a graduate seminar  on “Health Cognition, Behavior, and Systems” focused on the problem of compliance with prevention and treatment regimes (link to syllabus, for those who are interested) and an undergraduate seminar on placebo effects (link to syllabus).  Our sense was that while a lot of health psychology was appropriately focused on the psychobiology of the stress-disease connection, there was an awful lot of straight-ahead social science to be done in the domain of health behavior.  At the micro (individual) level, that includes such topics as lay (common-sense) representations of sickness and health; symptom perception and reporting; medication compliance; utilization of health-care services, and psychosomatic interactions, including but not limited to the placebo effect.  At the macro level, there’s the dynamic nature of the health-care system, organizational effects on patient and provider behavior, and mental health issues in primary care (somatization, hypochondriasis, anxiety, and depression).  Not to mention the interactions between the micro and macro levels, including provider-patient communication; adherence to guidelines and plans for treatment and prevention, and inter-professional relations affecting provider and patient behavior.  In other words, a lot of social psychology.  With that background I have a lot of ideas for "classics" that might not be in the mainstream of health psychology. 

In reply to Mark and Martin, I asked "Do “should-be” classics count?".  If so, I nominate “Anxiety and helplessness in the face of stress predisposes, precipitates, and sustains gastric ulceration by Bruce Overmier and Robert Murison (2000; see also their papers from 1997 and 2013).  Ever since Marshall and Warren discovered h. pylori infection in ulcer patients, the medical establishment has been at pains to discount a role for psychology in medical illness.   M&W got the 2005 Nobel Prize in Medicine, and they deserved it.  But more important, Steven Hyman (1994), a prominent biological psychiatrist who was soon to become the Director of NIMH, went so far as to write an article on the discovery entitled "Another One Bites the Dust" -- meaning that ulcers represented another case where a putative psychological cause of illness had been disproved in favor of something biochemical in nature.  But, as O&M might say, “Not so fast”.  In a line of elegant research going back to the 1980s, their animal models clearly challenge a simple bacterial-infection theory of peptic ulcers and show that stress – defined as unpredictable and uncontrollable aversive events – is an equally important causal agent.  This work has not gotten the attention it deserves (the 1997 paper has 12 citations, 3 of them by me), but the 2013 paper, which summarizes their entire program of research, is perhaps the best empirical argument for the biopsychosocial model of disease and illness. 


Hyman, S. E. (1994). Another one bites the dust: An infectious origin for peptic ulcers. Harvard Review of Psychiatry, 1, 294-295.

Overmier, J. B., & Murison, R. (1997). Animal models reveal the "psych" in the psychosomatics of peptic ulcers. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 6(6), 180-184. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8721.ep10772955

Overmier, J. B., & Murison, R. (2000). Anxiety and helplessness in the face of stress predisposes, precipitates, and sustains gastric ulceration. Behavioural Brain Research, 110(1-2), 161-174. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0166-4328(99)00193-X

Overmier, J. B., & Murison, R. (2013). Restoring psychology's role in peptic ulcer. Applied Psychology: Health and Well-being, 5(1), 5-27. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1758-0854.2012.01076.x

On Perception and Cognition

The February 2020 issue of the APS Observer, the house-organ of the Association for Psychological Science, carried an article by Alexandra Michel entitled “Perception and Cognition: Is There Really a Difference?”.   The article began with the assertion that “for decades, textbooks have taught that there is a clear line between perception – how we see, hear, touch, taste, and smell – and higher-level cognitive processes that allow us to integrate and interpret our senses.  It then went on to describe “interdisciplinary research” (mostly from cognitive neuroscience) that blurred the distinction between perception and cognition.  When the article first appeared, its premise didn’t sound right, but I didn’t think about it too much.  But when the article reappeared in an APS “Summer Spotlight” email highlighting “some of our most popular stories from the year so far”, I thought about it some more, and it still didn’t sound right.  The following was published in the "Comment" section of the article in the Observer.

I taught the introductory psychology course for almost 40 years, using high-end texts like Gleitman, and I never saw one that explicitly stated, or even implied, that perception was independent of cognition.   True, every introductory text I know gives perception its own chapter (and the best ones give sensation its own chapter, as well).  But this is just because we know more about cognition than about other areas of psychology, like motivation and emotion, and so the material has to be broken up into manageable bites.  Learning, memory, thinking, and language usually get separate chapters as well.   Often, intro texts combine motivation and emotion into a single chapter.  But with continued development, these areas might well be split up too – e.g., into separate chapters  on basic and social emotions, or on biological drives and human social motives. 

Cognitive psychology is about knowledge, and the British empiricists taught that knowledge is acquired through experience and reflections on experience.  That means that cognition begins with perception.  The major textbooks in cognitive psychology, including Neisser (1967), Anderson (6e,2005), Medin et al. (4e, 2005), and Reisberg (7e, 2020) all contain chapters on perception. 

Wundt may have made a distinction between “lower” and “higher” mental processes, but in my reading that was mainly for methodological reasons – depending on whether the stimulus was physically present in the environment. 

Helmholtz certainly thought that perception depended on cognition – that’s where “unconscious inferences” come from.  And post-Helmholtz, there is the whole “constructivist” tradition in perception, including such figures as Richard Gregory, Julian Hochberg, and Irvin Rock, who argued that perception is intelligent mental activity involving the interaction of bottom-up and top-down processing. 

And modern signal-detection theory holds that even the most elementary perceptual operation – noticing a stimulus in a field of noise – depends intimately on the observer’s expectations and motives.

Now, things may be changing these days.  J.J. Gibson’s (1979) theory of direct perception asserts that all the information needed for perception is provided by the stimulus, and (as Michel points out) Firestone and Scholl (2016) have argued that there’s no evidence for the involvement of top-down processes in perception.  But these are recent, revolutionary statements, intended to constrain if not overthrow Helmholtzian constructivism.  It’s just not true that psychologists have believed this all along, leading perception to be treated as independent of cognition.  What psychologists have believed all along was that perception provides the experiential basis of cognition, and cognition enables perceptual construction.  As Neisser (1976) wrote, perception is where cognition and reality meet. 

On Cloning Stanford

In an Op-Ed essay published in the New York Times, David Kirp, a Professor of Education at UC Berkeley, suggested that elite universities could expand their student bodies, and thus improve diversity, equity, and inclusion in college admissions, by cloning themselves into branch campuses situated around the country ("Why Stanford Should Clone Itself", 04/07/2021).   I think that such a move is both unnecessary and undesirable.  Herewith is Letter to the Editor which I submitted to the Times (it wasn't published). 

David Kirp suggests that, in order to foster diversity, equity, and inclusion in higher education, Stanford and other "elite" universities should clone themselves, producing "Harvard--San Diego" and "Yale--Houston" (“Why Stanford Should Clone Itself”, April 7).  But that's what they're already doing.

For a long time, the “elite” universities have produced more PhDs than they themselves can hire, with the result that many of their graduates take their teaching interests and research programs to other institutions, thus raising their level.  Higher education is one area where a rising tide really does lift all boats, which is why we have more “elite” universities now than we did 50 years ago.  “Harvard-San Diego” is called UCSD; “Yale-Houston” is called Rice. 

Instead of cloning themselves into branch campuses, “elite” universities would do better to encourage their graduate students to take whatever teaching positions are available to them, instead of entering a perpetual holding pattern of post-doctoral and adjunct positions, waiting for an “elite” job to open up. 
When I was an assistant professor at Harvard, 1975-1980, the Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Henry Rosofsky (whose book, The University: An Owner's Manual should be required reading for all academics), visited the Department to inform us that all of the tenure-track positions in psychology open that year could be filled by the graduates of the University of Michigan.  I decided there and then that, whatever happened to me, I would work only with as many graduate students as I thought I could place in academic positions; I made a few exceptions, only for "clinical" students -- who had job prospects outside academia. 

Lila Gleitman and the Origins of Metacognition

When Lila Gleitman (1929-2021), a prominent developmental psycholinguist, died, an admiring tribute to her was distributed to the fellows of the  Society of Experimental Psychologists, and posted on the Update webpage of the Association for Psychological Science (08/13/2021).  I did not know Lila well: she was a professor in the School of Education at the University of Pennsylvania when I was a graduate student there (1970-1975), and only later affiliated with the Department of Psychology.  However, her husband Henry Gleitman sat on my dissertation committee, and I used his textbook in my introductory psychology course. 

The tribute was well deserved, but it missed one important element in Lila's career:  Among her many accomplishments was that she coined the term "meta-cognition” (with a hyphen, but still) in a paper on “The Child as Grammarian” written with Henry Gleitman and Liz Shipley (Cognition 1972).  Also “meta-language”.  This was several years before the concepts of “metacognition” and “metamemory” began appearing elsewhere in the literature, with the same meaning -- referring to people's knowledge of their own cognitive processes.  The child, as an intuitive grammarian, possesses metalanguage, which is one component of metacognition (along with metamemory, etc.).

As far as I can tell, none of these later papers recognized Lila's original coinage, so I added a Comment to the Update article reminding my colleagues of her priority.  Martin Orne used to say that we know when a new concept has received wide acceptance when it is used without a reference citation: he was proud that ecological validity and demand characteristics had achieved that status.  On the other hand, as a psychologist with historical interests, I think this practice often allows individuals to be written out of the historical consciousness of later generations of psychologists.  After all, as academics, our capital is accumulated in the currency of ideas, and that currency is devalued when our ideas are no longer associated with our names.

Albert Bandura and Reciprocal Determinism

When Albert Bandura died in July 2021, the New York Times published a very nice obituary, which was then circulated to members of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology via their "Open Forum" listserv (08/02/2021).  But the Times piece omitted any mention of what I consider to be one of his most important contributions to the field: what I have called the Doctrine of Reciprocal Determinism.  Maybe that was too much "inside baseball" for an article in the popular press, but Bandura's ideas were important, so I posted the following comment to the SPSP listserv (08/14/2021).

The Times obituary for Al Bandura, and the earlier piece from the APA, focused on his contributions to our understanding of observational learning (the Bobo Doll Experiment), and the role of self-efficacy in behavior change.  But they both missed a contribution that, in my view, is equally important: his concept of reciprocal determinism, as exemplified by his 1989 American Psychologist paper. 

Back in the 1970s personality psychologists began to embrace a Doctrine of Interactionism as a correction to both the traditional Doctrine of Traits and the revisionist Doctrine of Situationism: as Ken Bowers (Psych. Rev. 1973) put it, persons affect the situations to which they respond. 

Interactionism was, in essence, a revival of Lewin’s “Grand Truism” (Ned Jones’s phrase) that B=f(P,E), and provided a framework for the unification of personality and social psychology.  Bowers left open the question of just how people affected the situations to which they respond and most early applications of Interactionism were modeled on the interaction term in the analysis of variance.  Too passive for Lewin, I think, and for Bowers too.  We now understand that the person shapes the environment through evocation, selection, behavioral manipulation, and cognitive transformation. 

So far all in all of this causality was unidirectional.  The person affected behavior, the situation affected behavior, and the person affected the situation.  Bandura completed the cycle: persons may emit behavior, but behavior also feeds back to change the person; situations may elicit behavior, but that behavior also feeds back to change the situation; persons may affect the situation, but situations also shape the person.  It’s a much more interesting view of personality and social interaction, and we have Bandura to thank for promoting it.

Kihlstrom, J. F., & Harackiewicz, J. M. (1990). An evolutionary milestone in the psychology of personality [essay review of Social Foundations of Thought and Action by Albert Bandura]. Psychological Inquiry, 1(1), 86-92.

Kihlstrom, J. F. (2013). The person-situation interaction. In D. Carlston (Ed.), Oxford handbook of social cognition (pp. 786-805). New York: Oxford University Press.

Stoner on the Academic Life

For six years at Berkeley, I took a turn teaching a course on "Teaching Psychology", required of all graduate students before they could serve as teaching assistants (we called them "Graduate Student Instructors").  In that course, I described the pleasures, and instructive value, of reading academic satires -- though, to my regret, I didn't actually assign any of them to be read (I always had a fiction assignment in my upper-division undergraduate courses: Thinks... by David Lodge for my Consciousness course, and The Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-Time by Mark Haddon for my Social Cognition course).

Here, for the record, are some of my favorites:
And then there's Stoner (1965) by John Williams -- not exactly a satire, but a much darker, almost existentialist representation of academic life. 

From the first page of the book:
William Stoner... did not rise above the rank of assistant professor, and few students remembered him with any sharpness after they had taken his courses.  When he died his colleagues made a memorial contribution of a medieval manuscript to the University library....  An occasional student who comes upon the name may wonder idly who William Stoner was, but he seldom pursues his curiosity beyond a casual question.  Stoner's colleagues, who held him in no particular esteem when he was alive, speak of him rarely now; to the older ones, his name is a reminder of the end that awaits them all, and to the younger ones it is merely a sound which evokes no sense of the past and no identity with which they can associate themselves or their careers.
And from almost the last page, as Stoner is dying:
Dispassionately, reasonably, he contemplated the failure that his life must appear to be.... 
A sense of his own identity came upon him with a sudden force, and he felt the power of it. He was himself, and he knew what he had been.

This page last revised 08/13/2021.